2004-11-07 02:33:06 +01:00
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/* Copyright 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
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* Copyright 2001-2004 Roger Dingledine.
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* Copyright 2004 Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. */
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2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
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/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
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/* $Id$ */
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2004-11-29 23:25:31 +01:00
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const char circuitbuild_c_id[] = "$Id$";
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2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
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/**
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* \file circuitbuild.c
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* \brief The actual details of building circuits.
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**/
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#include "or.h"
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/********* START VARIABLES **********/
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/** A global list of all circuits at this hop. */
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extern circuit_t *global_circuitlist;
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/********* END VARIABLES ************/
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2004-07-03 01:08:59 +02:00
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static int
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circuit_deliver_create_cell(circuit_t *circ, char *payload);
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2005-01-12 05:58:23 +01:00
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static cpath_build_state_t *
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onion_new_cpath_build_state(uint8_t purpose, const char *exit_digest,
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Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard
to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must
be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect
streams can use internal circs if they want.
New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around
to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal
circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime
if we've seen that lately).
Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs),
which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones
are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long
we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit.
Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as
long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web
browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.)
Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND
circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when
we try to launch one.
Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since
there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching
over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete.
Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take
into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses --
it won't.
Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when
it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which
means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken.
svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
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int need_uptime, int need_capacity, int internal);
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2004-11-12 06:05:41 +01:00
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static int onion_extend_cpath(crypt_path_t **head_ptr,
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cpath_build_state_t *state, routerinfo_t **router_out);
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2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
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static int count_acceptable_routers(smartlist_t *routers);
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/** Iterate over values of circ_id, starting from conn-\>next_circ_id,
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* and with the high bit specified by circ_id_type (see
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* decide_circ_id_type()), until we get a circ_id that is not in use
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* by any other circuit on that conn.
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*
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* Return it, or 0 if can't get a unique circ_id.
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*/
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2004-11-10 21:14:37 +01:00
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static uint16_t get_unique_circ_id_by_conn(connection_t *conn) {
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2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
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uint16_t test_circ_id;
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int attempts=0;
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uint16_t high_bit;
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2004-10-17 00:14:52 +02:00
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tor_assert(conn);
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tor_assert(conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR);
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2004-11-10 21:14:37 +01:00
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high_bit = (conn->circ_id_type == CIRC_ID_TYPE_HIGHER) ? 1<<15 : 0;
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2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
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do {
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/* Sequentially iterate over test_circ_id=1...1<<15-1 until we find a
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* circID such that (high_bit|test_circ_id) is not already used. */
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test_circ_id = conn->next_circ_id++;
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if (test_circ_id == 0 || test_circ_id >= 1<<15) {
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test_circ_id = 1;
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conn->next_circ_id = 2;
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}
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2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
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if (++attempts > 1<<15) {
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2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
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/* Make sure we don't loop forever if all circ_id's are used. This
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* matters because it's an external DoS vulnerability.
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*/
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log_fn(LOG_WARN,"No unused circ IDs. Failing.");
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return 0;
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}
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test_circ_id |= high_bit;
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2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
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} while (circuit_get_by_circ_id_conn(test_circ_id, conn));
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2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
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return test_circ_id;
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}
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2004-11-23 01:11:36 +01:00
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/** If <b>verbose</b> is false, allocate and return a comma-separated
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* list of the currently built elements of circuit_t. If
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* <b>verbose</b> is true, also list information about link status in
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* a more verbose format using spaces.
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2004-11-03 19:33:07 +01:00
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*/
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2004-11-23 01:11:36 +01:00
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char *
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circuit_list_path(circuit_t *circ, int verbose)
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2004-11-03 19:33:07 +01:00
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{
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struct crypt_path_t *hop;
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smartlist_t *elements;
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2004-11-23 01:11:36 +01:00
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const char *states[] = {"closed", "waiting for keys", "open"};
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char buf[128];
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2004-11-03 19:33:07 +01:00
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char *s;
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tor_assert(CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ));
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tor_assert(circ->cpath);
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elements = smartlist_create();
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2004-11-23 01:11:36 +01:00
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if (verbose) {
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Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard
to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must
be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect
streams can use internal circs if they want.
New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around
to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal
circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime
if we've seen that lately).
Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs),
which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones
are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long
we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit.
Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as
long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web
browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.)
Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND
circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when
we try to launch one.
Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since
there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching
over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete.
Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take
into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses --
it won't.
Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when
it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which
means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken.
svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
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tor_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf)-1, "%s%s circ (length %d, exit %s):",
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circ->build_state->is_internal ? "internal" : "exit",
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circ->build_state->need_uptime ? " (high-uptime)" : "",
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2004-11-23 01:11:36 +01:00
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circ->build_state->desired_path_len,
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circ->build_state->chosen_exit_name);
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smartlist_add(elements, tor_strdup(buf));
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}
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2004-11-23 07:08:08 +01:00
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hop = circ->cpath;
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do {
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2004-11-23 01:11:36 +01:00
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const char *elt;
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routerinfo_t *r;
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2004-11-23 07:08:08 +01:00
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if (!hop)
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break;
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2004-11-23 01:11:36 +01:00
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if (!verbose && hop->state != CPATH_STATE_OPEN)
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2004-11-03 19:33:07 +01:00
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break;
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if ((r = router_get_by_digest(hop->identity_digest))) {
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2004-11-23 01:11:36 +01:00
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elt = r->nickname;
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2004-11-03 19:33:07 +01:00
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} else if (circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED) {
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2004-11-23 01:11:36 +01:00
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elt = "<rendezvous splice>";
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} else {
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buf[0]='$';
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base16_encode(buf+1,sizeof(buf)-1,hop->identity_digest,DIGEST_LEN);
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elt = buf;
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}
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if (verbose) {
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size_t len = strlen(elt)+2+strlen(states[hop->state])+1;
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char *v = tor_malloc(len);
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tor_assert(hop->state <= 2);
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tor_snprintf(v,len,"%s(%s)",elt,states[hop->state]);
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smartlist_add(elements, v);
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2004-11-03 19:33:07 +01:00
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} else {
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2004-11-23 01:11:36 +01:00
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smartlist_add(elements, tor_strdup(elt));
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2004-11-03 19:33:07 +01:00
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}
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2004-11-23 07:08:08 +01:00
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hop = hop->next;
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} while (hop != circ->cpath);
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2004-11-03 19:33:07 +01:00
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2004-11-23 01:11:36 +01:00
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s = smartlist_join_strings(elements, verbose?" ":",", 0, NULL);
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2004-11-03 19:33:07 +01:00
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SMARTLIST_FOREACH(elements, char*, cp, tor_free(cp));
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2004-12-07 08:48:16 +01:00
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smartlist_free(elements);
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2004-11-03 19:33:07 +01:00
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return s;
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}
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2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
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/** Log, at severity <b>severity</b>, the nicknames of each router in
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* circ's cpath. Also log the length of the cpath, and the intended
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* exit point.
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*/
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void circuit_log_path(int severity, circuit_t *circ) {
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2004-11-23 01:11:36 +01:00
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char *s = circuit_list_path(circ,1);
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log_fn(severity,"%s",s);
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tor_free(s);
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2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
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}
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/** Tell the rep(utation)hist(ory) module about the status of the links
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* in circ. Hops that have become OPEN are marked as successfully
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* extended; the _first_ hop that isn't open (if any) is marked as
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* unable to extend.
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*/
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void circuit_rep_hist_note_result(circuit_t *circ) {
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struct crypt_path_t *hop;
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2004-07-13 20:23:40 +02:00
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char *prev_digest = NULL;
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2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
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routerinfo_t *router;
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hop = circ->cpath;
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2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
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if (!hop) {
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2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
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/* XXX
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* if !hop, then we're not the beginning of this circuit.
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* for now, just forget about it. later, we should remember when
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* extends-through-us failed, too.
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*/
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return;
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}
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2004-11-06 06:18:11 +01:00
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if (server_mode(get_options())) {
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2004-07-21 02:44:04 +02:00
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routerinfo_t *me = router_get_my_routerinfo();
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tor_assert(me);
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prev_digest = me->identity_digest;
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2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
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}
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do {
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2004-07-02 01:13:04 +02:00
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router = router_get_by_digest(hop->identity_digest);
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2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
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if (router) {
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2004-07-13 20:23:40 +02:00
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if (prev_digest) {
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2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
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if (hop->state == CPATH_STATE_OPEN)
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2004-07-13 20:23:40 +02:00
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rep_hist_note_extend_succeeded(prev_digest, router->identity_digest);
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2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
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else {
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2004-07-13 20:23:40 +02:00
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rep_hist_note_extend_failed(prev_digest, router->identity_digest);
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2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
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break;
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}
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}
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2004-07-13 20:23:40 +02:00
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prev_digest = router->identity_digest;
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2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
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} else {
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2004-07-13 20:23:40 +02:00
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prev_digest = NULL;
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2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
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}
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hop=hop->next;
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} while (hop!=circ->cpath);
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}
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/** A helper function for circuit_dump_by_conn() below. Log a bunch
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* of information about circuit <b>circ</b>.
