2005-09-12 00:43:23 +02:00
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.TH TOR 1 "September 2005" "TOR"
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2003-11-20 21:56:52 +01:00
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.SH NAME
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tor \- The second-generation onion router
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.SH SYNOPSIS
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.B tor
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[\fIOPTION value\fR]...
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.SH DESCRIPTION
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.I tor
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is a connection-oriented anonymizing communication
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service. Users choose a source-routed path through a set of nodes, and
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negotiate a "virtual circuit" through the network, in which each node
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knows its predecessor and successor, but no others. Traffic flowing down
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the circuit is unwrapped by a symmetric key at each node, which reveals
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the downstream node.
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.PP
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Basically \fItor\fR provides a distributed network of servers ("onion
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2004-11-10 02:16:50 +01:00
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routers"). Users bounce their TCP streams -- web traffic, ftp, ssh, etc --
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2003-11-20 21:56:52 +01:00
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around the routers, and recipients, observers, and even the routers
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themselves have difficulty tracking the source of the stream.
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.SH OPTIONS
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\fB-h, -help\fP
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Display a short help message and exit.
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2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
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.LP
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2003-11-20 21:56:52 +01:00
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.TP
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\fB-f \fR\fIFILE\fP
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FILE contains further "option value" pairs. (Default: @CONFDIR@/torrc)
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2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
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.LP
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2003-11-20 21:56:52 +01:00
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.TP
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2004-11-10 02:16:50 +01:00
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Other options can be specified either on the command-line (\fI--option
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2004-10-27 05:07:53 +02:00
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value\fR), or in the configuration file (\fIoption value\fR).
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Options are case-insensitive.
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2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
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.LP
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2003-12-03 11:44:11 +01:00
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.TP
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2004-11-22 22:58:55 +01:00
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\fBBandwidthRate \fR\fIN\fR \fBbytes\fR|\fBKB\fR|\fBMB\fR|\fBGB\fR|\fBTB\fP
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A token bucket limits the average incoming bandwidth on this node to
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2005-04-27 06:14:41 +02:00
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the specified number of bytes per second. (Default: 2 MB)
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2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
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.LP
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2004-01-11 00:42:24 +01:00
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.TP
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2004-11-22 22:58:55 +01:00
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\fBBandwidthBurst \fR\fIN\fR \fBbytes\fR|\fBKB\fR|\fBMB\fR|\fBGB\fR|\fBTB\fP
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2005-04-27 06:14:41 +02:00
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Limit the maximum token bucket size (also known as the burst) to the given number of bytes. (Default: 5 MB)
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2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
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.LP
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2004-01-11 00:42:24 +01:00
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.TP
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2005-03-22 20:01:46 +01:00
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\fBMaxAdvertisedBandwidth \fR\fIN\fR \fBbytes\fR|\fBKB\fR|\fBMB\fR|\fBGB\fR|\fBTB\fP
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2005-03-22 21:32:48 +01:00
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If set, we will not advertise more than this amount of bandwidth for our
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BandwidthRate. Server operators who want to reduce the number of clients
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who ask to build circuits through them (since this is proportional to
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advertised bandwidth rate) can thus reduce the CPU demands on their
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server without impacting network performance.
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2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
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.LP
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2005-03-22 20:01:46 +01:00
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.TP
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2005-05-15 04:11:58 +02:00
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\fBControlPort \fR\fIPort\fP
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If set, Tor will accept connections from the same machine (localhost only) on
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this port, and allow those connections to control the Tor process using the
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Tor Control Protocol (described in control-spec.txt). Note: unless you also
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specify one of \fBHashedControlPassword\fP or \fBCookieAuthentication\fP,
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setting this option will cause Tor to allow any process on the local host to
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control it.
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2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
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.LP
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2005-05-15 04:11:58 +02:00
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.TP
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\fBHashedControlPassword \fR\fIhashed_password\fP
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Don't allow any connections on the control port except when the other process
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knows the password whose one-way hash is \fIhashed_password\fP. You can
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compute the hash of a password by running "tor --hash-password
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\fIpassword\fP".
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2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
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.LP
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2005-05-15 04:11:58 +02:00
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.TP
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\fBCookieAuthentication \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fP
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If this option is set to 1, don't allow any connections on the control port
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except when the connecting process knows the contents of a file named
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"control_auth_cookie", which Tor will create in its data directory. This
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authentication methods should only be used on systems with good filesystem
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security. (Default: 0)
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2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
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.LP
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2005-05-15 04:11:58 +02:00
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.TP
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2004-11-12 04:29:03 +01:00
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\fBDataDirectory \fR\fIDIR\fP
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Store working data in DIR (Default: @LOCALSTATEDIR@/lib/tor)
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2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
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.LP
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2004-11-12 04:29:03 +01:00
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.TP
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2005-05-15 04:11:58 +02:00
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\fBDirFetchPeriod \fR\fIN\fR \fBseconds\fR|\fBminutes\fR|\fBhours\fR|\fBdays\fR|\fBweeks\fP
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Every time the specified period elapses, Tor downloads a directory.
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A directory contains a signed list of all known servers as well as
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their current liveness status. A value of "0 seconds" tells Tor to choose an
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2005-05-23 16:02:26 +02:00
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appropriate default. (Default: 1 hour for clients, 20 minutes for servers)
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2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
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.LP
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2005-05-15 04:11:58 +02:00
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.TP
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2005-10-04 23:21:09 +02:00
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\fBDirServer \fR[\fInickname\fR] [\fBv1\fR] \fIaddress\fR\fB:\fIport fingerprint\fP
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2004-10-17 05:33:51 +02:00
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Use a nonstandard authoritative directory server at the provided
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address and port, with the specified key fingerprint. This option can
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be repeated many times, for multiple authoritative directory
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2005-09-23 22:44:22 +02:00
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servers. If the "v1" option is provided, Tor will use this server as an
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authority for old-style (v1) directories as well. (Only directory mirrors
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care about this.) If no \fBdirserver\fP line is given, Tor will use the default
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directory servers: moria1, moria2, and tor26. NOTE: this option is intended
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for setting up a private Tor network with its own directory authorities. If
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you use it, you will be distinguishable from other users, because you won't
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believe the same authorities they do.
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2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
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.LP
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2004-10-17 05:33:51 +02:00
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.TP
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2004-10-27 05:07:53 +02:00
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\fBGroup \fR\fIGID\fP
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2003-11-20 21:56:52 +01:00
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On startup, setgid to this user.
