2006-02-09 06:46:49 +01:00
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/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
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* Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
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2007-12-12 22:09:01 +01:00
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* Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
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2009-05-02 22:00:54 +02:00
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* Copyright (c) 2007-2009, The Tor Project, Inc. */
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2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
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/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
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/**
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* \file circuituse.c
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2005-06-11 07:31:17 +02:00
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* \brief Launch the right sort of circuits and attach streams to them.
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2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
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**/
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#include "or.h"
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/********* START VARIABLES **********/
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extern circuit_t *global_circuitlist; /* from circuitlist.c */
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/********* END VARIABLES ************/
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2006-03-22 01:52:37 +01:00
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static void circuit_expire_old_circuits(time_t now);
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2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
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static void circuit_increment_failure_count(void);
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2007-02-02 21:06:43 +01:00
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/** Return 1 if <b>circ</b> could be returned by circuit_get_best().
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2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
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* Else return 0.
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*/
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2005-06-11 20:52:12 +02:00
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static int
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2006-07-26 21:07:26 +02:00
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circuit_is_acceptable(circuit_t *circ, edge_connection_t *conn,
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2005-11-25 09:08:56 +01:00
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int must_be_open, uint8_t purpose,
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int need_uptime, int need_internal,
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2005-06-11 20:52:12 +02:00
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time_t now)
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2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
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{
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routerinfo_t *exitrouter;
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2006-07-23 09:37:35 +02:00
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cpath_build_state_t *build_state;
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Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard
to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must
be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect
streams can use internal circs if they want.
New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around
to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal
circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime
if we've seen that lately).
Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs),
which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones
are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long
we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit.
Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as
long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web
browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.)
Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND
circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when
we try to launch one.
Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since
there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching
over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete.
Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take
into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses --
it won't.
Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when
it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which
means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken.
svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
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tor_assert(circ);
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tor_assert(conn);
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tor_assert(conn->socks_request);
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2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
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if (!CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ))
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return 0; /* this circ doesn't start at us */
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if (must_be_open && (circ->state != CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN || !circ->n_conn))
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return 0; /* ignore non-open circs */
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if (circ->marked_for_close)
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return 0;
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/* if this circ isn't our purpose, skip. */
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2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
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if (purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED && !must_be_open) {
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if (circ->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND &&
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2005-01-19 18:13:11 +01:00
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circ->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY &&
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circ->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED &&
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circ->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED)
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2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
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return 0;
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2005-12-14 21:40:40 +01:00
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} else if (purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT &&
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!must_be_open) {
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2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
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if (circ->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING &&
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circ->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT)
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return 0;
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} else {
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2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
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if (purpose != circ->purpose)
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2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
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return 0;
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}
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2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
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if (purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL)
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if (circ->timestamp_dirty &&
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Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard
to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must
be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect
streams can use internal circs if they want.
New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around
to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal
circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime
if we've seen that lately).
Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs),
which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones
are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long
we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit.
Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as
long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web
browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.)
Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND
circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when
we try to launch one.
Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since
there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching
over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete.
Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take
into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses --
it won't.
Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when
it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which
means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken.
svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
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circ->timestamp_dirty+get_options()->MaxCircuitDirtiness <= now)
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2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
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return 0;
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Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard
to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must
be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect
streams can use internal circs if they want.
New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around
to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal
circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime
if we've seen that lately).
Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs),
which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones
are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long
we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit.
Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as
long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web
browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.)
Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND
circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when
we try to launch one.
Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since
there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching
over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete.
Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take
into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses --
it won't.
Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when
it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which
means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken.
svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
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/* decide if this circ is suitable for this conn */
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2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
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Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard
to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must
be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect
streams can use internal circs if they want.
New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around
to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal
circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime
if we've seen that lately).
Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs),
which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones
are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long
we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit.
Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as
long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web
browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.)
Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND
circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when
we try to launch one.
Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since
there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching
over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete.
Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take
into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses --
it won't.
Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when
it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which
means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken.
svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
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/* for rend circs, circ->cpath->prev is not the last router in the
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* circuit, it's the magical extra bob hop. so just check the nickname
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* of the one we meant to finish at.
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*/
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2006-07-23 09:37:35 +02:00
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build_state = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)->build_state;
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exitrouter = build_state_get_exit_router(build_state);
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2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
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2006-07-23 09:37:35 +02:00
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if (need_uptime && !build_state->need_uptime)
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2005-11-25 09:08:56 +01:00
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return 0;
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2006-07-23 09:37:35 +02:00
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if (need_internal != build_state->is_internal)
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Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard
to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must
be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect
streams can use internal circs if they want.
New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around
to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal
circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime
if we've seen that lately).
Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs),
which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones
are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long
we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit.
Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as
long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web
browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.)
Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND
circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when
we try to launch one.
Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since
there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching
over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete.
Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take
into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses --
it won't.
Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when
it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which
means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken.
svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
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return 0;
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2005-01-12 05:58:23 +01:00
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2005-02-02 07:26:52 +01:00
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if (purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL) {
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2007-03-01 04:56:21 +01:00
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if (!exitrouter && !build_state->onehop_tunnel) {
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2008-04-16 02:12:44 +02:00
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log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Not considering circuit with unknown router.");
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2005-06-29 23:46:55 +02:00
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return 0; /* this circuit is screwed and doesn't know it yet,
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* or is a rendezvous circuit. */
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}
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2006-12-13 03:49:45 +01:00
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if (build_state->onehop_tunnel) {
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2007-10-28 09:16:19 +01:00
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if (!conn->want_onehop) {
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2006-12-13 03:49:45 +01:00
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log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Skipping one-hop circuit.");
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return 0;
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}
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2007-04-27 12:26:09 +02:00
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tor_assert(conn->chosen_exit_name);
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if (build_state->chosen_exit) {
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char digest[DIGEST_LEN];
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2008-06-20 05:13:16 +02:00
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if (hexdigest_to_digest(conn->chosen_exit_name, digest) < 0)
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return 0; /* broken digest, we don't want it */
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if (memcmp(digest, build_state->chosen_exit->identity_digest,
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DIGEST_LEN))
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2007-04-27 12:26:09 +02:00
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return 0; /* this is a circuit to somewhere else */
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2008-06-20 05:13:16 +02:00
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if (tor_digest_is_zero(digest)) {
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/* we don't know the digest; have to compare addr:port */
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2008-08-05 22:08:19 +02:00
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tor_addr_t addr;
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int r = tor_addr_from_str(&addr, conn->socks_request->address);
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if (r < 0 ||
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!tor_addr_eq(&build_state->chosen_exit->addr, &addr) ||
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2008-06-20 05:13:16 +02:00
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build_state->chosen_exit->port != conn->socks_request->port)
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return 0;
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}
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2007-04-27 12:26:09 +02:00
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}
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2006-12-13 03:49:45 +01:00
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} else {
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2007-10-28 09:16:19 +01:00
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if (conn->want_onehop) {
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2006-12-13 03:49:45 +01:00
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/* don't use three-hop circuits -- that could hurt our anonymity. */
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return 0;
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}
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}
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2007-03-01 04:56:21 +01:00
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if (exitrouter && !connection_ap_can_use_exit(conn, exitrouter)) {
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2005-02-02 07:26:52 +01:00
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/* can't exit from this router */
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return 0;
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}
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} else { /* not general */
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2008-09-24 16:44:29 +02:00
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origin_circuit_t *ocirc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ);
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if ((conn->rend_data && !ocirc->rend_data) ||
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(!conn->rend_data && ocirc->rend_data) ||
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(conn->rend_data && ocirc->rend_data &&
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rend_cmp_service_ids(conn->rend_data->onion_address,
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ocirc->rend_data->onion_address))) {
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2005-02-02 07:26:52 +01:00
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/* this circ is not for this conn */
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return 0;
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2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
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}
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}
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return 1;
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}
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2007-02-02 21:06:43 +01:00
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/** Return 1 if circuit <b>a</b> is better than circuit <b>b</b> for
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2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
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* <b>purpose</b>, and return 0 otherwise. Used by circuit_get_best.
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*/
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2005-06-11 20:52:12 +02:00
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static int
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circuit_is_better(circuit_t *a, circuit_t *b, uint8_t purpose)
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2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
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{
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2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
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switch (purpose) {
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2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
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case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL:
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/* if it's used but less dirty it's best;
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* else if it's more recently created it's best
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*/
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2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
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if (b->timestamp_dirty) {
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if (a->timestamp_dirty &&
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2004-11-28 12:39:53 +01:00
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a->timestamp_dirty > b->timestamp_dirty)
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2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
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return 1;
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} else {
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2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
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if (a->timestamp_dirty ||
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2004-11-28 12:39:53 +01:00
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a->timestamp_created > b->timestamp_created)
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2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
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return 1;
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2006-07-23 09:37:35 +02:00
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if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(b) &&
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TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(b)->build_state->is_internal)
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return 1;
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2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
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}
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break;
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case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT:
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/* the closer it is to ack_wait the better it is */
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2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
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if (a->purpose > b->purpose)
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2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
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return 1;
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break;
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case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED:
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/* the closer it is to rend_joined the better it is */
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2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
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if (a->purpose > b->purpose)
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2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
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return 1;
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break;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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/** Find the best circ that conn can use, preferably one which is
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* dirty. Circ must not be too old.
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*
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* Conn must be defined.
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*
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* If must_be_open, ignore circs not in CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN.
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*
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* circ_purpose specifies what sort of circuit we must have.
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* It can be C_GENERAL, C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT, or C_REND_JOINED.
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*
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* If it's REND_JOINED and must_be_open==0, then return the closest
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* rendezvous-purposed circuit that you can find.
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*
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* If it's INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT and must_be_open==0, then return the
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* closest introduce-purposed circuit that you can find.
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*/
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2006-07-23 09:37:35 +02:00
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static origin_circuit_t *
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2006-07-26 21:07:26 +02:00
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circuit_get_best(edge_connection_t *conn, int must_be_open, uint8_t purpose,
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2005-11-25 09:08:56 +01:00
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int need_uptime, int need_internal)
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2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
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{
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circuit_t *circ, *best=NULL;
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time_t now = time(NULL);
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2008-10-15 20:52:06 +02:00
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int intro_going_on_but_too_old = 0;
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2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
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|
|
tor_assert(conn);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL ||
|
|
|
|
purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT ||
|
|
|
|
purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (circ=global_circuitlist;circ;circ = circ->next) {
|
2005-11-25 09:08:56 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!circuit_is_acceptable(circ,conn,must_be_open,purpose,
|
|
|
|
need_uptime,need_internal,now))
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
|
2008-10-15 20:52:06 +02:00
|
|
|
/* XXX022 make this 15 be a function of circuit finishing times we've
|
|
|
|
* seen lately, a la Fallon Chen's GSoC work -RD */
|
|
|
|
#define REND_PARALLEL_INTRO_DELAY 15
|
|
|
|
if (purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT &&
|
|
|
|
!must_be_open && circ->state != CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN &&
|
|
|
|
circ->timestamp_created + REND_PARALLEL_INTRO_DELAY < now) {
|
|
|
|
intro_going_on_but_too_old = 1;
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
/* now this is an acceptable circ to hand back. but that doesn't
|
|
|
|
* mean it's the *best* circ to hand back. try to decide.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!best || circuit_is_better(circ,best,purpose))
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
best = circ;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-10-15 20:52:06 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!best && intro_going_on_but_too_old)
|
|
|
|
log_info(LD_REND|LD_CIRC, "There is an intro circuit being created "
|
|
|
|
"right now, but it has already taken quite a while. Starting "
|
|
|
|
"one in parallel.");
|
|
|
|
|
2006-07-23 09:37:35 +02:00
|
|
|
return best ? TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(best) : NULL;
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2008-09-16 00:29:47 +02:00
|
|
|
/** Check whether, according to the policies in <b>options</b>, the
|
2008-12-22 15:56:16 +01:00
|
|
|
* circuit <b>circ</b> makes sense. */
|
2008-12-18 17:11:03 +01:00
|
|
|
/* XXXX currently only checks Exclude{Exit}Nodes. It should check more. */
|
2008-09-16 00:29:47 +02:00
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
circuit_conforms_to_options(const origin_circuit_t *circ,
|
|
|
|
const or_options_t *options)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
const crypt_path_t *cpath, *cpath_next = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (cpath = circ->cpath; cpath && cpath_next != circ->cpath;
|
|
|
|
cpath = cpath_next) {
|
|
|
|
cpath_next = cpath->next;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (routerset_contains_extendinfo(options->ExcludeNodes,
|
|
|
|
cpath->extend_info))
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (cpath->next == circ->cpath) {
|
|
|
|
/* This is apparently the exit node. */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (routerset_contains_extendinfo(options->ExcludeExitNodes,
|
|
|
|
cpath->extend_info))
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
/** Close all circuits that start at us, aren't open, and were born
|
2006-03-22 01:52:37 +01:00
|
|
|
* at least CircuitBuildTimeout seconds ago.
