make connection_tls_finish_handshake() more plausible.

now we accept connections from unknown routers.


svn:r2074
This commit is contained in:
Roger Dingledine 2004-07-21 02:25:14 +00:00
parent 334de84cbe
commit e547ab293b
3 changed files with 21 additions and 22 deletions

View File

@ -957,7 +957,7 @@ static routerinfo_t *choose_good_exit_server(uint8_t purpose, routerlist_t *dir)
}
/** Allocate a cpath_build_state_t, populate it based on
* <b>purpose</b> and <b>exit_nickname</b> (if specified), and
* <b>purpose</b> and <b>exit_digest</b> (if specified), and
* return it.
*/
static cpath_build_state_t *

View File

@ -941,7 +941,7 @@ int connection_ap_can_use_exit(connection_t *conn, routerinfo_t *exit)
if (conn->socks_request->command == SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE) {
/* 0.0.7 servers and earlier don't support DNS resolution. There are no
* ORs running code before 0.0.7, so we only worry about 0.0.7. Once all
* servers are running 0.0.8, remove this check. */
* servers are running 0.0.8, remove this check. XXX */
return strncmp(exit->platform, "Tor 0.0.7", 9) ? 1 : 0;
}
addr = client_dns_lookup_entry(conn->socks_request->address);

View File

@ -245,6 +245,12 @@ int connection_tls_continue_handshake(connection_t *conn) {
return 0;
}
static int digest_is_nonzero(const char *id) {
char ZERO_DIGEST[DIGEST_LEN];
memset(ZERO_DIGEST, 0, DIGEST_LEN);
return !memcmp(ZERO_DIGEST, id, DIGEST_LEN);
}
/** The tls handshake is finished.
*
* Make sure we are happy with the person we just handshaked with:
@ -270,6 +276,7 @@ connection_tls_finish_handshake(connection_t *conn) {
char nickname[MAX_NICKNAME_LEN+1];
connection_t *c;
crypto_pk_env_t *identity_rcvd=NULL;
char digest_rcvd[DIGEST_LEN];
conn->state = OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN;
connection_watch_events(conn, POLLIN);
@ -291,32 +298,24 @@ connection_tls_finish_handshake(connection_t *conn) {
}
log_fn(LOG_DEBUG, "Other side (%s:%d) claims to be '%s'", conn->address,
conn->port, nickname);
router = router_get_by_nickname(nickname);
/* XXX008 here we need to tolerate unknown routers, so ORs can
* connect to us even when we don't know they're verified. This
* should probably be a call to router_get_by_digest() now, since
* we can't trust the nickname some guy shows up with. */
if (!router) {
log_fn(LOG_INFO, "Unrecognized router with nickname '%s' at %s:%d",
nickname, conn->address, conn->port);
return -1;
}
if(tor_tls_verify(conn->tls, &identity_rcvd)<0) {
if(tor_tls_verify(conn->tls, &identity_rcvd) < 0) {
log_fn(LOG_WARN,"Other side '%s' (%s:%d) has a cert but it's invalid. Closing.",
nickname, conn->address, conn->port);
return -1;
}
log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"The router's cert is valid.");
if(crypto_pk_cmp_keys(identity_rcvd, router->identity_pkey) != 0) {
crypto_free_pk_env(identity_rcvd);
crypto_pk_get_digest(identity_rcvd, digest_rcvd);
crypto_free_pk_env(identity_rcvd);
router = router_get_by_nickname(nickname);
if(router && /* we know this nickname; make sure it's the right guy */
memcmp(digest_rcvd, router->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN) != 0) {
log_fn(LOG_WARN, "Identity key not as expected for %s", nickname);
return -1;
}
crypto_free_pk_env(identity_rcvd);
/* XXXX008 This isn't right; fix this one we launch by identity digest
* XXXX008 rather than by nickname */
if (conn->nickname) {
if (digest_is_nonzero(conn->identity_digest)) {
/* I initiated this connection. */
if (strcasecmp(conn->nickname, nickname)) {
log_fn(options.DirPort ? LOG_WARN : LOG_INFO,
@ -325,11 +324,11 @@ connection_tls_finish_handshake(connection_t *conn) {
return -1;
}
} else {
if((c=connection_get_by_identity_digest(router->identity_digest, CONN_TYPE_OR))) {
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Router %s is already connected on fd %d. Dropping fd %d.", router->nickname, c->s, conn->s);
if((c=connection_get_by_identity_digest(digest_rcvd, CONN_TYPE_OR))) {
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Router %s is already connected on fd %d. Dropping fd %d.", nickname, c->s, conn->s);
return -1;
}
connection_or_init_conn_from_router(conn,router);
connection_or_init_conn_from_address(conn,conn->addr,conn->port,digest_rcvd);
}
if (!server_mode()) { /* If I'm an OP... */