tor/src/or/command.c

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2006-02-09 06:46:49 +01:00
/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
* Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
* Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
2011-01-03 17:50:39 +01:00
* Copyright (c) 2007-2011, The Tor Project, Inc. */
/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
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/**
* \file command.c
* \brief Functions for processing incoming cells.
**/
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/* In-points to command.c:
*
* - command_process_cell(), called from
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* connection_or_process_cells_from_inbuf() in connection_or.c
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*/
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#include "or.h"
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#include "circuitbuild.h"
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#include "circuitlist.h"
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#include "command.h"
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#include "connection.h"
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#include "connection_or.h"
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#include "config.h"
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#include "control.h"
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#include "cpuworker.h"
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#include "hibernate.h"
Initial conversion to use node_t throughout our codebase. A node_t is an abstraction over routerstatus_t, routerinfo_t, and microdesc_t. It should try to present a consistent interface to all of them. There should be a node_t for a server whenever there is * A routerinfo_t for it in the routerlist * A routerstatus_t in the current_consensus. (note that a microdesc_t alone isn't enough to make a node_t exist, since microdescriptors aren't usable on their own.) There are three ways to get a node_t right now: looking it up by ID, looking it up by nickname, and iterating over the whole list of microdescriptors. All (or nearly all) functions that are supposed to return "a router" -- especially those used in building connections and circuits -- should return a node_t, not a routerinfo_t or a routerstatus_t. A node_t should hold all the *mutable* flags about a node. This patch moves the is_foo flags from routerinfo_t into node_t. The flags in routerstatus_t remain, but they get set from the consensus and should not change. Some other highlights of this patch are: * Looking up routerinfo and routerstatus by nickname is now unified and based on the "look up a node by nickname" function. This tries to look only at the values from current consensus, and not get confused by the routerinfo_t->is_named flag, which could get set for other weird reasons. This changes the behavior of how authorities (when acting as clients) deal with nodes that have been listed by nickname. * I tried not to artificially increase the size of the diff here by moving functions around. As a result, some functions that now operate on nodes are now in the wrong file -- they should get moved to nodelist.c once this refactoring settles down. This moving should happen as part of a patch that moves functions AND NOTHING ELSE. * Some old code is now left around inside #if 0/1 blocks, and should get removed once I've verified that I don't want it sitting around to see how we used to do things. There are still some unimplemented functions: these are flagged with "UNIMPLEMENTED_NODELIST()." I'll work on filling in the implementation here, piece by piece. I wish this patch could have been smaller, but there did not seem to be any piece of it that was independent from the rest. Moving flags forces many functions that once returned routerinfo_t * to return node_t *, which forces their friends to change, and so on.
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#include "nodelist.h"
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#include "onion.h"
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#include "relay.h"
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#include "router.h"
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#include "routerlist.h"
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/** How many CELL_PADDING cells have we received, ever? */
uint64_t stats_n_padding_cells_processed = 0;
/** How many CELL_CREATE cells have we received, ever? */
uint64_t stats_n_create_cells_processed = 0;
/** How many CELL_CREATED cells have we received, ever? */
uint64_t stats_n_created_cells_processed = 0;
/** How many CELL_RELAY cells have we received, ever? */
uint64_t stats_n_relay_cells_processed = 0;
/** How many CELL_DESTROY cells have we received, ever? */
uint64_t stats_n_destroy_cells_processed = 0;
/** How many CELL_VERSIONS cells have we received, ever? */
uint64_t stats_n_versions_cells_processed = 0;
/** How many CELL_NETINFO cells have we received, ever? */
uint64_t stats_n_netinfo_cells_processed = 0;
/* These are the main functions for processing cells */
static void command_process_create_cell(cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn);
static void command_process_created_cell(cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn);
static void command_process_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn);
static void command_process_destroy_cell(cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn);
static void command_process_versions_cell(var_cell_t *cell,
or_connection_t *conn);
static void command_process_netinfo_cell(cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn);
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#ifdef KEEP_TIMING_STATS
/** This is a wrapper function around the actual function that processes the
* <b>cell</b> that just arrived on <b>conn</b>. Increment <b>*time</b>
* by the number of microseconds used by the call to <b>*func(cell, conn)</b>.