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2005-06-11 20:52:12 +02:00
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
|
circuit_expire_building(time_t now)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
circuit_t *victim, *circ = global_circuitlist;
|
2008-10-15 02:36:09 +02:00
|
|
|
time_t general_cutoff = now - get_options()->CircuitBuildTimeout;
|
2008-11-05 11:40:29 +01:00
|
|
|
time_t begindir_cutoff = now - get_options()->CircuitBuildTimeout/2;
|
|
|
|
time_t introcirc_cutoff = begindir_cutoff;
|
2008-03-24 04:50:21 +01:00
|
|
|
cpath_build_state_t *build_state;
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
while (circ) {
|
2008-10-15 02:36:09 +02:00
|
|
|
time_t cutoff;
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
victim = circ;
|
|
|
|
circ = circ->next;
|
2005-12-03 06:29:05 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(victim) || /* didn't originate here */
|
|
|
|
victim->marked_for_close) /* don't mess with marked circs */
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2008-03-24 04:50:21 +01:00
|
|
|
build_state = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->build_state;
|
2008-10-15 02:36:09 +02:00
|
|
|
if (build_state && build_state->onehop_tunnel)
|
|
|
|
cutoff = begindir_cutoff;
|
|
|
|
else if (victim->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING)
|
|
|
|
cutoff = introcirc_cutoff;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
cutoff = general_cutoff;
|
|
|
|
if (victim->timestamp_created > cutoff)
|
2008-03-24 04:50:21 +01:00
|
|
|
continue; /* it's still young, leave it alone */
|
|
|
|
|
2005-01-17 19:49:13 +01:00
|
|
|
#if 0
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
/* some debug logs, to help track bugs */
|
2008-10-15 02:36:09 +02:00
|
|
|
if (victim->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING &&
|
|
|
|
victim->timestamp_created <= introcirc_cutoff &&
|
|
|
|
victim->timestamp_created > general_cutoff)
|
|
|
|
log_info(LD_REND|LD_CIRC, "Timing out introduction circuit which we "
|
|
|
|
"would not have done if it had been a general circuit.");
|
|
|
|
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (victim->purpose >= CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING &&
|
2004-11-28 12:39:53 +01:00
|
|
|
victim->purpose <= CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED) {
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!victim->timestamp_dirty)
|
2009-05-27 23:55:51 +02:00
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Considering %sopen purpose %d to %s (circid %d)."
|
2005-12-14 21:40:40 +01:00
|
|
|
"(clean).",
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
victim->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN ? "" : "non",
|
2004-07-03 01:40:03 +02:00
|
|
|
victim->purpose, victim->build_state->chosen_exit_name,
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
victim->n_circ_id);
|
|
|
|
else
|
2009-05-27 23:55:51 +02:00
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Considering %sopen purpose %d to %s (circid %d). "
|
2005-12-14 21:40:40 +01:00
|
|
|
"%d secs since dirty.",
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
victim->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN ? "" : "non",
|
2004-07-03 01:40:03 +02:00
|
|
|
victim->purpose, victim->build_state->chosen_exit_name,
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
victim->n_circ_id,
|
|
|
|
(int)(now - victim->timestamp_dirty));
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-01-17 19:49:13 +01:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* if circ is !open, or if it's open but purpose is a non-finished
|
|
|
|
* intro or rend, then mark it for close */
|
2005-12-03 06:29:05 +01:00
|
|
|
if (victim->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN) {
|
|
|
|
switch (victim->purpose) {
|
2005-12-04 23:19:04 +01:00
|
|
|
default: /* most open circuits can be left alone. */
|
2005-12-03 17:32:29 +01:00
|
|
|
continue; /* yes, continue inside a switch refers to the nearest
|
|
|
|
* enclosing loop. C is smart. */
|
2005-12-03 06:29:05 +01:00
|
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND:
|
|
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING:
|
|
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO:
|
2005-12-04 23:19:04 +01:00
|
|
|
break; /* too old, need to die */
|
2005-12-03 06:29:05 +01:00
|
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY:
|
|
|
|
/* it's a rend_ready circ -- has it already picked a query? */
|
2005-12-04 22:51:50 +01:00
|
|
|
/* c_rend_ready circs measure age since timestamp_dirty,
|
|
|
|
* because that's set when they switch purposes
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2008-09-24 16:44:29 +02:00
|
|
|
if (TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->rend_data ||
|
2006-07-26 21:05:34 +02:00
|
|
|
victim->timestamp_dirty > cutoff)
|
2005-12-03 06:29:05 +01:00
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED:
|
|
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT:
|
|
|
|
/* rend and intro circs become dirty each time they
|
|
|
|
* make an introduction attempt. so timestamp_dirty
|
|
|
|
* will reflect the time since the last attempt.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (victim->timestamp_dirty > cutoff)
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2005-12-03 06:29:05 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (victim->n_conn)
|
2006-02-13 09:28:42 +01:00
|
|
|
log_info(LD_CIRC,"Abandoning circ %s:%d:%d (state %d:%s, purpose %d)",
|
2008-07-30 15:04:32 +02:00
|
|
|
victim->n_conn->_base.address, victim->n_conn->_base.port,
|
2006-07-26 21:07:37 +02:00
|
|
|
victim->n_circ_id,
|
2006-02-13 09:28:42 +01:00
|
|
|
victim->state, circuit_state_to_string(victim->state),
|
|
|
|
victim->purpose);
|
2005-12-03 06:29:05 +01:00
|
|
|
else
|
2006-02-13 09:28:42 +01:00
|
|
|
log_info(LD_CIRC,"Abandoning circ %d (state %d:%s, purpose %d)",
|
|
|
|
victim->n_circ_id, victim->state,
|
|
|
|
circuit_state_to_string(victim->state), victim->purpose);
|
2005-12-03 06:29:05 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2006-07-23 09:37:35 +02:00
|
|
|
circuit_log_path(LOG_INFO,LD_CIRC,TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim));
|
2006-10-17 17:20:00 +02:00
|
|
|
circuit_mark_for_close(victim, END_CIRC_REASON_TIMEOUT);
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2004-12-05 08:10:08 +01:00
|
|
|
/** Remove any elements in <b>needed_ports</b> that are handled by an
|
|
|
|
* open or in-progress circuit.
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2004-12-05 08:10:08 +01:00
|
|
|
void
|
2005-06-11 20:52:12 +02:00
|
|
|
circuit_remove_handled_ports(smartlist_t *needed_ports)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2004-12-05 08:10:08 +01:00
|
|
|
int i;
|
2004-12-07 16:29:54 +01:00
|
|
|
uint16_t *port;
|
2004-12-05 08:10:08 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(needed_ports); ++i) {
|
2004-12-07 16:29:54 +01:00
|
|
|
port = smartlist_get(needed_ports, i);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(*port);
|
2006-12-10 09:04:50 +01:00
|
|
|
if (circuit_stream_is_being_handled(NULL, *port,
|
|
|
|
MIN_CIRCUITS_HANDLING_STREAM)) {
|
2006-02-13 09:28:42 +01:00
|
|
|
// log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Port %d is already being handled; removing.", port);
|
2004-12-05 08:10:08 +01:00
|
|
|
smartlist_del(needed_ports, i--);
|
2004-12-07 16:29:54 +01:00
|
|
|
tor_free(port);
|
2004-12-05 08:10:08 +01:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2006-02-13 09:28:42 +01:00
|
|
|
log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Port %d is not handled.", *port);
|
2004-12-05 08:10:08 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2005-11-25 09:08:56 +01:00
|
|
|
/** Return 1 if at least <b>min</b> general-purpose non-internal circuits
|
|
|
|
* will have an acceptable exit node for exit stream <b>conn</b> if it
|
|
|
|
* is defined, else for "*:port".
|
2004-12-05 08:10:08 +01:00
|
|
|
* Else return 0.
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2005-06-11 20:52:12 +02:00
|
|
|
int
|
2006-07-26 21:07:37 +02:00
|
|
|
circuit_stream_is_being_handled(edge_connection_t *conn,
|
|
|
|
uint16_t port, int min)
|
2005-06-11 20:52:12 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
circuit_t *circ;
|
|
|
|
routerinfo_t *exitrouter;
|
|
|
|
int num=0;
|
|
|
|
time_t now = time(NULL);
|
2005-01-13 08:23:19 +01:00
|
|
|
int need_uptime = smartlist_string_num_isin(get_options()->LongLivedPorts,
|
|
|
|
conn ? conn->socks_request->port : port);
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
for (circ=global_circuitlist;circ;circ = circ->next) {
|
2004-11-28 12:39:53 +01:00
|
|
|
if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ) &&
|
|
|
|
!circ->marked_for_close &&
|
|
|
|
circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL &&
|
|
|
|
(!circ->timestamp_dirty ||
|
2005-12-04 23:23:24 +01:00
|
|
|
circ->timestamp_dirty + get_options()->MaxCircuitDirtiness > now)) {
|
2006-07-23 09:37:35 +02:00
|
|
|
cpath_build_state_t *build_state = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)->build_state;
|
2006-12-13 03:49:45 +01:00
|
|
|
if (build_state->is_internal || build_state->onehop_tunnel)
|
2006-07-23 09:37:35 +02:00
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
exitrouter = build_state_get_exit_router(build_state);
|
|
|
|
if (exitrouter && (!need_uptime || build_state->need_uptime)) {
|
2005-03-19 07:57:16 +01:00
|
|
|
int ok;
|
|
|
|
if (conn) {
|
|
|
|
ok = connection_ap_can_use_exit(conn, exitrouter);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2006-03-27 04:25:34 +02:00
|
|
|
addr_policy_result_t r = compare_addr_to_addr_policy(
|
2005-12-14 21:40:40 +01:00
|
|
|
0, port, exitrouter->exit_policy);
|
2005-03-19 07:57:16 +01:00
|
|
|
ok = r != ADDR_POLICY_REJECTED && r != ADDR_POLICY_PROBABLY_REJECTED;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ok) {
|
|
|
|
if (++num >= min)
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2004-12-05 08:10:08 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2006-03-12 23:48:18 +01:00
|
|
|
/** Don't keep more than this many unused open circuits around. */
|
2005-11-25 09:08:56 +01:00
|
|
|
#define MAX_UNUSED_OPEN_CIRCUITS 12
|
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard
to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must
be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect
streams can use internal circs if they want.
New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around
to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal
circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime
if we've seen that lately).
Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs),
which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones
are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long
we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit.
Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as
long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web
browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.)
Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND
circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when
we try to launch one.
Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since
there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching
over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete.
Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take
into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses --
it won't.
Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when
it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which
means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken.
svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/** Figure out how many circuits we have open that are clean. Make
|
|
|
|
* sure it's enough for all the upcoming behaviors we predict we'll have.
|
|
|
|
* But if we have too many, close the not-so-useful ones.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
circuit_predict_and_launch_new(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
circuit_t *circ;
|
|
|
|
int num=0, num_internal=0, num_uptime_internal=0;
|
|
|
|
int hidserv_needs_uptime=0, hidserv_needs_capacity=1;
|
|
|
|
int port_needs_uptime=0, port_needs_capacity=1;
|
|
|
|
time_t now = time(NULL);
|
2007-12-23 20:15:22 +01:00
|
|
|
int flags = 0;
|
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard
to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must
be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect
streams can use internal circs if they want.
New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around
to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal
circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime
if we've seen that lately).
Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs),
which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones
are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long
we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit.
Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as
long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web
browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.)
Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND
circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when
we try to launch one.
Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since
there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching
over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete.
Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take
into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses --
it won't.
Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when
it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which
means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken.
svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2005-08-13 02:22:07 +02:00
|
|
|
/* First, count how many of each type of circuit we have already. */
|
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard
to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must
be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect
streams can use internal circs if they want.
New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around
to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal
circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime
if we've seen that lately).
Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs),
which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones
are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long
we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit.
Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as
long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web
browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.)
Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND
circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when
we try to launch one.
Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since
there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching
over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete.
Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take
into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses --
it won't.
Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when
it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which
means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken.
svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
|
|
|
for (circ=global_circuitlist;circ;circ = circ->next) {
|
2006-07-23 09:37:35 +02:00
|
|
|
cpath_build_state_t *build_state;
|
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard
to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must
be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect
streams can use internal circs if they want.
New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around
to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal
circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime
if we've seen that lately).
Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs),
which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones
are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long
we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit.
Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as
long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web
browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.)
Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND
circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when
we try to launch one.
Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since
there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching
over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete.
Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take
into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses --
it won't.
Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when
it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which
means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken.
svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ))
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
if (circ->marked_for_close)
|
|
|
|
continue; /* don't mess with marked circs */
|
|
|
|
if (circ->timestamp_dirty)
|
|
|
|
continue; /* only count clean circs */
|
|
|
|
if (circ->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL)
|
|
|
|
continue; /* only pay attention to general-purpose circs */
|
2006-07-23 09:37:35 +02:00
|
|
|
build_state = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)->build_state;
|
2006-12-13 03:49:45 +01:00
|
|
|
if (build_state->onehop_tunnel)
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
num++;
|
2006-07-23 09:37:35 +02:00
|
|
|
if (build_state->is_internal)
|
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard
to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must
be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect
streams can use internal circs if they want.
New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around
to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal
circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime
if we've seen that lately).
Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs),
which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones
are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long
we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit.
Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as
long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web
browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.)
Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND
circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when
we try to launch one.
Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since
there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching
over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete.
Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take
into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses --
it won't.
Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when
it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which
means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken.
svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
|
|
|
num_internal++;
|
2006-07-23 09:37:35 +02:00
|
|
|
if (build_state->need_uptime && build_state->is_internal)
|
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard
to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must
be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect
streams can use internal circs if they want.
New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around
to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal
circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime
if we've seen that lately).
Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs),
which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones
are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long
we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit.
Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as
long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web
browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.)
Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND
circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when
we try to launch one.
Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since
there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching
over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete.
Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take
into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses --
it won't.
Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when
it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which
means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken.
svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
|
|
|
num_uptime_internal++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-08-13 02:22:07 +02:00
|
|
|
/* If that's enough, then stop now. */
|
|
|
|
if (num >= MAX_UNUSED_OPEN_CIRCUITS)
|
|
|
|
return; /* we already have many, making more probably will hurt */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Second, see if we need any more exit circuits. */
|
|
|
|
/* check if we know of a port that's been requested recently
|
|
|
|
* and no circuit is currently available that can handle it. */
|
|
|
|
if (!circuit_all_predicted_ports_handled(now, &port_needs_uptime,
|
|
|
|
&port_needs_capacity)) {
|
2007-12-23 20:15:22 +01:00
|
|
|
if (port_needs_uptime)
|
|
|
|
flags |= CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_UPTIME;
|
|
|
|
if (port_needs_capacity)
|
|
|
|
flags |= CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_CAPACITY;
|
2006-02-13 09:28:42 +01:00
|
|
|
log_info(LD_CIRC,
|
|
|
|
"Have %d clean circs (%d internal), need another exit circ.",
|
|
|
|
num, num_internal);
|
2007-12-23 20:15:22 +01:00
|
|
|
circuit_launch_by_router(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL, NULL, flags);
|
2005-08-13 02:22:07 +02:00
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Third, see if we need any more hidden service (server) circuits. */
|
|
|
|
if (num_rend_services() && num_uptime_internal < 3) {
|
2007-12-23 20:15:22 +01:00
|
|
|
flags = (CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_CAPACITY | CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_UPTIME |
|
|
|
|
CIRCLAUNCH_IS_INTERNAL);
|
2006-02-13 09:28:42 +01:00
|
|
|
log_info(LD_CIRC,
|
|
|
|
"Have %d clean circs (%d internal), need another internal "
|
|
|
|
"circ for my hidden service.",
|
|
|
|
num, num_internal);
|
2007-12-23 20:15:22 +01:00
|
|
|
circuit_launch_by_router(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL, NULL, flags);
|
2005-08-13 02:22:07 +02:00
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Fourth, see if we need any more hidden service (client) circuits. */
|
2005-11-25 09:08:56 +01:00
|
|
|
if (rep_hist_get_predicted_internal(now, &hidserv_needs_uptime,
|
|
|
|
&hidserv_needs_capacity) &&
|
2005-08-13 02:22:07 +02:00
|
|
|
((num_uptime_internal<2 && hidserv_needs_uptime) ||
|
|
|
|
num_internal<2)) {
|
2007-12-23 20:15:22 +01:00
|
|
|
if (hidserv_needs_uptime)
|
|
|
|
flags |= CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_UPTIME;
|
|
|
|
if (hidserv_needs_capacity)
|
|
|
|
flags |= CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_CAPACITY;
|
|
|
|
flags |= CIRCLAUNCH_IS_INTERNAL;
|
2006-02-13 09:28:42 +01:00
|
|
|
log_info(LD_CIRC,
|
|
|
|
"Have %d clean circs (%d uptime-internal, %d internal), need"
|
2009-05-27 23:55:51 +02:00
|
|
|
" another hidden service circ.",
|
2006-02-13 09:28:42 +01:00
|
|
|
num, num_uptime_internal, num_internal);
|
2007-12-23 20:15:22 +01:00
|
|
|
circuit_launch_by_router(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL, NULL, flags);
|
2005-08-13 02:22:07 +02:00
|
|
|
return;
|
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard
to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must
be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect
streams can use internal circs if they want.
New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around
to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal
circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime
if we've seen that lately).
Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs),
which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones
are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long
we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit.
Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as
long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web
browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.)
Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND
circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when
we try to launch one.
Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since
there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching
over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete.
Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take
into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses --
it won't.
Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when
it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which
means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken.
svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
/** Build a new test circuit every 5 minutes */
|
|
|
|
#define TESTING_CIRCUIT_INTERVAL 300
|
|
|
|
|
2007-02-22 08:41:14 +01:00
|
|
|
/** This function is called once a second, if router_have_min_dir_info() is
|
|
|
|
* true. Its job is to make sure all services we offer have enough circuits
|
|
|
|
* available. Some services just want enough circuits for current tasks,
|
|
|
|
* whereas others want a minimum set of idle circuits hanging around.
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2005-06-11 20:52:12 +02:00
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
|
circuit_build_needed_circs(time_t now)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2009-01-22 17:28:12 +01:00
|
|
|
static time_t time_to_new_circuit = 0;
|
2007-04-30 11:18:48 +02:00
|
|
|
or_options_t *options = get_options();
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* launch a new circ for any pending streams that need one */
|
|
|
|
connection_ap_attach_pending();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* make sure any hidden services have enough intro points */
|
2007-02-22 08:41:14 +01:00
|
|
|
rend_services_introduce();
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (time_to_new_circuit < now) {
|
2004-08-18 10:51:04 +02:00
|
|
|
circuit_reset_failure_count(1);
|
2007-04-30 11:18:48 +02:00
|
|
|
time_to_new_circuit = now + options->NewCircuitPeriod;
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (proxy_mode(get_options()))
|
2005-02-22 01:53:08 +01:00
|
|
|
addressmap_clean(now);
|
2006-03-22 01:52:37 +01:00
|
|
|
circuit_expire_old_circuits(now);
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard
to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must
be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect
streams can use internal circs if they want.
New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around
to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal
circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime
if we've seen that lately).
Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs),
which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones
are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long
we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit.
Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as
long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web
browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.)
Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND
circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when
we try to launch one.
Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since
there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching
over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete.
Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take
into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses --
it won't.
Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when
it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which
means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken.
svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
|
|
|
#if 0 /* disable for now, until predict-and-launch-new can cull leftovers */
|
|
|
|
circ = circuit_get_youngest_clean_open(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL);
|
2004-11-28 12:39:53 +01:00
|
|
|
if (get_options()->RunTesting &&
|
|
|
|
circ &&
|
|
|
|
circ->timestamp_created + TESTING_CIRCUIT_INTERVAL < now) {
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Creating a new testing circuit.");
|
2007-12-23 20:15:22 +01:00
|
|
|
circuit_launch_by_router(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL, NULL, 0);
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2004-12-05 08:10:08 +01:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
}
|
2007-04-30 11:18:48 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!options->DisablePredictedCircuits)
|
|
|
|
circuit_predict_and_launch_new();
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/** If the stream <b>conn</b> is a member of any of the linked
|
|
|
|
* lists of <b>circ</b>, then remove it from the list.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2005-06-11 20:52:12 +02:00
|
|
|
void
|
2006-07-26 21:07:26 +02:00
|
|
|
circuit_detach_stream(circuit_t *circ, edge_connection_t *conn)
|
2005-06-11 20:52:12 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2006-07-26 21:07:26 +02:00
|
|
|
edge_connection_t *prevconn;
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2004-10-17 00:14:52 +02:00
|
|
|
tor_assert(circ);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(conn);
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2004-10-11 03:17:42 +02:00
|
|
|
conn->cpath_layer = NULL; /* make sure we don't keep a stale pointer */
|
2005-04-06 08:13:49 +02:00
|
|
|
conn->on_circuit = NULL;
|
2004-10-11 03:17:42 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2006-07-23 09:37:35 +02:00
|
|
|
if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) {
|
|
|
|
origin_circuit_t *origin_circ = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ);
|
|
|
|
if (conn == origin_circ->p_streams) {
|
|
|
|
origin_circ->p_streams = conn->next_stream;
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2006-07-23 09:37:35 +02:00
|
|
|
for (prevconn = origin_circ->p_streams;
|
|
|
|
prevconn && prevconn->next_stream && prevconn->next_stream != conn;
|
|
|
|
prevconn = prevconn->next_stream)
|
|
|
|
;
|
|
|
|
if (prevconn && prevconn->next_stream) {
|
|
|
|
prevconn->next_stream = conn->next_stream;
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
or_circuit_t *or_circ = TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ);
|
|
|
|
if (conn == or_circ->n_streams) {
|
|
|
|
or_circ->n_streams = conn->next_stream;
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (conn == or_circ->resolving_streams) {
|
|
|
|
or_circ->resolving_streams = conn->next_stream;
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2006-07-23 09:37:35 +02:00
|
|
|
for (prevconn = or_circ->n_streams;
|
|
|
|
prevconn && prevconn->next_stream && prevconn->next_stream != conn;
|
|
|
|
prevconn = prevconn->next_stream)
|
|
|
|
;
|
|
|
|
if (prevconn && prevconn->next_stream) {
|
|
|
|
prevconn->next_stream = conn->next_stream;
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2006-07-23 09:37:35 +02:00
|
|
|
for (prevconn = or_circ->resolving_streams;
|
|
|
|
prevconn && prevconn->next_stream && prevconn->next_stream != conn;
|
|
|
|
prevconn = prevconn->next_stream)
|
|
|
|
;
|
|
|
|
if (prevconn && prevconn->next_stream) {
|
|
|
|
prevconn->next_stream = conn->next_stream;
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2007-05-29 21:54:51 +02:00
|
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG,"Edge connection not in circuit's list.");
|
|
|
|
/* Don't give an error here; it's harmless. */
|
2007-06-01 01:57:46 +02:00
|
|
|
tor_fragile_assert();
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2006-05-30 08:19:06 +02:00
|
|
|
/** Find each circuit that has been unused for too long, or dirty
|
2007-01-15 10:09:03 +01:00
|
|
|
* for too long and has no streams on it: mark it for close.
