If we decide not to use a new guard because we want to retry older
guards, only close the locally-originating circuits passing through
that guard. Previously we would close all the circuits.
Fixes bug 9819; bugfix on 0.2.1.1-alpha. Reported by "skruffy".
Stop assuming that private addresses are local when checking
reachability in a TestingTorNetwork. Instead, when testing, assume
all OR connections are remote. (This is necessary due to many test
scenarios running all nodes on localhost.)
This assists in bootstrapping a testing Tor network.
Fixes bugs 13718 & 13924.
choose_good_entry_server() now excludes current entry
guards and their families, unless we're in a test network,
and excluding guards would exclude all nodes.
This typically occurs in incredibly small tor networks,
and those using TestingAuthVoteGuard *
This is an incomplete fix, but is no worse than the previous
behaviour, and only applies to minimal, testing tor networks
(so it's no less secure).
Discovered as part of #13718.
By now, support in the network is widespread and it's time to require
more modern crypto on all Tor instances, whether they're clients or
servers. By doing this early in 0.2.6, we can be sure that at some point
all clients will have reasonable support.
Also, refactor the way we handle failed handshakes so that this
warning doesn't propagate itself to "onion_skin_client_handshake
failed" and "circuit_finish_handshake failed" and
"connection_edge_process_relay_cell (at origin) failed."
Resolves warning from 9635.
I looked for other places where we set circ->n_chan early, and found
one in circuit_handle_first_hop() right before it calls
circuit_send_next_onion_skin(). If onion_skin_create() fails there,
then n_chan will still be set when circuit_send_next_onion_skin()
returns. We should probably fix that too.
Check for consistency between the queued destroy cells and the marked
circuit IDs. Check for consistency in the count of queued destroy
cells in several ways. Check to see whether any of the marked circuit
IDs have somehow been marked longer than the channel has existed.
Use a per-channel ratelim_t to control the rate at which we report
failures for each channel.
Explain why I picked N=32.
Never return a zero circID.
Thanks to Andrea and to cypherpunks.
Fixes a possible root cause of 11553 by only making 64 attempts at
most to pick a circuitID. Previously, we would test every possible
circuit ID until we found one or ran out.
This algorithm succeeds probabilistically. As the comment says:
This potentially causes us to give up early if our circuit ID
space is nearly full. If we have N circuit IDs in use, then we
will reject a new circuit with probability (N / max_range) ^
MAX_CIRCID_ATTEMPTS. This means that in practice, a few percent
of our circuit ID capacity will go unused.
The alternative here, though, is to do a linear search over the
whole circuit ID space every time we extend a circuit, which is
not so great either.
This makes new vs old clients distinguishable, so we should try to
batch it with other patches that do that, like 11438.
Right now this accounts for about 1% of circuits over all, but if you
pick a guard that's running 0.2.3, it will be about 6% of the circuits
running through that guard.
Making sure that every circuit has at least one ntor link means that
we're getting plausibly good forward secrecy on every circuit.
This implements ticket 9777,
The old code had logic to use a shorter path length if we didn't
have enough nodes. But we don't support 2-node networks anwyay.
Fix for #9926. I'm not calling this a bugfix on any particular
version, since a 2-node network would fail to work for you for a lot
of other reasons too, and it's not clear to me when that began, or if
2-node networks would ever have worked.
We need to subtract both the current built circuits *and* the attempted
circuits from the attempt count during scaling, since *both* have already been
counted there.
It seems that some versions of clang that would prefer the
-Wswitch-enum compiler flag to warn about switch statements with
missing enum values, even if those switch statements have a
default.
Fixes bug 8598; bugfix on 0.2.4.10-alpha.
Now that circid_t is 4 bytes long, the default integer promotions will
leave it alone when sizeof(int) == 4, which will leave us formatting an
unsigned as an int. That's technically undefined behavior.
Fixes bug 8447 on bfffc1f0fc. Bug not
in any released Tor.
These seem to have gotten conflicted out of existence while mike was
working on path bias stuff.
Thanks to sysrqb for collecting these in a handy patch.
Now we can specify to skip bridges that wouldn't be able to answer the
type of dir fetch we're launching.
It's still the responsibility of the rest of the code to prevent us from
launching a given dir fetch if we have no bridges that could handle it.
Now as we move into a future where most bridges can handle microdescs
we will generally find ourselves using them, rather than holding back
just because one of our bridges doesn't use them.
Also, deprecate the torrc options for the scaling values. It's unlikely anyone
but developers will ever tweak them, even if we provided a single ratio value.
If any circuits were opened during a scaling event, we were scaling attempts
and successes by different amounts. This leads to rounding error.
The fix is to record how many circuits are in a state that hasn't been fully
counted yet, and subtract that before scaling, and add it back afterwords.
Since they use RELAY_EARLY (which can be seen by all hops on the path),
it's not safe to say they actually count as a successful use.
There are also problems with trying to allow them to finish extending due to
the circuit purpose state machine logic. It is way less complicated (and
possibly more semantically coherent) to simply wait until we actually try to
do something with them before claiming we 'used' them.
Also, we shouldn't call timed out circuits 'used' either, for semantic
consistency.
Path use bias measures how often we can actually succeed using the circuits we
actually try to use. It is a subset of path bias accounting, but it is
computed as a separate statistic because the rate of client circuit use may
vary depending on use case.
This is an automatically generated commit, from the following perl script,
run with the options "-w -i -p".
s/smartlist_string_num_isin/smartlist_contains_int_as_string/g;
s/smartlist_string_isin((?:_case)?)/smartlist_contains_string$1/g;
s/smartlist_digest_isin/smartlist_contains_digest/g;
s/smartlist_isin/smartlist_contains/g;
s/digestset_isin/digestset_contains/g;
In general, if we tried to use a circ for a stream, but then decided to place
that stream on a different circuit, we need to probe the original circuit
before deciding it was a "success".
We also need to do the same for cannibalized circuits that go unused.
The unit of work sent to a cpuworker is now a create_cell_t; its
response is now a created_cell_t. Several of the things that call or
get called by this chain of logic now take create_cell_t or
created_cell_t too.
Since all cpuworkers are forked or spawned by Tor, they don't need a
stable wire protocol, so we can just send structs. This saves us some
insanity, and helps p
The handshake_digest field was never meaningfully a digest *of* the
handshake, but rather is a digest *from* the handshake that we exapted
to prevent replays of ESTABLISH_INTRO cells. The ntor handshake will
generate it as more key material rather than taking it from any part
of the circuit handshake reply..
I'm going to want a generic "onionskin" type and set of wrappers, and
for that, it will be helpful to isolate the different circuit creation
handshakes. Now the original handshake is in onion_tap.[ch], the
CREATE_FAST handshake is in onion_fast.[ch], and onion.[ch] now
handles the onion queue.
This commit does nothing but move code and adjust header files.
This has several advantages, including more resilience to ambient failure.
I still need to rename all the first_hop vars tho.. Saving that for a separate
commit.
Turns out there's more than one way to block a tagged circuit.
This seems to successfully handle all of the normal exit circuits. Hidden
services need additional tweaks, still.
Conflicts:
src/or/circuitbuild.c
There was a huge-looking conflict in circuitbuild.c, but the only
change that had been made to circuitbuild.c since I forked off the
split_circuitbuild branch was 17442560c4. So I took the
split_circuitbuild version of the conflicting part, and manually
re-applied the change from 17442560c44e8093f9a..
