HSv3: Add subcredential in client auth KDF on the service-side.

Also update some client auth test vectors that broke...
This commit is contained in:
George Kadianakis 2018-09-06 16:07:27 +03:00 committed by David Goulet
parent c76d00abfa
commit 1e9428dc61
3 changed files with 32 additions and 12 deletions

View File

@ -2851,11 +2851,12 @@ hs_desc_build_fake_authorized_client(void)
return client_auth;
}
/* Using the client public key, auth ephemeral secret key, and descriptor
* cookie, build the auth client so we can then encode the descriptor for
* publication. client_out must be already allocated. */
/* Using the service's subcredential, client public key, auth ephemeral secret
* key, and descriptor cookie, build the auth client so we can then encode the
* descriptor for publication. client_out must be already allocated. */
void
hs_desc_build_authorized_client(const curve25519_public_key_t *client_auth_pk,
hs_desc_build_authorized_client(const uint8_t *subcredential,
const curve25519_public_key_t *client_auth_pk,
const curve25519_secret_key_t *
auth_ephemeral_sk,
const uint8_t *descriptor_cookie,
@ -2871,20 +2872,24 @@ hs_desc_build_authorized_client(const curve25519_public_key_t *client_auth_pk,
tor_assert(auth_ephemeral_sk);
tor_assert(descriptor_cookie);
tor_assert(client_out);
tor_assert(subcredential);
tor_assert(!tor_mem_is_zero((char *) auth_ephemeral_sk,
sizeof(*auth_ephemeral_sk)));
tor_assert(!tor_mem_is_zero((char *) client_auth_pk,
sizeof(*client_auth_pk)));
tor_assert(!tor_mem_is_zero((char *) descriptor_cookie,
HS_DESC_DESCRIPTOR_COOKIE_LEN));
tor_assert(!tor_mem_is_zero((char *) subcredential,
DIGEST256_LEN));
/* Calculate x25519(hs_y, client_X) */
curve25519_handshake(secret_seed,
auth_ephemeral_sk,
client_auth_pk);
/* Calculate KEYS = KDF(SECRET_SEED, 40) */
/* Calculate KEYS = KDF(subcredential | SECRET_SEED, 40) */
xof = crypto_xof_new();
crypto_xof_add_bytes(xof, subcredential, DIGEST256_LEN);
crypto_xof_add_bytes(xof, secret_seed, sizeof(secret_seed));
crypto_xof_squeeze_bytes(xof, keystream, sizeof(keystream));
crypto_xof_free(xof);

View File

@ -1744,10 +1744,18 @@ build_service_desc_superencrypted(const hs_service_t *service,
/* The ephemeral key pair is already generated, so this should not give
* an error. */
if (BUG(!curve25519_public_key_is_ok(&desc->auth_ephemeral_kp.pubkey))) {
return -1;
}
memcpy(&superencrypted->auth_ephemeral_pubkey,
&desc->auth_ephemeral_kp.pubkey,
sizeof(curve25519_public_key_t));
/* Test that subcred is not zero because we might use it below */
if (BUG(tor_mem_is_zero((char*)desc->desc->subcredential, DIGEST256_LEN))) {
return -1;
}
/* Create a smartlist to store clients */
superencrypted->clients = smartlist_new();
@ -1761,7 +1769,8 @@ build_service_desc_superencrypted(const hs_service_t *service,
/* Prepare the client for descriptor and then add to the list in the
* superencrypted part of the descriptor */
hs_desc_build_authorized_client(&client->client_pk,
hs_desc_build_authorized_client(desc->desc->subcredential,
&client->client_pk,
&desc->auth_ephemeral_kp.seckey,
desc->descriptor_cookie, desc_client);
smartlist_add(superencrypted->clients, desc_client);

View File

@ -400,12 +400,16 @@ test_decode_descriptor(void *arg)
memcpy(&desc->superencrypted_data.auth_ephemeral_pubkey,
&auth_ephemeral_kp.pubkey, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
hs_helper_get_subcred_from_identity_keypair(&signing_kp,
subcredential);
/* Build and add the auth client to the descriptor. */
clients = desc->superencrypted_data.clients;
if (!clients) {
clients = smartlist_new();
}
hs_desc_build_authorized_client(&client_kp.pubkey,
hs_desc_build_authorized_client(subcredential,
&client_kp.pubkey,
&auth_ephemeral_kp.seckey,
descriptor_cookie, client);
smartlist_add(clients, client);
@ -418,8 +422,6 @@ test_decode_descriptor(void *arg)
desc->superencrypted_data.clients = clients;
/* Test the encoding/decoding in the following lines. */
hs_helper_get_subcred_from_identity_keypair(&signing_kp,
subcredential);
tor_free(encoded);
ret = hs_desc_encode_descriptor(desc, &signing_kp,
descriptor_cookie, &encoded);
@ -874,6 +876,7 @@ test_build_authorized_client(void *arg)
"07d087f1d8c68393721f6e70316d3b29";
const char client_pubkey_b16[] =
"8c1298fa6050e372f8598f6deca32e27b0ad457741422c2629ebb132cf7fae37";
uint8_t subcredential[DIGEST256_LEN];
char *mem_op_hex_tmp=NULL;
(void) arg;
@ -885,6 +888,8 @@ test_build_authorized_client(void *arg)
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
curve25519_public_key_generate(&client_auth_pk, &client_auth_sk);
memset(subcredential, 42, sizeof(subcredential));
desc_client = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(hs_desc_authorized_client_t));
base16_decode((char *) &auth_ephemeral_sk,
@ -904,15 +909,16 @@ test_build_authorized_client(void *arg)
MOCK(crypto_strongest_rand, mock_crypto_strongest_rand);
hs_desc_build_authorized_client(&client_auth_pk, &auth_ephemeral_sk,
hs_desc_build_authorized_client(subcredential,
&client_auth_pk, &auth_ephemeral_sk,
descriptor_cookie, desc_client);
test_memeq_hex((char *) desc_client->client_id,
"b514ef67192cad5f");
"EC19B7FF4D2DDA13");
test_memeq_hex((char *) desc_client->iv,
"01010101010101010101010101010101");
test_memeq_hex((char *) desc_client->encrypted_cookie,
"46860a9df37b9f6d708E0D7E730C10C1");
"B21222BE13F385F355BD07B2381F9F29");
done:
tor_free(desc_client);