tor/src/or/circuitbuild.c

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2006-02-09 06:46:49 +01:00
/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
* Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
* Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. */
/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
/* $Id$ */
const char circuitbuild_c_id[] =
"$Id$";
/**
* \file circuitbuild.c
* \brief The actual details of building circuits.
**/
#include "or.h"
/********* START VARIABLES **********/
/** A global list of all circuits at this hop. */
extern circuit_t *global_circuitlist;
/** An entry_guard_t represents our information about a chosen long-term
* first hop, known as a "helper" node in the literature. We can't just
* use a routerinfo_t, since we want to remember these even when we
* don't have a directory. */
typedef struct {
char nickname[MAX_NICKNAME_LEN+1];
char identity[DIGEST_LEN];
uint8_t made_contact; /**< 0 if we have never connected to this router,
* 1 if we have. */
time_t down_since; /**< 0 if this router is currently up, or the time at
* which it was observed to go down. */
time_t unlisted_since; /**< 0 if this router is currently listed, or the
* time at which it became unlisted */
} entry_guard_t;
/** A list of our chosen entry guards. */
static smartlist_t *entry_guards = NULL;
/** A value of 1 means that the entry_guards list has changed
* and those changes need to be flushed to disk. */
static int entry_guards_dirty = 0;
/********* END VARIABLES ************/
static int circuit_deliver_create_cell(circuit_t *circ,
uint8_t cell_type, char *payload);
static int onion_pick_cpath_exit(circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *exit);
static crypt_path_t *onion_next_hop_in_cpath(crypt_path_t *cpath);
static int onion_extend_cpath(uint8_t purpose, crypt_path_t **head_ptr,
cpath_build_state_t *state);
static int count_acceptable_routers(smartlist_t *routers);
static int onion_append_hop(crypt_path_t **head_ptr, extend_info_t *choice);
static routerinfo_t *choose_random_entry(cpath_build_state_t *state);
static void entry_guards_changed(void);
/** Iterate over values of circ_id, starting from conn-\>next_circ_id,
* and with the high bit specified by circ_id_type (see
* decide_circ_id_type()), until we get a circ_id that is not in use
* by any other circuit on that conn.
*
* Return it, or 0 if can't get a unique circ_id.
*/
static uint16_t
get_unique_circ_id_by_conn(connection_t *conn)
{
uint16_t test_circ_id;
uint16_t attempts=0;
uint16_t high_bit;
tor_assert(conn);
tor_assert(conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR);
high_bit = (conn->circ_id_type == CIRC_ID_TYPE_HIGHER) ? 1<<15 : 0;
do {
/* Sequentially iterate over test_circ_id=1...1<<15-1 until we find a
* circID such that (high_bit|test_circ_id) is not already used. */
test_circ_id = conn->next_circ_id++;
if (test_circ_id == 0 || test_circ_id >= 1<<15) {
test_circ_id = 1;
conn->next_circ_id = 2;
}
if (++attempts > 1<<15) {
/* Make sure we don't loop forever if all circ_id's are used. This
2005-10-17 10:41:58 +02:00
* matters because it's an external DoS opportunity.
*/
log_warn(LD_CIRC,"No unused circ IDs. Failing.");
return 0;
}
test_circ_id |= high_bit;
} while (circuit_id_used_on_conn(test_circ_id, conn));
return test_circ_id;
}
/** If <b>verbose</b> is false, allocate and return a comma-separated
* list of the currently built elements of circuit_t. If
* <b>verbose</b> is true, also list information about link status in
* a more verbose format using spaces.
*/
char *
circuit_list_path(circuit_t *circ, int verbose)
{
crypt_path_t *hop;
smartlist_t *elements;
const char *states[] = {"closed", "waiting for keys", "open"};
char buf[128];
char *s;
tor_assert(CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ));
elements = smartlist_create();
if (verbose) {
const char *nickname = build_state_get_exit_nickname(circ->build_state);
tor_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s%s circ (length %d%s%s):",
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect streams can use internal circs if they want. New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime if we've seen that lately). Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs), which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit. Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.) Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when we try to launch one. Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete. Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses -- it won't. Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken. svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
circ->build_state->is_internal ? "internal" : "exit",
circ->build_state->need_uptime ? " (high-uptime)" : "",
circ->build_state->desired_path_len,
circ->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN ? "" : ", exit ",
circ->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN ? "" :
(nickname?nickname:"*unnamed*"));
smartlist_add(elements, tor_strdup(buf));
}
hop = circ->cpath;
do {
const char *elt;
if (!hop)
break;
if (!verbose && hop->state != CPATH_STATE_OPEN)
break;
if (!hop->extend_info)
break;
elt = hop->extend_info->nickname;
tor_assert(elt);
if (verbose) {
size_t len = strlen(elt)+2+strlen(states[hop->state])+1;
char *v = tor_malloc(len);
tor_assert(hop->state <= 2);
tor_snprintf(v,len,"%s(%s)",elt,states[hop->state]);
smartlist_add(elements, v);
} else {
smartlist_add(elements, tor_strdup(elt));
}
hop = hop->next;
} while (hop != circ->cpath);
s = smartlist_join_strings(elements, verbose?" ":",", 0, NULL);
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(elements, char*, cp, tor_free(cp));
smartlist_free(elements);
return s;
}
/** Log, at severity <b>severity</b>, the nicknames of each router in
* circ's cpath. Also log the length of the cpath, and the intended
* exit point.
*/
void
circuit_log_path(int severity, unsigned int domain, circuit_t *circ)
{
char *s = circuit_list_path(circ,1);
log(severity,domain,"%s",s);
tor_free(s);
}
/** Tell the rep(utation)hist(ory) module about the status of the links
* in circ. Hops that have become OPEN are marked as successfully
* extended; the _first_ hop that isn't open (if any) is marked as
* unable to extend.
*/
void
circuit_rep_hist_note_result(circuit_t *circ)
{
crypt_path_t *hop;
char *prev_digest = NULL;
routerinfo_t *router;
hop = circ->cpath;
if (!hop) {
/* XXX
* if !hop, then we're not the beginning of this circuit.
* for now, just forget about it. later, we should remember when
* extends-through-us failed, too.
*/
return;
}
if (server_mode(get_options())) {
routerinfo_t *me = router_get_my_routerinfo();
tor_assert(me);
prev_digest = me->cache_info.identity_digest;
}
do {
router = router_get_by_digest(hop->extend_info->identity_digest);
if (router) {
if (prev_digest) {
if (hop->state == CPATH_STATE_OPEN)
rep_hist_note_extend_succeeded(prev_digest,
router->cache_info.identity_digest);
else {
rep_hist_note_extend_failed(prev_digest,
router->cache_info.identity_digest);
break;
}
}
prev_digest = router->cache_info.identity_digest;
} else {
prev_digest = NULL;
}
hop=hop->next;
} while (hop!=circ->cpath);
}
/** A helper function for circuit_dump_by_conn() below. Log a bunch
* of information about circuit <b>circ</b>.
*/
static void
circuit_dump_details(int severity, circuit_t *circ, int poll_index,
const char *type, int this_circid, int other_circid)
{
log(severity, LD_CIRC, "Conn %d has %s circuit: circID %d (other side %d), "
"state %d (%s), born %d:",
poll_index, type, this_circid, other_circid, circ->state,
circuit_state_to_string(circ->state), (int)circ->timestamp_created);
if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) { /* circ starts at this node */
circuit_log_path(severity, LD_CIRC, circ);
}
}
/** Log, at severity <b>severity</b>, information about each circuit
* that is connected to <b>conn</b>.
*/
void
circuit_dump_by_conn(connection_t *conn, int severity)
{
circuit_t *circ;
connection_t *tmpconn;
for (circ=global_circuitlist;circ;circ = circ->next) {
if (circ->marked_for_close)
continue;
if (circ->p_conn == conn)
circuit_dump_details(severity, circ, conn->poll_index, "App-ward",
circ->p_circ_id, circ->n_circ_id);
for (tmpconn=circ->p_streams; tmpconn; tmpconn=tmpconn->next_stream) {
if (tmpconn == conn) {
circuit_dump_details(severity, circ, conn->poll_index, "App-ward",
circ->p_circ_id, circ->n_circ_id);
}
}
if (circ->n_conn == conn)
circuit_dump_details(severity, circ, conn->poll_index, "Exit-ward",
circ->n_circ_id, circ->p_circ_id);
for (tmpconn=circ->n_streams; tmpconn; tmpconn=tmpconn->next_stream) {
if (tmpconn == conn) {
circuit_dump_details(severity, circ, conn->poll_index, "Exit-ward",
circ->n_circ_id, circ->p_circ_id);
}
}
if (!circ->n_conn && circ->n_addr && circ->n_port &&
circ->n_addr == conn->addr &&
circ->n_port == conn->port &&
!memcmp(conn->identity_digest, circ->n_conn_id_digest, DIGEST_LEN)) {
circuit_dump_details(severity, circ, conn->poll_index,
(circ->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN &&
!CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) ?
"Endpoint" : "Pending",
circ->n_circ_id, circ->p_circ_id);
}
}
}
/** Pick all the entries in our cpath. Stop and return 0 when we're
* happy, or return -1 if an error occurs. */
static int
onion_populate_cpath(circuit_t *circ)
{
int r;
again:
r = onion_extend_cpath(circ->purpose, &circ->cpath, circ->build_state);
// || !CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) { // wtf? -rd
if (r < 0) {
log_info(LD_CIRC,"Generating cpath hop failed.");
return -1;
}
if (r == 0)
goto again;
return 0; /* if r == 1 */
}
/** Create and return a new circuit. Initialize its purpose and
* build-state based on our arguments. */
circuit_t *
circuit_init(uint8_t purpose, int need_uptime, int need_capacity, int internal)
{
/* sets circ->p_circ_id and circ->p_conn */
circuit_t *circ = circuit_new(0, NULL);
circuit_set_state(circ, CIRCUIT_STATE_OR_WAIT);
circ->build_state = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(cpath_build_state_t));
circ->build_state->need_uptime = need_uptime;
circ->build_state->need_capacity = need_capacity;
circ->build_state->is_internal = internal;
circ->purpose = purpose;
return circ;
}
/** Build a new circuit for <b>purpose</b>. If <b>info/b>
* is defined, then use that as your exit router, else choose a suitable
* exit node.
