Fix spelling mistakes corresponding to ticket #23650

.gitlab-ci.yml

@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ update:
     - ssh-add <(echo "$DEPLOY_KEY")
 
     # For Docker builds disable host key checking. Be aware that by adding that
-    # you are suspectible to man-in-the-middle attacks.
+    # you are susceptible to man-in-the-middle attacks.
     # WARNING: Use this only with the Docker executor, if you use it with shell
     # you will overwrite your user's SSH config.
     - mkdir -p ~/.ssh

ChangeLog

@@ -8267,7 +8267,7 @@ Changes in version 0.2.6.5-rc - 2015-03-18
   o Major bugfixes (pluggable transports):
     - Initialize the extended OR Port authentication cookie before
       launching pluggable transports. This prevents a race condition
-      that occured when server-side pluggable transports would cache the
+      that occurred when server-side pluggable transports would cache the
       authentication cookie before it has been (re)generated. Fixes bug
       15240; bugfix on 0.2.5.1-alpha.
 
@@ -9010,7 +9010,7 @@ Changes in version 0.2.6.2-alpha - 2014-12-31
       some bugs where we would look at (but fortunately, not reveal)
       uninitialized memory on the stack. Fixes bug 14013; bugfix on all
       versions of Tor.
-    - Clear all memory targetted by tor_addr_{to,from}_sockaddr(), not
+    - Clear all memory targeted by tor_addr_{to,from}_sockaddr(), not
       just the part that's used. This makes it harder for data leak bugs
       to occur in the event of other programming failures. Resolves
       ticket 14041.
@@ -10153,7 +10153,7 @@ Changes in version 0.2.5.5-alpha - 2014-06-18
       directory authority options, remove the documentation for a
       V2-directory fetching option that no longer exists. Resolves
       ticket 11634.
-    - Correct the documenation so that it lists the correct directory
+    - Correct the documentation so that it lists the correct directory
       for the stats files. (They are in a subdirectory called "stats",
       not "status".)
     - In the manpage, move more authority-only options into the
@@ -11438,7 +11438,7 @@ Changes in version 0.2.5.1-alpha - 2013-10-02
       from Arlo Breault.
     - Remove instances of strcpy() from the unit tests. They weren't
       hurting anything, since they were only in the unit tests, but it's
-      embarassing to have strcpy() in the code at all, and some analysis
+      embarrassing to have strcpy() in the code at all, and some analysis
       tools don't like it. Fixes bug 8790; bugfix on 0.2.3.6-alpha and
       0.2.3.8-alpha. Patch from Arlo Breault.
 
@@ -11539,7 +11539,7 @@ Changes in version 0.2.4.16-rc - 2013-08-10
       0.2.4.15-rc. Found by stem integration tests.
 
   o Minor bugfixes:
-    - Fix an invalid memory read that occured when a pluggable
+    - Fix an invalid memory read that occurred when a pluggable
       transport proxy failed its configuration protocol.
       Fixes bug 9288; bugfix on 0.2.4.1-alpha.
     - When evaluating whether to use a connection that we haven't
@@ -14330,7 +14330,7 @@ Changes in version 0.2.3.11-alpha - 2012-01-22
       CloseHSServiceRendCircuitsImmediatelyOnTimeout option. Fixes the
       remaining part of bug 1297; bugfix on 0.2.2.2-alpha.
     - Make sure we never mark the wrong rendezvous circuit as having
-      had its introduction cell acknowleged by the introduction-point
+      had its introduction cell acknowledged by the introduction-point
       relay. Previously, when we received an INTRODUCE_ACK cell on a
       client-side hidden-service introduction circuit, we might have
       marked a rendezvous circuit other than the one we specified in
@@ -15637,7 +15637,7 @@ Changes in version 0.2.3.3-alpha - 2011-09-01
       raised by bug 3898.
     - The "--quiet" and "--hush" options now apply not only to Tor's
       behavior before logs are configured, but also to Tor's behavior in
-      the absense of configured logs. Fixes bug 3550; bugfix on
+      the absence of configured logs. Fixes bug 3550; bugfix on
       0.2.0.10-alpha.
 
   o Minor bugfixes (also part of 0.2.2.31-rc):
@@ -18138,7 +18138,7 @@ Changes in version 0.2.2.8-alpha - 2010-01-26
   please upgrade.
 
   o Major bugfixes:
-    - Fix a memory corruption bug on bridges that occured during the
+    - Fix a memory corruption bug on bridges that occurred during the
       inclusion of stats data in extra-info descriptors. Also fix the
       interface for geoip_get_bridge_stats* to prevent similar bugs in
       the future. Diagnosis by Tas, patch by Karsten and Sebastian.
@@ -18552,7 +18552,7 @@ Changes in version 0.2.2.2-alpha - 2009-09-21
       to EDGE and find out if the build-time data in the .tor/state gets
       reset without loss of Tor usability. You should also see a notice
       log message telling you that Tor has reset its timeout.
-    - Directory authorities can now vote on arbitary integer values as
+    - Directory authorities can now vote on arbitrary integer values as
       part of the consensus process. This is designed to help set
       network-wide parameters. Implements proposal 167.
     - Tor now reads the "circwindow" parameter out of the consensus,
@@ -21580,7 +21580,7 @@ Changes in version 0.2.0.9-alpha - 2007-10-24
     - Distinguish between detached signatures for the wrong period, and
       detached signatures for a divergent vote.
     - Fix a small memory leak when computing a consensus.
-    - When there's no concensus, we were forming a vote every 30
+    - When there's no consensus, we were forming a vote every 30
       minutes, but writing the "valid-after" line in our vote based
       on our configured V3AuthVotingInterval: so unless the intervals
       matched up, we immediately rejected our own vote because it didn't
@@ -24967,7 +24967,7 @@ Changes in version 0.1.0.9-rc - 2005-06-09
       KeepalivePeriod, ClientOnly, NoPublish, HttpProxy, HttpsProxy,
       HttpProxyAuthenticator
     - Stop warning about sigpipes in the logs. We're going to
-      pretend that getting these occassionally is normal and fine.
+      pretend that getting these occasionally is normal and fine.
     - Resolve OS X installer bugs: stop claiming to be 0.0.9.2 in
       certain
       installer screens; and don't put stuff into StartupItems unless
@@ -25432,7 +25432,7 @@ Changes in version 0.1.0.1-rc - 2005-03-28
 
 Changes in version 0.0.9.6 - 2005-03-24
   o Bugfixes on 0.0.9.x (crashes and asserts):
-    - Add new end stream reasons to maintainance branch. Fix bug where
+    - Add new end stream reasons to maintenance branch. Fix bug where
       reason (8) could trigger an assert. Prevent bug from recurring.
     - Apparently win32 stat wants paths to not end with a slash.
     - Fix assert triggers in assert_cpath_layer_ok(), where we were

ReleaseNotes

@@ -6476,7 +6476,7 @@ Changes in version 0.2.6.6 - 2015-03-24
   o Major bugfixes (pluggable transports):
     - Initialize the extended OR Port authentication cookie before
       launching pluggable transports. This prevents a race condition
-      that occured when server-side pluggable transports would cache the
+      that occurred when server-side pluggable transports would cache the
       authentication cookie before it has been (re)generated. Fixes bug
       15240; bugfix on 0.2.5.1-alpha.
 
@@ -6949,7 +6949,7 @@ Changes in version 0.2.6.6 - 2015-03-24
       some bugs where we would look at (but fortunately, not reveal)
       uninitialized memory on the stack. Fixes bug 14013; bugfix on all
       versions of Tor.
-    - Clear all memory targetted by tor_addr_{to,from}_sockaddr(), not
+    - Clear all memory targeted by tor_addr_{to,from}_sockaddr(), not
       just the part that's used. This makes it harder for data leak bugs
       to occur in the event of other programming failures. Resolves
       ticket 14041.
@@ -8126,7 +8126,7 @@ Changes in version 0.2.5.10 - 2014-10-24
       from Arlo Breault.
     - Remove instances of strcpy() from the unit tests. They weren't
       hurting anything, since they were only in the unit tests, but it's
-      embarassing to have strcpy() in the code at all, and some analysis
+      embarrassing to have strcpy() in the code at all, and some analysis
       tools don't like it. Fixes bug 8790; bugfix on 0.2.3.6-alpha and
       0.2.3.8-alpha. Patch from Arlo Breault.
     - Remove is_internal_IP() function. Resolves ticket 4645.
@@ -8150,7 +8150,7 @@ Changes in version 0.2.5.10 - 2014-10-24
       directory authority options, remove the documentation for a
       V2-directory fetching option that no longer exists. Resolves
       ticket 11634.
-    - Correct the documenation so that it lists the correct directory
+    - Correct the documentation so that it lists the correct directory
       for the stats files. (They are in a subdirectory called "stats",
       not "status".)
     - In the manpage, move more authority-only options into the
@@ -10293,7 +10293,7 @@ Changes in version 0.2.3.25 - 2012-11-19
       bugfix on 0.2.0.3-alpha.
     - The "--quiet" and "--hush" options now apply not only to Tor's
       behavior before logs are configured, but also to Tor's behavior in
-      the absense of configured logs. Fixes bug 3550; bugfix on
+      the absence of configured logs. Fixes bug 3550; bugfix on
       0.2.0.10-alpha.
     - Change the AllowDotExit rules so they should actually work.
       We now enforce AllowDotExit only immediately after receiving an
@@ -11406,7 +11406,7 @@ Changes in version 0.2.2.32 - 2011-08-27
       algorithms for signatures and resource selection. Newer formats
       are signed with SHA256, with a possibility for moving to a better
       hash algorithm in the future.
-    - Directory authorities can now vote on arbitary integer values as
+    - Directory authorities can now vote on arbitrary integer values as
       part of the consensus process. This is designed to help set
       network-wide parameters. Implements proposal 167.
 