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static void
|
2006-03-22 01:52:37 +01:00
|
|
|
circuit_expire_old_circuits(time_t now)
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
circuit_t *circ;
|
2006-03-22 01:52:37 +01:00
|
|
|
time_t cutoff = now - get_options()->CircuitIdleTimeout;
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (circ = global_circuitlist; circ; circ = circ->next) {
|
2006-07-23 09:37:35 +02:00
|
|
|
if (circ->marked_for_close || ! CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ))
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
/* If the circuit has been dirty for too long, and there are no streams
|
|
|
|
* on it, mark it for close.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (circ->timestamp_dirty &&
|
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard
to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must
be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect
streams can use internal circs if they want.
New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around
to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal
circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime
if we've seen that lately).
Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs),
which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones
are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long
we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit.
Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as
long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web
browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.)
Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND
circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when
we try to launch one.
Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since
there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching
over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete.
Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take
into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses --
it won't.
Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when
it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which
means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken.
svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
|
|
|
circ->timestamp_dirty + get_options()->MaxCircuitDirtiness < now &&
|
2006-07-23 09:37:35 +02:00
|
|
|
!TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ)->p_streams /* nothing attached */ ) {
|
2009-05-28 17:54:56 +02:00
|
|
|
log_debug(LD_CIRC, "Closing n_circ_id %d (dirty %d secs ago, "
|
|
|
|
"purpose %d)",
|
2006-02-13 09:28:42 +01:00
|
|
|
circ->n_circ_id, (int)(now - circ->timestamp_dirty),
|
|
|
|
circ->purpose);
|
2006-10-17 17:20:00 +02:00
|
|
|
circuit_mark_for_close(circ, END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED);
|
2006-07-23 09:37:35 +02:00
|
|
|
} else if (!circ->timestamp_dirty &&
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
circ->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN &&
|
|
|
|
circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL) {
|
2006-03-22 01:52:37 +01:00
|
|
|
if (circ->timestamp_created < cutoff) {
|
2006-02-13 09:28:42 +01:00
|
|
|
log_debug(LD_CIRC,
|
|
|
|
"Closing circuit that has been unused for %d seconds.",
|
|
|
|
(int)(now - circ->timestamp_created));
|
2006-10-17 17:20:00 +02:00
|
|
|
circuit_mark_for_close(circ, END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED);
|
2004-12-05 08:10:08 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2007-02-24 08:50:38 +01:00
|
|
|
/** Number of testing circuits we want open before testing our bandwidth. */
|
2006-09-15 07:30:25 +02:00
|
|
|
#define NUM_PARALLEL_TESTING_CIRCS 4
|
|
|
|
|
2007-02-24 08:50:38 +01:00
|
|
|
/** True iff we've ever had enough testing circuits open to test our
|
2007-02-16 21:39:37 +01:00
|
|
|
* bandwidth. */
|
2006-09-15 07:30:25 +02:00
|
|
|
static int have_performed_bandwidth_test = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/** Reset have_performed_bandwidth_test, so we'll start building
|
|
|
|
* testing circuits again so we can exercise our bandwidth. */
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
|
reset_bandwidth_test(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
have_performed_bandwidth_test = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/** Return 1 if we've already exercised our bandwidth, or if we
|
|
|
|
* have fewer than NUM_PARALLEL_TESTING_CIRCS testing circuits
|
|
|
|
* established or on the way. Else return 0.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
circuit_enough_testing_circs(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
circuit_t *circ;
|
|
|
|
int num = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (have_performed_bandwidth_test)
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (circ = global_circuitlist; circ; circ = circ->next) {
|
|
|
|
if (!circ->marked_for_close && CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ) &&
|
|
|
|
circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING &&
|
|
|
|
circ->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN)
|
|
|
|
num++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return num >= NUM_PARALLEL_TESTING_CIRCS;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/** A testing circuit has completed. Take whatever stats we want.
|
|
|
|
* Noticing reachability is taken care of in onionskin_answer(),
|
|
|
|
* so there's no need to record anything here. But if we still want
|
|
|
|
* to do the bandwidth test, and we now have enough testing circuits
|
|
|
|
* open, do it.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2005-02-27 10:47:01 +01:00
|
|
|
static void
|
2006-07-23 09:37:35 +02:00
|
|
|
circuit_testing_opened(origin_circuit_t *circ)
|
2005-06-11 20:52:12 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2008-09-29 11:36:42 +02:00
|
|
|
if (have_performed_bandwidth_test ||
|
|
|
|
!check_whether_orport_reachable()) {
|
|
|
|
/* either we've already done everything we want with testing circuits,
|
|
|
|
* or this testing circuit became open due to a fluke, e.g. we picked
|
|
|
|
* a last hop where we already had the connection open due to an
|
|
|
|
* outgoing local circuit. */
|
2006-09-15 07:30:25 +02:00
|
|
|
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_AT_ORIGIN);
|
|
|
|
} else if (circuit_enough_testing_circs()) {
|
|
|
|
router_perform_bandwidth_test(NUM_PARALLEL_TESTING_CIRCS, time(NULL));
|
|
|
|
have_performed_bandwidth_test = 1;
|
2006-09-15 07:53:00 +02:00
|
|
|
} else
|
|
|
|
consider_testing_reachability(1, 0);
|
2005-02-27 10:47:01 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/** A testing circuit has failed to build. Take whatever stats we want. */
|
|
|
|
static void
|
2006-07-23 09:37:35 +02:00
|
|
|
circuit_testing_failed(origin_circuit_t *circ, int at_last_hop)
|
2005-09-30 03:09:52 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2007-01-06 06:42:31 +01:00
|
|
|
routerinfo_t *me = router_get_my_routerinfo();
|
2006-09-18 06:59:15 +02:00
|
|
|
if (server_mode(get_options()) && check_whether_orport_reachable())
|
|
|
|
return;
|
2007-01-06 06:42:31 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!me)
|
|
|
|
return;
|
2006-09-18 06:59:15 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2006-02-13 09:28:42 +01:00
|
|
|
log_info(LD_GENERAL,
|
|
|
|
"Our testing circuit (to see if your ORPort is reachable) "
|
2006-09-18 06:59:15 +02:00
|
|
|
"has failed. I'll try again later.");
|
2007-01-06 06:42:31 +01:00
|
|
|
control_event_server_status(LOG_WARN, "REACHABILITY_FAILED ORADDRESS=%s:%d",
|
|
|
|
me->address, me->or_port);
|
2006-06-05 00:42:13 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* These aren't used yet. */
|
|
|
|
(void)circ;
|
|
|
|
(void)at_last_hop;
|
2005-02-27 10:47:01 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
/** The circuit <b>circ</b> has just become open. Take the next
|
|
|
|
* step: for rendezvous circuits, we pass circ to the appropriate
|
|
|
|
* function in rendclient or rendservice. For general circuits, we
|
|
|
|
* call connection_ap_attach_pending, which looks for pending streams
|
|
|
|
* that could use circ.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2005-06-11 20:52:12 +02:00
|
|
|
void
|
2006-07-23 09:37:35 +02:00
|
|
|
circuit_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circ)
|
2005-06-11 20:52:12 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2006-10-09 17:47:27 +02:00
|
|
|
control_event_circuit_status(circ, CIRC_EVENT_BUILT, 0);
|
2004-11-03 19:33:07 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2006-07-23 09:37:35 +02:00
|
|
|
switch (TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose) {
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND:
|
|
|
|
rend_client_rendcirc_has_opened(circ);
|
2005-01-19 18:13:11 +01:00
|
|
|
connection_ap_attach_pending();
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING:
|
|
|
|
rend_client_introcirc_has_opened(circ);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL:
|
|
|
|
/* Tell any AP connections that have been waiting for a new
|
|
|
|
* circuit that one is ready. */
|
|
|
|
connection_ap_attach_pending();
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO:
|
|
|
|
/* at Bob, waiting for introductions */
|
|
|
|
rend_service_intro_has_opened(circ);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND:
|
|
|
|
/* at Bob, connecting to rend point */
|
|
|
|
rend_service_rendezvous_has_opened(circ);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2005-02-27 10:47:01 +01:00
|
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING:
|
|
|
|
circuit_testing_opened(circ);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2006-10-10 00:26:21 +02:00
|
|
|
/* default:
|
|
|
|
* This won't happen in normal operation, but might happen if the
|
|
|
|
* controller did it. Just let it slide. */
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-06-11 20:52:12 +02:00
|
|
|
/** Called whenever a circuit could not be successfully built.