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*/
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static void
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circuit_dump_details(int severity, circuit_t *circ, int poll_index,
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2004-10-27 23:14:11 +02:00
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const char *type, int this_circid, int other_circid) {
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2004-12-04 03:51:11 +01:00
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log(severity,"Conn %d has %s circuit: circID %d (other side %d), state %d (%s), born %d:",
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2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
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poll_index, type, this_circid, other_circid, circ->state,
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circuit_state_to_string[circ->state], (int)circ->timestamp_created);
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2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
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if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) { /* circ starts at this node */
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2004-12-04 03:51:11 +01:00
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circuit_log_path(severity, circ);
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2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
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}
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}
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/** Log, at severity <b>severity</b>, information about each circuit
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* that is connected to <b>conn</b>.
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*/
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void circuit_dump_by_conn(connection_t *conn, int severity) {
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circuit_t *circ;
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connection_t *tmpconn;
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2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
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for (circ=global_circuitlist;circ;circ = circ->next) {
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2004-12-04 03:51:11 +01:00
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if (circ->marked_for_close)
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continue;
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2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
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if (circ->p_conn == conn)
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2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
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circuit_dump_details(severity, circ, conn->poll_index, "App-ward",
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circ->p_circ_id, circ->n_circ_id);
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2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
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for (tmpconn=circ->p_streams; tmpconn; tmpconn=tmpconn->next_stream) {
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if (tmpconn == conn) {
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2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
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circuit_dump_details(severity, circ, conn->poll_index, "App-ward",
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circ->p_circ_id, circ->n_circ_id);
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}
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}
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2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
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if (circ->n_conn == conn)
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2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
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circuit_dump_details(severity, circ, conn->poll_index, "Exit-ward",
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circ->n_circ_id, circ->p_circ_id);
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2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
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for (tmpconn=circ->n_streams; tmpconn; tmpconn=tmpconn->next_stream) {
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if (tmpconn == conn) {
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2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
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circuit_dump_details(severity, circ, conn->poll_index, "Exit-ward",
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circ->n_circ_id, circ->p_circ_id);
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}
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}
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2004-12-18 00:17:00 +01:00
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if (!circ->n_conn && circ->n_addr && circ->n_port &&
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2004-12-04 03:51:11 +01:00
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circ->n_addr == conn->addr &&
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circ->n_port == conn->port &&
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!memcmp(conn->identity_digest, circ->n_conn_id_digest, DIGEST_LEN)) {
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circuit_dump_details(severity, circ, conn->poll_index, "Pending",
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circ->n_circ_id, circ->p_circ_id);
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}
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2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
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}
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}
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2004-07-03 01:40:03 +02:00
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/** Build a new circuit for <b>purpose</b>. If <b>exit_digest</b>
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2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
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* is defined, then use that as your exit router, else choose a suitable
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* exit node.
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*
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* Also launch a connection to the first OR in the chosen path, if
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* it's not open already.
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*/
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2005-01-12 05:58:23 +01:00
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|
|
circuit_t *
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circuit_establish_circuit(uint8_t purpose, const char *exit_digest,
|
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard
to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must
be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect
streams can use internal circs if they want.
New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around
to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal
circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime
if we've seen that lately).
Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs),
which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones
are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long
we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit.
Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as
long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web
browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.)
Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND
circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when
we try to launch one.
Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since
there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching
over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete.
Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take
into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses --
it won't.
Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when
it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which
means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken.
svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
|
|
|
int need_uptime, int need_capacity, int internal) {
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
routerinfo_t *firsthop;
|
|
|
|
connection_t *n_conn;
|
|
|
|
circuit_t *circ;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
circ = circuit_new(0, NULL); /* sets circ->p_circ_id and circ->p_conn */
|
|
|
|
circ->state = CIRCUIT_STATE_OR_WAIT;
|
2005-01-12 05:58:23 +01:00
|
|
|
circ->build_state = onion_new_cpath_build_state(purpose, exit_digest,
|
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard
to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must
be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect
streams can use internal circs if they want.
New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around
to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal
circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime
if we've seen that lately).
Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs),
which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones
are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long
we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit.
Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as
long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web
browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.)
Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND
circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when
we try to launch one.
Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since
there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching
over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete.
Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take
into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses --
it won't.
Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when
it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which
means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken.
svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
|
|
|
need_uptime, need_capacity, internal);
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
circ->purpose = purpose;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (! circ->build_state) {
|
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Generating cpath failed.");
|
|
|
|
circuit_mark_for_close(circ);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (onion_extend_cpath(&circ->cpath, circ->build_state, &firsthop)<0 ||
|
2004-11-28 12:39:53 +01:00
|
|
|
!CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) {
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Generating first cpath hop failed.");
|
|
|
|
circuit_mark_for_close(circ);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2004-11-03 19:33:07 +01:00
|
|
|
control_event_circuit_status(circ, CIRC_EVENT_LAUNCHED);
|
|
|
|
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
/* now see if we're already connected to the first OR in 'route' */
|
|
|
|
|
2004-08-17 14:09:37 +02:00
|
|
|
tor_assert(firsthop);
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Looking for firsthop '%s:%u'",
|
|
|
|
firsthop->address,firsthop->or_port);
|
2004-07-13 01:53:16 +02:00
|
|
|
/* imprint the circuit with its future n_conn->id */
|
|
|
|
memcpy(circ->n_conn_id_digest, firsthop->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
|
2004-07-02 01:13:04 +02:00
|
|
|
n_conn = connection_get_by_identity_digest(firsthop->identity_digest,
|
|
|
|
CONN_TYPE_OR);
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!n_conn || n_conn->state != OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN) { /* not currently connected */
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
circ->n_addr = firsthop->addr;
|
|
|
|
circ->n_port = firsthop->or_port;
|
|
|
|
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!n_conn) { /* launch the connection */
|
2004-07-02 11:29:01 +02:00
|
|
|
n_conn = connection_or_connect(firsthop->addr, firsthop->or_port,
|
|
|
|
firsthop->identity_digest);
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!n_conn) { /* connect failed, forget the whole thing */
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"connect to firsthop failed. Closing.");
|
|
|
|
circuit_mark_for_close(circ);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"connecting in progress (or finished). Good.");
|
|
|
|
/* return success. The onion/circuit/etc will be taken care of automatically
|
|
|
|
* (may already have been) whenever n_conn reaches OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
return circ;
|
2004-08-18 22:35:11 +02:00
|
|
|
} else { /* it's already open. use it. */
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
circ->n_addr = n_conn->addr;
|
|
|
|
circ->n_port = n_conn->port;
|
|
|
|
circ->n_conn = n_conn;
|
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Conn open. Delivering first onion skin.");
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (circuit_send_next_onion_skin(circ) < 0) {
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"circuit_send_next_onion_skin failed.");
|
|
|
|
circuit_mark_for_close(circ);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return circ;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/** Find circuits that are waiting on <b>or_conn</b> to become open,
|
|
|
|
* if any, and get them to send their create cells forward.
|
2004-11-21 08:43:12 +01:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Status is 1 if connect succeeded, or 0 if connect failed.