@@ -16595,7 +16595,7 @@ Changes in version 0.1.0.10 - 2005-06-14
     - Use correct errno on win32 if libevent fails.
     - Check and warn about known-bad/slow libevent versions.
     - Stop warning about sigpipes in the logs. We're going to
-      pretend that getting these occassionally is normal and fine.
+      pretend that getting these occasionally is normal and fine.
 
   o New contrib scripts:
     - New experimental script tor/contrib/exitlist: a simple python
@@ -16714,7 +16714,7 @@ Changes in version 0.0.9.7 - 2005-04-01
 
 Changes in version 0.0.9.6 - 2005-03-24
   o Bugfixes on 0.0.9.x (crashes and asserts):
-    - Add new end stream reasons to maintainance branch. Fix bug where
+    - Add new end stream reasons to maintenance branch. Fix bug where
       reason (8) could trigger an assert.  Prevent bug from recurring.
     - Apparently win32 stat wants paths to not end with a slash.
     - Fix assert triggers in assert_cpath_layer_ok(), where we were

configure.ac

@@ -573,7 +573,7 @@ AC_CHECK_FUNCS(
 # Apple messed up when they added two functions functions in Sierra: they
 # forgot to decorate them with appropriate AVAILABLE_MAC_OS_VERSION
 # checks. So we should only probe for those functions if we are sure that we
-# are not targetting OSX 10.11 or earlier.
+# are not targeting OSX 10.11 or earlier.
 AC_MSG_CHECKING([for a pre-Sierra OSX build target])
 AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
 #ifdef __APPLE__

contrib/operator-tools/linux-tor-prio.sh

@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ RATE_UP=5000
 # machine does any other network activity. That is not very fun.
 RATE_UP_TOR=1500
 
-# RATE_UP_TOR_CEIL is the maximum rate allowed for all Tor trafic in
+# RATE_UP_TOR_CEIL is the maximum rate allowed for all Tor traffic in
 # kbits/sec.
 RATE_UP_TOR_CEIL=5000
 

doc/HACKING/GettingStartedRust.md

@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ the module calls.  Modules which call fewer other modules are better targets.
 
 Strive to change the C API as little as possible.
 
-We are currently targetting Rust nightly, *for now*. We expect this to change
+We are currently targeting Rust nightly, *for now*. We expect this to change
 moving forward, as we understand more about which nightly features we need. It
 is on our TODO list to try to cultivate good standing with various distro
 maintainers of `rustc` and `cargo`, in order to ensure that whatever version we

doc/HACKING/Tracing.md

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ tracing framework.
 
 ## Basics ###
 
-Event tracing is seperated in two concepts, trace events and a tracer. The
+Event tracing is separated in two concepts, trace events and a tracer. The
 tracing subsystem can be found in `src/trace`. The `events.h` header file is
 the main file that maps the different tracers to trace events.
 

doc/HACKING/android/Simpleperf.md

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ the Android Software Development Kit (SDK) and Native Development Kit
    repository and build an Orbot APK (Android Package) file with
    debugging enabled. Make sure that when you build the native content of
    the Orbot application that you run the `make -C external` command with
-   an additional `DEBUG=1` as paramter to ensure that the Orbot build
+   an additional `DEBUG=1` as parameter to ensure that the Orbot build
    process does not strip the debug symbols from the Tor binary.
 
 2. (Optional) Uninstall and clean-up your old Orbot installation that

doc/tor.1.txt

@@ -2695,7 +2695,7 @@ The following options are used to configure a hidden service.
 [[HiddenServiceMaxStreams]] **HiddenServiceMaxStreams** __N__::
    The maximum number of simultaneous streams (connections) per rendezvous
    circuit. The maximum value allowed is 65535. (Setting this to 0 will allow
-   an unlimited number of simultanous streams.) (Default: 0)
+   an unlimited number of simultaneous streams.) (Default: 0)
 
 [[HiddenServiceMaxStreamsCloseCircuit]] **HiddenServiceMaxStreamsCloseCircuit** **0**|**1**::
    If set to 1, then exceeding **HiddenServiceMaxStreams** will cause the
@@ -3186,7 +3186,7 @@ __CacheDirectory__**/diff-cache**::
     Directory cache only. Holds older consensuses, and diffs from older
     consensuses to the most recent consensus of each type, compressed
     in various ways. Each file contains a set of key-value arguments
-    decribing its contents, followed by a single NUL byte, followed by the
+    describing its contents, followed by a single NUL byte, followed by the
     main file contents.
 
 __DataDirectory__**/bw_accounting**::

scripts/maint/redox.py

@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ def read():
 
 def findline(lines, lineno, ident):
     """Given a list of all the lines in the file (adjusted so 1-indexing works),
-       a line number that ident is alledgedly on, and ident, I figure out
+       a line number that ident is allegedly on, and ident, I figure out
        the line where ident was really declared."""
     lno = lineno
     for lineno in xrange(lineno, 0, -1):

scripts/maint/updateFallbackDirs.py

@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ MAX_FALLBACKS_PER_FAMILY = 7
 
 ## Fallback Bandwidth Requirements
 
-# Any fallback with the Exit flag has its bandwidth multipled by this fraction
+# Any fallback with the Exit flag has its bandwidth multiplied by this fraction
 # to make sure we aren't further overloading exits
 # (Set to 1.0, because we asked that only lightly loaded exits opt-in,
 # and the extra load really isn't that much for large relays.)
@@ -561,7 +561,7 @@ class Candidate(object):
       details['flags'] = []
     if (not 'advertised_bandwidth' in details
         or details['advertised_bandwidth'] is None):
-      # relays without advertised bandwdith have it calculated from their
+      # relays without advertised bandwidth have it calculated from their
       # consensus weight
       details['advertised_bandwidth'] = 0
     if (not 'effective_family' in details
@@ -1595,7 +1595,7 @@ class CandidateList(dict):
                                                 excluded_count, initial_count)
 
   # calculate each fallback's measured bandwidth based on the median
-  # consensus weight to advertised bandwdith ratio
+  # consensus weight to advertised bandwidth ratio
   def calculate_measured_bandwidth(self):
     self.sort_fallbacks_by_cw_to_bw_factor()
     median_fallback = self.fallback_median(True)

src/common/address.c

@@ -1125,7 +1125,7 @@ tor_addr_compare_masked(const tor_addr_t *addr1, const tor_addr_t *addr2,
       case AF_UNIX:
         /* HACKHACKHACKHACKHACK:
          * tor_addr_t doesn't contain a copy of sun_path, so it's not
-         * possible to comapre this at all.
+         * possible to compare this at all.
          *
          * Since the only time we currently actually should be comparing
          * 2 AF_UNIX addresses is when dealing with ISO_CLIENTADDR (which

src/common/compat.c

@@ -2455,7 +2455,7 @@ get_environment(void)
 
 /** Get name of current host and write it to <b>name</b> array, whose
  * length is specified by <b>namelen</b> argument. Return 0 upon
- * successfull completion; otherwise return return -1. (Currently,
+ * successful completion; otherwise return return -1. (Currently,
  * this function is merely a mockable wrapper for POSIX gethostname().)
  */
 MOCK_IMPL(int,

src/common/compat_openssl.h

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
 /**
  * \file compat_openssl.h
  *
- * \brief compatability definitions for working with different openssl forks
+ * \brief compatibility definitions for working with different openssl forks
  **/
 
 #if !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && \

src/common/compat_time.c

@@ -807,7 +807,7 @@ monotime_coarse_absolute_msec(void)
   return monotime_coarse_absolute_nsec() / ONE_MILLION;
 }
 #else
-#define initalized_at_coarse initialized_at
+#define initialized_at_coarse initialized_at
 #endif /* defined(MONOTIME_COARSE_FN_IS_DIFFERENT) */
 
 /**

src/common/crypto.c

@@ -1917,7 +1917,7 @@ crypto_strongest_rand_syscall(uint8_t *out, size_t out_len)
 #elif defined(__linux__) && defined(SYS_getrandom)
   static int getrandom_works = 1; /* Be optimitic about our chances... */
 