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2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
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.LP
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2003-11-20 21:56:52 +01:00
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.TP
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2004-11-07 23:36:43 +01:00
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\fBHttpProxy\fR \fIhost\fR[:\fIport\fR]\fP
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2005-05-27 13:57:52 +02:00
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Tor will make all its directory requests through this host:port
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(or host:80 if port is not specified),
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2004-11-07 23:36:43 +01:00
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rather than connecting directly to any directory servers.
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2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
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.LP
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2004-11-07 23:36:43 +01:00
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.TP
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2005-05-27 13:57:52 +02:00
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\fBHttpProxyAuthenticator\fR \fIusername:password\fP
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If defined, Tor will use this username:password for Basic Http proxy
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authentication, as in RFC 2617. This is currently the only form of
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Http proxy authentication that Tor supports; feel free to submit a
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patch if you want it to support others.
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2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
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.LP
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2005-05-27 13:57:52 +02:00
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.TP
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2005-02-24 12:00:06 +01:00
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\fBHttpsProxy\fR \fIhost\fR[:\fIport\fR]\fP
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2005-05-27 13:57:52 +02:00
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Tor will make all its OR (SSL) connections through this host:port
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(or host:443 if port is not specified), via HTTP CONNECT rather than
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connecting directly to servers. You may want to set \fBFascistFirewall\fR
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to restrict the set of ports you might try to connect to, if your Https
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proxy only allows connecting to certain ports.
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2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
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.LP
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2005-02-24 12:00:06 +01:00
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.TP
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2005-04-26 21:26:47 +02:00
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\fBHttpsProxyAuthenticator\fR \fIusername:password\fP
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If defined, Tor will use this username:password for Basic Https proxy
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authentication, as in RFC 2617. This is currently the only form of
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Https proxy authentication that Tor supports; feel free to submit a
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2005-05-22 17:04:02 +02:00
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patch if you want it to support others.
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2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
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.LP
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2005-04-26 21:26:47 +02:00
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.TP
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2004-10-27 05:07:53 +02:00
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\fBKeepalivePeriod \fR\fINUM\fP
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2004-11-07 23:36:43 +01:00
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To keep firewalls from expiring connections, send a padding keepalive
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2005-05-27 09:36:54 +02:00
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cell every NUM seconds on open connections that are in use. If the
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connection has no open circuits, it will instead be closed after NUM
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seconds of idleness. (Default: 5 minutes)
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2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
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.LP
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2003-11-20 21:56:52 +01:00
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.TP
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2005-05-15 04:11:58 +02:00
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\fBLog \fR\fIminSeverity\fR[-\fImaxSeverity\fR] \fBstderr\fR|\fBstdout\fR|\fBsyslog\fR\fP
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Send all messages between \fIminSeverity\fR and \fImaxSeverity\fR to
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the standard output stream, the standard error stream, or to the system
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log. (The "syslog" value is only supported on Unix.) Recognized
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severity levels are debug, info, notice, warn, and err. If only one
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severity level is given, all messages of that level or higher will be
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sent to the listed destination.
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2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
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.LP
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2005-05-15 04:11:58 +02:00
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.TP
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\fBLog \fR\fIminSeverity\fR[-\fImaxSeverity\fR] \fBfile\fR \fIFILENAME\fP
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As above, but send log messages to the listed filename. The "Log"
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option may appear more than once in a configuration file. Messages
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are sent to all the logs that match their severity level.
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2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
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.LP
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2005-05-15 04:11:58 +02:00
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.TP
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2004-10-27 05:07:53 +02:00
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\fBMaxConn \fR\fINUM\fP
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2004-11-07 23:36:43 +01:00
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Maximum number of simultaneous sockets allowed. You probably don't need
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to adjust this. (Default: 1024)
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2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
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.LP
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2004-09-08 08:46:33 +02:00
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.TP
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2004-11-07 23:36:43 +01:00
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\fBOutboundBindAddress \fR\fIIP\fP
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2004-09-03 01:41:06 +02:00
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Make all outbound connections originate from the IP address specified. This
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is only useful when you have multiple network interfaces, and you want all
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of Tor's outgoing connections to use a single one.
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2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
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.LP
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2004-09-03 01:41:06 +02:00
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.TP
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2005-08-25 08:11:50 +02:00
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\fBPidFile \fR\fIFILE\fP
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2003-11-20 21:56:52 +01:00
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On startup, write our PID to FILE. On clean shutdown, remove FILE.
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2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
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.LP
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2003-11-20 21:56:52 +01:00
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.TP
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2004-11-07 23:36:43 +01:00
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\fBRunAsDaemon \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
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2003-11-20 21:56:52 +01:00
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If 1, Tor forks and daemonizes to the background. (Default: 0)
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2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
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.LP
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2003-11-20 21:56:52 +01:00
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.TP
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2005-05-15 04:11:58 +02:00
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\fBSafeLogging \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fP
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If 1, Tor replaces potentially sensitive strings in the logs
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(e.g. addresses) with the string [scrubbed]. This way logs can still be
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useful, but they don't leave behind personally identifying information
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about what sites a user might have visited. (Default: 1)
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2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
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.LP
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2004-11-13 18:17:04 +01:00
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.TP
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2005-05-15 04:11:58 +02:00
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\fBStatusFetchPeriod \fR\fIN\fR \fBseconds\fR|\fBminutes\fR|\fBhours\fR|\fBdays\fR|\fBweeks\fP
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Every time the specified period elapses, Tor downloads signed status
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information about the current state of known servers. A value of
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"0 seconds" tells Tor to choose an appropriate default. (Default: 30
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2005-05-23 16:02:26 +02:00
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minutes for clients, 15 minutes for servers)
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2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
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.LP
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2004-11-13 18:17:04 +01:00
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.TP
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2005-05-15 04:11:58 +02:00
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\fBUser \fR\fIUID\fP
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On startup, setuid to this user.
