2018-06-20 14:13:28 +02:00
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/* Copyright (c) 2016-2018, The Tor Project, Inc. */
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2016-09-05 17:58:19 +02:00
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/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
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/**
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* \file hs_service.c
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* \brief Implement next generation hidden service functionality
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**/
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2017-01-17 18:09:54 +01:00
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#define HS_SERVICE_PRIVATE
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2018-07-05 22:34:59 +02:00
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#include "core/or/or.h"
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2018-09-25 23:57:58 +02:00
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#include "app/config/config.h"
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#include "app/config/statefile.h"
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#include "core/mainloop/connection.h"
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#include "core/mainloop/mainloop.h"
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2018-07-05 22:34:59 +02:00
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#include "core/or/circuitbuild.h"
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#include "core/or/circuitlist.h"
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#include "core/or/circuituse.h"
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2018-09-25 23:57:58 +02:00
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#include "core/or/relay.h"
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#include "feature/client/circpathbias.h"
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2018-09-21 16:26:57 +02:00
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#include "feature/dirclient/dirclient.h"
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2018-09-25 23:57:58 +02:00
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#include "feature/dircommon/directory.h"
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#include "feature/hs_common/shared_random_client.h"
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#include "feature/keymgt/loadkey.h"
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#include "feature/nodelist/describe.h"
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2018-07-05 22:34:59 +02:00
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#include "feature/nodelist/networkstatus.h"
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2018-09-25 23:57:58 +02:00
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#include "feature/nodelist/nickname.h"
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#include "feature/nodelist/node_select.h"
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2018-07-05 22:34:59 +02:00
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#include "feature/nodelist/nodelist.h"
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#include "feature/rend/rendservice.h"
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2018-09-25 23:57:58 +02:00
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#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_ope.h"
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#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h"
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#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h"
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#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h"
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2016-09-05 17:58:19 +02:00
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2018-07-05 22:34:59 +02:00
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#include "feature/hs/hs_circuit.h"
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#include "feature/hs/hs_common.h"
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#include "feature/hs/hs_config.h"
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#include "feature/hs/hs_control.h"
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#include "feature/hs/hs_descriptor.h"
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#include "feature/hs/hs_ident.h"
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#include "feature/hs/hs_intropoint.h"
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#include "feature/hs/hs_service.h"
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#include "feature/hs/hs_stats.h"
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2016-09-05 17:58:19 +02:00
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2018-07-05 22:34:59 +02:00
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#include "feature/dircommon/dir_connection_st.h"
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#include "core/or/edge_connection_st.h"
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#include "core/or/extend_info_st.h"
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#include "feature/nodelist/networkstatus_st.h"
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#include "feature/nodelist/node_st.h"
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#include "core/or/origin_circuit_st.h"
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#include "app/config/or_state_st.h"
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#include "feature/nodelist/routerstatus_st.h"
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2018-06-15 16:07:17 +02:00
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2018-07-01 17:32:11 +02:00
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#include "lib/encoding/confline.h"
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2018-07-01 19:04:21 +02:00
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#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_format.h"
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2018-07-01 17:32:11 +02:00
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2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
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/* Trunnel */
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2018-06-20 15:35:05 +02:00
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#include "trunnel/ed25519_cert.h"
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#include "trunnel/hs/cell_common.h"
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#include "trunnel/hs/cell_establish_intro.h"
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2016-09-05 17:58:19 +02:00
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2018-07-01 21:02:01 +02:00
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#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
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#include <sys/stat.h>
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#endif
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#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
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#include <unistd.h>
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#endif
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2017-02-03 21:29:31 +01:00
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/* Helper macro. Iterate over every service in the global map. The var is the
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* name of the service pointer. */
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#define FOR_EACH_SERVICE_BEGIN(var) \
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STMT_BEGIN \
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hs_service_t **var##_iter, *var; \
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HT_FOREACH(var##_iter, hs_service_ht, hs_service_map) { \
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var = *var##_iter;
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#define FOR_EACH_SERVICE_END } STMT_END ;
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2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
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/* Helper macro. Iterate over both current and previous descriptor of a
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* service. The var is the name of the descriptor pointer. This macro skips
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* any descriptor object of the service that is NULL. */
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#define FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_BEGIN(service, var) \
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STMT_BEGIN \
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hs_service_descriptor_t *var; \
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for (int var ## _loop_idx = 0; var ## _loop_idx < 2; \
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++var ## _loop_idx) { \
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(var ## _loop_idx == 0) ? (var = service->desc_current) : \
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(var = service->desc_next); \
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if (var == NULL) continue;
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#define FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_END } STMT_END ;
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2017-02-01 15:18:58 +01:00
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/* Onion service directory file names. */
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2017-08-03 12:24:50 +02:00
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static const char fname_keyfile_prefix[] = "hs_ed25519";
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2018-08-18 07:28:12 +02:00
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static const char dname_client_pubkeys[] = "authorized_clients";
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2017-08-03 12:24:50 +02:00
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static const char fname_hostname[] = "hostname";
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static const char address_tld[] = "onion";
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2017-02-01 15:18:58 +01:00
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2017-01-13 22:00:07 +01:00
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/* Staging list of service object. When configuring service, we add them to
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* this list considered a staging area and they will get added to our global
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2018-01-24 09:55:15 +01:00
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* map once the keys have been loaded. These two steps are separated because
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2017-01-13 22:00:07 +01:00
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* loading keys requires that we are an actual running tor process. */
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static smartlist_t *hs_service_staging_list;
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2017-08-24 15:17:26 +02:00
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/** True if the list of available router descriptors might have changed which
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* might result in an altered hash ring. Check if the hash ring changed and
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* reupload if needed */
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static int consider_republishing_hs_descriptors = 0;
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2018-04-27 17:14:12 +02:00
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/* Static declaration. */
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2018-08-18 07:28:12 +02:00
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static int load_client_keys(hs_service_t *service);
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2018-06-14 14:35:59 +02:00
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static void set_descriptor_revision_counter(hs_service_descriptor_t *hs_desc,
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time_t now, bool is_current);
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2018-05-09 22:35:29 +02:00
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static int build_service_desc_superencrypted(const hs_service_t *service,
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hs_service_descriptor_t *desc);
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2017-08-25 15:06:17 +02:00
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static void move_descriptors(hs_service_t *src, hs_service_t *dst);
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2018-04-13 23:04:31 +02:00
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static int service_encode_descriptor(const hs_service_t *service,
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const hs_service_descriptor_t *desc,
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const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_kp,
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char **encoded_out);
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2017-07-21 14:53:17 +02:00
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2017-01-13 22:00:07 +01:00
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/* Helper: Function to compare two objects in the service map. Return 1 if the
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* two service have the same master public identity key. */
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static inline int
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hs_service_ht_eq(const hs_service_t *first, const hs_service_t *second)
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{
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tor_assert(first);
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tor_assert(second);
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/* Simple key compare. */
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return ed25519_pubkey_eq(&first->keys.identity_pk,
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&second->keys.identity_pk);
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}
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/* Helper: Function for the service hash table code below. The key used is the
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* master public identity key which is ultimately the onion address. */
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static inline unsigned int
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hs_service_ht_hash(const hs_service_t *service)
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{
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tor_assert(service);
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return (unsigned int) siphash24g(service->keys.identity_pk.pubkey,
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sizeof(service->keys.identity_pk.pubkey));
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}
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/* This is _the_ global hash map of hidden services which indexed the service
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* contained in it by master public identity key which is roughly the onion
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* address of the service. */
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static struct hs_service_ht *hs_service_map;
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/* Register the service hash table. */
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HT_PROTOTYPE(hs_service_ht, /* Name of hashtable. */
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hs_service_t, /* Object contained in the map. */
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hs_service_node, /* The name of the HT_ENTRY member. */
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hs_service_ht_hash, /* Hashing function. */
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hs_service_ht_eq) /* Compare function for objects. */
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HT_GENERATE2(hs_service_ht, hs_service_t, hs_service_node,
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hs_service_ht_hash, hs_service_ht_eq,
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0.6, tor_reallocarray, tor_free_)
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/* Query the given service map with a public key and return a service object
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* if found else NULL. It is also possible to set a directory path in the
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* search query. If pk is NULL, then it will be set to zero indicating the
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* hash table to compare the directory path instead. */
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2017-02-02 21:26:04 +01:00
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STATIC hs_service_t *
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2017-01-13 22:00:07 +01:00
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find_service(hs_service_ht *map, const ed25519_public_key_t *pk)
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{
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2017-07-13 23:18:11 +02:00
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hs_service_t dummy_service;
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2017-01-13 22:00:07 +01:00
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tor_assert(map);
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tor_assert(pk);
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2017-07-13 23:18:11 +02:00
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memset(&dummy_service, 0, sizeof(dummy_service));
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2017-01-13 22:00:07 +01:00
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ed25519_pubkey_copy(&dummy_service.keys.identity_pk, pk);
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return HT_FIND(hs_service_ht, map, &dummy_service);
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}
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/* Register the given service in the given map. If the service already exists
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* in the map, -1 is returned. On success, 0 is returned and the service
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2018-01-24 09:55:15 +01:00
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* ownership has been transferred to the global map. */
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2017-02-02 21:26:04 +01:00
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STATIC int
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2017-01-13 22:00:07 +01:00
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register_service(hs_service_ht *map, hs_service_t *service)
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{
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tor_assert(map);
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tor_assert(service);
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tor_assert(!ed25519_public_key_is_zero(&service->keys.identity_pk));
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if (find_service(map, &service->keys.identity_pk)) {
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/* Existing service with the same key. Do not register it. */
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return -1;
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}
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/* Taking ownership of the object at this point. */
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HT_INSERT(hs_service_ht, map, service);
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2018-04-27 17:14:12 +02:00
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/* If we just modified the global map, we notify. */
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if (map == hs_service_map) {
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hs_service_map_has_changed();
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}
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2017-01-13 22:00:07 +01:00
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return 0;
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}
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/* Remove a given service from the given map. If service is NULL or the
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* service key is unset, return gracefully. */
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2017-02-02 21:26:04 +01:00
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STATIC void
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2017-01-13 22:00:07 +01:00
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remove_service(hs_service_ht *map, hs_service_t *service)
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{
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hs_service_t *elm;
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tor_assert(map);
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/* Ignore if no service or key is zero. */
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if (BUG(service == NULL) ||
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BUG(ed25519_public_key_is_zero(&service->keys.identity_pk))) {
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return;
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}
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elm = HT_REMOVE(hs_service_ht, map, service);
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if (elm) {
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tor_assert(elm == service);
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} else {
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log_warn(LD_BUG, "Could not find service in the global map "
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"while removing service %s",
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escaped(service->config.directory_path));
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}
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2018-04-27 17:14:12 +02:00
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/* If we just modified the global map, we notify. */
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if (map == hs_service_map) {
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hs_service_map_has_changed();
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}
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2017-01-13 22:00:07 +01:00
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}
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2017-01-16 19:19:44 +01:00
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/* Set the default values for a service configuration object <b>c</b>. */
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static void
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set_service_default_config(hs_service_config_t *c,
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const or_options_t *options)
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{
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2017-04-19 21:27:11 +02:00
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(void) options;
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2017-01-16 19:19:44 +01:00
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tor_assert(c);
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c->ports = smartlist_new();
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c->directory_path = NULL;
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c->max_streams_per_rdv_circuit = 0;
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c->max_streams_close_circuit = 0;
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c->num_intro_points = NUM_INTRO_POINTS_DEFAULT;
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c->allow_unknown_ports = 0;
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c->is_single_onion = 0;
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c->dir_group_readable = 0;
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c->is_ephemeral = 0;
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}
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2017-07-12 17:53:26 +02:00
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/* From a service configuration object config, clear everything from it
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* meaning free allocated pointers and reset the values. */
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2018-05-16 16:57:24 +02:00
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STATIC void
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2017-07-12 17:53:26 +02:00
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service_clear_config(hs_service_config_t *config)
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{
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if (config == NULL) {
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return;
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}
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tor_free(config->directory_path);
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if (config->ports) {
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SMARTLIST_FOREACH(config->ports, rend_service_port_config_t *, p,
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rend_service_port_config_free(p););
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smartlist_free(config->ports);
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}
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2018-08-18 07:28:12 +02:00
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if (config->clients) {
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SMARTLIST_FOREACH(config->clients, hs_service_authorized_client_t *, p,
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service_authorized_client_free(p));
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smartlist_free(config->clients);
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}
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2017-07-12 17:53:26 +02:00
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memset(config, 0, sizeof(*config));
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}
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2017-09-20 18:47:09 +02:00
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/* Helper function to return a human readable description of the given intro
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* point object.
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*
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* This function is not thread-safe. Each call to this invalidates the
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* previous values returned by it. */
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static const char *
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describe_intro_point(const hs_service_intro_point_t *ip)
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{
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/* Hex identity digest of the IP prefixed by the $ sign and ends with NUL
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* byte hence the plus two. */
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static char buf[HEX_DIGEST_LEN + 2];
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const char *legacy_id = NULL;
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SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(ip->base.link_specifiers,
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const hs_desc_link_specifier_t *, lspec) {
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if (lspec->type == LS_LEGACY_ID) {
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legacy_id = (const char *) lspec->u.legacy_id;
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break;
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}
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} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(lspec);
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/* For now, we only print the identity digest but we could improve this with
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* much more information such as the ed25519 identity has well. */
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buf[0] = '$';
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if (legacy_id) {
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base16_encode(buf + 1, HEX_DIGEST_LEN + 1, legacy_id, DIGEST_LEN);
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}
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return buf;
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}
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|
|
2017-08-03 15:02:51 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Return the lower bound of maximum INTRODUCE2 cells per circuit before we
|
|
|
|
* rotate intro point (defined by a consensus parameter or the default
|
|
|
|
* value). */
|
2017-05-09 22:05:28 +02:00
|
|
|
static int32_t
|
|
|
|
get_intro_point_min_introduce2(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2018-01-24 09:55:15 +01:00
|
|
|
/* The [0, 2147483647] range is quite large to accommodate anything we decide
|
2017-05-09 22:05:28 +02:00
|
|
|
* in the future. */
|
|
|
|
return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "hs_intro_min_introduce2",
|
|
|
|
INTRO_POINT_MIN_LIFETIME_INTRODUCTIONS,
|
|
|
|
0, INT32_MAX);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-03 15:02:51 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Return the upper bound of maximum INTRODUCE2 cells per circuit before we
|
|
|
|
* rotate intro point (defined by a consensus parameter or the default
|
|
|
|
* value). */
|
2017-05-09 22:05:28 +02:00
|
|
|
static int32_t
|
|
|
|
get_intro_point_max_introduce2(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2018-01-24 09:55:15 +01:00
|
|
|
/* The [0, 2147483647] range is quite large to accommodate anything we decide
|
2017-05-09 22:05:28 +02:00
|
|
|
* in the future. */
|
|
|
|
return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "hs_intro_max_introduce2",
|
|
|
|
INTRO_POINT_MAX_LIFETIME_INTRODUCTIONS,
|
|
|
|
0, INT32_MAX);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-03 15:02:51 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Return the minimum lifetime in seconds of an introduction point defined by a
|
|
|
|
* consensus parameter or the default value. */
|
2017-05-09 22:10:14 +02:00
|
|
|
static int32_t
|
|
|
|
get_intro_point_min_lifetime(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2017-05-26 20:20:00 +02:00
|
|
|
#define MIN_INTRO_POINT_LIFETIME_TESTING 10
|
|
|
|
if (get_options()->TestingTorNetwork) {
|
|
|
|
return MIN_INTRO_POINT_LIFETIME_TESTING;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-01-24 09:55:15 +01:00
|
|
|
/* The [0, 2147483647] range is quite large to accommodate anything we decide
|
2017-05-09 22:10:14 +02:00
|
|
|
* in the future. */
|
|
|
|
return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "hs_intro_min_lifetime",
|
|
|
|
INTRO_POINT_LIFETIME_MIN_SECONDS,
|
|
|
|
0, INT32_MAX);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-03 15:02:51 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Return the maximum lifetime in seconds of an introduction point defined by a
|
|
|
|
* consensus parameter or the default value. */
|
2017-05-09 22:10:14 +02:00
|
|
|
static int32_t
|
|
|
|
get_intro_point_max_lifetime(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2017-05-26 20:20:00 +02:00
|
|
|
#define MAX_INTRO_POINT_LIFETIME_TESTING 30
|
|
|
|
if (get_options()->TestingTorNetwork) {
|
|
|
|
return MAX_INTRO_POINT_LIFETIME_TESTING;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-01-24 09:55:15 +01:00
|
|
|
/* The [0, 2147483647] range is quite large to accommodate anything we decide
|
2017-05-09 22:10:14 +02:00
|
|
|
* in the future. */
|
|
|
|
return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "hs_intro_max_lifetime",
|
|
|
|
INTRO_POINT_LIFETIME_MAX_SECONDS,
|
|
|
|
0, INT32_MAX);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-05-09 22:15:12 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Return the number of extra introduction point defined by a consensus
|
|
|
|
* parameter or the default value. */
|
|
|
|
static int32_t
|
|
|
|
get_intro_point_num_extra(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* The [0, 128] range bounds the number of extra introduction point allowed.
|
|
|
|
* Above 128 intro points, it's getting a bit crazy. */
|
|
|
|
return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "hs_intro_num_extra",
|
|
|
|
NUM_INTRO_POINTS_EXTRA, 0, 128);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-01-13 22:00:07 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Helper: Function that needs to return 1 for the HT for each loop which
|
|
|
|
* frees every service in an hash map. */
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
ht_free_service_(struct hs_service_t *service, void *data)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
(void) data;
|
|
|
|
hs_service_free(service);
|
|
|
|
/* This function MUST return 1 so the given object is then removed from the
|
|
|
|
* service map leading to this free of the object being safe. */
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Free every service that can be found in the global map. Once done, clear
|
|
|
|
* and free the global map. */
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
service_free_all(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2017-02-01 15:18:58 +01:00
|
|
|
if (hs_service_map) {
|
|
|
|
/* The free helper function returns 1 so this is safe. */
|
|
|
|
hs_service_ht_HT_FOREACH_FN(hs_service_map, ht_free_service_, NULL);
|
|
|
|
HT_CLEAR(hs_service_ht, hs_service_map);
|
|
|
|
tor_free(hs_service_map);
|
|
|
|
hs_service_map = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (hs_service_staging_list) {
|
|
|
|
/* Cleanup staging list. */
|
|
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(hs_service_staging_list, hs_service_t *, s,
|
|
|
|
hs_service_free(s));
|
|
|
|
smartlist_free(hs_service_staging_list);
|
|
|
|
hs_service_staging_list = NULL;
|
2017-01-13 22:00:07 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Free a given service intro point object. */
|
2017-04-28 19:41:34 +02:00
|
|
|
STATIC void
|
2017-11-21 15:37:47 +01:00
|
|
|
service_intro_point_free_(hs_service_intro_point_t *ip)
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (!ip) {
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memwipe(&ip->auth_key_kp, 0, sizeof(ip->auth_key_kp));
|
|
|
|
memwipe(&ip->enc_key_kp, 0, sizeof(ip->enc_key_kp));
|
|
|
|
crypto_pk_free(ip->legacy_key);
|
|
|
|
replaycache_free(ip->replay_cache);
|
2017-08-03 14:51:24 +02:00
|
|
|
hs_intropoint_clear(&ip->base);
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
tor_free(ip);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Helper: free an hs_service_intro_point_t object. This function is used by
|
|
|
|
* digest256map_free() which requires a void * pointer. */
|
|
|
|
static void
|
2017-11-21 15:37:47 +01:00
|
|
|
service_intro_point_free_void(void *obj)
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
2017-12-04 21:09:18 +01:00
|
|
|
service_intro_point_free_(obj);
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Return a newly allocated service intro point and fully initialized from the
|
2018-07-24 10:22:41 +02:00
|
|
|
* given extend_info_t ei if non NULL.
|
|
|
|
* If is_legacy is true, we also generate the legacy key.
|
|
|
|
* If supports_ed25519_link_handshake_any is true, we add the relay's ed25519
|
|
|
|
* key to the link specifiers.
|
2017-10-26 05:47:54 +02:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* If ei is NULL, returns a hs_service_intro_point_t with an empty link
|
|
|
|
* specifier list and no onion key. (This is used for testing.)
|
2018-07-24 10:22:41 +02:00
|
|
|
* On any other error, NULL is returned.
|
2017-10-26 05:47:54 +02:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* ei must be an extend_info_t containing an IPv4 address. (We will add supoort
|
|
|
|
* for IPv6 in a later release.) When calling extend_info_from_node(), pass
|
|
|
|
* 0 in for_direct_connection to make sure ei always has an IPv4 address. */
|
2017-04-28 19:41:34 +02:00
|
|
|
STATIC hs_service_intro_point_t *
|
2018-07-24 10:22:41 +02:00
|
|
|
service_intro_point_new(const extend_info_t *ei, unsigned int is_legacy,
|
|
|
|
unsigned int supports_ed25519_link_handshake_any)
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
hs_desc_link_specifier_t *ls;
|
|
|
|
hs_service_intro_point_t *ip;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ip = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*ip));
|
|
|
|
/* We'll create the key material. No need for extra strong, those are short
|
|
|
|
* term keys. */
|
|
|
|
ed25519_keypair_generate(&ip->auth_key_kp, 0);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-03 14:49:42 +02:00
|
|
|
{ /* Set introduce2 max cells limit */
|
|
|
|
int32_t min_introduce2_cells = get_intro_point_min_introduce2();
|
|
|
|
int32_t max_introduce2_cells = get_intro_point_max_introduce2();
|
|
|
|
if (BUG(max_introduce2_cells < min_introduce2_cells)) {
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ip->introduce2_max = crypto_rand_int_range(min_introduce2_cells,
|
|
|
|
max_introduce2_cells);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
{ /* Set intro point lifetime */
|
|
|
|
int32_t intro_point_min_lifetime = get_intro_point_min_lifetime();
|
|
|
|
int32_t intro_point_max_lifetime = get_intro_point_max_lifetime();
|
|
|
|
if (BUG(intro_point_max_lifetime < intro_point_min_lifetime)) {
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2018-06-14 14:38:14 +02:00
|
|
|
ip->time_to_expire = approx_time() +
|
2017-08-03 14:49:42 +02:00
|
|
|
crypto_rand_int_range(intro_point_min_lifetime,intro_point_max_lifetime);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
ip->replay_cache = replaycache_new(0, 0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Initialize the base object. We don't need the certificate object. */
|
|
|
|
ip->base.link_specifiers = smartlist_new();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Generate the encryption key for this intro point. */
|
|
|
|
curve25519_keypair_generate(&ip->enc_key_kp, 0);
|
|
|
|
/* Figure out if this chosen node supports v3 or is legacy only. */
|
|
|
|
if (is_legacy) {
|
|
|
|
ip->base.is_only_legacy = 1;
|
|
|
|
/* Legacy mode that is doesn't support v3+ with ed25519 auth key. */
|
|
|
|
ip->legacy_key = crypto_pk_new();
|
|
|
|
if (crypto_pk_generate_key(ip->legacy_key) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2018-04-27 23:45:16 +02:00
|
|
|
if (crypto_pk_get_digest(ip->legacy_key,
|
|
|
|
(char *) ip->legacy_key_digest) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ei == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-10-26 05:47:54 +02:00
|
|
|
/* We'll try to add all link specifiers. Legacy is mandatory.