*/
static void
command_time_process_cell(cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn, int *time,
void (*func)(cell_t *, or_connection_t *))
{
struct timeval start, end;
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long time_passed;
tor_gettimeofday(&start);
(*func)(cell, conn);
tor_gettimeofday(&end);
time_passed = tv_udiff(&start, &end) ;
if (time_passed > 10000) { /* more than 10ms */
log_debug(LD_OR,"That call just took %ld ms.",time_passed/1000);
}
if (time_passed < 0) {
log_info(LD_GENERAL,"That call took us back in time!");
time_passed = 0;
}
*time += time_passed;
}
#endif
/** Process a <b>cell</b> that was just received on <b>conn</b>. Keep internal
* statistics about how many of each cell we've processed so far
* this second, and the total number of microseconds it took to
* process each type of cell.
*/
void
command_process_cell(cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
{
int handshaking = (conn->_base.state == OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V2);
#ifdef KEEP_TIMING_STATS
/* how many of each cell have we seen so far this second? needs better
* name. */
static int num_create=0, num_created=0, num_relay=0, num_destroy=0;
/* how long has it taken to process each type of cell? */
static int create_time=0, created_time=0, relay_time=0, destroy_time=0;
static time_t current_second = 0; /* from previous calls to time */
time_t now = time(NULL);
if (now > current_second) { /* the second has rolled over */
/* print stats */
log_info(LD_OR,
"At end of second: %d creates (%d ms), %d createds (%d ms), "
"%d relays (%d ms), %d destroys (%d ms)",
num_create, create_time/1000,
num_created, created_time/1000,
num_relay, relay_time/1000,
num_destroy, destroy_time/1000);
/* zero out stats */
num_create = num_created = num_relay = num_destroy = 0;
create_time = created_time = relay_time = destroy_time = 0;
/* remember which second it is, for next time */
current_second = now;
}
#endif
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#ifdef KEEP_TIMING_STATS
#define PROCESS_CELL(tp, cl, cn) STMT_BEGIN { \
++num ## tp; \
command_time_process_cell(cl, cn, & tp ## time , \
command_process_ ## tp ## _cell); \
} STMT_END
#else
#define PROCESS_CELL(tp, cl, cn) command_process_ ## tp ## _cell(cl, cn)
#endif
/* Reject all but VERSIONS and NETINFO when handshaking. */
if (handshaking && cell->command != CELL_VERSIONS &&
cell->command != CELL_NETINFO)
return;
switch (cell->command) {
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case CELL_PADDING:
++stats_n_padding_cells_processed;
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/* do nothing */
break;
case CELL_CREATE:
case CELL_CREATE_FAST:
++stats_n_create_cells_processed;
PROCESS_CELL(create, cell, conn);
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break;
case CELL_CREATED:
case CELL_CREATED_FAST:
++stats_n_created_cells_processed;
PROCESS_CELL(created, cell, conn);
break;
case CELL_RELAY:
case CELL_RELAY_EARLY:
++stats_n_relay_cells_processed;
PROCESS_CELL(relay, cell, conn);
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break;
case CELL_DESTROY:
++stats_n_destroy_cells_processed;
PROCESS_CELL(destroy, cell, conn);
break;
case CELL_VERSIONS:
tor_fragile_assert();
break;
case CELL_NETINFO:
++stats_n_netinfo_cells_processed;
PROCESS_CELL(netinfo, cell, conn);
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break;
default:
log_fn(LOG_INFO, LD_PROTOCOL,
"Cell of unknown type (%d) received. Dropping.", cell->command);
break;
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}
}
/** Process a <b>cell</b> that was just received on <b>conn</b>. Keep internal
* statistics about how many of each cell we've processed so far
* this second, and the total number of microseconds it took to
* process each type of cell.
*/
void
command_process_var_cell(var_cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
{
#ifdef KEEP_TIMING_STATS
/* how many of each cell have we seen so far this second? needs better
* name. */
static int num_versions=0, num_cert=0;
time_t now = time(NULL);
if (now > current_second) { /* the second has rolled over */
/* print stats */
log_info(LD_OR,
"At end of second: %d versions (%d ms), %d cert (%d ms)",
num_versions, versions_time/1000,
cert, cert_time/1000);
num_versions = num_cert = 0;
versions_time = cert_time = 0;
/* remember which second it is, for next time */
current_second = now;
}
#endif
/* reject all when not handshaking. */
if (conn->_base.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V2)
return;
switch (cell->command) {
case CELL_VERSIONS:
++stats_n_versions_cells_processed;
PROCESS_CELL(versions, cell, conn);
break;
default:
log_fn(LOG_INFO, LD_PROTOCOL,
"Variable-length cell of unknown type (%d) received.",
cell->command);
break;
}
}
/** Process a 'create' <b>cell</b> that just arrived from <b>conn</b>. Make a
* new circuit with the p_circ_id specified in cell. Put the circuit in state
* onionskin_pending, and pass the onionskin to the cpuworker. Circ will get
* picked up again when the cpuworker finishes decrypting it.