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2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
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.LP
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2005-06-20 20:56:35 +02:00
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.TP
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\fBHardwareAccel \fR\fI0|1\fP
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If non-zero, try to use crypto hardware acceleration when
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available. (Default: 1. )
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2003-11-20 21:56:52 +01:00
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.SH CLIENT OPTIONS
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.PP
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2004-10-27 05:07:53 +02:00
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The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if \fBSOCKSPort\fP is non-zero):
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2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
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.LP
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2003-11-20 21:56:52 +01:00
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.TP
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2004-11-07 23:36:43 +01:00
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\fBAllowUnverifiedNodes\fR \fBentry\fR|\fBexit\fR|\fBmiddle\fR|\fBintroduction\fR|\fBrendezvous\fR|...\fP
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2004-09-10 01:52:15 +02:00
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Where on our circuits should we allow Tor servers that the directory
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2005-05-23 16:02:26 +02:00
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servers haven't authenticated as "verified"? (Default: middle,rendezvous)
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2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
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.LP
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2004-11-10 01:19:04 +01:00
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.TP
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2004-11-07 23:36:43 +01:00
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\fBClientOnly \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
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2005-05-15 01:13:24 +02:00
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If set to 1, Tor will under no circumstances run as a server. The default
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2005-05-15 02:04:24 +02:00
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is to run as a client unless ORPort is configured. (Usually,
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2004-09-10 02:15:59 +02:00
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you don't need to set this; Tor is pretty smart at figuring out whether
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2005-05-15 02:04:24 +02:00
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you are reliable and high-bandwidth enough to be a useful server.)
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2005-06-09 11:01:42 +02:00
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This option will likely be deprecated in the future; see the NoPublish
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2005-06-09 11:03:12 +02:00
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option below. (Default: 0)
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2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
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.LP
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2004-09-10 02:15:59 +02:00
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.TP
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2004-11-22 22:58:55 +01:00
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\fBEntryNodes \fR\fInickname\fR,\fInickname\fR,\fI...\fP
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2004-01-12 07:06:47 +01:00
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A list of preferred nodes to use for the first hop in the circuit, if possible.
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2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
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.LP
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2004-01-12 07:06:47 +01:00
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.TP
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2004-11-22 22:58:55 +01:00
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\fBExitNodes \fR\fInickname\fR,\fInickname\fR,\fI...\fP
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2004-01-12 07:06:47 +01:00
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A list of preferred nodes to use for the last hop in the circuit, if possible.
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2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
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.LP
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2004-01-12 07:06:47 +01:00
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.TP
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2004-11-22 22:58:55 +01:00
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\fBExcludeNodes \fR\fInickname\fR,\fInickname\fR,\fI...\fP
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2004-02-28 06:11:10 +01:00
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A list of nodes to never use when building a circuit.
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2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
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.LP
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2004-02-28 06:11:10 +01:00
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.TP
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2004-11-07 23:36:43 +01:00
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\fBStrictExitNodes \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
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2004-08-15 22:14:44 +02:00
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If 1, Tor will never use any nodes besides those listed in "exitnodes" for
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the last hop of a circuit.
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2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
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.LP
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2004-08-15 22:14:44 +02:00
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.TP
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2004-11-07 23:36:43 +01:00
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\fBStrictEntryNodes \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
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2004-08-15 22:14:44 +02:00
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If 1, Tor will never use any nodes besides those listed in "entrynodes" for
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the first hop of a circuit.
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2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
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.LP
|
2004-08-15 22:14:44 +02:00
|
|
|
.TP
|
2004-11-07 23:36:43 +01:00
|
|
|
\fBFascistFirewall \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
|
2004-09-08 08:46:33 +02:00
|
|
|
If 1, Tor will only create outgoing connections to ORs running on ports that
|
2004-11-07 23:36:43 +01:00
|
|
|
your firewall allows (defaults to 80 and 443; see \fBFirewallPorts\fR). This will
|
2004-09-08 08:46:33 +02:00
|
|
|
allow you to run Tor as a client behind a firewall with restrictive policies,
|
2004-09-10 20:56:52 +02:00
|
|
|
but will not allow you to run as a server behind such a firewall.
|
2005-08-08 23:58:48 +02:00
|
|
|
This option is deprecated; use
|
|
|
|
ReachableAddresses instead.
|
2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
|
|
|
.LP
|
2004-09-08 08:46:33 +02:00
|
|
|
.TP
|
2004-10-27 05:07:53 +02:00
|
|
|
\fBFirewallPorts \fR\fIPORTS\fP
|
2005-08-08 23:58:48 +02:00
|
|
|
A list of ports that your firewall allows you to connect to. Only
|
|
|
|
used when \fBFascistFirewall\fR is set. This option is deprecated; use
|
|
|
|
ReachableAddresses instead. (Default: 80, 443)
|
|
|
|
.LP
|
|
|
|
.TP
|
2005-08-09 12:35:06 +02:00
|
|
|
\fBReachableAddresses \fR\fIADDR\fP[\fB/\fP\fIMASK\fP][:\fIPORT\fP]...\fP
|
2005-08-08 23:58:48 +02:00
|
|
|
A comma-separated list of IPs that your firewall allows you to connect
|
|
|
|
to. Only used when \fBFascistFirewall\fR is set. The format is as
|
|
|
|
for the addresses in ExitPolicy, except that "accept" is understood
|
2005-08-17 06:15:25 +02:00
|
|
|
unless "reject" is explicitly provided. For example, 'ReachableAddresses
|
2005-08-08 23:58:48 +02:00
|
|
|
99.0.0.0/8, reject 18.0.0.0/8:80, accept *:80' means that your
|
|
|
|
firewall allows connections to everything inside net 99, rejects port
|
|
|
|
80 connections to net 18, and accepts connections to port 80 otherwise.
|
|
|
|
(Default: 'accept *:*'.)
|
2005-08-07 23:24:00 +02:00
|
|
|
.LP
|
|
|
|
.TP
|
2005-01-12 07:45:00 +01:00
|
|
|
\fBLongLivedPorts \fR\fIPORTS\fP
|
|
|
|
A list of ports for services that tend to have long-running connections
|
|
|
|
(e.g. chat and interactive shells). Circuits for streams that use these
|
|
|
|
ports will contain only high-uptime nodes, to reduce the chance that a
|
2005-05-23 16:02:26 +02:00
|
|
|
node will go down before the stream is finished. (Default: 21, 22, 706, 1863, 5050,
|
|
|
|
5190, 5222, 5223, 6667, 8300, 8888)
|
2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
|
|
|
.LP
|
2005-01-12 07:45:00 +01:00
|
|
|
.TP
|
2005-02-25 22:15:04 +01:00
|
|
|
\fBMapAddress\fR \fIaddress\fR \fInewaddress\fR
|
2005-05-23 16:02:26 +02:00
|
|
|
When a request for address arrives to Tor, it will rewrite it to newaddress before
|
|
|
|
processing it. For example, if you always want connections to www.indymedia.org to
|
|
|
|
exit via \fItorserver\fR (where \fItorserver\fR is the nickname of the server),
|
|
|
|
use "MapAddress www.indymedia.org www.indymedia.org.torserver.exit".