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2005-06-11 20:52:12 +02:00
|
|
|
void
|
2006-07-23 09:37:35 +02:00
|
|
|
circuit_build_failed(origin_circuit_t *circ)
|
2005-06-11 20:52:12 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
/* we should examine circ and see if it failed because of
|
|
|
|
* the last hop or an earlier hop. then use this info below.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int failed_at_last_hop = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* If the last hop isn't open, and the second-to-last is, we failed
|
|
|
|
* at the last hop. */
|
|
|
|
if (circ->cpath &&
|
|
|
|
circ->cpath->prev->state != CPATH_STATE_OPEN &&
|
|
|
|
circ->cpath->prev->prev->state == CPATH_STATE_OPEN) {
|
2005-11-19 07:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
failed_at_last_hop = 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (circ->cpath &&
|
|
|
|
circ->cpath->state != CPATH_STATE_OPEN) {
|
|
|
|
/* We failed at the first hop. If there's an OR connection
|
2009-01-07 01:30:12 +01:00
|
|
|
* to blame, blame it. Also, avoid this relay for a while, and
|
|
|
|
* fail any one-hop directory fetches destined for it. */
|
|
|
|
const char *n_conn_id = circ->cpath->extend_info->identity_digest;
|
2006-07-23 09:37:35 +02:00
|
|
|
if (circ->_base.n_conn) {
|
2009-01-06 22:31:46 +01:00
|
|
|
or_connection_t *n_conn = circ->_base.n_conn;
|
2006-02-13 09:28:42 +01:00
|
|
|
log_info(LD_OR,
|
|
|
|
"Our circuit failed to get a response from the first hop "
|
|
|
|
"(%s:%d). I'm going to try to rotate to a better connection.",
|
2006-07-26 21:07:26 +02:00
|
|
|
n_conn->_base.address, n_conn->_base.port);
|
2008-12-17 15:59:19 +01:00
|
|
|
n_conn->is_bad_for_new_circs = 1;
|
2005-11-19 07:57:44 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2009-01-06 23:20:31 +01:00
|
|
|
if (n_conn_id) {
|
2009-02-05 00:27:35 +01:00
|
|
|
entry_guard_register_connect_status(n_conn_id, 0, 1, time(NULL));
|
2009-01-06 22:42:05 +01:00
|
|
|
/* if there are any one-hop streams waiting on this circuit, fail
|
|
|
|
* them now so they can retry elsewhere. */
|
|
|
|
connection_ap_fail_onehop(n_conn_id, circ->build_state);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2006-07-23 09:37:35 +02:00
|
|
|
switch (circ->_base.purpose) {
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL:
|
2006-06-05 10:25:02 +02:00
|
|
|
/* If we never built the circuit, note it as a failure. */
|
|
|
|
circuit_increment_failure_count();
|
2006-10-01 08:41:13 +02:00
|
|
|
if (failed_at_last_hop) {
|
|
|
|
/* Make sure any streams that demand our last hop as their exit
|
|
|
|
* know that it's unlikely to happen. */
|
|
|
|
circuit_discard_optional_exit_enclaves(circ->cpath->prev->extend_info);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
break;
|
2005-02-27 10:47:01 +01:00
|
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING:
|
|
|
|
circuit_testing_failed(circ, failed_at_last_hop);
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO:
|
|
|
|
/* at Bob, waiting for introductions */
|
2006-07-23 09:37:35 +02:00
|
|
|
if (circ->_base.state != CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN) {
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
circuit_increment_failure_count();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* no need to care here, because bob will rebuild intro
|
|
|
|
* points periodically. */
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING:
|
|
|
|
/* at Alice, connecting to intro point */
|
|
|
|
/* Don't increment failure count, since Bob may have picked
|
|
|
|
* the introduction point maliciously */
|
|
|
|
/* Alice will pick a new intro point when this one dies, if
|
|
|
|
* the stream in question still cares. No need to act here. */
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND:
|
|
|
|
/* at Alice, waiting for Bob */
|
2006-06-05 10:25:02 +02:00
|
|
|
circuit_increment_failure_count();
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Alice will pick a new rend point when this one dies, if
|
|
|
|
* the stream in question still cares. No need to act here. */
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND:
|
|
|
|
/* at Bob, connecting to rend point */
|
|
|
|
/* Don't increment failure count, since Alice may have picked
|
|
|
|
* the rendezvous point maliciously */
|
2006-02-13 09:28:42 +01:00
|
|
|
log_info(LD_REND,
|
|
|
|
"Couldn't connect to Alice's chosen rend point %s "
|
|
|
|
"(%s hop failed).",
|
2006-03-05 10:50:26 +01:00
|
|
|
escaped(build_state_get_exit_nickname(circ->build_state)),
|
2006-02-13 09:28:42 +01:00
|
|
|
failed_at_last_hop?"last":"non-last");
|
2005-03-19 05:38:59 +01:00
|
|
|
rend_service_relaunch_rendezvous(circ);
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
break;
|
2006-10-10 00:26:21 +02:00
|
|
|
/* default:
|
|
|
|
* This won't happen in normal operation, but might happen if the
|
|
|
|
* controller did it. Just let it slide. */
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/** Number of consecutive failures so far; should only be touched by
|
|
|
|
* circuit_launch_new and circuit_*_failure_count.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int n_circuit_failures = 0;
|
2007-02-16 21:39:37 +01:00
|
|
|
/** Before the last time we called circuit_reset_failure_count(), were
|
|
|
|
* there a lot of failures? */
|
2004-08-18 10:51:04 +02:00
|
|
|
static int did_circs_fail_last_period = 0;
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/** Don't retry launching a new circuit if we try this many times with no
|
|
|
|
* success. */
|
|
|
|
#define MAX_CIRCUIT_FAILURES 5
|
|
|
|
|
2005-07-14 10:43:19 +02:00
|
|
|
/** Launch a new circuit; see circuit_launch_by_extend_info() for
|
|
|
|
* details on arguments. */
|
2006-07-23 09:37:35 +02:00
|
|
|
origin_circuit_t *
|
2007-12-23 20:15:22 +01:00
|
|
|
circuit_launch_by_router(uint8_t purpose,
|
|
|
|
routerinfo_t *exit, int flags)
|
2004-07-03 01:40:03 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2006-07-23 09:37:35 +02:00
|
|
|
origin_circuit_t *circ;
|
2005-06-29 23:46:55 +02:00
|
|
|
extend_info_t *info = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (exit)
|
|
|
|
info = extend_info_from_router(exit);
|
2007-12-23 20:15:22 +01:00
|
|
|
circ = circuit_launch_by_extend_info(purpose, info, flags);
|
2005-06-29 23:46:55 +02:00
|
|
|
if (info)
|
|
|
|
extend_info_free(info);
|
|
|
|
return circ;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2007-07-29 06:38:21 +02:00
|
|
|
/** Launch a new circuit with purpose <b>purpose</b> and exit node
|
2007-12-23 20:15:22 +01:00
|
|
|
* <b>extend_info</b> (or NULL to select a random exit node). If flags
|
|
|
|
* contains CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_UPTIME, choose among routers with high uptime. If
|
|
|
|
* CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_CAPACITY is set, choose among routers with high bandwidth.
|
|
|
|
* If CIRCLAUNCH_IS_INTERNAL is true, the last hop need not be an exit node.
|
|
|
|
* If CIRCLAUNCH_ONEHOP_TUNNEL is set, the circuit will have only one hop.
|
|
|
|
* Return the newly allocated circuit on success, or NULL on failure. */
|
2006-07-23 09:37:35 +02:00
|
|
|
origin_circuit_t *
|
2007-12-23 20:15:22 +01:00
|
|
|
circuit_launch_by_extend_info(uint8_t purpose,
|
|
|
|
extend_info_t *extend_info,
|
|
|
|
int flags)
|
2005-06-29 23:46:55 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2006-07-23 09:37:35 +02:00
|
|
|
origin_circuit_t *circ;
|
2008-07-01 01:27:11 +02:00
|
|
|
int onehop_tunnel = (flags & CIRCLAUNCH_ONEHOP_TUNNEL) != 0;
|
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard
to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must
be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect
streams can use internal circs if they want.
New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around
to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal
circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime
if we've seen that lately).
Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs),
which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones
are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long
we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit.
Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as
long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web
browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.)
Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND
circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when
we try to launch one.
Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since
there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching
over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete.
Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take
into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses --
it won't.
Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when
it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which
means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken.
svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2006-12-13 03:49:45 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!onehop_tunnel && !router_have_minimum_dir_info()) {
|
2006-02-13 09:28:42 +01:00
|
|
|
log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Haven't fetched enough directory info yet; canceling "
|
|
|
|
"circuit launch.");
|
2004-07-13 03:25:39 +02:00
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-11-15 04:05:23 +01:00
|
|
|
if ((extend_info || purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL) &&
|
2006-12-13 03:49:45 +01:00
|
|
|
purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING && !onehop_tunnel) {
|
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard
to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must
be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect
streams can use internal circs if they want.
New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around
to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal
circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime
if we've seen that lately).
Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs),
which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones
are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long
we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit.
Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as
long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web
browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.)
Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND
circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when
we try to launch one.
Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since
there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching
over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete.
Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take
into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses --
it won't.
Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when
it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which
means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken.
svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
|
|
|
/* see if there are appropriate circs available to cannibalize. */
|
2008-12-18 17:11:03 +01:00
|
|
|
/* XXX if we're planning to add a hop, perhaps we want to look for
|
2007-10-28 09:16:19 +01:00
|
|
|
* internal circs rather than exit circs? -RD */
|
2007-12-23 20:15:22 +01:00
|
|
|
circ = circuit_find_to_cannibalize(purpose, extend_info, flags);
|
2005-11-11 20:25:30 +01:00
|
|
|
if (circ) {
|
2006-02-13 09:28:42 +01:00
|
|
|
log_info(LD_CIRC,"Cannibalizing circ '%s' for purpose %d",
|
|
|
|
build_state_get_exit_nickname(circ->build_state), purpose);
|
2006-07-23 09:37:35 +02:00
|
|
|
circ->_base.purpose = purpose;
|
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard
to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must
be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect
streams can use internal circs if they want.
New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around
to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal
circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime
if we've seen that lately).
Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs),
which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones
are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long
we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit.
Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as
long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web
browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.)
Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND
circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when
we try to launch one.
Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since
there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching
over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete.
Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take
into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses --
it won't.
Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when
it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which
means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken.
svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
|
|
|
/* reset the birth date of this circ, else expire_building
|
|
|
|
* will see it and think it's been trying to build since it
|
|
|
|
* began. */
|
2006-07-23 09:37:35 +02:00
|
|
|
circ->_base.timestamp_created = time(NULL);
|
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard
to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must
be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect
streams can use internal circs if they want.
New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around
to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal
circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime
if we've seen that lately).
Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs),
which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones
are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long
we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit.
Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as
long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web
browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.)
Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND
circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when
we try to launch one.
Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since
there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching
over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete.
Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take
into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses --
it won't.
Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when
it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which
means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken.
svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
|
|
|
switch (purpose) {
|
|
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND:
|
|
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO:
|
|
|
|
/* it's ready right now */
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING:
|
|
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND:
|
2005-08-15 05:25:40 +02:00
|
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL:
|
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard
to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must
be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect
streams can use internal circs if they want.
New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around
to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal
circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime
if we've seen that lately).
Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs),
which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones
are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long
we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit.
Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as
long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web
browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.)
Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND
circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when
we try to launch one.
Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since
there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching
over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete.
Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take
into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses --
it won't.
Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when
it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which
means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken.
svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
|
|
|
/* need to add a new hop */
|
2005-11-15 04:05:23 +01:00
|
|
|
tor_assert(extend_info);
|
|
|
|
if (circuit_extend_to_new_exit(circ, extend_info) < 0)
|
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard
to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must
be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect
streams can use internal circs if they want.
New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around
to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal
circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime
if we've seen that lately).
Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs),
which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones
are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long
we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit.
Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as
long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web
browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.)
Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND
circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when
we try to launch one.
Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since
there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching
over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete.
Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take
into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses --
it won't.
Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when
it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which
means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken.
svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
2006-02-13 09:28:42 +01:00
|
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG,
|
2007-03-04 21:11:46 +01:00
|
|
|
"unexpected purpose %d when cannibalizing a circ.",
|
2006-02-13 09:28:42 +01:00
|
|
|
purpose);
|
2005-04-26 20:52:16 +02:00
|
|
|
tor_fragile_assert();
|
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard
to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must
be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect
streams can use internal circs if they want.
New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around
to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal
circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime
if we've seen that lately).
Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs),
which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones
are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long
we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit.
Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as
long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web
browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.)
Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND
circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when
we try to launch one.
Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since
there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching
over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete.
Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take
into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses --
it won't.
Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when
it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which
means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken.
svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return circ;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2004-08-18 10:51:04 +02:00
|
|
|
if (did_circs_fail_last_period &&
|
|
|
|
n_circuit_failures > MAX_CIRCUIT_FAILURES) {
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
/* too many failed circs in a row. don't try. */
|
|
|
|
// log_fn(LOG_INFO,"%d failures so far, not trying.",n_circuit_failures);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-12-14 21:40:40 +01:00
|
|
|
/* try a circ. if it fails, circuit_mark_for_close will increment
|
|
|
|
* n_circuit_failures */
|
2007-12-23 20:15:22 +01:00
|
|
|
return circuit_establish_circuit(purpose, extend_info, flags);
|
2004-07-03 01:40:03 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
/** Record another failure at opening a general circuit. When we have
|
|
|
|
* too many, we'll stop trying for the remainder of this minute.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2005-06-11 20:52:12 +02:00
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
circuit_increment_failure_count(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
++n_circuit_failures;
|
2006-02-13 09:28:42 +01:00
|
|
|
log_debug(LD_CIRC,"n_circuit_failures now %d.",n_circuit_failures);
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/** Reset the failure count for opening general circuits. This means
|
|
|
|
* we will try MAX_CIRCUIT_FAILURES times more (if necessary) before
|
|
|
|
* stopping again.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2005-06-11 20:52:12 +02:00
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
|
circuit_reset_failure_count(int timeout)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (timeout && n_circuit_failures > MAX_CIRCUIT_FAILURES)
|
2004-08-18 10:51:04 +02:00
|
|
|
did_circs_fail_last_period = 1;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
did_circs_fail_last_period = 0;
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
n_circuit_failures = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2006-09-21 23:48:42 +02:00
|
|
|
/** Find an open circ that we're happy to use for <b>conn</b> and return 1. If
|
|
|
|
* there isn't one, and there isn't one on the way, launch one and return
|
|
|
|
* 0. If it will never work, return -1.