*/
static void
command_process_create_cell(cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
{
or_circuit_t *circ;
int id_is_high;
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if (we_are_hibernating()) {
log_info(LD_OR,
"Received create cell but we're shutting down. Sending back "
"destroy.");
connection_or_send_destroy(cell->circ_id, conn,
END_CIRC_REASON_HIBERNATING);
return;
}
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if (!server_mode(get_options())) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
"Received create cell (type %d) from %s:%d, but we're a client. "
"Sending back a destroy.",
(int)cell->command, conn->_base.address, conn->_base.port);
connection_or_send_destroy(cell->circ_id, conn,
END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL);
return;
}
/* If the high bit of the circuit ID is not as expected, close the
* circ. */
id_is_high = cell->circ_id & (1<<15);
if ((id_is_high && conn->circ_id_type == CIRC_ID_TYPE_HIGHER) ||
(!id_is_high && conn->circ_id_type == CIRC_ID_TYPE_LOWER)) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
"Received create cell with unexpected circ_id %d. Closing.",
cell->circ_id);
connection_or_send_destroy(cell->circ_id, conn,
END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL);
return;
}
if (circuit_id_in_use_on_orconn(cell->circ_id, conn)) {
Initial conversion to use node_t throughout our codebase. A node_t is an abstraction over routerstatus_t, routerinfo_t, and microdesc_t. It should try to present a consistent interface to all of them. There should be a node_t for a server whenever there is * A routerinfo_t for it in the routerlist * A routerstatus_t in the current_consensus. (note that a microdesc_t alone isn't enough to make a node_t exist, since microdescriptors aren't usable on their own.) There are three ways to get a node_t right now: looking it up by ID, looking it up by nickname, and iterating over the whole list of microdescriptors. All (or nearly all) functions that are supposed to return "a router" -- especially those used in building connections and circuits -- should return a node_t, not a routerinfo_t or a routerstatus_t. A node_t should hold all the *mutable* flags about a node. This patch moves the is_foo flags from routerinfo_t into node_t. The flags in routerstatus_t remain, but they get set from the consensus and should not change. Some other highlights of this patch are: * Looking up routerinfo and routerstatus by nickname is now unified and based on the "look up a node by nickname" function. This tries to look only at the values from current consensus, and not get confused by the routerinfo_t->is_named flag, which could get set for other weird reasons. This changes the behavior of how authorities (when acting as clients) deal with nodes that have been listed by nickname. * I tried not to artificially increase the size of the diff here by moving functions around. As a result, some functions that now operate on nodes are now in the wrong file -- they should get moved to nodelist.c once this refactoring settles down. This moving should happen as part of a patch that moves functions AND NOTHING ELSE. * Some old code is now left around inside #if 0/1 blocks, and should get removed once I've verified that I don't want it sitting around to see how we used to do things. There are still some unimplemented functions: these are flagged with "UNIMPLEMENTED_NODELIST()." I'll work on filling in the implementation here, piece by piece. I wish this patch could have been smaller, but there did not seem to be any piece of it that was independent from the rest. Moving flags forces many functions that once returned routerinfo_t * to return node_t *, which forces their friends to change, and so on.