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2004-11-21 08:43:12 +01:00
|
|
|
void circuit_n_conn_done(connection_t *or_conn, int status) {
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
circuit_t *circ;
|
|
|
|
|
2004-11-21 08:43:12 +01:00
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"or_conn to %s, status=%d", or_conn->nickname, status);
|
2004-07-13 01:53:16 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
for (circ=global_circuitlist;circ;circ = circ->next) {
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
if (circ->marked_for_close)
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!circ->n_conn &&
|
2004-11-28 12:39:53 +01:00
|
|
|
circ->n_addr == or_conn->addr &&
|
|
|
|
circ->n_port == or_conn->port &&
|
|
|
|
!memcmp(or_conn->identity_digest, circ->n_conn_id_digest, DIGEST_LEN)) {
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
tor_assert(circ->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OR_WAIT);
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!status) { /* or_conn failed; close circ */
|
2004-07-02 11:29:01 +02:00
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"or_conn failed. Closing circ.");
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
circuit_mark_for_close(circ);
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
2004-07-02 11:29:01 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Found circ %d, sending create cell.", circ->n_circ_id);
|
|
|
|
circ->n_conn = or_conn;
|
2004-07-03 03:37:59 +02:00
|
|
|
memcpy(circ->n_conn_id_digest, or_conn->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) {
|
|
|
|
if (circuit_send_next_onion_skin(circ) < 0) {
|
2004-07-02 11:29:01 +02:00
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"send_next_onion_skin failed; circuit marked for closing.");
|
|
|
|
circuit_mark_for_close(circ);
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
/* XXX could this be bad, eg if next_onion_skin failed because conn died? */
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2004-07-03 01:08:59 +02:00
|
|
|
/* pull the create cell out of circ->onionskin, and send it */
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (circuit_deliver_create_cell(circ, circ->onionskin) < 0) {
|
2004-07-03 01:08:59 +02:00
|
|
|
circuit_mark_for_close(circ);
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2004-07-03 01:08:59 +02:00
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
circuit_deliver_create_cell(circuit_t *circ, char *payload) {
|
|
|
|
cell_t cell;
|
|
|
|
|
2004-10-17 00:14:52 +02:00
|
|
|
tor_assert(circ);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(circ->n_conn);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(circ->n_conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR);
|
2004-07-03 01:08:59 +02:00
|
|
|
tor_assert(payload);
|
|
|
|
|
2004-11-10 21:14:37 +01:00
|
|
|
circ->n_circ_id = get_unique_circ_id_by_conn(circ->n_conn);
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!circ->n_circ_id) {
|
2004-07-03 01:08:59 +02:00
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_WARN,"failed to get unique circID.");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Chosen circID %u.",circ->n_circ_id);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memset(&cell, 0, sizeof(cell_t));
|
|
|
|
cell.command = CELL_CREATE;
|
|
|
|
cell.circ_id = circ->n_circ_id;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memcpy(cell.payload, payload, ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN);
|
|
|
|
connection_or_write_cell_to_buf(&cell, circ->n_conn);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
extern int has_completed_circuit;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/** This is the backbone function for building circuits.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* If circ's first hop is closed, then we need to build a create
|
|
|
|
* cell and send it forward.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Otherwise, we need to build a relay extend cell and send it
|
|
|
|
* forward.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Return -1 if we want to tear down circ, else return 0.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int circuit_send_next_onion_skin(circuit_t *circ) {
|
|
|
|
crypt_path_t *hop;
|
|
|
|
routerinfo_t *router;
|
|
|
|
int r;
|
2004-07-01 03:16:59 +02:00
|
|
|
char payload[2+4+DIGEST_LEN+ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN];
|
|
|
|
char *onionskin;
|
2004-10-14 04:47:09 +02:00
|
|
|
size_t payload_len;
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2004-10-17 00:14:52 +02:00
|
|
|
tor_assert(circ);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ));
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (circ->cpath->state == CPATH_STATE_CLOSED) {
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"First skin; sending create cell.");
|
|
|
|
|
2004-07-03 01:40:03 +02:00
|
|
|
router = router_get_by_digest(circ->n_conn->identity_digest);
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!router) {
|
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_WARN,"Couldn't find routerinfo for %s",
|
|
|
|
circ->n_conn->nickname);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (onion_skin_create(router->onion_pkey,
|
2004-11-28 12:39:53 +01:00
|
|
|
&(circ->cpath->handshake_state),
|
|
|
|
payload) < 0) {
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_WARN,"onion_skin_create (first hop) failed.");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (circuit_deliver_create_cell(circ, payload) < 0)
|
2004-07-03 01:08:59 +02:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
circ->cpath->state = CPATH_STATE_AWAITING_KEYS;
|
|
|
|
circ->state = CIRCUIT_STATE_BUILDING;
|
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"first skin; finished sending create cell.");
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(circ->cpath->state == CPATH_STATE_OPEN);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(circ->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_BUILDING);
|
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"starting to send subsequent skin.");
|
|
|
|
r = onion_extend_cpath(&circ->cpath, circ->build_state, &router);
|
|
|
|
if (r==1) {
|
|
|
|
/* done building the circuit. whew. */
|
|
|
|
circ->state = CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN;
|
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"circuit built!");
|
2004-08-18 10:51:04 +02:00
|
|
|
circuit_reset_failure_count(0);
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!has_completed_circuit) {
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
has_completed_circuit=1;
|
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_NOTICE,"Tor has successfully opened a circuit. Looks like it's working.");
|
2004-11-16 04:32:01 +01:00
|
|
|
/* XXX009 Log a count of known routers here */
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
circuit_rep_hist_note_result(circ);
|
|
|
|
circuit_has_opened(circ); /* do other actions as necessary */
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
} else if (r<0) {
|
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Unable to extend circuit path.");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
hop = circ->cpath->prev;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*(uint32_t*)payload = htonl(hop->addr);
|
|
|
|
*(uint16_t*)(payload+4) = htons(hop->port);
|
2004-07-22 05:47:20 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
onionskin = payload+2+4;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(payload+2+4+ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN, hop->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
|
|
payload_len = 2+4+ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN+DIGEST_LEN;
|
2004-07-01 03:16:59 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (onion_skin_create(router->onion_pkey, &(hop->handshake_state), onionskin) < 0) {
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_WARN,"onion_skin_create failed.");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Sending extend relay cell.");
|
|
|
|
/* send it to hop->prev, because it will transfer
|
|
|
|
* it to a create cell and then send to hop */
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (connection_edge_send_command(NULL, circ, RELAY_COMMAND_EXTEND,
|
2004-11-28 12:39:53 +01:00
|
|
|
payload, payload_len, hop->prev) < 0)
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
return 0; /* circuit is closed */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
hop->state = CPATH_STATE_AWAITING_KEYS;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/** Take the 'extend' cell, pull out addr/port plus the onion skin. Make
|
|
|
|
* sure we're connected to the next hop, and pass it the onion skin in
|
|
|
|
* a create cell.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int circuit_extend(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ) {
|
|
|
|
connection_t *n_conn;
|
2004-07-01 03:16:59 +02:00
|
|
|
relay_header_t rh;
|
|
|
|
char *onionskin;
|
2004-07-03 01:08:59 +02:00
|
|
|
char *id_digest=NULL;
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (circ->n_conn) {
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_WARN,"n_conn already set. Bug/attack. Closing.");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2004-07-01 03:16:59 +02:00
|
|
|
relay_header_unpack(&rh, cell->payload);
|
|
|
|
|
2004-10-17 23:51:20 +02:00
|
|
|
if (rh.length < 4+2+ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN+DIGEST_LEN) {
|
2004-08-08 09:25:45 +02:00
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_WARN, "Wrong length %d on extend cell. Closing circuit.", rh.length);
|
2004-07-03 01:08:59 +02:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2004-07-01 03:16:59 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
circ->n_addr = ntohl(get_uint32(cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE));
|
|
|
|
circ->n_port = ntohs(get_uint16(cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE+4));
|
|
|
|
|
2004-10-17 23:51:20 +02:00
|
|
|
onionskin = cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE+4+2;
|
|
|
|
id_digest = cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE+4+2+ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN;
|
|
|
|
n_conn = connection_get_by_identity_digest(id_digest, CONN_TYPE_OR);
|
2004-07-01 03:16:59 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!n_conn || n_conn->state != OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN) {
|
2004-07-02 11:29:01 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Note that this will close circuits where the onion has the same
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
* router twice in a row in the path. I think that's ok.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
struct in_addr in;
|
2005-02-22 09:18:36 +01:00
|
|
|
char tmpbuf[INET_NTOA_BUF_LEN];
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
in.s_addr = htonl(circ->n_addr);
|
2005-02-22 09:18:36 +01:00
|
|
|
tor_inet_ntoa(&in,tmpbuf,sizeof(tmpbuf));
|
2004-07-02 11:29:01 +02:00
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Next router (%s:%d) not connected. Connecting.",
|
2005-02-22 09:18:36 +01:00
|
|
|
tmpbuf, circ->n_port);
|
2004-07-02 11:29:01 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2004-07-03 01:08:59 +02:00
|
|
|
memcpy(circ->onionskin, onionskin, ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN);
|
|
|
|
circ->state = CIRCUIT_STATE_OR_WAIT;
|
2004-07-13 01:53:16 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* imprint the circuit with its future n_conn->id */
|
|
|
|
memcpy(circ->n_conn_id_digest, id_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
|
|
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (n_conn) {
|
2004-08-08 12:32:36 +02:00
|
|
|
circ->n_addr = n_conn->addr;
|
|
|
|
circ->n_port = n_conn->port;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/* we should try to open a connection */
|
|
|
|
n_conn = connection_or_connect(circ->n_addr, circ->n_port, id_digest);
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!n_conn) {
|
2004-08-08 12:32:36 +02:00
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Launching n_conn failed. Closing.");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"connecting in progress (or finished). Good.");
|
2004-07-03 01:08:59 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* return success. The onion/circuit/etc will be taken care of automatically
|
|
|
|
* (may already have been) whenever n_conn reaches OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN.
