tor/src/or/router.c

2087 lines
66 KiB
C
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2006-02-09 06:46:49 +01:00
/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
* Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
* Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
2009-05-02 22:00:54 +02:00
* Copyright (c) 2007-2009, The Tor Project, Inc. */
/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
#define ROUTER_PRIVATE
#include "or.h"
/**
* \file router.c
* \brief OR functionality, including key maintenance, generating
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* and uploading server descriptors, retrying OR connections.
**/
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extern long stats_n_seconds_working;
/************************************************************/
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/*****
* Key management: ORs only.
*****/
/** Private keys for this OR. There is also an SSL key managed by tortls.c.
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*/
static tor_mutex_t *key_lock=NULL;
static time_t onionkey_set_at=0; /**< When was onionkey last changed? */
/** Current private onionskin decryption key: used to decode CREATE cells. */
static crypto_pk_env_t *onionkey=NULL;
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/** Previous private onionskin decryption key: used to decode CREATE cells
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* generated by clients that have an older version of our descriptor. */
static crypto_pk_env_t *lastonionkey=NULL;
/** Private "identity key": used to sign directory info and TLS
* certificates. Never changes. */
static crypto_pk_env_t *identitykey=NULL;
/** Digest of identitykey. */
static char identitykey_digest[DIGEST_LEN];
/** Signing key used for v3 directory material; only set for authorities. */
static crypto_pk_env_t *authority_signing_key = NULL;
/** Key certificate to authenticate v3 directory material; only set for
* authorities. */
static authority_cert_t *authority_key_certificate = NULL;
/** For emergency V3 authority key migration: An extra signing key that we use
* with our old (obsolete) identity key for a while. */
static crypto_pk_env_t *legacy_signing_key = NULL;
/** For emergency V3 authority key migration: An extra certificate to
* authenticate legacy_signing_key with our obsolete identity key.*/
static authority_cert_t *legacy_key_certificate = NULL;
/* (Note that v3 authorities also have a separate "authority identity key",
* but this key is never actually loaded by the Tor process. Instead, it's
* used by tor-gencert to sign new signing keys and make new key
* certificates. */
/** Replace the current onion key with <b>k</b>. Does not affect
* lastonionkey; to update lastonionkey correctly, call rotate_onion_key().
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*/
static void
set_onion_key(crypto_pk_env_t *k)
{
tor_mutex_acquire(key_lock);
if (onionkey)
crypto_free_pk_env(onionkey);
onionkey = k;
onionkey_set_at = time(NULL);
tor_mutex_release(key_lock);
mark_my_descriptor_dirty();
}
/** Return the current onion key. Requires that the onion key has been
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* loaded or generated. */
crypto_pk_env_t *
get_onion_key(void)
{
tor_assert(onionkey);
return onionkey;
}
/** Store a full copy of the current onion key into *<b>key</b>, and a full
* copy of the most recent onion key into *<b>last</b>.
*/
void
dup_onion_keys(crypto_pk_env_t **key, crypto_pk_env_t **last)
{
tor_assert(key);
tor_assert(last);
tor_mutex_acquire(key_lock);
tor_assert(onionkey);
*key = crypto_pk_copy_full(onionkey);
if (lastonionkey)
*last = crypto_pk_copy_full(lastonionkey);
else
*last = NULL;
tor_mutex_release(key_lock);
}
/** Return the time when the onion key was last set. This is either the time
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* when the process launched, or the time of the most recent key rotation since
* the process launched.
*/
time_t
get_onion_key_set_at(void)
{
return onionkey_set_at;
}
/** Set the current identity key to k.
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*/
void
set_identity_key(crypto_pk_env_t *k)
{
if (identitykey)
crypto_free_pk_env(identitykey);
identitykey = k;
crypto_pk_get_digest(identitykey, identitykey_digest);
}
/** Returns the current identity key; requires that the identity key has been
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* set.
*/
crypto_pk_env_t *
get_identity_key(void)
{
tor_assert(identitykey);
return identitykey;
}
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/** Return true iff the identity key has been set. */
int
identity_key_is_set(void)
{
return identitykey != NULL;
}
/** Return the key certificate for this v3 (voting) authority, or NULL
* if we have no such certificate. */
authority_cert_t *
get_my_v3_authority_cert(void)
{
return authority_key_certificate;
}
/** Return the v3 signing key for this v3 (voting) authority, or NULL
* if we have no such key. */
crypto_pk_env_t *
get_my_v3_authority_signing_key(void)
{
return authority_signing_key;
}
/** If we're an authority, and we're using a legacy authority identity key for
* emergency migration purposes, return the certificate associated with that
* key. */
authority_cert_t *
get_my_v3_legacy_cert(void)
{
return legacy_key_certificate;
}
/** If we're an authority, and we're using a legacy authority identity key for
* emergency migration purposes, return that key. */
crypto_pk_env_t *
get_my_v3_legacy_signing_key(void)
{
return legacy_signing_key;
}
/** Replace the previous onion key with the current onion key, and generate
* a new previous onion key. Immediately after calling this function,
* the OR should:
* - schedule all previous cpuworkers to shut down _after_ processing
* pending work. (This will cause fresh cpuworkers to be generated.)
* - generate and upload a fresh routerinfo.
*/
void
rotate_onion_key(void)
{
char *fname, *fname_prev;
crypto_pk_env_t *prkey;
or_state_t *state = get_or_state();
time_t now;
fname = get_datadir_fname2("keys", "secret_onion_key");
fname_prev = get_datadir_fname2("keys", "secret_onion_key.old");
if (!(prkey = crypto_new_pk_env())) {
log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error constructing rotated onion key");
goto error;
}
if (crypto_pk_generate_key(prkey)) {
log_err(LD_BUG,"Error generating onion key");
goto error;
}
if (file_status(fname) == FN_FILE) {
if (replace_file(fname, fname_prev))
goto error;
}
if (crypto_pk_write_private_key_to_filename(prkey, fname)) {
log_err(LD_FS,"Couldn't write generated onion key to \"%s\".", fname);
goto error;
}
log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Rotating onion key");
tor_mutex_acquire(key_lock);
if (lastonionkey)
crypto_free_pk_env(lastonionkey);
lastonionkey = onionkey;
onionkey = prkey;
now = time(NULL);
state->LastRotatedOnionKey = onionkey_set_at = now;
tor_mutex_release(key_lock);
mark_my_descriptor_dirty();
or_state_mark_dirty(state, get_options()->AvoidDiskWrites ? now+3600 : 0);
goto done;
error:
log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Couldn't rotate onion key.");
if (prkey)
crypto_free_pk_env(prkey);
done:
tor_free(fname);
tor_free(fname_prev);
}
/** Try to read an RSA key from <b>fname</b>. If <b>fname</b> doesn't exist
* and <b>generate</b> is true, create a new RSA key and save it in
* <b>fname</b>. Return the read/created key, or NULL on error. Log all
* errors at level <b>severity</b>.
