Document remaining configuration options; add a ccheck for redundant authentication mechanisms in options_validate; add TODO items for post-009 hibernation features

svn:r2833
This commit is contained in:
Nick Mathewson 2004-11-13 17:17:04 +00:00
parent 08627d5d87
commit dc48e7aeed
3 changed files with 36 additions and 5 deletions

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@ -26,10 +26,11 @@ N - clients now have certs, which means we warn when their certs have
R - fix print_usage()
- Download and use running-routers
R - document signals in man page
N - Document all undocumented configuration options.
- Accounting
- Control interface authentication
- ... ?
N - Check for hibernation on startup, hup, etc.
- Test hibernation a lot.
o Document all undocumented configuration options.
o Accounting
o Control interface authentication
N - RPMs
o Merge changes from jbash
- Figure out versioning
@ -43,6 +44,9 @@ Beyond 0.0.9:
- controller should have 'getinfo' command to query about rephist,
about rendezvous status, etc.
- weasel wants to say 50GB rather than 50000000 in config ints.
- Better hibernation flexibility
- Add hibernation intervals for weeks, days.
- Start at a time other than 0:00 GMT.
- allow transition from ORPort to !ORPort, and back
R . bandwidth buckets for write as well as read.
- Limit to 2 dir, 2 OR, N SOCKS connections per IP.

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@ -85,6 +85,27 @@ If 1, Tor forks and daemonizes to the background. (Default: 0)
.TP
\fBUser \fR\fIUID\fP
On startup, setuid to this user.
.TP
\fBControlPort \fR\fIPort\fP
If set, Tor will accept connections from the same machine (localhost only) on
this port, and allow those connections to control the Tor process using the
Tor Control Protocol (described in control-spec.txt). Note: unless you also
specify one of \fBHashedControlPassword\fP or \fBCookieAuthentication\fP,
setting this option will cause Tor to allow any process on the local host to
control it.
.TP
\fBHashedControlPassword \fR\fIhashed_password\fP
Don't allow any connections on the control port except when the other process
knows the password whose one-way hash is \fIhashed_password\fP. You can
compute the hash of a password by running "tor --hash-password
\fIpassword\fP".
.TP
\fBCookieAuthentication \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fP
If this option is set to 1, don't allow any connections on the control port
except when the connecting process knows the contents of a file named
"control_auth_cookie", which Tor will create in its data directory. This
authentication methods should only be used on systems with good filesystem
security.
.SH CLIENT OPTIONS
.PP
@ -223,7 +244,8 @@ If you have more than this number of onionskins queued for decrypt, reject new o
Declare that this Tor server is controlled or administered by a group
or organization identical or similar to that of the other named servers.
When two servers both declare that they are in the same 'family', Tor clients
will not use them in the same circuit.
will not use them in the same circuit. (Each server only need to list the
other servers in its family; it doesn't need to list itself.)
.TP
\fBNickname \fR\fIname\fP
Set the server's nickname to 'name'.

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@ -1317,6 +1317,11 @@ options_validate(or_options_t *options)
result = -1;
}
}
if (options->HashedControlPassword && options->CookieAuthentication) {
log_fn(LOG_WARN,"Cannot enable both HashedControlPassword and CookieAuthentication");
result = -1;
}
if (check_nickname_list(options->ExitNodes, "ExitNodes"))
result = -1;
if (check_nickname_list(options->EntryNodes, "EntryNodes"))