-  /* getrandom() isn't as straight foward as getentropy(), and has
+  /* getrandom() isn't as straightforward as getentropy(), and has
    * no glibc wrapper.
    *
    * As far as I can tell from getrandom(2) and the source code, the
@@ -1930,7 +1930,7 @@ crypto_strongest_rand_syscall(uint8_t *out, size_t out_len)
    *
    * We optimistically assume that getrandom() is available and functional
    * because it is the way of the future, and 2 branch mispredicts pale in
-   * comparision to the overheads involved with failing to open
+   * comparison to the overheads involved with failing to open
    * /dev/srandom followed by opening and reading from /dev/urandom.
    */
   if (PREDICT_LIKELY(getrandom_works)) {

src/common/crypto_ed25519.c

@@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ ed25519_public_key_is_zero(const ed25519_public_key_t *pubkey)
 
 /* Return a heap-allocated array that contains <b>msg</b> prefixed by the
  * string <b>prefix_str</b>. Set <b>final_msg_len_out</b> to the size of the
- * final array. If an error occured, return NULL. It's the resonsibility of the
+ * final array. If an error occurred, return NULL. It's the resonsibility of the
  * caller to free the returned array. */
 static uint8_t *
 get_prefixed_msg(const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len,
@@ -259,7 +259,7 @@ get_prefixed_msg(const uint8_t *msg, size_t msg_len,
  * Set <b>signature_out</b> to a signature of the <b>len</b>-byte message
  * <b>msg</b>, using the secret and public key in <b>keypair</b>.
  *
- * Return 0 if we successfuly signed the message, otherwise return -1.
+ * Return 0 if we successfully signed the message, otherwise return -1.
  */
 int
 ed25519_sign(ed25519_signature_t *signature_out,
@@ -529,7 +529,7 @@ ed25519_keypair_blind(ed25519_keypair_t *out,
 /**
  * Given an ed25519 public key in <b>inp</b>, generate a corresponding blinded
  * public key in <b>out</b>, blinded with the 32-byte parameter in
- * <b>param</b>.  Return 0 on sucess, -1 on railure.
+ * <b>param</b>.  Return 0 on success, -1 on railure.
  */
 int
 ed25519_public_blind(ed25519_public_key_t *out,
@@ -719,7 +719,7 @@ ed25519_impl_spot_check,(void))
     return -1;
 
   /* XXX/yawning: Someone that's more paranoid than I am, can write "Assume
-   * ref0 is cannonical, and fuzz impl against it" if they want, but I doubt
+   * ref0 is canonical, and fuzz impl against it" if they want, but I doubt
    * that will catch anything that the known answer tests won't.
    */
   goto end;
@@ -762,7 +762,7 @@ pick_ed25519_impl(void)
   /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
 }
 
-/* Initialize the Ed25519 implementation. This is neccessary if you're
+/* Initialize the Ed25519 implementation. This is necessary if you're
  * going to use them in a multithreaded setting, and not otherwise. */
 void
 ed25519_init(void)

src/common/crypto_rsa.c

@@ -852,7 +852,7 @@ crypto_pk_get_hashed_fingerprint(crypto_pk_t *pk, char *fp_out)
 /** Given a crypto_pk_t <b>pk</b>, allocate a new buffer containing the
  * Base64 encoding of the DER representation of the private key as a NUL
  * terminated string, and return it via <b>priv_out</b>.  Return 0 on
- * sucess, -1 on failure.
+ * success, -1 on failure.
  *
  * It is the caller's responsibility to sanitize and free the resulting buffer.
  */

src/common/timers.c

@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ struct timeout_cb {
 #define TIMEOUT_CB_OVERRIDE
 /* We're going to support timers that are pretty far out in advance. Making
  * this big can be inefficient, but having a significant number of timers
- * above TIMEOUT_MAX can also be super-inefficent. Choosing 5 here sets
+ * above TIMEOUT_MAX can also be super-inefficient. Choosing 5 here sets
  * timeout_max to 2^30 ticks, or 29 hours with our value for USEC_PER_TICK */
 #define WHEEL_NUM 5
 #include "src/ext/timeouts/timeout.c"

src/common/tortls.c

@@ -1942,7 +1942,7 @@ tor_tls_handshake(tor_tls_t *tls)
   return r;
 }
 
-/** Perform the final part of the intial TLS handshake on <b>tls</b>.  This
+/** Perform the final part of the initial TLS handshake on <b>tls</b>.  This
  * should be called for the first handshake only: it determines whether the v1
  * or the v2 handshake was used, and adjusts things for the renegotiation
  * handshake as appropriate.

src/common/util.c

@@ -3047,7 +3047,7 @@ unescape_string(const char *s, char **result, size_t *size_out)
 
 /** Removes enclosing quotes from <b>path</b> and unescapes quotes between the
  * enclosing quotes. Backslashes are not unescaped. Return the unquoted
- * <b>path</b> on sucess or 0 if <b>path</b> is not quoted correctly. */
+ * <b>path</b> on success or 0 if <b>path</b> is not quoted correctly. */
 char *
 get_unquoted_path(const char *path)
 {
@@ -3898,7 +3898,7 @@ format_number_sigsafe(unsigned long x, char *buf, int buf_len,
  * call it with a signed int and an unsigned char, and since the C standard
  * does not guarantee that an int is wider than a char (an int must be at
  * least 16 bits but it is permitted for a char to be that wide as well), we
- * can't assume a signed int is sufficient to accomodate an unsigned char.
+ * can't assume a signed int is sufficient to accommodate an unsigned char.
  * Thus, format_helper_exit_status() will still need to emit any require '-'
  * on its own.
  *
@@ -3928,7 +3928,7 @@ format_dec_number_sigsafe(unsigned long x, char *buf, int buf_len)
  *
  * The format of <b>hex_errno</b> is: "CHILD_STATE/ERRNO\n", left-padded
  * with spaces. CHILD_STATE indicates where
- * in the processs of starting the child process did the failure occur (see
+ * in the process of starting the child process did the failure occur (see
  * CHILD_STATE_* macros for definition), and SAVED_ERRNO is the value of
  * errno when the failure occurred.
  *

src/ext/ed25519/donna/ed25519_tor.c

@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ ED25519_FN(curved25519_scalarmult_basepoint) (curved25519_key pk, const curved25
 }
 
 /*
-   Tor has a specific idea of how an Ed25519 implementaion should behave.
+   Tor has a specific idea of how an Ed25519 implementation should behave.
    Implement such a beast using the ed25519-donna primitives/internals.
 
     * Private key generation using Tor's CSPRNG.

src/or/bridges.c

@@ -356,7 +356,7 @@ bridge_resolve_conflicts(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port,
 {
   /* Iterate the already-registered bridge list:
 
-     If you find a bridge with the same adress and port, mark it for
+     If you find a bridge with the same address and port, mark it for
      removal. It doesn't make sense to have two active bridges with
      the same IP:PORT. If the bridge in question has a different
      digest or transport than <b>digest</b>/<b>transport_name</b>,

src/or/channel.c

@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@
  * channel_set_cell_handlers(). Currently, this is passed back to the command
  * subsystem which is command_process_cell().
  *
- * NOTE: For now, the seperation between channels and specialized channels
+ * NOTE: For now, the separation between channels and specialized channels
  * (like channeltls) is not that well defined. So the channeltls layer calls
  * channel_process_cell() which originally comes from the connection subsytem.
  * This should be hopefully be fixed with #23993.
@@ -1438,7 +1438,7 @@ channel_clear_remote_end(channel_t *chan)
  *
  * Two possible errors can happen. Either the channel is not opened or the
  * lower layer (specialized channel) failed to write it. In both cases, it is
- * the caller responsability to free the cell.
+ * the caller responsibility to free the cell.
  */
 static int
 write_packed_cell(channel_t *chan, packed_cell_t *cell)
@@ -1514,7 +1514,7 @@ channel_write_packed_cell(channel_t *chan, packed_cell_t *cell)
   ret = write_packed_cell(chan, cell);
 
  end:
-  /* Whatever happens, we free the cell. Either an error occured or the cell
+  /* Whatever happens, we free the cell. Either an error occurred or the cell
    * was put on the connection outbuf, both cases we have ownership of the
    * cell and we free it. */
   packed_cell_free(cell);
@@ -1717,7 +1717,7 @@ channel_listener_change_state(channel_listener_t *chan_l,
   }
 }
 