*/
crypto_pk_env_t *
init_key_from_file(const char *fname, int generate, int severity)
{
crypto_pk_env_t *prkey = NULL;
if (!(prkey = crypto_new_pk_env())) {
log(severity, LD_GENERAL,"Error constructing key");
goto error;
}
switch (file_status(fname)) {
case FN_DIR:
case FN_ERROR:
log(severity, LD_FS,"Can't read key from \"%s\"", fname);
goto error;
case FN_NOENT:
if (generate) {
if (!have_lockfile()) {
if (try_locking(get_options(), 0)<0) {
/* Make sure that --list-fingerprint only creates new keys
* if there is no possibility for a deadlock. */
log(severity, LD_FS, "Another Tor process has locked \"%s\". Not "
"writing any new keys.", fname);
/*XXXX The 'other process' might make a key in a second or two;
* maybe we should wait for it. */
goto error;
}
}
log_info(LD_GENERAL, "No key found in \"%s\"; generating fresh key.",
fname);
if (crypto_pk_generate_key(prkey)) {
log(severity, LD_GENERAL,"Error generating onion key");
goto error;
}
if (crypto_pk_check_key(prkey) <= 0) {
log(severity, LD_GENERAL,"Generated key seems invalid");
goto error;
}
log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Generated key seems valid");
if (crypto_pk_write_private_key_to_filename(prkey, fname)) {
log(severity, LD_FS,
"Couldn't write generated key to \"%s\".", fname);
goto error;
}
} else {
log_info(LD_GENERAL, "No key found in \"%s\"", fname);
}
return prkey;
case FN_FILE:
if (crypto_pk_read_private_key_from_filename(prkey, fname)) {
log(severity, LD_GENERAL,"Error loading private key.");
goto error;
}
return prkey;
default:
tor_assert(0);
}
error:
if (prkey)
crypto_free_pk_env(prkey);
return NULL;
}
/** Try to load the vote-signing private key and certificate for being a v3
* directory authority, and make sure they match. If <b>legacy</b>, load a
* legacy key/cert set for emergency key migration; otherwise load the regular
* key/cert set. On success, store them into *<b>key_out</b> and
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* *<b>cert_out</b> respectively, and return 0. On failure, return -1. */
static int
load_authority_keyset(int legacy, crypto_pk_env_t **key_out,
authority_cert_t **cert_out)
{
int r = -1;
char *fname = NULL, *cert = NULL;
const char *eos = NULL;
crypto_pk_env_t *signing_key = NULL;
authority_cert_t *parsed = NULL;
fname = get_datadir_fname2("keys",
legacy ? "legacy_signing_key" : "authority_signing_key");
signing_key = init_key_from_file(fname, 0, LOG_INFO);
if (!signing_key) {
log_warn(LD_DIR, "No version 3 directory key found in %s", fname);
goto done;
}
tor_free(fname);
fname = get_datadir_fname2("keys",
legacy ? "legacy_certificate" : "authority_certificate");
cert = read_file_to_str(fname, 0, NULL);
if (!cert) {
log_warn(LD_DIR, "Signing key found, but no certificate found in %s",
fname);
goto done;
}
parsed = authority_cert_parse_from_string(cert, &eos);
if (!parsed) {
log_warn(LD_DIR, "Unable to parse certificate in %s", fname);
goto done;
}
if (crypto_pk_cmp_keys(signing_key, parsed->signing_key) != 0) {
log_warn(LD_DIR, "Stored signing key does not match signing key in "
"certificate");
goto done;
}
if (*key_out)
crypto_free_pk_env(*key_out);
if (*cert_out)
authority_cert_free(*cert_out);
*key_out = signing_key;
*cert_out = parsed;
r = 0;
signing_key = NULL;
parsed = NULL;
done:
tor_free(fname);
tor_free(cert);
if (signing_key)
crypto_free_pk_env(signing_key);
if (parsed)
authority_cert_free(parsed);
return r;
}
/** Load the v3 (voting) authority signing key and certificate, if they are
* present. Return -1 if anything is missing, mismatched, or unloadable;
* return 0 on success. */
static int
init_v3_authority_keys(void)
{
if (load_authority_keyset(0, &authority_signing_key,
&authority_key_certificate)<0)
return -1;
if (get_options()->V3AuthUseLegacyKey &&
load_authority_keyset(1, &legacy_signing_key,
&legacy_key_certificate)<0)
return -1;
return 0;
}
2008-01-18 05:50:15 +01:00
/** If we're a v3 authority, check whether we have a certificate that's
* likely to expire soon. Warn if we do, but not too often. */
void
v3_authority_check_key_expiry(void)
{
time_t now, expires;
static time_t last_warned = 0;
int badness, time_left, warn_interval;
if (!authdir_mode_v3(get_options()) || !authority_key_certificate)
return;
now = time(NULL);
expires = authority_key_certificate->expires;
time_left = (int)( expires - now );
if (time_left <= 0) {
badness = LOG_ERR;
warn_interval = 60*60;
} else if (time_left <= 24*60*60) {
badness = LOG_WARN;
warn_interval = 60*60;
} else if (time_left <= 24*60*60*7) {
badness = LOG_WARN;
warn_interval = 24*60*60;
} else if (time_left <= 24*60*60*30) {
badness = LOG_WARN;
warn_interval = 24*60*60*5;
} else {
return;
}
if (last_warned + warn_interval > now)
return;
if (time_left <= 0) {
log(badness, LD_DIR, "Your v3 authority certificate has expired."
" Generate a new one NOW.");
} else if (time_left <= 24*60*60) {
log(badness, LD_DIR, "Your v3 authority certificate expires in %d hours;"
" Generate a new one NOW.", time_left/(60*60));
} else {
log(badness, LD_DIR, "Your v3 authority certificate expires in %d days;"
" Generate a new one soon.", time_left/(24*60*60));
}
last_warned = now;
}
/** Initialize all OR private keys, and the TLS context, as necessary.
* On OPs, this only initializes the tls context. Return 0 on success,
* or -1 if Tor should die.
2004-05-04 20:17:45 +02:00
*/
int
init_keys(void)
{
char *keydir;
char fingerprint[FINGERPRINT_LEN+1];
2006-03-17 05:43:37 +01:00
/*nickname<space>fp\n\0 */
char fingerprint_line[MAX_NICKNAME_LEN+FINGERPRINT_LEN+3];
const char *mydesc;
crypto_pk_env_t *prkey;
char digest[20];
char v3_digest[20];
char *cp;
or_options_t *options = get_options();
authority_type_t type;
time_t now = time(NULL);
trusted_dir_server_t *ds;
int v3_digest_set = 0;
authority_cert_t *cert = NULL;
if (!key_lock)
2004-06-05 03:56:54 +02:00
key_lock = tor_mutex_new();
/* There are a couple of paths that put us here before */
if (crypto_global_init(get_options()->HardwareAccel,
get_options()->AccelName,
get_options()->AccelDir)) {
log_err(LD_BUG, "Unable to initialize OpenSSL. Exiting.");
return -1;
}
/* OP's don't need persistent keys; just make up an identity and
* initialize the TLS context. */
if (!server_mode(options)) {
if (!(prkey = crypto_new_pk_env()))
return -1;
if (crypto_pk_generate_key(prkey)) {
crypto_free_pk_env(prkey);
return -1;
}
set_identity_key(prkey);
/* Create a TLS context; default the client nickname to "client". */
if (tor_tls_context_new(get_identity_key(), MAX_SSL_KEY_LIFETIME) < 0) {
log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error creating TLS context for Tor client.");
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
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/* Make sure DataDirectory exists, and is private. */
if (check_private_dir(options->DataDirectory, CPD_CREATE)) {
return -1;
}
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/* Check the key directory. */
keydir = get_datadir_fname("keys");
if (check_private_dir(keydir, CPD_CREATE)) {
tor_free(keydir);
return -1;
}
tor_free(keydir);
/* 1a. Read v3 directory authority key/cert information. */
memset(v3_digest, 0, sizeof(v3_digest));
if (authdir_mode_v3(options)) {
if (init_v3_authority_keys()<0) {
log_err(LD_GENERAL, "We're configured as a V3 authority, but we "
"were unable to load our v3 authority keys and certificate! "
"Use tor-gencert to generate them. Dying.");
return -1;
}
cert = get_my_v3_authority_cert();
if (cert) {
crypto_pk_get_digest(get_my_v3_authority_cert()->identity_key,
v3_digest);
v3_digest_set = 1;
}
}
/* 1. Read identity key. Make it if none is found. */
keydir = get_datadir_fname2("keys", "secret_id_key");
log_info(LD_GENERAL,"Reading/making identity key \"%s\"...",keydir);
prkey = init_key_from_file(keydir, 1, LOG_ERR);
tor_free(keydir);
if (!prkey) return -1;
set_identity_key(prkey);
/* 2. Read onion key. Make it if none is found. */
keydir = get_datadir_fname2("keys", "secret_onion_key");
log_info(LD_GENERAL,"Reading/making onion key \"%s\"...",keydir);
prkey = init_key_from_file(keydir, 1, LOG_ERR);
tor_free(keydir);
if (!prkey) return -1;
set_onion_key(prkey);
if (options->command == CMD_RUN_TOR) {
/* only mess with the state file if we're actually running Tor */
or_state_t *state = get_or_state();
if (state->LastRotatedOnionKey > 100 && state->LastRotatedOnionKey < now) {
/* We allow for some parsing slop, but we don't want to risk accepting
* values in the distant future. If we did, we might never rotate the
* onion key. */
onionkey_set_at = state->LastRotatedOnionKey;
} else {
/* We have no LastRotatedOnionKey set; either we just created the key
* or it's a holdover from 0.1.2.4-alpha-dev or earlier. In either case,
* start the clock ticking now so that we will eventually rotate it even
* if we don't stay up for a full MIN_ONION_KEY_LIFETIME. */
state->LastRotatedOnionKey = onionkey_set_at = now;
or_state_mark_dirty(state, options->AvoidDiskWrites ?