|
2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
|
|
|
.LP
|
2005-02-25 22:15:04 +01:00
|
|
|
.TP
|
2004-10-27 05:07:53 +02:00
|
|
|
\fBNewCircuitPeriod \fR\fINUM\fP
|
2005-05-15 03:37:34 +02:00
|
|
|
Every NUM seconds consider whether to build a new circuit. (Default: 30 seconds)
|
2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
|
|
|
.LP
|
2003-11-20 21:56:52 +01:00
|
|
|
.TP
|
2005-03-12 02:09:41 +01:00
|
|
|
\fBMaxCircuitDirtiness \fR\fINUM\fP
|
|
|
|
Feel free to reuse a circuit that was first used at most NUM seconds
|
2005-05-15 03:37:34 +02:00
|
|
|
ago, but never attach a new stream to a circuit that is too old. (Default: 10 minutes)
|
2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
|
|
|
.LP
|
2005-03-12 02:09:41 +01:00
|
|
|
.TP
|
2004-11-22 22:58:55 +01:00
|
|
|
\fBNodeFamily \fR\fInickname\fR,\fInickname\fR,\fI...\fP
|
2004-11-10 02:16:50 +01:00
|
|
|
The named Tor servers constitute a "family" of similar or co-administered
|
2004-11-10 01:36:58 +01:00
|
|
|
servers, so never use any two of them in the same circuit. Defining a
|
|
|
|
NodeFamily is only needed when a server doesn't list the family itself
|
|
|
|
(with MyFamily). This option can be used multiple times.
|
2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
|
|
|
.LP
|
2004-10-17 05:33:51 +02:00
|
|
|
.TP
|
2004-10-27 05:07:53 +02:00
|
|
|
.\" \fBPathlenCoinWeight \fR\fI0.0-1.0\fP
|
2005-05-23 16:02:26 +02:00
|
|
|
.\" Paths are 3 hops plus a geometric distribution centered around this coinweight.
|
|
|
|
.\" Must be >=0.0 and <1.0. (Default: 0.3) NOT USED CURRENTLY
|
2004-10-27 05:07:53 +02:00
|
|
|
.\" .TP
|
2004-11-22 22:58:55 +01:00
|
|
|
\fBRendNodes \fR\fInickname\fR,\fInickname\fR,\fI...\fP
|
2004-09-03 01:41:06 +02:00
|
|
|
A list of preferred nodes to use for the rendezvous point, if possible.
|
2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
|
|
|
.LP
|
2004-09-03 01:41:06 +02:00
|
|
|
.TP
|
2004-11-22 22:58:55 +01:00
|
|
|
\fBRendExcludeNodes \fR\fInickname\fR,\fInickname\fR,\fI...\fP
|
2004-09-03 01:41:06 +02:00
|
|
|
A list of nodes to never use when choosing a rendezvous point.
|
2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
|
|
|
.LP
|
2004-09-03 01:41:06 +02:00
|
|
|
.TP
|
2004-10-27 05:07:53 +02:00
|
|
|
\fBSOCKSPort \fR\fIPORT\fP
|
2005-05-12 14:58:49 +02:00
|
|
|
Advertise this port to listen for connections from SOCKS-speaking
|
|
|
|
applications. Set this to 0 if you don't want to allow application
|
|
|
|
connections. (Default: 9050)
|
2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
|
|
|
.LP
|
2003-11-20 21:56:52 +01:00
|
|
|
.TP
|
2005-05-12 14:58:49 +02:00
|
|
|
\fBSOCKSBindAddress \fR\fIIP\fR[:\fIPORT\fR]\fP
|
|
|
|
Bind to this address to listen for connections from SOCKS-speaking
|
|
|
|
applications. (Default: 127.0.0.1) You can also specify a port
|
|
|
|
(e.g. 192.168.0.1:9100). This directive can be specified multiple times
|
|
|
|
to bind to multiple addresses/ports.
|
2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
|
|
|
.LP
|
2004-06-07 21:09:05 +02:00
|
|
|
.TP
|
2004-11-22 22:58:55 +01:00
|
|
|
\fBSOCKSPolicy \fR\fIpolicy\fR,\fIpolicy\fR,\fI...\fP
|
2005-05-23 16:02:26 +02:00
|
|
|
Set an entrance policy for this server, to limit who can connect to the SOCKS ports.
|
|
|
|
The policies have the same form as exit policies below.
|
2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
|
|
|
.LP
|
2005-02-25 22:15:04 +01:00
|
|
|
.TP
|
2005-04-28 02:03:34 +02:00
|
|
|
\fBTrackHostExits \fR\fIhost\fR,\fI.domain\fR,\fI...\fR\fP
|
2005-02-25 22:15:04 +01:00
|
|
|
For each value in the comma separated list, Tor will track recent connections
|
|
|
|
to hosts that match this value and attempt to
|
|
|
|
reuse the same exit node for each. If the value is prepended with a '.', it is
|
|
|
|
treated as matching an entire domain. If one of the values is just a '.', it
|
|
|
|
means match everything. This option is useful if you frequently connect to
|
|
|
|
sites that will expire all your authentication cookies (ie log you out) if
|
|
|
|
your IP address changes. Note that this option does have the disadvantage of
|
|
|
|
making it more clear that a given history is
|
|
|
|
associated with a single user. However, most people who would wish to observe
|
|
|
|
this will observe it through cookies or other protocol-specific means anyhow.
|
2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
|
|
|
.LP
|
2005-02-25 22:15:04 +01:00
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
\fBTrackHostExitsExpire \fR\fINUM\fP
|
|
|
|
Since exit servers go up and down, it is desirable to expire the association
|
2005-07-12 23:06:31 +02:00
|
|
|
between host and exit server after NUM seconds. The default
|
2005-02-25 22:15:04 +01:00
|
|
|
is 1800 seconds (30 minutes).
|
2005-08-05 03:40:10 +02:00
|
|
|
.LP
|
|
|
|
.TP
|
2005-12-28 10:13:02 +01:00
|
|
|
\fBUseEntryNodes \fR\fI0|1\fP
|
|
|
|
If this option is set to 1, we pick a few long-term entry servers, and
|
|
|
|
try to stick with them.. This is desirable because
|
2005-08-05 03:40:10 +02:00
|
|
|
constantly changing servers increases the odds that an adversary who owns
|
|
|
|
some servers will observe a fraction of your paths.