*
* Also launch a connection to the first OR in the chosen path, if
* it's not open already.
*/
circuit_t *
circuit_establish_circuit(uint8_t purpose, extend_info_t *info,
int need_uptime, int need_capacity, int internal)
{
circuit_t *circ;
circ = circuit_init(purpose, need_uptime, need_capacity, internal);
if (onion_pick_cpath_exit(circ, info) < 0 ||
onion_populate_cpath(circ) < 0) {
circuit_mark_for_close(circ, END_CIRC_AT_ORIGIN);
return NULL;
}
control_event_circuit_status(circ, CIRC_EVENT_LAUNCHED);
if (circuit_handle_first_hop(circ) < 0) {
circuit_mark_for_close(circ, END_CIRC_AT_ORIGIN);
return NULL;
}
return circ;
}
/** Start establishing the first hop of our circuit. Figure out what
* OR we should connect to, and if necessary start the connection to
* it. If we're already connected, then send the 'create' cell.
* Return 0 for ok, -1 if circ should be marked-for-close. */
int
circuit_handle_first_hop(circuit_t *circ)
{
crypt_path_t *firsthop;
connection_t *n_conn;
char tmpbuf[INET_NTOA_BUF_LEN];
struct in_addr in;
firsthop = onion_next_hop_in_cpath(circ->cpath);
tor_assert(firsthop);
tor_assert(firsthop->extend_info);
/* now see if we're already connected to the first OR in 'route' */
in.s_addr = htonl(firsthop->extend_info->addr);
tor_inet_ntoa(&in, tmpbuf, sizeof(tmpbuf));
log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Looking for firsthop '%s:%u'",tmpbuf,
firsthop->extend_info->port);
/* imprint the circuit with its future n_conn->id */
memcpy(circ->n_conn_id_digest, firsthop->extend_info->identity_digest,
DIGEST_LEN);
n_conn = connection_or_get_by_identity_digest(
firsthop->extend_info->identity_digest);
/* If we don't have an open conn, or the conn we have is obsolete
* (i.e. old or broken) and the other side will let us make a second
* connection without dropping it immediately... */
if (!n_conn || n_conn->state != OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN ||
(n_conn->is_obsolete &&
router_digest_version_as_new_as(firsthop->extend_info->identity_digest,
"0.1.1.9-alpha-cvs"))) {
/* not currently connected */
circ->n_addr = firsthop->extend_info->addr;
circ->n_port = firsthop->extend_info->port;
if (!n_conn || n_conn->is_obsolete) { /* launch the connection */
n_conn = connection_or_connect(firsthop->extend_info->addr,
firsthop->extend_info->port,
firsthop->extend_info->identity_digest);
if (!n_conn) { /* connect failed, forget the whole thing */
log_info(LD_CIRC,"connect to firsthop failed. Closing.");
return -1;
}
}
log_debug(LD_CIRC,"connecting in progress (or finished). Good.");
/* return success. The onion/circuit/etc will be taken care of
* automatically (may already have been) whenever n_conn reaches
* OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN.
*/
return 0;
} else { /* it's already open. use it. */
circ->n_addr = n_conn->addr;
circ->n_port = n_conn->port;
circ->n_conn = n_conn;
log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Conn open. Delivering first onion skin.");
if (circuit_send_next_onion_skin(circ) < 0) {
log_info(LD_CIRC,"circuit_send_next_onion_skin failed.");
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
/** Find any circuits that are waiting on <b>or_conn</b> to become
* open and get them to send their create cells forward.
*
* Status is 1 if connect succeeded, or 0 if connect failed.
*/
void
circuit_n_conn_done(connection_t *or_conn, int status)
{
extern smartlist_t *circuits_pending_or_conns;
smartlist_t *changed_circs;
log_debug(LD_CIRC,"or_conn to %s, status=%d",
or_conn->nickname ? or_conn->nickname : "NULL", status);
if (!circuits_pending_or_conns)
return;
changed_circs = smartlist_create();
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(circuits_pending_or_conns, circuit_t *, circ,
{
if (circ->marked_for_close)
continue;
tor_assert(circ->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OR_WAIT);
if (!circ->n_conn &&
!memcmp(or_conn->identity_digest, circ->n_conn_id_digest,
DIGEST_LEN)) {
if (!status) { /* or_conn failed; close circ */
log_info(LD_CIRC,"or_conn failed. Closing circ.");
circuit_mark_for_close(circ, END_CIRC_REASON_OR_CONN_CLOSED);
continue;
}
2006-05-30 07:29:03 +02:00
log_debug(LD_CIRC, "Found circ, sending create cell.");
/* circuit_deliver_create_cell will set n_circ_id and add us to
* orconn_circuid_circuit_map, so we don't need to call
* set_circid_orconn here. */
circ->n_conn = or_conn;
if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) {
if (circuit_send_next_onion_skin(circ) < 0) {
log_info(LD_CIRC,
"send_next_onion_skin failed; circuit marked for closing.");
circuit_mark_for_close(circ, END_CIRC_AT_ORIGIN);
continue;
/* XXX could this be bad, eg if next_onion_skin failed because conn
* died? */
}
} else {
/* pull the create cell out of circ->onionskin, and send it */
tor_assert(circ->onionskin);
if (circuit_deliver_create_cell(circ,CELL_CREATE,circ->onionskin)<0) {
circuit_mark_for_close(circ, END_CIRC_REASON_RESOURCELIMIT);
continue;
}
tor_free(circ->onionskin);
/* We don't want to change circ's state here, since the act
* of doing that modifies the circuits_pending_or_conns list
* that we're looping through right now. So collect a list of
* circs to change their state when we're done. */
smartlist_add(changed_circs, circ);
}
}
});
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(changed_circs, circuit_t *, circ,
circuit_set_state(circ, CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN));
smartlist_free(changed_circs);
}
/** Find a new circid that isn't currently in use on the circ->n_conn
* for the outgoing
* circuit <b>circ</b>, and deliver a cell of type <b>cell_type</b>
* (either CELL_CREATE or CELL_CREATE_FAST) with payload <b>payload</b>
* to this circuit.
* Return -1 if we failed to find a suitable circid, else return 0.
*/
static int
circuit_deliver_create_cell(circuit_t *circ, uint8_t cell_type, char *payload)
{
cell_t cell;
uint16_t id;
tor_assert(circ);
tor_assert(circ->n_conn);
tor_assert(circ->n_conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR);
tor_assert(payload);
tor_assert(cell_type == CELL_CREATE || cell_type == CELL_CREATE_FAST);
id = get_unique_circ_id_by_conn(circ->n_conn);
if (!id) {
log_warn(LD_CIRC,"failed to get unique circID.");
return -1;
}
log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Chosen circID %u.", id);
circuit_set_circid_orconn(circ, id, circ->n_conn, N_CONN_CHANGED);
memset(&cell, 0, sizeof(cell_t));
cell.command = cell_type;
cell.circ_id = circ->n_circ_id;
memcpy(cell.payload, payload, ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN);
connection_or_write_cell_to_buf(&cell, circ->n_conn);
return 0;
}
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/** We've decided to start our reachability testing. If all
* is set, log this to the user. Return 1 if we did, or 0 if
* we chose not to log anything. */
int
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inform_testing_reachability(void)
{
char dirbuf[128];
routerinfo_t *me = router_get_my_routerinfo();
if (!me)
return 0;
if (me->dir_port)
tor_snprintf(dirbuf, sizeof(dirbuf), " and DirPort %s:%d",
me->address, me->dir_port);
log(LOG_NOTICE, LD_OR, "Now checking whether ORPort %s:%d%s %s reachable... "
"(this may take up to %d minutes -- look for log "
"messages indicating success)",
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me->address, me->or_port,
me->dir_port ? dirbuf : "",
me->dir_port ? "are" : "is",
TIMEOUT_UNTIL_UNREACHABILITY_COMPLAINT/60);
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return 1;
}
/** Return true iff we should send a create_fast cell to build a circuit
* starting at <b>router</b>. (If <b>router</b> is NULL, we don't have
* information on the router. */
static INLINE int
should_use_create_fast_for_router(routerinfo_t *router)
{
or_options_t *options = get_options();
if (!options->FastFirstHopPK || options->ORPort)
return 0;
else if (!router || !router->platform ||
!tor_version_as_new_as(router->platform, "0.1.0.6-rc"))
return 0;
else
return 1;
}
extern int has_completed_circuit;
/** This is the backbone function for building circuits.
*
* If circ's first hop is closed, then we need to build a create
* cell and send it forward.
*
* Otherwise, we need to build a relay extend cell and send it
* forward.
*
* Return -reason if we want to tear down circ, else return 0.
*/
int
circuit_send_next_onion_skin(circuit_t *circ)
{
crypt_path_t *hop;
routerinfo_t *router;
char payload[2+4+DIGEST_LEN+ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN];
char *onionskin;
size_t payload_len;
tor_assert(circ);
tor_assert(CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ));
if (circ->cpath->state == CPATH_STATE_CLOSED) {
int fast;
uint8_t cell_type;
log_debug(LD_CIRC,"First skin; sending create cell.");
2004-07-03 01:40:03 +02:00
router = router_get_by_digest(circ->n_conn->identity_digest);
fast = should_use_create_fast_for_router(router);
if (! fast) {
/* We are an OR, or we are connecting to an old Tor: we should
* send an old slow create cell.
