In particular, these functions are the ones that set the identity of
a given connection or channel, and/or confirm that we have learned
said IDs.
There's a lot of stub code here: we don't actually need to use the
new keys till we start looking up connections/channels by Ed25519
IDs. Still, we want to start passing the Ed25519 IDs in now, so it
makes sense to add these stubs as part of 15055.
This simplifies the function: if we have an ntor key, use ntor/EXTEND2,
otherwise, use TAP/EXTEND.
Bugfix on commit 10aa913 from 19163 in 0.2.9.3-alpha.
The changes in #19973 fixed ReachableAddresses being applied
too broadly, but they also broke Tor2web (somewhat unintentional)
compatibility with ReachableAddresses.
This patch restores that functionality, which makes intro and
rend point selection is consistent between Tor2web and Single Onion
Services.
Add experimental OnionServiceSingleHopMode and
OnionServiceNonAnonymousMode options. When both are set to 1, every
hidden service on a tor instance becomes a non-anonymous Single Onion
Service. Single Onions make one-hop (direct) connections to their
introduction and renzedvous points. One-hop circuits make Single Onion
servers easily locatable, but clients remain location-anonymous.
This is compatible with the existing hidden service implementation, and
works on the current tor network without any changes to older relays or
clients.
Implements proposal #260, completes ticket #17178. Patch by teor & asn.
squash! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! fixup! Implement Prop #260: Single Onion Services
Redesign single onion service poisoning.
When in OnionServiceSingleHopMode, each hidden service key is poisoned
(marked as non-anonymous) on creation by creating a poison file in the
hidden service directory.
Existing keys are considered non-anonymous if this file exists, and
anonymous if it does not.
Tor refuses to launch in OnionServiceSingleHopMode if any existing keys
are anonymous. Similarly, it refuses to launch in anonymous client mode
if any existing keys are non-anonymous.
Rewrite the unit tests to match and be more comprehensive.
Adds a bonus unit test for rend_service_load_all_keys().
Rely on onion_populate_cpath to check that we're only using
TAP for the rare hidden service cases.
Check and log if handshakes only support TAP when they should support
ntor.
When a client connects to an intro point not in the client's consensus,
or a hidden service connects to a rend point not in the hidden service's
consensus, we are stuck with using TAP, because there is no ntor link
specifier.
If we know a node's version, and it can't do ntor, consider it not running.
If we have a node's descriptor, and it doesn't have a valid ntor key,
consider it not running.
Refactor these checks so they're consistent between authorities and clients.
So, back long ago, XXX012 meant, "before Tor 0.1.2 is released, we
had better revisit this comment and fix it!"
But we have a huge pile of such comments accumulated for a large
number of released versions! Not cool.
So, here's what I tried to do:
* 0.2.9 and 0.2.8 are retained, since those are not yet released.
* XXX+ or XXX++ or XXX++++ or whatever means, "This one looks
quite important!"
* The others, after one-by-one examination, are downgraded to
plain old XXX. Which doesn't mean they aren't a problem -- just
that they cannot possibly be a release-blocking problem.
Remove support for "GET /tor/bytes.txt" DirPort request, and
"GETINFO dir-usage" controller request, which were only available
via a compile-time option in Tor anyway.
Feature was added in 0.2.2.1-alpha. Resolves ticket 19035.
Apparently somewhere along the line we decided that MIN might be
missing.
But we already defined it (if it was missing) in compat.h, which
everybody includes.
Closes ticket 18889.
Regardless of the setting of ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses.
This fixes a bug with pluggable transports that ignore the
(potentially private) address in their bridge line.
Fixes bug 18517; bugfix on 23b088907f in tor-0.2.8.1-alpha.
Modify callers to correctly handle these new NULL returns:
* fix assert in onion_extend_cpath
* warn and discard circuit in circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch
* warn, discard circuit, and tell controller in handle_control_extendcircuit
ClientUseIPv4 0 tells tor to avoid IPv4 client connections.
ClientPreferIPv6DirPort 1 tells tor to prefer IPv6 directory connections.
Refactor policy for IPv4/IPv6 preferences.
Fix a bug where node->ipv6_preferred could become stale if
ClientPreferIPv6ORPort was changed after the consensus was loaded.
Update documentation, existing code, add unit tests.
When an HS process an INTRODUCE2 cell, we didn't validate if the IP address
of the rendezvous point was a local address. If it's the case, we end up
wasting resources by trying to extend to a local address which fails since
we do not allow that in circuit_extend().