|
|
|
|
(Defaults to 0; will eventually default to 1.)
|
|
|
|
.LP
|
|
|
|
.TP
|
2005-12-28 10:13:02 +01:00
|
|
|
\fBNumEntryNodes \fR\fINUM\fP
|
|
|
|
If UseEntryNodes is set to 1, we will try to pick a total of NUM routers
|
|
|
|
as long-term entries for our circuits.
|
2005-08-05 03:40:10 +02:00
|
|
|
(Defaults to 3.)
|
2003-11-20 21:56:52 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.SH SERVER OPTIONS
|
|
|
|
.PP
|
2004-10-27 05:07:53 +02:00
|
|
|
The following options are useful only for servers (that is, if \fBORPort\fP is non-zero):
|
2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
|
|
|
.LP
|
2003-11-20 21:56:52 +01:00
|
|
|
.TP
|
2004-10-27 05:07:53 +02:00
|
|
|
\fBAddress \fR\fIaddress\fP
|
2004-11-12 04:30:11 +01:00
|
|
|
The IP or fqdn of this server (e.g. moria.mit.edu). You can leave this
|
|
|
|
unset, and Tor will guess your IP.
|
2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
|
|
|
.LP
|
2003-11-20 21:56:52 +01:00
|
|
|
.TP
|
2005-08-27 00:57:24 +02:00
|
|
|
\fBAssumeReachable \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
|
|
|
|
This option is used when bootstrapping a new Tor network. If set to 1,
|
|
|
|
don't do self-reachability testing; just upload your server descriptor
|
|
|
|
immediately. If \fBAuthoritativeDirectory\fP is also set, this option
|
|
|
|
instructs the dirserver to bypass remote reachability testing too and
|
|
|
|
list all connected servers as running.
|
|
|
|
.LP
|
|
|
|
.TP
|
2004-11-22 22:58:55 +01:00
|
|
|
\fBContactInfo \fR\fIemail_address\fP
|
2004-11-12 04:29:03 +01:00
|
|
|
Administrative contact information for server.
|
2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
|
|
|
.LP
|
2003-11-20 21:56:52 +01:00
|
|
|
.TP
|
2004-11-22 22:58:55 +01:00
|
|
|
\fBExitPolicy \fR\fIpolicy\fR,\fIpolicy\fR,\fI...\fP
|
2004-04-06 03:00:26 +02:00
|
|
|
Set an exit policy for this server. Each policy is of the form
|
2005-05-24 18:59:29 +02:00
|
|
|
"\fBaccept\fP|\fBreject\fP \fIADDR\fP[\fB/\fP\fIMASK\fP]\fB[:\fP\fIPORT\fP]".
|
2004-06-07 21:09:05 +02:00
|
|
|
If \fB/\fP\fIMASK\fP is omitted then this policy just applies to the host
|
2004-04-06 03:00:26 +02:00
|
|
|
given. Instead of giving a host or network you can also use "\fB*\fP" to
|
2004-12-11 17:13:15 +01:00
|
|
|
denote the universe (0.0.0.0/0). \fIPORT\fP can be a single port number,
|
|
|
|
an interval of ports "\fIFROM_PORT\fP\fB-\fP\fITO_PORT\fP", or "\fB*\fP".
|
2005-05-24 18:59:29 +02:00
|
|
|
If \fiPORT\fP is omitted, that means "\fB*\fP".
|
2004-04-06 03:00:26 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
For example, "reject 127.0.0.1:*,reject 192.168.1.0/24:*,accept *:*" would
|
|
|
|
reject any traffic destined for localhost and any 192.168.1.* address, but
|
|
|
|
accept anything else.
|
2004-06-07 21:09:05 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2005-12-08 20:58:14 +01:00
|
|
|
To specify all internal and link-local networks (including 0.0.0.0/8,
|
|
|
|
169.254.0.0/16, 127.0.0.0/8, 192.168.0.0/16, 10.0.0.0/8, and
|
|
|
|
172.16.0.0/12), you can use the "private" alias instead of an address.
|
|
|
|
For example, to allow HTTP to 127.0.0.1 and block all other
|
|
|
|
connections to internal networks, you can say "accept
|
|
|
|
127.0.0.1:80,reject private:*". See RFC 1918 and RFC 3330 for more
|
2005-12-08 20:40:24 +01:00
|
|
|
details about internal and reserved IP address space.
|
|
|
|
|
2004-06-23 03:49:10 +02:00
|
|
|
This directive can be specified multiple times so you don't have to put
|
|
|
|
it all on one line.
|
|
|
|
|
2005-12-08 20:40:24 +01:00
|
|
|
Policies are considered first to last, and the first match wins. If
|
2004-12-11 17:13:15 +01:00
|
|
|
you want to _replace_ the default exit policy, end your exit policy with
|
|
|
|
either a reject *:* or an accept *:*. Otherwise, you're _augmenting_
|
|
|
|
(prepending to) the default exit policy. The default exit policy is:
|
2004-06-23 03:49:10 +02:00
|
|
|
.PD 0
|
|
|
|
.RS 12
|
2005-12-08 20:40:24 +01:00
|
|
|
.IP "reject private:*" 0
|
2005-03-11 06:18:18 +01:00
|
|
|
.IP "reject *:25"
|
|
|
|
.IP "reject *:119"
|
|
|
|
.IP "reject *:135-139"
|
|
|
|
.IP "reject *:445"
|
2005-09-10 00:47:08 +02:00
|
|
|
.IP "reject *:465"
|
|
|
|
.IP "reject *:587"
|
2004-08-08 07:33:15 +02:00
|
|
|
.IP "reject *:1214"
|
2005-02-04 00:44:10 +01:00
|
|
|
.IP "reject *:4661-4666"
|
|
|
|
.IP "reject *:6346-6429"
|
2005-03-11 06:18:18 +01:00
|
|
|
.IP "reject *:6699"
|
2005-02-04 00:44:10 +01:00
|
|
|
.IP "reject *:6881-6999"
|
2005-03-11 06:18:18 +01:00
|
|
|
.IP "accept *:*"
|
2004-06-23 03:49:10 +02:00
|
|
|
.RE
|
|
|
|
.PD
|
2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
|
|
|
.LP
|
2003-11-20 21:56:52 +01:00
|
|
|
.TP
|
2004-10-27 05:07:53 +02:00
|
|
|
\fBMaxOnionsPending \fR\fINUM\fP
|
2003-11-20 21:56:52 +01:00
|
|
|
If you have more than this number of onionskins queued for decrypt, reject new ones. (Default: 100)
|
2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
|
|
|
.LP
|
2003-11-20 21:56:52 +01:00
|
|
|
.TP
|
2004-11-22 22:58:55 +01:00
|
|
|
\fBMyFamily \fR\fInickname\fR,\fInickname\fR,\fI...\fP
|
2004-10-17 05:33:51 +02:00
|
|
|
Declare that this Tor server is controlled or administered by a group
|
2004-11-10 02:20:17 +01:00
|
|
|
or organization identical or similar to that of the other named servers.