|
2004-07-02 11:29:01 +02:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2004-08-08 12:32:36 +02:00
|
|
|
/* these may be different if the router connected to us from elsewhere */
|
|
|
|
circ->n_addr = n_conn->addr;
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
circ->n_port = n_conn->port;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
circ->n_conn = n_conn;
|
2004-07-03 03:37:59 +02:00
|
|
|
memcpy(circ->n_conn_id_digest, n_conn->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"n_conn is %s:%u",n_conn->address,n_conn->port);
|
|
|
|
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (circuit_deliver_create_cell(circ, onionskin) < 0)
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/** Initialize cpath-\>{f|b}_{crypto|digest} from the key material in
|
|
|
|
* key_data. key_data must contain CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL bytes, which are
|
|
|
|
* used as follows:
|
|
|
|
* - 20 to initialize f_digest
|
|
|
|
* - 20 to initialize b_digest
|
|
|
|
* - 16 to key f_crypto
|
|
|
|
* - 16 to key b_crypto
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* (If 'reverse' is true, then f_XX and b_XX are swapped.)
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int circuit_init_cpath_crypto(crypt_path_t *cpath, char *key_data, int reverse)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
crypto_digest_env_t *tmp_digest;
|
|
|
|
crypto_cipher_env_t *tmp_crypto;
|
|
|
|
|
2004-10-17 00:14:52 +02:00
|
|
|
tor_assert(cpath);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(key_data);
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
tor_assert(!(cpath->f_crypto || cpath->b_crypto ||
|
|
|
|
cpath->f_digest || cpath->b_digest));
|
|
|
|
|
2004-12-04 01:25:54 +01:00
|
|
|
// log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"hop init digest forward 0x%.8x, backward 0x%.8x.",
|
|
|
|
// (unsigned int)*(uint32_t*)key_data, (unsigned int)*(uint32_t*)(key_data+20));
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
cpath->f_digest = crypto_new_digest_env();
|
|
|
|
crypto_digest_add_bytes(cpath->f_digest, key_data, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
|
|
cpath->b_digest = crypto_new_digest_env();
|
|
|
|
crypto_digest_add_bytes(cpath->b_digest, key_data+DIGEST_LEN, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
|
|
|
2004-12-04 01:25:54 +01:00
|
|
|
// log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"hop init cipher forward 0x%.8x, backward 0x%.8x.",
|
|
|
|
// (unsigned int)*(uint32_t*)(key_data+40), (unsigned int)*(uint32_t*)(key_data+40+16));
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!(cpath->f_crypto =
|
|
|
|
crypto_create_init_cipher(key_data+(2*DIGEST_LEN),1))) {
|
2004-12-13 01:44:39 +01:00
|
|
|
log(LOG_WARN,"Bug: forward cipher initialization failed.");
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!(cpath->b_crypto =
|
2004-11-28 12:39:53 +01:00
|
|
|
crypto_create_init_cipher(key_data+(2*DIGEST_LEN)+CIPHER_KEY_LEN,0))) {
|
2004-12-13 01:44:39 +01:00
|
|
|
log(LOG_WARN,"Bug: backward cipher initialization failed.");
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (reverse) {
|
|
|
|
tmp_digest = cpath->f_digest;
|
|
|
|
cpath->f_digest = cpath->b_digest;
|
|
|
|
cpath->b_digest = tmp_digest;
|
|
|
|
tmp_crypto = cpath->f_crypto;
|
|
|
|
cpath->f_crypto = cpath->b_crypto;
|
|
|
|
cpath->b_crypto = tmp_crypto;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/** A created or extended cell came back to us on the circuit,
|
|
|
|
* and it included <b>reply</b> (the second DH key, plus KH).
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Calculate the appropriate keys and digests, make sure KH is
|
|
|
|
* correct, and initialize this hop of the cpath.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Return -1 if we want to mark circ for close, else return 0.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int circuit_finish_handshake(circuit_t *circ, char *reply) {
|
|
|
|
unsigned char keys[CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN];
|
|
|
|
crypt_path_t *hop;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ));
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (circ->cpath->state == CPATH_STATE_AWAITING_KEYS)
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
hop = circ->cpath;
|
|
|
|
else {
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
for (hop=circ->cpath->next;
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
hop != circ->cpath && hop->state == CPATH_STATE_OPEN;
|
|
|
|
hop=hop->next) ;
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (hop == circ->cpath) { /* got an extended when we're all done? */
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_WARN,"got extended when circ already built? Closing.");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(hop->state == CPATH_STATE_AWAITING_KEYS);
|
|
|
|
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (onion_skin_client_handshake(hop->handshake_state, reply, keys,
|
2004-11-28 12:39:53 +01:00
|
|
|
DIGEST_LEN*2+CIPHER_KEY_LEN*2) < 0) {
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_WARN,"onion_skin_client_handshake failed.");
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
crypto_dh_free(hop->handshake_state); /* don't need it anymore */
|
|
|
|
hop->handshake_state = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* Remember hash of g^xy */
|
|
|
|
memcpy(hop->handshake_digest, reply+DH_KEY_LEN, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (circuit_init_cpath_crypto(hop, keys, 0)<0) {
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
hop->state = CPATH_STATE_OPEN;
|
2004-11-23 01:11:36 +01:00
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Finished building circuit:");
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
circuit_log_path(LOG_INFO,circ);
|
2004-11-03 19:33:07 +01:00
|
|
|
control_event_circuit_status(circ, CIRC_EVENT_EXTENDED);
|
|
|
|
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/** We received a relay truncated cell on circ.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Since we don't ask for truncates currently, getting a truncated
|
|
|
|
* means that a connection broke or an extend failed. For now,
|
|
|
|
* just give up: for circ to close, and return 0.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int circuit_truncated(circuit_t *circ, crypt_path_t *layer) {
|
2004-10-11 03:17:42 +02:00
|
|
|
// crypt_path_t *victim;
|
|
|
|
// connection_t *stream;
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2004-10-17 00:14:52 +02:00
|
|
|
tor_assert(circ);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ));
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
tor_assert(layer);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* XXX Since we don't ask for truncates currently, getting a truncated
|
|
|
|
* means that a connection broke or an extend failed. For now,
|
|
|
|
* just give up.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
circuit_mark_for_close(circ);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2004-10-11 03:17:42 +02:00
|
|
|
#if 0
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
while (layer->next != circ->cpath) {
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
/* we need to clear out layer->next */
|
|
|
|
victim = layer->next;
|
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_DEBUG, "Killing a layer of the cpath.");
|
|
|
|
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
for (stream = circ->p_streams; stream; stream=stream->next_stream) {
|
|
|
|
if (stream->cpath_layer == victim) {
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_INFO, "Marking stream %d for close.", stream->stream_id);
|
|
|
|
/* no need to send 'end' relay cells,
|
|
|
|
* because the other side's already dead
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
stream->has_sent_end = 1;
|
|
|
|
connection_mark_for_close(stream);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
layer->next = victim->next;
|
|
|
|
circuit_free_cpath_node(victim);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_INFO, "finished");
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2004-10-11 03:17:42 +02:00
|
|
|
#endif
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/** Given a response payload and keys, initialize, then send a created
|
|
|
|
* cell back.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int onionskin_answer(circuit_t *circ, unsigned char *payload, unsigned char *keys) {
|
|
|
|
cell_t cell;
|
|
|
|
crypt_path_t *tmp_cpath;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tmp_cpath = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(crypt_path_t));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memset(&cell, 0, sizeof(cell_t));
|
|
|
|
cell.command = CELL_CREATED;
|
|
|
|
cell.circ_id = circ->p_circ_id;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
circ->state = CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Entering.");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memcpy(cell.payload, payload, ONIONSKIN_REPLY_LEN);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"init digest forward 0x%.8x, backward 0x%.8x.",
|
|
|
|
(unsigned int)*(uint32_t*)(keys), (unsigned int)*(uint32_t*)(keys+20));
|
|
|
|
if (circuit_init_cpath_crypto(tmp_cpath, keys, 0)<0) {
|
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_WARN,"Circuit initialization failed");
|
|
|
|
tor_free(tmp_cpath);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
circ->n_digest = tmp_cpath->f_digest;
|
|
|
|
circ->n_crypto = tmp_cpath->f_crypto;
|
|
|
|
circ->p_digest = tmp_cpath->b_digest;
|
|
|
|
circ->p_crypto = tmp_cpath->b_crypto;
|
|
|
|
tor_free(tmp_cpath);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
memcpy(circ->handshake_digest, cell.payload+DH_KEY_LEN, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
connection_or_write_cell_to_buf(&cell, circ->p_conn);
|
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Finished sending 'created' cell.");
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/** Choose a length for a circuit of purpose <b>purpose</b>.