time(NULL)+3600 : 0);
}
}
keydir = get_datadir_fname2("keys", "secret_onion_key.old");
if (!lastonionkey && file_status(keydir) == FN_FILE) {
prkey = init_key_from_file(keydir, 1, LOG_ERR);
if (prkey)
lastonionkey = prkey;
}
tor_free(keydir);
/* 3. Initialize link key and TLS context. */
if (tor_tls_context_new(get_identity_key(), MAX_SSL_KEY_LIFETIME) < 0) {
log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error initializing TLS context");
return -1;
}
/* 4. Build our router descriptor. */
/* Must be called after keys are initialized. */
mydesc = router_get_my_descriptor();
if (authdir_mode(options)) {
const char *m;
routerinfo_t *ri;
/* We need to add our own fingerprint so it gets recognized. */
if (dirserv_add_own_fingerprint(options->Nickname, get_identity_key())) {
log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error adding own fingerprint to approved set");
return -1;
}
if (mydesc) {
ri = router_parse_entry_from_string(mydesc, NULL, 1, 0, NULL);
if (!ri) {
log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Generated a routerinfo we couldn't parse.");
return -1;
}
if (!WRA_WAS_ADDED(dirserv_add_descriptor(ri, &m, "self"))) {
log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Unable to add own descriptor to directory: %s",
m?m:"<unknown error>");
return -1;
}
}
}
/* 5. Dump fingerprint to 'fingerprint' */
keydir = get_datadir_fname("fingerprint");
log_info(LD_GENERAL,"Dumping fingerprint to \"%s\"...",keydir);
if (crypto_pk_get_fingerprint(get_identity_key(), fingerprint, 1)<0) {
log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error computing fingerprint");
tor_free(keydir);
return -1;
}
tor_assert(strlen(options->Nickname) <= MAX_NICKNAME_LEN);
if (tor_snprintf(fingerprint_line, sizeof(fingerprint_line),
"%s %s\n",options->Nickname, fingerprint) < 0) {
log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error writing fingerprint line");
tor_free(keydir);
return -1;
}
/* Check whether we need to write the fingerprint file. */
cp = NULL;
if (file_status(keydir) == FN_FILE)
cp = read_file_to_str(keydir, 0, NULL);
if (!cp || strcmp(cp, fingerprint_line)) {
if (write_str_to_file(keydir, fingerprint_line, 0)) {
log_err(LD_FS, "Error writing fingerprint line to file");
tor_free(keydir);
return -1;
}
}
tor_free(cp);
tor_free(keydir);
log(LOG_NOTICE, LD_GENERAL,
"Your Tor server's identity key fingerprint is '%s %s'",
options->Nickname, fingerprint);
if (!authdir_mode(options))
return 0;
/* 6. [authdirserver only] load approved-routers file */
if (dirserv_load_fingerprint_file() < 0) {
log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error loading fingerprints");
return -1;
}
/* 6b. [authdirserver only] add own key to approved directories. */
crypto_pk_get_digest(get_identity_key(), digest);
type = ((options->V1AuthoritativeDir ? V1_AUTHORITY : NO_AUTHORITY) |
(options->V2AuthoritativeDir ? V2_AUTHORITY : NO_AUTHORITY) |
(options->V3AuthoritativeDir ? V3_AUTHORITY : NO_AUTHORITY) |
(options->BridgeAuthoritativeDir ? BRIDGE_AUTHORITY : NO_AUTHORITY) |
(options->HSAuthoritativeDir ? HIDSERV_AUTHORITY : NO_AUTHORITY));
ds = router_get_trusteddirserver_by_digest(digest);
if (!ds) {
ds = add_trusted_dir_server(options->Nickname, NULL,
(uint16_t)options->DirPort,
(uint16_t)options->ORPort,
digest,
v3_digest,
type);
if (!ds) {
log_err(LD_GENERAL,"We want to be a directory authority, but we "
"couldn't add ourselves to the authority list. Failing.");
return -1;
}
}
if (ds->type != type) {
log_warn(LD_DIR, "Configured authority type does not match authority "
"type in DirServer list. Adjusting. (%d v %d)",
type, ds->type);
ds->type = type;
}
if (v3_digest_set && (ds->type & V3_AUTHORITY) &&
memcmp(v3_digest, ds->v3_identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN)) {
log_warn(LD_DIR, "V3 identity key does not match identity declared in "
"DirServer line. Adjusting.");
memcpy(ds->v3_identity_digest, v3_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
}
if (cert) { /* add my own cert to the list of known certs */
log_info(LD_DIR, "adding my own v3 cert");
if (trusted_dirs_load_certs_from_string(
cert->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body, 0, 0)<0) {
log_warn(LD_DIR, "Unable to parse my own v3 cert! Failing.");
return -1;
}
}
return 0; /* success */
}
/* Keep track of whether we should upload our server descriptor,
* and what type of server we are.
*/
/** Whether we can reach our ORPort from the outside. */
static int can_reach_or_port = 0;
/** Whether we can reach our DirPort from the outside. */
static int can_reach_dir_port = 0;
/** Forget what we have learned about our reachability status. */
void
router_reset_reachability(void)
{
can_reach_or_port = can_reach_dir_port = 0;
}
/** Return 1 if ORPort is known reachable; else return 0. */
int
check_whether_orport_reachable(void)
{
or_options_t *options = get_options();
return options->AssumeReachable ||
can_reach_or_port;
}
/** Return 1 if we don't have a dirport configured, or if it's reachable. */
int
check_whether_dirport_reachable(void)
{
or_options_t *options = get_options();
return !options->DirPort ||
options->AssumeReachable ||
we_are_hibernating() ||
can_reach_dir_port;
}
/** Look at a variety of factors, and return 0 if we don't want to
* advertise the fact that we have a DirPort open. Else return the
* DirPort we want to advertise.
*
* Log a helpful message if we change our mind about whether to publish
* a DirPort.