*/
cell_type = CELL_CREATE;
if (onion_skin_create(circ->cpath->extend_info->onion_key,
&(circ->cpath->dh_handshake_state),
payload) < 0) {
log_warn(LD_CIRC,"onion_skin_create (first hop) failed.");
return - END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL;
}
} else {
/* We are not an OR, and we're building the first hop of a circuit to a
* new OR: we can be speedy and use CREATE_FAST to save an RSA operation
* and a DH operation. */
cell_type = CELL_CREATE_FAST;
memset(payload, 0, sizeof(payload));
crypto_rand(circ->cpath->fast_handshake_state,
sizeof(circ->cpath->fast_handshake_state));
memcpy(payload, circ->cpath->fast_handshake_state,
sizeof(circ->cpath->fast_handshake_state));
}
if (circuit_deliver_create_cell(circ, cell_type, payload) < 0)
return - END_CIRC_REASON_RESOURCELIMIT;
circ->cpath->state = CPATH_STATE_AWAITING_KEYS;
circuit_set_state(circ, CIRCUIT_STATE_BUILDING);
log_info(LD_CIRC,"First hop: finished sending %s cell to '%s'",
fast ? "CREATE_FAST" : "CREATE",
router ? router->nickname : "<unnamed>");
} else {
tor_assert(circ->cpath->state == CPATH_STATE_OPEN);
tor_assert(circ->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_BUILDING);
log_debug(LD_CIRC,"starting to send subsequent skin.");
hop = onion_next_hop_in_cpath(circ->cpath);
if (!hop) {
/* done building the circuit. whew. */
circuit_set_state(circ, CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN);
log_info(LD_CIRC,"circuit built!");
circuit_reset_failure_count(0);
if (!has_completed_circuit) {
or_options_t *options = get_options();
has_completed_circuit=1;
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/* FFFF Log a count of known routers here */
log(LOG_NOTICE, LD_GENERAL,
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"Tor has successfully opened a circuit. "
"Looks like client functionality is working.");
if (server_mode(options) && !check_whether_orport_reachable()) {
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inform_testing_reachability();
consider_testing_reachability();
}
}
circuit_rep_hist_note_result(circ);
circuit_has_opened(circ); /* do other actions as necessary */
return 0;
}
*(uint32_t*)payload = htonl(hop->extend_info->addr);
*(uint16_t*)(payload+4) = htons(hop->extend_info->port);
onionskin = payload+2+4;
memcpy(payload+2+4+ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN,
hop->extend_info->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
payload_len = 2+4+ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN+DIGEST_LEN;
if (onion_skin_create(hop->extend_info->onion_key,
&(hop->dh_handshake_state), onionskin) < 0) {
log_warn(LD_CIRC,"onion_skin_create failed.");
return - END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL;
}
log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Sending extend relay cell.");
/* send it to hop->prev, because it will transfer
* it to a create cell and then send to hop */
if (connection_edge_send_command(NULL, circ, RELAY_COMMAND_EXTEND,
payload, payload_len, hop->prev) < 0)
return 0; /* circuit is closed */
hop->state = CPATH_STATE_AWAITING_KEYS;
}
return 0;
}
/** Our clock just jumped forward by <b>seconds_elapsed</b>. Assume
* something has also gone wrong with our network: notify the user,
* and abandon all not-yet-used circuits. */
void
circuit_note_clock_jumped(int seconds_elapsed)
{
if (server_mode(get_options()))
log(LOG_WARN, LD_GENERAL,
"Please report: your clock just jumped %d seconds forward; "
"assuming established circuits no longer work.", seconds_elapsed);
else
log(LOG_NOTICE, LD_GENERAL, "Your clock just jumped %d seconds forward; "
"assuming established circuits no longer work.", seconds_elapsed);
has_completed_circuit=0; /* so it'll log when it works again */
circuit_mark_all_unused_circs();
circuit_expire_all_dirty_circs();
}
/** Take the 'extend' cell, pull out addr/port plus the onion skin. Make
2005-10-17 03:29:28 +02:00
* sure we're connected to the next hop, and pass it the onion skin using
* a create cell. Return -1 if we want to warn and tear down the circuit,
* else return 0.
*/
int
circuit_extend(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ)
{
connection_t *n_conn;
relay_header_t rh;
char *onionskin;
char *id_digest=NULL;
if (circ->n_conn) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN,LD_PROTOCOL,
"n_conn already set. Bug/attack. Closing.");
return -1;
}
relay_header_unpack(&rh, cell->payload);
if (rh.length < 4+2+ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN+DIGEST_LEN) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
"Wrong length %d on extend cell. Closing circuit.",
rh.length);
return -1;
}
circ->n_addr = ntohl(get_uint32(cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE));
circ->n_port = ntohs(get_uint16(cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE+4));
onionskin = cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE+4+2;
id_digest = cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE+4+2+ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN;
n_conn = connection_or_get_by_identity_digest(id_digest);
/* If we don't have an open conn, or the conn we have is obsolete
* (i.e. old or broken) and the other side will let us make a second
* connection without dropping it immediately... */
if (!n_conn || n_conn->state != OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN ||
(n_conn->is_obsolete &&
router_digest_version_as_new_as(id_digest,"0.1.1.9-alpha-cvs"))) {
struct in_addr in;
char tmpbuf[INET_NTOA_BUF_LEN];
in.s_addr = htonl(circ->n_addr);
tor_inet_ntoa(&in,tmpbuf,sizeof(tmpbuf));
log_info(LD_CIRC|LD_OR,"Next router (%s:%d) not connected. Connecting.",
tmpbuf, circ->n_port);
circ->onionskin = tor_malloc(ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN);
memcpy(circ->onionskin, onionskin, ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN);
circuit_set_state(circ, CIRCUIT_STATE_OR_WAIT);
/* imprint the circuit with its future n_conn->id */
memcpy(circ->n_conn_id_digest, id_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
if (n_conn && !n_conn->is_obsolete) {
circ->n_addr = n_conn->addr;
circ->n_port = n_conn->port;
} else {
/* we should try to open a connection */
n_conn = connection_or_connect(circ->n_addr, circ->n_port, id_digest);
if (!n_conn) {
log_info(LD_CIRC,"Launching n_conn failed. Closing circuit.");
circuit_mark_for_close(circ, END_CIRC_REASON_CONNECTFAILED);
2005-10-17 03:29:28 +02:00
return 0;
}
log_debug(LD_CIRC,"connecting in progress (or finished). Good.");
}
/* return success. The onion/circuit/etc will be taken care of
* automatically (may already have been) whenever n_conn reaches
* OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN.
*/
return 0;
}
/* these may be different if the router connected to us from elsewhere */
circ->n_addr = n_conn->addr;
circ->n_port = n_conn->port;
circ->n_conn = n_conn;
memcpy(circ->n_conn_id_digest, n_conn->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
log_debug(LD_CIRC,"n_conn is %s:%u",n_conn->address,n_conn->port);
if (circuit_deliver_create_cell(circ, CELL_CREATE, onionskin) < 0)
return -1;
return 0;
}
/** Initialize cpath-\>{f|b}_{crypto|digest} from the key material in
* key_data. key_data must contain CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL bytes, which are
* used as follows:
* - 20 to initialize f_digest
* - 20 to initialize b_digest
* - 16 to key f_crypto
* - 16 to key b_crypto
*
* (If 'reverse' is true, then f_XX and b_XX are swapped.)
*/
int
circuit_init_cpath_crypto(crypt_path_t *cpath, char *key_data, int reverse)
{
crypto_digest_env_t *tmp_digest;
crypto_cipher_env_t *tmp_crypto;
tor_assert(cpath);
tor_assert(key_data);
tor_assert(!(cpath->f_crypto || cpath->b_crypto ||
cpath->f_digest || cpath->b_digest));
cpath->f_digest = crypto_new_digest_env();
crypto_digest_add_bytes(cpath->f_digest, key_data, DIGEST_LEN);
cpath->b_digest = crypto_new_digest_env();
crypto_digest_add_bytes(cpath->b_digest, key_data+DIGEST_LEN, DIGEST_LEN);
if (!(cpath->f_crypto =
crypto_create_init_cipher(key_data+(2*DIGEST_LEN),1))) {
log_warn(LD_BUG,"Bug: forward cipher initialization failed.");
return -1;
}
if (!(cpath->b_crypto =
crypto_create_init_cipher(key_data+(2*DIGEST_LEN)+CIPHER_KEY_LEN,0))) {
log_warn(LD_BUG,"Bug: backward cipher initialization failed.");
return -1;
}
if (reverse) {
tmp_digest = cpath->f_digest;
cpath->f_digest = cpath->b_digest;
cpath->b_digest = tmp_digest;
tmp_crypto = cpath->f_crypto;
cpath->f_crypto = cpath->b_crypto;
cpath->b_crypto = tmp_crypto;
}
return 0;
}
/** A created or extended cell came back to us on the circuit, and it included
* <b>reply</b> as its body. (If <b>reply_type</b> is CELL_CREATED, the body
* contains (the second DH key, plus KH). If <b>reply_type</b> is
* CELL_CREATED_FAST, the body contains a secret y and a hash H(x|y).)
*
* Calculate the appropriate keys and digests, make sure KH is
* correct, and initialize this hop of the cpath.
*
* Return - reason if we want to mark circ for close, else return 0.
*/
int
circuit_finish_handshake(circuit_t *circ, uint8_t reply_type, char *reply)
{
char keys[CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN];
crypt_path_t *hop;
tor_assert(CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ));
if (circ->cpath->state == CPATH_STATE_AWAITING_KEYS)
hop = circ->cpath;
else {
hop = onion_next_hop_in_cpath(circ->cpath);
if (!hop) { /* got an extended when we're all done? */
log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL,"got extended when circ already built? Closing.");
return - END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
}
}
tor_assert(hop->state == CPATH_STATE_AWAITING_KEYS);
if (reply_type == CELL_CREATED && hop->dh_handshake_state) {
if (onion_skin_client_handshake(hop->dh_handshake_state, reply, keys,
DIGEST_LEN*2+CIPHER_KEY_LEN*2) < 0) {
log_warn(LD_CIRC,"onion_skin_client_handshake failed.");
return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
}
/* Remember hash of g^xy */
memcpy(hop->handshake_digest, reply+DH_KEY_LEN, DIGEST_LEN);
} else if (reply_type == CELL_CREATED_FAST && !hop->dh_handshake_state) {
if (fast_client_handshake(hop->fast_handshake_state, reply, keys,
DIGEST_LEN*2+CIPHER_KEY_LEN*2) < 0) {
log_warn(LD_CIRC,"fast_client_handshake failed.");
return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
}
memcpy(hop->handshake_digest, reply+DIGEST_LEN, DIGEST_LEN);
} else {
log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL,"CREATED cell type did not match CREATE cell type.");
return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
}
if (hop->dh_handshake_state) {
crypto_dh_free(hop->dh_handshake_state); /* don't need it anymore */
hop->dh_handshake_state = NULL;
}
memset(hop->fast_handshake_state, 0, sizeof(hop->fast_handshake_state));
if (circuit_init_cpath_crypto(hop, keys, 0)<0) {
return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
}
hop->state = CPATH_STATE_OPEN;
log_info(LD_CIRC,"Finished building %scircuit hop:",
(reply_type == CELL_CREATED_FAST) ? "fast " : "");
circuit_log_path(LOG_INFO,LD_CIRC,circ);
control_event_circuit_status(circ, CIRC_EVENT_EXTENDED);
return 0;
}
/** We received a relay truncated cell on circ.