|
|
|
|
* Default length is 3 + the number of endpoints that would give something
|
|
|
|
* away. If the routerlist <b>routers</b> doesn't have enough routers
|
|
|
|
* to handle the desired path length, return as large a path length as
|
|
|
|
* is feasible, except if it's less than 2, in which case return -1.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int new_route_len(double cw, uint8_t purpose, smartlist_t *routers) {
|
|
|
|
int num_acceptable_routers;
|
|
|
|
int routelen;
|
|
|
|
|
2004-10-17 00:14:52 +02:00
|
|
|
tor_assert(cw >= 0.);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(cw < 1.);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(routers);
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef TOR_PERF
|
|
|
|
routelen = 2;
|
|
|
|
#else
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL)
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
routelen = 3;
|
2005-02-27 10:47:01 +01:00
|
|
|
else if (purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING)
|
|
|
|
routelen = 3;
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
else if (purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING)
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
routelen = 4;
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
else if (purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND)
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
routelen = 3;
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
else if (purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO)
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
routelen = 3;
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
else if (purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND)
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
routelen = 4;
|
|
|
|
else {
|
2004-12-13 01:44:39 +01:00
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_WARN,"Bug: unhandled purpose %d", purpose);
|
2005-02-01 01:37:16 +01:00
|
|
|
#ifdef TOR_FRAGILE
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(0);
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if 0
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
for (routelen = 3; ; routelen++) { /* 3, increment until coinflip says we're done */
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
if (crypto_pseudo_rand_int(255) >= cw*255) /* don't extend */
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Chosen route length %d (%d routers available).",routelen,
|
|
|
|
smartlist_len(routers));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
num_acceptable_routers = count_acceptable_routers(routers);
|
|
|
|
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (num_acceptable_routers < 2) {
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Not enough acceptable routers (%d). Discarding this circuit.",
|
|
|
|
num_acceptable_routers);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (num_acceptable_routers < routelen) {
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Not enough routers: cutting routelen from %d to %d.",
|
|
|
|
routelen, num_acceptable_routers);
|
|
|
|
routelen = num_acceptable_routers;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return routelen;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2004-12-07 16:29:54 +01:00
|
|
|
/** Fetch the list of predicted ports, dup it into a smartlist of
|
|
|
|
* uint16_t's, remove the ones that are already handled by an
|
2004-12-05 08:10:08 +01:00
|
|
|
* existing circuit, and return it.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static smartlist_t *
|
|
|
|
circuit_get_unhandled_ports(time_t now) {
|
2004-12-07 16:29:54 +01:00
|
|
|
smartlist_t *source = rep_hist_get_predicted_ports(now);
|
|
|
|
smartlist_t *dest = smartlist_create();
|
|
|
|
uint16_t *tmp;
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(source); ++i) {
|
|
|
|
tmp = tor_malloc(sizeof(uint16_t));
|
|
|
|
memcpy(tmp, smartlist_get(source, i), sizeof(uint16_t));
|
|
|
|
smartlist_add(dest, tmp);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2004-12-05 08:10:08 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2004-12-07 16:29:54 +01:00
|
|
|
circuit_remove_handled_ports(dest);
|
|
|
|
return dest;
|
2004-12-05 08:10:08 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/** Return 1 if we already have circuits present or on the way for
|
|
|
|
* all anticipated ports. Return 0 if we should make more.
|
2005-01-12 05:58:23 +01:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* If we're returning 0, set need_uptime and need_capacity to
|
|
|
|
* indicate any requirements that the unhandled ports have.
|
2004-12-05 08:10:08 +01:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int
|
2005-01-12 05:58:23 +01:00
|
|
|
circuit_all_predicted_ports_handled(time_t now, int *need_uptime,
|
|
|
|
int *need_capacity) {
|
|
|
|
int i, enough;
|
|
|
|
uint16_t *port;
|
2004-12-05 08:10:08 +01:00
|
|
|
smartlist_t *sl = circuit_get_unhandled_ports(now);
|
2005-01-12 05:58:23 +01:00
|
|
|
smartlist_t *LongLivedServices = get_options()->LongLivedPorts;
|
2004-12-05 08:10:08 +01:00
|
|
|
enough = (smartlist_len(sl) == 0);
|
2005-01-12 05:58:23 +01:00
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(sl); ++i) {
|
|
|
|
port = smartlist_get(sl, i);
|
|
|
|
if (smartlist_string_num_isin(LongLivedServices, *port))
|
|
|
|
*need_uptime = 1;
|
|
|
|
tor_free(port);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2004-12-05 08:10:08 +01:00
|
|
|
smartlist_free(sl);
|
|
|
|
return enough;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/** Return 1 if <b>router</b> can handle one or more of the ports in
|
|
|
|
* <b>needed_ports</b>, else return 0.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
router_handles_some_port(routerinfo_t *router, smartlist_t *needed_ports) {
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
uint16_t port;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(needed_ports); ++i) {
|
|
|
|
port = *(uint16_t *)smartlist_get(needed_ports, i);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(port);
|
|
|
|
if (router_compare_addr_to_addr_policy(0, port, router->exit_policy) !=
|
|
|
|
ADDR_POLICY_REJECTED)
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/** How many circuits do we want simultaneously in-progress to handle
|
|
|
|
* a given stream?
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#define MIN_CIRCUITS_HANDLING_STREAM 2
|
|
|
|
|
2005-01-19 18:59:37 +01:00
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
ap_stream_wants_exit_attention(connection_t *conn) {
|
|
|
|
if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_AP &&
|
|
|
|
conn->state == AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT &&
|
|
|
|
!conn->marked_for_close &&
|
|
|
|
!connection_edge_is_rendezvous_stream(conn) &&
|
|
|
|
!circuit_stream_is_being_handled(conn, 0, MIN_CIRCUITS_HANDLING_STREAM))
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
/** Return a pointer to a suitable router to be the exit node for the
|
|
|
|
* general-purpose circuit we're about to build.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Look through the connection array, and choose a router that maximizes
|
|
|
|
* the number of pending streams that can exit from this router.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Return NULL if we can't find any suitable routers.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2005-01-12 05:58:23 +01:00
|
|
|
static routerinfo_t *
|
|
|
|
choose_good_exit_server_general(routerlist_t *dir, int need_uptime,
|
|
|
|
int need_capacity)
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int *n_supported;
|
|
|
|
int i, j;
|
|
|
|
int n_pending_connections = 0;
|
|
|
|
connection_t **carray;
|
|
|
|
int n_connections;
|
|
|
|
int best_support = -1;
|
|
|
|
int n_best_support=0;
|
2004-08-17 09:09:02 +02:00
|
|
|
smartlist_t *sl, *preferredexits, *preferredentries, *excludedexits;
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
routerinfo_t *router;
|
2004-11-06 06:18:11 +01:00
|
|
|
or_options_t *options = get_options();
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2004-08-17 09:09:02 +02:00
|
|
|
preferredentries = smartlist_create();
|
2004-11-06 06:18:11 +01:00
|
|
|
add_nickname_list_to_smartlist(preferredentries,options->EntryNodes,1);
|
2004-08-17 09:09:02 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
get_connection_array(&carray, &n_connections);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Count how many connections are waiting for a circuit to be built.
|
|
|
|
* We use this for log messages now, but in the future we may depend on it.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < n_connections; ++i) {
|
2005-01-19 18:59:37 +01:00
|
|
|
if (ap_stream_wants_exit_attention(carray[i]))
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
++n_pending_connections;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2004-12-04 01:25:54 +01:00
|
|
|
// log_fn(LOG_DEBUG, "Choosing exit node; %d connections are pending",
|
|
|
|
// n_pending_connections);
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Now we count, for each of the routers in the directory, how many
|
|
|
|
* of the pending connections could possibly exit from that
|
|
|
|
* router (n_supported[i]). (We can't be sure about cases where we
|
|
|
|
* don't know the IP address of the pending connection.)