*/
static int
decide_to_advertise_dirport(or_options_t *options, uint16_t dir_port)
{
static int advertising=1; /* start out assuming we will advertise */
int new_choice=1;
const char *reason = NULL;
/* Section one: reasons to publish or not publish that aren't
* worth mentioning to the user, either because they're obvious
* or because they're normal behavior. */
if (!dir_port) /* short circuit the rest of the function */
return 0;
if (authdir_mode(options)) /* always publish */
return dir_port;
if (we_are_hibernating())
return 0;
if (!check_whether_dirport_reachable())
return 0;
/* Section two: reasons to publish or not publish that the user
* might find surprising. These are generally config options that
* make us choose not to publish. */
if (accounting_is_enabled(options)) {
/* if we might potentially hibernate */
new_choice = 0;
reason = "AccountingMax enabled";
#define MIN_BW_TO_ADVERTISE_DIRPORT 51200
} else if (options->BandwidthRate < MIN_BW_TO_ADVERTISE_DIRPORT ||
(options->RelayBandwidthRate > 0 &&
options->RelayBandwidthRate < MIN_BW_TO_ADVERTISE_DIRPORT)) {
/* if we're advertising a small amount */
new_choice = 0;
reason = "BandwidthRate under 50KB";
}
if (advertising != new_choice) {
if (new_choice == 1) {
log(LOG_NOTICE, LD_DIR, "Advertising DirPort as %d", dir_port);
} else {
tor_assert(reason);
log(LOG_NOTICE, LD_DIR, "Not advertising DirPort (Reason: %s)", reason);
}
advertising = new_choice;
}
return advertising ? dir_port : 0;
}
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/** Some time has passed, or we just got new directory information.
* See if we currently believe our ORPort or DirPort to be
* unreachable. If so, launch a new test for it.
*
* For ORPort, we simply try making a circuit that ends at ourselves.
* Success is noticed in onionskin_answer().
*
* For DirPort, we make a connection via Tor to our DirPort and ask
* for our own server descriptor.
* Success is noticed in connection_dir_client_reached_eof().
*/
void
consider_testing_reachability(int test_or, int test_dir)
{
routerinfo_t *me = router_get_my_routerinfo();
int orport_reachable = check_whether_orport_reachable();
tor_addr_t addr;
if (!me)
return;
if (test_or && (!orport_reachable || !circuit_enough_testing_circs())) {
log_info(LD_CIRC, "Testing %s of my ORPort: %s:%d.",
!orport_reachable ? "reachability" : "bandwidth",
me->address, me->or_port);
circuit_launch_by_router(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING, me,
CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_CAPACITY|CIRCLAUNCH_IS_INTERNAL);
control_event_server_status(LOG_NOTICE,
"CHECKING_REACHABILITY ORADDRESS=%s:%d",
me->address, me->or_port);
}
tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&addr, me->addr);
if (test_dir && !check_whether_dirport_reachable() &&
!connection_get_by_type_addr_port_purpose(
CONN_TYPE_DIR, &addr, me->dir_port,
DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_SERVERDESC)) {
/* ask myself, via tor, for my server descriptor. */
directory_initiate_command(me->address, &addr,
me->or_port, me->dir_port,
0, /* does not matter */
0, me->cache_info.identity_digest,
DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_SERVERDESC,
ROUTER_PURPOSE_GENERAL,
1, "authority.z", NULL, 0, 0);
control_event_server_status(LOG_NOTICE,
"CHECKING_REACHABILITY DIRADDRESS=%s:%d",
me->address, me->dir_port);
}
}
/** Annotate that we found our ORPort reachable. */
void
router_orport_found_reachable(void)
{
if (!can_reach_or_port) {
routerinfo_t *me = router_get_my_routerinfo();
log_notice(LD_OR,"Self-testing indicates your ORPort is reachable from "
"the outside. Excellent.%s",
get_options()->_PublishServerDescriptor != NO_AUTHORITY ?
" Publishing server descriptor." : "");
can_reach_or_port = 1;
mark_my_descriptor_dirty();
if (!me)
return;
control_event_server_status(LOG_NOTICE,
"REACHABILITY_SUCCEEDED ORADDRESS=%s:%d",
me->address, me->or_port);
}
}
/** Annotate that we found our DirPort reachable. */
void
router_dirport_found_reachable(void)
{
if (!can_reach_dir_port) {
routerinfo_t *me = router_get_my_routerinfo();
log_notice(LD_DIRSERV,"Self-testing indicates your DirPort is reachable "
"from the outside. Excellent.");
can_reach_dir_port = 1;
if (!me || decide_to_advertise_dirport(get_options(), me->dir_port))
mark_my_descriptor_dirty();
if (!me)
return;
control_event_server_status(LOG_NOTICE,
"REACHABILITY_SUCCEEDED DIRADDRESS=%s:%d",
me->address, me->dir_port);
}
}
/** We have enough testing circuits open. Send a bunch of "drop"
* cells down each of them, to exercise our bandwidth. */
void
router_perform_bandwidth_test(int num_circs, time_t now)
{
int num_cells = (int)(get_options()->BandwidthRate * 10 / CELL_NETWORK_SIZE);
int max_cells = num_cells < CIRCWINDOW_START ?
num_cells : CIRCWINDOW_START;
int cells_per_circuit = max_cells / num_circs;
origin_circuit_t *circ = NULL;
log_notice(LD_OR,"Performing bandwidth self-test...done.");
while ((circ = circuit_get_next_by_pk_and_purpose(circ, NULL,
CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING))) {
/* dump cells_per_circuit drop cells onto this circ */
int i = cells_per_circuit;
if (circ->_base.state != CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN)
continue;
circ->_base.timestamp_dirty = now;
while (i-- > 0) {
if (relay_send_command_from_edge(0, TO_CIRCUIT(circ),
RELAY_COMMAND_DROP,
NULL, 0, circ->cpath->prev)<0) {
return; /* stop if error */
}
}
}
}
/** Return true iff we believe ourselves to be an authoritative
* directory server.
*/
int
authdir_mode(or_options_t *options)
{
return options->AuthoritativeDir != 0;
}
/** Return true iff we believe ourselves to be a v1 authoritative
* directory server.
*/
int
authdir_mode_v1(or_options_t *options)
{
return authdir_mode(options) && options->V1AuthoritativeDir != 0;
}
/** Return true iff we believe ourselves to be a v2 authoritative
* directory server.
*/
int
authdir_mode_v2(or_options_t *options)
{
return authdir_mode(options) && options->V2AuthoritativeDir != 0;
}
/** Return true iff we believe ourselves to be a v3 authoritative
* directory server.
*/
int
authdir_mode_v3(or_options_t *options)
{
return authdir_mode(options) && options->V3AuthoritativeDir != 0;
}
/** Return true iff we are a v1, v2, or v3 directory authority. */
int
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authdir_mode_any_main(or_options_t *options)
{
return options->V1AuthoritativeDir ||
options->V2AuthoritativeDir ||
options->V3AuthoritativeDir;
}
/** Return true if we believe ourselves to be any kind of
* authoritative directory beyond just a hidserv authority. */
int
authdir_mode_any_nonhidserv(or_options_t *options)
{
2007-12-21 07:28:59 +01:00
return options->BridgeAuthoritativeDir ||
authdir_mode_any_main(options);
}
/** Return true iff we are an authoritative directory server that is
* authoritative about receiving and serving descriptors of type
* <b>purpose</b> its dirport. Use -1 for "any purpose". */
int
authdir_mode_handles_descs(or_options_t *options, int purpose)
{
if (purpose < 0)
return authdir_mode_any_nonhidserv(options);
else if (purpose == ROUTER_PURPOSE_GENERAL)
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return authdir_mode_any_main(options);
else if (purpose == ROUTER_PURPOSE_BRIDGE)
return (options->BridgeAuthoritativeDir);
else
return 0;
}
/** Return true iff we are an authoritative directory server that
* publishes its own network statuses.
*/
int
authdir_mode_publishes_statuses(or_options_t *options)
{
if (authdir_mode_bridge(options))
return 0;
return authdir_mode_any_nonhidserv(options);
}
/** Return true iff we are an authoritative directory server that
* tests reachability of the descriptors it learns about.
*/
int
authdir_mode_tests_reachability(or_options_t *options)
{
return authdir_mode_handles_descs(options, -1);
}
/** Return true iff we believe ourselves to be a bridge authoritative
* directory server.