|
2004-10-17 05:33:51 +02:00
|
|
|
When two servers both declare that they are in the same 'family', Tor clients
|
2005-03-12 00:53:07 +01:00
|
|
|
will not use them in the same circuit. (Each server only needs to list the
|
|
|
|
other servers in its family; it doesn't need to list itself, but it won't hurt.)
|
2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
|
|
|
.LP
|
2004-10-17 05:33:51 +02:00
|
|
|
.TP
|
2004-10-27 05:07:53 +02:00
|
|
|
\fBNickname \fR\fIname\fP
|
2003-11-20 21:56:52 +01:00
|
|
|
Set the server's nickname to 'name'.
|
2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
|
|
|
.LP
|
2003-11-20 21:56:52 +01:00
|
|
|
.TP
|
2005-06-09 11:01:42 +02:00
|
|
|
\fBNoPublish \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
|
|
|
|
If you set NoPublish 1, Tor will act as a server if you have an ORPort
|
|
|
|
defined, but it will not publish its descriptor to the dirservers. This
|
|
|
|
option is useful if you're testing out your server, or if you're using
|
|
|
|
alternate dirservers (e.g. for other Tor networks such as Blossom).
|
2005-06-09 11:03:12 +02:00
|
|
|
(Default: 0)
|
2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
|
|
|
.LP
|
2005-06-09 11:01:42 +02:00
|
|
|
.TP
|
2004-10-27 05:07:53 +02:00
|
|
|
\fBNumCPUs \fR\fInum\fP
|
2003-11-20 21:56:52 +01:00
|
|
|
How many processes to use at once for decrypting onionskins. (Default: 1)
|
2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
|
|
|
.LP
|
2003-11-20 21:56:52 +01:00
|
|
|
.TP
|
2004-10-27 05:07:53 +02:00
|
|
|
\fBORPort \fR\fIPORT\fP
|
2005-05-12 14:58:49 +02:00
|
|
|
Advertise this port to listen for connections from Tor clients and servers.
|
2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
|
|
|
.LP
|
2003-11-20 21:56:52 +01:00
|
|
|
.TP
|
2005-05-12 14:58:49 +02:00
|
|
|
\fBORBindAddress \fR\fIIP\fR[:\fIPORT\fR]\fP
|
|
|
|
Bind to this IP address to listen for connections from Tor clients and
|
|
|
|
servers. If you specify a port, bind to this port rather than the one
|
|
|
|
specified in ORPort. (Default: 0.0.0.0)
|
2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
|
|
|
.LP
|
2004-10-17 05:33:51 +02:00
|
|
|
.TP
|
2004-10-27 05:07:53 +02:00
|
|
|
\fBRedirectExit \fR\fIpattern target\fP
|
2004-10-17 05:33:51 +02:00
|
|
|
Whenever an outgoing connection tries to connect to one of a given set
|
2004-10-19 19:46:06 +02:00
|
|
|
of addresses, connect to \fItarget\fP (an \fIaddress:port\fP pair) instead.
|
|
|
|
The address
|
2004-10-17 05:33:51 +02:00
|
|
|
pattern is given in the same format as for an exit policy. The
|
|
|
|
address translation applies after exit policies are applied. Multiple
|
2004-10-27 05:07:53 +02:00
|
|
|
\fBRedirectExit\fP options can be used: once any one has matched
|
2004-10-19 19:46:06 +02:00
|
|
|
successfully, no subsequent rules are considered. You can specify that no
|
|
|
|
redirection is to be performed on a given set of addresses by using the
|
|
|
|
special target string "pass", which prevents subsequent rules from being
|
|
|
|
considered.
|
2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
|
|
|
.LP
|
2004-11-09 06:18:15 +01:00
|
|
|
.TP
|
2005-08-09 12:35:06 +02:00
|
|
|
\fBShutdownWaitLength\fR \fINUM\fP
|
2005-03-12 21:18:38 +01:00
|
|
|
When we get a SIGINT and we're a server, we begin shutting down: we close
|
|
|
|
listeners and start refusing new circuits. After \fBNUM\fP seconds,
|
|
|
|
we exit. If we get a second SIGINT, we exit immediately. (Default:
|
|
|
|
30 seconds)
|
2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
|
|
|
.LP
|
2005-03-12 21:18:38 +01:00
|
|
|
.TP
|
2004-11-22 22:58:55 +01:00
|
|
|
\fBDirPostPeriod \fR\fIN\fR \fBseconds\fR|\fBminutes\fR|\fBhours\fR|\fBdays\fR|\fBweeks\fP
|
|
|
|
Every time the specified period elapses, Tor uploads its server
|
|
|
|
descriptors to the directory servers. This information is also
|
2005-05-23 16:02:26 +02:00
|
|
|
uploaded whenever it changes. (Default: 20 minutes)
|
2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
|
|
|
.LP
|
2004-11-22 22:58:55 +01:00
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
\fBAccountingMax \fR\fIN\fR \fBbytes\fR|\fBKB\fR|\fBMB\fR|\fBGB\fR|\fBTB\fP
|
|
|
|
Never send more than the specified number of bytes in a given
|
2004-11-23 08:37:25 +01:00
|
|
|
accounting period, or receive more than that number in the period.
|
2005-05-01 21:36:56 +02:00
|
|
|
For example, with AccountingMax set to 1 GB, a server could send 900 MB
|
|
|
|
and receive 800 MB and continue running. It will only hibernate once one
|
|
|
|
of the two reaches 1 GB.