|
|
|
|
* IPv4 or IPv6 is required, and we always send IPv4. */
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
ls = hs_desc_link_specifier_new(ei, LS_IPV4);
|
|
|
|
/* It is impossible to have an extend info object without a v4. */
|
2017-08-03 14:47:06 +02:00
|
|
|
if (BUG(!ls)) {
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
smartlist_add(ip->base.link_specifiers, ls);
|
2017-08-03 15:00:18 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
ls = hs_desc_link_specifier_new(ei, LS_LEGACY_ID);
|
|
|
|
/* It is impossible to have an extend info object without an identity
|
|
|
|
* digest. */
|
2017-08-03 14:47:06 +02:00
|
|
|
if (BUG(!ls)) {
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
smartlist_add(ip->base.link_specifiers, ls);
|
2017-08-03 15:00:18 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2018-07-24 10:22:41 +02:00
|
|
|
/* ed25519 identity key is optional for intro points. If the node supports
|
|
|
|
* ed25519 link authentication, we include it. */
|
|
|
|
if (supports_ed25519_link_handshake_any) {
|
|
|
|
ls = hs_desc_link_specifier_new(ei, LS_ED25519_ID);
|
|
|
|
if (ls) {
|
|
|
|
smartlist_add(ip->base.link_specifiers, ls);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-08-03 15:00:18 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-10-26 05:47:54 +02:00
|
|
|
/* IPv6 is not supported in this release. */
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Finally, copy onion key from the extend_info_t object. */
|
|
|
|
memcpy(&ip->onion_key, &ei->curve25519_onion_key, sizeof(ip->onion_key));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
|
|
return ip;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
|
|
service_intro_point_free(ip);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Add the given intro point object to the given intro point map. The intro
|
|
|
|
* point MUST have its RSA encryption key set if this is a legacy type or the
|
|
|
|
* authentication key set otherwise. */
|
2017-05-05 20:55:26 +02:00
|
|
|
STATIC void
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
service_intro_point_add(digest256map_t *map, hs_service_intro_point_t *ip)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2017-08-03 15:04:25 +02:00
|
|
|
hs_service_intro_point_t *old_ip_entry;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
tor_assert(map);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(ip);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-03 15:04:25 +02:00
|
|
|
old_ip_entry = digest256map_set(map, ip->auth_key_kp.pubkey.pubkey, ip);
|
|
|
|
/* Make sure we didn't just try to double-add an intro point */
|
|
|
|
tor_assert_nonfatal(!old_ip_entry);
|
2017-02-21 20:20:39 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-03 15:04:25 +02:00
|
|
|
/* For a given service, remove the intro point from that service's descriptors
|
|
|
|
* (check both current and next descriptor) */
|
2017-05-05 20:55:26 +02:00
|
|
|
STATIC void
|
2017-02-21 20:20:39 +01:00
|
|
|
service_intro_point_remove(const hs_service_t *service,
|
|
|
|
const hs_service_intro_point_t *ip)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(service);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(ip);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Trying all descriptors. */
|
|
|
|
FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_BEGIN(service, desc) {
|
|
|
|
/* We'll try to remove the descriptor on both descriptors which is not
|
|
|
|
* very expensive to do instead of doing loopup + remove. */
|
|
|
|
digest256map_remove(desc->intro_points.map,
|
|
|
|
ip->auth_key_kp.pubkey.pubkey);
|
|
|
|
} FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_END;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* For a given service and authentication key, return the intro point or NULL
|
|
|
|
* if not found. This will check both descriptors in the service. */
|
2017-05-05 20:55:26 +02:00
|
|
|
STATIC hs_service_intro_point_t *
|
2017-02-21 20:20:39 +01:00
|
|
|
service_intro_point_find(const hs_service_t *service,
|
|
|
|
const ed25519_public_key_t *auth_key)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
hs_service_intro_point_t *ip = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(service);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(auth_key);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-03 15:02:51 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Trying all descriptors to find the right intro point.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Even if we use the same node as intro point in both descriptors, the node
|
|
|
|
* will have a different intro auth key for each descriptor since we generate
|
|
|
|
* a new one everytime we pick an intro point.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* After #22893 gets implemented, intro points will be moved to be
|
|
|
|
* per-service instead of per-descriptor so this function will need to
|
|
|
|
* change.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2017-02-21 20:20:39 +01:00
|
|
|
FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_BEGIN(service, desc) {
|
|
|
|
if ((ip = digest256map_get(desc->intro_points.map,
|
|
|
|
auth_key->pubkey)) != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_END;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ip;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* For a given service and intro point, return the descriptor for which the
|
|
|
|
* intro point is assigned to. NULL is returned if not found. */
|
2017-05-05 20:55:26 +02:00
|
|
|
STATIC hs_service_descriptor_t *
|
2017-02-21 20:20:39 +01:00
|
|
|
service_desc_find_by_intro(const hs_service_t *service,
|
|
|
|
const hs_service_intro_point_t *ip)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
hs_service_descriptor_t *descp = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(service);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(ip);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_BEGIN(service, desc) {
|
|
|
|
if (digest256map_get(desc->intro_points.map,
|
|
|
|
ip->auth_key_kp.pubkey.pubkey)) {
|
|
|
|
descp = desc;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_END;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return descp;
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-08 18:08:03 +01:00
|
|
|
/* From a circuit identifier, get all the possible objects associated with the
|
|
|
|
* ident. If not NULL, service, ip or desc are set if the object can be found.
|
|
|
|
* They are untouched if they can't be found.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* This is an helper function because we do those lookups often so it's more
|
|
|
|
* convenient to simply call this functions to get all the things at once. */
|
2017-05-05 20:55:26 +02:00
|
|
|
STATIC void
|
2017-03-08 18:08:03 +01:00
|
|
|
get_objects_from_ident(const hs_ident_circuit_t *ident,
|
|
|
|
hs_service_t **service, hs_service_intro_point_t **ip,
|
|
|
|
hs_service_descriptor_t **desc)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
hs_service_t *s;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(ident);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Get service object from the circuit identifier. */
|
|
|
|
s = find_service(hs_service_map, &ident->identity_pk);
|
|
|
|
if (s && service) {
|
|
|
|
*service = s;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* From the service object, get the intro point object of that circuit. The
|
|
|
|
* following will query both descriptors intro points list. */
|
|
|
|
if (s && ip) {
|
|
|
|
*ip = service_intro_point_find(s, &ident->intro_auth_pk);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Get the descriptor for this introduction point and service. */
|
|
|
|
if (s && ip && *ip && desc) {
|
|
|
|
*desc = service_desc_find_by_intro(s, *ip);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
/* From a given intro point, return the first link specifier of type
|
|
|
|
* encountered in the link specifier list. Return NULL if it can't be found.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* The caller does NOT have ownership of the object, the intro point does. */
|
|
|
|
static hs_desc_link_specifier_t *
|
|
|
|
get_link_spec_by_type(const hs_service_intro_point_t *ip, uint8_t type)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
hs_desc_link_specifier_t *lnk_spec = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(ip);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(ip->base.link_specifiers,
|
|
|
|
hs_desc_link_specifier_t *, ls) {
|
|
|
|
if (ls->type == type) {
|
|
|
|
lnk_spec = ls;
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(ls);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
end:
|
|
|
|
return lnk_spec;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Given a service intro point, return the node_t associated to it. This can
|
|
|
|
* return NULL if the given intro point has no legacy ID or if the node can't
|
|
|
|
* be found in the consensus. */
|
2017-05-05 20:55:26 +02:00
|
|
|
STATIC const node_t *
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
get_node_from_intro_point(const hs_service_intro_point_t *ip)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
const hs_desc_link_specifier_t *ls;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(ip);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ls = get_link_spec_by_type(ip, LS_LEGACY_ID);
|
2017-08-03 14:47:06 +02:00
|
|
|
if (BUG(!ls)) {
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
/* XXX In the future, we want to only use the ed25519 ID (#22173). */
|
|
|
|
return node_get_by_id((const char *) ls->u.legacy_id);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-02-16 21:55:12 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Given a service intro point, return the extend_info_t for it. This can
|
|
|
|
* return NULL if the node can't be found for the intro point or the extend
|
|
|
|
* info can't be created for the found node. If direct_conn is set, the extend
|
|
|
|
* info is validated on if we can connect directly. */
|
|
|
|
static extend_info_t *
|
|
|
|
get_extend_info_from_intro_point(const hs_service_intro_point_t *ip,
|
|
|
|
unsigned int direct_conn)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
extend_info_t *info = NULL;
|
|
|
|
const node_t *node;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(ip);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
node = get_node_from_intro_point(ip);
|
|
|
|
if (node == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
/* This can happen if the relay serving as intro point has been removed
|
|
|
|
* from the consensus. In that case, the intro point will be removed from
|
|
|
|
* the descriptor during the scheduled events. */
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* In the case of a direct connection (single onion service), it is possible
|
|
|
|
* our firewall policy won't allow it so this can return a NULL value. */
|
|
|
|
info = extend_info_from_node(node, direct_conn);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
end:
|
|
|
|
return info;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-04-19 21:27:11 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Return the number of introduction points that are established for the
|
|
|
|
* given descriptor. */
|
|
|
|
static unsigned int
|
|
|
|
count_desc_circuit_established(const hs_service_descriptor_t *desc)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unsigned int count = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(desc);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
DIGEST256MAP_FOREACH(desc->intro_points.map, key,
|
|
|
|
const hs_service_intro_point_t *, ip) {
|
|
|
|
count += ip->circuit_established;
|
|
|
|
} DIGEST256MAP_FOREACH_END;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return count;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-09-11 19:16:23 +02:00
|
|
|
/* For a given service and descriptor of that service, close all active
|
|
|
|
* directory connections. */
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
close_directory_connections(const hs_service_t *service,
|
|
|
|
const hs_service_descriptor_t *desc)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unsigned int count = 0;
|
|
|
|
smartlist_t *dir_conns;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(service);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(desc);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Close pending HS desc upload connections for the blinded key of 'desc'. */
|
|
|
|
dir_conns = connection_list_by_type_purpose(CONN_TYPE_DIR,
|
|
|
|
DIR_PURPOSE_UPLOAD_HSDESC);
|
|
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(dir_conns, connection_t *, conn) {
|
|
|
|
dir_connection_t *dir_conn = TO_DIR_CONN(conn);
|
|
|
|
if (ed25519_pubkey_eq(&dir_conn->hs_ident->identity_pk,
|
|
|
|
&service->keys.identity_pk) &&
|
|
|
|
ed25519_pubkey_eq(&dir_conn->hs_ident->blinded_pk,
|
|
|
|
&desc->blinded_kp.pubkey)) {
|
|
|
|
connection_mark_for_close(conn);
|
|
|
|
count++;
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(conn);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
log_info(LD_REND, "Closed %u active service directory connections for "
|
|
|
|
"descriptor %s of service %s",
|
|
|
|
count, safe_str_client(ed25519_fmt(&desc->blinded_kp.pubkey)),
|
|
|
|
safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
|
|
|
|
/* We don't have ownership of the objects in this list. */
|
|
|
|
smartlist_free(dir_conns);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-01-13 22:00:07 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Close all rendezvous circuits for the given service. */
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
close_service_rp_circuits(hs_service_t *service)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
origin_circuit_t *ocirc = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-01-13 22:00:07 +01:00
|
|
|
tor_assert(service);
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* The reason we go over all circuit instead of using the circuitmap API is
|
|
|
|
* because most hidden service circuits are rendezvous circuits so there is
|
|
|
|
* no real improvement at getting all rendezvous circuits from the
|
|
|
|
* circuitmap and then going over them all to find the right ones.
|
|
|
|
* Furthermore, another option would have been to keep a list of RP cookies
|
|
|
|
* for a service but it creates an engineering complexity since we don't
|
|
|
|
* have a "RP circuit closed" event to clean it up properly so we avoid a
|
|
|
|
* memory DoS possibility. */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
while ((ocirc = circuit_get_next_service_rp_circ(ocirc))) {
|
|
|
|
/* Only close circuits that are v3 and for this service. */
|
|
|
|
if (ocirc->hs_ident != NULL &&
|
|
|
|
ed25519_pubkey_eq(ô->hs_ident->identity_pk,
|
|
|
|
&service->keys.identity_pk)) {
|
|
|
|
/* Reason is FINISHED because service has been removed and thus the
|
|
|
|
* circuit is considered old/uneeded. When freed, it is removed from the
|
|
|
|
* hs circuitmap. */
|
|
|
|
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(ocirc), END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-01-13 22:00:07 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Close the circuit(s) for the given map of introduction points. */
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
close_intro_circuits(hs_service_intropoints_t *intro_points)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(intro_points);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
DIGEST256MAP_FOREACH(intro_points->map, key,
|
|
|
|
const hs_service_intro_point_t *, ip) {
|
2017-07-19 17:42:04 +02:00
|
|
|
origin_circuit_t *ocirc = hs_circ_service_get_intro_circ(ip);
|
2017-01-13 22:00:07 +01:00
|
|
|
if (ocirc) {
|
|
|
|
/* Reason is FINISHED because service has been removed and thus the
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
* circuit is considered old/uneeded. When freed, the circuit is removed
|
|
|
|
* from the HS circuitmap. */
|
2017-01-13 22:00:07 +01:00
|
|
|
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(ocirc), END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} DIGEST256MAP_FOREACH_END;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Close all introduction circuits for the given service. */
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
close_service_intro_circuits(hs_service_t *service)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(service);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_BEGIN(service, desc) {
|
|
|
|
close_intro_circuits(&desc->intro_points);
|
|
|
|
} FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_END;
|
2017-01-13 22:00:07 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Close any circuits related to the given service. */
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
close_service_circuits(hs_service_t *service)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(service);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Only support for version >= 3. */
|
2017-07-13 14:51:14 +02:00
|
|
|
if (BUG(service->config.version < HS_VERSION_THREE)) {
|
2017-01-13 22:00:07 +01:00
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Close intro points. */
|
|
|
|
close_service_intro_circuits(service);
|
|
|
|
/* Close rendezvous points. */
|
|
|
|
close_service_rp_circuits(service);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Move every ephemeral services from the src service map to the dst service
|
|
|
|
* map. It is possible that a service can't be register to the dst map which
|
|
|
|
* won't stop the process of moving them all but will trigger a log warn. */
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
move_ephemeral_services(hs_service_ht *src, hs_service_ht *dst)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
hs_service_t **iter, **next;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(src);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(dst);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Iterate over the map to find ephemeral service and move them to the other
|
|
|
|
* map. We loop using this method to have a safe removal process. */
|
|
|
|
for (iter = HT_START(hs_service_ht, src); iter != NULL; iter = next) {
|
|
|
|
hs_service_t *s = *iter;
|
|
|
|
if (!s->config.is_ephemeral) {
|
|
|
|
/* Yeah, we are in a very manual loop :). */
|
|
|
|
next = HT_NEXT(hs_service_ht, src, iter);
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Remove service from map and then register to it to the other map.
|
|
|
|
* Reminder that "*iter" and "s" are the same thing. */
|
|
|
|
next = HT_NEXT_RMV(hs_service_ht, src, iter);
|
|
|
|
if (register_service(dst, s) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Ephemeral service key is already being used. "
|
|
|
|
"Skipping.");
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-02-01 15:18:58 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Return a const string of the directory path escaped. If this is an
|
|
|
|
* ephemeral service, it returns "[EPHEMERAL]". This can only be called from
|
|
|
|
* the main thread because escaped() uses a static variable. */
|
|
|
|
static const char *
|
|
|
|
service_escaped_dir(const hs_service_t *s)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return (s->config.is_ephemeral) ? "[EPHEMERAL]" :
|
|
|
|
escaped(s->config.directory_path);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-25 16:09:17 +02:00
|
|
|
/** Move the hidden service state from <b>src</b> to <b>dst</b>. We do this
|
|
|
|
* when we receive a SIGHUP: <b>dst</b> is the post-HUP service */
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
move_hs_state(hs_service_t *src_service, hs_service_t *dst_service)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(src_service);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(dst_service);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
hs_service_state_t *src = &src_service->state;
|
|
|
|
hs_service_state_t *dst = &dst_service->state;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Let's do a shallow copy */
|
|
|
|
dst->intro_circ_retry_started_time = src->intro_circ_retry_started_time;
|
|
|
|
dst->num_intro_circ_launched = src->num_intro_circ_launched;
|
2018-04-23 17:09:57 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Freeing a NULL replaycache triggers an info LD_BUG. */
|
|
|
|
if (dst->replay_cache_rend_cookie != NULL) {
|
|
|
|
replaycache_free(dst->replay_cache_rend_cookie);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-08-25 16:09:17 +02:00
|
|
|
dst->replay_cache_rend_cookie = src->replay_cache_rend_cookie;
|
2018-07-28 17:31:46 +02:00
|
|
|
dst->next_rotation_time = src->next_rotation_time;
|
2017-08-25 16:09:17 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
src->replay_cache_rend_cookie = NULL; /* steal pointer reference */
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-02-01 15:18:58 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Register services that are in the staging list. Once this function returns,
|
|
|
|
* the global service map will be set with the right content and all non
|
|
|
|
* surviving services will be cleaned up. */
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
register_all_services(void)
|
2017-01-13 22:00:07 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
struct hs_service_ht *new_service_map;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-02-01 15:18:58 +01:00
|
|
|
tor_assert(hs_service_staging_list);
|
2017-01-13 22:00:07 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Allocate a new map that will replace the current one. */
|
|
|
|
new_service_map = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*new_service_map));
|
|
|
|
HT_INIT(hs_service_ht, new_service_map);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* First step is to transfer all ephemeral services from the current global
|
|
|
|
* map to the new one we are constructing. We do not prune ephemeral
|
|
|
|
* services as the only way to kill them is by deleting it from the control
|
|
|
|
* port or stopping the tor daemon. */
|
|
|
|
move_ephemeral_services(hs_service_map, new_service_map);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-02-01 15:18:58 +01:00
|
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(hs_service_staging_list, hs_service_t *, snew) {
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
hs_service_t *s;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-01-13 22:00:07 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Check if that service is already in our global map and if so, we'll
|
|
|
|
* transfer the intro points to it. */
|
|
|
|
s = find_service(hs_service_map, &snew->keys.identity_pk);
|
|
|
|
if (s) {
|
2017-07-28 17:47:32 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Pass ownership of the descriptors from s (the current service) to
|
|
|
|
* snew (the newly configured one). */
|
|
|
|
move_descriptors(s, snew);
|
2017-08-25 16:09:17 +02:00
|
|
|
move_hs_state(s, snew);
|
2017-01-13 22:00:07 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Remove the service from the global map because after this, we need to
|
|
|
|
* go over the remaining service in that map that aren't surviving the
|
|
|
|
* reload to close their circuits. */
|
|
|
|
remove_service(hs_service_map, s);
|
2017-07-28 17:47:32 +02:00
|
|
|
hs_service_free(s);
|
2017-01-13 22:00:07 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Great, this service is now ready to be added to our new map. */
|
|
|
|
if (BUG(register_service(new_service_map, snew) < 0)) {
|
|
|
|
/* This should never happen because prior to registration, we validate
|
|
|
|
* every service against the entire set. Not being able to register a
|
|
|
|
* service means we failed to validate correctly. In that case, don't
|
|
|
|
* break tor and ignore the service but tell user. */
|
|
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unable to register service with directory %s",
|
2017-02-01 15:18:58 +01:00
|
|
|
service_escaped_dir(snew));
|
|
|
|
SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(hs_service_staging_list, snew);
|
2017-01-13 22:00:07 +01:00
|
|
|
hs_service_free(snew);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(snew);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Close any circuits associated with the non surviving services. Every
|
|
|
|
* service in the current global map are roaming. */
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
FOR_EACH_SERVICE_BEGIN(service) {
|
|
|
|
close_service_circuits(service);
|
|
|
|
} FOR_EACH_SERVICE_END;
|
2017-01-13 22:00:07 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2017-02-01 15:18:58 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Time to make the switch. We'll clear the staging list because its content
|
|
|
|
* has now changed ownership to the map. */
|
|
|
|
smartlist_clear(hs_service_staging_list);
|
2017-01-13 22:00:07 +01:00
|
|
|
service_free_all();
|
|
|
|
hs_service_map = new_service_map;
|
2018-04-27 17:14:12 +02:00
|
|
|
/* We've just register services into the new map and now we've replaced the
|
|
|
|
* global map with it so we have to notify that the change happened. When
|
|
|
|
* registering a service, the notify is only triggered if the destination
|
|
|
|
* map is the global map for which in here it was not. */
|
|
|
|
hs_service_map_has_changed();
|
2017-01-13 22:00:07 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-02-01 15:18:58 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Write the onion address of a given service to the given filename fname_ in
|
|
|
|
* the service directory. Return 0 on success else -1 on error. */
|
2017-08-05 22:25:44 +02:00
|
|
|
STATIC int
|
2017-02-01 15:18:58 +01:00
|
|
|
write_address_to_file(const hs_service_t *service, const char *fname_)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int ret = -1;
|
|
|
|
char *fname = NULL;
|
2017-08-03 12:24:50 +02:00
|
|
|
char *addr_buf = NULL;
|
2017-02-01 15:18:58 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(service);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(fname_);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Construct the full address with the onion tld and write the hostname file
|
|
|
|
* to disk. */
|
2017-08-03 12:24:50 +02:00
|
|
|
tor_asprintf(&addr_buf, "%s.%s\n", service->onion_address, address_tld);
|
2017-02-01 15:18:58 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Notice here that we use the given "fname_". */
|
|
|
|
fname = hs_path_from_filename(service->config.directory_path, fname_);
|
2017-08-03 12:24:50 +02:00
|
|
|
if (write_str_to_file(fname, addr_buf, 0) < 0) {
|
2017-02-01 15:18:58 +01:00
|
|
|
log_warn(LD_REND, "Could not write onion address to hostname file %s",
|
|
|
|
escaped(fname));
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifndef _WIN32
|
|
|
|
if (service->config.dir_group_readable) {
|
|
|
|
/* Mode to 0640. */
|
|
|
|
if (chmod(fname, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IRGRP) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
log_warn(LD_FS, "Unable to make onion service hostname file %s "
|
|
|
|
"group-readable.", escaped(fname));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-09-15 22:24:44 +02:00
|
|
|
#endif /* !defined(_WIN32) */
|
2017-02-01 15:18:58 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Success. */
|
|
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
end:
|
|
|
|
tor_free(fname);
|
2017-08-03 12:24:50 +02:00
|
|
|
tor_free(addr_buf);
|
2017-02-01 15:18:58 +01:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Load and/or generate private keys for the given service. On success, the
|
|
|
|
* hostname file will be written to disk along with the master private key iff
|
|
|
|
* the service is not configured for offline keys. Return 0 on success else -1
|
|
|
|
* on failure. */
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
load_service_keys(hs_service_t *service)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int ret = -1;
|
|
|
|
char *fname = NULL;
|
|
|
|
ed25519_keypair_t *kp;
|
|
|
|
const hs_service_config_t *config;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(service);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config = &service->config;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Create and fix permission on service directory. We are about to write
|
|
|
|
* files to that directory so make sure it exists and has the right
|
|
|
|
* permissions. We do this here because at this stage we know that Tor is
|
|
|
|
* actually running and the service we have has been validated. */
|
2018-09-14 16:56:34 +02:00
|
|
|
if (hs_check_service_private_dir(get_options()->User,
|
|
|
|
config->directory_path,
|
|
|
|
config->dir_group_readable, 1) < 0) {
|
2017-02-01 15:18:58 +01:00
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Try to load the keys from file or generate it if not found. */
|
|
|
|
fname = hs_path_from_filename(config->directory_path, fname_keyfile_prefix);
|
|
|
|
/* Don't ask for key creation, we want to know if we were able to load it or
|
|
|
|
* we had to generate it. Better logging! */
|
2017-10-03 17:16:50 +02:00
|
|
|
kp = ed_key_init_from_file(fname, INIT_ED_KEY_SPLIT, LOG_INFO, NULL, 0, 0,
|
2018-08-22 17:32:57 +02:00
|
|
|
0, NULL, NULL);
|
2017-02-01 15:18:58 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!kp) {
|
|
|
|
log_info(LD_REND, "Unable to load keys from %s. Generating it...", fname);
|
|
|
|
/* We'll now try to generate the keys and for it we want the strongest
|
|
|
|
* randomness for it. The keypair will be written in different files. */
|
|
|
|
uint32_t key_flags = INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE | INIT_ED_KEY_EXTRA_STRONG |
|
|
|
|
INIT_ED_KEY_SPLIT;
|
|
|
|
kp = ed_key_init_from_file(fname, key_flags, LOG_WARN, NULL, 0, 0, 0,
|
2018-08-22 17:32:57 +02:00
|
|
|
NULL, NULL);
|
2017-02-01 15:18:58 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!kp) {
|
|
|
|
log_warn(LD_REND, "Unable to generate keys and save in %s.", fname);
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Copy loaded or generated keys to service object. */
|
|
|
|
ed25519_pubkey_copy(&service->keys.identity_pk, &kp->pubkey);
|
|
|
|
memcpy(&service->keys.identity_sk, &kp->seckey,
|
|
|
|
sizeof(service->keys.identity_sk));
|
|
|
|
/* This does a proper memory wipe. */
|
|
|
|
ed25519_keypair_free(kp);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Build onion address from the newly loaded keys. */
|
2017-07-13 14:51:14 +02:00
|
|
|
tor_assert(service->config.version <= UINT8_MAX);
|
|
|
|
hs_build_address(&service->keys.identity_pk,
|
|
|
|
(uint8_t) service->config.version,
|
2017-02-01 15:18:58 +01:00
|
|
|
service->onion_address);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Write onion address to hostname file. */
|
|
|
|
if (write_address_to_file(service, fname_hostname) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-08-18 07:28:12 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Load all client authorization keys in the service. */
|
|
|
|
if (load_client_keys(service) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-02-01 15:18:58 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Succes. */
|
|
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
end:
|
|
|
|
tor_free(fname);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-08-18 07:28:12 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Check if the client file name is valid or not. Return 1 if valid,
|
|
|
|
* otherwise return 0. */
|
2018-08-18 16:24:26 +02:00
|
|
|
STATIC int
|
2018-08-18 07:28:12 +02:00
|
|
|
client_filename_is_valid(const char *filename)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int ret = 1;
|
|
|
|
const char *valid_extension = ".auth";
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(filename);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* The file extension must match and the total filename length can't be the
|
|
|
|
* length of the extension else we do not have a filename. */
|
|
|
|
if (!strcmpend(filename, valid_extension) &&
|
|
|
|
strlen(filename) != strlen(valid_extension)) {
|
|
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Parse an authorized client from a string. The format of a client string
|
|
|
|
* looks like (see rend-spec-v3.txt):
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* <auth-type>:<key-type>:<base32-encoded-public-key>
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* The <auth-type> can only be "descriptor".
|
|
|
|
* The <key-type> can only be "x25519".