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const node_t *node = node_get_by_id(conn->identity_digest);
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
"Received CREATE cell (circID %d) for known circ. "
"Dropping (age %d).",
cell->circ_id, (int)(time(NULL) - conn->_base.timestamp_created));
if (node) {
char *p = esc_for_log(node_get_platform(node));
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
"Details: router %s, platform %s.",
node_describe(node), p);
tor_free(p);
}
return;
}
circ = or_circuit_new(cell->circ_id, conn);
circ->_base.purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_OR;
circuit_set_state(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), CIRCUIT_STATE_ONIONSKIN_PENDING);
if (cell->command == CELL_CREATE) {
char *onionskin = tor_malloc(ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN);
memcpy(onionskin, cell->payload, ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN);
/* hand it off to the cpuworkers, and then return. */
if (assign_onionskin_to_cpuworker(NULL, circ, onionskin) < 0) {
#define WARN_HANDOFF_FAILURE_INTERVAL (6*60*60)
static ratelim_t handoff_warning =
RATELIM_INIT(WARN_HANDOFF_FAILURE_INTERVAL);
char *m;
if ((m = rate_limit_log(&handoff_warning, approx_time()))) {
log_warn(LD_GENERAL,"Failed to hand off onionskin. Closing.%s",m);
tor_free(m);
}
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL);
return;
}
log_debug(LD_OR,"success: handed off onionskin.");
} else {
/* This is a CREATE_FAST cell; we can handle it immediately without using
* a CPU worker. */
char keys[CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN];
char reply[DIGEST_LEN*2];
tor_assert(cell->command == CELL_CREATE_FAST);
if (fast_server_handshake(cell->payload, (uint8_t*)reply,
(uint8_t*)keys, sizeof(keys))<0) {
log_warn(LD_OR,"Failed to generate key material. Closing.");
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL);
return;
}
if (onionskin_answer(circ, CELL_CREATED_FAST, reply, keys)<0) {
log_warn(LD_OR,"Failed to reply to CREATE_FAST cell. Closing.");
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL);
return;
}
}
}
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/** Process a 'created' <b>cell</b> that just arrived from <b>conn</b>.
* Find the circuit
* that it's intended for. If we're not the origin of the circuit, package
* the 'created' cell in an 'extended' relay cell and pass it back. If we
* are the origin of the circuit, send it to circuit_finish_handshake() to
* finish processing keys, and then call circuit_send_next_onion_skin() to
* extend to the next hop in the circuit if necessary.
*/
static void
command_process_created_cell(cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
{
circuit_t *circ;
circ = circuit_get_by_circid_orconn(cell->circ_id, conn);
if (!circ) {
log_info(LD_OR,
"(circID %d) unknown circ (probably got a destroy earlier). "
"Dropping.", cell->circ_id);
return;
}
if (circ->n_circ_id != cell->circ_id) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN,LD_PROTOCOL,
"got created cell from Tor client? Closing.");
circuit_mark_for_close(circ, END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL);
return;
}
if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) { /* we're the OP. Handshake this. */
origin_circuit_t *origin_circ = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ);
int err_reason = 0;
log_debug(LD_OR,"at OP. Finishing handshake.");
if ((err_reason = circuit_finish_handshake(origin_circ, cell->command,
cell->payload)) < 0) {
log_warn(LD_OR,"circuit_finish_handshake failed.");
circuit_mark_for_close(circ, -err_reason);
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return;
}
log_debug(LD_OR,"Moving to next skin.");
if ((err_reason = circuit_send_next_onion_skin(origin_circ)) < 0) {
log_info(LD_OR,"circuit_send_next_onion_skin failed.");
/* XXX push this circuit_close lower */
circuit_mark_for_close(circ, -err_reason);
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return;
}
} else { /* pack it into an extended relay cell, and send it. */
log_debug(LD_OR,
"Converting created cell to extended relay cell, sending.");
relay_send_command_from_edge(0, circ, RELAY_COMMAND_EXTENDED,
(char*)cell->payload, ONIONSKIN_REPLY_LEN,
NULL);
}
}
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/** Process a 'relay' or 'relay_early' <b>cell</b> that just arrived from
* <b>conn</b>. Make sure it came in with a recognized circ_id. Pass it on to
* circuit_receive_relay_cell() for actual processing.
*/
static void
command_process_relay_cell(cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
{
circuit_t *circ;
int reason, direction;
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circ = circuit_get_by_circid_orconn(cell->circ_id, conn);
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if (!circ) {
log_debug(LD_OR,
"unknown circuit %d on connection from %s:%d. Dropping.",
cell->circ_id, conn->_base.address, conn->_base.port);
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return;
}
if (circ->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_ONIONSKIN_PENDING) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN,LD_PROTOCOL,"circuit in create_wait. Closing.");
circuit_mark_for_close(circ, END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL);
return;
}
if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) {
/* if we're a relay and treating connections with recent local
* traffic better, then this is one of them. */
conn->client_used = time(NULL);
}
if (!CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ) &&
cell->circ_id == TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->p_circ_id)
direction = CELL_DIRECTION_OUT;
else
direction = CELL_DIRECTION_IN;
/* If we have a relay_early cell, make sure that it's outbound, and we've
* gotten no more than MAX_RELAY_EARLY_CELLS_PER_CIRCUIT of them. */
if (cell->command == CELL_RELAY_EARLY) {
if (direction == CELL_DIRECTION_IN) {
/* Allow an unlimited number of inbound relay_early cells,
* for hidden service compatibility. There isn't any way to make
* a long circuit through inbound relay_early cells anyway. See
* bug 1038. -RD */
} else {
or_circuit_t *or_circ = TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ);
if (or_circ->remaining_relay_early_cells == 0) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR,
"Received too many RELAY_EARLY cells on circ %d from %s:%d."
