Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/maint-0.2.2'

changes/fix-connection_printf_to_buf

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+  * Code simplifications and refactoring:
+
+    - Make connection_printf_to_buf's behaviour sane.  Its callers
+      expect it to emit a CRLF iff the format string ends with CRLF;
+      it actually emits a CRLF iff (a) the format string ends with
+      CRLF or (b) the resulting string is over 1023 characters long or
+      (c) the format string does not end with CRLF ''and'' the
+      resulting string is 1021 characters long or longer.  Bugfix on
+      0.1.1.9-alpha; fixes part of bug 3407.
+
+    - Make send_control_event_impl's behaviour sane.  Its callers
+      expect it to always emit a CRLF at the end of the string; it
+      might emit extra control characters as well.  Bugfix on
+      0.1.1.9-alpha; fixes another part of bug 3407.
+

src/or/connection_or.c

@@ -997,13 +997,16 @@ connection_tls_continue_handshake(or_connection_t *conn)
       if (! tor_tls_used_v1_handshake(conn->tls)) {
         if (!tor_tls_is_server(conn->tls)) {
           if (conn->_base.state == OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_HANDSHAKING) {
-            // log_notice(LD_OR,"Done. state was TLS_HANDSHAKING.");
+            log_debug(LD_OR, "Done with initial SSL handshake (client-side). "
+                             "Requesting renegotiation.");
             conn->_base.state = OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATING;
             goto again;
           }
           // log_notice(LD_OR,"Done. state was %d.", conn->_base.state);
         } else {
           /* improved handshake, but not a client. */
+          log_debug(LD_OR, "Done with initial SSL handshake (server-side). "
+                           "Expecting renegotiation.");
           tor_tls_set_renegotiate_callback(conn->tls,
                                            connection_or_tls_renegotiated_cb,
                                            conn);

src/or/control.c

@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ static int disable_log_messages = 0;
 static int authentication_cookie_is_set = 0;
 /** If authentication_cookie_is_set, a secret cookie that we've stored to disk
  * and which we're using to authenticate controllers.  (If the controller can
- * read it off disk, it has permission to connect. */
+ * read it off disk, it has permission to connect.) */
 static char authentication_cookie[AUTHENTICATION_COOKIE_LEN];
 
 /** A sufficiently large size to record the last bootstrap phase string. */
@@ -488,33 +488,26 @@ decode_escaped_string(const char *start, size_t in_len_max,
 }
 
 /** Acts like sprintf, but writes its formatted string to the end of
- * <b>conn</b>-\>outbuf.  The message may be truncated if it is too long,
+ * <b>conn</b>-\>outbuf. */
- * but it will always end with a CRLF sequence.
- *
- * Currently the length of the message is limited to 1024 (including the
- * ending CR LF NUL ("\\r\\n\\0"). */
 static void
 connection_printf_to_buf(control_connection_t *conn, const char *format, ...)
 {
-#define CONNECTION_PRINTF_TO_BUF_BUFFERSIZE 1024
   va_list ap;
-  char buf[CONNECTION_PRINTF_TO_BUF_BUFFERSIZE];
+  char *buf = NULL;
-  int r;
+  int len;
-  size_t len;
+
   va_start(ap,format);
-  r = tor_vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), format, ap);
+  len = tor_vasprintf(&buf, format, ap);
   va_end(ap);
-  if (r<0) {
+
+  if (len < 0) {
     log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unable to format string for controller.");
     return;
   }
-  len = strlen(buf);
+
-  if (fast_memcmp("\r\n\0", buf+len-2, 3)) {
+  connection_write_to_buf(buf, (size_t)len, TO_CONN(conn));
-    buf[CONNECTION_PRINTF_TO_BUF_BUFFERSIZE-1] = '\0';
+
-    buf[CONNECTION_PRINTF_TO_BUF_BUFFERSIZE-2] = '\n';
+  tor_free(buf);
-    buf[CONNECTION_PRINTF_TO_BUF_BUFFERSIZE-3] = '\r';
-  }
-  connection_write_to_buf(buf, len, TO_CONN(conn));
 }
 
 /** Write all of the open control ports to ControlPortWriteToFile */
@@ -613,46 +606,31 @@ send_control_event_string(uint16_t event, event_format_t which,
   } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(conn);
 }
 
-/** Helper for send_control1_event and send_control1_event_extended:
+/** Helper for send_control_event and control_event_status:
  * Send an event to all v1 controllers that are listening for code
  * <b>event</b>.  The event's body is created by the printf-style format in
- * <b>format</b>, and other arguments as provided.
+ * <b>format</b>, and other arguments as provided. */
- *
- * Currently the length of the message is limited to 1024 (including the
- * ending \\r\\n\\0). */
 static void
 send_control_event_impl(uint16_t event, event_format_t which,
                          const char *format, va_list ap)
 {
-  /* This is just a little longer than the longest allowed log message */
+  char *buf = NULL;
-#define SEND_CONTROL1_EVENT_BUFFERSIZE 10064
+  int len;
-  int r;
-  char buf[SEND_CONTROL1_EVENT_BUFFERSIZE];
-  size_t len;
 
-  r = tor_vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), format, ap);
+  len = tor_vasprintf(&buf, format, ap);
-  if (r<0) {
+  if (len < 0) {
     log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unable to format event for controller.");
     return;
   }
 
-  len = strlen(buf);
-  if (fast_memcmp("\r\n\0", buf+len-2, 3)) {
-    /* if it is not properly terminated, do it now */
-    buf[SEND_CONTROL1_EVENT_BUFFERSIZE-1] = '\0';
-    buf[SEND_CONTROL1_EVENT_BUFFERSIZE-2] = '\n';
-    buf[SEND_CONTROL1_EVENT_BUFFERSIZE-3] = '\r';
-  }
-
   send_control_event_string(event, which|ALL_FORMATS, buf);
+
+  tor_free(buf);
 }
 
 /** Send an event to all v1 controllers that are listening for code
  * <b>event</b>.  The event's body is created by the printf-style format in
- * <b>format</b>, and other arguments as provided.
+ * <b>format</b>, and other arguments as provided. */
- *
- * Currently the length of the message is limited to 1024 (including the
- * ending \\n\\r\\0. */
 static void
 send_control_event(uint16_t event, event_format_t which,
                    const char *format, ...)