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Return the key on success, return NULL, otherwise. */
|
2018-08-18 16:24:26 +02:00
|
|
|
STATIC hs_service_authorized_client_t *
|
2018-08-18 07:28:12 +02:00
|
|
|
parse_authorized_client(const char *client_key_str)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
char *auth_type = NULL;
|
|
|
|
char *key_type = NULL;
|
|
|
|
char *pubkey_b32 = NULL;
|
|
|
|
hs_service_authorized_client_t *client = NULL;
|
|
|
|
smartlist_t *fields = smartlist_new();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(client_key_str);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
smartlist_split_string(fields, client_key_str, ":",
|
|
|
|
SPLIT_SKIP_SPACE, 0);
|
|
|
|
/* Wrong number of fields. */
|
|
|
|
if (smartlist_len(fields) != 3) {
|
2018-08-30 15:16:48 +02:00
|
|
|
log_warn(LD_REND, "Unknown format of client authorization file.");
|
2018-08-18 07:28:12 +02:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
auth_type = smartlist_get(fields, 0);
|
|
|
|
key_type = smartlist_get(fields, 1);
|
|
|
|
pubkey_b32 = smartlist_get(fields, 2);
|
|
|
|
|
2018-08-19 14:37:38 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Currently, the only supported auth type is "descriptor". */
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(auth_type, "descriptor")) {
|
2018-08-30 15:16:48 +02:00
|
|
|
log_warn(LD_REND, "Client authorization auth type '%s' not supported.",
|
|
|
|
auth_type);
|
2018-08-19 14:37:38 +02:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Currently, the only supported key type is "x25519". */
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(key_type, "x25519")) {
|
2018-08-30 15:16:48 +02:00
|
|
|
log_warn(LD_REND, "Client authorization key type '%s' not supported.",
|
|
|
|
key_type);
|
2018-08-18 07:28:12 +02:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* We expect a specific length of the base32 encoded key so make sure we
|
|
|
|
* have that so we don't successfully decode a value with a different length
|
|
|
|
* and end up in trouble when copying the decoded key into a fixed length
|
|
|
|
* buffer. */
|
|
|
|
if (strlen(pubkey_b32) != BASE32_NOPAD_LEN(CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN)) {
|
|
|
|
log_warn(LD_REND, "Client authorization encoded base32 public key "
|
|
|
|
"length is invalid: %s", pubkey_b32);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
client = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(hs_service_authorized_client_t));
|
|
|
|
if (base32_decode((char *) client->client_pk.public_key,
|
|
|
|
sizeof(client->client_pk.public_key),
|
|
|
|
pubkey_b32, strlen(pubkey_b32)) < 0) {
|
2018-08-30 15:16:48 +02:00
|
|
|
log_warn(LD_REND, "Client authorization public key cannot be decoded: %s",
|
|
|
|
pubkey_b32);
|
2018-08-18 07:28:12 +02:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Success. */
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
|
|
service_authorized_client_free(client);
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
|
|
/* It is also a good idea to wipe the public key. */
|
|
|
|
if (pubkey_b32) {
|
|
|
|
memwipe(pubkey_b32, 0, strlen(pubkey_b32));
|
|
|
|
}
|
2018-09-10 15:47:28 +02:00
|
|
|
tor_assert(fields);
|
|
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(fields, char *, s, tor_free(s));
|
|
|
|
smartlist_free(fields);
|
2018-08-18 07:28:12 +02:00
|
|
|
return client;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Load all the client public keys for the given service. Return 0 on
|
|
|
|
* success else -1 on failure. */
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
load_client_keys(hs_service_t *service)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int ret = -1;
|
|
|
|
char *client_key_str = NULL;
|
|
|
|
char *client_key_file_path = NULL;
|
|
|
|
char *client_keys_dir_path = NULL;
|
|
|
|
hs_service_config_t *config;
|
|
|
|
smartlist_t *file_list = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(service);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config = &service->config;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Before calling this function, we already call load_service_keys to make
|
|
|
|
* sure that the directory exists with the right permission. So, if we
|
|
|
|
* cannot create a client pubkey key directory, we consider it as a bug. */
|
|
|
|
client_keys_dir_path = hs_path_from_filename(config->directory_path,
|
|
|
|
dname_client_pubkeys);
|
|
|
|
if (BUG(hs_check_service_private_dir(get_options()->User,
|
|
|
|
client_keys_dir_path,
|
|
|
|
config->dir_group_readable, 1) < 0)) {
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If the list of clients already exists, we must clear it first. */
|
|
|
|
if (config->clients) {
|
|
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(config->clients, hs_service_authorized_client_t *, p,
|
|
|
|
service_authorized_client_free(p));
|
|
|
|
smartlist_free(config->clients);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
config->clients = smartlist_new();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
file_list = tor_listdir(client_keys_dir_path);
|
|
|
|
if (file_list == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
log_warn(LD_REND, "Client authorization directory %s can't be listed.",
|
|
|
|
client_keys_dir_path);
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(file_list, const char *, filename) {
|
|
|
|
hs_service_authorized_client_t *client = NULL;
|
2018-08-19 14:37:38 +02:00
|
|
|
log_info(LD_REND, "Loading a client authorization key file %s...",
|
|
|
|
filename);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!client_filename_is_valid(filename)) {
|
2018-08-30 15:16:48 +02:00
|
|
|
log_warn(LD_REND, "Client authorization unrecognized filename %s. "
|
|
|
|
"File must end in .auth. Ignoring.", filename);
|
2018-08-19 14:37:38 +02:00
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Create a full path for a file. */
|
|
|
|
client_key_file_path = hs_path_from_filename(client_keys_dir_path,
|
|
|
|
filename);
|
|
|
|
client_key_str = read_file_to_str(client_key_file_path, 0, NULL);
|
|
|
|
/* Free immediately after using it. */
|
|
|
|
tor_free(client_key_file_path);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If we cannot read the file, continue with the next file. */
|
|
|
|
if (!client_key_str) {
|
2018-08-30 15:16:48 +02:00
|
|
|
log_warn(LD_REND, "Client authorization file %s can't be read. "
|
|
|
|
"Corrupted or verify permission? Ignoring.",
|
|
|
|
client_key_file_path);
|
2018-08-19 14:37:38 +02:00
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
client = parse_authorized_client(client_key_str);
|
|
|
|
/* Wipe and free immediately after using it. */
|
|
|
|
memwipe(client_key_str, 0, strlen(client_key_str));
|
|
|
|
tor_free(client_key_str);
|
2018-08-18 07:28:12 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2018-08-19 14:37:38 +02:00
|
|
|
if (client) {
|
|
|
|
smartlist_add(config->clients, client);
|
|
|
|
log_info(LD_REND, "Loaded a client authorization key file %s.",
|
|
|
|
filename);
|
2018-08-18 07:28:12 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(filename);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If the number of clients is greater than zero, set the flag to be true. */
|
|
|
|
if (smartlist_len(config->clients) > 0) {
|
|
|
|
config->is_client_auth_enabled = 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Success. */
|
|
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
end:
|
|
|
|
if (client_key_str) {
|
|
|
|
memwipe(client_key_str, 0, strlen(client_key_str));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (file_list) {
|
|
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(file_list, char *, s, tor_free(s));
|
|
|
|
smartlist_free(file_list);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
tor_free(client_key_str);
|
|
|
|
tor_free(client_key_file_path);
|
|
|
|
tor_free(client_keys_dir_path);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
STATIC void
|
|
|
|
service_authorized_client_free_(hs_service_authorized_client_t *client)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (!client) {
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memwipe(&client->client_pk, 0, sizeof(client->client_pk));
|
|
|
|
tor_free(client);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Free a given service descriptor object and all key material is wiped. */
|
2017-07-24 12:03:19 +02:00
|
|
|
STATIC void
|
2017-11-21 15:37:47 +01:00
|
|
|
service_descriptor_free_(hs_service_descriptor_t *desc)
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (!desc) {
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
hs_descriptor_free(desc->desc);
|
|
|
|
memwipe(&desc->signing_kp, 0, sizeof(desc->signing_kp));
|
|
|
|
memwipe(&desc->blinded_kp, 0, sizeof(desc->blinded_kp));
|
|
|
|
/* Cleanup all intro points. */
|
2017-11-21 15:37:47 +01:00
|
|
|
digest256map_free(desc->intro_points.map, service_intro_point_free_void);
|
2017-05-09 20:31:17 +02:00
|
|
|
digestmap_free(desc->intro_points.failed_id, tor_free_);
|
2017-08-19 15:26:46 +02:00
|
|
|
if (desc->previous_hsdirs) {
|
|
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(desc->previous_hsdirs, char *, s, tor_free(s));
|
|
|
|
smartlist_free(desc->previous_hsdirs);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2018-07-17 18:03:18 +02:00
|
|
|
crypto_ope_free(desc->ope_cipher);
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
tor_free(desc);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Return a newly allocated service descriptor object. */
|
2017-05-05 20:55:26 +02:00
|
|
|
STATIC hs_service_descriptor_t *
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
service_descriptor_new(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
hs_service_descriptor_t *sdesc = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*sdesc));
|
|
|
|
sdesc->desc = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(hs_descriptor_t));
|
|
|
|
/* Initialize the intro points map. */
|
|
|
|
sdesc->intro_points.map = digest256map_new();
|
2017-05-09 20:31:17 +02:00
|
|
|
sdesc->intro_points.failed_id = digestmap_new();
|
2017-08-19 15:26:46 +02:00
|
|
|
sdesc->previous_hsdirs = smartlist_new();
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
return sdesc;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-05-09 22:35:29 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Allocate and return a deep copy of client. */
|
|
|
|
static hs_service_authorized_client_t *
|
|
|
|
service_authorized_client_dup(const hs_service_authorized_client_t *client)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
hs_service_authorized_client_t *client_dup = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(client);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
client_dup = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(hs_service_authorized_client_t));
|
|
|
|
/* Currently, the public key is the only component of
|
|
|
|
* hs_service_authorized_client_t. */
|
|
|
|
memcpy(client_dup->client_pk.public_key,
|
|
|
|
client->client_pk.public_key,
|
|
|
|
CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return client_dup;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If two authorized clients are equal, return 0. If the first one should come
|
|
|
|
* before the second, return less than zero. If the first should come after
|
|
|
|
* the second, return greater than zero. */
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
service_authorized_client_cmp(const hs_service_authorized_client_t *client1,
|
|
|
|
const hs_service_authorized_client_t *client2)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(client1);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(client2);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Currently, the public key is the only component of
|
|
|
|
* hs_service_authorized_client_t. */
|
|
|
|
return tor_memcmp(client1->client_pk.public_key,
|
|
|
|
client2->client_pk.public_key,
|
|
|
|
CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Helper for sorting authorized clients. */
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
compare_service_authorzized_client_(const void **_a, const void **_b)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
const hs_service_authorized_client_t *a = *_a, *b = *_b;
|
|
|
|
return service_authorized_client_cmp(a, b);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If the list of hs_service_authorized_client_t's is different between
|
|
|
|
* src and dst, return 1. Otherwise, return 0. */
|
2018-05-16 16:57:24 +02:00
|
|
|
STATIC int
|
2018-05-09 22:35:29 +02:00
|
|
|
service_authorized_client_config_equal(const hs_service_config_t *config1,
|
|
|
|
const hs_service_config_t *config2)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
smartlist_t *sl1 = smartlist_new();
|
|
|
|
smartlist_t *sl2 = smartlist_new();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(config1);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(config2);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(config1->clients);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(config2->clients);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If the number of clients is different, it is obvious that the list
|
|
|
|
* changes. */
|
|
|
|
if (smartlist_len(config1->clients) != smartlist_len(config2->clients)) {
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* We do not want to mutate config1 and config2, so we will duplicate both
|
|
|
|
* entire client lists here. */
|
|
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(config1->clients,
|
|
|
|
hs_service_authorized_client_t *, client,
|
|
|
|
smartlist_add(sl1, service_authorized_client_dup(client)));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(config2->clients,
|
|
|
|
hs_service_authorized_client_t *, client,
|
|
|
|
smartlist_add(sl2, service_authorized_client_dup(client)));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
smartlist_sort(sl1, compare_service_authorzized_client_);
|
|
|
|
smartlist_sort(sl2, compare_service_authorzized_client_);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(sl1); i++) {
|
|
|
|
/* If the clients at index i in both lists differ, the whole configs
|
|
|
|
* differ. */
|
|
|
|
if (service_authorized_client_cmp(smartlist_get(sl1, i),
|
|
|
|
smartlist_get(sl2, i))) {
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Success. */
|
|
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
|
|
if (sl1) {
|
|
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(sl1, hs_service_authorized_client_t *, p,
|
|
|
|
service_authorized_client_free(p));
|
|
|
|
smartlist_free(sl1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (sl2) {
|
|
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(sl2, hs_service_authorized_client_t *, p,
|
|
|
|
service_authorized_client_free(p));
|
|
|
|
smartlist_free(sl2);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Move descriptor(s) from the src service to the dst service and modify their
|
|
|
|
* content if necessary. We do this during SIGHUP when we re-create our
|
|
|
|
* hidden services. */
|
2017-08-25 15:06:17 +02:00
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
move_descriptors(hs_service_t *src, hs_service_t *dst)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(src);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(dst);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (src->desc_current) {
|
2017-08-25 15:13:19 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Nothing should be there, but clean it up just in case */
|
|
|
|
if (BUG(dst->desc_current)) {
|
|
|
|
service_descriptor_free(dst->desc_current);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-08-25 15:06:17 +02:00
|
|
|
dst->desc_current = src->desc_current;
|
|
|
|
src->desc_current = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-08-25 15:13:19 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2017-08-25 15:06:17 +02:00
|
|
|
if (src->desc_next) {
|
2017-08-25 15:13:19 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Nothing should be there, but clean it up just in case */
|
|
|
|
if (BUG(dst->desc_next)) {
|
|
|
|
service_descriptor_free(dst->desc_next);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-08-25 15:06:17 +02:00
|
|
|
dst->desc_next = src->desc_next;
|
|
|
|
src->desc_next = NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2018-05-09 22:35:29 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If the client authorization changes, we must rebuild the superencrypted
|
|
|
|
* section and republish the descriptors. */
|
|
|
|
int client_auth_changed =
|
|
|
|
!service_authorized_client_config_equal(&src->config, &dst->config);
|
|
|
|
if (client_auth_changed && dst->desc_current) {
|
|
|
|
/* We have to clear the superencrypted content first. */
|
|
|
|
hs_desc_superencrypted_data_free_contents(
|
|
|
|
&dst->desc_current->desc->superencrypted_data);
|
|
|
|
if (build_service_desc_superencrypted(dst, dst->desc_current) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
service_desc_schedule_upload(dst->desc_current, time(NULL), 1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (client_auth_changed && dst->desc_next) {
|
|
|
|
/* We have to clear the superencrypted content first. */
|
|
|
|
hs_desc_superencrypted_data_free_contents(
|
|
|
|
&dst->desc_next->desc->superencrypted_data);
|
|
|
|
if (build_service_desc_superencrypted(dst, dst->desc_next) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
service_desc_schedule_upload(dst->desc_next, time(NULL), 1);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
|
|
/* If there is an error, free all descriptors to make it clean and generate
|
|
|
|
* them later. */
|
|
|
|
service_descriptor_free(dst->desc_current);
|
|
|
|
service_descriptor_free(dst->desc_next);
|
2017-08-25 15:06:17 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-05-09 20:31:17 +02:00
|
|
|
/* From the given service, remove all expired failing intro points for each
|
|
|
|
* descriptor. */
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
remove_expired_failing_intro(hs_service_t *service, time_t now)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(service);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* For both descriptors, cleanup the failing intro points list. */
|
|
|
|
FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_BEGIN(service, desc) {
|
|
|
|
DIGESTMAP_FOREACH_MODIFY(desc->intro_points.failed_id, key, time_t *, t) {
|
|
|
|
time_t failure_time = *t;
|
|
|
|
if ((failure_time + INTRO_CIRC_RETRY_PERIOD) <= now) {
|
|
|
|
MAP_DEL_CURRENT(key);
|
|
|
|
tor_free(t);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} DIGESTMAP_FOREACH_END;
|
|
|
|
} FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_END;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* For the given descriptor desc, put all node_t object found from its failing
|
|
|
|
* intro point list and put them in the given node_list. */
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
setup_intro_point_exclude_list(const hs_service_descriptor_t *desc,
|
|
|
|
smartlist_t *node_list)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(desc);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(node_list);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
DIGESTMAP_FOREACH(desc->intro_points.failed_id, key, time_t *, t) {
|
|
|
|
(void) t; /* Make gcc happy. */
|
|
|
|
const node_t *node = node_get_by_id(key);
|
|
|
|
if (node) {
|
|
|
|
smartlist_add(node_list, (void *) node);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} DIGESTMAP_FOREACH_END;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* For the given failing intro point ip, we add its time of failure to the
|
|
|
|
* failed map and index it by identity digest (legacy ID) in the descriptor
|
|
|
|
* desc failed id map. */
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
remember_failing_intro_point(const hs_service_intro_point_t *ip,
|
|
|
|
hs_service_descriptor_t *desc, time_t now)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
time_t *time_of_failure, *prev_ptr;
|
|
|
|
const hs_desc_link_specifier_t *legacy_ls;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(ip);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(desc);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
time_of_failure = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(time_t));
|
|
|
|
*time_of_failure = now;
|
|
|
|
legacy_ls = get_link_spec_by_type(ip, LS_LEGACY_ID);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(legacy_ls);
|
|
|
|
prev_ptr = digestmap_set(desc->intro_points.failed_id,
|
|
|
|
(const char *) legacy_ls->u.legacy_id,
|
|
|
|
time_of_failure);
|
|
|
|
tor_free(prev_ptr);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Copy the descriptor link specifier object from src to dst. */
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
link_specifier_copy(hs_desc_link_specifier_t *dst,
|
|
|
|
const hs_desc_link_specifier_t *src)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(dst);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(src);
|
|
|
|
memcpy(dst, src, sizeof(hs_desc_link_specifier_t));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Using a given descriptor signing keypair signing_kp, a service intro point
|
|
|
|
* object ip and the time now, setup the content of an already allocated
|
|
|
|
* descriptor intro desc_ip.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Return 0 on success else a negative value. */
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
setup_desc_intro_point(const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_kp,
|
|
|
|
const hs_service_intro_point_t *ip,
|
|
|
|
time_t now, hs_desc_intro_point_t *desc_ip)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int ret = -1;
|
|
|
|
time_t nearest_hour = now - (now % 3600);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(signing_kp);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(ip);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(desc_ip);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Copy the onion key. */
|
|
|
|
memcpy(&desc_ip->onion_key, &ip->onion_key, sizeof(desc_ip->onion_key));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Key and certificate material. */
|
|
|
|
desc_ip->auth_key_cert = tor_cert_create(signing_kp,
|
|
|
|
CERT_TYPE_AUTH_HS_IP_KEY,
|
|
|
|
&ip->auth_key_kp.pubkey,
|
|
|
|
nearest_hour,
|
|
|
|
HS_DESC_CERT_LIFETIME,
|
|
|
|
CERT_FLAG_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY);
|
|
|
|
if (desc_ip->auth_key_cert == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
log_warn(LD_REND, "Unable to create intro point auth-key certificate");
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Copy link specifier(s). */
|
|
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(ip->base.link_specifiers,
|
|
|
|
const hs_desc_link_specifier_t *, ls) {
|
2018-01-03 15:13:00 +01:00
|
|
|
hs_desc_link_specifier_t *copy = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*copy));
|
|
|
|
link_specifier_copy(copy, ls);
|
|
|
|
smartlist_add(desc_ip->link_specifiers, copy);
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(ls);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* For a legacy intro point, we'll use an RSA/ed cross certificate. */
|
|
|
|
if (ip->base.is_only_legacy) {
|
|
|
|
desc_ip->legacy.key = crypto_pk_dup_key(ip->legacy_key);
|
|
|
|
/* Create cross certification cert. */
|
|
|
|
ssize_t cert_len = tor_make_rsa_ed25519_crosscert(
|
|
|
|
&signing_kp->pubkey,
|
|
|
|
desc_ip->legacy.key,
|
|
|
|
nearest_hour + HS_DESC_CERT_LIFETIME,
|
|
|
|
&desc_ip->legacy.cert.encoded);
|
|
|
|
if (cert_len < 0) {
|
|
|
|
log_warn(LD_REND, "Unable to create enc key legacy cross cert.");
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
desc_ip->legacy.cert.len = cert_len;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Encryption key and its cross certificate. */
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
ed25519_public_key_t ed25519_pubkey;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Use the public curve25519 key. */
|
|
|
|
memcpy(&desc_ip->enc_key, &ip->enc_key_kp.pubkey,
|
|
|
|
sizeof(desc_ip->enc_key));
|
|
|
|
/* The following can't fail. */
|
|
|
|
ed25519_public_key_from_curve25519_public_key(&ed25519_pubkey,
|
|
|
|
&ip->enc_key_kp.pubkey,
|
|
|
|
0);
|
|
|
|
desc_ip->enc_key_cert = tor_cert_create(signing_kp,
|
|
|
|
CERT_TYPE_CROSS_HS_IP_KEYS,
|
|
|
|
&ed25519_pubkey, nearest_hour,
|
|
|
|
HS_DESC_CERT_LIFETIME,
|
|
|
|
CERT_FLAG_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY);
|
|
|
|
if (desc_ip->enc_key_cert == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
log_warn(LD_REND, "Unable to create enc key curve25519 cross cert.");
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Success. */
|
|
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Using the given descriptor from the given service, build the descriptor
|
|
|
|
* intro point list so we can then encode the descriptor for publication. This
|
|
|
|
* function does not pick intro points, they have to be in the descriptor
|
|
|
|
* current map. Cryptographic material (keys) must be initialized in the
|
|
|
|
* descriptor for this function to make sense. */
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
build_desc_intro_points(const hs_service_t *service,
|
|
|
|
hs_service_descriptor_t *desc, time_t now)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
hs_desc_encrypted_data_t *encrypted;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(service);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(desc);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Ease our life. */
|
|
|
|
encrypted = &desc->desc->encrypted_data;
|
|
|
|
/* Cleanup intro points, we are about to set them from scratch. */
|
2017-08-03 14:51:24 +02:00
|
|
|
hs_descriptor_clear_intro_points(desc->desc);
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
DIGEST256MAP_FOREACH(desc->intro_points.map, key,
|
|
|
|
const hs_service_intro_point_t *, ip) {
|
|
|
|
hs_desc_intro_point_t *desc_ip = hs_desc_intro_point_new();
|
|
|
|
if (setup_desc_intro_point(&desc->signing_kp, ip, now, desc_ip) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
hs_desc_intro_point_free(desc_ip);
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* We have a valid descriptor intro point. Add it to the list. */
|
|
|
|
smartlist_add(encrypted->intro_points, desc_ip);
|
|
|
|
} DIGEST256MAP_FOREACH_END;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
hs-v3: Create desc signing key cert before uploading
Before this commit, we would create the descriptor signing key certificate
when first building the descriptor.
In some extreme cases, it lead to the expiry of the certificate which triggers
a BUG() when encoding the descriptor before uploading.