This commit now rejects a rendezvous point that has a local address once
seen at the hidden service side unless ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses is set.
Fixes#8976
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@ev0ke.net>
Refuse connection requests to private OR addresses unless
ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses is set. Previously, tor would
connect, then refuse to send any cells to a private address.
Fixes bugs 17674 and 8976; bugfix on b7c172c9ec (28 Aug 2012)
Original bug 6710, released in 0.2.3.21-rc and an 0.2.2 maint
release.
Patch by "teor".
When self-testing reachability, use ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses
to determine if local/private addresses imply reachability.
The previous fix used TestingTorNetwork, which implies
ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses, but this excluded rare configs where
ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses is set but TestingTorNetwork is not.
Fixes bug 15771; bugfix on 0.2.6.1-alpha, bug #13924.
Patch by "teor", issue discovered by CJ Ess.
like might happen for Tails or Whonix users who start with a very wrong
hardware clock, use Tor to discover a more accurate time, and then
fix their clock.
Resolves part of ticket 8766.
(There are still some timers in various places that aren't addressed yet.)
If we decide not to use a new guard because we want to retry older
guards, only close the locally-originating circuits passing through
that guard. Previously we would close all the circuits.
Fixes bug 9819; bugfix on 0.2.1.1-alpha. Reported by "skruffy".
Stop assuming that private addresses are local when checking
reachability in a TestingTorNetwork. Instead, when testing, assume
all OR connections are remote. (This is necessary due to many test
scenarios running all nodes on localhost.)
This assists in bootstrapping a testing Tor network.
Fixes bugs 13718 & 13924.
choose_good_entry_server() now excludes current entry
guards and their families, unless we're in a test network,
and excluding guards would exclude all nodes.
This typically occurs in incredibly small tor networks,
and those using TestingAuthVoteGuard *
This is an incomplete fix, but is no worse than the previous
behaviour, and only applies to minimal, testing tor networks
(so it's no less secure).
Discovered as part of #13718.
By now, support in the network is widespread and it's time to require
more modern crypto on all Tor instances, whether they're clients or
servers. By doing this early in 0.2.6, we can be sure that at some point
all clients will have reasonable support.
Also, refactor the way we handle failed handshakes so that this
warning doesn't propagate itself to "onion_skin_client_handshake
failed" and "circuit_finish_handshake failed" and
"connection_edge_process_relay_cell (at origin) failed."
Resolves warning from 9635.
I looked for other places where we set circ->n_chan early, and found
one in circuit_handle_first_hop() right before it calls
circuit_send_next_onion_skin(). If onion_skin_create() fails there,
then n_chan will still be set when circuit_send_next_onion_skin()
returns. We should probably fix that too.
Check for consistency between the queued destroy cells and the marked
circuit IDs. Check for consistency in the count of queued destroy
cells in several ways. Check to see whether any of the marked circuit
IDs have somehow been marked longer than the channel has existed.
Use a per-channel ratelim_t to control the rate at which we report
failures for each channel.
Explain why I picked N=32.
Never return a zero circID.
Thanks to Andrea and to cypherpunks.
Fixes a possible root cause of 11553 by only making 64 attempts at
most to pick a circuitID. Previously, we would test every possible
circuit ID until we found one or ran out.
This algorithm succeeds probabilistically. As the comment says:
This potentially causes us to give up early if our circuit ID
space is nearly full. If we have N circuit IDs in use, then we
will reject a new circuit with probability (N / max_range) ^
MAX_CIRCID_ATTEMPTS. This means that in practice, a few percent
of our circuit ID capacity will go unused.
The alternative here, though, is to do a linear search over the
whole circuit ID space every time we extend a circuit, which is
not so great either.
This makes new vs old clients distinguishable, so we should try to
batch it with other patches that do that, like 11438.
Right now this accounts for about 1% of circuits over all, but if you
pick a guard that's running 0.2.3, it will be about 6% of the circuits
running through that guard.
Making sure that every circuit has at least one ntor link means that
we're getting plausibly good forward secrecy on every circuit.
This implements ticket 9777,
The old code had logic to use a shorter path length if we didn't
have enough nodes. But we don't support 2-node networks anwyay.
Fix for #9926. I'm not calling this a bugfix on any particular
version, since a 2-node network would fail to work for you for a lot
of other reasons too, and it's not clear to me when that began, or if
2-node networks would ever have worked.