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Write the found or in-progress or launched circ into *circp.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int
|
2006-07-26 21:07:26 +02:00
|
|
|
circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch(edge_connection_t *conn,
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
uint8_t desired_circuit_purpose,
|
2006-07-23 09:37:35 +02:00
|
|
|
origin_circuit_t **circp)
|
2005-06-11 20:52:12 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2006-07-23 09:37:35 +02:00
|
|
|
origin_circuit_t *circ;
|
2006-12-13 01:28:56 +01:00
|
|
|
int check_exit_policy;
|
2005-11-25 09:08:56 +01:00
|
|
|
int need_uptime, need_internal;
|
2006-12-13 03:49:45 +01:00
|
|
|
int want_onehop;
|
2007-07-29 06:38:21 +02:00
|
|
|
or_options_t *options = get_options();
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(conn);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(circp);
|
2006-07-26 21:07:26 +02:00
|
|
|
tor_assert(conn->_base.state == AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT);
|
2006-12-13 01:28:56 +01:00
|
|
|
check_exit_policy =
|
2007-10-28 09:16:19 +01:00
|
|
|
conn->socks_request->command == SOCKS_COMMAND_CONNECT &&
|
|
|
|
!conn->use_begindir &&
|
2006-12-13 01:28:56 +01:00
|
|
|
!connection_edge_is_rendezvous_stream(conn);
|
2007-10-28 09:16:19 +01:00
|
|
|
want_onehop = conn->want_onehop;
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2007-10-28 09:16:19 +01:00
|
|
|
need_uptime = !conn->want_onehop && !conn->use_begindir &&
|
2007-07-29 06:38:21 +02:00
|
|
|
smartlist_string_num_isin(options->LongLivedPorts,
|
2005-11-25 09:08:56 +01:00
|
|
|
conn->socks_request->port);
|
|
|
|
need_internal = desired_circuit_purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
circ = circuit_get_best(conn, 1, desired_circuit_purpose,
|
|
|
|
need_uptime, need_internal);
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (circ) {
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
*circp = circ;
|
|
|
|
return 1; /* we're happy */
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2006-12-13 03:49:45 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!want_onehop && !router_have_minimum_dir_info()) {
|
2005-01-07 16:57:57 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!connection_get_by_type(CONN_TYPE_DIR)) {
|
2008-08-03 07:35:18 +02:00
|
|
|
int severity = LOG_NOTICE;
|
2009-05-27 23:55:51 +02:00
|
|
|
/* FFFF if this is a tunneled directory fetch, don't yell
|
2008-08-03 07:35:18 +02:00
|
|
|
* as loudly. the user doesn't even know it's happening. */
|
2007-11-26 07:26:17 +01:00
|
|
|
if (options->UseBridges && bridges_known_but_down()) {
|
2008-08-03 07:35:18 +02:00
|
|
|
log_fn(severity, LD_APP|LD_DIR,
|
|
|
|
"Application request when we're believed to be "
|
|
|
|
"offline. Optimistically trying known bridges again.");
|
2007-07-29 06:38:21 +02:00
|
|
|
bridges_retry_all();
|
|
|
|
} else if (!options->UseBridges || any_bridge_descriptors_known()) {
|
2008-08-03 07:35:18 +02:00
|
|
|
log_fn(severity, LD_APP|LD_DIR,
|
|
|
|
"Application request when we're believed to be "
|
|
|
|
"offline. Optimistically trying directory fetches again.");
|
2007-07-29 06:38:21 +02:00
|
|
|
routerlist_retry_directory_downloads(time(NULL));
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-01-07 16:57:57 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2005-12-15 21:44:15 +01:00
|
|
|
/* the stream will be dealt with when router_have_minimum_dir_info becomes
|
2005-01-07 16:57:57 +01:00
|
|
|
* 1, or when all directory attempts fail and directory_all_unreachable()
|
|
|
|
* kills it.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2004-06-17 20:13:09 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Do we need to check exit policy? */
|
2006-12-13 01:28:56 +01:00
|
|
|
if (check_exit_policy) {
|
2008-10-21 19:09:04 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!conn->chosen_exit_name) {
|
|
|
|
struct in_addr in;
|
|
|
|
uint32_t addr = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (tor_inet_aton(conn->socks_request->address, &in))
|
|
|
|
addr = ntohl(in.s_addr);
|
2008-11-07 02:48:55 +01:00
|
|
|
if (router_exit_policy_all_routers_reject(addr,
|
|
|
|
conn->socks_request->port,
|
2008-10-21 19:09:04 +02:00
|
|
|
need_uptime)) {
|
|
|
|
log_notice(LD_APP,
|
2008-11-07 02:48:55 +01:00
|
|
|
"No Tor server allows exit to %s:%d. Rejecting.",
|
2008-10-21 19:09:04 +02:00
|
|
|
safe_str(conn->socks_request->address),
|
|
|
|
conn->socks_request->port);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2008-12-29 21:17:24 +01:00
|
|
|
/* XXXX022 Duplicates checks in connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit */
|
2008-10-21 19:09:04 +02:00
|
|
|
routerinfo_t *router = router_get_by_nickname(conn->chosen_exit_name, 1);
|
2008-12-17 15:59:28 +01:00
|
|
|
int opt = conn->chosen_exit_optional;
|
2008-10-21 19:09:04 +02:00
|
|
|
if (router && !connection_ap_can_use_exit(conn, router)) {
|
|
|
|
log_fn(opt ? LOG_INFO : LOG_WARN, LD_APP,
|
|
|
|
"Requested exit point '%s' would refuse request. %s.",
|
|
|
|
conn->chosen_exit_name, opt ? "Trying others" : "Closing");
|
|
|
|
if (opt) {
|
2008-12-17 15:59:28 +01:00
|
|
|
conn->chosen_exit_optional = 0;
|
2008-10-21 19:09:04 +02:00
|
|
|
tor_free(conn->chosen_exit_name);
|
|
|
|
/* Try again. */
|
|
|
|
return circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch(conn,
|
|
|
|
desired_circuit_purpose,
|
|
|
|
circp);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* is one already on the way? */
|
2005-11-25 09:08:56 +01:00
|
|
|
circ = circuit_get_best(conn, 0, desired_circuit_purpose,
|
|
|
|
need_uptime, need_internal);
|
2007-10-28 09:16:19 +01:00
|
|
|
if (circ)
|
|
|
|
log_debug(LD_CIRC, "one on the way!");
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!circ) {
|
2005-06-29 23:46:55 +02:00
|
|
|
extend_info_t *extend_info=NULL;
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
uint8_t new_circ_purpose;
|
|
|
|
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (desired_circuit_purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT) {
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
/* need to pick an intro point */
|
2008-09-24 16:44:29 +02:00
|
|
|
tor_assert(conn->rend_data);
|
|
|
|
extend_info = rend_client_get_random_intro(conn->rend_data);
|
2005-06-29 23:46:55 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!extend_info) {
|
2006-02-13 09:28:42 +01:00
|
|
|
log_info(LD_REND,
|
2009-05-27 23:55:51 +02:00
|
|
|
"No intro points for '%s': re-fetching service descriptor.",
|
2008-09-24 16:44:29 +02:00
|
|
|
safe_str(conn->rend_data->onion_address));
|
|
|
|
/* Fetch both, v0 and v2 rend descriptors in parallel. Use whichever
|
|
|
|
* arrives first. Exception: When using client authorization, only
|
|
|
|
* fetch v2 descriptors.*/
|
|
|
|
rend_client_refetch_v2_renddesc(conn->rend_data);
|
|
|
|
if (conn->rend_data->auth_type == REND_NO_AUTH)
|
|
|
|
rend_client_refetch_renddesc(conn->rend_data->onion_address);
|
2006-07-26 21:07:26 +02:00
|
|
|
conn->_base.state = AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT;
|
2005-01-20 00:15:59 +01:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2006-02-13 09:28:42 +01:00
|
|
|
log_info(LD_REND,"Chose '%s' as intro point for '%s'.",
|
2008-09-24 16:44:29 +02:00
|
|
|
extend_info->nickname,
|
|
|
|
safe_str(conn->rend_data->onion_address));
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2004-11-29 09:34:54 +01:00
|
|
|
/* If we have specified a particular exit node for our
|
|
|
|
* connection, then be sure to open a circuit to that exit node.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2004-11-30 03:26:41 +01:00
|
|
|
if (desired_circuit_purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL) {
|
2004-11-29 09:34:54 +01:00
|
|
|
if (conn->chosen_exit_name) {
|
2005-06-29 23:46:55 +02:00
|
|
|
routerinfo_t *r;
|
2008-12-17 15:59:28 +01:00
|
|
|
int opt = conn->chosen_exit_optional;
|
2007-01-27 20:29:16 +01:00
|
|
|
r = router_get_by_nickname(conn->chosen_exit_name, 1);
|
|
|
|
if (r) {
|
|
|
|
extend_info = extend_info_from_router(r);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2007-03-01 04:56:21 +01:00
|
|
|
log_debug(LD_DIR, "considering %d, %s",
|
|
|
|
want_onehop, conn->chosen_exit_name);
|
2007-01-27 20:29:16 +01:00
|
|
|
if (want_onehop && conn->chosen_exit_name[0] == '$') {
|
|
|
|
/* We're asking for a one-hop circuit to a router that
|
2007-06-12 11:17:23 +02:00
|
|
|
* we don't have a routerinfo about. Make up an extend_info. */
|
|
|
|
char digest[DIGEST_LEN];
|
|
|
|
char *hexdigest = conn->chosen_exit_name+1;
|
2008-08-05 22:08:19 +02:00
|
|
|
tor_addr_t addr;
|
2007-06-12 11:17:23 +02:00
|
|
|
if (strlen(hexdigest) < HEX_DIGEST_LEN ||
|
|
|
|
base16_decode(digest,DIGEST_LEN,hexdigest,HEX_DIGEST_LEN)<0) {
|
|
|
|
log_info(LD_DIR, "Broken exit digest on tunnel conn. Closing.");
|
2007-01-27 20:29:16 +01:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2008-08-05 22:08:19 +02:00
|
|
|
if (tor_addr_from_str(&addr, conn->socks_request->address) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
log_info(LD_DIR, "Broken address %s on tunnel conn. Closing.",
|
|
|
|
escaped_safe_str(conn->socks_request->address));
|
2007-06-12 11:17:23 +02:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
extend_info = extend_info_alloc(conn->chosen_exit_name+1,
|
2008-08-05 22:08:19 +02:00
|
|
|
digest, NULL, &addr,
|
2007-06-12 11:17:23 +02:00
|
|
|
conn->socks_request->port);
|
2007-01-27 20:29:16 +01:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/* We will need an onion key for the router, and we
|
|
|
|
* don't have one. Refuse or relax requirements. */
|
|
|
|
log_fn(opt ? LOG_INFO : LOG_WARN, LD_APP,
|
|
|
|
"Requested exit point '%s' is not known. %s.",
|
|
|
|
conn->chosen_exit_name, opt ? "Trying others" : "Closing");
|
|
|
|
if (opt) {
|
2008-12-17 15:59:28 +01:00
|
|
|
conn->chosen_exit_optional = 0;
|
2007-01-27 20:29:16 +01:00
|
|
|
tor_free(conn->chosen_exit_name);
|
2009-02-09 17:55:48 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Try again with no requested exit */
|
|
|
|
return circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch(conn,
|
|
|
|
desired_circuit_purpose,
|
|
|
|
circp);
|
2007-01-27 20:29:16 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2006-07-18 02:59:46 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2004-11-29 09:34:54 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (desired_circuit_purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED)
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
new_circ_purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND;
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
else if (desired_circuit_purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT)
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
new_circ_purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING;
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
new_circ_purpose = desired_circuit_purpose;
|
|
|
|
|
2007-12-23 20:15:22 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int flags = CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_CAPACITY;
|
|
|
|
if (want_onehop) flags |= CIRCLAUNCH_ONEHOP_TUNNEL;
|
|
|
|
if (need_uptime) flags |= CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_UPTIME;
|
|
|
|
if (need_internal) flags |= CIRCLAUNCH_IS_INTERNAL;
|
|
|
|
circ = circuit_launch_by_extend_info(new_circ_purpose, extend_info,
|
|
|
|
flags);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-06-29 23:46:55 +02:00
|
|
|
if (extend_info)
|
|
|
|
extend_info_free(extend_info);
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard
to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must
be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect
streams can use internal circs if they want.