Ticket #27838 details a possible scenario in which this can happen. It is an
edge case where tor losts internet connectivity, notices it and closes all
circuits. When it came back up, the HS subsystem noticed that it had no
introduction circuits, created them and tried to upload the descriptor.
However, in the meantime, if tor did lack a live consensus because it is
currently seeking to download one, we would consider that we don't need to
rotate the descriptors leading to using the expired signing key certificate.
That being said, this commit does a bit more to make this process cleaner.
There are a series of things that we need to "refresh" before uploading a
descriptor: signing key cert, intro points and revision counter.
A refresh function is added to deal with all mutable descriptor fields. It in
turn simplified a bit the code surrounding the creation of the plaintext data.
We keep creating the cert when building the descriptor in order to accomodate
the unit tests. However, it is replaced every single time the descriptor is
uploaded.
Fixes #27838
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
2018-10-22 22:18:44 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Build the descriptor signing key certificate. */
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
build_desc_signing_key_cert(hs_service_descriptor_t *desc, time_t now)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
hs_desc_plaintext_data_t *plaintext;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(desc);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(desc->desc);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Ease our life a bit. */
|
|
|
|
plaintext = &desc->desc->plaintext_data;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Get rid of what we have right now. */
|
|
|
|
tor_cert_free(plaintext->signing_key_cert);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Fresh certificate for the signing key. */
|
|
|
|
plaintext->signing_key_cert =
|
|
|
|
tor_cert_create(&desc->blinded_kp, CERT_TYPE_SIGNING_HS_DESC,
|
|
|
|
&desc->signing_kp.pubkey, now, HS_DESC_CERT_LIFETIME,
|
|
|
|
CERT_FLAG_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY);
|
|
|
|
/* If the cert creation fails, the descriptor encoding will fail and thus
|
|
|
|
* ultimately won't be uploaded. We'll get a stack trace to help us learn
|
|
|
|
* where the call came from and the tor_cert_create() will log the error. */
|
|
|
|
tor_assert_nonfatal(plaintext->signing_key_cert);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-01-24 09:55:15 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Populate the descriptor encrypted section from the given service object.
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
* This will generate a valid list of introduction points that can be used
|
|
|
|
* after for circuit creation. Return 0 on success else -1 on error. */
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
build_service_desc_encrypted(const hs_service_t *service,
|
|
|
|
hs_service_descriptor_t *desc)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
hs_desc_encrypted_data_t *encrypted;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(service);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(desc);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
encrypted = &desc->desc->encrypted_data;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
encrypted->create2_ntor = 1;
|
|
|
|
encrypted->single_onion_service = service->config.is_single_onion;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Setup introduction points from what we have in the service. */
|
|
|
|
if (encrypted->intro_points == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
encrypted->intro_points = smartlist_new();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* We do NOT build introduction point yet, we only do that once the circuit
|
|
|
|
* have been opened. Until we have the right number of introduction points,
|
|
|
|
* we do not encode anything in the descriptor. */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* XXX: Support client authorization (#20700). */
|
|
|
|
encrypted->intro_auth_types = NULL;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-04-09 18:09:41 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Populate the descriptor superencrypted section from the given service
|
|
|
|
* object. This will generate a valid list of hs_desc_authorized_client_t
|
|
|
|
* of clients that are authorized to use the service. Return 0 on success
|
|
|
|
* else -1 on error. */
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
build_service_desc_superencrypted(const hs_service_t *service,
|
|
|
|
hs_service_descriptor_t *desc)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
const hs_service_config_t *config;
|
|
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
hs_desc_superencrypted_data_t *superencrypted;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(service);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(desc);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
superencrypted = &desc->desc->superencrypted_data;
|
|
|
|
config = &service->config;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* The ephemeral key pair is already generated, so this should not give
|
|
|
|
* an error. */
|
2018-09-06 15:07:27 +02:00
|
|
|
if (BUG(!curve25519_public_key_is_ok(&desc->auth_ephemeral_kp.pubkey))) {
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2018-04-09 18:09:41 +02:00
|
|
|
memcpy(&superencrypted->auth_ephemeral_pubkey,
|
|
|
|
&desc->auth_ephemeral_kp.pubkey,
|
|
|
|
sizeof(curve25519_public_key_t));
|
|
|
|
|
2018-09-06 15:07:27 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Test that subcred is not zero because we might use it below */
|
|
|
|
if (BUG(tor_mem_is_zero((char*)desc->desc->subcredential, DIGEST256_LEN))) {
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-04-09 18:09:41 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Create a smartlist to store clients */
|
|
|
|
superencrypted->clients = smartlist_new();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* We do not need to build the desc authorized client if the client
|
|
|
|
* authorization is disabled */
|
|
|
|
if (config->is_client_auth_enabled) {
|
|
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(config->clients,
|
|
|
|
hs_service_authorized_client_t *, client) {
|
|
|
|
hs_desc_authorized_client_t *desc_client;
|
|
|
|
desc_client = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(hs_desc_authorized_client_t));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Prepare the client for descriptor and then add to the list in the
|
|
|
|
* superencrypted part of the descriptor */
|
2018-09-06 15:07:27 +02:00
|
|
|
hs_desc_build_authorized_client(desc->desc->subcredential,
|
|
|
|
&client->client_pk,
|
2018-04-09 18:09:41 +02:00
|
|
|
&desc->auth_ephemeral_kp.seckey,
|
|
|
|
desc->descriptor_cookie, desc_client);
|
|
|
|
smartlist_add(superencrypted->clients, desc_client);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(client);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* We cannot let the number of auth-clients to be zero, so we need to
|
|
|
|
* make it be 16. If it is already a multiple of 16, we do not need to
|
|
|
|
* do anything. Otherwise, add the additional ones to make it a
|
|
|
|
* multiple of 16. */
|
|
|
|
int num_clients = smartlist_len(superencrypted->clients);
|
|
|
|
int num_clients_to_add;
|
|
|
|
if (num_clients == 0) {
|
|
|
|
num_clients_to_add = HS_DESC_AUTH_CLIENT_MULTIPLE;
|
|
|
|
} else if (num_clients % HS_DESC_AUTH_CLIENT_MULTIPLE == 0) {
|
|
|
|
num_clients_to_add = 0;
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
num_clients_to_add =
|
|
|
|
HS_DESC_AUTH_CLIENT_MULTIPLE
|
|
|
|
- (num_clients % HS_DESC_AUTH_CLIENT_MULTIPLE);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < num_clients_to_add; i++) {
|
2018-09-05 19:37:37 +02:00
|
|
|
hs_desc_authorized_client_t *desc_client =
|
|
|
|
hs_desc_build_fake_authorized_client();
|
2018-04-09 18:09:41 +02:00
|
|
|
smartlist_add(superencrypted->clients, desc_client);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-09-07 16:29:44 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Shuffle the list to prevent the client know the position in the
|
|
|
|
* config. */
|
|
|
|
smartlist_shuffle(superencrypted->clients);
|
|
|
|
|
2018-04-09 18:09:41 +02:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-01-24 09:55:15 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Populate the descriptor plaintext section from the given service object.
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
* The caller must make sure that the keys in the descriptors are valid that
|
hs-v3: Create desc signing key cert before uploading
Before this commit, we would create the descriptor signing key certificate
when first building the descriptor.
In some extreme cases, it lead to the expiry of the certificate which triggers
a BUG() when encoding the descriptor before uploading.
Ticket #27838 details a possible scenario in which this can happen. It is an
edge case where tor losts internet connectivity, notices it and closes all
circuits. When it came back up, the HS subsystem noticed that it had no
introduction circuits, created them and tried to upload the descriptor.
However, in the meantime, if tor did lack a live consensus because it is
currently seeking to download one, we would consider that we don't need to
rotate the descriptors leading to using the expired signing key certificate.
That being said, this commit does a bit more to make this process cleaner.
There are a series of things that we need to "refresh" before uploading a
descriptor: signing key cert, intro points and revision counter.
A refresh function is added to deal with all mutable descriptor fields. It in
turn simplified a bit the code surrounding the creation of the plaintext data.
We keep creating the cert when building the descriptor in order to accomodate
the unit tests. However, it is replaced every single time the descriptor is
uploaded.
Fixes #27838
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
2018-10-22 22:18:44 +02:00
|
|
|
* is are non-zero. This can't fail. */
|
|
|
|
static void
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
build_service_desc_plaintext(const hs_service_t *service,
|
hs-v3: Create desc signing key cert before uploading
Before this commit, we would create the descriptor signing key certificate
when first building the descriptor.
In some extreme cases, it lead to the expiry of the certificate which triggers
a BUG() when encoding the descriptor before uploading.
Ticket #27838 details a possible scenario in which this can happen. It is an
edge case where tor losts internet connectivity, notices it and closes all
circuits. When it came back up, the HS subsystem noticed that it had no
introduction circuits, created them and tried to upload the descriptor.
However, in the meantime, if tor did lack a live consensus because it is
currently seeking to download one, we would consider that we don't need to
rotate the descriptors leading to using the expired signing key certificate.
That being said, this commit does a bit more to make this process cleaner.
There are a series of things that we need to "refresh" before uploading a
descriptor: signing key cert, intro points and revision counter.
A refresh function is added to deal with all mutable descriptor fields. It in
turn simplified a bit the code surrounding the creation of the plaintext data.
We keep creating the cert when building the descriptor in order to accomodate
the unit tests. However, it is replaced every single time the descriptor is
uploaded.
Fixes #27838
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
2018-10-22 22:18:44 +02:00
|
|
|
hs_service_descriptor_t *desc)
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
hs_desc_plaintext_data_t *plaintext;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(service);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(desc);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(!tor_mem_is_zero((char *) &desc->blinded_kp,
|
|
|
|
sizeof(desc->blinded_kp)));
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(!tor_mem_is_zero((char *) &desc->signing_kp,
|
|
|
|
sizeof(desc->signing_kp)));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Set the subcredential. */
|
|
|
|
hs_get_subcredential(&service->keys.identity_pk, &desc->blinded_kp.pubkey,
|
|
|
|
desc->desc->subcredential);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
plaintext = &desc->desc->plaintext_data;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
plaintext->version = service->config.version;
|
|
|
|
plaintext->lifetime_sec = HS_DESC_DEFAULT_LIFETIME;
|
|
|
|
/* Copy public key material to go in the descriptor. */
|
|
|
|
ed25519_pubkey_copy(&plaintext->signing_pubkey, &desc->signing_kp.pubkey);
|
|
|
|
ed25519_pubkey_copy(&plaintext->blinded_pubkey, &desc->blinded_kp.pubkey);
|
|
|
|
|
hs-v3: Create desc signing key cert before uploading
Before this commit, we would create the descriptor signing key certificate
when first building the descriptor.
In some extreme cases, it lead to the expiry of the certificate which triggers
a BUG() when encoding the descriptor before uploading.
Ticket #27838 details a possible scenario in which this can happen. It is an
edge case where tor losts internet connectivity, notices it and closes all
circuits. When it came back up, the HS subsystem noticed that it had no
introduction circuits, created them and tried to upload the descriptor.
However, in the meantime, if tor did lack a live consensus because it is
currently seeking to download one, we would consider that we don't need to
rotate the descriptors leading to using the expired signing key certificate.
That being said, this commit does a bit more to make this process cleaner.
There are a series of things that we need to "refresh" before uploading a
descriptor: signing key cert, intro points and revision counter.
A refresh function is added to deal with all mutable descriptor fields. It in
turn simplified a bit the code surrounding the creation of the plaintext data.
We keep creating the cert when building the descriptor in order to accomodate
the unit tests. However, it is replaced every single time the descriptor is
uploaded.
Fixes #27838
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
2018-10-22 22:18:44 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Create the signing key certificate. This will be updated before each
|
|
|
|
* upload but we create it here so we don't complexify our unit tests. */
|
|
|
|
build_desc_signing_key_cert(desc, approx_time());
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-07-17 18:03:18 +02:00
|
|
|
/** Compute the descriptor's OPE cipher for encrypting revision counters. */
|
|
|
|
static crypto_ope_t *
|
|
|
|
generate_ope_cipher_for_desc(const hs_service_descriptor_t *hs_desc)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* Compute OPE key as H("rev-counter-generation" | blinded privkey) */
|
|
|
|
uint8_t key[DIGEST256_LEN];
|
|
|
|
crypto_digest_t *digest = crypto_digest256_new(DIGEST_SHA3_256);
|
|
|
|
const char ope_key_prefix[] = "rev-counter-generation";
|
|
|
|
const ed25519_secret_key_t *eph_privkey = &hs_desc->blinded_kp.seckey;
|
|
|
|
crypto_digest_add_bytes(digest, ope_key_prefix, sizeof(ope_key_prefix));
|
|
|
|
crypto_digest_add_bytes(digest, (char*)eph_privkey->seckey,
|
|
|
|
sizeof(eph_privkey->seckey));
|
|
|
|
crypto_digest_get_digest(digest, (char *)key, sizeof(key));
|
|
|
|
crypto_digest_free(digest);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return crypto_ope_new(key);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
/* For the given service and descriptor object, create the key material which
|
2018-04-09 18:09:41 +02:00
|
|
|
* is the blinded keypair, the descriptor signing keypair, the ephemeral
|
|
|
|
* keypair, and the descriptor cookie. Return 0 on success else -1 on error
|
|
|
|
* where the generated keys MUST be ignored. */
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
build_service_desc_keys(const hs_service_t *service,
|
2018-07-17 18:03:18 +02:00
|
|
|
hs_service_descriptor_t *desc)
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
2018-04-09 18:09:41 +02:00
|
|
|
int ret = -1;
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
ed25519_keypair_t kp;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(desc);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(!tor_mem_is_zero((char *) &service->keys.identity_pk,
|
|
|
|
ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* XXX: Support offline key feature (#18098). */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Copy the identity keys to the keypair so we can use it to create the
|
|
|
|
* blinded key. */
|
|
|
|
memcpy(&kp.pubkey, &service->keys.identity_pk, sizeof(kp.pubkey));
|
|
|
|
memcpy(&kp.seckey, &service->keys.identity_sk, sizeof(kp.seckey));
|
|
|
|
/* Build blinded keypair for this time period. */
|
2018-07-17 18:03:18 +02:00
|
|
|
hs_build_blinded_keypair(&kp, NULL, 0, desc->time_period_num,
|
|
|
|
&desc->blinded_kp);
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Let's not keep too much traces of our keys in memory. */
|
|
|
|
memwipe(&kp, 0, sizeof(kp));
|
|
|
|
|
2018-07-17 18:03:18 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Compute the OPE cipher struct (it's tied to the current blinded key) */
|
|
|
|
log_info(LD_GENERAL,
|
|
|
|
"Getting OPE for TP#%u", (unsigned) desc->time_period_num);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert_nonfatal(!desc->ope_cipher);
|
|
|
|
desc->ope_cipher = generate_ope_cipher_for_desc(desc);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
/* No need for extra strong, this is a temporary key only for this
|
|
|
|
* descriptor. Nothing long term. */
|
|
|
|
if (ed25519_keypair_generate(&desc->signing_kp, 0) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
log_warn(LD_REND, "Can't generate descriptor signing keypair for "
|
|
|
|
"service %s",
|
|
|
|
safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
|
2018-04-09 18:09:41 +02:00
|
|
|
goto end;
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-04-09 18:09:41 +02:00
|
|
|
/* No need for extra strong, this is a temporary key only for this
|
|
|
|
* descriptor. Nothing long term. */
|
|
|
|
if (curve25519_keypair_generate(&desc->auth_ephemeral_kp, 0) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
log_warn(LD_REND, "Can't generate auth ephemeral keypair for "
|
|
|
|
"service %s",
|
|
|
|
safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-10-18 17:44:26 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Random descriptor cookie to be used as a part of a key to encrypt the
|
|
|
|
* descriptor, only if the client auth is enabled will it be used. */
|
|
|
|
crypto_strongest_rand(desc->descriptor_cookie,
|
|
|
|
sizeof(desc->descriptor_cookie));
|
2018-04-09 18:09:41 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Success. */
|
|
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
end:
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Given a service and the current time, build a descriptor for the service.
|
|
|
|
* This function does not pick introduction point, this needs to be done by
|
|
|
|
* the update function. On success, desc_out will point to the newly allocated
|
|
|
|
* descriptor object.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* This can error if we are unable to create keys or certificate. */
|
|
|
|
static void
|
hs-v3: Create desc signing key cert before uploading
Before this commit, we would create the descriptor signing key certificate
when first building the descriptor.
In some extreme cases, it lead to the expiry of the certificate which triggers
a BUG() when encoding the descriptor before uploading.
Ticket #27838 details a possible scenario in which this can happen. It is an
edge case where tor losts internet connectivity, notices it and closes all
circuits. When it came back up, the HS subsystem noticed that it had no
introduction circuits, created them and tried to upload the descriptor.
However, in the meantime, if tor did lack a live consensus because it is
currently seeking to download one, we would consider that we don't need to
rotate the descriptors leading to using the expired signing key certificate.
That being said, this commit does a bit more to make this process cleaner.
There are a series of things that we need to "refresh" before uploading a
descriptor: signing key cert, intro points and revision counter.
A refresh function is added to deal with all mutable descriptor fields. It in
turn simplified a bit the code surrounding the creation of the plaintext data.
We keep creating the cert when building the descriptor in order to accomodate
the unit tests. However, it is replaced every single time the descriptor is
uploaded.
Fixes #27838
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
2018-10-22 22:18:44 +02:00
|
|
|
build_service_descriptor(hs_service_t *service, uint64_t time_period_num,
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
hs_service_descriptor_t **desc_out)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
char *encoded_desc;
|
|
|
|
hs_service_descriptor_t *desc;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(service);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(desc_out);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
desc = service_descriptor_new();
|
2018-07-17 18:03:18 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Set current time period */
|
2017-04-19 21:27:11 +02:00
|
|
|
desc->time_period_num = time_period_num;
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Create the needed keys so we can setup the descriptor content. */
|
2018-07-17 18:03:18 +02:00
|
|
|
if (build_service_desc_keys(service, desc) < 0) {
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Setup plaintext descriptor content. */
|
hs-v3: Create desc signing key cert before uploading
Before this commit, we would create the descriptor signing key certificate
when first building the descriptor.
In some extreme cases, it lead to the expiry of the certificate which triggers
a BUG() when encoding the descriptor before uploading.
Ticket #27838 details a possible scenario in which this can happen. It is an
edge case where tor losts internet connectivity, notices it and closes all
circuits. When it came back up, the HS subsystem noticed that it had no
introduction circuits, created them and tried to upload the descriptor.
However, in the meantime, if tor did lack a live consensus because it is
currently seeking to download one, we would consider that we don't need to
rotate the descriptors leading to using the expired signing key certificate.
That being said, this commit does a bit more to make this process cleaner.
There are a series of things that we need to "refresh" before uploading a
descriptor: signing key cert, intro points and revision counter.
A refresh function is added to deal with all mutable descriptor fields. It in
turn simplified a bit the code surrounding the creation of the plaintext data.
We keep creating the cert when building the descriptor in order to accomodate
the unit tests. However, it is replaced every single time the descriptor is
uploaded.
Fixes #27838
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
2018-10-22 22:18:44 +02:00
|
|
|
build_service_desc_plaintext(service, desc);
|
|
|
|
|
2018-04-09 18:09:41 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Setup superencrypted descriptor content. */
|
|
|
|
if (build_service_desc_superencrypted(service, desc) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Setup encrypted descriptor content. */
|
|
|
|
if (build_service_desc_encrypted(service, desc) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Let's make sure that we've created a descriptor that can actually be
|
|
|
|
* encoded properly. This function also checks if the encoded output is
|
|
|
|
* decodable after. */
|
2018-04-13 23:04:31 +02:00
|
|
|
if (BUG(service_encode_descriptor(service, desc, &desc->signing_kp,
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
&encoded_desc) < 0)) {
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
tor_free(encoded_desc);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Assign newly built descriptor to the next slot. */
|
|
|
|
*desc_out = desc;
|
2017-11-10 20:34:41 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Fire a CREATED control port event. */
|
|
|
|
hs_control_desc_event_created(service->onion_address,
|
|
|
|
&desc->blinded_kp.pubkey);
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
|
|
service_descriptor_free(desc);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-09-05 21:52:05 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Build both descriptors for the given service that has just booted up.
|
|
|
|
* Because it's a special case, it deserves its special function ;). */
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
build_descriptors_for_new_service(hs_service_t *service, time_t now)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
uint64_t current_desc_tp, next_desc_tp;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(service);
|
|
|
|
/* These are the conditions for a new service. */
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(!service->desc_current);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(!service->desc_next);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* +------------------------------------------------------------------+
|
|
|
|
* | |
|
|
|
|
* | 00:00 12:00 00:00 12:00 00:00 12:00 |
|
|
|
|
* | SRV#1 TP#1 SRV#2 TP#2 SRV#3 TP#3 |
|
|
|
|
* | |
|
|
|
|
* | $==========|-----------$===========|-----------$===========| |
|
|
|
|
* | ^ ^ |
|
|
|
|
* | A B |
|
|
|
|
* +------------------------------------------------------------------+
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Case A: The service boots up before a new time period, the current time
|
|
|
|
* period is thus TP#1 and the next is TP#2 which for both we have access to
|
|
|
|
* their SRVs.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Case B: The service boots up inside TP#2, we can't use the TP#3 for the
|
|
|
|
* next descriptor because we don't have the SRV#3 so the current should be
|
|
|
|
* TP#1 and next TP#2.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
2017-09-08 18:06:20 +02:00
|
|
|
if (hs_in_period_between_tp_and_srv(NULL, now)) {
|
2017-09-05 21:52:05 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Case B from the above, inside of the new time period. */
|
|
|
|
current_desc_tp = hs_get_previous_time_period_num(0); /* TP#1 */
|
|
|
|
next_desc_tp = hs_get_time_period_num(0); /* TP#2 */
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/* Case A from the above, outside of the new time period. */
|
|
|
|
current_desc_tp = hs_get_time_period_num(0); /* TP#1 */
|
|
|
|
next_desc_tp = hs_get_next_time_period_num(0); /* TP#2 */
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Build descriptors. */
|
hs-v3: Create desc signing key cert before uploading
Before this commit, we would create the descriptor signing key certificate
when first building the descriptor.
In some extreme cases, it lead to the expiry of the certificate which triggers
a BUG() when encoding the descriptor before uploading.
Ticket #27838 details a possible scenario in which this can happen. It is an
edge case where tor losts internet connectivity, notices it and closes all
circuits. When it came back up, the HS subsystem noticed that it had no
introduction circuits, created them and tried to upload the descriptor.
However, in the meantime, if tor did lack a live consensus because it is
currently seeking to download one, we would consider that we don't need to
rotate the descriptors leading to using the expired signing key certificate.
That being said, this commit does a bit more to make this process cleaner.
There are a series of things that we need to "refresh" before uploading a
descriptor: signing key cert, intro points and revision counter.
A refresh function is added to deal with all mutable descriptor fields. It in
turn simplified a bit the code surrounding the creation of the plaintext data.
We keep creating the cert when building the descriptor in order to accomodate
the unit tests. However, it is replaced every single time the descriptor is
uploaded.
Fixes #27838
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
2018-10-22 22:18:44 +02:00
|
|
|
build_service_descriptor(service, current_desc_tp, &service->desc_current);
|
|
|
|
build_service_descriptor(service, next_desc_tp, &service->desc_next);
|
2017-09-05 21:52:05 +02:00
|
|
|
log_info(LD_REND, "Hidden service %s has just started. Both descriptors "
|
|
|
|
"built. Now scheduled for upload.",
|
|
|
|
safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Build descriptors for each service if needed. There are conditions to build
|
|
|
|
* a descriptor which are details in the function. */
|
2017-05-05 20:55:26 +02:00
|
|
|
STATIC void
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
build_all_descriptors(time_t now)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
FOR_EACH_SERVICE_BEGIN(service) {
|
2017-09-05 21:52:05 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* A service booting up will have both descriptors to NULL. No other cases
|
|
|
|
* makes both descriptor non existent. */
|
|
|
|
if (service->desc_current == NULL && service->desc_next == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
build_descriptors_for_new_service(service, now);
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2017-09-05 21:52:05 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Reaching this point means we are pass bootup so at runtime. We should
|
|
|
|
* *never* have an empty current descriptor. If the next descriptor is
|
|
|
|
* empty, we'll try to build it for the next time period. This only
|
|
|
|
* happens when we rotate meaning that we are guaranteed to have a new SRV
|
|
|
|
* at that point for the next time period. */
|
2018-02-26 16:45:58 +01:00
|
|
|
if (BUG(service->desc_current == NULL)) {
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-09-05 21:52:05 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (service->desc_next == NULL) {
|
hs-v3: Create desc signing key cert before uploading
Before this commit, we would create the descriptor signing key certificate
when first building the descriptor.