*
* Since we don't ask for truncates currently, getting a truncated
* means that a connection broke or an extend failed. For now,
* just give up: for circ to close, and return 0.
*/
int
circuit_truncated(circuit_t *circ, crypt_path_t *layer)
{
// crypt_path_t *victim;
// connection_t *stream;
tor_assert(circ);
tor_assert(CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ));
tor_assert(layer);
/* XXX Since we don't ask for truncates currently, getting a truncated
* means that a connection broke or an extend failed. For now,
* just give up.
*/
circuit_mark_for_close(circ, END_CIRC_AT_ORIGIN);
return 0;
#if 0
while (layer->next != circ->cpath) {
/* we need to clear out layer->next */
victim = layer->next;
log_debug(LD_CIRC, "Killing a layer of the cpath.");
for (stream = circ->p_streams; stream; stream=stream->next_stream) {
if (stream->cpath_layer == victim) {
/* XXXX NM LD_CIRC? */
log_info(LD_APP, "Marking stream %d for close.", stream->stream_id);
/* no need to send 'end' relay cells,
* because the other side's already dead
*/
connection_mark_unattached_ap(stream, END_STREAM_REASON_DESTROY);
}
}
layer->next = victim->next;
circuit_free_cpath_node(victim);
}
log_info(LD_CIRC, "finished");
return 0;
#endif
}
/** Given a response payload and keys, initialize, then send a created
* cell back.
*/
int
onionskin_answer(circuit_t *circ, uint8_t cell_type, char *payload, char *keys)
{
cell_t cell;
crypt_path_t *tmp_cpath;
tmp_cpath = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(crypt_path_t));
tmp_cpath->magic = CRYPT_PATH_MAGIC;
memset(&cell, 0, sizeof(cell_t));
cell.command = cell_type;
cell.circ_id = circ->p_circ_id;
circuit_set_state(circ, CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN);
memcpy(cell.payload, payload,
cell_type == CELL_CREATED ? ONIONSKIN_REPLY_LEN : DIGEST_LEN*2);
log_debug(LD_CIRC,"init digest forward 0x%.8x, backward 0x%.8x.",
(unsigned int)*(uint32_t*)(keys),
(unsigned int)*(uint32_t*)(keys+20));
if (circuit_init_cpath_crypto(tmp_cpath, keys, 0)<0) {
log_warn(LD_BUG,"Circuit initialization failed");
tor_free(tmp_cpath);
return -1;
}
circ->n_digest = tmp_cpath->f_digest;
circ->n_crypto = tmp_cpath->f_crypto;
circ->p_digest = tmp_cpath->b_digest;
circ->p_crypto = tmp_cpath->b_crypto;
tmp_cpath->magic = 0;
tor_free(tmp_cpath);
if (cell_type == CELL_CREATED)
memcpy(circ->handshake_digest, cell.payload+DH_KEY_LEN, DIGEST_LEN);
else
memcpy(circ->handshake_digest, cell.payload+DIGEST_LEN, DIGEST_LEN);
connection_or_write_cell_to_buf(&cell, circ->p_conn);
log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Finished sending 'created' cell.");
if (!is_local_IP(circ->p_conn->addr) &&
!connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(circ->p_conn)) {
/* record that we could process create cells from a non-local conn
* that we didn't initiate; presumably this means that create cells
* can reach us too. */
router_orport_found_reachable();
}
return 0;
}
/** Choose a length for a circuit of purpose <b>purpose</b>.
* Default length is 3 + the number of endpoints that would give something
* away. If the routerlist <b>routers</b> doesn't have enough routers
* to handle the desired path length, return as large a path length as
* is feasible, except if it's less than 2, in which case return -1.
*/
static int
new_route_len(double cw, uint8_t purpose, extend_info_t *exit,
smartlist_t *routers)
{
int num_acceptable_routers;
int routelen;
tor_assert(cw >= 0.);
tor_assert(cw < 1.);
tor_assert(routers);
#ifdef TOR_PERF
routelen = 2;
#else
routelen = 3;
if (exit &&
purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING &&
purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO)
routelen++;
#endif
log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Chosen route length %d (%d routers available).",
routelen, smartlist_len(routers));
num_acceptable_routers = count_acceptable_routers(routers);
if (num_acceptable_routers < 2) {
log_info(LD_CIRC,
"Not enough acceptable routers (%d). Discarding this circuit.",
num_acceptable_routers);
return -1;
}
if (num_acceptable_routers < routelen) {
log_info(LD_CIRC,"Not enough routers: cutting routelen from %d to %d.",
routelen, num_acceptable_routers);
routelen = num_acceptable_routers;
}
return routelen;
}
/** Fetch the list of predicted ports, dup it into a smartlist of
* uint16_t's, remove the ones that are already handled by an
* existing circuit, and return it.
*/
static smartlist_t *
circuit_get_unhandled_ports(time_t now)
{
smartlist_t *source = rep_hist_get_predicted_ports(now);
smartlist_t *dest = smartlist_create();
uint16_t *tmp;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(source); ++i) {
tmp = tor_malloc(sizeof(uint16_t));
memcpy(tmp, smartlist_get(source, i), sizeof(uint16_t));
smartlist_add(dest, tmp);
}
circuit_remove_handled_ports(dest);
return dest;
}
/** Return 1 if we already have circuits present or on the way for
* all anticipated ports. Return 0 if we should make more.
*
* If we're returning 0, set need_uptime and need_capacity to
* indicate any requirements that the unhandled ports have.
*/
int
circuit_all_predicted_ports_handled(time_t now, int *need_uptime,
int *need_capacity)
{
int i, enough;
uint16_t *port;
smartlist_t *sl = circuit_get_unhandled_ports(now);
smartlist_t *LongLivedServices = get_options()->LongLivedPorts;
tor_assert(need_uptime);
tor_assert(need_capacity);
enough = (smartlist_len(sl) == 0);
for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(sl); ++i) {
port = smartlist_get(sl, i);
if (smartlist_string_num_isin(LongLivedServices, *port))
*need_uptime = 1;
tor_free(port);
}
smartlist_free(sl);
return enough;
}
/** Return 1 if <b>router</b> can handle one or more of the ports in
* <b>needed_ports</b>, else return 0.
*/
static int
router_handles_some_port(routerinfo_t *router, smartlist_t *needed_ports)
{
int i;
uint16_t port;
for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(needed_ports); ++i) {
addr_policy_result_t r;
port = *(uint16_t *)smartlist_get(needed_ports, i);
tor_assert(port);
r = compare_addr_to_addr_policy(0, port, router->exit_policy);
if (r != ADDR_POLICY_REJECTED && r != ADDR_POLICY_PROBABLY_REJECTED)
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
/** How many circuits do we want simultaneously in-progress to handle
* a given stream?
*/
#define MIN_CIRCUITS_HANDLING_STREAM 2
static int
ap_stream_wants_exit_attention(connection_t *conn)
{
if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_AP &&
conn->state == AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT &&
!conn->marked_for_close &&
!connection_edge_is_rendezvous_stream(conn) &&
!circuit_stream_is_being_handled(conn, 0, MIN_CIRCUITS_HANDLING_STREAM))
return 1;
return 0;
}
/** Return a pointer to a suitable router to be the exit node for the
* general-purpose circuit we're about to build.
*
* Look through the connection array, and choose a router that maximizes
* the number of pending streams that can exit from this router.
*
* Return NULL if we can't find any suitable routers.
*/
static routerinfo_t *
choose_good_exit_server_general(routerlist_t *dir, int need_uptime,
int need_capacity)
{
int *n_supported;
int i, j;
int n_pending_connections = 0;
connection_t **carray;
int n_connections;
int best_support = -1;
int n_best_support=0;
smartlist_t *sl, *preferredexits, *excludedexits;
routerinfo_t *router;
or_options_t *options = get_options();
get_connection_array(&carray, &n_connections);
/* Count how many connections are waiting for a circuit to be built.
* We use this for log messages now, but in the future we may depend on it.
*/
for (i = 0; i < n_connections; ++i) {
if (ap_stream_wants_exit_attention(carray[i]))
++n_pending_connections;
}
// log_fn(LOG_DEBUG, "Choosing exit node; %d connections are pending",
// n_pending_connections);
/* Now we count, for each of the routers in the directory, how many
* of the pending connections could possibly exit from that
* router (n_supported[i]). (We can't be sure about cases where we
* don't know the IP address of the pending connection.)