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
n_supported = tor_malloc(sizeof(int)*smartlist_len(dir->routers));
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(dir->routers); ++i) { /* iterate over routers */
|
|
|
|
router = smartlist_get(dir->routers, i);
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (router_is_me(router)) {
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
n_supported[i] = -1;
|
2004-12-04 01:25:54 +01:00
|
|
|
// log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Skipping node %s -- it's me.", router->nickname);
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
/* XXX there's probably a reverse predecessor attack here, but
|
|
|
|
* it's slow. should we take this out? -RD
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!router->is_running) {
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
n_supported[i] = -1;
|
2004-12-04 01:25:54 +01:00
|
|
|
// log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Skipping node %s (index %d) -- directory says it's not running.",
|
|
|
|
// router->nickname, i);
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
continue; /* skip routers that are known to be down */
|
|
|
|
}
|
2005-01-12 05:58:23 +01:00
|
|
|
if (router_is_unreliable(router, need_uptime, need_capacity)) {
|
|
|
|
n_supported[i] = -1;
|
|
|
|
continue; /* skip routers that are not suitable */
|
|
|
|
}
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!router->is_verified &&
|
2004-11-28 12:39:53 +01:00
|
|
|
(!(options->_AllowUnverified & ALLOW_UNVERIFIED_EXIT) ||
|
2005-01-12 05:58:23 +01:00
|
|
|
router_is_unreliable(router, 1, 1))) {
|
2004-08-20 23:34:36 +02:00
|
|
|
/* if it's unverified, and either we don't want it or it's unsuitable */
|
2004-07-21 11:35:24 +02:00
|
|
|
n_supported[i] = -1;
|
2004-12-04 01:25:54 +01:00
|
|
|
// log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Skipping node %s (index %d) -- unverified router.",
|
|
|
|
// router->nickname, i);
|
2004-07-21 11:35:24 +02:00
|
|
|
continue; /* skip unverified routers */
|
|
|
|
}
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (router_exit_policy_rejects_all(router)) {
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
n_supported[i] = -1;
|
2004-12-04 01:25:54 +01:00
|
|
|
// log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Skipping node %s (index %d) -- it rejects all.",
|
|
|
|
// router->nickname, i);
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
continue; /* skip routers that reject all */
|
|
|
|
}
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (smartlist_len(preferredentries)==1 &&
|
2004-11-28 12:39:53 +01:00
|
|
|
router == (routerinfo_t*)smartlist_get(preferredentries, 0)) {
|
2004-08-17 09:09:02 +02:00
|
|
|
n_supported[i] = -1;
|
2004-12-04 01:25:54 +01:00
|
|
|
// log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Skipping node %s (index %d) -- it's our only preferred entry node.", router->nickname, i);
|
2004-08-17 09:09:02 +02:00
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
n_supported[i] = 0;
|
|
|
|
for (j = 0; j < n_connections; ++j) { /* iterate over connections */
|
2005-01-19 18:59:37 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!ap_stream_wants_exit_attention(carray[j]))
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
continue; /* Skip everything but APs in CIRCUIT_WAIT */
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (connection_ap_can_use_exit(carray[j], router)) {
|
2004-07-21 05:16:24 +02:00
|
|
|
++n_supported[i];
|
2004-12-04 01:25:54 +01:00
|
|
|
// log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"%s is supported. n_supported[%d] now %d.",
|
|
|
|
// router->nickname, i, n_supported[i]);
|
2004-07-21 05:16:24 +02:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2004-12-04 01:25:54 +01:00
|
|
|
// log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"%s (index %d) would reject this stream.",
|
|
|
|
// router->nickname, i);
|
2004-07-21 05:16:24 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
} /* End looping over connections. */
|
|
|
|
if (n_supported[i] > best_support) {
|
|
|
|
/* If this router is better than previous ones, remember its index
|
|
|
|
* and goodness, and start counting how many routers are this good. */
|
|
|
|
best_support = n_supported[i]; n_best_support=1;
|
2004-12-04 01:25:54 +01:00
|
|
|
// log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"%s is new best supported option so far.",
|
|
|
|
// router->nickname);
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
} else if (n_supported[i] == best_support) {
|
|
|
|
/* If this router is _as good_ as the best one, just increment the
|
|
|
|
* count of equally good routers.*/
|
|
|
|
++n_best_support;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_INFO, "Found %d servers that might support %d/%d pending connections.",
|
|
|
|
n_best_support, best_support, n_pending_connections);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
preferredexits = smartlist_create();
|
2004-11-06 06:18:11 +01:00
|
|
|
add_nickname_list_to_smartlist(preferredexits,options->ExitNodes,1);
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
excludedexits = smartlist_create();
|
2004-11-06 06:18:11 +01:00
|
|
|
add_nickname_list_to_smartlist(excludedexits,options->ExcludeNodes,0);
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
sl = smartlist_create();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If any routers definitely support any pending connections, choose one
|
|
|
|
* at random. */
|
|
|
|
if (best_support > 0) {
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(dir->routers); i++)
|
|
|
|
if (n_supported[i] == best_support)
|
|
|
|
smartlist_add(sl, smartlist_get(dir->routers, i));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
smartlist_subtract(sl,excludedexits);
|
2004-11-06 06:18:11 +01:00
|
|
|
if (options->StrictExitNodes || smartlist_overlap(sl,preferredexits))
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
smartlist_intersect(sl,preferredexits);
|
2004-08-18 08:10:12 +02:00
|
|
|
router = routerlist_sl_choose_by_bandwidth(sl);
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/* Either there are no pending connections, or no routers even seem to
|
2004-12-05 08:10:08 +01:00
|
|
|
* possibly support any of them. Choose a router at random that satisfies
|
|
|
|
* at least one predicted exit port. */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
int try;
|
|
|
|
smartlist_t *needed_ports = circuit_get_unhandled_ports(time(NULL));
|
|
|
|
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
if (best_support == -1) {
|
2004-12-13 01:44:39 +01:00
|
|
|
log(LOG_NOTICE, "All routers are down or middleman -- choosing a doomed exit at random.");
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2004-12-05 08:10:08 +01:00
|
|
|
for (try = 0; try < 2; try++) {
|
|
|
|
/* try once to pick only from routers that satisfy a needed port,
|
|
|
|
* then if there are none, pick from any that support exiting. */
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(dir->routers); i++) {
|
|
|
|
router = smartlist_get(dir->routers, i);
|
|
|
|
if (n_supported[i] != -1 &&
|
|
|
|
(try || router_handles_some_port(router, needed_ports))) {
|
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Try %d: '%s' is a possibility.", try, router->nickname);
|
|
|
|
smartlist_add(sl, router);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2004-12-05 08:10:08 +01:00
|
|
|
smartlist_subtract(sl,excludedexits);
|
|
|
|
if (options->StrictExitNodes || smartlist_overlap(sl,preferredexits))
|
|
|
|
smartlist_intersect(sl,preferredexits);
|
|
|
|
router = routerlist_sl_choose_by_bandwidth(sl);
|
|
|
|
if (router)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2004-12-07 16:29:54 +01:00
|
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(needed_ports, uint16_t *, cp, tor_free(cp));
|
2004-12-05 08:10:08 +01:00
|
|
|
smartlist_free(needed_ports);
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
smartlist_free(preferredexits);
|
2004-08-17 09:09:02 +02:00
|
|
|
smartlist_free(preferredentries);
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
smartlist_free(excludedexits);
|
|
|
|
smartlist_free(sl);
|
|
|
|
tor_free(n_supported);
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (router) {
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_INFO, "Chose exit server '%s'", router->nickname);
|
|
|
|
return router;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2004-11-06 06:18:11 +01:00
|
|
|
if (options->StrictExitNodes)
|
2004-08-15 22:14:44 +02:00
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_WARN, "No exit routers seem to be running; can't choose an exit.");
|
2004-08-17 09:09:02 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/** Return a pointer to a suitable router to be the exit node for the
|
|
|
|
* circuit of purpose <b>purpose</b> that we're about to build (or NULL
|
|
|
|
* if no router is suitable).