In some extreme cases, it lead to the expiry of the certificate which triggers
a BUG() when encoding the descriptor before uploading.
Ticket #27838 details a possible scenario in which this can happen. It is an
edge case where tor losts internet connectivity, notices it and closes all
circuits. When it came back up, the HS subsystem noticed that it had no
introduction circuits, created them and tried to upload the descriptor.
However, in the meantime, if tor did lack a live consensus because it is
currently seeking to download one, we would consider that we don't need to
rotate the descriptors leading to using the expired signing key certificate.
That being said, this commit does a bit more to make this process cleaner.
There are a series of things that we need to "refresh" before uploading a
descriptor: signing key cert, intro points and revision counter.
A refresh function is added to deal with all mutable descriptor fields. It in
turn simplified a bit the code surrounding the creation of the plaintext data.
We keep creating the cert when building the descriptor in order to accomodate
the unit tests. However, it is replaced every single time the descriptor is
uploaded.
Fixes #27838
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
2018-10-22 22:18:44 +02:00
|
|
|
build_service_descriptor(service, hs_get_next_time_period_num(0),
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
&service->desc_next);
|
|
|
|
log_info(LD_REND, "Hidden service %s next descriptor successfully "
|
|
|
|
"built. Now scheduled for upload.",
|
|
|
|
safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_END;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Randomly pick a node to become an introduction point but not present in the
|
|
|
|
* given exclude_nodes list. The chosen node is put in the exclude list
|
|
|
|
* regardless of success or not because in case of failure, the node is simply
|
2017-10-26 05:47:54 +02:00
|
|
|
* unsusable from that point on.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* If direct_conn is set, try to pick a node that our local firewall/policy
|
|
|
|
* allows us to connect to directly. If we can't find any, return NULL.
|
|
|
|
* This function supports selecting dual-stack nodes for direct single onion
|
|
|
|
* service IPv6 connections. But it does not send IPv6 addresses in link
|
|
|
|
* specifiers. (Current clients don't use IPv6 addresses to extend, and
|
|
|
|
* direct client connections to intro points are not supported.)
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Return a newly allocated service intro point ready to be used for encoding.
|
|
|
|
* Return NULL on error. */
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
static hs_service_intro_point_t *
|
|
|
|
pick_intro_point(unsigned int direct_conn, smartlist_t *exclude_nodes)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
const node_t *node;
|
|
|
|
extend_info_t *info = NULL;
|
|
|
|
hs_service_intro_point_t *ip = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* Normal 3-hop introduction point flags. */
|
|
|
|
router_crn_flags_t flags = CRN_NEED_UPTIME | CRN_NEED_DESC;
|
|
|
|
/* Single onion flags. */
|
|
|
|
router_crn_flags_t direct_flags = flags | CRN_PREF_ADDR | CRN_DIRECT_CONN;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
node = router_choose_random_node(exclude_nodes, get_options()->ExcludeNodes,
|
|
|
|
direct_conn ? direct_flags : flags);
|
2017-10-26 05:47:54 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Unable to find a node. When looking for a node for a direct connection,
|
|
|
|
* we could try a 3-hop path instead. We'll add support for this in a later
|
|
|
|
* release. */
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
if (!node) {
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* We have a suitable node, add it to the exclude list. We do this *before*
|
|
|
|
* we can validate the extend information because even in case of failure,
|
|
|
|
* we don't want to use that node anymore. */
|
|
|
|
smartlist_add(exclude_nodes, (void *) node);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* We do this to ease our life but also this call makes appropriate checks
|
2017-10-26 05:47:54 +02:00
|
|
|
* of the node object such as validating ntor support for instance.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* We must provide an extend_info for clients to connect over a 3-hop path,
|
|
|
|
* so we don't pass direct_conn here. */
|
|
|
|
info = extend_info_from_node(node, 0);
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
if (BUG(info == NULL)) {
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-08-07 15:17:33 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Let's do a basic sanity check here so that we don't end up advertising the
|
|
|
|
* ed25519 identity key of relays that don't actually support the link
|
|
|
|
* protocol */
|
2017-09-11 16:00:11 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!node_supports_ed25519_link_authentication(node, 0)) {
|
2017-08-07 15:17:33 +02:00
|
|
|
tor_assert_nonfatal(ed25519_public_key_is_zero(&info->ed_identity));
|
2017-10-26 20:54:20 +02:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/* Make sure we *do* have an ed key if we support the link authentication.
|
|
|
|
* Sending an empty key would result in a failure to extend. */
|
|
|
|
tor_assert_nonfatal(!ed25519_public_key_is_zero(&info->ed_identity));
|
2017-08-07 15:17:33 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-07-24 10:22:41 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Create our objects and populate them with the node information.
|
|
|
|
* We don't care if the intro's link auth is compatible with us, because
|
|
|
|
* we are sending the ed25519 key to a remote client via the descriptor. */
|
|
|
|
ip = service_intro_point_new(info, !node_supports_ed25519_hs_intro(node),
|
|
|
|
node_supports_ed25519_link_authentication(node,
|
|
|
|
0));
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
if (ip == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-09-25 22:31:43 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
log_info(LD_REND, "Picked intro point: %s", extend_info_describe(info));
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
extend_info_free(info);
|
|
|
|
return ip;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
|
|
service_intro_point_free(ip);
|
|
|
|
extend_info_free(info);
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* For a given descriptor from the given service, pick any needed intro points
|
|
|
|
* and update the current map with those newly picked intro points. Return the
|
|
|
|
* number node that might have been added to the descriptor current map. */
|
|
|
|
static unsigned int
|
|
|
|
pick_needed_intro_points(hs_service_t *service,
|
|
|
|
hs_service_descriptor_t *desc)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int i = 0, num_needed_ip;
|
|
|
|
smartlist_t *exclude_nodes = smartlist_new();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(service);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(desc);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Compute how many intro points we actually need to open. */
|
|
|
|
num_needed_ip = service->config.num_intro_points -
|
|
|
|
digest256map_size(desc->intro_points.map);
|
|
|
|
if (BUG(num_needed_ip < 0)) {
|
|
|
|
/* Let's not make tor freak out here and just skip this. */
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-05-09 22:15:12 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
/* We want to end up with config.num_intro_points intro points, but if we
|
|
|
|
* have no intro points at all (chances are they all cycled or we are
|
2017-05-09 22:15:12 +02:00
|
|
|
* starting up), we launch get_intro_point_num_extra() extra circuits and
|
|
|
|
* use the first config.num_intro_points that complete. See proposal #155,
|
|
|
|
* section 4 for the rationale of this which is purely for performance.
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* The ones after the first config.num_intro_points will be converted to
|
|
|
|
* 'General' internal circuits and then we'll drop them from the list of
|
|
|
|
* intro points. */
|
|
|
|
if (digest256map_size(desc->intro_points.map) == 0) {
|
2017-05-09 22:15:12 +02:00
|
|
|
num_needed_ip += get_intro_point_num_extra();
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Build an exclude list of nodes of our intro point(s). The expiring intro
|
|
|
|
* points are OK to pick again because this is afterall a concept of round
|
|
|
|
* robin so they are considered valid nodes to pick again. */
|
|
|
|
DIGEST256MAP_FOREACH(desc->intro_points.map, key,
|
|
|
|
hs_service_intro_point_t *, ip) {
|
2017-08-03 14:47:06 +02:00
|
|
|
const node_t *intro_node = get_node_from_intro_point(ip);
|
|
|
|
if (intro_node) {
|
|
|
|
smartlist_add(exclude_nodes, (void*)intro_node);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
} DIGEST256MAP_FOREACH_END;
|
2017-05-09 20:31:17 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Also, add the failing intro points that our descriptor encounteered in
|
|
|
|
* the exclude node list. */
|
|
|
|
setup_intro_point_exclude_list(desc, exclude_nodes);
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < num_needed_ip; i++) {
|
|
|
|
hs_service_intro_point_t *ip;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* This function will add the picked intro point node to the exclude nodes
|
|
|
|
* list so we don't pick the same one at the next iteration. */
|
|
|
|
ip = pick_intro_point(service->config.is_single_onion, exclude_nodes);
|
|
|
|
if (ip == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
/* If we end up unable to pick an introduction point it is because we
|
|
|
|
* can't find suitable node and calling this again is highly unlikely to
|
|
|
|
* give us a valid node all of the sudden. */
|
|
|
|
log_info(LD_REND, "Unable to find a suitable node to be an "
|
|
|
|
"introduction point for service %s.",
|
|
|
|
safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Valid intro point object, add it to the descriptor current map. */
|
|
|
|
service_intro_point_add(desc->intro_points.map, ip);
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-04-19 21:27:11 +02:00
|
|
|
/* We've successfully picked all our needed intro points thus none are
|
|
|
|
* missing which will tell our upload process to expect the number of
|
|
|
|
* circuits to be the number of configured intro points circuits and not the
|
|
|
|
* number of intro points object that we have. */
|
|
|
|
desc->missing_intro_points = 0;
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Success. */
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
|
|
/* We don't have ownership of the node_t object in this list. */
|
|
|
|
smartlist_free(exclude_nodes);
|
|
|
|
return i;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-19 15:26:46 +02:00
|
|
|
/** Clear previous cached HSDirs in <b>desc</b>. */
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
service_desc_clear_previous_hsdirs(hs_service_descriptor_t *desc)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (BUG(!desc->previous_hsdirs)) {
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(desc->previous_hsdirs, char*, s, tor_free(s));
|
|
|
|
smartlist_clear(desc->previous_hsdirs);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/** Note that we attempted to upload <b>desc</b> to <b>hsdir</b>. */
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
service_desc_note_upload(hs_service_descriptor_t *desc, const node_t *hsdir)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
char b64_digest[BASE64_DIGEST_LEN+1] = {0};
|
|
|
|
digest_to_base64(b64_digest, hsdir->identity);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (BUG(!desc->previous_hsdirs)) {
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!smartlist_contains_string(desc->previous_hsdirs, b64_digest)) {
|
|
|
|
smartlist_add_strdup(desc->previous_hsdirs, b64_digest);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/** Schedule an upload of <b>desc</b>. If <b>descriptor_changed</b> is set, it
|
|
|
|
* means that this descriptor is dirty. */
|
|
|
|
STATIC void
|
|
|
|
service_desc_schedule_upload(hs_service_descriptor_t *desc,
|
|
|
|
time_t now,
|
|
|
|
int descriptor_changed)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
desc->next_upload_time = now;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If the descriptor changed, clean up the old HSDirs list. We want to
|
|
|
|
* re-upload no matter what. */
|
|
|
|
if (descriptor_changed) {
|
|
|
|
service_desc_clear_previous_hsdirs(desc);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-10-23 15:35:02 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Pick missing intro points for this descriptor if needed. */
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
static void
|
2018-10-23 15:35:02 +02:00
|
|
|
update_service_descriptor_intro_points(hs_service_t *service,
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
hs_service_descriptor_t *desc, time_t now)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unsigned int num_intro_points;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(service);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(desc);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(desc->desc);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
num_intro_points = digest256map_size(desc->intro_points.map);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Pick any missing introduction point(s). */
|
|
|
|
if (num_intro_points < service->config.num_intro_points) {
|
|
|
|
unsigned int num_new_intro_points = pick_needed_intro_points(service,
|
|
|
|
desc);
|
|
|
|
if (num_new_intro_points != 0) {
|
|
|
|
log_info(LD_REND, "Service %s just picked %u intro points and wanted "
|
2017-09-25 22:31:43 +02:00
|
|
|
"%u for %s descriptor. It currently has %d intro "
|
|
|
|
"points. Launching ESTABLISH_INTRO circuit shortly.",
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
safe_str_client(service->onion_address),
|
|
|
|
num_new_intro_points,
|
|
|
|
service->config.num_intro_points - num_intro_points,
|
2017-09-25 22:31:43 +02:00
|
|
|
(desc == service->desc_current) ? "current" : "next",
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
num_intro_points);
|
|
|
|
/* We'll build those introduction point into the descriptor once we have
|
|
|
|
* confirmation that the circuits are opened and ready. However,
|
|
|
|
* indicate that this descriptor should be uploaded from now on. */
|
2017-08-19 15:26:46 +02:00
|
|
|
service_desc_schedule_upload(desc, now, 1);
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2017-04-19 21:27:11 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Were we able to pick all the intro points we needed? If not, we'll
|
|
|
|
* flag the descriptor that it's missing intro points because it
|
|
|
|
* couldn't pick enough which will trigger a descriptor upload. */
|
|
|
|
if ((num_new_intro_points + num_intro_points) <
|
|
|
|
service->config.num_intro_points) {
|
|
|
|
desc->missing_intro_points = 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-10-23 15:35:02 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Update descriptor intro points for each service if needed. We do this as
|
|
|
|
* part of the periodic event because we need to establish intro point circuits
|
|
|
|
* before we publish descriptors. */
|
2017-05-05 20:55:26 +02:00
|
|
|
STATIC void
|
2018-10-23 15:35:02 +02:00
|
|
|
update_all_descriptors_intro_points(time_t now)
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
FOR_EACH_SERVICE_BEGIN(service) {
|
|
|
|
/* We'll try to update each descriptor that is if certain conditions apply
|
|
|
|
* in order for the descriptor to be updated. */
|
|
|
|
FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_BEGIN(service, desc) {
|
2018-10-23 15:35:02 +02:00
|
|
|
update_service_descriptor_intro_points(service, desc, now);
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
} FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_END;
|
|
|
|
} FOR_EACH_SERVICE_END;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Return true iff the given intro point has expired that is it has been used
|
|
|
|
* for too long or we've reached our max seen INTRODUCE2 cell. */
|
2017-05-05 20:55:26 +02:00
|
|
|
STATIC int
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
intro_point_should_expire(const hs_service_intro_point_t *ip,
|
|
|
|
time_t now)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(ip);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ip->introduce2_count >= ip->introduce2_max) {
|
|
|
|
goto expired;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (ip->time_to_expire <= now) {
|
|
|
|
goto expired;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Not expiring. */
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
expired:
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Go over the given set of intro points for each service and remove any
|
|
|
|
* invalid ones. The conditions for removal are:
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* - The node doesn't exists anymore (not in consensus)
|
|
|
|
* OR
|
|
|
|
* - The intro point maximum circuit retry count has been reached and no
|
|
|
|
* circuit can be found associated with it.
|
|
|
|
* OR
|
|
|
|
* - The intro point has expired and we should pick a new one.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* If an intro point is removed, the circuit (if any) is immediately close.
|
|
|
|
* If a circuit can't be found, the intro point is kept if it hasn't reached
|
|
|
|
* its maximum circuit retry value and thus should be retried. */
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
cleanup_intro_points(hs_service_t *service, time_t now)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2017-12-12 15:12:30 +01:00
|
|
|
/* List of intro points to close. We can't mark the intro circuits for close
|
|
|
|
* in the modify loop because doing so calls
|
|
|
|
* hs_service_intro_circ_has_closed() which does a digest256map_get() on the
|
|
|
|
* intro points map (that we are iterating over). This can't be done in a
|
|
|
|
* single iteration after a MAP_DEL_CURRENT, the object will still be
|
|
|
|
* returned leading to a use-after-free. So, we close the circuits and free
|
|
|
|
* the intro points after the loop if any. */
|
|
|
|
smartlist_t *ips_to_free = smartlist_new();
|
|
|
|
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
tor_assert(service);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* For both descriptors, cleanup the intro points. */
|
|
|
|
FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_BEGIN(service, desc) {
|
|
|
|
/* Go over the current intro points we have, make sure they are still
|
|
|
|
* valid and remove any of them that aren't. */
|
|
|
|
DIGEST256MAP_FOREACH_MODIFY(desc->intro_points.map, key,
|
|
|
|
hs_service_intro_point_t *, ip) {
|
|
|
|
const node_t *node = get_node_from_intro_point(ip);
|
|
|
|
int has_expired = intro_point_should_expire(ip, now);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* We cleanup an intro point if it has expired or if we do not know the
|
|
|
|
* node_t anymore (removed from our latest consensus) or if we've
|
|
|
|
* reached the maximum number of retry with a non existing circuit. */
|
|
|
|
if (has_expired || node == NULL ||
|
2017-05-25 16:28:00 +02:00
|
|
|
ip->circuit_retries > MAX_INTRO_POINT_CIRCUIT_RETRIES) {
|
2017-09-20 18:47:09 +02:00
|
|
|
log_info(LD_REND, "Intro point %s%s (retried: %u times). "
|
|
|
|
"Removing it.",
|
|
|
|
describe_intro_point(ip),
|
|
|
|
has_expired ? " has expired" :
|
|
|
|
(node == NULL) ? " fell off the consensus" : "",
|
|
|
|
ip->circuit_retries);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-09-25 22:47:16 +02:00
|
|
|
/* We've retried too many times, remember it as a failed intro point
|
|
|
|
* so we don't pick it up again for INTRO_CIRC_RETRY_PERIOD sec. */
|
|
|
|
if (ip->circuit_retries > MAX_INTRO_POINT_CIRCUIT_RETRIES) {
|
|
|
|
remember_failing_intro_point(ip, desc, approx_time());
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-12-12 15:12:30 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Remove intro point from descriptor map and add it to the list of
|
|
|
|
* ips to free for which we'll also try to close the intro circuit. */
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
MAP_DEL_CURRENT(key);
|
2017-12-12 15:12:30 +01:00
|
|
|
smartlist_add(ips_to_free, ip);
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} DIGEST256MAP_FOREACH_END;
|
|
|
|
} FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_END;
|
2017-12-12 15:12:30 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Go over the intro points to free and close their circuit if any. */
|
|
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(ips_to_free, hs_service_intro_point_t *, ip) {
|
|
|
|
/* See if we need to close the intro point circuit as well */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* XXX: Legacy code does NOT close circuits like this: it keeps the circuit
|
|
|
|
* open until a new descriptor is uploaded and then closed all expiring
|
|
|
|
* intro point circuit. Here, we close immediately and because we just
|
|
|
|
* discarded the intro point, a new one will be selected, a new descriptor
|
|
|
|
* created and uploaded. There is no difference to an attacker between the
|
|
|
|
* timing of a new consensus and intro point rotation (possibly?). */
|
|
|
|
origin_circuit_t *ocirc = hs_circ_service_get_intro_circ(ip);
|
|
|
|
if (ocirc && !TO_CIRCUIT(ocirc)->marked_for_close) {
|
|
|
|
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(ocirc), END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Cleanup the intro point */
|
|
|
|
service_intro_point_free(ip);
|
|
|
|
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(ip);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
smartlist_free(ips_to_free);
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-09-05 21:52:05 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Set the next rotation time of the descriptors for the given service for the
|
|
|
|
* time now. */
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
static void
|
2018-07-17 17:00:18 +02:00
|
|
|
set_rotation_time(hs_service_t *service)
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
2017-09-05 21:52:05 +02:00
|
|
|
tor_assert(service);
|
2018-07-17 17:00:18 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2017-09-05 21:52:05 +02:00
|
|
|
service->state.next_rotation_time =
|
2018-07-17 17:00:18 +02:00
|
|
|
sr_state_get_start_time_of_current_protocol_run() +
|
2017-09-05 21:52:05 +02:00
|
|
|
sr_state_get_protocol_run_duration();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
char fmt_time[ISO_TIME_LEN + 1];
|
|
|
|
format_local_iso_time(fmt_time, service->state.next_rotation_time);
|
|
|
|
log_info(LD_REND, "Next descriptor rotation time set to %s for %s",
|
|
|
|
fmt_time, safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-09-05 21:52:05 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Return true iff the service should rotate its descriptor. The time now is
|
|
|
|
* only used to fetch the live consensus and if none can be found, this
|
|
|
|
* returns false. */
|
|
|
|
static unsigned int
|
|
|
|
should_rotate_descriptors(hs_service_t *service, time_t now)
|
2017-08-24 15:16:44 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2017-09-05 21:52:05 +02:00
|
|
|
const networkstatus_t *ns;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(service);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ns = networkstatus_get_live_consensus(now);
|
|
|
|
if (ns == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
goto no_rotation;
|
2017-08-24 15:16:44 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-09-05 21:52:05 +02:00
|
|
|
if (ns->valid_after >= service->state.next_rotation_time) {
|
2018-02-26 16:45:58 +01:00
|
|
|
/* In theory, we should never get here with no descriptors. We can never
|
|
|
|
* have a NULL current descriptor except when tor starts up. The next
|
|
|
|
* descriptor can be NULL after a rotation but we build a new one right
|
|
|
|
* after.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* So, when tor starts, the next rotation time is set to the start of the
|
|
|
|
* next SRV period using the consensus valid after time so it should
|
|
|
|
* always be set to a future time value. This means that we should never
|
|
|
|
* reach this point at bootup that is this check safeguards tor in never
|
|
|
|
* allowing a rotation if the valid after time is smaller than the next
|
|
|
|
* rotation time.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* This is all good in theory but we've had a NULL descriptor issue here
|
|
|
|
* so this is why we BUG() on both with extra logging to try to understand
|
|
|
|
* how this can possibly happens. We'll simply ignore and tor should
|
|
|
|
* recover from this by skipping rotation and building the missing
|
|
|
|
* descriptors just after this. */
|
|
|
|
if (BUG(service->desc_current == NULL || service->desc_next == NULL)) {
|
|
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Service descriptor is NULL (%p/%p). Next rotation "
|
|
|
|
"time is %ld (now: %ld). Valid after time from "
|
|
|
|
"consensus is %ld",
|
|
|
|
service->desc_current, service->desc_next,
|
2018-03-23 22:47:56 +01:00
|
|
|
(long)service->state.next_rotation_time,
|
|
|
|
(long)now,
|
|
|
|
(long)ns->valid_after);
|
2018-02-26 16:45:58 +01:00
|
|
|
goto no_rotation;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-09-05 21:52:05 +02:00
|
|
|
goto rotation;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
no_rotation:
|
2017-08-24 15:16:44 +02:00
|
|
|
return 0;
|
2017-09-05 21:52:05 +02:00
|
|
|
rotation:
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
2017-08-24 15:16:44 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-09-05 21:52:05 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Rotate the service descriptors of the given service. The current descriptor
|
|
|
|
* will be freed, the next one put in as the current and finally the next
|
|
|
|
* descriptor pointer is NULLified. */
|
|
|
|
static void
|
2018-07-17 17:00:18 +02:00
|
|
|
rotate_service_descriptors(hs_service_t *service)
|
2017-08-24 15:16:44 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
2017-09-05 21:52:05 +02:00
|
|
|
if (service->desc_current) {
|
|
|
|
/* Close all IP circuits for the descriptor. */
|
|
|
|
close_intro_circuits(&service->desc_current->intro_points);
|
|
|
|
/* We don't need this one anymore, we won't serve any clients coming with
|
|
|
|
* this service descriptor. */
|
|
|
|
service_descriptor_free(service->desc_current);
|
2017-08-24 15:16:44 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2017-09-05 21:52:05 +02:00
|
|
|
/* The next one become the current one and emptying the next will trigger
|
|
|
|
* a descriptor creation for it. */
|
|
|
|
service->desc_current = service->desc_next;
|
|
|
|
service->desc_next = NULL;
|
2017-08-24 15:16:44 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2017-09-05 21:52:05 +02:00
|
|
|
/* We've just rotated, set the next time for the rotation. */
|
2018-07-17 17:00:18 +02:00
|
|
|
set_rotation_time(service);
|
2017-08-24 15:16:44 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-09-05 21:52:05 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Rotate descriptors for each service if needed. A non existing current
|
|
|
|
* descriptor will trigger a descriptor build for the next time period. */
|
2017-05-05 20:55:26 +02:00
|
|
|
STATIC void
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
rotate_all_descriptors(time_t now)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2017-08-03 15:02:51 +02:00
|
|
|
/* XXX We rotate all our service descriptors at once. In the future it might
|
|
|
|
* be wise, to rotate service descriptors independently to hide that all
|
|
|
|
* those descriptors are on the same tor instance */
|
|
|
|
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
FOR_EACH_SERVICE_BEGIN(service) {
|
2017-08-24 15:16:44 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2017-09-05 21:52:05 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Note for a service booting up: Both descriptors are NULL in that case
|
|
|
|
* so this function might return true if we are in the timeframe for a
|
|
|
|
* rotation leading to basically swapping two NULL pointers which is
|
|
|
|
* harmless. However, the side effect is that triggering a rotation will
|
|
|
|
* update the service state and avoid doing anymore rotations after the
|
|
|
|
* two descriptors have been built. */
|
|
|
|
if (!should_rotate_descriptors(service, now)) {
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
2017-08-24 15:16:44 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-09-05 21:52:05 +02:00
|
|
|
log_info(LD_REND, "Time to rotate our descriptors (%p / %p) for %s",
|
|
|
|
service->desc_current, service->desc_next,
|
|
|
|
safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
|
2017-08-19 15:00:58 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2018-07-17 17:00:18 +02:00
|
|
|
rotate_service_descriptors(service);
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
} FOR_EACH_SERVICE_END;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-02-03 21:29:31 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Scheduled event run from the main loop. Make sure all our services are up