*/
int
authdir_mode_bridge(or_options_t *options)
{
return authdir_mode(options) && options->BridgeAuthoritativeDir != 0;
}
/** Return true iff we once tried to stay connected to all ORs at once.
* FFFF this function, and the notion of staying connected to ORs, is
* nearly obsolete. One day there will be a proposal for getting rid of
* it.
*/
int
clique_mode(or_options_t *options)
{
return authdir_mode_tests_reachability(options);
}
/** Return true iff we are trying to be a server.
*/
int
server_mode(or_options_t *options)
{
if (options->ClientOnly) return 0;
return (options->ORPort != 0 || options->ORListenAddress);
}
/** Remember if we've advertised ourselves to the dirservers. */
static int server_is_advertised=0;
/** Return true iff we have published our descriptor lately.
*/
int
advertised_server_mode(void)
{
return server_is_advertised;
}
/**
* Called with a boolean: set whether we have recently published our
* descriptor.
*/
static void
set_server_advertised(int s)
{
server_is_advertised = s;
}
/** Return true iff we are trying to be a socks proxy. */
int
proxy_mode(or_options_t *options)
{
return (options->SocksPort != 0 || options->SocksListenAddress ||
options->TransPort != 0 || options->TransListenAddress ||
options->NatdPort != 0 || options->NatdListenAddress ||
options->DNSPort != 0 || options->DNSListenAddress);
}
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/** Decide if we're a publishable server. We are a publishable server if:
* - We don't have the ClientOnly option set
* and
* - We have the PublishServerDescriptor option set to non-empty
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* and
* - We have ORPort set
* and
* - We believe we are reachable from the outside; or
* - We are an authoritative directory server.
*/
static int
decide_if_publishable_server(void)
{
or_options_t *options = get_options();
if (options->ClientOnly)
return 0;
if (options->_PublishServerDescriptor == NO_AUTHORITY)
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return 0;
if (!server_mode(options))
return 0;
if (authdir_mode(options))
return 1;
return check_whether_orport_reachable();
}
/** Initiate server descriptor upload as reasonable (if server is publishable,
* etc). <b>force</b> is as for router_upload_dir_desc_to_dirservers.
*
* We need to rebuild the descriptor if it's dirty even if we're not
* uploading, because our reachability testing *uses* our descriptor to
* determine what IP address and ports to test.
*/
void
consider_publishable_server(int force)
{
int rebuilt;
if (!server_mode(get_options()))
return;
rebuilt = router_rebuild_descriptor(0);
if (decide_if_publishable_server()) {
set_server_advertised(1);
if (rebuilt == 0)
router_upload_dir_desc_to_dirservers(force);
} else {
set_server_advertised(0);
}
}
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/*
* Clique maintenance -- to be phased out.
2004-05-04 20:17:45 +02:00
*/
/** Return true iff we believe this OR tries to keep connections open
* to all other ORs. */
int
router_is_clique_mode(routerinfo_t *router)
{
if (router_digest_is_trusted_dir(router->cache_info.identity_digest))
return 1;
return 0;
}
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/*
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* OR descriptor generation.
2004-05-10 06:34:48 +02:00
*/
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/** My routerinfo. */
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static routerinfo_t *desc_routerinfo = NULL;
/** My extrainfo */
static extrainfo_t *desc_extrainfo = NULL;
/** Since when has our descriptor been "clean"? 0 if we need to regenerate it
* now. */
static time_t desc_clean_since = 0;
/** Boolean: do we need to regenerate the above? */
static int desc_needs_upload = 0;
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/** OR only: If <b>force</b> is true, or we haven't uploaded this
* descriptor successfully yet, try to upload our signed descriptor to
* all the directory servers we know about.
2004-05-04 20:17:45 +02:00
*/
void
router_upload_dir_desc_to_dirservers(int force)
{
routerinfo_t *ri;
extrainfo_t *ei;
char *msg;
size_t desc_len, extra_len = 0, total_len;
authority_type_t auth = get_options()->_PublishServerDescriptor;
ri = router_get_my_routerinfo();
if (!ri) {
log_info(LD_GENERAL, "No descriptor; skipping upload");
return;
}
ei = router_get_my_extrainfo();
if (auth == NO_AUTHORITY)
return;
if (!force && !desc_needs_upload)
return;
desc_needs_upload = 0;
desc_len = ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len;
extra_len = ei ? ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len : 0;
total_len = desc_len + extra_len + 1;
msg = tor_malloc(total_len);
memcpy(msg, ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body, desc_len);
if (ei) {
memcpy(msg+desc_len, ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body, extra_len);
}
msg[desc_len+extra_len] = 0;
directory_post_to_dirservers(DIR_PURPOSE_UPLOAD_DIR,
(auth & BRIDGE_AUTHORITY) ?
ROUTER_PURPOSE_BRIDGE :
ROUTER_PURPOSE_GENERAL,
auth, msg, desc_len, extra_len);
tor_free(msg);
}
/** OR only: Check whether my exit policy says to allow connection to
* conn. Return 0 if we accept; non-0 if we reject.
*/
int
router_compare_to_my_exit_policy(edge_connection_t *conn)
{
if (!router_get_my_routerinfo()) /* make sure desc_routerinfo exists */
return -1;
/* make sure it's resolved to something. this way we can't get a
'maybe' below. */
if (tor_addr_is_null(&conn->_base.addr))
return -1;
/* XXXX IPv6 */
if (tor_addr_family(&conn->_base.addr) != AF_INET)
return -1;
return compare_tor_addr_to_addr_policy(&conn->_base.addr, conn->_base.port,
desc_routerinfo->exit_policy) != ADDR_POLICY_ACCEPTED;
}
/** Return true iff I'm a server and <b>digest</b> is equal to
* my identity digest. */
int
router_digest_is_me(const char *digest)
{
return identitykey && !memcmp(identitykey_digest, digest, DIGEST_LEN);
}
/** Return true iff I'm a server and <b>digest</b> is equal to
* my identity digest. */
int
router_extrainfo_digest_is_me(const char *digest)
{
extrainfo_t *ei = router_get_my_extrainfo();
if (!ei)
return 0;
return !memcmp(digest,
ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_digest,
DIGEST_LEN);
}
/** A wrapper around router_digest_is_me(). */
int
router_is_me(routerinfo_t *router)
{
return router_digest_is_me(router->cache_info.identity_digest);
}
/** Return true iff <b>fp</b> is a hex fingerprint of my identity digest. */
int
router_fingerprint_is_me(const char *fp)
{
char digest[DIGEST_LEN];
if (strlen(fp) == HEX_DIGEST_LEN &&
base16_decode(digest, sizeof(digest), fp, HEX_DIGEST_LEN) == 0)
return router_digest_is_me(digest);
return 0;
}
/** Return a routerinfo for this OR, rebuilding a fresh one if
2004-05-04 20:17:45 +02:00
* necessary. Return NULL on error, or if called on an OP. */
routerinfo_t *
router_get_my_routerinfo(void)
{
if (!server_mode(get_options()))
return NULL;
if (router_rebuild_descriptor(0))
return NULL;
return desc_routerinfo;
}
/** OR only: Return a signed server descriptor for this OR, rebuilding a fresh
2004-05-04 20:17:45 +02:00
* one if necessary. Return NULL on error.
*/
const char *
router_get_my_descriptor(void)
{
const char *body;
if (!router_get_my_routerinfo())
return NULL;
/* Make sure this is nul-terminated. */
tor_assert(desc_routerinfo->cache_info.saved_location == SAVED_NOWHERE);
body = signed_descriptor_get_body(&desc_routerinfo->cache_info);
tor_assert(!body[desc_routerinfo->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len]);
log_debug(LD_GENERAL,"my desc is '%s'", body);
return body;
}
/** Return the extrainfo document for this OR, or NULL if we have none.