*/
n_supported = tor_malloc(sizeof(int)*smartlist_len(dir->routers));
for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(dir->routers); ++i) {/* iterate over routers */
router = smartlist_get(dir->routers, i);
if (router_is_me(router)) {
n_supported[i] = -1;
// log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Skipping node %s -- it's me.", router->nickname);
/* XXX there's probably a reverse predecessor attack here, but
* it's slow. should we take this out? -RD
*/
continue;
}
if (!router->is_running) {
n_supported[i] = -1;
// log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,
// "Skipping node %s (index %d) -- directory says it's not running.",
// router->nickname, i);
continue; /* skip routers that are known to be down */
}
if (router_is_unreliable(router, need_uptime, need_capacity, 0)) {
n_supported[i] = -1;
continue; /* skip routers that are not suitable */
}
if (!router->is_valid &&
(!(options->_AllowInvalid & ALLOW_INVALID_EXIT) ||
router_is_unreliable(router, 1, 1, 0))) {
/* if it's invalid, and either we don't want it or it's unsuitable */
n_supported[i] = -1;
// log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Skipping node %s (index %d) -- invalid router.",
// router->nickname, i);
continue; /* skip invalid routers */
}
if (router_exit_policy_rejects_all(router)) {
n_supported[i] = -1;
// log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Skipping node %s (index %d) -- it rejects all.",
// router->nickname, i);
continue; /* skip routers that reject all */
}
n_supported[i] = 0;
for (j = 0; j < n_connections; ++j) { /* iterate over connections */
if (!ap_stream_wants_exit_attention(carray[j]))
continue; /* Skip everything but APs in CIRCUIT_WAIT */
if (connection_ap_can_use_exit(carray[j], router)) {
++n_supported[i];
// log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"%s is supported. n_supported[%d] now %d.",
// router->nickname, i, n_supported[i]);
} else {
// log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"%s (index %d) would reject this stream.",
// router->nickname, i);
}
} /* End looping over connections. */
if (n_supported[i] > best_support) {
/* If this router is better than previous ones, remember its index
* and goodness, and start counting how many routers are this good. */
best_support = n_supported[i]; n_best_support=1;
// log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"%s is new best supported option so far.",
// router->nickname);
} else if (n_supported[i] == best_support) {
/* If this router is _as good_ as the best one, just increment the
* count of equally good routers.*/
++n_best_support;
}
}
log_info(LD_CIRC,
"Found %d servers that might support %d/%d pending connections.",
n_best_support, best_support >= 0 ? best_support : 0,
n_pending_connections);
preferredexits = smartlist_create();
add_nickname_list_to_smartlist(preferredexits,options->ExitNodes,1,1,1);
excludedexits = smartlist_create();
add_nickname_list_to_smartlist(excludedexits,options->ExcludeNodes,0,0,1);
sl = smartlist_create();
/* If any routers definitely support any pending connections, choose one
* at random. */
if (best_support > 0) {
for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(dir->routers); i++)
if (n_supported[i] == best_support)
smartlist_add(sl, smartlist_get(dir->routers, i));
smartlist_subtract(sl,excludedexits);
if (options->StrictExitNodes || smartlist_overlap(sl,preferredexits))
smartlist_intersect(sl,preferredexits);
router = routerlist_sl_choose_by_bandwidth(sl);
} else {
/* Either there are no pending connections, or no routers even seem to
* possibly support any of them. Choose a router at random that satisfies
* at least one predicted exit port. */
int try;
smartlist_t *needed_ports = circuit_get_unhandled_ports(time(NULL));
if (best_support == -1) {
if (need_uptime || need_capacity) {
log_info(LD_CIRC,
"We couldn't find any live%s%s routers; falling back "
"to list of all routers.",
need_capacity?", fast":"",
need_uptime?", stable":"");
return choose_good_exit_server_general(dir, 0, 0);
}
log_notice(LD_CIRC, "All routers are down or middleman -- choosing a "
"doomed exit at random.");
}
for (try = 0; try < 2; try++) {
/* try once to pick only from routers that satisfy a needed port,
* then if there are none, pick from any that support exiting. */
for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(dir->routers); i++) {
router = smartlist_get(dir->routers, i);
if (n_supported[i] != -1 &&
(try || router_handles_some_port(router, needed_ports))) {
// log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Try %d: '%s' is a possibility.",
// try, router->nickname);
smartlist_add(sl, router);
}
}
smartlist_subtract(sl,excludedexits);
if (options->StrictExitNodes || smartlist_overlap(sl,preferredexits))
smartlist_intersect(sl,preferredexits);
/* XXX sometimes the above results in null, when the requested
* exit node is down. we should pick it anyway. */
router = routerlist_sl_choose_by_bandwidth(sl);
if (router)
break;
}
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(needed_ports, uint16_t *, cp, tor_free(cp));
smartlist_free(needed_ports);
}
smartlist_free(preferredexits);
smartlist_free(excludedexits);
smartlist_free(sl);
tor_free(n_supported);
if (router) {
log_info(LD_CIRC, "Chose exit server '%s'", router->nickname);
return router;
}
if (options->StrictExitNodes) {
log_warn(LD_CIRC,
"No specified exit routers seem to be running, and "
"StrictExitNodes is set: can't choose an exit.");
}
return NULL;
}
/** Return a pointer to a suitable router to be the exit node for the
* circuit of purpose <b>purpose</b> that we're about to build (or NULL
* if no router is suitable).
*
* For general-purpose circuits, pass it off to
* choose_good_exit_server_general()
*
* For client-side rendezvous circuits, choose a random node, weighted
* toward the preferences in 'options'.
*/
static routerinfo_t *
choose_good_exit_server(uint8_t purpose, routerlist_t *dir,
int need_uptime, int need_capacity, int is_internal)
{
or_options_t *options = get_options();
switch (purpose) {
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL:
if (is_internal) /* pick it like a middle hop */
return router_choose_random_node(NULL, get_options()->ExcludeNodes,
NULL, need_uptime, need_capacity, 0,
get_options()->_AllowInvalid & ALLOW_INVALID_MIDDLE, 0);
else
return choose_good_exit_server_general(dir,need_uptime,need_capacity);
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND:
return router_choose_random_node(
options->RendNodes, options->RendExcludeNodes,
NULL, need_uptime, need_capacity, 0,
options->_AllowInvalid & ALLOW_INVALID_RENDEZVOUS, 0);
}
log_warn(LD_BUG,"Bug: unhandled purpose %d", purpose);
tor_fragile_assert();
2004-10-17 00:56:46 +02:00
return NULL;
}
/** Decide a suitable length for circ's cpath, and pick an exit
* router (or use <b>exit</b> if provided). Store these in the
* cpath. Return 0 if ok, -1 if circuit should be closed. */
static int
onion_pick_cpath_exit(circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *exit)
{
cpath_build_state_t *state = circ->build_state;
routerlist_t *rl = router_get_routerlist();
int r;
r = new_route_len(get_options()->PathlenCoinWeight, circ->purpose,
exit, rl->routers);
if (r < 1) /* must be at least 1 */
return -1;
state->desired_path_len = r;
if (exit) { /* the circuit-builder pre-requested one */
log_info(LD_CIRC,"Using requested exit node '%s'", exit->nickname);
exit = extend_info_dup(exit);
} else { /* we have to decide one */
routerinfo_t *router =
choose_good_exit_server(circ->purpose, rl, state->need_uptime,
state->need_capacity, state->is_internal);
if (!router) {
log_warn(LD_CIRC,"failed to choose an exit server");
return -1;
}
exit = extend_info_from_router(router);
}
state->chosen_exit = exit;
return 0;
}
/** Give <b>circ</b> a new exit destination to <b>exit</b>, and add a
* hop to the cpath reflecting this. Don't send the next extend cell --
* the caller will do this if it wants to.
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect streams can use internal circs if they want. New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime if we've seen that lately). Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs), which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit. Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.) Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when we try to launch one. Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete. Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses -- it won't. Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken. svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
*/
int
circuit_append_new_exit(circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *info)
{
cpath_build_state_t *state;
tor_assert(info);
tor_assert(circ && CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ));
state = circ->build_state;
tor_assert(state);
if (state->chosen_exit)
extend_info_free(state->chosen_exit);
state->chosen_exit = extend_info_dup(info);
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect streams can use internal circs if they want. New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime if we've seen that lately). Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs), which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit. Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.) Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when we try to launch one. Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete. Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses -- it won't. Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken. svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
++circ->build_state->desired_path_len;
onion_append_hop(&circ->cpath, info);
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect streams can use internal circs if they want. New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime if we've seen that lately). Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs), which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit. Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.) Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when we try to launch one. Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete. Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses -- it won't. Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken. svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
return 0;
}
/** Take an open <b>circ</b>, and add a new hop at the end, based on
* <b>info</b>. Set its state back to CIRCUIT_STATE_BUILDING, and then
* send the next extend cell to begin connecting to that hop.
*/
int
circuit_extend_to_new_exit(circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *info)
{
tor_assert(CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ));
circuit_append_new_exit(circ, info);
circuit_set_state(circ, CIRCUIT_STATE_BUILDING);
if (circuit_send_next_onion_skin(circ)<0) {
log_warn(LD_CIRC, "Couldn't extend circuit to new point '%s'.",
info->nickname);
circuit_mark_for_close(circ, END_CIRC_AT_ORIGIN);
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
/** Return the number of routers in <b>routers</b> that are currently up
* and available for building circuits through.
*/
static int
count_acceptable_routers(smartlist_t *routers)
{
int i, n;
int num=0;
routerinfo_t *r;
n = smartlist_len(routers);
for (i=0;i<n;i++) {
r = smartlist_get(routers, i);
// log_debug(LD_CIRC,
// "Contemplating whether router %d (%s) is a new option.",
// i, r->nickname);
if (r->is_running == 0) {
// log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Nope, the directory says %d is not running.",i);
goto next_i_loop;
}
if (r->is_valid == 0) {
// log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Nope, the directory says %d is not valid.",i);
goto next_i_loop;
2006-04-25 09:06:48 +02:00
/* XXX This clause makes us count incorrectly: if AllowInvalidRouters
* allows this node in some places, then we're getting an inaccurate
* count. For now, be conservative and don't count it. But later we
* should try to be smarter. */
}
num++;
// log_debug(LD_CIRC,"I like %d. num_acceptable_routers now %d.",i, num);
next_i_loop:
; /* C requires an explicit statement after the label */
}
return num;
}
/** Add <b>new_hop</b> to the end of the doubly-linked-list <b>head_ptr</b>.
* This function is used to extend cpath by another hop.