|
|
|
|
* to date and ready for the other scheduled events. This includes looking at
|
|
|
|
* the introduction points status and descriptor rotation time. */
|
2017-05-05 20:55:26 +02:00
|
|
|
STATIC void
|
2017-02-03 21:29:31 +01:00
|
|
|
run_housekeeping_event(time_t now)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Note that nothing here opens circuit(s) nor uploads descriptor(s). We are
|
2017-09-20 01:55:57 +02:00
|
|
|
* simply moving things around or removing unneeded elements. */
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
FOR_EACH_SERVICE_BEGIN(service) {
|
2017-09-05 21:52:05 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If the service is starting off, set the rotation time. We can't do that
|
|
|
|
* at configure time because the get_options() needs to be set for setting
|
|
|
|
* that time that uses the voting interval. */
|
|
|
|
if (service->state.next_rotation_time == 0) {
|
|
|
|
/* Set the next rotation time of the descriptors. If it's Oct 25th
|
|
|
|
* 23:47:00, the next rotation time is when the next SRV is computed
|
|
|
|
* which is at Oct 26th 00:00:00 that is in 13 minutes. */
|
2018-07-17 17:00:18 +02:00
|
|
|
set_rotation_time(service);
|
2017-09-05 21:52:05 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Cleanup invalid intro points from the service descriptor. */
|
|
|
|
cleanup_intro_points(service, now);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-05-09 20:31:17 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Remove expired failing intro point from the descriptor failed list. We
|
|
|
|
* reset them at each INTRO_CIRC_RETRY_PERIOD. */
|
|
|
|
remove_expired_failing_intro(service, now);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
/* At this point, the service is now ready to go through the scheduled
|
|
|
|
* events guaranteeing a valid state. Intro points might be missing from
|
|
|
|
* the descriptors after the cleanup but the update/build process will
|
|
|
|
* make sure we pick those missing ones. */
|
|
|
|
} FOR_EACH_SERVICE_END;
|
2017-02-03 21:29:31 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Scheduled event run from the main loop. Make sure all descriptors are up to
|
|
|
|
* date. Once this returns, each service descriptor needs to be considered for
|
|
|
|
* new introduction circuits and then for upload. */
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
run_build_descriptor_event(time_t now)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* For v2 services, this step happens in the upload event. */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Run v3+ events. */
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
/* We start by rotating the descriptors only if needed. */
|
|
|
|
rotate_all_descriptors(now);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Then, we'll try to build new descriptors that we might need. The
|
|
|
|
* condition is that the next descriptor is non existing because it has
|
|
|
|
* been rotated or we just started up. */
|
|
|
|
build_all_descriptors(now);
|
|
|
|
|
2018-10-23 15:35:02 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Finally, we'll check if we should update the descriptors' intro
|
|
|
|
* points. Missing introduction points will be picked in this function which
|
|
|
|
* is useful for newly built descriptors. */
|
|
|
|
update_all_descriptors_intro_points(now);
|
2017-02-03 21:29:31 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-02-16 21:55:12 +01:00
|
|
|
/* For the given service, launch any intro point circuits that could be
|
|
|
|
* needed. This considers every descriptor of the service. */
|
|
|
|
static void
|
2017-08-04 18:06:34 +02:00
|
|
|
launch_intro_point_circuits(hs_service_t *service)
|
2017-02-16 21:55:12 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(service);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* For both descriptors, try to launch any missing introduction point
|
|
|
|
* circuits using the current map. */
|
|
|
|
FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_BEGIN(service, desc) {
|
|
|
|
/* Keep a ref on if we need a direct connection. We use this often. */
|
|
|
|
unsigned int direct_conn = service->config.is_single_onion;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
DIGEST256MAP_FOREACH_MODIFY(desc->intro_points.map, key,
|
|
|
|
hs_service_intro_point_t *, ip) {
|
|
|
|
extend_info_t *ei;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Skip the intro point that already has an existing circuit
|
|
|
|
* (established or not). */
|
2017-07-19 17:42:04 +02:00
|
|
|
if (hs_circ_service_get_intro_circ(ip)) {
|
2017-02-16 21:55:12 +01:00
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ei = get_extend_info_from_intro_point(ip, direct_conn);
|
|
|
|
if (ei == NULL) {
|
2017-09-26 19:55:51 +02:00
|
|
|
/* This is possible if we can get a node_t but not the extend info out
|
|
|
|
* of it. In this case, we remove the intro point and a new one will
|
|
|
|
* be picked at the next main loop callback. */
|
2017-02-16 21:55:12 +01:00
|
|
|
MAP_DEL_CURRENT(key);
|
|
|
|
service_intro_point_free(ip);
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Launch a circuit to the intro point. */
|
|
|
|
ip->circuit_retries++;
|
2017-08-04 18:06:34 +02:00
|
|
|
if (hs_circ_launch_intro_point(service, ip, ei) < 0) {
|
2017-09-25 22:31:43 +02:00
|
|
|
log_info(LD_REND, "Unable to launch intro circuit to node %s "
|
2017-02-16 21:55:12 +01:00
|
|
|
"for service %s.",
|
|
|
|
safe_str_client(extend_info_describe(ei)),
|
|
|
|
safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
|
|
|
|
/* Intro point will be retried if possible after this. */
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
extend_info_free(ei);
|
|
|
|
} DIGEST256MAP_FOREACH_END;
|
|
|
|
} FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_END;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Don't try to build more than this many circuits before giving up for a
|
|
|
|
* while. Dynamically calculated based on the configured number of intro
|
|
|
|
* points for the given service and how many descriptor exists. The default
|
|
|
|
* use case of 3 introduction points and two descriptors will allow 28
|
|
|
|
* circuits for a retry period (((3 + 2) + (3 * 3)) * 2). */
|
|
|
|
static unsigned int
|
|
|
|
get_max_intro_circ_per_period(const hs_service_t *service)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unsigned int count = 0;
|
|
|
|
unsigned int multiplier = 0;
|
|
|
|
unsigned int num_wanted_ip;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(service);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(service->config.num_intro_points <=
|
|
|
|
HS_CONFIG_V3_MAX_INTRO_POINTS);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-05-26 20:20:00 +02:00
|
|
|
/* For a testing network, allow to do it for the maximum amount so circuit
|
|
|
|
* creation and rotation and so on can actually be tested without limit. */
|
|
|
|
#define MAX_INTRO_POINT_CIRCUIT_RETRIES_TESTING -1
|
|
|
|
if (get_options()->TestingTorNetwork) {
|
|
|
|
return MAX_INTRO_POINT_CIRCUIT_RETRIES_TESTING;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-02-16 21:55:12 +01:00
|
|
|
num_wanted_ip = service->config.num_intro_points;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* The calculation is as follow. We have a number of intro points that we
|
|
|
|
* want configured as a torrc option (num_intro_points). We then add an
|
|
|
|
* extra value so we can launch multiple circuits at once and pick the
|
|
|
|
* quickest ones. For instance, we want 3 intros, we add 2 extra so we'll
|
|
|
|
* pick 5 intros and launch 5 circuits. */
|
2017-05-09 22:15:12 +02:00
|
|
|
count += (num_wanted_ip + get_intro_point_num_extra());
|
2017-02-16 21:55:12 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Then we add the number of retries that is possible to do for each intro
|
|
|
|
* point. If we want 3 intros, we'll allow 3 times the number of possible
|
|
|
|
* retry. */
|
|
|
|
count += (num_wanted_ip * MAX_INTRO_POINT_CIRCUIT_RETRIES);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Then, we multiply by a factor of 2 if we have both descriptor or 0 if we
|
|
|
|
* have none. */
|
|
|
|
multiplier += (service->desc_current) ? 1 : 0;
|
|
|
|
multiplier += (service->desc_next) ? 1 : 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return (count * multiplier);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* For the given service, return 1 if the service is allowed to launch more
|
|
|
|
* introduction circuits else 0 if the maximum has been reached for the retry
|
|
|
|
* period of INTRO_CIRC_RETRY_PERIOD. */
|
2017-05-05 20:55:26 +02:00
|
|
|
STATIC int
|
2017-02-16 21:55:12 +01:00
|
|
|
can_service_launch_intro_circuit(hs_service_t *service, time_t now)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(service);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Consider the intro circuit retry period of the service. */
|
|
|
|
if (now > (service->state.intro_circ_retry_started_time +
|
|
|
|
INTRO_CIRC_RETRY_PERIOD)) {
|
|
|
|
service->state.intro_circ_retry_started_time = now;
|
|
|
|
service->state.num_intro_circ_launched = 0;
|
|
|
|
goto allow;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Check if we can still launch more circuits in this period. */
|
|
|
|
if (service->state.num_intro_circ_launched <=
|
|
|
|
get_max_intro_circ_per_period(service)) {
|
|
|
|
goto allow;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Rate limit log that we've reached our circuit creation limit. */
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
char *msg;
|
|
|
|
time_t elapsed_time = now - service->state.intro_circ_retry_started_time;
|
|
|
|
static ratelim_t rlimit = RATELIM_INIT(INTRO_CIRC_RETRY_PERIOD);
|
|
|
|
if ((msg = rate_limit_log(&rlimit, now))) {
|
|
|
|
log_info(LD_REND, "Hidden service %s exceeded its circuit launch limit "
|
|
|
|
"of %u per %d seconds. It launched %u circuits in "
|
|
|
|
"the last %ld seconds. Will retry in %ld seconds.",
|
|
|
|
safe_str_client(service->onion_address),
|
|
|
|
get_max_intro_circ_per_period(service),
|
|
|
|
INTRO_CIRC_RETRY_PERIOD,
|
2017-08-11 21:08:45 +02:00
|
|
|
service->state.num_intro_circ_launched,
|
|
|
|
(long int) elapsed_time,
|
2017-08-23 19:12:58 +02:00
|
|
|
(long int) (INTRO_CIRC_RETRY_PERIOD - elapsed_time));
|
2017-02-16 21:55:12 +01:00
|
|
|
tor_free(msg);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Not allow. */
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
allow:
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-02-03 21:29:31 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Scheduled event run from the main loop. Make sure we have all the circuits
|
|
|
|
* we need for each service. */
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
run_build_circuit_event(time_t now)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2017-02-16 21:55:12 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Make sure we can actually have enough information or able to build
|
|
|
|
* internal circuits as required by services. */
|
|
|
|
if (router_have_consensus_path() == CONSENSUS_PATH_UNKNOWN ||
|
|
|
|
!have_completed_a_circuit()) {
|
2017-02-03 21:29:31 +01:00
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Run v2 check. */
|
2017-07-10 17:31:51 +02:00
|
|
|
if (rend_num_services() > 0) {
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
rend_consider_services_intro_points(now);
|
2017-02-03 21:29:31 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2017-02-03 21:29:31 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Run v3+ check. */
|
|
|
|
FOR_EACH_SERVICE_BEGIN(service) {
|
2017-02-16 21:55:12 +01:00
|
|
|
/* For introduction circuit, we need to make sure we don't stress too much
|
|
|
|
* circuit creation so make sure this service is respecting that limit. */
|
|
|
|
if (can_service_launch_intro_circuit(service, now)) {
|
|
|
|
/* Launch intro point circuits if needed. */
|
2017-08-04 18:06:34 +02:00
|
|
|
launch_intro_point_circuits(service);
|
2017-02-16 21:55:12 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Once the circuits have opened, we'll make sure to update the
|
|
|
|
* descriptor intro point list and cleanup any extraneous. */
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-02-03 21:29:31 +01:00
|
|
|
} FOR_EACH_SERVICE_END;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-04-19 21:27:11 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Encode and sign the service descriptor desc and upload it to the given
|
|
|
|
* hidden service directory. This does nothing if PublishHidServDescriptors
|
|
|
|
* is false. */
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
upload_descriptor_to_hsdir(const hs_service_t *service,
|
|
|
|
hs_service_descriptor_t *desc, const node_t *hsdir)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2017-11-15 20:01:16 +01:00
|
|
|
char *encoded_desc = NULL;
|
2017-04-19 21:27:11 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(service);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(desc);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(hsdir);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Let's avoid doing that if tor is configured to not publish. */
|
|
|
|
if (!get_options()->PublishHidServDescriptors) {
|
|
|
|
log_info(LD_REND, "Service %s not publishing descriptor. "
|
|
|
|
"PublishHidServDescriptors is set to 1.",
|
|
|
|
safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* First of all, we'll encode the descriptor. This should NEVER fail but
|
|
|
|
* just in case, let's make sure we have an actual usable descriptor. */
|
2018-04-13 23:04:31 +02:00
|
|
|
if (BUG(service_encode_descriptor(service, desc, &desc->signing_kp,
|
2017-04-19 21:27:11 +02:00
|
|
|
&encoded_desc) < 0)) {
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-11-15 20:01:16 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Time to upload the descriptor to the directory. */
|
|
|
|
hs_service_upload_desc_to_dir(encoded_desc, service->config.version,
|
|
|
|
&service->keys.identity_pk,
|
|
|
|
&desc->blinded_kp.pubkey, hsdir->rs);
|
2017-04-19 21:27:11 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2017-08-19 15:26:46 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Add this node to previous_hsdirs list */
|
|
|
|
service_desc_note_upload(desc, hsdir);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-04-19 21:27:11 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Logging so we know where it was sent. */
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int is_next_desc = (service->desc_next == desc);
|
2018-04-29 01:56:12 +02:00
|
|
|
const uint8_t *idx = (is_next_desc) ? hsdir->hsdir_index.store_second:
|
|
|
|
hsdir->hsdir_index.store_first;
|
2018-07-16 14:28:11 +02:00
|
|
|
char *blinded_pubkey_log_str =
|
|
|
|
tor_strdup(hex_str((char*)&desc->blinded_kp.pubkey.pubkey, 32));
|
2017-04-19 21:27:11 +02:00
|
|
|
log_info(LD_REND, "Service %s %s descriptor of revision %" PRIu64
|
2018-07-16 14:28:11 +02:00
|
|
|
" initiated upload request to %s with index %s (%s)",
|
2017-04-19 21:27:11 +02:00
|
|
|
safe_str_client(service->onion_address),
|
|
|
|
(is_next_desc) ? "next" : "current",
|
|
|
|
desc->desc->plaintext_data.revision_counter,
|
|
|
|
safe_str_client(node_describe(hsdir)),
|
2018-07-16 14:28:11 +02:00
|
|
|
safe_str_client(hex_str((const char *) idx, 32)),
|
|
|
|
safe_str_client(blinded_pubkey_log_str));
|
|
|
|
tor_free(blinded_pubkey_log_str);
|
2017-11-10 20:48:52 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Fire a UPLOAD control port event. */
|
|
|
|
hs_control_desc_event_upload(service->onion_address, hsdir->identity,
|
2018-01-03 16:09:20 +01:00
|
|
|
&desc->blinded_kp.pubkey, idx);
|
2017-04-19 21:27:11 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
end:
|
|
|
|
tor_free(encoded_desc);
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-06-14 14:35:59 +02:00
|
|
|
/** Set the revision counter in <b>hs_desc</b>. We do this by encrypting a
|
|
|
|
* timestamp using an OPE scheme and using the ciphertext as our revision
|
|
|
|
* counter.
|
2017-07-21 14:53:17 +02:00
|
|
|
*
|
2018-06-14 14:35:59 +02:00
|
|
|
* If <b>is_current</b> is true, then this is the current HS descriptor,
|
|
|
|
* otherwise it's the next one. */
|
2017-07-21 14:53:17 +02:00
|
|
|
static void
|
2018-06-14 14:35:59 +02:00
|
|
|
set_descriptor_revision_counter(hs_service_descriptor_t *hs_desc, time_t now,
|
|
|
|
bool is_current)
|
2017-07-21 14:53:17 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
uint64_t rev_counter = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
2018-06-14 14:35:59 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Get current time */
|
|
|
|
time_t srv_start = 0;
|
2017-07-21 14:53:17 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2018-06-14 14:35:59 +02:00
|
|
|
/* As our revision counter plaintext value, we use the seconds since the
|
|
|
|
* start of the SR protocol run that is relevant to this descriptor. This is
|
|
|
|
* guaranteed to be a positive value since we need the SRV to start making a
|
|
|
|
* descriptor (so that we know where to upload it).
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Depending on whether we are building the current or the next descriptor,
|
|
|
|
* services use a different SRV value. See [SERVICEUPLOAD] in
|
|
|
|
* rend-spec-v3.txt:
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* In particular, for the current descriptor (aka first descriptor), Tor
|
|
|
|
* always uses the previous SRV for uploading the descriptor, and hence we
|
|
|
|
* should use the start time of the previous protocol run here.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Whereas for the next descriptor (aka second descriptor), Tor always uses
|
|
|
|
* the current SRV for uploading the descriptor. and hence we use the start
|
|
|
|
* time of the current protocol run.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (is_current) {
|
2018-07-17 17:00:18 +02:00
|
|
|
srv_start = sr_state_get_start_time_of_previous_protocol_run();
|
2018-06-14 14:35:59 +02:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
2018-07-17 17:00:18 +02:00
|
|
|
srv_start = sr_state_get_start_time_of_current_protocol_run();
|
2017-07-21 14:53:17 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-06-14 14:35:59 +02:00
|
|
|
log_info(LD_REND, "Setting rev counter for TP #%u: "
|
|
|
|
"SRV started at %d, now %d (%s)",
|
|
|
|
(unsigned) hs_desc->time_period_num, (int)srv_start,
|
|
|
|
(int)now, is_current ? "current" : "next");
|
2017-07-21 14:53:17 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2018-06-14 14:35:59 +02:00
|
|
|
tor_assert_nonfatal(now >= srv_start);
|
2017-07-21 14:53:17 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2018-06-14 14:35:59 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Compute seconds elapsed since the start of the time period. That's the
|
|
|
|
* number of seconds of how long this blinded key has been active. */
|
|
|
|
time_t seconds_since_start_of_srv = now - srv_start;
|
2017-07-21 14:53:17 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2018-06-14 14:35:59 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Increment by one so that we are definitely sure this is strictly
|
|
|
|
* positive and not zero. */
|
|
|
|
seconds_since_start_of_srv++;
|
2017-07-21 14:53:17 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2018-06-14 14:35:59 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Check for too big inputs. */
|
|
|
|
if (BUG(seconds_since_start_of_srv > OPE_INPUT_MAX)) {
|
|
|
|
seconds_since_start_of_srv = OPE_INPUT_MAX;
|
2017-07-21 14:53:17 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-07-17 18:03:18 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Now we compute the final revision counter value by encrypting the
|
|
|
|
plaintext using our OPE cipher: */
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(hs_desc->ope_cipher);
|
|
|
|
rev_counter = crypto_ope_encrypt(hs_desc->ope_cipher,
|
|
|
|
(int) seconds_since_start_of_srv);
|
2017-07-21 14:53:17 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2018-07-10 19:10:22 +02:00
|
|
|
/* The OPE module returns CRYPTO_OPE_ERROR in case of errors. */
|
|
|
|
tor_assert_nonfatal(rev_counter < CRYPTO_OPE_ERROR);
|
2017-07-21 14:53:17 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2018-06-14 14:35:59 +02:00
|
|
|
log_info(LD_REND, "Encrypted revision counter %d to %ld",
|
|
|
|
(int) seconds_since_start_of_srv, (long int) rev_counter);
|
2017-07-21 14:53:17 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2018-06-14 14:35:59 +02:00
|
|
|
hs_desc->desc->plaintext_data.revision_counter = rev_counter;
|
2017-07-21 14:53:17 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-04-19 21:27:11 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Encode and sign the service descriptor desc and upload it to the
|
|
|
|
* responsible hidden service directories. If for_next_period is true, the set
|
|
|
|
* of directories are selected using the next hsdir_index. This does nothing
|
|
|
|
* if PublishHidServDescriptors is false. */
|
2017-08-19 15:26:46 +02:00
|
|
|
STATIC void
|
2017-04-19 21:27:11 +02:00
|
|
|
upload_descriptor_to_all(const hs_service_t *service,
|
2017-09-06 17:12:28 +02:00
|
|
|
hs_service_descriptor_t *desc)
|
2017-04-19 21:27:11 +02:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
smartlist_t *responsible_dirs = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(service);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(desc);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-09-11 19:16:23 +02:00
|
|
|
/* We'll first cancel any directory request that are ongoing for this
|
|
|
|
* descriptor. It is possible that we can trigger multiple uploads in a
|
|
|
|
* short time frame which can lead to a race where the second upload arrives
|
|
|
|
* before the first one leading to a 400 malformed descriptor response from
|
|
|
|
* the directory. Closing all pending requests avoids that. */
|
|
|
|
close_directory_connections(service, desc);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-04-19 21:27:11 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Get our list of responsible HSDir. */
|
|
|
|
responsible_dirs = smartlist_new();
|
|
|
|
/* The parameter 0 means that we aren't a client so tell the function to use
|
|
|
|
* the spread store consensus paremeter. */
|
|
|
|
hs_get_responsible_hsdirs(&desc->blinded_kp.pubkey, desc->time_period_num,
|
2017-09-08 12:05:22 +02:00
|
|
|
service->desc_next == desc, 0, responsible_dirs);
|
2017-04-19 21:27:11 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2017-08-29 15:02:01 +02:00
|
|
|
/** Clear list of previous hsdirs since we are about to upload to a new
|
|
|
|
* list. Let's keep it up to date. */
|
|
|
|
service_desc_clear_previous_hsdirs(desc);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-04-19 21:27:11 +02:00
|
|
|
/* For each responsible HSDir we have, initiate an upload command. */
|
|
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(responsible_dirs, const routerstatus_t *,
|
|
|
|
hsdir_rs) {
|
|
|
|
const node_t *hsdir_node = node_get_by_id(hsdir_rs->identity_digest);
|
|
|
|
/* Getting responsible hsdir implies that the node_t object exists for the
|
|
|
|
* routerstatus_t found in the consensus else we have a problem. */
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(hsdir_node);
|
|
|
|
/* Upload this descriptor to the chosen directory. */
|
|
|
|
upload_descriptor_to_hsdir(service, desc, hsdir_node);
|
|
|
|
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(hsdir_rs);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Set the next upload time for this descriptor. Even if we are configured
|
|
|
|
* to not upload, we still want to follow the right cycle of life for this
|
|
|
|
* descriptor. */
|
|
|
|
desc->next_upload_time =
|
|
|
|
(time(NULL) + crypto_rand_int_range(HS_SERVICE_NEXT_UPLOAD_TIME_MIN,
|
|
|
|
HS_SERVICE_NEXT_UPLOAD_TIME_MAX));
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
char fmt_next_time[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
|
|
|
|
format_local_iso_time(fmt_next_time, desc->next_upload_time);
|
|
|
|
log_debug(LD_REND, "Service %s set to upload a descriptor at %s",
|
|
|
|
safe_str_client(service->onion_address), fmt_next_time);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
smartlist_free(responsible_dirs);
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-24 18:32:33 +02:00
|
|
|
/** The set of HSDirs have changed: check if the change affects our descriptor
|
|
|
|
* HSDir placement, and if it does, reupload the desc. */
|
|
|
|
STATIC int
|
|
|
|
service_desc_hsdirs_changed(const hs_service_t *service,
|
|
|
|
const hs_service_descriptor_t *desc)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2017-08-30 14:29:41 +02:00
|
|
|
int should_reupload = 0;
|
2017-08-24 18:32:33 +02:00
|
|
|
smartlist_t *responsible_dirs = smartlist_new();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* No desc upload has happened yet: it will happen eventually */
|
|
|
|
if (!desc->previous_hsdirs || !smartlist_len(desc->previous_hsdirs)) {
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Get list of responsible hsdirs */
|
|
|
|
hs_get_responsible_hsdirs(&desc->blinded_kp.pubkey, desc->time_period_num,
|
|
|
|
service->desc_next == desc, 0, responsible_dirs);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-30 14:29:41 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Check if any new hsdirs have been added to the responsible hsdirs set:
|
|
|
|
* Iterate over the list of new hsdirs, and reupload if any of them is not
|
|
|
|
* present in the list of previous hsdirs.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2017-08-24 18:32:33 +02:00
|
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(responsible_dirs, const routerstatus_t *, hsdir_rs) {
|
|
|
|
char b64_digest[BASE64_DIGEST_LEN+1] = {0};
|
|
|
|
digest_to_base64(b64_digest, hsdir_rs->identity_digest);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-30 14:29:41 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!smartlist_contains_string(desc->previous_hsdirs, b64_digest)) {
|
|
|
|
should_reupload = 1;
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(hsdir_rs);
|
2017-08-24 18:32:33 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
|
|
smartlist_free(responsible_dirs);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-30 14:29:41 +02:00
|
|
|
return should_reupload;
|
2017-08-24 18:32:33 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-04-19 21:27:11 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Return 1 if the given descriptor from the given service can be uploaded
|
|
|
|
* else return 0 if it can not. */
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
should_service_upload_descriptor(const hs_service_t *service,
|
|
|
|
const hs_service_descriptor_t *desc, time_t now)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
unsigned int num_intro_points;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(service);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(desc);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If this descriptors has missing intro points that is that it couldn't get
|
|
|
|
* them all when it was time to pick them, it means that we should upload
|
|
|
|
* instead of waiting an arbitrary amount of time breaking the service.
|
|
|
|
* Else, if we have no missing intro points, we use the value taken from the
|
|
|
|
* service configuration. */
|
2017-07-31 12:27:16 +02:00
|
|
|
if (desc->missing_intro_points) {
|
|
|
|
num_intro_points = digest256map_size(desc->intro_points.map);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
num_intro_points = service->config.num_intro_points;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-04-19 21:27:11 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* This means we tried to pick intro points but couldn't get any so do not
|
|
|
|
* upload descriptor in this case. We need at least one for the service to
|
|
|
|
* be reachable. */
|
|
|
|
if (desc->missing_intro_points && num_intro_points == 0) {
|
|
|
|
goto cannot;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Check if all our introduction circuit have been established for all the
|
|
|
|
* intro points we have selected. */
|
|
|
|
if (count_desc_circuit_established(desc) != num_intro_points) {
|
|
|
|
goto cannot;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Is it the right time to upload? */
|
|
|
|
if (desc->next_upload_time > now) {
|
|
|
|
goto cannot;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-13 19:16:21 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Don't upload desc if we don't have a live consensus */
|
|
|
|
if (!networkstatus_get_live_consensus(now)) {
|
|
|
|
goto cannot;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Do we know enough router descriptors to have adequate vision of the HSDir
|
|
|
|
hash ring? */
|
|
|
|
if (!router_have_minimum_dir_info()) {
|
|
|
|
goto cannot;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-04-19 21:27:11 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Can upload! */
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
cannot:
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
hs-v3: Create desc signing key cert before uploading
Before this commit, we would create the descriptor signing key certificate
when first building the descriptor.