-/* Maximum number of cells that is allowed to flush at once withing
+/* Maximum number of cells that is allowed to flush at once within
  * channel_flush_some_cells(). */
 #define MAX_CELLS_TO_GET_FROM_CIRCUITS_FOR_UNLIMITED 256
 

src/or/circpathbias.c

@@ -1467,7 +1467,7 @@ pathbias_measure_close_rate(entry_guard_t *guard)
  *
  * XXX: The attempt count transfer stuff here might be done
  * better by keeping separate pending counters that get
- * transfered at circuit close. See ticket #8160.
+ * transferred at circuit close. See ticket #8160.
  */
 static void
 pathbias_scale_close_rates(entry_guard_t *guard)
@@ -1527,7 +1527,7 @@ pathbias_scale_close_rates(entry_guard_t *guard)
  *
  * XXX: The attempt count transfer stuff here might be done
  * better by keeping separate pending counters that get
- * transfered at circuit close. See ticket #8160.
+ * transferred at circuit close. See ticket #8160.
  */
 void
 pathbias_scale_use_rates(entry_guard_t *guard)

src/or/circuitbuild.c

@@ -2223,7 +2223,7 @@ pick_restricted_middle_node(router_crn_flags_t flags,
    * Max number of restricted nodes before we alert the user and try
    * to load balance for them.
    *
-   * The most agressive vanguard design had 16 nodes at layer3.
+   * The most aggressive vanguard design had 16 nodes at layer3.
    * Let's give a small ceiling above that. */
 #define MAX_SANE_RESTRICTED_NODES 20
   /* If the user (or associated tor controller) selected only a few nodes,

src/or/circuitlist.c

@@ -806,9 +806,9 @@ circuit_purpose_to_string(uint8_t purpose)
     case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_INTRO_POINT:
       return "Acting as intro point";
     case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_REND_POINT_WAITING:
-      return "Acting as rendevous (pending)";
+      return "Acting as rendezvous (pending)";
     case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_REND_ESTABLISHED:
-      return "Acting as rendevous (established)";
+      return "Acting as rendezvous (established)";
     case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL:
       return "General-purpose client";
     case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING:

src/or/circuitstats.c

@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ circuit_build_times_disabled_(const or_options_t *options,
 }
 
 /**
- * Retrieve and bounds-check the cbtmaxtimeouts consensus paramter.
+ * Retrieve and bounds-check the cbtmaxtimeouts consensus parameter.
  *
  * Effect: When this many timeouts happen in the last 'cbtrecentcount'
  * circuit attempts, the client should discard all of its history and
@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ circuit_build_times_max_timeouts(void)
 }
 
 /**
- * Retrieve and bounds-check the cbtnummodes consensus paramter.
+ * Retrieve and bounds-check the cbtnummodes consensus parameter.
  *
  * Effect: This value governs how many modes to use in the weighted
  * average calculation of Pareto parameter Xm. A value of 3 introduces
@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ circuit_build_times_default_num_xm_modes(void)
 }
 
 /**
- * Retrieve and bounds-check the cbtmincircs consensus paramter.
+ * Retrieve and bounds-check the cbtmincircs consensus parameter.
  *
  * Effect: This is the minimum number of circuits to build before
  * computing a timeout.
@@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ circuit_build_times_enough_to_compute(const circuit_build_times_t *cbt)
 }
 
 /**
- * Retrieve and bounds-check the cbtquantile consensus paramter.
+ * Retrieve and bounds-check the cbtquantile consensus parameter.
  *
  * Effect: This is the position on the quantile curve to use to set the
  * timeout value. It is a percent (10-99).
@@ -277,7 +277,7 @@ circuit_build_times_quantile_cutoff(void)
 }
 
 /**
- * Retrieve and bounds-check the cbtclosequantile consensus paramter.
+ * Retrieve and bounds-check the cbtclosequantile consensus parameter.
  *
  * Effect: This is the position on the quantile curve to use to set the
  * timeout value to use to actually close circuits. It is a percent
@@ -309,7 +309,7 @@ circuit_build_times_close_quantile(void)
 }
 
 /**
- * Retrieve and bounds-check the cbttestfreq consensus paramter.
+ * Retrieve and bounds-check the cbttestfreq consensus parameter.
  *
  * Effect: Describes how often in seconds to build a test circuit to
  * gather timeout values. Only applies if less than 'cbtmincircs'
@@ -356,7 +356,7 @@ circuit_build_times_min_timeout(void)
 }
 
 /**
- * Retrieve and bounds-check the cbtinitialtimeout consensus paramter.
+ * Retrieve and bounds-check the cbtinitialtimeout consensus parameter.
  *
  * Effect: This is the timeout value to use before computing a timeout,
  * in milliseconds.
@@ -386,7 +386,7 @@ circuit_build_times_initial_timeout(void)
 }
 
 /**
- * Retrieve and bounds-check the cbtrecentcount consensus paramter.
+ * Retrieve and bounds-check the cbtrecentcount consensus parameter.
  *
  * Effect: This is the number of circuit build times to keep track of
  * for deciding if we hit cbtmaxtimeouts and need to reset our state

src/or/circuituse.c

@@ -674,7 +674,7 @@ circuit_expire_building(void)
           break;
         case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING:
           /* That purpose means that the intro point circuit has been opened
-           * succesfully but the INTRODUCE1 cell hasn't been sent yet because
+           * successfully but the INTRODUCE1 cell hasn't been sent yet because
            * the client is waiting for the rendezvous point circuit to open.
            * Keep this circuit open while waiting for the rendezvous circuit.
            * We let the circuit idle timeout take care of cleaning this

src/or/config.c

@@ -3146,7 +3146,7 @@ warn_if_option_path_is_relative(const char *option,
   return 0;
 }
 
-/** Scan <b>options</b> for occurances of relative file/directory
+/** Scan <b>options</b> for occurrences of relative file/directory
  * path and log a warning whenever it is found.
  *
  * Return 1 if there were relative paths; 0 otherwise.

src/or/connection.c

@@ -4250,7 +4250,7 @@ connection_buf_add_buf(connection_t *conn, buf_t *buf)
 
 /* Return a list of connections that aren't close and matches the given type
  * and state. The returned list can be empty and must be freed using
- * smartlist_free(). The caller does NOT have owernship of the objects in the
+ * smartlist_free(). The caller does NOT have ownership of the objects in the
  * list so it must not free them nor reference them as they can disappear. */
 smartlist_t *
 connection_list_by_type_state(int type, int state)
@@ -4260,7 +4260,7 @@ connection_list_by_type_state(int type, int state)
 
 /* Return a list of connections that aren't close and matches the given type
  * and purpose. The returned list can be empty and must be freed using
- * smartlist_free(). The caller does NOT have owernship of the objects in the
+ * smartlist_free(). The caller does NOT have ownership of the objects in the
  * list so it must not free them nor reference them as they can disappear. */
 smartlist_t *
 connection_list_by_type_purpose(int type, int purpose)

src/or/control.c

@@ -4458,11 +4458,11 @@ handle_control_hspost(control_connection_t *conn,
  * used in pk is given to the HS subsystem so the caller must stop accessing
  * it after.
  *
- * The port_cfgs is a list of service port. Ownership transfered to service.
+ * The port_cfgs is a list of service port. Ownership transferred to service.
  * The max_streams refers to the MaxStreams= key.
  * The max_streams_close_circuit refers to the MaxStreamsCloseCircuit key.
  * The auth_type is the authentication type of the clients in auth_clients.
- * The ownership of that list is transfered to the service.
+ * The ownership of that list is transferred to the service.
  *
  * On success (RSAE_OKAY), the address_out points to a newly allocated string
  * containing the onion address without the .onion part. On error, address_out
@@ -4911,7 +4911,7 @@ add_onion_helper_keyarg(const char *arg, int discard_pk,
     goto err;
   }
 
-  /* Succeded in loading or generating a private key. */
+  /* Succeeded in loading or generating a private key. */
   ret = 0;
 
  err:

src/or/directory.c

@@ -1112,7 +1112,7 @@ directory_request_free_(directory_request_t *req)
 /**
  * Set the address and OR port to use for this directory request.  If there is
  * no OR port, we'll have to connect over the dirport.  (If there are both,
- * the indirection setting determins which to use.)
+ * the indirection setting determines which to use.)
  */
 void
 directory_request_set_or_addr_port(directory_request_t *req,
@@ -1123,7 +1123,7 @@ directory_request_set_or_addr_port(directory_request_t *req,
 /**
  * Set the address and dirport to use for this directory request.  If there
  * is no dirport, we'll have to connect over the OR port.  (If there are both,
- * the indirection setting determins which to use.)
+ * the indirection setting determines which to use.)
  */
 void
 directory_request_set_dir_addr_port(directory_request_t *req,
@@ -3413,7 +3413,7 @@ connection_dir_process_inbuf(dir_connection_t *conn)
 }
 
 /** We are closing a dir connection: If <b>dir_conn</b> is a dir connection
- *  that tried to fetch an HS descriptor, check if it successfuly fetched it,
+ *  that tried to fetch an HS descriptor, check if it successfully fetched it,
  *  or if we need to try again. */
 static void
 refetch_hsdesc_if_needed(dir_connection_t *dir_conn)
@@ -4036,7 +4036,7 @@ find_best_diff(const smartlist_t *digests, int flav,
 }
 