|
2004-11-22 22:58:55 +01:00
|
|
|
When the number of bytes is exhausted, Tor will hibernate until some
|
|
|
|
time in the next accounting period. To prevent all servers from
|
|
|
|
waking at the same time, Tor will also wait until a random point in
|
|
|
|
each period before waking up. If you have bandwidth cost issues,
|
2005-03-26 07:15:43 +01:00
|
|
|
enabling hibernation is preferable to setting a low bandwidth, since it
|
2004-11-09 06:18:15 +01:00
|
|
|
provides users with a collection of fast servers that are up some of
|
|
|
|
the time, which is more useful than a set of slow servers that are
|
|
|
|
always "available".
|
2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
|
|
|
.LP
|
2004-11-09 06:18:15 +01:00
|
|
|
.TP
|
2004-11-22 22:58:55 +01:00
|
|
|
\fBAccountingStart \fR\fBday\fR|\fBweek\fR|\fBmonth\fR [\fIday\fR] \fIHH:MM\fR\fP
|
|
|
|
Specify how long accounting periods last. If \fBmonth\fP is given,
|
|
|
|
each accounting period runs from the time \fIHH:MM\fR on the
|
|
|
|
\fIday\fRth day of one month to the same day and time of the next.
|
|
|
|
(The day must be between 1 and 28.) If \fBweek\fP is given, each
|
|
|
|
accounting period runs from the time \fIHH:MM\fR of the \fIday\fRth
|
|
|
|
day of one week to the same day and time of the next week, with Monday
|
|
|
|
as day 1 and Sunday as day 7. If \fBday\fR is given, each accounting
|
|
|
|
period runs from the time \fIHH:MM\fR each day to the same time on the
|
2004-11-23 23:35:22 +01:00
|
|
|
next day. All times are local, and given in 24-hour time. (Defaults to
|
|
|
|
"month 1 0:00".)
|
2003-11-20 21:56:52 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.SH DIRECTORY SERVER OPTIONS
|
|
|
|
.PP
|
2004-10-27 05:07:53 +02:00
|
|
|
The following options are useful only for directory servers (that is, if \fBDirPort\fP is non-zero):
|
2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
|
|
|
.LP
|
2003-11-20 21:56:52 +01:00
|
|
|
.TP
|
2004-11-07 23:36:43 +01:00
|
|
|
\fBAuthoritativeDirectory \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
|
2004-09-10 01:52:15 +02:00
|
|
|
When this option is set to 1, Tor operates as an authoritative
|
|
|
|
directory server. Instead of caching the directory, it generates its
|
|
|
|
own list of good servers, signs it, and sends that to the clients.
|
|
|
|
Unless the clients already have you listed as a trusted directory, you
|
|
|
|
probably do not want to set this option. Please coordinate with the other
|
|
|
|
admins at tor-ops@freehaven.net if you think you should be a directory.
|
2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
|
|
|
.LP
|
2004-09-10 01:52:15 +02:00
|
|
|
.TP
|
2004-10-27 05:07:53 +02:00
|
|
|
\fBDirPort \fR\fIPORT\fP
|
2005-05-12 14:58:49 +02:00
|
|
|
Advertise the directory service on this port.
|
2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
|
|
|
.LP
|
2003-11-20 21:56:52 +01:00
|
|
|
.TP
|
2005-05-12 14:58:49 +02:00
|
|
|
\fBDirBindAddress \fR\fIIP\fR[:\fIPORT\fR]\fP
|
|
|
|
Bind the directory service to this address. If you specify a port, bind
|
|
|
|
to this port rather than the one specified in DirPort. (Default: 0.0.0.0)
|
2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
|
|
|
.LP
|
2003-11-20 21:56:52 +01:00
|
|
|
.TP
|
2004-11-22 22:58:55 +01:00
|
|
|
\fBDirPolicy \fR\fIpolicy\fR,\fIpolicy\fR,\fI...\fP
|
2005-05-23 16:02:26 +02:00
|
|
|
Set an entrance policy for this server, to limit who can connect to the directory ports.
|
|
|
|
The policies have the same form as exit policies above.
|
2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
|
|
|
.LP
|
2004-10-27 08:29:11 +02:00
|
|
|
.TP
|
2004-10-27 05:07:53 +02:00
|
|
|
\fBRecommendedVersions \fR\fISTRING\fP
|
2004-10-17 05:33:51 +02:00
|
|
|
STRING is a command-separated list of Tor versions currently believed
|
|
|
|
to be safe. The list is included in each directory, and nodes which
|
|
|
|
pull down the directory learn whether they need to upgrade. This
|
|
|
|
option can appear multiple times: the values from multiple lines are
|
|
|
|
spliced together.
|
2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
|
|
|
.LP
|
2004-09-10 01:52:15 +02:00
|
|
|
.TP
|
2005-01-06 22:03:47 +01:00
|
|
|
\fBDirAllowPrivateAddresses \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
|
|
|
|
If set to 1, Tor will accept router descriptors with arbitrary "Address"
|
|
|
|
elements. Otherwise, if the address is not an IP or is a private IP,
|
|
|
|
it will reject the router descriptor. Defaults to 0.
|
2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
|
|
|
.LP
|
2005-01-06 22:03:47 +01:00
|
|
|
.TP
|
2004-11-07 23:36:43 +01:00
|
|
|
\fBRunTesting \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
|
2004-09-10 02:15:59 +02:00
|
|
|
If set to 1, Tor tries to build circuits through all of the servers it
|
2004-09-10 01:52:15 +02:00
|
|
|
knows about, so it can tell which are up and which are down. This
|
|
|
|
option is only useful for authoritative directories, so you probably
|
|
|
|
don't want to use it.
|
|
|
|
|
2004-10-27 05:07:53 +02:00
|
|
|
.SH HIDDEN SERVICE OPTIONS
|
2004-04-01 02:36:46 +02:00
|
|
|
.PP
|
|
|
|
The following options are used to configure a hidden service.
|
2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
|
|
|
.LP
|
2004-04-01 02:36:46 +02:00
|
|
|
.TP
|
2004-10-27 05:07:53 +02:00
|
|
|
\fBHiddenServiceDir \fR\fIDIRECTORY\fP
|
2004-04-01 02:36:46 +02:00
|
|
|
Store data files for a hidden service in DIRECTORY. Every hidden
|
|
|
|
service must have a separate directory. You may use this option multiple
|
|
|
|
times to specify multiple services.