* Rebuilt it (and the server descriptor) if necessary. */
extrainfo_t *
router_get_my_extrainfo(void)
{
if (!server_mode(get_options()))
return NULL;
if (router_rebuild_descriptor(0))
return NULL;
return desc_extrainfo;
}
/** A list of nicknames that we've warned about including in our family
* declaration verbatim rather than as digests. */
static smartlist_t *warned_nonexistent_family = NULL;
static int router_guess_address_from_dir_headers(uint32_t *guess);
/** Make a current best guess at our address, either because
* it's configured in torrc, or because we've learned it from
* dirserver headers. Place the answer in *<b>addr</b> and return
* 0 on success, else return -1 if we have no guess. */
int
router_pick_published_address(or_options_t *options, uint32_t *addr)
{
if (resolve_my_address(LOG_INFO, options, addr, NULL) < 0) {
log_info(LD_CONFIG, "Could not determine our address locally. "
"Checking if directory headers provide any hints.");
if (router_guess_address_from_dir_headers(addr) < 0) {
log_info(LD_CONFIG, "No hints from directory headers either. "
"Will try again later.");
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
/** If <b>force</b> is true, or our descriptor is out-of-date, rebuild a fresh
* routerinfo, signed server descriptor, and extra-info document for this OR.
* Return 0 on success, -1 on temporary error.
2004-05-04 20:17:45 +02:00
*/
int
router_rebuild_descriptor(int force)
{
routerinfo_t *ri;
extrainfo_t *ei;
uint32_t addr;
char platform[256];
int hibernating = we_are_hibernating();
or_options_t *options = get_options();
if (desc_clean_since && !force)
return 0;
if (router_pick_published_address(options, &addr) < 0) {
/* Stop trying to rebuild our descriptor every second. We'll
* learn that it's time to try again when server_has_changed_ip()
* marks it dirty. */
desc_clean_since = time(NULL);
return -1;
}
ri = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(routerinfo_t));
ri->cache_info.routerlist_index = -1;
ri->address = tor_dup_ip(addr);
ri->nickname = tor_strdup(options->Nickname);
ri->addr = addr;
ri->or_port = options->ORPort;
ri->dir_port = options->DirPort;
ri->cache_info.published_on = time(NULL);
ri->onion_pkey = crypto_pk_dup_key(get_onion_key()); /* must invoke from
* main thread */
ri->identity_pkey = crypto_pk_dup_key(get_identity_key());
if (crypto_pk_get_digest(ri->identity_pkey,
ri->cache_info.identity_digest)<0) {
routerinfo_free(ri);
return -1;
}
get_platform_str(platform, sizeof(platform));
ri->platform = tor_strdup(platform);
/* compute ri->bandwidthrate as the min of various options */
ri->bandwidthrate = (int)options->BandwidthRate;
if (ri->bandwidthrate > options->MaxAdvertisedBandwidth)
ri->bandwidthrate = (int)options->MaxAdvertisedBandwidth;
if (options->RelayBandwidthRate > 0 &&
ri->bandwidthrate > options->RelayBandwidthRate)
ri->bandwidthrate = (int)options->RelayBandwidthRate;
/* and compute ri->bandwidthburst similarly */
ri->bandwidthburst = (int)options->BandwidthBurst;
if (options->RelayBandwidthBurst > 0 &&
ri->bandwidthburst > options->RelayBandwidthBurst)
ri->bandwidthburst = (int)options->RelayBandwidthBurst;
ri->bandwidthcapacity = hibernating ? 0 : rep_hist_bandwidth_assess();
policies_parse_exit_policy(options->ExitPolicy, &ri->exit_policy,
options->ExitPolicyRejectPrivate,
ri->address);
if (desc_routerinfo) { /* inherit values */
ri->is_valid = desc_routerinfo->is_valid;
ri->is_running = desc_routerinfo->is_running;
ri->is_named = desc_routerinfo->is_named;
}
if (authdir_mode(options))
ri->is_valid = ri->is_named = 1; /* believe in yourself */
if (options->MyFamily) {
smartlist_t *family;
if (!warned_nonexistent_family)
warned_nonexistent_family = smartlist_create();
family = smartlist_create();
ri->declared_family = smartlist_create();
smartlist_split_string(family, options->MyFamily, ",",
SPLIT_SKIP_SPACE|SPLIT_SKIP_SPACE|SPLIT_IGNORE_BLANK, 0);
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(family, char *, name,
{
routerinfo_t *member;
if (!strcasecmp(name, options->Nickname))
member = ri;
else
member = router_get_by_nickname(name, 1);
if (!member) {
int is_legal = is_legal_nickname_or_hexdigest(name);
if (!smartlist_string_isin(warned_nonexistent_family, name) &&
!is_legal_hexdigest(name)) {
if (is_legal)
log_warn(LD_CONFIG,
"I have no descriptor for the router named \"%s\" in my "
"declared family; I'll use the nickname as is, but "
"this may confuse clients.", name);
else
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "There is a router named \"%s\" in my "
"declared family, but that isn't a legal nickname. "
"Skipping it.", escaped(name));
smartlist_add(warned_nonexistent_family, tor_strdup(name));
}
if (is_legal) {
smartlist_add(ri->declared_family, name);
name = NULL;
}
} else if (router_is_me(member)) {
/* Don't list ourself in our own family; that's redundant */
} else {
char *fp = tor_malloc(HEX_DIGEST_LEN+2);
fp[0] = '$';
base16_encode(fp+1,HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1,
member->cache_info.identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
smartlist_add(ri->declared_family, fp);
if (smartlist_string_isin(warned_nonexistent_family, name))
smartlist_string_remove(warned_nonexistent_family, name);
}
tor_free(name);
});
/* remove duplicates from the list */
smartlist_sort_strings(ri->declared_family);
smartlist_uniq_strings(ri->declared_family);
smartlist_free(family);
}
/* Now generate the extrainfo. */
ei = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(extrainfo_t));
ei->cache_info.is_extrainfo = 1;
strlcpy(ei->nickname, get_options()->Nickname, sizeof(ei->nickname));
ei->cache_info.published_on = ri->cache_info.published_on;
memcpy(ei->cache_info.identity_digest, ri->cache_info.identity_digest,
DIGEST_LEN);
ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body = tor_malloc(8192);
if (extrainfo_dump_to_string(ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body, 8192,
ei, get_identity_key()) < 0) {
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't generate extra-info descriptor.");
extrainfo_free(ei);
return -1;
}
ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len =
strlen(ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body);
router_get_extrainfo_hash(ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body,
ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_digest);
/* Now finish the router descriptor. */
memcpy(ri->cache_info.extra_info_digest,
ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_digest,
DIGEST_LEN);
ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body = tor_malloc(8192);
if (router_dump_router_to_string(ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body, 8192,
ri, get_identity_key())<0) {
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't generate router descriptor.");
return -1;
}
ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len =