 /** Lookup the cached consensus document by the flavor found in <b>flav</b>.
- * The prefered set of compression methods should be listed in the
+ * The preferred set of compression methods should be listed in the
  * <b>compression_methods</b> bitfield. The compression method chosen (if any)
  * is stored in <b>compression_used_out</b>. */
 static struct consensus_cache_entry_t *
@@ -4948,7 +4948,7 @@ handle_get_robots(dir_connection_t *conn, const get_handler_args_t *args)
 
 /* Given the <b>url</b> from a POST request, try to extract the version number
  * using the provided <b>prefix</b>. The version should be after the prefix and
- * ending with the seperator "/". For instance:
+ * ending with the separator "/". For instance:
  *      /tor/hs/3/publish
  *
  * On success, <b>end_pos</b> points to the position right after the version

src/or/dirserv.c

@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@
  * the directory authority functionality.  The directory.c module delegates
  * here in order to handle incoming requests from clients, via
  * connection_dirserv_flushed_some() and its kin.  In order to save RAM, this
- * module is reponsible for spooling directory objects (in whole or in part)
+ * module is responsible for spooling directory objects (in whole or in part)
  * onto buf_t instances, and then closing the dir_connection_t once the
  * objects are totally flushed.
  *
@@ -1086,7 +1086,7 @@ router_is_active(const routerinfo_t *ri, const node_t *node, time_t now)
   if (!node->is_running || !node->is_valid || ri->is_hibernating) {
     return 0;
   }
-  /* Only require bandwith capacity in non-test networks, or
+  /* Only require bandwidth capacity in non-test networks, or
    * if TestingTorNetwork, and TestingMinExitFlagThreshold is non-zero */
   if (!ri->bandwidthcapacity) {
     if (get_options()->TestingTorNetwork) {

src/or/dirserv.h

@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ void dirserv_set_cached_consensus_networkstatus(const char *consensus,
 void dirserv_clear_old_networkstatuses(time_t cutoff);
 int dirserv_get_routerdesc_spool(smartlist_t *spools_out, const char *key,
                                  dir_spool_source_t source,
-                                 int conn_is_encrytped,
+                                 int conn_is_encrypted,
                                  const char **msg_out);
 int dirserv_get_routerdescs(smartlist_t *descs_out, const char *key,
                             const char **msg);

src/or/dirvote.c

@@ -665,7 +665,7 @@ static int
 consensus_method_is_supported(int method)
 {
   if (method == MIN_METHOD_FOR_ED25519_ID_IN_MD) {
-    /* This method was broken due to buggy code accidently left in
+    /* This method was broken due to buggy code accidentally left in
      * dircollate.c; do not actually use it.
      */
     return 0;

src/or/dns.c

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
  *      dns_seems_to_be_broken().
  *    <li>When a client has asked the relay, in a RELAY_BEGIN cell, to connect
  *      to a given server by hostname.  This happens via dns_resolve().
- *    <li>When a client has asked the rela, in a RELAY_RESOLVE cell, to look
+ *    <li>When a client has asked the relay, in a RELAY_RESOLVE cell, to look
  *      up a given server's IP address(es) by hostname. This also happens via
  *      dns_resolve().
  *   </ol>

src/or/hs_cache.c

@@ -702,7 +702,7 @@ cache_clean_v3_as_client(time_t now)
     /* Entry is not in the cache anymore, destroy it. */
     cache_client_desc_free(entry);
     /* Update our OOM. We didn't use the remove() function because we are in
-     * a loop so we have to explicitely decrement. */
+     * a loop so we have to explicitey decrement. */
     rend_cache_decrement_allocation(entry_size);
     /* Logging. */
     {
@@ -805,7 +805,7 @@ hs_cache_purge_as_client(void)
     MAP_DEL_CURRENT(key);
     cache_client_desc_free(entry);
     /* Update our OOM. We didn't use the remove() function because we are in
-     * a loop so we have to explicitely decrement. */
+     * a loop so we have to explicitly decrement. */
     rend_cache_decrement_allocation(entry_size);
   } DIGEST256MAP_FOREACH_END;
 

src/or/hs_client.c

@@ -716,7 +716,7 @@ desc_intro_point_to_extend_info(const hs_desc_intro_point_t *ip)
     smartlist_add(lspecs, lspec);
   } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(desc_lspec);
 
-  /* Explicitely put the direct connection option to 0 because this is client
+  /* Explicitly put the direct connection option to 0 because this is client
    * side and there is no such thing as a non anonymous client. */
   ei = hs_get_extend_info_from_lspecs(lspecs, &ip->onion_key, 0);
 

src/or/hs_config.c

@@ -558,7 +558,7 @@ hs_config_service_all(const or_options_t *options, int validate_only)
   }
 
   /* In non validation mode, we'll stage those services we just successfully
-   * configured. Service ownership is transfered from the list to the global
+   * configured. Service ownership is transferred from the list to the global
    * state. If any service is invalid, it will be removed from the list and
    * freed. All versions are handled in that function. */
   if (!validate_only) {

src/or/hs_descriptor.c

@@ -745,7 +745,7 @@ get_fake_auth_client_lines(void)
 
 /* Create the inner layer of the descriptor (which includes the intro points,
  * etc.). Return a newly-allocated string with the layer plaintext, or NULL if
- * an error occured. It's the responsibility of the caller to free the returned
+ * an error occurred. It's the responsibility of the caller to free the returned
  * string. */
 static char *
 get_inner_encrypted_layer_plaintext(const hs_descriptor_t *desc)
@@ -802,7 +802,7 @@ get_inner_encrypted_layer_plaintext(const hs_descriptor_t *desc)
 /* Create the middle layer of the descriptor, which includes the client auth
  * data and the encrypted inner layer (provided as a base64 string at
  * <b>layer2_b64_ciphertext</b>). Return a newly-allocated string with the
- * layer plaintext, or NULL if an error occured. It's the responsibility of the
+ * layer plaintext, or NULL if an error occurred. It's the responsibility of the
  * caller to free the returned string. */
 static char *
 get_outer_encrypted_layer_plaintext(const hs_descriptor_t *desc,
@@ -1609,7 +1609,7 @@ decode_intro_legacy_key(const directory_token_t *tok,
   /* The check on the expiration date is for the entire lifetime of a
    * certificate which is 24 hours. However, a descriptor has a maximum
    * lifetime of 12 hours meaning we have a 12h difference between the two
-   * which ultimately accomodate the clock skewed client. */
+   * which ultimately accommodate the clock skewed client. */
   if (rsa_ed25519_crosscert_check(ip->legacy.cert.encoded,
                                   ip->legacy.cert.len, ip->legacy.key,
                                   &desc->plaintext_data.signing_pubkey,

src/or/hs_intropoint.c

@@ -424,7 +424,7 @@ validate_introduce1_parsed_cell(const trn_cell_introduce1_t *cell)
 
 /* We just received a non legacy INTRODUCE1 cell on <b>client_circ</b> with
  * the payload in <b>request</b> of size <b>request_len</b>. Return 0 if
- * everything went well, or -1 if an error occured. This function is in charge
+ * everything went well, or -1 if an error occurred. This function is in charge
  * of sending back an INTRODUCE_ACK cell and will close client_circ on error.
  */
 STATIC int

src/or/hs_service.c

@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ static const char address_tld[] = "onion";
 
 /* Staging list of service object. When configuring service, we add them to
  * this list considered a staging area and they will get added to our global
- * map once the keys have been loaded. These two steps are seperated because
+ * map once the keys have been loaded. These two steps are separated because
  * loading keys requires that we are an actual running tor process. */
 static smartlist_t *hs_service_staging_list;
 
@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ find_service(hs_service_ht *map, const ed25519_public_key_t *pk)
 
 /* Register the given service in the given map. If the service already exists
  * in the map, -1 is returned. On success, 0 is returned and the service
- * ownership has been transfered to the global map. */
+ * ownership has been transferred to the global map. */
 STATIC int
 register_service(hs_service_ht *map, hs_service_t *service)
 {
@@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ describe_intro_point(const hs_service_intro_point_t *ip)
 static int32_t
 get_intro_point_min_introduce2(void)
 {
-  /* The [0, 2147483647] range is quite large to accomodate anything we decide
+  /* The [0, 2147483647] range is quite large to accommodate anything we decide
    * in the future. */
   return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "hs_intro_min_introduce2",
                                  INTRO_POINT_MIN_LIFETIME_INTRODUCTIONS,
@@ -266,7 +266,7 @@ get_intro_point_min_introduce2(void)
 static int32_t
 get_intro_point_max_introduce2(void)
 {
-  /* The [0, 2147483647] range is quite large to accomodate anything we decide
+  /* The [0, 2147483647] range is quite large to accommodate anything we decide
    * in the future. */
   return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "hs_intro_max_introduce2",
                                  INTRO_POINT_MAX_LIFETIME_INTRODUCTIONS,
@@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ get_intro_point_min_lifetime(void)
     return MIN_INTRO_POINT_LIFETIME_TESTING;
   }
 