New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around
to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal
circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime
if we've seen that lately).
Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs),
which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones
are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long
we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit.
Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as
long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web
browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.)
Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND
circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when
we try to launch one.
Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since
there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching
over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete.
Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take
into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses --
it won't.
Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when
it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which
means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken.
svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
|
|
|
if (desired_circuit_purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL) {
|
|
|
|
/* help predict this next time */
|
2005-11-25 09:08:56 +01:00
|
|
|
rep_hist_note_used_internal(time(NULL), need_uptime, 1);
|
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard
to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must
be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect
streams can use internal circs if they want.
New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around
to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal
circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime
if we've seen that lately).
Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs),
which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones
are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long
we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit.
Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as
long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web
browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.)
Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND
circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when
we try to launch one.
Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since
there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching
over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete.
Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take
into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses --
it won't.
Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when
it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which
means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken.
svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
|
|
|
if (circ) {
|
|
|
|
/* write the service_id into circ */
|
2008-09-24 16:44:29 +02:00
|
|
|
circ->rend_data = rend_data_dup(conn->rend_data);
|
2006-07-23 09:37:35 +02:00
|
|
|
if (circ->_base.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND &&
|
|
|
|
circ->_base.state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN)
|
2005-08-12 03:26:21 +02:00
|
|
|
rend_client_rendcirc_has_opened(circ);
|
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard
to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must
be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect
streams can use internal circs if they want.
New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around
to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal
circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime
if we've seen that lately).
Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs),
which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones
are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long
we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit.
Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as
long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web
browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.)
Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND
circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when
we try to launch one.
Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since
there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching
over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete.
Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take
into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses --
it won't.
Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when
it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which
means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken.
svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!circ)
|
2006-02-13 09:28:42 +01:00
|
|
|
log_info(LD_APP,
|
|
|
|
"No safe circuit (purpose %d) ready for edge "
|
|
|
|
"connection; delaying.",
|
|
|
|
desired_circuit_purpose);
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
*circp = circ;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2007-04-30 16:09:11 +02:00
|
|
|
/** Return true iff <b>crypt_path</b> is one of the crypt_paths for
|
2007-05-02 11:12:04 +02:00
|
|
|
* <b>circ</b>. */
|
2007-04-30 16:09:11 +02:00
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
cpath_is_on_circuit(origin_circuit_t *circ, crypt_path_t *crypt_path)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
crypt_path_t *cpath, *cpath_next = NULL;
|
|
|
|
for (cpath = circ->cpath; cpath_next != circ->cpath; cpath = cpath_next) {
|
|
|
|
cpath_next = cpath->next;
|
|
|
|
if (crypt_path == cpath)
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
/** Attach the AP stream <b>apconn</b> to circ's linked list of
|
2007-04-30 16:09:11 +02:00
|
|
|
* p_streams. Also set apconn's cpath_layer to <b>cpath</b>, or to the last
|
|
|
|
* hop in circ's cpath if <b>cpath</b> is NULL.
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2005-06-11 20:52:12 +02:00
|
|
|
static void
|
2007-04-30 13:10:45 +02:00
|
|
|
link_apconn_to_circ(edge_connection_t *apconn, origin_circuit_t *circ,
|
|
|
|
crypt_path_t *cpath)
|
2005-06-11 20:52:12 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
/* add it into the linked list of streams on this circuit */
|
2006-02-13 09:28:42 +01:00
|
|
|
log_debug(LD_APP|LD_CIRC, "attaching new conn to circ. n_circ_id %d.",
|
2006-07-23 09:37:35 +02:00
|
|
|
circ->_base.n_circ_id);
|
2005-12-14 21:40:40 +01:00
|
|
|
/* reset it, so we can measure circ timeouts */
|
2006-07-26 21:07:26 +02:00
|
|
|
apconn->_base.timestamp_lastread = time(NULL);
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
apconn->next_stream = circ->p_streams;
|
2006-07-23 09:37:35 +02:00
|
|
|
apconn->on_circuit = TO_CIRCUIT(circ);
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
/* assert_connection_ok(conn, time(NULL)); */
|
|
|
|
circ->p_streams = apconn;
|
|
|
|
|
2007-04-30 13:10:45 +02:00
|
|
|
if (cpath) { /* we were given one; use it */
|
2007-04-30 16:09:11 +02:00
|
|
|
tor_assert(cpath_is_on_circuit(circ, cpath));
|
2007-04-30 13:10:45 +02:00
|
|
|
apconn->cpath_layer = cpath;
|
|
|
|
} else { /* use the last hop in the circuit */
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(circ->cpath);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(circ->cpath->prev);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(circ->cpath->prev->state == CPATH_STATE_OPEN);
|
|
|
|
apconn->cpath_layer = circ->cpath->prev;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2005-02-22 01:53:08 +01:00
|
|
|
/** If an exit wasn't specifically chosen, save the history for future
|
2005-12-04 22:51:50 +01:00
|
|
|
* use. */
|
2005-02-22 01:53:08 +01:00
|
|
|
static void
|
2006-07-26 21:07:26 +02:00
|
|
|
consider_recording_trackhost(edge_connection_t *conn, origin_circuit_t *circ)
|
2005-06-11 20:52:12 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2005-02-22 01:53:08 +01:00
|
|
|
int found_needle = 0;
|
|
|
|
or_options_t *options = get_options();
|
|
|
|
size_t len;
|
|
|
|
char *new_address;
|
2005-12-05 01:15:42 +01:00
|
|
|
char fp[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
|
2005-02-22 01:53:08 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Search the addressmap for this conn's destination. */
|
|
|
|
/* If he's not in the address map.. */
|
|
|
|
if (!options->TrackHostExits ||
|
2008-09-29 16:53:53 +02:00
|
|
|
addressmap_have_mapping(conn->socks_request->address,
|
|
|
|
options->TrackHostExitsExpire))
|
2005-02-22 01:53:08 +01:00
|
|
|
return; /* nothing to track, or already mapped */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(options->TrackHostExits, const char *, cp, {
|
|
|
|
if (cp[0] == '.') { /* match end */
|
2008-02-21 09:08:13 +01:00
|
|
|
if (cp[1] == '\0' ||
|
|
|
|
!strcasecmpend(conn->socks_request->address, cp) ||
|
2006-10-03 21:00:12 +02:00
|
|
|
!strcasecmp(conn->socks_request->address, &cp[1]))
|
2005-02-22 01:53:08 +01:00
|
|
|
found_needle = 1;
|
2006-10-03 00:13:37 +02:00
|
|
|
} else if (strcasecmp(cp, conn->socks_request->address) == 0) {
|
2005-02-22 01:53:08 +01:00
|
|
|
found_needle = 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
|
2005-06-29 23:46:55 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!found_needle || !circ->build_state->chosen_exit)
|
2005-02-22 01:53:08 +01:00
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
2005-12-05 01:15:42 +01:00
|
|
|
/* write down the fingerprint of the chosen exit, not the nickname,
|
2006-03-19 02:21:59 +01:00
|
|
|
* because the chosen exit might not be named. */
|
2005-12-05 01:15:42 +01:00
|
|
|
base16_encode(fp, sizeof(fp),
|
|
|
|
circ->build_state->chosen_exit->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
|
|
|
2005-02-22 01:53:08 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Add this exit/hostname pair to the addressmap. */
|
|
|
|
len = strlen(conn->socks_request->address) + 1 /* '.' */ +
|
2005-12-05 01:15:42 +01:00
|
|
|
strlen(fp) + 1 /* '.' */ +
|
2005-02-22 01:53:08 +01:00
|
|
|
strlen("exit") + 1 /* '\0' */;
|
|
|
|
new_address = tor_malloc(len);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tor_snprintf(new_address, len, "%s.%s.exit",
|
2005-12-05 01:15:42 +01:00
|
|
|
conn->socks_request->address, fp);
|
2005-02-22 01:53:08 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
addressmap_register(conn->socks_request->address, new_address,
|
2008-02-21 19:45:11 +01:00
|
|
|
time(NULL) + options->TrackHostExitsExpire,
|
|
|
|
ADDRMAPSRC_TRACKEXIT);
|
2005-02-22 01:53:08 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2007-04-30 16:09:11 +02:00
|
|
|
/** Attempt to attach the connection <b>conn</b> to <b>circ</b>, and send a
|
|
|
|
* begin or resolve cell as appropriate. Return values are as for
|
|
|
|
* connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit. The stream will exit from the hop
|
2007-05-01 01:24:38 +02:00
|
|
|
* indicated by <b>cpath</b>, or from the last hop in circ's cpath if
|
2007-04-30 16:09:11 +02:00
|
|
|
* <b>cpath</b> is NULL. */
|
2005-03-12 05:22:01 +01:00
|
|
|
int
|
2006-07-26 21:07:26 +02:00
|
|
|
connection_ap_handshake_attach_chosen_circuit(edge_connection_t *conn,
|
2007-04-30 13:10:45 +02:00
|
|
|
origin_circuit_t *circ,
|
|
|
|
crypt_path_t *cpath)
|
2005-03-12 05:22:01 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(conn);
|
2006-07-26 21:07:26 +02:00
|
|
|
tor_assert(conn->_base.state == AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT ||
|
|
|
|
conn->_base.state == AP_CONN_STATE_CONTROLLER_WAIT);
|
2005-03-12 05:22:01 +01:00
|
|
|
tor_assert(conn->socks_request);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(circ);
|
2006-07-23 09:37:35 +02:00
|
|
|
tor_assert(circ->_base.state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN);
|
2005-03-24 07:05:14 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2006-07-26 21:07:26 +02:00
|
|
|
conn->_base.state = AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT;
|
2005-03-12 05:22:01 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2006-07-23 09:37:35 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!circ->_base.timestamp_dirty)
|
|
|
|
circ->_base.timestamp_dirty = time(NULL);
|
2005-03-12 05:22:01 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2007-04-30 13:10:45 +02:00
|
|
|
link_apconn_to_circ(conn, circ, cpath);
|
2005-03-12 05:22:01 +01:00
|
|
|
tor_assert(conn->socks_request);
|
2007-10-28 09:16:19 +01:00
|
|
|
if (conn->socks_request->command == SOCKS_COMMAND_CONNECT) {
|
|
|
|
if (!conn->use_begindir)
|
2006-12-13 01:28:56 +01:00
|
|
|
consider_recording_trackhost(conn, circ);
|
2007-10-28 09:16:19 +01:00
|
|
|
if (connection_ap_handshake_send_begin(conn) < 0)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
if (connection_ap_handshake_send_resolve(conn) < 0)
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2005-03-12 05:22:01 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
/** Try to find a safe live circuit for CONN_TYPE_AP connection conn. If
|
|
|
|
* we don't find one: if conn cannot be handled by any known nodes,
|
2008-03-17 04:37:54 +01:00
|
|
|
* warn and return -1 (conn needs to die, and is maybe already marked);
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
* else launch new circuit (if necessary) and return 0.