In some extreme cases, it lead to the expiry of the certificate which triggers
a BUG() when encoding the descriptor before uploading.
Ticket #27838 details a possible scenario in which this can happen. It is an
edge case where tor losts internet connectivity, notices it and closes all
circuits. When it came back up, the HS subsystem noticed that it had no
introduction circuits, created them and tried to upload the descriptor.
However, in the meantime, if tor did lack a live consensus because it is
currently seeking to download one, we would consider that we don't need to
rotate the descriptors leading to using the expired signing key certificate.
That being said, this commit does a bit more to make this process cleaner.
There are a series of things that we need to "refresh" before uploading a
descriptor: signing key cert, intro points and revision counter.
A refresh function is added to deal with all mutable descriptor fields. It in
turn simplified a bit the code surrounding the creation of the plaintext data.
We keep creating the cert when building the descriptor in order to accomodate
the unit tests. However, it is replaced every single time the descriptor is
uploaded.
Fixes #27838
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
2018-10-22 22:18:44 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Refresh the given service descriptor meaning this will update every mutable
|
|
|
|
* field that needs to be updated before we upload.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* This should ONLY be called before uploading a descriptor. It assumes that
|
|
|
|
* the descriptor has been built (desc->desc) and that all intro point
|
|
|
|
* circuits have been established. */
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
refresh_service_descriptor(const hs_service_t *service,
|
|
|
|
hs_service_descriptor_t *desc, time_t now)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* There are few fields that we consider "mutable" in the descriptor meaning
|
|
|
|
* we need to update them regurlarly over the lifetime fo the descriptor.
|
|
|
|
* The rest are set once and should not be modified.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* - Signing key certificate.
|
|
|
|
* - Revision counter.
|
|
|
|
* - Introduction points which includes many thing. See
|
|
|
|
* hs_desc_intro_point_t. and the setup_desc_intro_point() function.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Create the signing key certificate. */
|
|
|
|
build_desc_signing_key_cert(desc, now);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Build the intro points descriptor section. The refresh step is just
|
|
|
|
* before we upload so all circuits have been properly established. */
|
|
|
|
build_desc_intro_points(service, desc, now);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Set the desc revision counter right before uploading */
|
|
|
|
set_descriptor_revision_counter(desc, now, service->desc_current == desc);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-02-03 21:29:31 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Scheduled event run from the main loop. Try to upload the descriptor for
|
|
|
|
* each service. */
|
2017-05-05 20:55:26 +02:00
|
|
|
STATIC void
|
2017-02-03 21:29:31 +01:00
|
|
|
run_upload_descriptor_event(time_t now)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* v2 services use the same function for descriptor creation and upload so
|
|
|
|
* we do everything here because the intro circuits were checked before. */
|
2017-07-10 17:31:51 +02:00
|
|
|
if (rend_num_services() > 0) {
|
2017-02-03 21:29:31 +01:00
|
|
|
rend_consider_services_upload(now);
|
|
|
|
rend_consider_descriptor_republication();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Run v3+ check. */
|
|
|
|
FOR_EACH_SERVICE_BEGIN(service) {
|
2017-04-19 21:27:11 +02:00
|
|
|
FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_BEGIN(service, desc) {
|
2017-08-24 15:17:26 +02:00
|
|
|
/* If we were asked to re-examine the hash ring, and it changed, then
|
|
|
|
schedule an upload */
|
|
|
|
if (consider_republishing_hs_descriptors &&
|
|
|
|
service_desc_hsdirs_changed(service, desc)) {
|
|
|
|
service_desc_schedule_upload(desc, now, 0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Can this descriptor be uploaded? */
|
2017-04-19 21:27:11 +02:00
|
|
|
if (!should_service_upload_descriptor(service, desc, now)) {
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
log_info(LD_REND, "Initiating upload for hidden service %s descriptor "
|
|
|
|
"for service %s with %u/%u introduction points%s.",
|
|
|
|
(desc == service->desc_current) ? "current" : "next",
|
|
|
|
safe_str_client(service->onion_address),
|
|
|
|
digest256map_size(desc->intro_points.map),
|
|
|
|
service->config.num_intro_points,
|
|
|
|
(desc->missing_intro_points) ? " (couldn't pick more)" : "");
|
|
|
|
|
hs-v3: Create desc signing key cert before uploading
Before this commit, we would create the descriptor signing key certificate
when first building the descriptor.
In some extreme cases, it lead to the expiry of the certificate which triggers
a BUG() when encoding the descriptor before uploading.
Ticket #27838 details a possible scenario in which this can happen. It is an
edge case where tor losts internet connectivity, notices it and closes all
circuits. When it came back up, the HS subsystem noticed that it had no
introduction circuits, created them and tried to upload the descriptor.
However, in the meantime, if tor did lack a live consensus because it is
currently seeking to download one, we would consider that we don't need to
rotate the descriptors leading to using the expired signing key certificate.
That being said, this commit does a bit more to make this process cleaner.
There are a series of things that we need to "refresh" before uploading a
descriptor: signing key cert, intro points and revision counter.
A refresh function is added to deal with all mutable descriptor fields. It in
turn simplified a bit the code surrounding the creation of the plaintext data.
We keep creating the cert when building the descriptor in order to accomodate
the unit tests. However, it is replaced every single time the descriptor is
uploaded.
Fixes #27838
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
2018-10-22 22:18:44 +02:00
|
|
|
/* We are about to upload so we need to do one last step which is to
|
|
|
|
* update the service's descriptor mutable fields in order to upload a
|
|
|
|
* coherent descriptor. */
|
|
|
|
refresh_service_descriptor(service, desc, now);
|
2018-07-12 15:51:31 +02:00
|
|
|
|
hs-v3: Create desc signing key cert before uploading
Before this commit, we would create the descriptor signing key certificate
when first building the descriptor.
In some extreme cases, it lead to the expiry of the certificate which triggers
a BUG() when encoding the descriptor before uploading.
Ticket #27838 details a possible scenario in which this can happen. It is an
edge case where tor losts internet connectivity, notices it and closes all
circuits. When it came back up, the HS subsystem noticed that it had no
introduction circuits, created them and tried to upload the descriptor.
However, in the meantime, if tor did lack a live consensus because it is
currently seeking to download one, we would consider that we don't need to
rotate the descriptors leading to using the expired signing key certificate.
That being said, this commit does a bit more to make this process cleaner.
There are a series of things that we need to "refresh" before uploading a
descriptor: signing key cert, intro points and revision counter.
A refresh function is added to deal with all mutable descriptor fields. It in
turn simplified a bit the code surrounding the creation of the plaintext data.
We keep creating the cert when building the descriptor in order to accomodate
the unit tests. However, it is replaced every single time the descriptor is
uploaded.
Fixes #27838
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
2018-10-22 22:18:44 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Proceed with the upload, the descriptor is ready to be encoded. */
|
2017-09-06 17:12:28 +02:00
|
|
|
upload_descriptor_to_all(service, desc);
|
2017-04-19 21:27:11 +02:00
|
|
|
} FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_END;
|
2017-02-03 21:29:31 +01:00
|
|
|
} FOR_EACH_SERVICE_END;
|
2017-08-24 15:17:26 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* We are done considering whether to republish rend descriptors */
|
|
|
|
consider_republishing_hs_descriptors = 0;
|
2017-02-03 21:29:31 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-02-21 20:20:39 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Called when the introduction point circuit is done building and ready to be
|
|
|
|
* used. */
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
service_intro_circ_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circ)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2017-03-08 18:08:03 +01:00
|
|
|
hs_service_t *service = NULL;
|
|
|
|
hs_service_intro_point_t *ip = NULL;
|
2017-02-21 20:20:39 +01:00
|
|
|
hs_service_descriptor_t *desc = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(circ);
|
2017-08-03 14:47:06 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Let's do some basic sanity checking of the circ state */
|
|
|
|
if (BUG(!circ->cpath)) {
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (BUG(TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO)) {
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (BUG(!circ->hs_ident)) {
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-02-21 20:20:39 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2017-03-08 18:08:03 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Get the corresponding service and intro point. */
|
|
|
|
get_objects_from_ident(circ->hs_ident, &service, &ip, &desc);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-02-21 20:20:39 +01:00
|
|
|
if (service == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
log_warn(LD_REND, "Unknown service identity key %s on the introduction "
|
|
|
|
"circuit %u. Can't find onion service.",
|
|
|
|
safe_str_client(ed25519_fmt(&circ->hs_ident->identity_pk)),
|
|
|
|
TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ip == NULL) {
|
2017-03-08 18:08:03 +01:00
|
|
|
log_warn(LD_REND, "Unknown introduction point auth key on circuit %u "
|
|
|
|
"for service %s",
|
|
|
|
TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id,
|
|
|
|
safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
|
2017-02-21 20:20:39 +01:00
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* We can't have an IP object without a descriptor. */
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(desc);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (hs_circ_service_intro_has_opened(service, ip, desc, circ)) {
|
|
|
|
/* Getting here means that the circuit has been re-purposed because we
|
|
|
|
* have enough intro circuit opened. Remove the IP from the service. */
|
|
|
|
service_intro_point_remove(service, ip);
|
|
|
|
service_intro_point_free(ip);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
|
|
/* Close circuit, we can't use it. */
|
2017-03-08 18:08:03 +01:00
|
|
|
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_NOSUCHSERVICE);
|
2017-02-21 20:20:39 +01:00
|
|
|
done:
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-09 18:54:51 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Called when a rendezvous circuit is done building and ready to be used. */
|
2017-02-21 20:20:39 +01:00
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
service_rendezvous_circ_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circ)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2017-03-09 18:54:51 +01:00
|
|
|
hs_service_t *service = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
2017-02-21 20:20:39 +01:00
|
|
|
tor_assert(circ);
|
2017-03-09 18:54:51 +01:00
|
|
|
tor_assert(circ->cpath);
|
2017-08-03 15:02:51 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Getting here means this is a v3 rendezvous circuit. */
|
2017-03-09 18:54:51 +01:00
|
|
|
tor_assert(circ->hs_ident);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-31 17:40:22 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Declare the circuit dirty to avoid reuse, and for path-bias. We set the
|
|
|
|
* timestamp regardless of its content because that circuit could have been
|
|
|
|
* cannibalized so in any cases, we are about to use that circuit more. */
|
|
|
|
TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->timestamp_dirty = time(NULL);
|
2017-03-09 18:54:51 +01:00
|
|
|
pathbias_count_use_attempt(circ);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Get the corresponding service and intro point. */
|
|
|
|
get_objects_from_ident(circ->hs_ident, &service, NULL, NULL);
|
|
|
|
if (service == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
log_warn(LD_REND, "Unknown service identity key %s on the rendezvous "
|
|
|
|
"circuit %u with cookie %s. Can't find onion service.",
|
|
|
|
safe_str_client(ed25519_fmt(&circ->hs_ident->identity_pk)),
|
|
|
|
TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id,
|
|
|
|
hex_str((const char *) circ->hs_ident->rendezvous_cookie,
|
|
|
|
REND_COOKIE_LEN));
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If the cell can't be sent, the circuit will be closed within this
|
|
|
|
* function. */
|
|
|
|
hs_circ_service_rp_has_opened(service, circ);
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
|
|
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_NOSUCHSERVICE);
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
|
|
return;
|
2017-02-21 20:20:39 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-03 15:02:51 +02:00
|
|
|
/* We've been expecting an INTRO_ESTABLISHED cell on this circuit and it just
|
|
|
|
* arrived. Handle the INTRO_ESTABLISHED cell arriving on the given
|
|
|
|
* introduction circuit. Return 0 on success else a negative value. */
|
2017-03-07 20:33:03 +01:00
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
service_handle_intro_established(origin_circuit_t *circ,
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t *payload,
|
|
|
|
size_t payload_len)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
hs_service_t *service = NULL;
|
|
|
|
hs_service_intro_point_t *ip = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(circ);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(payload);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-08 18:08:03 +01:00
|
|
|
/* We need the service and intro point for this cell. */
|
|
|
|
get_objects_from_ident(circ->hs_ident, &service, &ip, NULL);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-07 20:33:03 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Get service object from the circuit identifier. */
|
|
|
|
if (service == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
log_warn(LD_REND, "Unknown service identity key %s on the introduction "
|
2017-03-08 18:08:03 +01:00
|
|
|
"circuit %u. Can't find onion service.",
|
2017-03-07 20:33:03 +01:00
|
|
|
safe_str_client(ed25519_fmt(&circ->hs_ident->identity_pk)),
|
|
|
|
TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ip == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
/* We don't recognize the key. */
|
|
|
|
log_warn(LD_REND, "Introduction circuit established without an intro "
|
|
|
|
"point object on circuit %u for service %s",
|
|
|
|
TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id,
|
|
|
|
safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Try to parse the payload into a cell making sure we do actually have a
|
2017-08-03 15:02:51 +02:00
|
|
|
* valid cell. On success, the ip object and circuit purpose is updated to
|
|
|
|
* reflect the fact that the introduction circuit is established. */
|
2017-03-07 20:33:03 +01:00
|
|
|
if (hs_circ_handle_intro_established(service, ip, circ, payload,
|
|
|
|
payload_len) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Flag that we have an established circuit for this intro point. This value
|
|
|
|
* is what indicates the upload scheduled event if we are ready to build the
|
|
|
|
* intro point into the descriptor and upload. */
|
|
|
|
ip->circuit_established = 1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
log_info(LD_REND, "Successfully received an INTRO_ESTABLISHED cell "
|
|
|
|
"on circuit %u for service %s",
|
|
|
|
TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id,
|
|
|
|
safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-08-03 15:02:51 +02:00
|
|
|
/* We just received an INTRODUCE2 cell on the established introduction circuit
|
|
|
|
* circ. Handle the cell and return 0 on success else a negative value. */
|
2017-03-07 20:57:14 +01:00
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
service_handle_introduce2(origin_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *payload,
|
|
|
|
size_t payload_len)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
hs_service_t *service = NULL;
|
|
|
|
hs_service_intro_point_t *ip = NULL;
|
|
|
|
hs_service_descriptor_t *desc = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(circ);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(payload);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* We'll need every object associated with this circuit. */
|
|
|
|
get_objects_from_ident(circ->hs_ident, &service, &ip, &desc);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Get service object from the circuit identifier. */
|
|
|
|
if (service == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unknown service identity key %s when handling "
|
|
|
|
"an INTRODUCE2 cell on circuit %u",
|
|
|
|
safe_str_client(ed25519_fmt(&circ->hs_ident->identity_pk)),
|
|
|
|
TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ip == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
/* We don't recognize the key. */
|
|
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unknown introduction auth key when handling "
|
|
|
|
"an INTRODUCE2 cell on circuit %u for service %s",
|
|
|
|
TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id,
|
|
|
|
safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If we have an IP object, we MUST have a descriptor object. */
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(desc);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-04-05 18:26:02 +02:00
|
|
|
/* The following will parse, decode and launch the rendezvous point circuit.
|
|
|
|
* Both current and legacy cells are handled. */
|
2017-03-07 20:57:14 +01:00
|
|
|
if (hs_circ_handle_introduce2(service, circ, ip, desc->desc->subcredential,
|
|
|
|
payload, payload_len) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-05-10 17:04:06 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Add to list every filename used by service. This is used by the sandbox
|
|
|
|
* subsystem. */
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
|
service_add_fnames_to_list(const hs_service_t *service, smartlist_t *list)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
const char *s_dir;
|
|
|
|
char fname[128] = {0};
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(service);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(list);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Ease our life. */
|
|
|
|
s_dir = service->config.directory_path;
|
|
|
|
/* The hostname file. */
|
|
|
|
smartlist_add(list, hs_path_from_filename(s_dir, fname_hostname));
|
|
|
|
/* The key files splitted in two. */
|
|
|
|
tor_snprintf(fname, sizeof(fname), "%s_secret_key", fname_keyfile_prefix);
|
|
|
|
smartlist_add(list, hs_path_from_filename(s_dir, fname));
|
|
|
|
tor_snprintf(fname, sizeof(fname), "%s_public_key", fname_keyfile_prefix);
|
|
|
|
smartlist_add(list, hs_path_from_filename(s_dir, fname));
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-08-22 17:38:28 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Return true iff the given service identity key is present on disk. */
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
service_key_on_disk(const char *directory_path)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
char *fname;
|
|
|
|
ed25519_keypair_t *kp = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(directory_path);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Build the v3 key path name and then try to load it. */
|
|
|
|
fname = hs_path_from_filename(directory_path, fname_keyfile_prefix);
|
|
|
|
kp = ed_key_init_from_file(fname, INIT_ED_KEY_SPLIT,
|
|
|
|
LOG_DEBUG, NULL, 0, 0, 0, NULL, NULL);
|
|
|
|
if (kp) {
|
|
|
|
ret = 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ed25519_keypair_free(kp);
|
|
|
|
tor_free(fname);
|
2018-04-13 23:04:31 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* This is a proxy function before actually calling hs_desc_encode_descriptor
|
|
|
|
* because we need some preprocessing here */
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
|
service_encode_descriptor(const hs_service_t *service,
|
|
|
|
const hs_service_descriptor_t *desc,
|
|
|
|
const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_kp,
|
|
|
|
char **encoded_out)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t *descriptor_cookie = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(service);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(desc);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(encoded_out);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* If the client authorization is enabled, send the descriptor cookie to
|
|
|
|
* hs_desc_encode_descriptor. Otherwise, send NULL */
|
|
|
|
if (service->config.is_client_auth_enabled) {
|
|
|
|
descriptor_cookie = desc->descriptor_cookie;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ret = hs_desc_encode_descriptor(desc->desc, signing_kp,
|
|
|
|
descriptor_cookie, encoded_out);
|
|
|
|
|
2018-08-22 17:38:28 +02:00
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-02-03 21:29:31 +01:00
|
|
|
/* ========== */
|
|
|
|
/* Public API */
|
|
|
|
/* ========== */
|
|
|
|
|
2018-04-27 17:14:12 +02:00
|
|
|
/* This is called everytime the service map (v2 or v3) changes that is if an
|
|
|
|
* element is added or removed. */
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
|
hs_service_map_has_changed(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* If we now have services where previously we had not, we need to enable
|
|
|
|
* the HS service main loop event. If we changed to having no services, we
|
|
|
|
* need to disable the event. */
|
|
|
|
rescan_periodic_events(get_options());
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-11-15 20:01:16 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Upload an encoded descriptor in encoded_desc of the given version. This
|
|
|
|
* descriptor is for the service identity_pk and blinded_pk used to setup the
|
|
|
|
* directory connection identifier. It is uploaded to the directory hsdir_rs
|
|
|
|
* routerstatus_t object.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* NOTE: This function does NOT check for PublishHidServDescriptors because it
|
|
|
|
* is only used by the control port command HSPOST outside of this subsystem.