" Closing circuit.",
cell->circ_id, safe_str(conn->_base.address),
conn->_base.port);
circuit_mark_for_close(circ, END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL);
return;
}
--or_circ->remaining_relay_early_cells;
}
}
if ((reason = circuit_receive_relay_cell(cell, circ, direction)) < 0) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN,LD_PROTOCOL,"circuit_receive_relay_cell "
"(%s) failed. Closing.",
direction==CELL_DIRECTION_OUT?"forward":"backward");
circuit_mark_for_close(circ, -reason);
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}
}
/** Process a 'destroy' <b>cell</b> that just arrived from
* <b>conn</b>. Find the circ that it refers to (if any).
*
* If the circ is in state
* onionskin_pending, then call onion_pending_remove() to remove it
* from the pending onion list (note that if it's already being
* processed by the cpuworker, it won't be in the list anymore; but
* when the cpuworker returns it, the circuit will be gone, and the
* cpuworker response will be dropped).
*
* Then mark the circuit for close (which marks all edges for close,
* and passes the destroy cell onward if necessary).
*/
static void
command_process_destroy_cell(cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
{
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circuit_t *circ;
int reason;
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circ = circuit_get_by_circid_orconn(cell->circ_id, conn);
reason = (uint8_t)cell->payload[0];
if (!circ) {
log_info(LD_OR,"unknown circuit %d on connection from %s:%d. Dropping.",
cell->circ_id, conn->_base.address, conn->_base.port);
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return;
}
log_debug(LD_OR,"Received for circID %d.",cell->circ_id);
if (!CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ) &&
cell->circ_id == TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->p_circ_id) {
/* the destroy came from behind */
circuit_set_p_circid_orconn(TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ), 0, NULL);
circuit_mark_for_close(circ, reason|END_CIRC_REASON_FLAG_REMOTE);
} else { /* the destroy came from ahead */
circuit_set_n_circid_orconn(circ, 0, NULL);
if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) {
circuit_mark_for_close(circ, reason|END_CIRC_REASON_FLAG_REMOTE);
} else {
char payload[1];
log_debug(LD_OR, "Delivering 'truncated' back.");
payload[0] = (char)reason;
relay_send_command_from_edge(0, circ, RELAY_COMMAND_TRUNCATED,
payload, sizeof(payload), NULL);
}
}
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}
/** Process a 'versions' cell. The current link protocol version must be 0
* to indicate that no version has yet been negotiated. We compare the
* versions in the cell to the list of versions we support, pick the
* highest version we have in common, and continue the negotiation from
* there.
*/
static void
command_process_versions_cell(var_cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
{
int highest_supported_version = 0;
const uint8_t *cp, *end;
if (conn->link_proto != 0 ||
conn->_base.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V2 ||
(conn->handshake_state && conn->handshake_state->received_versions)) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR,
"Received a VERSIONS cell on a connection with its version "
"already set to %d; dropping", (int) conn->link_proto);
return;
}
tor_assert(conn->handshake_state);
end = cell->payload + cell->payload_len;
for (cp = cell->payload; cp+1 < end; ++cp) {
uint16_t v = ntohs(get_uint16(cp));
if (is_or_protocol_version_known(v) && v > highest_supported_version)
highest_supported_version = v;
}
if (!highest_supported_version) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR,
"Couldn't find a version in common between my version list and the "
"list in the VERSIONS cell; closing connection.");
connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
return;
} else if (highest_supported_version == 1) {
/* Negotiating version 1 makes no sense, since version 1 has no VERSIONS
* cells. */
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR,
"Used version negotiation protocol to negotiate a v1 connection. "
"That's crazily non-compliant. Closing connection.");
connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
return;
}
conn->link_proto = highest_supported_version;
conn->handshake_state->received_versions = 1;
log_info(LD_OR, "Negotiated version %d with %s:%d; sending NETINFO.",
highest_supported_version,
safe_str_client(conn->_base.address),