|
|
|
|
* Otherwise, associate conn with a safe live circuit, do the
|
|
|
|
* right next step, and return 1.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2008-12-18 17:11:24 +01:00
|
|
|
/* XXXX this function should mark for close whenever it returns -1;
|
2008-03-17 04:37:54 +01:00
|
|
|
* its callers shouldn't have to worry about that. */
|
2005-06-11 20:52:12 +02:00
|
|
|
int
|
2006-07-26 21:07:26 +02:00
|
|
|
connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit(edge_connection_t *conn)
|
2005-06-11 20:52:12 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
int retval;
|
|
|
|
int conn_age;
|
2007-03-01 04:56:21 +01:00
|
|
|
int want_onehop;
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(conn);
|
2006-07-26 21:07:26 +02:00
|
|
|
tor_assert(conn->_base.state == AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT);
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
tor_assert(conn->socks_request);
|
2007-10-28 09:16:19 +01:00
|
|
|
want_onehop = conn->want_onehop;
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2008-02-22 04:44:36 +01:00
|
|
|
conn_age = (int)(time(NULL) - conn->_base.timestamp_created);
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2007-08-19 09:17:40 +02:00
|
|
|
if (conn_age >= get_options()->SocksTimeout) {
|
2008-08-05 22:08:19 +02:00
|
|
|
int severity = (tor_addr_is_null(&conn->_base.addr) && !conn->_base.port) ?
|
|
|
|
LOG_INFO : LOG_NOTICE;
|
2007-08-19 09:17:40 +02:00
|
|
|
log_fn(severity, LD_APP,
|
|
|
|
"Tried for %d seconds to get a connection to %s:%d. Giving up.",
|
|
|
|
conn_age, safe_str(conn->socks_request->address),
|
|
|
|
conn->socks_request->port);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!connection_edge_is_rendezvous_stream(conn)) { /* we're a general conn */
|
2006-07-23 09:37:35 +02:00
|
|
|
origin_circuit_t *circ=NULL;
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2004-11-30 09:39:14 +01:00
|
|
|
if (conn->chosen_exit_name) {
|
2005-10-05 00:23:31 +02:00
|
|
|
routerinfo_t *router = router_get_by_nickname(conn->chosen_exit_name, 1);
|
2008-12-17 15:59:28 +01:00
|
|
|
int opt = conn->chosen_exit_optional;
|
2007-03-01 04:56:21 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!router && !want_onehop) {
|
2008-09-09 10:41:58 +02:00
|
|
|
/* We ran into this warning when trying to extend a circuit to a
|
|
|
|
* hidden service directory for which we didn't have a router
|
|
|
|
* descriptor. See flyspray task 767 for more details. We should
|
|
|
|
* keep this in mind when deciding to use BEGIN_DIR cells for other
|
|
|
|
* directory requests as well. -KL*/
|
2006-07-18 02:59:46 +02:00
|
|
|
log_fn(opt ? LOG_INFO : LOG_WARN, LD_APP,
|
|
|
|
"Requested exit point '%s' is not known. %s.",
|
|
|
|
conn->chosen_exit_name, opt ? "Trying others" : "Closing");
|
|
|
|
if (opt) {
|
2008-12-17 15:59:28 +01:00
|
|
|
conn->chosen_exit_optional = 0;
|
2006-07-18 02:59:46 +02:00
|
|
|
tor_free(conn->chosen_exit_name);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2004-11-30 09:39:14 +01:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2007-03-01 04:56:21 +01:00
|
|
|
if (router && !connection_ap_can_use_exit(conn, router)) {
|
2006-07-18 02:59:46 +02:00
|
|
|
log_fn(opt ? LOG_INFO : LOG_WARN, LD_APP,
|
|
|
|
"Requested exit point '%s' would refuse request. %s.",
|
|
|
|
conn->chosen_exit_name, opt ? "Trying others" : "Closing");
|
|
|
|
if (opt) {
|
2008-12-17 15:59:28 +01:00
|
|
|
conn->chosen_exit_optional = 0;
|
2006-07-18 02:59:46 +02:00
|
|
|
tor_free(conn->chosen_exit_name);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2004-11-30 09:39:14 +01:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
/* find the circuit that we should use, if there is one. */
|
2005-12-14 21:40:40 +01:00
|
|
|
retval = circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch(
|
|
|
|
conn, CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL, &circ);
|
2008-06-20 05:13:16 +02:00
|
|
|
if (retval < 1) // XXX021 if we totally fail, this still returns 0 -RD
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
return retval;
|
|
|
|
|
2006-02-13 09:28:42 +01:00
|
|
|
log_debug(LD_APP|LD_CIRC,
|
|
|
|
"Attaching apconn to circ %d (stream %d sec old).",
|
2006-07-23 09:37:35 +02:00
|
|
|
circ->_base.n_circ_id, conn_age);
|
2007-10-28 09:16:19 +01:00
|
|
|
/* print the circ's path, so people can figure out which circs are
|
2005-12-14 21:40:40 +01:00
|
|
|
* sucking. */
|
2005-10-25 09:04:36 +02:00
|
|
|
circuit_log_path(LOG_INFO,LD_APP|LD_CIRC,circ);
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2005-03-12 05:22:01 +01:00
|
|
|
/* We have found a suitable circuit for our conn. Hurray. */
|
2007-04-30 13:10:45 +02:00
|
|
|
return connection_ap_handshake_attach_chosen_circuit(conn, circ, NULL);
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} else { /* we're a rendezvous conn */
|
2006-07-23 09:37:35 +02:00
|
|
|
origin_circuit_t *rendcirc=NULL, *introcirc=NULL;
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(!conn->cpath_layer);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* start by finding a rendezvous circuit for us */
|
|
|
|
|
2005-12-14 21:40:40 +01:00
|
|
|
retval = circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch(
|
|
|
|
conn, CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED, &rendcirc);
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (retval < 0) return -1; /* failed */
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (retval > 0) {
|
2004-10-12 00:19:12 +02:00
|
|
|
tor_assert(rendcirc);
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
/* one is already established, attach */
|
2006-02-13 09:28:42 +01:00
|
|
|
log_info(LD_REND,
|
|
|
|
"rend joined circ %d already here. attaching. "
|
|
|
|
"(stream %d sec old)",
|
2006-07-23 09:37:35 +02:00
|
|
|
rendcirc->_base.n_circ_id, conn_age);
|
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard
to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must
be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect
streams can use internal circs if they want.
New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around
to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal
circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime
if we've seen that lately).
Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs),
which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones
are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long
we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit.
Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as
long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web
browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.)
Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND
circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when
we try to launch one.
Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since
there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching
over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete.
Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take
into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses --
it won't.
Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when
it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which
means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken.
svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Mark rendezvous circuits as 'newly dirty' every time you use
|
|
|
|
* them, since the process of rebuilding a rendezvous circ is so
|
2009-05-27 23:55:51 +02:00
|
|
|
* expensive. There is a tradeoff between linkability and
|
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard
to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must
be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect
streams can use internal circs if they want.
New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around
to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal
circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime
if we've seen that lately).
Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs),
which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones
are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long
we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit.
Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as
long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web
browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.)
Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND
circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when
we try to launch one.
Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since
there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching
over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete.
Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take
into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses --
it won't.
Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when
it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which
means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken.
svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
|
|
|
* feasibility, at this point.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2006-07-23 09:37:35 +02:00
|
|
|
rendcirc->_base.timestamp_dirty = time(NULL);
|
2007-04-30 13:10:45 +02:00
|
|
|
link_apconn_to_circ(conn, rendcirc, NULL);
|
2007-03-24 16:58:11 +01:00
|
|
|
if (connection_ap_handshake_send_begin(conn) < 0)
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
return 0; /* already marked, let them fade away */
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2006-07-23 09:37:35 +02:00
|
|
|
if (rendcirc && (rendcirc->_base.purpose ==
|
2005-12-14 21:40:40 +01:00
|
|
|
CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED)) {
|
2006-02-13 09:28:42 +01:00
|
|
|
log_info(LD_REND,
|
|
|
|
"pending-join circ %d already here, with intro ack. "
|
|
|
|
"Stalling. (stream %d sec old)",
|
2006-07-23 09:37:35 +02:00
|
|
|
rendcirc->_base.n_circ_id, conn_age);
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* it's on its way. find an intro circ. */
|
2005-12-14 21:40:40 +01:00
|
|
|
retval = circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch(
|
|
|
|
conn, CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT, &introcirc);
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (retval < 0) return -1; /* failed */
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (retval > 0) {
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
/* one has already sent the intro. keep waiting. */
|
2008-10-15 20:52:06 +02:00
|
|
|
circuit_t *c = NULL;
|
2004-10-12 00:19:12 +02:00
|
|
|
tor_assert(introcirc);
|
2006-02-13 09:28:42 +01:00
|
|
|
log_info(LD_REND, "Intro circ %d present and awaiting ack (rend %d). "
|
|
|
|
"Stalling. (stream %d sec old)",
|
2006-07-23 09:37:35 +02:00
|
|
|
introcirc->_base.n_circ_id,
|
|
|
|
rendcirc ? rendcirc->_base.n_circ_id : 0,
|
2006-02-13 09:28:42 +01:00
|
|
|
conn_age);
|
2008-10-15 20:52:06 +02:00
|
|
|
/* abort parallel intro circs, if any */
|
|
|
|
for (c = global_circuitlist; c; c = c->next) {
|
|
|
|
if (c->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING &&
|
2008-11-01 21:27:41 +01:00
|
|
|
!c->marked_for_close && CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(c)) {
|
2008-10-15 20:52:06 +02:00
|
|
|
origin_circuit_t *oc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(c);
|
|
|
|
if (oc->rend_data &&
|
|
|
|
!rend_cmp_service_ids(conn->rend_data->onion_address,
|
|
|
|
oc->rend_data->onion_address)) {
|
|
|
|
log_info(LD_REND|LD_CIRC, "Closing introduction circuit that we "
|
|
|
|
"built in parallel.");
|
|
|
|
circuit_mark_for_close(c, END_CIRC_REASON_TIMEOUT);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2004-10-12 00:19:12 +02:00
|
|
|
/* now rendcirc and introcirc are each either undefined or not finished */
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2005-12-14 21:40:40 +01:00
|
|
|
if (rendcirc && introcirc &&
|
2006-07-23 09:37:35 +02:00
|
|
|
rendcirc->_base.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY) {
|
2006-02-13 09:28:42 +01:00
|
|
|
log_info(LD_REND,
|
|
|
|
"ready rend circ %d already here (no intro-ack yet on "
|
|
|
|
"intro %d). (stream %d sec old)",
|
2006-07-23 09:37:35 +02:00
|
|
|
rendcirc->_base.n_circ_id,
|
|
|
|
introcirc->_base.n_circ_id, conn_age);
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2006-07-23 09:37:35 +02:00
|
|
|
tor_assert(introcirc->_base.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING);
|
|
|
|
if (introcirc->_base.state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN) {
|
2006-02-13 09:28:42 +01:00
|
|
|
log_info(LD_REND,"found open intro circ %d (rend %d); sending "
|
|
|
|
"introduction. (stream %d sec old)",
|
2006-07-23 09:37:35 +02:00
|
|
|
introcirc->_base.n_circ_id, rendcirc->_base.n_circ_id,
|
|
|
|
conn_age);
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (rend_client_send_introduction(introcirc, rendcirc) < 0) {
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2006-07-23 09:37:35 +02:00
|
|
|
rendcirc->_base.timestamp_dirty = time(NULL);
|
|
|
|
introcirc->_base.timestamp_dirty = time(NULL);
|
|
|
|
assert_circuit_ok(TO_CIRCUIT(rendcirc));
|
|
|
|
assert_circuit_ok(TO_CIRCUIT(introcirc));
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2006-02-13 09:28:42 +01:00
|
|
|
log_info(LD_REND, "Intro (%d) and rend (%d) circs are not both ready. "
|
|
|
|
"Stalling conn. (%d sec old)",
|
2006-07-23 09:37:35 +02:00
|
|
|
introcirc ? introcirc->_base.n_circ_id : 0,
|
|
|
|
rendcirc ? rendcirc->_base.n_circ_id : 0, conn_age);
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-06-09 21:03:31 +02:00
|
|
|
|