-  /* The [0, 2147483647] range is quite large to accomodate anything we decide
+  /* The [0, 2147483647] range is quite large to accommodate anything we decide
    * in the future. */
   return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "hs_intro_min_lifetime",
                                  INTRO_POINT_LIFETIME_MIN_SECONDS,
@@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ get_intro_point_max_lifetime(void)
     return MAX_INTRO_POINT_LIFETIME_TESTING;
   }
 
-  /* The [0, 2147483647] range is quite large to accomodate anything we decide
+  /* The [0, 2147483647] range is quite large to accommodate anything we decide
    * in the future. */
   return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "hs_intro_max_lifetime",
                                  INTRO_POINT_LIFETIME_MAX_SECONDS,
@@ -1272,7 +1272,7 @@ build_desc_intro_points(const hs_service_t *service,
   } DIGEST256MAP_FOREACH_END;
 }
 
-/* Populate the descriptor encrypted section fomr the given service object.
+/* Populate the descriptor encrypted section from the given service object.
  * This will generate a valid list of introduction points that can be used
  * after for circuit creation. Return 0 on success else -1 on error. */
 static int
@@ -1302,7 +1302,7 @@ build_service_desc_encrypted(const hs_service_t *service,
   return 0;
 }
 
-/* Populare the descriptor plaintext section from the given service object.
+/* Populate the descriptor plaintext section from the given service object.
  * The caller must make sure that the keys in the descriptors are valid that
  * is are non-zero. Return 0 on success else -1 on error. */
 static int
@@ -2978,7 +2978,7 @@ hs_service_add_ephemeral(ed25519_secret_key_t *sk, smartlist_t *ports,
   service = hs_service_new(get_options());
 
   /* Setup the service configuration with specifics. A default service is
-   * HS_VERSION_TWO so explicitely set it. */
+   * HS_VERSION_TWO so explicitly set it. */
   service->config.version = HS_VERSION_THREE;
   service->config.max_streams_per_rdv_circuit = max_streams_per_rdv_circuit;
   service->config.max_streams_close_circuit = !!max_streams_close_circuit;
@@ -3218,7 +3218,7 @@ hs_service_set_conn_addr_port(const origin_circuit_t *circ,
   }
 
   /* Find a virtual port of that service mathcing the one in the connection if
-   * succesful, set the address in the connection. */
+   * successful, set the address in the connection. */
   if (hs_set_conn_addr_port(service->config.ports, conn) < 0) {
     log_info(LD_REND, "No virtual port mapping exists for port %d for "
                       "hidden service %s.",

src/or/main.c

@@ -2830,7 +2830,7 @@ run_main_loop_once(void)
   if (get_options()->MainloopStats) {
     /* Update our main loop counters. */
     if (loop_result == 0) {
-      // The call was succesful.
+      // The call was successful.
       increment_main_loop_success_count();
     } else if (loop_result == -1) {
       // The call was erroneous.

src/or/onion_fast.c

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
  * [*]Actually, it's possible that TAP _was_ a little better than TLS with
  * RSA1024 certificates and EDH1024 for forward secrecy, if you
  * hypothesize an adversary who can compute discrete logarithms on a
- * small number of targetted DH1024 fields, but who can't break all that
+ * small number of targeted DH1024 fields, but who can't break all that
  * many RSA1024 keys.
  **/
 

src/or/or.h

@@ -3142,7 +3142,7 @@ typedef struct circuit_t {
 
   /** When the circuit was first used, or 0 if the circuit is clean.
    *
-   * XXXX Note that some code will artifically adjust this value backward
+   * XXXX Note that some code will artificially adjust this value backward
    * in time in order to indicate that a circuit shouldn't be used for new
    * streams, but that it can stay alive as long as it has streams on it.
    * That's a kludge we should fix.
@@ -3400,7 +3400,7 @@ typedef struct origin_circuit_t {
   uint32_t global_identifier;
 
   /** True if we have associated one stream to this circuit, thereby setting
-   * the isolation paramaters for this circuit.  Note that this doesn't
+   * the isolation parameters for this circuit.  Note that this doesn't
    * necessarily mean that we've <em>attached</em> any streams to the circuit:
    * we may only have marked up this circuit during the launch process.
    */
@@ -4182,7 +4182,7 @@ typedef struct {
   int UseEntryGuards_option;
   /** Internal variable to remember whether we're actually acting on
    * UseEntryGuards_option -- when we're a non-anonymous Tor2web client or
-   * Single Onion Service, it is alwasy false, otherwise we use the value of
+   * Single Onion Service, it is always false, otherwise we use the value of
    * UseEntryGuards_option. */
   int UseEntryGuards;
 

src/or/policies.c

@@ -2407,7 +2407,7 @@ policy_summary_item_split(policy_summary_item_t* old, uint16_t new_starts)
 #define REJECT_CUTOFF_SCALE_IPV6 (64)
 /* Ports are rejected in an IPv6 summary if they are rejected in more than one
  * IPv6 /16 address block.
- * This is rougly equivalent to the IPv4 cutoff, as only five IPv6 /12s (and
+ * This is roughly equivalent to the IPv4 cutoff, as only five IPv6 /12s (and
  * some scattered smaller blocks) have been allocated to the RIRs.
  * Network providers are typically allocated one or more IPv6 /32s.
  */

src/or/reasons.c

@@ -428,7 +428,7 @@ socks5_response_code_to_string(uint8_t code)
   }
 }
 
-/** Return a string corresponding to a bandwidht_weight_rule_t */
+/** Return a string corresponding to a bandwidth_weight_rule_t */
 const char *
 bandwidth_weight_rule_to_string(bandwidth_weight_rule_t rule)
 {

src/or/rendcache.c

@@ -43,12 +43,12 @@ STATIC digestmap_t *rend_cache_v2_dir = NULL;
  * ID, that were NOT present in the descriptor are removed from this cache.
  * Which means that if at least one IP was not in this cache, thus usuable,
  * it's considered a new descriptor so we keep it. Else, if all IPs were in
- * this cache, we discard the descriptor as it's considered unsuable.
+ * this cache, we discard the descriptor as it's considered unusable.
  *
  * Once a descriptor is removed from the rend cache or expires, the entry
  * in this cache is also removed for the service ID.
  *
- * This scheme allows us to not realy on the descriptor's timestamp (which
+ * This scheme allows us to not relay on the descriptor's timestamp (which
  * is rounded down to the hour) to know if we have a newer descriptor. We
  * only rely on the usability of intro points from an internal state. */
 STATIC strmap_t *rend_cache_failure = NULL;

src/or/rendcache.h

@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ typedef struct rend_cache_entry_t {
 
 /* Introduction point failure type. */
 typedef struct rend_cache_failure_intro_t {
-  /* When this intro point failure occured thus we allocated this object and
+  /* When this intro point failure occurred thus we allocated this object and
    * cache it. */
   time_t created_ts;
   rend_intro_point_failure_t failure_type;

src/or/rendclient.c

@@ -571,7 +571,7 @@ fetch_v2_desc_by_descid(const char *desc_id,
 
 /** Fetch a v2 descriptor using the onion address in the given query object.
  * This will compute the descriptor id for each replicas and fetch it on the
- * given hsdir(s) if any or the responsible ones that are choosen
+ * given hsdir(s) if any or the responsible ones that are chosen
  * automatically.
  *
  * On success, 1 is returned. If no hidden service is left to ask, return 0.

src/or/rendservice.c

@@ -1360,7 +1360,7 @@ rend_services_add_filenames_to_lists(smartlist_t *open_lst,
 }
 
 /** Derive all rend_service_t internal material based on the service's key.
- * Returns 0 on sucess, -1 on failure.
+ * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
  */
 static int
 rend_service_derive_key_digests(struct rend_service_t *s)
@@ -3196,7 +3196,7 @@ rend_service_intro_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circuit)
 