|
2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
|
|
|
.LP
|
2004-04-01 02:36:46 +02:00
|
|
|
.TP
|
2004-10-27 05:07:53 +02:00
|
|
|
\fBHiddenServicePort \fR\fIVIRTPORT \fR[\fITARGET\fR]\fP
|
2004-04-01 02:36:46 +02:00
|
|
|
Configure a virtual port VIRTPORT for a hidden service. You may use this
|
|
|
|
option multiple times; each time applies to the service using the most recent
|
|
|
|
hiddenservicedir. By default, this option maps the virtual port to the
|
|
|
|
same port on 127.0.0.1. You may override the target port, address, or both
|
|
|
|
by specifying a target of addr, port, or addr:port.
|
2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
|
|
|
.LP
|
2004-04-08 08:30:15 +02:00
|
|
|
.TP
|
2004-11-22 22:58:55 +01:00
|
|
|
\fBHiddenServiceNodes \fR\fInickname\fR,\fInickname\fR,\fI...\fP
|
2004-04-08 08:30:15 +02:00
|
|
|
If possible, use the specified nodes as introduction points for the hidden
|
2005-01-18 22:53:11 +01:00
|
|
|
service. If this is left unset, Tor will be smart and pick some reasonable
|
|
|
|
ones; most people can leave this unset.
|
2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
|
|
|
.LP
|
2004-04-08 08:30:15 +02:00
|
|
|
.TP
|
2004-11-22 22:58:55 +01:00
|
|
|
\fBHiddenServiceExcludeNodes \fR\fInickname\fR,\fInickname\fR,\fI...\fP
|
2004-04-08 08:30:15 +02:00
|
|
|
Do not use the specified nodes as introduction points for the hidden
|
2005-01-18 22:53:11 +01:00
|
|
|
service. In normal use there is no reason to set this.
|
2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
|
|
|
.LP
|
2005-05-15 04:11:58 +02:00
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
\fBRendPostPeriod \fR\fIN\fR \fBseconds\fR|\fBminutes\fR|\fBhours\fR|\fBdays\fR|\fBweeks\fP
|
|
|
|
Every time the specified period elapses, Tor uploads any rendezvous
|
|
|
|
service descriptors to the directory servers. This information is also
|
2005-05-23 16:02:26 +02:00
|
|
|
uploaded whenever it changes. (Default: 20 minutes)
|
2004-04-01 02:36:46 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2004-09-03 01:41:06 +02:00
|
|
|
.\" UNDOCUMENTED
|
|
|
|
.\" ignoreversion
|
2004-09-10 01:52:15 +02:00
|
|
|
|
2004-11-16 03:19:55 +01:00
|
|
|
.SH SIGNALS
|
|
|
|
Tor catches the following signals:
|
2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
|
|
|
.LP
|
2004-11-16 03:19:55 +01:00
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
\fBSIGTERM\fR
|
|
|
|
Tor will catch this, clean up and sync to disk if necessary, and exit.
|
2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
|
|
|
.LP
|
2004-11-16 03:19:55 +01:00
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
\fBSIGINT\fR
|
|
|
|
Tor clients behave as with SIGTERM; but Tor servers will do a controlled
|
|
|
|
slow shutdown, closing listeners and waiting 30 seconds before exiting.
|
2005-04-26 02:52:21 +02:00
|
|
|
(The delay can be configured with the ShutdownWaitLength config option.)
|
2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
|
|
|
.LP
|
2004-11-16 03:19:55 +01:00
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
\fBSIGHUP\fR
|
2004-12-23 02:05:03 +01:00
|
|
|
The signal instructs Tor to reload its configuration (including closing
|
|
|
|
and reopening logs), fetch a new directory, and kill and restart its
|
|
|
|
helper processes if applicable.
|
2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
|
|
|
.LP
|
2004-11-16 03:19:55 +01:00
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
\fBSIGUSR1\fR
|
|
|
|
Log statistics about current connections, past connections, and
|
|
|
|
throughput.
|
2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
|
|
|
.LP
|
2004-11-16 03:19:55 +01:00
|
|
|
.TP
|
2004-11-20 08:35:20 +01:00
|
|
|
\fBSIGUSR2\fR
|
|
|
|
Switch all logs to loglevel debug. You can go back to the old loglevels
|
|
|
|
by sending a SIGHUP.
|
2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
|
|
|
.LP
|
2004-11-20 08:35:20 +01:00
|
|
|
.TP
|
2004-11-16 03:19:55 +01:00
|
|
|
\fBSIGCHLD\fR
|
|
|
|
Tor receives this signal when one of its helper processes has exited,
|
|
|
|
so it can clean up.
|
2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
|
|
|
.LP
|
2004-11-16 03:19:55 +01:00
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
\fBSIGPIPE\fR
|
|
|
|
Tor catches this signal and ignores it.
|
2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
|
|
|
.LP
|
2004-11-16 03:19:55 +01:00
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
\fBSIGXFSZ\fR
|
|
|
|
If this signal exists on your platform, Tor catches and ignores it.
|
|
|
|
|
2003-11-20 21:56:52 +01:00
|
|
|
.SH FILES
|
2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
|
|
|
.LP
|
2003-11-20 21:56:52 +01:00
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
.I @CONFDIR@/torrc
|
|
|
|
The configuration file, which contains "option value" pairs.
|
2005-06-26 10:57:25 +02:00
|
|
|
.LP
|
2003-11-20 21:56:52 +01:00
|
|
|
.TP
|
|
|
|
.I @LOCALSTATEDIR@/lib/tor/
|
2004-08-07 10:30:16 +02:00
|
|
|
The tor process stores keys and other data here.
|
2003-11-20 21:56:52 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.SH SEE ALSO
|
|
|
|
.BR privoxy (1),
|
2004-11-07 23:36:43 +01:00
|
|
|
.BR tsocks (1),
|
|
|
|
.BR torify (1)
|
2003-11-20 21:56:52 +01:00
|
|
|
|
2004-12-24 06:06:51 +01:00
|
|
|
.BR http://tor.eff.org/
|
2003-11-20 21:56:52 +01:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
.SH BUGS
|
2005-05-15 04:11:58 +02:00
|
|
|
Plenty, probably. Tor is still in development. Please report them.
|
2003-11-20 21:56:52 +01:00
|
|
|
.SH AUTHORS
|
2004-08-07 10:30:16 +02:00
|
|
|
Roger Dingledine <arma@mit.edu>, Nick Mathewson <nickm@alum.mit.edu>.
|