*/
void
onion_append_to_cpath(crypt_path_t **head_ptr, crypt_path_t *new_hop)
{
if (*head_ptr) {
new_hop->next = (*head_ptr);
new_hop->prev = (*head_ptr)->prev;
(*head_ptr)->prev->next = new_hop;
(*head_ptr)->prev = new_hop;
} else {
*head_ptr = new_hop;
new_hop->prev = new_hop->next = new_hop;
}
}
/** Pick a random server digest that's running a Tor version that
* doesn't have the reachability bug. These are versions 0.1.1.21-cvs+
* and 0.1.2.1-alpha+. Avoid picking authorities, since we're
* probably already connected to them.
*
* We only return one, so this doesn't become stupid when the
* whole network has upgraded. */
static char *
compute_preferred_testing_list(const char *answer)
{
smartlist_t *choices;
routerlist_t *rl = router_get_routerlist();
routerinfo_t *router;
char *s;
if (answer) /* they have one in mind -- easy */
return tor_strdup(answer);
choices = smartlist_create();
/* now count up our choices */
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(rl->routers, routerinfo_t *, r,
if (r->is_running && r->is_valid &&
((tor_version_as_new_as(r->platform,"0.1.1.21-cvs") &&
!tor_version_as_new_as(r->platform,"0.1.2.0-alpha-cvs")) ||
tor_version_as_new_as(r->platform,"0.1.2.1-alpha")) &&
!router_get_trusteddirserver_by_digest(r->cache_info.identity_digest))
smartlist_add(choices, r));
router = smartlist_choose(choices);
smartlist_free(choices);
if (!router) {
log_info(LD_CIRC, "Looking for middle server that doesn't have the "
"reachability bug, but didn't find one. Oh well.");
return NULL;
}
log_info(LD_CIRC, "Looking for middle server that doesn't have the "
"reachability bug, and chose '%s'. Great.", router->nickname);
s = tor_malloc(HEX_DIGEST_LEN+2);
s[0] = '$';
base16_encode(s+1, HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1,
router->cache_info.identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
return s;
}
/** A helper function used by onion_extend_cpath(). Use <b>purpose</b>
* and <b>state</b> and the cpath <b>head</b> (currently populated only
* to length <b>cur_len</b> to decide a suitable middle hop for a
* circuit. In particular, make sure we don't pick the exit node or its
* family, and make sure we don't duplicate any previous nodes or their
* families. */
static routerinfo_t *
choose_good_middle_server(uint8_t purpose,
cpath_build_state_t *state,
crypt_path_t *head,
int cur_len)
{
int i;
routerinfo_t *r, *choice;
crypt_path_t *cpath;
2004-12-07 10:18:25 +01:00
smartlist_t *excluded;
or_options_t *options = get_options();
char *preferred = NULL;
tor_assert(_CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_MIN <= purpose &&
purpose <= _CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_MAX);
log_debug(LD_CIRC, "Contemplating intermediate hop: random choice.");
excluded = smartlist_create();
if ((r = build_state_get_exit_router(state))) {
smartlist_add(excluded, r);
routerlist_add_family(excluded, r);
}
if ((r = routerlist_find_my_routerinfo())) {
smartlist_add(excluded, r);
routerlist_add_family(excluded, r);
}
for (i = 0, cpath = head; i < cur_len; ++i, cpath=cpath->next) {
if ((r = router_get_by_digest(cpath->extend_info->identity_digest))) {
smartlist_add(excluded, r);
routerlist_add_family(excluded, r);
}
}
if (purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING)
preferred = compute_preferred_testing_list(options->TestVia);
choice = router_choose_random_node(preferred,
options->ExcludeNodes, excluded,
state->need_uptime, state->need_capacity, 0,
options->_AllowInvalid & ALLOW_INVALID_MIDDLE, 0);
if (preferred)
tor_free(preferred);
smartlist_free(excluded);
return choice;
}
/** Pick a good entry server for the circuit to be built according to
* <b>state</b>. Don't reuse a chosen exit (if any), don't use this
* router (if we're an OR), and respect firewall settings; if we're
* using entry_guards, return one.
*
* If <b>state</b> is NULL, we're choosing routers to serve as entry
* nodes, not for any particular circuit.
*/
static routerinfo_t *
choose_good_entry_server(uint8_t purpose, cpath_build_state_t *state)
{
routerinfo_t *r, *choice;
smartlist_t *excluded;
or_options_t *options = get_options();
(void)purpose; /* not used yet. */
if (state && options->UseEntryGuards) {
return choose_random_entry(state);
}
excluded = smartlist_create();
if (state && (r = build_state_get_exit_router(state))) {
smartlist_add(excluded, r);
routerlist_add_family(excluded, r);
}
if ((r = routerlist_find_my_routerinfo())) {
smartlist_add(excluded, r);
routerlist_add_family(excluded, r);
}
if (firewall_is_fascist_or()) {
/* exclude all ORs that listen on the wrong port */
routerlist_t *rl = router_get_routerlist();
int i;
for (i=0; i < smartlist_len(rl->routers); i++) {
r = smartlist_get(rl->routers, i);
if (!fascist_firewall_allows_address_or(r->addr,r->or_port))
smartlist_add(excluded, r);
}
}
/* and exclude current entry guards, if applicable */
if (options->UseEntryGuards && entry_guards) {
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, entry,
{
if ((r = router_get_by_digest(entry->identity)))
smartlist_add(excluded, r);
});
}
// XXX we should exclude busy exit nodes here, too,
// but only if there are enough other nodes available.
choice = router_choose_random_node(
NULL, options->ExcludeNodes,
excluded, state ? state->need_uptime : 0,
state ? state->need_capacity : 0,
state ? 0 : 1,
options->_AllowInvalid & ALLOW_INVALID_ENTRY, 0);
smartlist_free(excluded);
return choice;
}
/** Return the first non-open hop in cpath, or return NULL if all
* hops are open. */
static crypt_path_t *
onion_next_hop_in_cpath(crypt_path_t *cpath)
{
crypt_path_t *hop = cpath;
do {
if (hop->state != CPATH_STATE_OPEN)
return hop;
hop = hop->next;
} while (hop != cpath);
return NULL;
}
/** Choose a suitable next hop in the cpath <b>head_ptr</b>,
* based on <b>state</b>. Append the hop info to head_ptr.
*/
static int
onion_extend_cpath(uint8_t purpose, crypt_path_t **head_ptr,
cpath_build_state_t *state)
{
int cur_len;
crypt_path_t *cpath;
extend_info_t *info = NULL;
tor_assert(head_ptr);
if (!*head_ptr) {
cur_len = 0;
} else {
cur_len = 1;
for (cpath = *head_ptr; cpath->next != *head_ptr; cpath = cpath->next) {
++cur_len;
}
}
if (cur_len >= state->desired_path_len) {
log_debug(LD_CIRC, "Path is complete: %d steps long",
state->desired_path_len);
return 1;
}
log_debug(LD_CIRC, "Path is %d long; we want %d", cur_len,
state->desired_path_len);
if (cur_len == state->desired_path_len - 1) { /* Picking last node */
info = extend_info_dup(state->chosen_exit);
} else if (cur_len == 0) { /* picking first node */
routerinfo_t *r = choose_good_entry_server(purpose, state);
if (r)
info = extend_info_from_router(r);
} else {
routerinfo_t *r =
choose_good_middle_server(purpose, state, *head_ptr, cur_len);
if (r)
info = extend_info_from_router(r);
}
if (!info) {
log_warn(LD_CIRC,"Failed to find node for hop %d of our path. Discarding "
"this circuit.", cur_len);
return -1;
}
log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Chose router %s for hop %d (exit is %s)",
info->nickname, cur_len+1, build_state_get_exit_nickname(state));
onion_append_hop(head_ptr, info);
extend_info_free(info);
return 0;
}
/** Create a new hop, annotate it with information about its
* corresponding router <b>choice</b>, and append it to the
* end of the cpath <b>head_ptr</b>. */
static int
onion_append_hop(crypt_path_t **head_ptr, extend_info_t *choice)
{
crypt_path_t *hop = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(crypt_path_t));
/* link hop into the cpath, at the end. */
onion_append_to_cpath(head_ptr, hop);
hop->magic = CRYPT_PATH_MAGIC;
hop->state = CPATH_STATE_CLOSED;
hop->extend_info = extend_info_dup(choice);
hop->package_window = CIRCWINDOW_START;
hop->deliver_window = CIRCWINDOW_START;
return 0;
}
/** Allocate and return a new extend_info_t that can be used to build a
* circuit to or through the router <b>r</b>. */
extend_info_t *
extend_info_from_router(routerinfo_t *r)
{
extend_info_t *info;
tor_assert(r);
info = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(extend_info_t));
strlcpy(info->nickname, r->nickname, sizeof(info->nickname));
memcpy(info->identity_digest, r->cache_info.identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
info->onion_key = crypto_pk_dup_key(r->onion_pkey);
info->addr = r->addr;
info->port = r->or_port;
return info;
}
/** Release storage held by an extend_info_t struct. */
void
extend_info_free(extend_info_t *info)
{
tor_assert(info);
crypto_free_pk_env(info->onion_key);
tor_free(info);
}
/** Allocate and return a new extend_info_t with the same contents as
* <b>info</b>. */
extend_info_t *
extend_info_dup(extend_info_t *info)
{
extend_info_t *newinfo;
tor_assert(info);
newinfo = tor_malloc(sizeof(extend_info_t));
memcpy(newinfo, info, sizeof(extend_info_t));
newinfo->onion_key = crypto_pk_dup_key(info->onion_key);
return newinfo;
}
/** Return the routerinfo_t for the chosen exit router in <b>state</b>.
* If there is no chosen exit, or if we don't know the routerinfo_t for
* the chosen exit, return NULL.
*/
routerinfo_t *
build_state_get_exit_router(cpath_build_state_t *state)
{
if (!state || !state->chosen_exit)
return NULL;
return router_get_by_digest(state->chosen_exit->identity_digest);
}
/** Return the nickname for the chosen exit router in <b>state</b>. If
* there is no chosen exit, or if we don't know the routerinfo_t for the
* chosen exit, return NULL.