strlen(ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body);
ri->purpose =
options->BridgeRelay ? ROUTER_PURPOSE_BRIDGE : ROUTER_PURPOSE_GENERAL;
ri->cache_info.send_unencrypted = 1;
/* Let bridges serve their own descriptors unencrypted, so they can
* pass reachability testing. (If they want to be harder to notice,
* they can always leave the DirPort off). */
if (!options->BridgeRelay)
ei->cache_info.send_unencrypted = 1;
router_get_router_hash(ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body,
ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_digest);
routerinfo_set_country(ri);
tor_assert(! routerinfo_incompatible_with_extrainfo(ri, ei, NULL, NULL));
if (desc_routerinfo)
routerinfo_free(desc_routerinfo);
desc_routerinfo = ri;
if (desc_extrainfo)
extrainfo_free(desc_extrainfo);
desc_extrainfo = ei;
desc_clean_since = time(NULL);
desc_needs_upload = 1;
control_event_my_descriptor_changed();
return 0;
}
/** Mark descriptor out of date if it's older than <b>when</b> */
void
mark_my_descriptor_dirty_if_older_than(time_t when)
{
if (desc_clean_since < when)
mark_my_descriptor_dirty();
}
/** Call when the current descriptor is out of date. */
void
mark_my_descriptor_dirty(void)
{
desc_clean_since = 0;
}
/** How frequently will we republish our descriptor because of large (factor
* of 2) shifts in estimated bandwidth? */
#define MAX_BANDWIDTH_CHANGE_FREQ (20*60)
/** Check whether bandwidth has changed a lot since the last time we announced
* bandwidth. If so, mark our descriptor dirty. */
void
check_descriptor_bandwidth_changed(time_t now)
{
static time_t last_changed = 0;
uint64_t prev, cur;
if (!desc_routerinfo)
return;
prev = desc_routerinfo->bandwidthcapacity;
cur = we_are_hibernating() ? 0 : rep_hist_bandwidth_assess();
if ((prev != cur && (!prev || !cur)) ||
cur > prev*2 ||
cur < prev/2) {
if (last_changed+MAX_BANDWIDTH_CHANGE_FREQ < now) {
log_info(LD_GENERAL,
"Measured bandwidth has changed; rebuilding descriptor.");
mark_my_descriptor_dirty();
last_changed = now;
}
}
}
/** Note at log level severity that our best guess of address has changed from
2007-02-24 08:50:38 +01:00
* <b>prev</b> to <b>cur</b>. */
static void
log_addr_has_changed(int severity, uint32_t prev, uint32_t cur,
const char *source)
{
char addrbuf_prev[INET_NTOA_BUF_LEN];
char addrbuf_cur[INET_NTOA_BUF_LEN];
struct in_addr in_prev;
struct in_addr in_cur;
in_prev.s_addr = htonl(prev);
tor_inet_ntoa(&in_prev, addrbuf_prev, sizeof(addrbuf_prev));
in_cur.s_addr = htonl(cur);
tor_inet_ntoa(&in_cur, addrbuf_cur, sizeof(addrbuf_cur));
if (prev)
log_fn(severity, LD_GENERAL,
"Our IP Address has changed from %s to %s; "
"rebuilding descriptor (source: %s).",
addrbuf_prev, addrbuf_cur, source);
else
log_notice(LD_GENERAL,
"Guessed our IP address as %s (source: %s).",
addrbuf_cur, source);
}
/** Check whether our own address as defined by the Address configuration
* has changed. This is for routers that get their address from a service
* like dyndns. If our address has changed, mark our descriptor dirty. */
void
check_descriptor_ipaddress_changed(time_t now)
{
uint32_t prev, cur;
or_options_t *options = get_options();
(void) now;
if (!desc_routerinfo)
return;
prev = desc_routerinfo->addr;
if (resolve_my_address(LOG_INFO, options, &cur, NULL) < 0) {
log_info(LD_CONFIG,"options->Address didn't resolve into an IP.");
return;
}
if (prev != cur) {
log_addr_has_changed(LOG_NOTICE, prev, cur, "resolve");
ip_address_changed(0);
}
}
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/** The most recently guessed value of our IP address, based on directory
* headers. */
static uint32_t last_guessed_ip = 0;
/** A directory server <b>d_conn</b> told us our IP address is
* <b>suggestion</b>.
* If this address is different from the one we think we are now, and
* if our computer doesn't actually know its IP address, then switch. */
void
router_new_address_suggestion(const char *suggestion,
const dir_connection_t *d_conn)
{
uint32_t addr, cur = 0;
struct in_addr in;
or_options_t *options = get_options();
/* first, learn what the IP address actually is */
if (!tor_inet_aton(suggestion, &in)) {
log_debug(LD_DIR, "Malformed X-Your-Address-Is header %s. Ignoring.",
escaped(suggestion));
return;
}
addr = ntohl(in.s_addr);
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log_debug(LD_DIR, "Got X-Your-Address-Is: %s.", suggestion);
if (!server_mode(options)) {
last_guessed_ip = addr; /* store it in case we need it later */
return;
}
if (resolve_my_address(LOG_INFO, options, &cur, NULL) >= 0) {
/* We're all set -- we already know our address. Great. */
last_guessed_ip = cur; /* store it in case we need it later */
return;
}
if (is_internal_IP(addr, 0)) {
/* Don't believe anybody who says our IP is, say, 127.0.0.1. */
return;
}
if (tor_addr_eq_ipv4h(&d_conn->_base.addr, addr)) {
/* Don't believe anybody who says our IP is their IP. */
log_debug(LD_DIR, "A directory server told us our IP address is %s, "
"but he's just reporting his own IP address. Ignoring.",
suggestion);
return;
}
/* Okay. We can't resolve our own address, and X-Your-Address-Is is giving
* us an answer different from what we had the last time we managed to
* resolve it. */
if (last_guessed_ip != addr) {
control_event_server_status(LOG_NOTICE,
"EXTERNAL_ADDRESS ADDRESS=%s METHOD=DIRSERV",
suggestion);
log_addr_has_changed(LOG_NOTICE, last_guessed_ip, addr,
d_conn->_base.address);
ip_address_changed(0);
last_guessed_ip = addr; /* router_rebuild_descriptor() will fetch it */
}
}
/** We failed to resolve our address locally, but we'd like to build
* a descriptor and publish / test reachability. If we have a guess
* about our address based on directory headers, answer it and return
* 0; else return -1. */
static int
router_guess_address_from_dir_headers(uint32_t *guess)
{
if (last_guessed_ip) {
*guess = last_guessed_ip;
return 0;
}
return -1;
}
extern const char tor_svn_revision[]; /* from tor_main.c */
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/** Set <b>platform</b> (max length <b>len</b>) to a NUL-terminated short
* string describing the version of Tor and the operating system we're
2004-05-04 20:17:45 +02:00
* currently running on.
*/
void
get_platform_str(char *platform, size_t len)
{
tor_snprintf(platform, len, "Tor %s on %s", get_version(), get_uname());
}
/* XXX need to audit this thing and count fenceposts. maybe
* refactor so we don't have to keep asking if we're
* near the end of maxlen?
*/
#define DEBUG_ROUTER_DUMP_ROUTER_TO_STRING
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2004-05-10 06:34:48 +02:00
/** OR only: Given a routerinfo for this router, and an identity key to sign
* with, encode the routerinfo as a signed server descriptor and write the
* result into <b>s</b>, using at most <b>maxlen</b> bytes. Return -1 on
* failure, and the number of bytes used on success.
