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Only send netinfo clock_skew to controller if an authority told us so
We were triggering a CLOCK_SKEW controller status event whenever we connect via the v2 connection protocol to any relay that has a wrong clock. Instead, we should only inform the controller when it's a trusted authority that claims our clock is wrong. Bugfix on 0.2.0.20-rc; starts to fix bug 1074. Reported by SwissTorExit.
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@ -18,6 +18,11 @@ Changes in version 0.2.1.20 - 2009-??-??
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- Fix an extremely rare infinite recursion bug that could occur if
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we tried to log a message after shutting down the log subsystem.
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Found by Matt Edman. Bugfix on 0.2.0.16-alpha.
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- We were triggering a CLOCK_SKEW controller status event whenever
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we connect via the v2 connection protocol to any relay that has
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a wrong clock. Instead, we should only inform the controller when
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it's a trusted authority that claims our clock is wrong. Bugfix
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on 0.2.0.20-rc; starts to fix bug 1074. Reported by SwissTorExit.
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Changes in version 0.2.1.19 - 2009-07-28
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@ -1255,20 +1255,26 @@ $Id$
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CLOCK_SKEW
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SKEW="+" / "-" SECONDS
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MIN_SKEW="+" / "-" SECONDS.
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SOURCE="DIRSERV:IP:Port" / "NETWORKSTATUS:IP:PORT" / "CONSENSUS"
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SOURCE="DIRSERV:" IP ":" Port /
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"NETWORKSTATUS:" IP ":" Port /
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"OR:" IP ":" Port /
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"CONSENSUS"
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If "SKEW" is present, it's an estimate of how far we are from the
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time declared in the source. (In other words, if we're an hour in
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the past, the value is -3600.) "MIN_SKEW" is present, it's a lower
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bound. If the source is a DIRSERV, we got the current time from a
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connection to a dirserver. If the source is a NETWORKSTATUS, we
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decided we're skewed because we got a v2 networkstatus from far in
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the future. If the source is CONSENSUS, we decided we're skewed
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because we got a networkstatus consensus from the future.
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the future. If the source is OR, the skew comes from a NETINFO
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cell from a connection to another relay. If the source is
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CONSENSUS, we decided we're skewed because we got a networkstatus
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consensus from the future.
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{Controllers may want to warn the user if the skew is high, or if
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multiple skew messages appear at severity WARN. Controllers
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shouldn't blindly adjust the clock, since the more accurate source
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of skew info (DIRSERV) is currently unauthenticated.}
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{Tor should send this message to controllers when it thinks the
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skew is so high that it will interfere with proper Tor operation.
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Controllers shouldn't blindly adjust the clock, since the more
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accurate source of skew info (DIRSERV) is currently
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unauthenticated.}
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BAD_LIBEVENT
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"METHOD=" libevent method
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@ -610,9 +610,11 @@ command_process_netinfo_cell(cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
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conn->_base.address, (int)conn->_base.port,
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apparent_skew>0 ? "ahead" : "behind", dbuf,
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apparent_skew>0 ? "behind" : "ahead");
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control_event_general_status(LOG_WARN,
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"CLOCK_SKEW SKEW=%ld SOURCE=OR:%s:%d",
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apparent_skew, conn->_base.address, conn->_base.port);
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if (severity == LOG_WARN) /* only tell the controller if an authority */
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control_event_general_status(LOG_WARN,
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"CLOCK_SKEW SKEW=%ld SOURCE=OR:%s:%d",
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apparent_skew,
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conn->_base.address, conn->_base.port);
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}
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/* XXX maybe act on my_apparent_addr, if the source is sufficiently
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