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* For general-purpose circuits, pass it off to
|
|
|
|
* choose_good_exit_server_general()
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* For client-side rendezvous circuits, choose a random node, weighted
|
|
|
|
* toward the preferences in 'options'.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2005-01-12 05:58:23 +01:00
|
|
|
static routerinfo_t *
|
|
|
|
choose_good_exit_server(uint8_t purpose, routerlist_t *dir,
|
|
|
|
int need_uptime, int need_capacity)
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
routerinfo_t *r;
|
2004-11-06 06:18:11 +01:00
|
|
|
or_options_t *options = get_options();
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
switch (purpose) {
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL:
|
2005-01-12 05:58:23 +01:00
|
|
|
return choose_good_exit_server_general(dir, need_uptime, need_capacity);
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND:
|
2004-11-06 06:18:11 +01:00
|
|
|
r = router_choose_random_node(options->RendNodes, options->RendExcludeNodes,
|
2005-01-12 05:58:23 +01:00
|
|
|
NULL, need_uptime, need_capacity,
|
|
|
|
options->_AllowUnverified & ALLOW_UNVERIFIED_RENDEZVOUS, 0);
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
return r;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2004-12-13 01:44:39 +01:00
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_WARN,"Bug: unhandled purpose %d", purpose);
|
2005-02-01 01:37:16 +01:00
|
|
|
#ifdef TOR_FRAGILE
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(0);
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
2004-10-17 00:56:46 +02:00
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/** Allocate a cpath_build_state_t, populate it based on
|
2004-07-21 04:25:14 +02:00
|
|
|
* <b>purpose</b> and <b>exit_digest</b> (if specified), and
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
* return it.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static cpath_build_state_t *
|
2005-01-12 05:58:23 +01:00
|
|
|
onion_new_cpath_build_state(uint8_t purpose, const char *exit_digest,
|
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard
to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must
be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect
streams can use internal circs if they want.
New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around
to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal
circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime
if we've seen that lately).
Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs),
which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones
are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long
we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit.
Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as
long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web
browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.)
Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND
circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when
we try to launch one.
Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since
there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching
over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete.
Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take
into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses --
it won't.
Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when
it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which
means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken.
svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
|
|
|
int need_uptime, int need_capacity, int internal)
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
routerlist_t *rl;
|
|
|
|
int r;
|
|
|
|
cpath_build_state_t *info;
|
|
|
|
routerinfo_t *exit;
|
2004-11-06 06:18:11 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
router_get_routerlist(&rl);
|
2004-10-14 05:44:45 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!rl)
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
2004-11-06 06:18:11 +01:00
|
|
|
r = new_route_len(get_options()->PathlenCoinWeight, purpose, rl->routers);
|
2004-08-17 14:09:37 +02:00
|
|
|
if (r < 1) /* must be at least 1 */
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
info = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(cpath_build_state_t));
|
|
|
|
info->desired_path_len = r;
|
2005-01-12 05:58:23 +01:00
|
|
|
info->need_uptime = need_uptime;
|
|
|
|
info->need_capacity = need_capacity;
|
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard
to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must
be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect
streams can use internal circs if they want.
New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around
to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal
circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime
if we've seen that lately).
Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs),
which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones
are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long
we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit.
Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as
long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web
browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.)
Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND
circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when
we try to launch one.
Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since
there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching
over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete.
Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take
into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses --
it won't.
Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when
it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which
means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken.
svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
|
|
|
info->is_internal = internal;
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (exit_digest) { /* the circuit-builder pre-requested one */
|
2004-07-03 01:40:03 +02:00
|
|
|
memcpy(info->chosen_exit_digest, exit_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
|
|
exit = router_get_by_digest(exit_digest);
|
|
|
|
if (exit) {
|
|
|
|
info->chosen_exit_name = tor_strdup(exit->nickname);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
info->chosen_exit_name = tor_malloc(HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1);
|
|
|
|
base16_encode(info->chosen_exit_name, HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1,
|
|
|
|
exit_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Using requested exit node '%s'", info->chosen_exit_name);
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
} else { /* we have to decide one */
|
2005-01-12 05:58:23 +01:00
|
|
|
exit = choose_good_exit_server(purpose, rl, need_uptime, need_capacity);
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!exit) {
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_WARN,"failed to choose an exit server");
|
|
|
|
tor_free(info);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2004-07-03 01:40:03 +02:00
|
|
|
memcpy(info->chosen_exit_digest, exit->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
|
|
info->chosen_exit_name = tor_strdup(exit->nickname);
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return info;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard
to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must
be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect
streams can use internal circs if they want.
New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around
to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal
circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime
if we've seen that lately).
Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs),
which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones
are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long
we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit.
Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as
long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web
browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.)
Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND
circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when
we try to launch one.
Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since
there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching
over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete.
Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take
into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses --
it won't.
Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when
it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which
means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken.
svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
|
|
|
/** Take the open circ originating here, give it a new exit destination
|
|
|
|
* to exit_digest (use nickname directly if it's provided, else strdup
|
|
|
|
* out of router->nickname), and get it to send the next extend cell.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
circuit_append_new_hop(circuit_t *circ, char *nickname, const char *exit_digest) {
|
|
|
|
routerinfo_t *exit = router_get_by_digest(exit_digest);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ));
|
|
|
|
circ->state = CIRCUIT_STATE_BUILDING;
|
|
|
|
tor_free(circ->build_state->chosen_exit_name);
|
|
|
|
if (nickname) {
|
|
|
|
circ->build_state->chosen_exit_name = nickname;
|
|
|
|
} else if (exit) {
|
|
|
|
circ->build_state->chosen_exit_name = tor_strdup(exit->nickname);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
circ->build_state->chosen_exit_name = tor_malloc(HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1);
|
|
|
|
base16_encode(circ->build_state->chosen_exit_name, HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1,
|
|
|
|
exit_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memcpy(circ->build_state->chosen_exit_digest, exit_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
|
|
++circ->build_state->desired_path_len;
|
|
|
|
if (circuit_send_next_onion_skin(circ)<0) {
|
2005-01-17 19:49:13 +01:00
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_WARN, "Couldn't extend circuit to new point '%s'.",
|
|
|
|
circ->build_state->chosen_exit_name);
|
Introduce a notion of 'internal' circs, which are chosen without regard
to the exit policy of the last hop. Intro and rendezvous circs must
be internal circs, to avoid leaking information. Resolve and connect
streams can use internal circs if they want.
New circuit pooling algorithm: make sure to have enough circs around
to satisfy any predicted ports, and also make sure to have 2 internal
circs around if we've required internal circs lately (with high uptime
if we've seen that lately).
Split NewCircuitPeriod config option into NewCircuitPeriod (30 secs),
which describes how often we retry making new circuits if current ones
are dirty, and MaxCircuitDirtiness (10 mins), which describes how long
we're willing to make use of an already-dirty circuit.
Once rendezvous circuits are established, keep using the same circuit as
long as you attach a new stream to it at least every 10 minutes. (So web
browsing doesn't require you to build new rend circs every 30 seconds.)
Cannibalize GENERAL circs to be C_REND, C_INTRO, S_INTRO, and S_REND
circ as necessary, if there are any completed ones lying around when
we try to launch one.
Re-instate the ifdef's to use version-0 style introduce cells, since
there was yet another bug in handling version-1 style. We'll try switching
over again after 0.0.9 is obsolete.
Bugfix: when choosing an exit node for a new non-internal circ, don't take
into account whether it'll be useful for any pending x.onion addresses --
it won't.
Bugfix: we weren't actually publishing the hidden service descriptor when
it became dirty. So we only published it every 20 minutes or so, which
means when you first start your Tor, the hidden service will seem broken.
svn:r3360
2005-01-17 19:13:09 +01:00
|
|
|
circuit_mark_for_close(circ);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
/** Return the number of routers in <b>routers</b> that are currently up
|
2004-08-18 22:35:11 +02:00
|
|
|
* and available for building circuits through.