   /* If we already have enough introduction circuits for this service,
    * redefine this one as a general circuit or close it, depending.
-   * Substract the amount of expiring nodes here because the circuits are
+   * Subtract the amount of expiring nodes here because the circuits are
    * still opened. */
   if (valid_ip_circuits > service->n_intro_points_wanted) {
     const or_options_t *options = get_options();
@@ -4121,7 +4121,7 @@ rend_consider_services_intro_points(time_t now)
                  n_intro_points_to_open);
         break;
       }
-      /* Add the choosen node to the exclusion list in order to avoid picking
+      /* Add the chosen node to the exclusion list in order to avoid picking
        * it again in the next iteration. */
       smartlist_add(exclude_nodes, (void*)node);
       intro = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(rend_intro_point_t));

src/or/rendservice.h

@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ typedef struct rend_service_t {
   /** If true, we don't close circuits for making requests to unsupported
    * ports. */
   int allow_unknown_ports;
-  /** The maximum number of simultanious streams-per-circuit that are allowed
+  /** The maximum number of simultaneous streams-per-circuit that are allowed
    * to be established, or 0 if no limit is set.
    */
   int max_streams_per_circuit;

src/or/rephist.c

@@ -2736,7 +2736,7 @@ rep_hist_desc_stats_write(time_t now)
 }
 
 /** Called to note that we've served a given descriptor (by
- * digest). Incrememnts the count of descriptors served, and the number
+ * digest). Increments the count of descriptors served, and the number
  * of times we've served this descriptor. */
 void
 rep_hist_note_desc_served(const char * desc)

src/or/routerlist.c

@@ -367,7 +367,7 @@ list_authority_ids_with_downloads, (void))
       smartlist_add(ids, tmp);
     }
   }
-  /* else definitely no downlaods going since nothing even has a cert list */
+  /* else definitely no downloads going since nothing even has a cert list */
 
   return ids;
 }
@@ -2652,7 +2652,7 @@ compute_weighted_bandwidths(const smartlist_t *sl,
     is_dir = node_is_dir(node);
     if (node->rs) {
       if (!node->rs->has_bandwidth) {
-        /* This should never happen, unless all the authorites downgrade
+        /* This should never happen, unless all the authorities downgrade
          * to 0.2.0 or rogue routerstatuses get inserted into our consensus. */
         if (! warned_missing_bw) {
           log_warn(LD_BUG,

src/or/shared_random.c

@@ -1071,7 +1071,7 @@ sr_parse_srv(const smartlist_t *args)
 
   srv = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*srv));
   srv->num_reveals = num_reveals;
-  /* We substract one byte from the srclen because the function ignores the
+  /* We subtract one byte from the srclen because the function ignores the
    * '=' character in the given buffer. This is broken but it's a documented
    * behavior of the implementation. */
   ret = base64_decode((char *) srv->value, sizeof(srv->value), value,

src/or/shared_random_state.c

@@ -1101,7 +1101,7 @@ sr_state_get_previous_srv(void)
 }
 
 /* Set the current SRV value from our state. Value CAN be NULL. The srv
- * object ownership is transfered to the state object. */
+ * object ownership is transferred to the state object. */
 void
 sr_state_set_previous_srv(const sr_srv_t *srv)
 {
@@ -1120,7 +1120,7 @@ sr_state_get_current_srv(void)
 }
 
 /* Set the current SRV value from our state. Value CAN be NULL. The srv
- * object ownership is transfered to the state object. */
+ * object ownership is transferred to the state object. */
 void
 sr_state_set_current_srv(const sr_srv_t *srv)
 {
@@ -1225,7 +1225,7 @@ sr_state_get_commit(const char *rsa_identity)
 }
 
 /* Add <b>commit</b> to the permanent state. The commit object ownership is
- * transfered to the state so the caller MUST not free it. */
+ * transferred to the state so the caller MUST not free it. */
 void
 sr_state_add_commit(sr_commit_t *commit)
 {

src/or/status.c

@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ log_heartbeat(time_t now)
     const uint64_t main_loop_idle_count = get_main_loop_idle_count();
 
     log_fn(LOG_NOTICE, LD_HEARTBEAT, "Main event loop statistics: "
-         U64_FORMAT " succesful returns, "
+         U64_FORMAT " successful returns, "
          U64_FORMAT " erroneous returns, and "
          U64_FORMAT " idle returns.",
          U64_PRINTF_ARG(main_loop_success_count),

src/or/transports.c

@@ -590,7 +590,7 @@ pt_configure_remaining_proxies(void)
     }
 
     /* If the proxy is not fully configured, try to configure it
-       futher. */
+       further. */
     if (!proxy_configuration_finished(mp))
       if (configure_proxy(mp) == 1)
         at_least_a_proxy_config_finished = 1;

src/test/test.c

@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ test_bad_onion_handshake(void *arg)
                                             s_buf, s_keys, 40));
   c_buf[64] ^= 33;
 
-  /* (Let the server procede) */
+  /* (Let the server proceed) */
   tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ,
             onion_skin_TAP_server_handshake(c_buf, pk, NULL,
                                             s_buf, s_keys, 40));

src/test/test_cell_formats.c

@@ -477,7 +477,7 @@ test_cfmt_create_cells(void *arg)
   cell.command = CELL_CREATED;
   tt_int_op(-1, OP_EQ, create_cell_parse(&cc, &cell));
 
-  /* You can't acutally make an unparseable CREATE or CREATE_FAST cell. */
+  /* You can't actually make an unparseable CREATE or CREATE_FAST cell. */
 
   /* Try some CREATE2 cells.  First with a bad type. */
   cell.command = CELL_CREATE2;

src/test/test_channelpadding.c

@@ -457,7 +457,7 @@ test_channelpadding_killonehop(void *arg)
   tt_assert(relay3_client->padding_enabled);
   tt_assert(client_relay3->padding_enabled);
   get_options_mutable()->Tor2webMode = 1;
-  /* For the relay to recieve the negotiate: */
+  /* For the relay to receive the negotiate: */
   get_options_mutable()->ORPort_set = 1;
   decision = channelpadding_decide_to_pad_channel(client_relay3);
   tt_int_op(decision, OP_EQ, CHANNELPADDING_WONTPAD);
@@ -530,7 +530,7 @@ test_channelpadding_killonehop(void *arg)
   // Test client side (it should stop immediately)
   get_options_mutable()->HiddenServiceSingleHopMode = 1;
   get_options_mutable()->HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode = 1;
-  /* For the relay to recieve the negotiate: */
+  /* For the relay to receive the negotiate: */
   get_options_mutable()->ORPort_set = 1;
   decision = channelpadding_decide_to_pad_channel(client_relay3);
   tt_int_op(decision, OP_EQ, CHANNELPADDING_WONTPAD);
@@ -835,7 +835,7 @@ test_channelpadding_negotiation(void *arg)
   get_options_mutable()->ORPort_set = 0;
 
   /* Test case #2: Torrc options */
-  /* ConnectionPadding auto; Relay doesn't suport us */
+  /* ConnectionPadding auto; Relay doesn't support us */
   ((channel_tls_t*)relay3_client)->conn->link_proto = 4;
   relay3_client->padding_enabled = 0;
   tried_to_write_cell = 0;
@@ -846,7 +846,7 @@ test_channelpadding_negotiation(void *arg)
   ((channel_tls_t*)relay3_client)->conn->link_proto = 5;
   relay3_client->padding_enabled = 1;
 
-  /* ConnectionPadding 1; Relay doesn't suport us */
+  /* ConnectionPadding 1; Relay doesn't support us */
   get_options_mutable()->ConnectionPadding = 1;
   tried_to_write_cell = 0;
   decision = channelpadding_decide_to_pad_channel(client_relay3);

src/test/test_config.c

@@ -323,7 +323,7 @@ test_config_write_to_data_subdir(void *arg)
   tt_int_op(mkdir(options->DataDirectory, 0700), OP_EQ, 0);
 #endif
 
-  // Write attempt shoudl fail, if subdirectory doesn't exist.
+  // Write attempt should fail, if subdirectory doesn't exist.
   tt_assert(write_to_data_subdir(subdir, fname, str, NULL));
   tt_assert(! check_or_create_data_subdir(subdir));
 
@@ -1391,7 +1391,7 @@ test_config_resolve_my_address(void *arg)
    *      if running on.
    *   3. Hostname from previous step cannot be converted to
    *      address by using tor_inet_aton() function.
-   *   4. However, tor_lookup_hostname() succeds in resolving the
+   *   4. However, tor_lookup_hostname() succeeds in resolving the
    *      hostname from step 2.
    *   5. Unfortunately, tor_addr_is_internal() deems this address
    *      to be internal.

src/test/test_connection.c

@@ -779,7 +779,7 @@ test_conn_download_status(void *arg)
 #define CONNECTION_TESTCASE(name, fork, setup)                           \
   { #name, test_conn_##name, fork, &setup, NULL }
 
-/* where arg is an expression (constant, varaible, compound expression) */
+/* where arg is an expression (constant, variable, compound expression) */
 #define CONNECTION_TESTCASE_ARG(name, fork, setup, arg)                  \
   { #name "_" #arg, test_conn_##name, fork, &setup, (void *)arg }
 

src/test/test_dir.c

@@ -1270,7 +1270,7 @@ test_dir_versions(void *arg)
   tt_int_op(0,OP_EQ, tor_version_as_new_as(
                                            "Tor 0.2.9.9 (git-00)",
                                            "Tor 0.2.9.9 (git-01)"));
-  /* In #21278, we comapre without integer overflows.
+  /* In #21278, we compare without integer overflows.
    * But since #21450 limits version components to [0, INT32_MAX], it is no
    * longer possible to cause an integer overflow in tor_version_compare() */
   tt_int_op(0,OP_EQ, tor_version_as_new_as(

src/test/test_entrynodes.c

@@ -2024,7 +2024,7 @@ test_entry_guard_select_for_circuit_highlevel_primary(void *arg)
   tt_mem_op(g->identity, OP_NE, g_prev->identity, DIGEST_LEN);
   tt_int_op(g->is_primary, OP_EQ, 1);
   tt_i64_op(g->last_tried_to_connect, OP_EQ, start+60);
-  tt_int_op(g->confirmed_idx, OP_EQ, -1); // not confirmd now.
+  tt_int_op(g->confirmed_idx, OP_EQ, -1); // not confirmed now.
 
