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Clean up some XXX comments.
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@ -1434,10 +1434,6 @@ pathbias_check_close(origin_circuit_t *ocirc, int reason)
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if (circ->timestamp_dirty) {
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/* Any circuit where there were attempted streams but no successful
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* streams could be bias */
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// XXX: May open up attacks if the adversary can force connections
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// on unresponsive hosts to use new circs. Vidalia displayes a "Retrying"
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// state.. Can we use that? Does optimistic data change this?
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log_info(LD_CIRC,
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"Circuit %d closed without successful use for reason %d. "
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"Circuit purpose %d currently %s.",
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@ -1166,6 +1166,7 @@ circuit_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circ)
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* building). */
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// XXX: Cannibalized now use RELAY_EARLY, which is visible
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// to taggers end-to-end! We really need to probe these instead.
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// Don't forget to remove this check once that's done!
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if (circ->has_opened &&
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circ->build_state->desired_path_len > DEFAULT_ROUTE_LEN) {
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circ->path_state = PATH_STATE_USE_SUCCEEDED;
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@ -697,7 +697,9 @@ connection_ap_process_end_not_open(
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/* Path bias: If we get a valid reason code from the exit,
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* it wasn't due to tagging */
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// XXX: This relies on recognized+digest being strong enough not
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// to be spoofable.. Is that a valid assumption?
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// to be spoofable.. Is that a valid assumption?
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// Or more accurately: is it better than nothing? Can the attack
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// be done offline?
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circ->path_state = PATH_STATE_USE_SUCCEEDED;
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}
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