conn->_base.port);
tor_assert(conn->link_proto >= 2);
if (connection_or_send_netinfo(conn) < 0) {
connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
return;
}
}
/** Process a 'netinfo' cell: read and act on its contents, and set the
* connection state to "open". */
static void
command_process_netinfo_cell(cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
{
time_t timestamp;
uint8_t my_addr_type;
uint8_t my_addr_len;
const uint8_t *my_addr_ptr;
const uint8_t *cp, *end;
uint8_t n_other_addrs;
time_t now = time(NULL);
long apparent_skew = 0;
uint32_t my_apparent_addr = 0;
if (conn->link_proto < 2) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR,
"Received a NETINFO cell on %s connection; dropping.",
conn->link_proto == 0 ? "non-versioned" : "a v1");
return;
}
if (conn->_base.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V2) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR,
"Received a NETINFO cell on non-handshaking connection; dropping.");
return;
}
tor_assert(conn->handshake_state &&
conn->handshake_state->received_versions);
/* Decode the cell. */
timestamp = ntohl(get_uint32(cell->payload));
if (labs(now - conn->handshake_state->sent_versions_at) < 180) {
apparent_skew = now - timestamp;
}
my_addr_type = (uint8_t) cell->payload[4];
my_addr_len = (uint8_t) cell->payload[5];
my_addr_ptr = (uint8_t*) cell->payload + 6;
end = cell->payload + CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE;
cp = cell->payload + 6 + my_addr_len;
if (cp >= end) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR,
"Addresses too long in netinfo cell; closing connection.");
connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
return;
} else if (my_addr_type == RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV4 && my_addr_len == 4) {
my_apparent_addr = ntohl(get_uint32(my_addr_ptr));
}
n_other_addrs = (uint8_t) *cp++;
while (n_other_addrs && cp < end-2) {
/* Consider all the other addresses; if any matches, this connection is
* "canonical." */
tor_addr_t addr;
2011-01-03 17:57:42 +01:00
const uint8_t *next =
decode_address_from_payload(&addr, cp, (int)(end-cp));
if (next == NULL) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR,
2008-12-22 10:52:56 +01:00
"Bad address in netinfo cell; closing connection.");
connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
return;
}
if (tor_addr_eq(&addr, &conn->real_addr)) {
conn->is_canonical = 1;
break;
}
cp = next;
--n_other_addrs;
}
/* Act on apparent skew. */
/** Warn when we get a netinfo skew with at least this value. */
#define NETINFO_NOTICE_SKEW 3600
if (labs(apparent_skew) > NETINFO_NOTICE_SKEW &&
router_get_by_id_digest(conn->identity_digest)) {
char dbuf[64];
int severity;
/*XXXX be smarter about when everybody says we are skewed. */
if (router_digest_is_trusted_dir(conn->identity_digest))
severity = LOG_WARN;
else
severity = LOG_INFO;
format_time_interval(dbuf, sizeof(dbuf), apparent_skew);
log_fn(severity, LD_GENERAL, "Received NETINFO cell with skewed time from "
"server at %s:%d. It seems that our clock is %s by %s, or "
"that theirs is %s. Tor requires an accurate clock to work: "
"please check your time and date settings.",
conn->_base.address, (int)conn->_base.port,
apparent_skew>0 ? "ahead" : "behind", dbuf,
apparent_skew>0 ? "behind" : "ahead");
if (severity == LOG_WARN) /* only tell the controller if an authority */
control_event_general_status(LOG_WARN,
"CLOCK_SKEW SKEW=%ld SOURCE=OR:%s:%d",
apparent_skew,
conn->_base.address, conn->_base.port);
}
/* XXX maybe act on my_apparent_addr, if the source is sufficiently
* trustworthy. */
(void)my_apparent_addr;
if (connection_or_set_state_open(conn)<0)
connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
else
log_info(LD_OR, "Got good NETINFO cell from %s:%d; OR connection is now "
"open, using protocol version %d",
safe_str_client(conn->_base.address),
conn->_base.port, (int)conn->link_proto);
assert_connection_ok(TO_CONN(conn),time(NULL));
}
2011-09-13 22:24:49 +02:00
/** Process a CERT cell from an OR connection.
*
* If the other side should not have sent us a CERT cell, or the cell is
* malformed, or it is supposed to authenticate the TLS key but it doesn't,
* then mark the connection.
*
* If the cell has a good cert chain and we're doing a v3 handshake, then
* store the certificates in or_handshake_state. If this is the client side
* of the connection, we then authenticate the server or mark the connection.
* If it's the server side, wait for an AUTHENTICATE cell.