*/
const char *
build_state_get_exit_nickname(cpath_build_state_t *state)
{
if (!state || !state->chosen_exit)
return NULL;
return state->chosen_exit->nickname;
}
/** Return the router corresponding to <b>e</b>, if <b>e</b> is
* working well enough that we are willing to use it as an entry
* right now. (Else return NULL.) In particular, it must be
* - Listed as either up or never yet contacted;
* - Present in the routerlist;
* - Listed as 'stable' or 'fast' by the current dirserver concensus,
2006-02-09 01:08:23 +01:00
* if demanded by <b>need_uptime</b> or <b>need_capacity</b>; and
* - Allowed by our current ReachableAddresses config option.
*/
static INLINE routerinfo_t *
entry_is_live(entry_guard_t *e, int need_uptime, int need_capacity)
{
routerinfo_t *r;
if (e->down_since && e->made_contact)
return NULL;
r = router_get_by_digest(e->identity);
if (!r)
return NULL;
if (router_is_unreliable(r, need_uptime, need_capacity, 0))
return NULL;
if (firewall_is_fascist_or() &&
!fascist_firewall_allows_address_or(r->addr,r->or_port))
return NULL;
return r;
}
/** Return the number of entry guards that we think are usable. */
static int
num_live_entry_guards(void)
{
int n = 0;
if (! entry_guards)
return 0;
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, entry,
{
if (entry_is_live(entry, 0, 1))
++n;
});
return n;
}
/** Return 1 if <b>digest</b> matches the identity of any node
* in the entry_guards list. Else return 0. */
static INLINE int
is_an_entry_guard(char *digest)
{
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, entry,
if (!memcmp(digest, entry->identity, DIGEST_LEN))
return 1;
);
return 0;
}
static void
log_entry_guards(int severity)
{
smartlist_t *elements = smartlist_create();
char buf[1024];
char *s;
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, e,
{
tor_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s (%s%s%s)",
e->nickname,
e->down_since ? "down " : "up ",
e->unlisted_since ? "unlisted " : "listed ",
e->made_contact ? "made-contact" : "never-contacted");
smartlist_add(elements, tor_strdup(buf));
});
s = smartlist_join_strings(elements, ",", 0, NULL);
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(elements, char*, cp, tor_free(cp));
smartlist_free(elements);
log_fn(severity,LD_CIRC,"%s",s);
tor_free(s);
}
#define NUM_ENTRY_PICK_TRIES 100
/** Add a new (preferably stable and fast) router to our
* entry_guards list. Return a pointer to the router if we succeed,
* or NULL if we can't find any more suitable entries.
*
* If <b>chosen</b> is defined, use that one, and if it's not
* already in our entry_guards list, put it at the *beginning*.
* Else, put the one we pick at the end of the list. */
static routerinfo_t *
add_an_entry_guard(routerinfo_t *chosen)
{
routerinfo_t *router;
entry_guard_t *entry;
if (chosen) {
router = chosen;
if (is_an_entry_guard(router->cache_info.identity_digest))
return NULL;
} else {
router = choose_good_entry_server(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL, NULL);
if (!router)
return NULL;
}
entry = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(entry_guard_t));
log_info(LD_CIRC, "Chose '%s' as new entry guard.", router->nickname);
strlcpy(entry->nickname, router->nickname, sizeof(entry->nickname));
memcpy(entry->identity, router->cache_info.identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
if (chosen) /* prepend */
smartlist_insert(entry_guards, 0, entry);
else /* append */
smartlist_add(entry_guards, entry);
log_entry_guards(LOG_INFO);
return router;
}
/** If the use of entry guards is configured, choose more entry guards
* until we have enough in the list. */
static void
pick_entry_guards(void)
{
or_options_t *options = get_options();
int changed = 0;
tor_assert(entry_guards);
while (num_live_entry_guards() < options->NumEntryGuards) {
if (!add_an_entry_guard(NULL))
break;
changed = 1;
}
if (changed)
entry_guards_changed();
}
/** Release all storage held by the list of entry guards. */
void
entry_guards_free_all(void)
{
if (entry_guards) {
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, e, tor_free(e));
smartlist_free(entry_guards);
entry_guards = NULL;
}
}
/** How long (in seconds) do we allow an entry guard to be nonfunctional
* before we give up on it? */
#define ENTRY_ALLOW_DOWNTIME (30*24*60*60)
/** How long (in seconds) do we allow an entry guard to be unlisted in the
* directory before we give up on it? */
#define ENTRY_ALLOW_UNLISTED (30*24*60*60)
/** Remove all entry guards that have been down or unlisted for so
* long that we don't think they'll come up again. Return 1 if we
* removed any, or 0 if we did nothing. */
static int
remove_dead_entries(void)
{
char dbuf[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
char tbuf[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
time_t now = time(NULL);
int i;
int changed = 0;
for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(entry_guards); ) {
entry_guard_t *entry = smartlist_get(entry_guards, i);
const char *why = NULL;
time_t since = 0;
if (entry->unlisted_since &&
entry->unlisted_since + ENTRY_ALLOW_UNLISTED < now) {
why = "unlisted";
since = entry->unlisted_since;
} else if (entry->down_since &&
entry->down_since + ENTRY_ALLOW_DOWNTIME < now) {
why = "down";
since = entry->down_since;
}
if (why) {
base16_encode(dbuf, sizeof(dbuf), entry->identity, DIGEST_LEN);
format_local_iso_time(tbuf, since);
log_info(LD_CIRC,
"Entry guard '%s' (%s) has been %s since %s; removing.",
entry->nickname, dbuf, why, tbuf);
tor_free(entry);
smartlist_del_keeporder(entry_guards, i);
log_entry_guards(LOG_INFO);
changed = 1;
} else
++i;
}
return changed ? 1 : 0;
}
/** A new directory or router-status has arrived; update the down/listed
* status of the entry guards.
*
* An entry is 'down' if the directory lists it as nonrunning.
* An entry is 'unlisted' if the directory doesn't include it.
*/
void
entry_guards_set_status_from_directory(void)
{
/* Don't call this on startup; only on a fresh download. Otherwise we'll
* think that things are unlisted. */
routerlist_t *routers;
time_t now;
int changed = 0;
int severity = LOG_INFO;
if (! entry_guards)
return;
routers = router_get_routerlist();
now = time(NULL);
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, entry,
{
routerinfo_t *r = router_get_by_digest(entry->identity);
if (! r) {
if (! entry->unlisted_since) {
entry->unlisted_since = time(NULL);
changed = 1;
log_info(LD_CIRC,"Entry guard '%s' is not listed by directories.",
entry->nickname);
severity = LOG_INFO;
}
} else {
if (entry->unlisted_since) {
log_info(LD_CIRC,"Entry guard '%s' is listed again by directories.",
entry->nickname);
changed = 1;
severity = LOG_INFO;
}
entry->unlisted_since = 0;
if (! r->is_running) {
if (! entry->down_since) {
entry->down_since = now;
log_info(LD_CIRC, "Entry guard '%s' is now down.",
entry->nickname);
changed = 1;
severity = LOG_INFO;
}
} else {
if (entry->down_since) {
log_info(LD_CIRC,"Entry guard '%s' is up in latest directories.",
entry->nickname);
changed = 1;
}
entry->down_since = 0;
}
}
log_info(LD_CIRC, "Summary: Entry '%s' is %s, %s, and %s.",
entry->nickname,
entry->down_since ? "down" : "up",
entry->unlisted_since ? "unlisted" : "listed",
entry_is_live(entry, 0, 1) ? "live" : "not live");
});
if (remove_dead_entries())
changed = 1;
if (changed) {
log_fn(severity, LD_CIRC, " (%d/%d entry guards are usable/new)",
num_live_entry_guards(), smartlist_len(entry_guards));
log_entry_guards(LOG_INFO);
entry_guards_changed();
}
}
/** Called when a connection to an OR with the identity digest <b>digest</b>
* is established (<b>succeeded</b>==1) or has failed (<b>succeeded</b>==0).
* If the OR is an entry, change that entry's up/down status.
* Return 0 normally, or -1 if we want to tear down the new connection.