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int count_acceptable_routers(smartlist_t *routers) {
|
2004-08-18 22:35:11 +02:00
|
|
|
int i, n;
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
int num=0;
|
2004-08-18 22:35:11 +02:00
|
|
|
routerinfo_t *r;
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
n = smartlist_len(routers);
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
for (i=0;i<n;i++) {
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
r = smartlist_get(routers, i);
|
2004-12-04 01:25:54 +01:00
|
|
|
// log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Contemplating whether router %d (%s) is a new option...",
|
|
|
|
// i, r->nickname);
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (r->is_running == 0) {
|
2004-12-04 01:25:54 +01:00
|
|
|
// log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Nope, the directory says %d is not running.",i);
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
goto next_i_loop;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (r->is_verified == 0) {
|
2004-12-04 01:25:54 +01:00
|
|
|
// log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Nope, the directory says %d is not verified.",i);
|
2004-11-10 15:27:26 +01:00
|
|
|
/* XXXX009 But unverified routers *are* sometimes acceptable. */
|
|
|
|
goto next_i_loop;
|
2004-07-21 11:35:24 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
num++;
|
2004-12-04 01:25:54 +01:00
|
|
|
// log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"I like %d. num_acceptable_routers now %d.",i, num);
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
next_i_loop:
|
|
|
|
; /* C requires an explicit statement after the label */
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return num;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/** Add <b>new_hop</b> to the end of the doubly-linked-list <b>head_ptr</b>.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* This function is used to extend cpath by another hop.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
void onion_append_to_cpath(crypt_path_t **head_ptr, crypt_path_t *new_hop)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (*head_ptr) {
|
|
|
|
new_hop->next = (*head_ptr);
|
|
|
|
new_hop->prev = (*head_ptr)->prev;
|
|
|
|
(*head_ptr)->prev->next = new_hop;
|
|
|
|
(*head_ptr)->prev = new_hop;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
*head_ptr = new_hop;
|
|
|
|
new_hop->prev = new_hop->next = new_hop;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2004-08-15 10:15:12 +02:00
|
|
|
static routerinfo_t *choose_good_middle_server(cpath_build_state_t *state,
|
|
|
|
crypt_path_t *head,
|
|
|
|
int cur_len)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
routerinfo_t *r, *choice;
|
|
|
|
crypt_path_t *cpath;
|
2004-12-07 10:18:25 +01:00
|
|
|
smartlist_t *excluded;
|
2004-08-15 10:15:12 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_DEBUG, "Contemplating intermediate hop: random choice.");
|
|
|
|
excluded = smartlist_create();
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if ((r = router_get_by_digest(state->chosen_exit_digest))) {
|
2004-08-15 10:15:12 +02:00
|
|
|
smartlist_add(excluded, r);
|
2004-10-15 03:58:11 +02:00
|
|
|
routerlist_add_family(excluded, r);
|
2004-09-10 23:40:29 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if ((r = routerlist_find_my_routerinfo())) {
|
2004-08-15 10:15:12 +02:00
|
|
|
smartlist_add(excluded, r);
|
2004-10-15 03:58:11 +02:00
|
|
|
routerlist_add_family(excluded, r);
|
2004-09-10 23:40:29 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2004-08-15 10:15:12 +02:00
|
|
|
for (i = 0, cpath = head; i < cur_len; ++i, cpath=cpath->next) {
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if ((r = router_get_by_digest(cpath->identity_digest))) {
|
2004-09-30 17:40:05 +02:00
|
|
|
smartlist_add(excluded, r);
|
2004-10-15 03:58:11 +02:00
|
|
|
routerlist_add_family(excluded, r);
|
2004-09-30 17:40:05 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2004-08-15 10:15:12 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2004-11-06 06:18:11 +01:00
|
|
|
choice = router_choose_random_node(NULL, get_options()->ExcludeNodes, excluded,
|
2005-01-12 05:58:23 +01:00
|
|
|
state->need_uptime, state->need_capacity,
|
|
|
|
get_options()->_AllowUnverified & ALLOW_UNVERIFIED_MIDDLE, 0);
|
2004-08-15 10:15:12 +02:00
|
|
|
smartlist_free(excluded);
|
|
|
|
return choice;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
static routerinfo_t *choose_good_entry_server(cpath_build_state_t *state)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
routerinfo_t *r, *choice;
|
|
|
|
smartlist_t *excluded = smartlist_create();
|
2004-11-06 06:18:11 +01:00
|
|
|
or_options_t *options = get_options();
|
2004-08-15 10:15:12 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if ((r = router_get_by_digest(state->chosen_exit_digest))) {
|
2004-08-15 10:15:12 +02:00
|
|
|
smartlist_add(excluded, r);
|
2004-10-15 03:58:11 +02:00
|
|
|
routerlist_add_family(excluded, r);
|
2004-09-10 23:40:29 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if ((r = routerlist_find_my_routerinfo())) {
|
2004-08-15 10:15:12 +02:00
|
|
|
smartlist_add(excluded, r);
|
2004-10-15 03:58:11 +02:00
|
|
|
routerlist_add_family(excluded, r);
|
2004-09-10 23:40:29 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (options->FascistFirewall) {
|
2004-08-15 10:15:12 +02:00
|
|
|
/* exclude all ORs that listen on the wrong port */
|
|
|
|
routerlist_t *rl;
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
router_get_routerlist(&rl);
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!rl)
|
2004-08-15 10:15:12 +02:00
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
for (i=0; i < smartlist_len(rl->routers); i++) {
|
2004-08-15 10:15:12 +02:00
|
|
|
r = smartlist_get(rl->routers, i);
|
2005-01-12 05:58:23 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!smartlist_string_num_isin(options->FirewallPorts, r->or_port))
|
2004-08-16 22:47:00 +02:00
|
|
|
smartlist_add(excluded, r);
|
2004-08-15 10:15:12 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2004-11-06 06:18:11 +01:00
|
|
|
choice = router_choose_random_node(options->EntryNodes, options->ExcludeNodes,
|
2005-01-12 05:58:23 +01:00
|
|
|
excluded, state->need_uptime, state->need_capacity,
|
|
|
|
options->_AllowUnverified & ALLOW_UNVERIFIED_ENTRY,
|
2004-11-06 06:18:11 +01:00
|
|
|
options->StrictEntryNodes);
|
2004-08-15 10:15:12 +02:00
|
|
|
smartlist_free(excluded);
|
|
|
|
return choice;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
/** Choose a suitable next hop in the cpath <b>head_ptr</b>,
|
|
|
|
* based on <b>state</b>. Add the hop info to head_ptr, and return a
|
|
|
|
* pointer to the chosen router in <b>router_out</b>.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
onion_extend_cpath(crypt_path_t **head_ptr, cpath_build_state_t
|
|
|
|
*state, routerinfo_t **router_out)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int cur_len;
|
|
|
|
crypt_path_t *cpath, *hop;
|
|
|
|
routerinfo_t *choice;
|
2004-08-15 10:15:12 +02:00
|
|
|
smartlist_t *excludednodes;
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(head_ptr);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(router_out);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!*head_ptr) {
|
|
|
|
cur_len = 0;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
cur_len = 1;
|
|
|
|
for (cpath = *head_ptr; cpath->next != *head_ptr; cpath = cpath->next) {
|
|
|
|
++cur_len;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (cur_len >= state->desired_path_len) {
|
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_DEBUG, "Path is complete: %d steps long",
|
|
|
|
state->desired_path_len);
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_DEBUG, "Path is %d long; we want %d", cur_len,
|
|
|
|
state->desired_path_len);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
excludednodes = smartlist_create();
|
2004-11-06 06:18:11 +01:00
|
|
|
add_nickname_list_to_smartlist(excludednodes,get_options()->ExcludeNodes,0);
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (cur_len == state->desired_path_len - 1) { /* Picking last node */
|
2004-07-03 01:40:03 +02:00
|
|
|
choice = router_get_by_digest(state->chosen_exit_digest);
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
} else if (cur_len == 0) { /* picking first node */
|
2004-08-15 10:15:12 +02:00
|
|
|
choice = choose_good_entry_server(state);
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2004-08-15 10:15:12 +02:00
|
|
|
choice = choose_good_middle_server(state, *head_ptr, cur_len);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
smartlist_free(excludednodes);
|
2004-11-28 10:05:49 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!choice) {
|
2004-08-15 10:15:12 +02:00
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_WARN,"Failed to find node for hop %d of our path. Discarding this circuit.", cur_len);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Chose router %s for hop %d (exit is %s)",
|
2004-10-30 07:04:52 +02:00
|
|
|
choice->nickname, cur_len+1, state->chosen_exit_name);
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
hop = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(crypt_path_t));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* link hop into the cpath, at the end. */
|
|
|
|
onion_append_to_cpath(head_ptr, hop);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
hop->state = CPATH_STATE_CLOSED;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
hop->port = choice->or_port;
|
|
|
|
hop->addr = choice->addr;
|
2004-07-01 03:16:59 +02:00
|
|
|
memcpy(hop->identity_digest, choice->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
hop->package_window = CIRCWINDOW_START;
|
|
|
|
hop->deliver_window = CIRCWINDOW_START;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
log_fn(LOG_DEBUG, "Extended circuit path with %s for hop %d",
|
2004-10-30 07:04:52 +02:00
|
|
|
choice->nickname, cur_len+1);
|
2004-05-13 09:24:49 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*router_out = choice;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|