   /* Call this one up; watch it get confirmed. */
   update_approx_time(start+90);

src/test/test_hs.c

@@ -1010,7 +1010,7 @@ test_prune_services_on_reload(void *arg)
     set_rend_service_list(old);
     set_rend_rend_service_staging_list(new);
     rend_service_prune_list_impl_();
-    /* Check if they've all been transfered. */
+    /* Check if they've all been transferred. */
     tt_int_op(smartlist_len(old), OP_EQ, 0);
     tt_int_op(smartlist_len(new), OP_EQ, 2);
   }

src/test/test_hs_descriptor.c

@@ -413,7 +413,7 @@ test_decode_invalid_intro_point(void *arg)
 
   (void) arg;
 
-  /* Seperate pieces of a valid encoded introduction point. */
+  /* Separate pieces of a valid encoded introduction point. */
   const char *intro_point =
     "introduction-point AQIUMDI5OUYyNjhGQ0E5RDU1Q0QxNTc=";
   const char *auth_key =

src/test/test_hs_intropoint.c

@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ helper_create_introduce1_cell(void)
     memcpy(auth_key_ptr, auth_key_kp.pubkey.pubkey, auth_key_len);
   }
 
-  /* Set the cell extentions to none. */
+  /* Set the cell extensions to none. */
   {
     trn_cell_extension_t *ext = trn_cell_extension_new();
     trn_cell_extension_set_num(ext, 0);
@@ -552,7 +552,7 @@ test_circuitmap_free_all(void)
   ;
 }
 
-/** Successfuly register a v2 intro point and a v3 intro point. Ensure that HS
+/** Successfully register a v2 intro point and a v3 intro point. Ensure that HS
  *  circuitmap is maintained properly. */
 static void
 test_intro_point_registration(void *arg)

src/test/test_hs_service.c

@@ -661,7 +661,7 @@ test_intro_circuit_opened(void *arg)
   UNMOCK(relay_send_command_from_edge_);
 }
 
-/** Test the operations we do on a circuit after we learn that we successfuly
+/** Test the operations we do on a circuit after we learn that we successfully
  *  established an intro point on it */
 static void
 test_intro_established(void *arg)

src/test/test_options.c

@@ -906,7 +906,7 @@ test_options_validate__authdir(void *ignored)
                                 "Address 100.200.10.1\n"
                                 "BridgeAuthoritativeDir 1\n"
                                 "ContactInfo hello@hello.com\n"
-                                "V3BandwidthsFile non-existant-file\n");
+                                "V3BandwidthsFile non-existent-file\n");
   mock_clean_saved_logs();
   options_validate(tdata->old_opt, tdata->opt, tdata->def_opt, 0, &msg);
   tt_str_op(msg, OP_EQ,
@@ -918,7 +918,7 @@ test_options_validate__authdir(void *ignored)
                                 "Address 100.200.10.1\n"
                                 "BridgeAuthoritativeDir 1\n"
                                 "ContactInfo hello@hello.com\n"
-                                "V3BandwidthsFile non-existant-file\n");
+                                "V3BandwidthsFile non-existent-file\n");
   mock_clean_saved_logs();
   options_validate(NULL, tdata->opt, tdata->def_opt, 0, &msg);
   tt_str_op(msg, OP_EQ,
@@ -930,7 +930,7 @@ test_options_validate__authdir(void *ignored)
                                 "Address 100.200.10.1\n"
                                 "BridgeAuthoritativeDir 1\n"
                                 "ContactInfo hello@hello.com\n"
-                                "GuardfractionFile non-existant-file\n");
+                                "GuardfractionFile non-existent-file\n");
   mock_clean_saved_logs();
   options_validate(tdata->old_opt, tdata->opt, tdata->def_opt, 0, &msg);
   tt_str_op(msg, OP_EQ,
@@ -942,7 +942,7 @@ test_options_validate__authdir(void *ignored)
                                 "Address 100.200.10.1\n"
                                 "BridgeAuthoritativeDir 1\n"
                                 "ContactInfo hello@hello.com\n"
-                                "GuardfractionFile non-existant-file\n");
+                                "GuardfractionFile non-existent-file\n");
   mock_clean_saved_logs();
   options_validate(NULL, tdata->opt, tdata->def_opt, 0, &msg);
   tt_str_op(msg, OP_EQ,
@@ -1112,7 +1112,7 @@ test_options_validate__transproxy(void *ignored)
 
   // Test unknown trans proxy
   free_options_test_data(tdata);
-  tdata = get_options_test_data("TransProxyType non-existant\n");
+  tdata = get_options_test_data("TransProxyType non-existent\n");
   ret = options_validate(tdata->old_opt, tdata->opt, tdata->def_opt, 0, &msg);
   tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1);
   tt_str_op(msg, OP_EQ, "Unrecognized value for TransProxyType");

src/test/test_shared_random.c

@@ -402,7 +402,7 @@ test_sr_commit(void *arg)
                                sizeof(our_commit->hashed_reveal)));
     /* Do we have a valid encoded commit and reveal. Note the following only
      * tests if the generated values are correct. Their could be a bug in
-     * the decode function but we test them seperately. */
+     * the decode function but we test them separately. */
     tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, reveal_decode(our_commit->encoded_reveal,
                                    &test_commit));
     tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, commit_decode(our_commit->encoded_commit,
@@ -612,7 +612,7 @@ test_vote(void *arg)
     ret = smartlist_split_string(chunks, lines, "\n", SPLIT_IGNORE_BLANK, 0);
     tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 4);
     tt_str_op(smartlist_get(chunks, 0), OP_EQ, "shared-rand-participate");
-    /* Get our commitment line and will validate it agains our commit. The
+    /* Get our commitment line and will validate it against our commit. The
      * format is as follow:
      * "shared-rand-commitment" SP version SP algname SP identity
      *                          SP COMMIT [SP REVEAL] NL

src/test/test_util.c

@@ -703,7 +703,7 @@ test_util_time(void *arg)
      * a "correct" retrospective gregorian negative year value,
      * which I'm pretty sure is:
      * -1*(2^63)/60/60/24*2000/730485 + 1970 = -292277022657
-     * 730485 is the number of days in two millenia, including leap days */
+     * 730485 is the number of days in two millennia, including leap days */
     a_time.tm_year = -292277022657-1900;
     CAPTURE();
     tt_int_op((time_t) -1,OP_EQ, tor_timegm(&a_time));
@@ -739,7 +739,7 @@ test_util_time(void *arg)
      * a "correct" proleptic gregorian year value,
      * which I'm pretty sure is:
      * (2^63-1)/60/60/24*2000/730485 + 1970 = 292277026596
-     * 730485 is the number of days in two millenia, including leap days */
+     * 730485 is the number of days in two millennia, including leap days */
     a_time.tm_year = 292277026596-1900;
     CAPTURE();
     tt_int_op((time_t) -1,OP_EQ, tor_timegm(&a_time));
@@ -875,7 +875,7 @@ test_util_time(void *arg)
      * a "correct" retrospective gregorian negative year value,
      * which I'm pretty sure is:
      * -1*(2^63)/60/60/24*2000/730485 + 1970 = -292277022657
-     * 730485 is the number of days in two millenia, including leap days
+     * 730485 is the number of days in two millennia, including leap days
      * (int64_t)b_time.tm_year == (-292277022657LL-1900LL) without clamping */
     t_res = INT64_MIN;
     CAPTURE();
@@ -921,7 +921,7 @@ test_util_time(void *arg)
      * a "correct" proleptic gregorian year value,
      * which I'm pretty sure is:
      * (2^63-1)/60/60/24*2000/730485 + 1970 = 292277026596
-     * 730485 is the number of days in two millenia, including leap days
+     * 730485 is the number of days in two millennia, including leap days
      * (int64_t)b_time.tm_year == (292277026596L-1900L) without clamping */
     t_res = INT64_MAX;
     CAPTURE();
@@ -5465,7 +5465,7 @@ is_there_a_localhost(int family)
 #endif /* 0 */
 
 /* Test for socketpair and ersatz_socketpair().  We test them both, since
- * the latter is a tolerably good way to exersize tor_accept_socket(). */
+ * the latter is a tolerably good way to exercise tor_accept_socket(). */
 static void
 test_util_socketpair(void *arg)
 {

src/trunnel/hs/cell_introduce1.trunnel

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ const TRUNNEL_REND_COOKIE_LEN = 20;
 
 /* INTRODUCE1 payload. See details in section 3.2.1. */
 struct trn_cell_introduce1 {
-  /* Always zeroed. MUST be checked explicitely by the caller. */
+  /* Always zeroed. MUST be checked explicitly by the caller. */
   u8 legacy_key_id[TRUNNEL_SHA1_LEN];
 
   /* Authentication key material. */