*/
static void
command_process_cert_cell(var_cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
{
#define ERR(s) \
do { \
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, \
"Received a bad CERT cell from %s:%d: %s", \
conn->_base.address, conn->_base.port, (s)); \
connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn)); \
goto err; \
} while (0)
tor_cert_t *link_cert = NULL;
tor_cert_t *id_cert = NULL;
tor_cert_t *auth_cert = NULL;
uint8_t *ptr;
int n_certs, i;
if (conn->_base.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3)
ERR("We're not doing a v3 handshake!");
if (conn->handshake_state->received_cert_cell)
ERR("We already got one");
if (cell->payload_len < 1)
ERR("It had no body");
if (cell->circ_id)
ERR("It had a nonzero circuit ID");
n_certs = cell->payload[0];
ptr = cell->payload + 1;
for (i = 0; i < n_certs; ++i) {
uint8_t cert_type;
uint16_t cert_len;
if (ptr + 3 > cell->payload + cell->payload_len) {
goto truncated;
}
cert_type = *ptr;
cert_len = ntohs(get_uint16(ptr+1));
if (ptr + 3 + cert_len > cell->payload + cell->payload_len) {
goto truncated;
}
if (cert_type == OR_CERT_TYPE_TLS_LINK ||
cert_type == OR_CERT_TYPE_ID_1024 ||
cert_type == OR_CERT_TYPE_AUTH_1024) {
tor_cert_t *cert = tor_cert_decode(ptr + 3, cert_len);
if (!cert) {
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
"Received undecodable certificate in CERT cell from %s:%d",
conn->_base.address, conn->_base.port);
} else {
if (cert_type == OR_CERT_TYPE_TLS_LINK && !link_cert)
link_cert = cert;
else if (cert_type == OR_CERT_TYPE_ID_1024 && !id_cert)
id_cert = cert;
else if (cert_type == OR_CERT_TYPE_AUTH_1024 && !auth_cert)
auth_cert = cert;
else
tor_cert_free(cert);
}
}
ptr += 3 + cert_len;
continue;
truncated:
ERR("It ends in the middle of a certificate");
}
if (conn->handshake_state->started_here) {
if (! (id_cert && link_cert))
ERR("The certs we wanted were missing");
/* Okay. We should be able to check the certificates now. */
if (! tor_tls_cert_matches_key(conn->tls, link_cert)) {
ERR("The link certificate didn't match the TLS public key");
}
if (! tor_tls_cert_is_valid(link_cert, id_cert, 0))
2011-09-13 22:24:49 +02:00
ERR("The link certificate was not valid");
if (! tor_tls_cert_is_valid(id_cert, id_cert, 1))
2011-09-13 22:24:49 +02:00
ERR("The ID certificate was not valid");
/* XXXX okay, we just got authentication. Do something about that. */
conn->handshake_state->id_cert = id_cert;
id_cert = NULL;
} else {
if (! (id_cert && auth_cert))
ERR("The certs we wanted were missing");
/* Remember these certificates so we can check an AUTHENTICATE cell */
conn->handshake_state->id_cert = id_cert;
conn->handshake_state->auth_cert = auth_cert;
if (! tor_tls_cert_is_valid(auth_cert, id_cert, 1))
2011-09-13 22:24:49 +02:00
ERR("The authentication certificate was not valid");
if (! tor_tls_cert_is_valid(id_cert, id_cert, 1))
2011-09-13 22:24:49 +02:00
ERR("The ID certificate was not valid");
/* XXXX check more stuff? */
id_cert = auth_cert = NULL;
}
conn->handshake_state->received_cert_cell = 1;
err:
tor_cert_free(id_cert);
tor_cert_free(link_cert);
tor_cert_free(auth_cert);
#undef ERR
}
/** Process an AUTH_CHALLENGE cell from an OR connection.
