Merge remote-tracking branch 'rransom-tor/bug3332-v2'

This commit is contained in:
Nick Mathewson 2011-06-15 11:33:40 -04:00
commit a857f61e27
4 changed files with 33 additions and 0 deletions

9
changes/bug3332 Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
o Minor bugfixes:
- Assert that hidden-service-related operations are not performed
using single-hop circuits. Previously, Tor would assert that
client-side streams are not attached to single-hop circuits, but
not that other sensitive operations on the client and service
side are not performed using single-hop circuits. Fixes bug
3332; bugfix on 0.0.6.

View File

@ -858,6 +858,20 @@ directory_initiate_command(const char *address, const tor_addr_t *_addr,
if_modified_since, NULL);
}
/** Return non-zero iff a directory connection with purpose
* <b>dir_purpose</b> reveals sensitive information about a Tor
* instance's client activities. (Such connections must be performed
* through normal three-hop Tor circuits.) */
static int
is_sensitive_dir_purpose(uint8_t dir_purpose)
{
return ((dir_purpose == DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_RENDDESC) ||
(dir_purpose == DIR_PURPOSE_HAS_FETCHED_RENDDESC) ||
(dir_purpose == DIR_PURPOSE_UPLOAD_RENDDESC) ||
(dir_purpose == DIR_PURPOSE_UPLOAD_RENDDESC_V2) ||
(dir_purpose == DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_RENDDESC_V2));
}
/** Same as directory_initiate_command(), but accepts rendezvous data to
* fetch a hidden service descriptor. */
static void
@ -892,6 +906,9 @@ directory_initiate_command_rend(const char *address, const tor_addr_t *_addr,
log_debug(LD_DIR, "Initiating %s", dir_conn_purpose_to_string(dir_purpose));
tor_assert(!(is_sensitive_dir_purpose(dir_purpose) &&
!anonymized_connection));
/* ensure that we don't make direct connections when a SOCKS server is
* configured. */
if (!anonymized_connection && !use_begindir && !options->HTTPProxy &&

View File

@ -145,6 +145,8 @@ rend_client_send_introduction(origin_circuit_t *introcirc,
tor_assert(rendcirc->rend_data);
tor_assert(!rend_cmp_service_ids(introcirc->rend_data->onion_address,
rendcirc->rend_data->onion_address));
tor_assert(!(introcirc->build_state->onehop_tunnel));
tor_assert(!(rendcirc->build_state->onehop_tunnel));
if (rend_cache_lookup_entry(introcirc->rend_data->onion_address, -1,
&entry) < 1) {
@ -335,6 +337,7 @@ rend_client_introduction_acked(origin_circuit_t *circ,
}
tor_assert(circ->build_state->chosen_exit);
tor_assert(!(circ->build_state->onehop_tunnel));
tor_assert(circ->rend_data);
if (request_len == 0) {
@ -346,6 +349,7 @@ rend_client_introduction_acked(origin_circuit_t *circ,
rendcirc = circuit_get_by_rend_query_and_purpose(
circ->rend_data->onion_address, CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY);
if (rendcirc) { /* remember the ack */
tor_assert(!(rendcirc->build_state->onehop_tunnel));
rendcirc->_base.purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED;
/* Set timestamp_dirty, because circuit_expire_building expects
* it to specify when a circuit entered the

View File

@ -905,6 +905,7 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request,
time_t *access_time;
const or_options_t *options = get_options();
tor_assert(!(circuit->build_state->onehop_tunnel));
tor_assert(circuit->rend_data);
base32_encode(serviceid, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1,
@ -1359,6 +1360,7 @@ rend_service_intro_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circuit)
crypto_pk_env_t *intro_key;
tor_assert(circuit->_base.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO);
tor_assert(!(circuit->build_state->onehop_tunnel));
tor_assert(circuit->cpath);
tor_assert(circuit->rend_data);
@ -1501,6 +1503,7 @@ rend_service_rendezvous_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circuit)
tor_assert(circuit->_base.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND);
tor_assert(circuit->cpath);
tor_assert(circuit->build_state);
tor_assert(!(circuit->build_state->onehop_tunnel));
tor_assert(circuit->rend_data);
hop = circuit->build_state->pending_final_cpath;
tor_assert(hop);