|
|
|
|
* Inside this code, upload_descriptor_to_hsdir() should be used. */
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
|
hs_service_upload_desc_to_dir(const char *encoded_desc,
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t version,
|
|
|
|
const ed25519_public_key_t *identity_pk,
|
|
|
|
const ed25519_public_key_t *blinded_pk,
|
|
|
|
const routerstatus_t *hsdir_rs)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
char version_str[4] = {0};
|
|
|
|
directory_request_t *dir_req;
|
|
|
|
hs_ident_dir_conn_t ident;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(encoded_desc);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(identity_pk);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(blinded_pk);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(hsdir_rs);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Setup the connection identifier. */
|
|
|
|
memset(&ident, 0, sizeof(ident));
|
|
|
|
hs_ident_dir_conn_init(identity_pk, blinded_pk, &ident);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* This is our resource when uploading which is used to construct the URL
|
|
|
|
* with the version number: "/tor/hs/<version>/publish". */
|
|
|
|
tor_snprintf(version_str, sizeof(version_str), "%u", version);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Build the directory request for this HSDir. */
|
|
|
|
dir_req = directory_request_new(DIR_PURPOSE_UPLOAD_HSDESC);
|
|
|
|
directory_request_set_routerstatus(dir_req, hsdir_rs);
|
|
|
|
directory_request_set_indirection(dir_req, DIRIND_ANONYMOUS);
|
|
|
|
directory_request_set_resource(dir_req, version_str);
|
|
|
|
directory_request_set_payload(dir_req, encoded_desc,
|
|
|
|
strlen(encoded_desc));
|
|
|
|
/* The ident object is copied over the directory connection object once
|
|
|
|
* the directory request is initiated. */
|
|
|
|
directory_request_upload_set_hs_ident(dir_req, &ident);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Initiate the directory request to the hsdir.*/
|
|
|
|
directory_initiate_request(dir_req);
|
|
|
|
directory_request_free(dir_req);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-11-09 20:28:22 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Add the ephemeral service using the secret key sk and ports. Both max
|
|
|
|
* streams parameter will be set in the newly created service.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Ownership of sk and ports is passed to this routine. Regardless of
|
|
|
|
* success/failure, callers should not touch these values after calling this
|
|
|
|
* routine, and may assume that correct cleanup has been done on failure.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Return an appropriate hs_service_add_ephemeral_status_t. */
|
|
|
|
hs_service_add_ephemeral_status_t
|
|
|
|
hs_service_add_ephemeral(ed25519_secret_key_t *sk, smartlist_t *ports,
|
|
|
|
int max_streams_per_rdv_circuit,
|
|
|
|
int max_streams_close_circuit, char **address_out)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
hs_service_add_ephemeral_status_t ret;
|
|
|
|
hs_service_t *service = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(sk);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(ports);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(address_out);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
service = hs_service_new(get_options());
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Setup the service configuration with specifics. A default service is
|
2018-01-24 09:55:15 +01:00
|
|
|
* HS_VERSION_TWO so explicitly set it. */
|
2017-11-09 20:28:22 +01:00
|
|
|
service->config.version = HS_VERSION_THREE;
|
|
|
|
service->config.max_streams_per_rdv_circuit = max_streams_per_rdv_circuit;
|
|
|
|
service->config.max_streams_close_circuit = !!max_streams_close_circuit;
|
|
|
|
service->config.is_ephemeral = 1;
|
|
|
|
smartlist_free(service->config.ports);
|
|
|
|
service->config.ports = ports;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Handle the keys. */
|
|
|
|
memcpy(&service->keys.identity_sk, sk, sizeof(service->keys.identity_sk));
|
|
|
|
if (ed25519_public_key_generate(&service->keys.identity_pk,
|
|
|
|
&service->keys.identity_sk) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Unable to generate ed25519 public key"
|
|
|
|
"for v3 service.");
|
|
|
|
ret = RSAE_BADPRIVKEY;
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Make sure we have at least one port. */
|
|
|
|
if (smartlist_len(service->config.ports) == 0) {
|
|
|
|
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "At least one VIRTPORT/TARGET must be specified "
|
|
|
|
"for v3 service.");
|
|
|
|
ret = RSAE_BADVIRTPORT;
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-05-23 17:49:02 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Build the onion address for logging purposes but also the control port
|
|
|
|
* uses it for the HS_DESC event. */
|
|
|
|
hs_build_address(&service->keys.identity_pk,
|
|
|
|
(uint8_t) service->config.version,
|
|
|
|
service->onion_address);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-11-09 20:28:22 +01:00
|
|
|
/* The only way the registration can fail is if the service public key
|
|
|
|
* already exists. */
|
|
|
|
if (BUG(register_service(hs_service_map, service) < 0)) {
|
|
|
|
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Onion Service private key collides with an "
|
|
|
|
"existing v3 service.");
|
|
|
|
ret = RSAE_ADDREXISTS;
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
log_info(LD_CONFIG, "Added ephemeral v3 onion service: %s",
|
|
|
|
safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
|
2018-05-23 17:49:02 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*address_out = tor_strdup(service->onion_address);
|
2017-11-09 20:28:22 +01:00
|
|
|
ret = RSAE_OKAY;
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
|
|
hs_service_free(service);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
end:
|
|
|
|
memwipe(sk, 0, sizeof(ed25519_secret_key_t));
|
|
|
|
tor_free(sk);
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* For the given onion address, delete the ephemeral service. Return 0 on
|
|
|
|
* success else -1 on error. */
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
hs_service_del_ephemeral(const char *address)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
uint8_t version;
|
|
|
|
ed25519_public_key_t pk;
|
|
|
|
hs_service_t *service = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(address);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (hs_parse_address(address, &pk, NULL, &version) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Requested malformed v3 onion address for removal.");
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (version != HS_VERSION_THREE) {
|
|
|
|
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Requested version of onion address for removal "
|
|
|
|
"is not supported.");
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
service = find_service(hs_service_map, &pk);
|
|
|
|
if (service == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Requested non-existent v3 hidden service for "
|
|
|
|
"removal.");
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!service->config.is_ephemeral) {
|
|
|
|
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Requested non-ephemeral v3 hidden service for "
|
|
|
|
"removal.");
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Close circuits, remove from map and finally free. */
|
|
|
|
close_service_circuits(service);
|
|
|
|
remove_service(hs_service_map, service);
|
|
|
|
hs_service_free(service);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
log_info(LD_CONFIG, "Removed ephemeral v3 hidden service: %s",
|
|
|
|
safe_str_client(address));
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-11-07 22:00:40 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Using the ed25519 public key pk, find a service for that key and return the
|
|
|
|
* current encoded descriptor as a newly allocated string or NULL if not
|
|
|
|
* found. This is used by the control port subsystem. */
|
|
|
|
char *
|
|
|
|
hs_service_lookup_current_desc(const ed25519_public_key_t *pk)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
const hs_service_t *service;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(pk);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
service = find_service(hs_service_map, pk);
|
|
|
|
if (service && service->desc_current) {
|
|
|
|
char *encoded_desc = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* No matter what is the result (which should never be a failure), return
|
|
|
|
* the encoded variable, if success it will contain the right thing else
|
|
|
|
* it will be NULL. */
|
2018-04-13 23:04:31 +02:00
|
|
|
service_encode_descriptor(service,
|
|
|
|
service->desc_current,
|
2017-11-07 22:00:40 +01:00
|
|
|
&service->desc_current->signing_kp,
|
|
|
|
&encoded_desc);
|
|
|
|
return encoded_desc;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-07-11 17:18:23 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Return the number of service we have configured and usable. */
|
|
|
|
unsigned int
|
|
|
|
hs_service_get_num_services(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (hs_service_map == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return HT_SIZE(hs_service_map);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-05-25 16:28:00 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Called once an introduction circuit is closed. If the circuit doesn't have
|
|
|
|
* a v3 identifier, it is ignored. */
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
|
hs_service_intro_circ_has_closed(origin_circuit_t *circ)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
hs_service_t *service = NULL;
|
|
|
|
hs_service_intro_point_t *ip = NULL;
|
|
|
|
hs_service_descriptor_t *desc = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(circ);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (circ->hs_ident == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
/* This is not a v3 circuit, ignore. */
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
get_objects_from_ident(circ->hs_ident, &service, &ip, &desc);
|
|
|
|
if (service == NULL) {
|
2017-11-09 20:30:20 +01:00
|
|
|
/* This is possible if the circuits are closed and the service is
|
|
|
|
* immediately deleted. */
|
|
|
|
log_info(LD_REND, "Unable to find any hidden service associated "
|
2017-05-25 16:28:00 +02:00
|
|
|
"identity key %s on intro circuit %u.",
|
|
|
|
ed25519_fmt(&circ->hs_ident->identity_pk),
|
|
|
|
TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id);
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ip == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
/* The introduction point object has already been removed probably by our
|
|
|
|
* cleanup process so ignore. */
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Can't have an intro point object without a descriptor. */
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(desc);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Circuit disappeared so make sure the intro point is updated. By
|
|
|
|
* keeping the object in the descriptor, we'll be able to retry. */
|
|
|
|
ip->circuit_established = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
end:
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-05-10 21:04:40 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Given conn, a rendezvous edge connection acting as an exit stream, look up
|
|
|
|
* the hidden service for the circuit circ, and look up the port and address
|
|
|
|
* based on the connection port. Assign the actual connection address.
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* Return 0 on success. Return -1 on failure and the caller should NOT close
|
|
|
|
* the circuit. Return -2 on failure and the caller MUST close the circuit for
|
|
|
|
* security reasons. */
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
hs_service_set_conn_addr_port(const origin_circuit_t *circ,
|
|
|
|
edge_connection_t *conn)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
hs_service_t *service = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(circ);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(conn);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_REND_JOINED);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(circ->hs_ident);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
get_objects_from_ident(circ->hs_ident, &service, NULL, NULL);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (service == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
log_warn(LD_REND, "Unable to find any hidden service associated "
|
|
|
|
"identity key %s on rendezvous circuit %u.",
|
|
|
|
ed25519_fmt(&circ->hs_ident->identity_pk),
|
|
|
|
TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id);
|
|
|
|
/* We want the caller to close the circuit because it's not a valid
|
|
|
|
* service so no danger. Attempting to bruteforce the entire key space by
|
|
|
|
* opening circuits to learn which service is being hosted here is
|
|
|
|
* impractical. */
|
|
|
|
goto err_close;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Enforce the streams-per-circuit limit, and refuse to provide a mapping if
|
|
|
|
* this circuit will exceed the limit. */
|
|
|
|
if (service->config.max_streams_per_rdv_circuit > 0 &&
|
|
|
|
(circ->hs_ident->num_rdv_streams >=
|
|
|
|
service->config.max_streams_per_rdv_circuit)) {
|
|
|
|
#define MAX_STREAM_WARN_INTERVAL 600
|
|
|
|
static struct ratelim_t stream_ratelim =
|
|
|
|
RATELIM_INIT(MAX_STREAM_WARN_INTERVAL);
|
|
|
|
log_fn_ratelim(&stream_ratelim, LOG_WARN, LD_REND,
|
|
|
|
"Maximum streams per circuit limit reached on "
|
|
|
|
"rendezvous circuit %u for service %s. Circuit has "
|
|
|
|
"%" PRIu64 " out of %" PRIu64 " streams. %s.",
|
|
|
|
TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id,
|
|
|
|
service->onion_address,
|
|
|
|
circ->hs_ident->num_rdv_streams,
|
|
|
|
service->config.max_streams_per_rdv_circuit,
|
|
|
|
service->config.max_streams_close_circuit ?
|
|
|
|
"Closing circuit" : "Ignoring open stream request");
|
|
|
|
if (service->config.max_streams_close_circuit) {
|
|
|
|
/* Service explicitly configured to close immediately. */
|
|
|
|
goto err_close;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Exceeding the limit makes tor silently ignore the stream creation
|
|
|
|
* request and keep the circuit open. */
|
|
|
|
goto err_no_close;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Find a virtual port of that service mathcing the one in the connection if
|
2018-01-24 09:55:15 +01:00
|
|
|
* successful, set the address in the connection. */
|
2017-05-10 21:04:40 +02:00
|
|
|
if (hs_set_conn_addr_port(service->config.ports, conn) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
log_info(LD_REND, "No virtual port mapping exists for port %d for "
|
|
|
|
"hidden service %s.",
|
|
|
|
TO_CONN(conn)->port, service->onion_address);
|
|
|
|
if (service->config.allow_unknown_ports) {
|
|
|
|
/* Service explicitly allow connection to unknown ports so close right
|
|
|
|
* away because we do not care about port mapping. */
|
|
|
|
goto err_close;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If the service didn't explicitly allow it, we do NOT close the circuit
|
|
|
|
* here to raise the bar in terms of performance for port mapping. */
|
|
|
|
goto err_no_close;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Success. */
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
err_close:
|
|
|
|
/* Indicate the caller that the circuit should be closed. */
|
|
|
|
return -2;
|
|
|
|
err_no_close:
|
|
|
|
/* Indicate the caller to NOT close the circuit. */
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-09-12 13:40:19 +02:00
|
|
|
/** Does the service with identity pubkey <b>pk</b> export the circuit IDs of
|
|
|
|
* its clients? */
|
2018-09-15 15:33:31 +02:00
|
|
|
hs_circuit_id_protocol_t
|
2018-09-12 13:40:19 +02:00
|
|
|
hs_service_exports_circuit_id(const ed25519_public_key_t *pk)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
hs_service_t *service = find_service(hs_service_map, pk);
|
|
|
|
if (!service) {
|
2018-09-15 15:33:31 +02:00
|
|
|
return HS_CIRCUIT_ID_PROTOCOL_NONE;
|
2018-09-12 13:40:19 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-09-15 15:33:31 +02:00
|
|
|
return service->config.circuit_id_protocol;
|
2018-09-12 13:40:19 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-05-10 17:04:06 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Add to file_list every filename used by a configured hidden service, and to
|
|
|
|
* dir_list every directory path used by a configured hidden service. This is
|
|
|
|
* used by the sandbox subsystem to whitelist those. */
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
|
hs_service_lists_fnames_for_sandbox(smartlist_t *file_list,
|
|
|
|
smartlist_t *dir_list)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(file_list);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(dir_list);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Add files and dirs for legacy services. */
|
|
|
|
rend_services_add_filenames_to_lists(file_list, dir_list);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Add files and dirs for v3+. */
|
|
|
|
FOR_EACH_SERVICE_BEGIN(service) {
|
|
|
|
/* Skip ephemeral service, they don't touch the disk. */
|
|
|
|
if (service->config.is_ephemeral) {
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
service_add_fnames_to_list(service, file_list);
|
|
|
|
smartlist_add_strdup(dir_list, service->config.directory_path);
|
2018-08-18 07:28:12 +02:00
|
|
|
smartlist_add_strdup(dir_list, dname_client_pubkeys);
|
2017-05-10 17:04:06 +02:00
|
|
|
} FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_END;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-04-19 21:27:11 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Called when our internal view of the directory has changed. We might have
|
2017-08-30 14:34:02 +02:00
|
|
|
* received a new batch of descriptors which might affect the shape of the
|
|
|
|
* HSDir hash ring. Signal that we should reexamine the hash ring and
|
|
|
|
* re-upload our HS descriptors if needed. */
|
2017-04-19 21:27:11 +02:00
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
|
hs_service_dir_info_changed(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2017-09-12 17:02:40 +02:00
|
|
|
if (hs_service_get_num_services() > 0) {
|
|
|
|
/* New directory information usually goes every consensus so rate limit
|
|
|
|
* every 30 minutes to not be too conservative. */
|
|
|
|
static struct ratelim_t dir_info_changed_ratelim = RATELIM_INIT(30 * 60);
|
|
|
|
log_fn_ratelim(&dir_info_changed_ratelim, LOG_INFO, LD_REND,
|
|
|
|
"New dirinfo arrived: consider reuploading descriptor");
|
|
|
|
consider_republishing_hs_descriptors = 1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2017-04-19 21:27:11 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-07 20:57:14 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Called when we get an INTRODUCE2 cell on the circ. Respond to the cell and
|
|
|
|
* launch a circuit to the rendezvous point. */
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
hs_service_receive_introduce2(origin_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *payload,
|
|
|
|
size_t payload_len)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int ret = -1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(circ);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(payload);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Do some initial validation and logging before we parse the cell */
|
|
|
|
if (TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO) {
|
|
|
|
log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Received an INTRODUCE2 cell on a "
|
|
|
|
"non introduction circuit of purpose %d",
|
|
|
|
TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose);
|
|
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-07-31 12:27:16 +02:00
|
|
|
if (circ->hs_ident) {
|
|
|
|
ret = service_handle_introduce2(circ, payload, payload_len);
|
2018-01-23 11:31:06 +01:00
|
|
|
hs_stats_note_introduce2_cell(1);
|
2017-07-31 12:27:16 +02:00
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
ret = rend_service_receive_introduction(circ, payload, payload_len);
|
2018-01-23 11:31:06 +01:00
|
|
|
hs_stats_note_introduce2_cell(0);
|
2017-07-31 12:27:16 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-07 20:57:14 +01:00
|
|
|
done:
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-07 20:33:03 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Called when we get an INTRO_ESTABLISHED cell. Mark the circuit as an
|
|
|
|
* established introduction point. Return 0 on success else a negative value
|
|
|
|
* and the circuit is closed. */
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
hs_service_receive_intro_established(origin_circuit_t *circ,
|
|
|
|
const uint8_t *payload,
|
|
|
|
size_t payload_len)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int ret = -1;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(circ);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(payload);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO) {
|
|
|
|
log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Received an INTRO_ESTABLISHED cell on a "
|
|
|
|
"non introduction circuit of purpose %d",
|
|
|
|
TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose);
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Handle both version. v2 uses rend_data and v3 uses the hs circuit
|
|
|
|
* identifier hs_ident. Can't be both. */
|
2017-07-31 12:27:16 +02:00
|
|
|
if (circ->hs_ident) {
|
|
|
|
ret = service_handle_intro_established(circ, payload, payload_len);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
ret = rend_service_intro_established(circ, payload, payload_len);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-03-07 20:33:03 +01:00
|
|
|
if (ret < 0) {
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
|
|
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL);
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-02-21 20:20:39 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Called when any kind of hidden service circuit is done building thus
|
|
|
|
* opened. This is the entry point from the circuit subsystem. */
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
|
hs_service_circuit_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circ)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(circ);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Handle both version. v2 uses rend_data and v3 uses the hs circuit
|
|
|
|
* identifier hs_ident. Can't be both. */
|
|
|
|
switch (TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose) {
|
|
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO:
|
2017-07-31 12:27:16 +02:00
|
|
|
if (circ->hs_ident) {
|
|
|
|
service_intro_circ_has_opened(circ);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2017-08-04 21:02:28 +02:00
|
|
|
rend_service_intro_has_opened(circ);
|
2017-07-31 12:27:16 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2017-02-21 20:20:39 +01:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND:
|
2017-07-31 12:27:16 +02:00
|
|
|
if (circ->hs_ident) {
|
|
|
|
service_rendezvous_circ_has_opened(circ);
|
|
|
|
} else {
|
2017-08-04 21:02:28 +02:00
|
|
|
rend_service_rendezvous_has_opened(circ);
|
2017-07-31 12:27:16 +02:00
|
|
|
}
|
2017-02-21 20:20:39 +01:00
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(0);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-08-22 17:38:28 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Return the service version by looking at the key in the service directory.
|
|
|
|
* If the key is not found or unrecognized, -1 is returned. Else, the service
|
|
|
|
* version is returned. */
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
hs_service_get_version_from_key(const hs_service_t *service)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
int version = -1; /* Unknown version. */
|
|
|
|
const char *directory_path;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(service);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* We'll try to load the key for version 3. If not found, we'll try version
|
2018-08-28 14:36:28 +02:00
|
|
|
* 2 and if not found, we'll send back an unknown version (-1). */
|
2018-08-22 17:38:28 +02:00
|
|
|
directory_path = service->config.directory_path;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Version 3 check. */
|
|
|
|
if (service_key_on_disk(directory_path)) {
|
|
|
|
version = HS_VERSION_THREE;
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Version 2 check. */
|
|
|
|
if (rend_service_key_on_disk(directory_path)) {
|
|
|
|
version = HS_VERSION_TWO;
|
|
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
end:
|
|
|
|
return version;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-02-01 15:18:58 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Load and/or generate keys for all onion services including the client
|
|
|
|
* authorization if any. Return 0 on success, -1 on failure. */
|
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
|
hs_service_load_all_keys(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* Load v2 service keys if we have v2. */
|
2017-07-10 17:31:51 +02:00
|
|
|
if (rend_num_services() != 0) {
|
2017-02-01 15:18:58 +01:00
|
|
|
if (rend_service_load_all_keys(NULL) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Load or/and generate them for v3+. */
|
|
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(hs_service_staging_list, hs_service_t *, service) {
|
|
|
|
/* Ignore ephemeral service, they already have their keys set. */
|
|
|
|
if (service->config.is_ephemeral) {
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
log_info(LD_REND, "Loading v3 onion service keys from %s",
|
|
|
|
service_escaped_dir(service));
|
|
|
|
if (load_service_keys(service) < 0) {
|
|
|
|
goto err;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(service);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Final step, the staging list contains service in a quiescent state that
|
|
|
|
* is ready to be used. Register them to the global map. Once this is over,
|
|
|
|
* the staging list will be cleaned up. */
|
|
|
|
register_all_services();
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* All keys have been loaded successfully. */
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-01-13 22:00:07 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Put all service object in the given service list. After this, the caller
|
|
|
|
* looses ownership of every elements in the list and responsible to free the
|
|
|
|
* list pointer. */
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
|
hs_service_stage_services(const smartlist_t *service_list)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(service_list);
|
|
|
|
/* This list is freed at registration time but this function can be called
|
|
|
|
* multiple time. */
|
|
|
|
if (hs_service_staging_list == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
hs_service_staging_list = smartlist_new();
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Add all service object to our staging list. Caller is responsible for
|
|
|
|
* freeing the service_list. */
|
|
|
|
smartlist_add_all(hs_service_staging_list, service_list);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-01-16 19:19:44 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Allocate and initilize a service object. The service configuration will
|
|
|
|
* contain the default values. Return the newly allocated object pointer. This
|
|
|
|
* function can't fail. */
|
|
|
|
hs_service_t *
|
|
|
|
hs_service_new(const or_options_t *options)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
hs_service_t *service = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(hs_service_t));
|
|
|
|
/* Set default configuration value. */
|
|
|
|
set_service_default_config(&service->config, options);
|
|
|
|
/* Set the default service version. */
|
2017-07-13 14:51:14 +02:00
|
|
|
service->config.version = HS_SERVICE_DEFAULT_VERSION;
|
2017-04-06 20:58:13 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Allocate the CLIENT_PK replay cache in service state. */
|
|
|
|
service->state.replay_cache_rend_cookie =
|
|
|
|
replaycache_new(REND_REPLAY_TIME_INTERVAL, REND_REPLAY_TIME_INTERVAL);
|
2017-09-05 21:52:05 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2017-01-16 19:19:44 +01:00
|
|
|
return service;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Free the given <b>service</b> object and all its content. This function
|
|
|
|
* also takes care of wiping service keys from memory. It is safe to pass a
|
|
|
|
* NULL pointer. */
|
|
|
|
void
|
2017-11-21 15:37:47 +01:00
|
|
|
hs_service_free_(hs_service_t *service)
|
2017-01-16 19:19:44 +01:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (service == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-02-03 21:30:46 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Free descriptors. Go over both descriptor with this loop. */
|
|
|
|
FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_BEGIN(service, desc) {
|
|
|
|
service_descriptor_free(desc);
|
|
|
|
} FOR_EACH_DESCRIPTOR_END;
|
2017-01-16 19:19:44 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Free service configuration. */
|
2017-07-12 17:53:26 +02:00
|
|
|
service_clear_config(&service->config);
|
2017-01-16 19:19:44 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2017-04-06 20:58:13 +02:00
|
|
|
/* Free replay cache from state. */
|
|
|
|
if (service->state.replay_cache_rend_cookie) {
|
|
|
|
replaycache_free(service->state.replay_cache_rend_cookie);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-01-16 19:19:44 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Wipe service keys. */
|
|
|
|
memwipe(&service->keys.identity_sk, 0, sizeof(service->keys.identity_sk));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
tor_free(service);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-02-03 21:29:31 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Periodic callback. Entry point from the main loop to the HS service
|
|
|
|
* subsystem. This is call every second. This is skipped if tor can't build a
|
|
|
|
* circuit or the network is disabled. */
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
|
hs_service_run_scheduled_events(time_t now)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* First thing we'll do here is to make sure our services are in a
|
|
|
|
* quiescent state for the scheduled events. */
|
|
|
|
run_housekeeping_event(now);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Order matters here. We first make sure the descriptor object for each
|
|
|
|
* service contains the latest data. Once done, we check if we need to open
|
|
|
|
* new introduction circuit. Finally, we try to upload the descriptor for
|
|
|
|
* each service. */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Make sure descriptors are up to date. */
|
|
|
|
run_build_descriptor_event(now);
|
|
|
|
/* Make sure services have enough circuits. */
|
|
|
|
run_build_circuit_event(now);
|
|
|
|
/* Upload the descriptors if needed/possible. */
|
|
|
|
run_upload_descriptor_event(now);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-01-16 19:29:03 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Initialize the service HS subsystem. */
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
|
hs_service_init(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
2017-01-13 22:00:07 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Should never be called twice. */
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(!hs_service_map);
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(!hs_service_staging_list);
|
|
|
|
|
2017-06-29 17:18:24 +02:00
|
|
|
/* v2 specific. */
|
|
|
|
rend_service_init();
|
|
|
|
|
2017-01-13 22:00:07 +01:00
|
|
|
hs_service_map = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(struct hs_service_ht));
|
|
|
|
HT_INIT(hs_service_ht, hs_service_map);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
hs_service_staging_list = smartlist_new();
|
2017-01-16 19:29:03 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-01-13 22:00:07 +01:00
|
|
|
/* Release all global storage of the hidden service subsystem. */
|
2017-01-16 19:19:44 +01:00
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
|
hs_service_free_all(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
rend_service_free_all();
|
2017-01-13 22:00:07 +01:00
|
|
|
service_free_all();
|
2017-01-16 19:19:44 +01:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-01-17 18:09:54 +01:00
|
|
|
#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Return the global service map size. Only used by unit test. */
|
|
|
|
STATIC unsigned int
|
|
|
|
get_hs_service_map_size(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return HT_SIZE(hs_service_map);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Return the staging list size. Only used by unit test. */
|
|
|
|
STATIC int
|
|
|
|
get_hs_service_staging_list_size(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return smartlist_len(hs_service_staging_list);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-02-02 21:26:04 +01:00
|
|
|
STATIC hs_service_ht *
|
|
|
|
get_hs_service_map(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
return hs_service_map;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
STATIC hs_service_t *
|
|
|
|
get_first_service(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
hs_service_t **obj = HT_START(hs_service_ht, hs_service_map);
|
|
|
|
if (obj == NULL) {
|
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return *obj;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2017-09-15 22:24:44 +02:00
|
|
|
#endif /* defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS) */
|