*
* If we weren't supposed to get one (for example, because we're not the
* originator of the connection), or it's ill-formed, or we aren't doing a v3
* handshake, mark the connection. If the cell is well-formed but we don't
* want to authenticate, just drop it. If the cell is well-formed *and* we
* want to authenticate, send an AUTHENTICATE cell. */
static void
command_process_auth_challenge_cell(var_cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
{
int n_types, i, use_type = -1;
uint8_t *cp;
#define ERR(s) \
do { \
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, \
"Received a bad AUTH_CHALLENGE cell from %s:%d: %s", \
conn->_base.address, conn->_base.port, (s)); \
connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn)); \
return; \
} while (0)
if (conn->_base.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3)
ERR("We're not currently doing a v3 handshake");
if (! conn->handshake_state->started_here)
ERR("We didn't originate this connection");
if (conn->handshake_state->received_auth_challenge)
ERR("We already received one");
if (cell->payload_len < OR_AUTH_CHALLENGE_LEN + 2)
ERR("It was too short");
if (cell->circ_id)
ERR("It had a nonzero circuit ID");
n_types = ntohs(get_uint16(cell->payload + OR_AUTH_CHALLENGE_LEN));
if (cell->payload_len < OR_AUTH_CHALLENGE_LEN + 2 + 2*n_types)
ERR("It looks truncated");
memcpy(conn->handshake_state->auth_challenge, cell->payload,
OR_AUTH_CHALLENGE_LEN);
/* Now see if there is an authentication type we can use */
cp=cell->payload+OR_AUTH_CHALLENGE_LEN+2;
for (i=0; i < n_types; ++i, cp += 2) {
uint16_t authtype = ntohs(get_uint16(cp));
if (authtype == AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET)
use_type = authtype;
}
conn->handshake_state->received_auth_challenge = 1;
/* Send back authentication if we want, and if use_type is set */
#undef ERR
}
/** Process an AUTHENTICATE cell from an OR connection.
*
* If it's ill-formed or we weren't supposed to get one or we're not doing a
* v3 handshake, then mark the connection. If it does not authenticate the
* other side of the connection successfully (because it isn't signed right,
* we didn't get a CERT cell, etc) mark the connection. Otherwise, accept
* the identity of the router on the other side of the connection.
*/
static void
command_process_authenticate_cell(or_connection_t *conn, var_cell_t *cell)
{
uint8_t expected[V3_AUTH_FIXED_PART_LEN];
const uint8_t *auth;
int authlen;
#define ERR(s) \
do { \
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, \
"Received a bad AUTHETNICATE cell from %s:%d: %s", \
conn->_base.address, conn->_base.port, (s)); \
connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn)); \
return; \
} while (0)
if (conn->_base.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3)
ERR("We're not doing a v3 handshake");
if (! conn->handshake_state->started_here)
ERR("We originated this connection");
if (conn->handshake_state->received_authenticate)
ERR("We already got one!");
if (conn->handshake_state->auth_cert == NULL)
ERR("We never got an authentication certificate");
if (cell->payload_len < 4)
ERR("Cell was way too short");
auth = cell->payload;
{
uint16_t type = ntohs(get_uint16(auth));
uint16_t len = ntohs(get_uint16(auth+2));
if (4 + len > cell->payload_len)
ERR("Authenticator was truncated");
if (type != AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET)
ERR("Authenticator type was not recognized");
auth += 4;
authlen = len;
}
if (authlen < V3_AUTH_BODY_LEN + 1)
ERR("Authenticator was too short");
if (connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(
conn, expected, sizeof(expected), NULL, 1) < 0)
ERR("Couldn't compute expected AUTHENTICATE cell body");
if (tor_memneq(expected, auth, sizeof(expected)))
ERR("Some field in the AUTHENTICATE cell body was not as expected");
{
crypto_pk_env_t *pk = tor_tls_cert_get_key(
conn->handshake_state->auth_cert);
char d[DIGEST256_LEN];
char *signed_data;
size_t keysize;
int signed_len;
crypto_digest256(d, (char*)auth, V3_AUTH_BODY_LEN, DIGEST_SHA256);
keysize = crypto_pk_keysize(pk);
signed_data = tor_malloc(keysize);
signed_len = crypto_pk_public_checksig(pk, signed_data, keysize,
(char*)auth + V3_AUTH_BODY_LEN,
authlen - V3_AUTH_BODY_LEN);
if (signed_len < 0) {
tor_free(signed_data);
ERR("Signature wasn't valid");
}
if (signed_len < DIGEST256_LEN) {
tor_free(signed_data);
ERR("Not enough data was signed");
}
if (tor_memneq(signed_data, d, DIGEST256_LEN)) {
tor_free(signed_data);
ERR("Signature did not match data to be signed.");
}
tor_free(signed_data);
}
/* XXXX we're authenticated. Now remember the fact, and remember whom we're
authenticated to. */
conn->handshake_state->received_authenticate = 1;
#undef ERR
}
void dummy_function(void);
void dummy_function(void)
{
/* this is only here to avoid 'static function isn't used' warnings */
command_process_auth_challenge_cell(NULL, NULL);
command_process_cert_cell(NULL, NULL);
command_process_authenticate_cell(NULL, NULL);
}