This is a _subtle_ bug introduced by d1494d14, which resolved
connections that was allocated in the extorport/handshake test. So
how did the connection get freed? Our test was set up so that every
extorport connection would get the same ext_or_id. Two connections
couldn't have the same ext_or_id, and if they did, one would get
freed. This meant that the _next_ connection to be constructed in
the test would cause the previous connection to become closeable,
even if it hadn't been closeable before.
But when we applied d149d14, we stopped making it so our code
enforced this uniqueness, and thereby make it so we _weren't_
freeing this connection in the tests.
Closes#40260; bug not in any released version of Tor.
Generates the compile_commands.json file using the "bear" application so the
ccls server can be more efficient with our code base.
Closes#40227
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
This step happens after we make each consensus flavor, and before we
worry about sigs or anything. That way if Tor crashes, or if we fail to
get enough sigs, we still have a chance to know what consensus we wanted
to make.
This validation was only done if DisableNetwork was off because we would use
the global list of transports/bridges and DisableNetwork would not populate
it.
This was a problem for any user using DisableNetwork which includes Tor
Browser and thus leading to the Bug() warning.
Without a more in depth refactoring, we can't do this validation without the
global list.
The previous commit makes it that any connection to a bridge without a
transport won't happen thus we keep the security feature of not connecting to
a bridge without its corresponding transport.
Related to #40106
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Don't pick the bridge as the guard or launch descriptor fetch if no transport
is found.
Fixes#40106
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
This patch limits the number of items in the consensus diff cache to 64
on the Windows platform. Hopefully, this will allow us to investigate a
smarter fix while avoiding the situation reported in tor#24857 where
Windows relay operators report Tor using 100% CPU.
See: tor#24857