*/
int
entry_guard_set_status(const char *digest, int succeeded)
{
int changed = 0;
int refuse_conn = 0;
if (! entry_guards)
return 0;
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, entry,
{
if (!memcmp(entry->identity, digest, DIGEST_LEN)) {
if (succeeded) {
if (!entry->made_contact) {
/* We've just added a new long-term entry guard. Perhaps
* the network just came back? We should give our earlier
* entries another try too, and close this connection so
* we don't use it before we've given the others a shot. */
entry->made_contact = 1;
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, e,
{
routerinfo_t *r;
if (e == entry)
break;
if (e->made_contact) {
e->down_since = 0;
r = entry_is_live(e, 0, 1);
if (r) {
refuse_conn = 1;
r->is_running = 1;
}
}
});
log_info(LD_CIRC,
"Connected to new entry guard '%s'. Marking earlier "
"entry guards up. %d/%d entry guards usable/new.",
entry->nickname,
num_live_entry_guards(), smartlist_len(entry_guards));
log_entry_guards(LOG_INFO);
changed = 1;
}
if (entry->down_since) {
entry->down_since = 0;
log_info(LD_CIRC,
"Connection to formerly down entry guard '%s' succeeded. "
"%d/%d entry guards usable/new.", entry->nickname,
num_live_entry_guards(), smartlist_len(entry_guards));
log_entry_guards(LOG_INFO);
changed = 1;
}
} else {
if (!entry->made_contact) { /* dump him */
log_info(LD_CIRC,
"Connection to never-contacted entry guard '%s' failed. "
"Removing from the list. %d/%d entry guards usable/new.",
entry->nickname,
num_live_entry_guards()-1, smartlist_len(entry_guards)-1);
tor_free(entry);
smartlist_del_keeporder(entry_guards, entry_sl_idx);
log_entry_guards(LOG_INFO);
changed = 1;
} else if (!entry->down_since) {
entry->down_since = time(NULL);
log_info(LD_CIRC, "Connection to entry guard '%s' failed. "
"%d/%d entry guards usable/new.",
entry->nickname,
num_live_entry_guards(), smartlist_len(entry_guards));
log_entry_guards(LOG_INFO);
changed = 1;
}
}
}
});
if (changed)
entry_guards_changed();
return refuse_conn ? -1 : 0;
}
/** When we try to choose an entry guard, should we parse and add
* config's EntryNodes first? */
static int should_add_entry_nodes = 0;
void
entry_nodes_should_be_added(void)
{
log_info(LD_CIRC, "New EntryNodes config option detected. Will use.");
should_add_entry_nodes = 1;
}
void
entry_guards_prepend_from_config(void)
{
int missed_some = 0;
int idx;
or_options_t *options = get_options();
smartlist_t *routers = smartlist_create();
smartlist_t *tmp = smartlist_create();
tor_assert(entry_guards);
tor_assert(options->EntryNodes);
if (options->StrictEntryNodes) {
log_info(LD_CIRC,"Clearing old entry guards");
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, e, tor_free(e));
smartlist_clear(entry_guards);
entry_guards_changed();
}
add_nickname_list_to_smartlist(routers, options->EntryNodes,
0, 1, 1);
/* take a moment first to notice whether we got them all */
log_info(LD_CIRC,"Adding configured EntryNodes '%s'.",
options->EntryNodes);
smartlist_split_string(tmp, options->EntryNodes, ",",
SPLIT_SKIP_SPACE|SPLIT_IGNORE_BLANK, 0);
missed_some = smartlist_len(routers) != smartlist_len(tmp);
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(tmp, char *, nick, tor_free(nick));
smartlist_free(tmp);
for (idx = smartlist_len(routers)-1 ; idx >= 0; idx--) {
/* pick off the last one, turn it into a router, prepend it
* to our entry_guards list. If we can't find it, set missed_some
* to 1. */
routerinfo_t *r = smartlist_get(routers, idx);
add_an_entry_guard(r);
}
if (!missed_some)
should_add_entry_nodes = 0; /* whew, we're done */
smartlist_free(routers);
}
/** Pick a live (up and listed) entry guard from entry_guards, and
* make sure not to pick this circuit's exit. */
static routerinfo_t *
choose_random_entry(cpath_build_state_t *state)
{
or_options_t *options = get_options();
smartlist_t *live_entry_guards = smartlist_create();
routerinfo_t *chosen_exit = build_state_get_exit_router(state);
routerinfo_t *r = NULL;
int need_uptime = state->need_uptime;
int need_capacity = state->need_capacity;
if (!entry_guards)
entry_guards = smartlist_create();
if (should_add_entry_nodes)
entry_guards_prepend_from_config();
if (!options->StrictEntryNodes &&
(! entry_guards ||
smartlist_len(entry_guards) < options->NumEntryGuards))
pick_entry_guards();
retry:
smartlist_clear(live_entry_guards);
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, entry,
{
r = entry_is_live(entry, need_uptime, need_capacity);
if (r && r != chosen_exit) {
smartlist_add(live_entry_guards, r);
if (smartlist_len(live_entry_guards) >= options->NumEntryGuards)
break; /* we have enough */
}
});
/* Try to have at least 2 choices available. This way we don't
* get stuck with a single live-but-crummy entry and just keep
* using him.
* (We might get 2 live-but-crummy entry guards, but so be it.) */
if (smartlist_len(live_entry_guards) < 2) {
if (need_uptime) {
need_uptime = 0; /* try without that requirement */
goto retry;
}
if (!options->StrictEntryNodes) {
/* still no? try adding a new entry then */
r = add_an_entry_guard(NULL);
if (r) {
smartlist_add(live_entry_guards, r);
entry_guards_changed();
}
}
if (!r && need_capacity) {
/* still no? last attempt, try without requiring capacity */
need_capacity = 0;
goto retry;
}
/* live_entry_guards will be empty below. Oh well, we tried. */
}
r = smartlist_choose(live_entry_guards);
smartlist_free(live_entry_guards);
return r;
}
/** Parse <b>state</b> and learn about the entry guards it describes.
* If <b>set</b> is true, and there are no errors, replace the global
* entry_list with what we find.
* On success, return 0. On failure, alloc into *<b>msg</b> a string
* describing the error, and return -1.
*/
int
entry_guards_parse_state(or_state_t *state, int set, char **msg)
{
entry_guard_t *node = NULL;
smartlist_t *new_entry_guards = smartlist_create();
config_line_t *line;
*msg = NULL;
for (line = state->EntryGuards; line; line = line->next) {
if (!strcasecmp(line->key, "EntryGuard")) {
smartlist_t *args = smartlist_create();
node = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(entry_guard_t));
2006-01-11 05:04:42 +01:00
/* all entry guards on disk have been contacted */
node->made_contact = 1;
smartlist_add(new_entry_guards, node);
smartlist_split_string(args, line->value, " ",
SPLIT_SKIP_SPACE|SPLIT_IGNORE_BLANK, 0);
if (smartlist_len(args)<2) {
*msg = tor_strdup("Unable to parse entry nodes: "
"Too few arguments to EntryGuard");
} else if (!is_legal_nickname(smartlist_get(args,0))) {
*msg = tor_strdup("Unable to parse entry nodes: "
"Bad nickname for EntryGuard");
} else {
strlcpy(node->nickname, smartlist_get(args,0), MAX_NICKNAME_LEN+1);
if (base16_decode(node->identity, DIGEST_LEN, smartlist_get(args,1),
strlen(smartlist_get(args,1)))<0) {
*msg = tor_strdup("Unable to parse entry nodes: "
"Bad hex digest for EntryGuard");
}
}
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(args, char*, cp, tor_free(cp));
smartlist_free(args);
if (*msg)
break;
} else {
time_t when;
if (!node) {
*msg = tor_strdup("Unable to parse entry nodes: "
"EntryGuardDownSince/UnlistedSince without EntryGuard");
break;
}
if (parse_iso_time(line->value, &when)<0) {
*msg = tor_strdup("Unable to parse entry nodes: "
"Bad time in EntryGuardDownSince/UnlistedSince");
break;
}
if (!strcasecmp(line->key, "EntryGuardDownSince"))
node->down_since = when;
else
node->unlisted_since = when;
}
}
if (*msg || !set) {
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(new_entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, e, tor_free(e));
smartlist_free(new_entry_guards);
} else { /* !*err && set */
if (entry_guards) {
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, e, tor_free(e));
smartlist_free(entry_guards);
}
entry_guards = new_entry_guards;
entry_guards_dirty = 0;
}
return *msg ? -1 : 0;
}
/** Our list of entry guards has changed, or some element of one
* of our entry guards has changed. Write the changes to disk. */
static void
entry_guards_changed(void)
{
entry_guards_dirty = 1;
or_state_save();
}
/** If the entry guard info has not changed, do nothing and return.
* Otherwise, free the EntryGuards piece of <b>state</b> and create
* a new one out of the global entry_guards list, and then mark
* <b>state</b> dirty so it will get saved to disk.
*/
void
entry_guards_update_state(or_state_t *state)
{
config_line_t **next, *line;
if (! entry_guards_dirty)
return;
config_free_lines(state->EntryGuards);
next = &state->EntryGuards;
*next = NULL;
if (!entry_guards)
entry_guards = smartlist_create();
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, e,
{
char dbuf[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
if (!e->made_contact)
continue; /* don't write this one to disk */
*next = line = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(config_line_t));
line->key = tor_strdup("EntryGuard");
line->value = tor_malloc(HEX_DIGEST_LEN+MAX_NICKNAME_LEN+2);
base16_encode(dbuf, sizeof(dbuf), e->identity, DIGEST_LEN);
tor_snprintf(line->value,HEX_DIGEST_LEN+MAX_NICKNAME_LEN+2,
"%s %s", e->nickname, dbuf);
next = &(line->next);
if (e->down_since) {
*next = line = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(config_line_t));
line->key = tor_strdup("EntryGuardDownSince");
line->value = tor_malloc(ISO_TIME_LEN+1);
format_iso_time(line->value, e->down_since);
next = &(line->next);
}
if (e->unlisted_since) {
*next = line = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(config_line_t));
line->key = tor_strdup("EntryGuardUnlistedSince");
line->value = tor_malloc(ISO_TIME_LEN+1);
format_iso_time(line->value, e->unlisted_since);
next = &(line->next);
}
});
state->dirty = 1;
entry_guards_dirty = 0;
}
/** If <b>question</b> is the string "entry-guards", then dump
* to *<b>answer</b> a newly allocated string describing all of
* the nodes in the global entry_guards list. See control-spec.txt
* for details.
* For backward compatibility, we also handle the string "helper-nodes".
* */
int
entry_guards_getinfo(const char *question, char **answer)
{
if (!strcmp(question,"entry-guards") ||
!strcmp(question,"helper-nodes")) {
smartlist_t *sl = smartlist_create();
char tbuf[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
char dbuf[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
if (!entry_guards)
entry_guards = smartlist_create();
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, e,
{
size_t len = HEX_DIGEST_LEN+ISO_TIME_LEN+32;
char *c = tor_malloc(len);
const char *status = NULL;
time_t when = 0;
if (!e->made_contact) {
status = "never-connected";
} else if (e->unlisted_since) {
when = e->unlisted_since;
status = "unlisted";
} else if (e->down_since) {
when = e->down_since;
status = "down";
} else {
status = "up";
}
base16_encode(dbuf, sizeof(dbuf), e->identity, DIGEST_LEN);
if (when) {
format_iso_time(tbuf, when);
tor_snprintf(c, len, "$%s %s %s\n", dbuf, status, tbuf);
} else {
tor_snprintf(c, len, "$%s %s\n", dbuf, status);
}
smartlist_add(sl, c);
});
*answer = smartlist_join_strings(sl, "", 0, NULL);
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(sl, char *, c, tor_free(c));
smartlist_free(sl);
}
return 0;
}