2004-05-04 20:17:45 +02:00
*/
int
router_dump_router_to_string(char *s, size_t maxlen, routerinfo_t *router,
crypto_pk_env_t *ident_key)
{
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char *onion_pkey; /* Onion key, PEM-encoded. */
char *identity_pkey; /* Identity key, PEM-encoded. */
char digest[DIGEST_LEN];
char published[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
char fingerprint[FINGERPRINT_LEN+1];
char extra_info_digest[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
size_t onion_pkeylen, identity_pkeylen;
size_t written;
int result=0;
addr_policy_t *tmpe;
char *family_line;
or_options_t *options = get_options();
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/* Make sure the identity key matches the one in the routerinfo. */
if (crypto_pk_cmp_keys(ident_key, router->identity_pkey)) {
log_warn(LD_BUG,"Tried to sign a router with a private key that didn't "
"match router's public key!");
return -1;
}
/* record our fingerprint, so we can include it in the descriptor */
if (crypto_pk_get_fingerprint(router->identity_pkey, fingerprint, 1)<0) {
log_err(LD_BUG,"Error computing fingerprint");
return -1;
}
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/* PEM-encode the onion key */
if (crypto_pk_write_public_key_to_string(router->onion_pkey,
&onion_pkey,&onion_pkeylen)<0) {
log_warn(LD_BUG,"write onion_pkey to string failed!");
return -1;
}
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/* PEM-encode the identity key key */
if (crypto_pk_write_public_key_to_string(router->identity_pkey,
&identity_pkey,&identity_pkeylen)<0) {
log_warn(LD_BUG,"write identity_pkey to string failed!");
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tor_free(onion_pkey);
return -1;
}
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/* Encode the publication time. */
format_iso_time(published, router->cache_info.published_on);
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if (router->declared_family && smartlist_len(router->declared_family)) {
size_t n;
char *family = smartlist_join_strings(router->declared_family, " ", 0, &n);
n += strlen("family ") + 2; /* 1 for \n, 1 for \0. */
family_line = tor_malloc(n);
tor_snprintf(family_line, n, "family %s\n", family);
tor_free(family);
} else {
family_line = tor_strdup("");
}
base16_encode(extra_info_digest, sizeof(extra_info_digest),
router->cache_info.extra_info_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
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/* Generate the easy portion of the router descriptor. */
result = tor_snprintf(s, maxlen,
"router %s %s %d 0 %d\n"
"platform %s\n"
"opt protocols Link 1 2 Circuit 1\n"
"published %s\n"
"opt fingerprint %s\n"
"uptime %ld\n"
"bandwidth %d %d %d\n"
"opt extra-info-digest %s\n%s"
"onion-key\n%s"
"signing-key\n%s"
"%s%s%s%s",
router->nickname,
router->address,
router->or_port,
decide_to_advertise_dirport(options, router->dir_port),
router->platform,
published,
fingerprint,
stats_n_seconds_working,
(int) router->bandwidthrate,
(int) router->bandwidthburst,
(int) router->bandwidthcapacity,
extra_info_digest,
options->DownloadExtraInfo ? "opt caches-extra-info\n" : "",
onion_pkey, identity_pkey,
family_line,
we_are_hibernating() ? "opt hibernating 1\n" : "",
options->HidServDirectoryV2 ? "opt hidden-service-dir\n" : "",
options->AllowSingleHopExits ? "opt allow-single-hop-exits\n" : "");
tor_free(family_line);
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tor_free(onion_pkey);
tor_free(identity_pkey);
if (result < 0) {
log_warn(LD_BUG,"descriptor snprintf #1 ran out of room!");
return -1;
}
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/* From now on, we use 'written' to remember the current length of 's'. */
written = result;
if (options->ContactInfo && strlen(options->ContactInfo)) {
const char *ci = options->ContactInfo;
if (strchr(ci, '\n') || strchr(ci, '\r'))
ci = escaped(ci);
result = tor_snprintf(s+written,maxlen-written, "contact %s\n", ci);
if (result<0) {
log_warn(LD_BUG,"descriptor snprintf #2 ran out of room!");
return -1;
}
written += result;
}
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/* Write the exit policy to the end of 's'. */
if (dns_seems_to_be_broken() || has_dns_init_failed() ||
!router->exit_policy || !smartlist_len(router->exit_policy)) {
/* DNS is screwed up; don't claim to be an exit. */
strlcat(s+written, "reject *:*\n", maxlen-written);
written += strlen("reject *:*\n");
tmpe = NULL;
} else if (router->exit_policy) {
int i;
for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(router->exit_policy); ++i) {
tmpe = smartlist_get(router->exit_policy, i);
result = policy_write_item(s+written, maxlen-written, tmpe, 1);
if (result < 0) {
log_warn(LD_BUG,"descriptor policy_write_item ran out of room!");
return -1;
}
tor_assert(result == (int)strlen(s+written));
written += result;
if (written+2 > maxlen) {
log_warn(LD_BUG,"descriptor policy_write_item ran out of room (2)!");
return -1;
}
s[written++] = '\n';
}
}
if (written+256 > maxlen) { /* Not enough room for signature. */
log_warn(LD_BUG,"not enough room left in descriptor for signature!");
return -1;
}
2009-04-11 02:40:11 +02:00
/* Sign the descriptor */
strlcpy(s+written, "router-signature\n", maxlen-written);
written += strlen(s+written);
s[written] = '\0';
if (router_get_router_hash(s, digest) < 0) {
return -1;
}
note_crypto_pk_op(SIGN_RTR);
if (router_append_dirobj_signature(s+written,maxlen-written,
digest,ident_key)<0) {
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't sign router descriptor");
return -1;
}
written += strlen(s+written);
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if (written+2 > maxlen) {
log_warn(LD_BUG,"Not enough room to finish descriptor.");
return -1;
}
/* include a last '\n' */
s[written] = '\n';
s[written+1] = 0;
#ifdef DEBUG_ROUTER_DUMP_ROUTER_TO_STRING
{
char *s_dup;
const char *cp;
routerinfo_t *ri_tmp;
cp = s_dup = tor_strdup(s);
ri_tmp = router_parse_entry_from_string(cp, NULL, 1, 0, NULL);
if (!ri_tmp) {
log_err(LD_BUG,
"We just generated a router descriptor we can't parse.");
log_err(LD_BUG, "Descriptor was: <<%s>>", s);
return -1;
}
tor_free(s_dup);
routerinfo_free(ri_tmp);
}
#endif
return (int)written+1;
}
/** Write the contents of <b>extrainfo</b> to the <b>maxlen</b>-byte string
* <b>s</b>, signing them with <b>ident_key</b>. Return 0 on success,
* negative on failure. */
int
extrainfo_dump_to_string(char *s, size_t maxlen, extrainfo_t *extrainfo,
crypto_pk_env_t *ident_key)
{
or_options_t *options = get_options();
char identity[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
char published[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
char digest[DIGEST_LEN];
char *bandwidth_usage;
int result;
size_t len;
base16_encode(identity, sizeof(identity),
extrainfo->cache_info.identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
format_iso_time(published, extrainfo->cache_info.published_on);
2007-04-16 20:54:56 +02:00
bandwidth_usage = rep_hist_get_bandwidth_lines(1);
result = tor_snprintf(s, maxlen,
"extra-info %s %s\n"
"published %s\n%s",
extrainfo->nickname, identity,
published, bandwidth_usage);
tor_free(bandwidth_usage);
if (result<0)
return -1;
2008-06-04 11:02:25 +02:00
if (should_record_bridge_info(options)) {
char *geoip_summary = extrainfo_get_client_geoip_summary(time(NULL));
if (geoip_summary) {
char geoip_start[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
format_iso_time(geoip_start, geoip_get_history_start());
result = tor_snprintf(s+strlen(s), maxlen-strlen(s),
"geoip-start-time %s\n"
"geoip-client-origins %s\n",
geoip_start, geoip_summary);
control_event_clients_seen(geoip_start, geoip_summary);
tor_free(geoip_summary);
if (result<0)
return -1;
}
}
len = strlen(s);
strlcat(s+len, "router-signature\n", maxlen-len);
len += strlen(s+len);
if (router_get_extrainfo_hash(s, digest)<0)
return -1;
if (router_append_dirobj_signature(s+len, maxlen-len, digest, ident_key)<0)
return -1;
#ifdef DEBUG_ROUTER_DUMP_ROUTER_TO_STRING
{
char *cp, *s_dup;
extrainfo_t *ei_tmp;
cp = s_dup = tor_strdup(s);
ei_tmp = extrainfo_parse_entry_from_string(cp, NULL, 1, NULL);
if (!ei_tmp) {
log_err(LD_BUG,
"We just generated an extrainfo descriptor we can't parse.");
log_err(LD_BUG, "Descriptor was: <<%s>>", s);
return -1;
}
tor_free(s_dup);
extrainfo_free(ei_tmp);
}
#endif
return (int)strlen(s)+1;
}
2009-01-28 08:16:22 +01:00
/** Wrapper function for geoip_get_client_history(). It first discards
* any items in the client history that are too old -- it dumps anything
* more than 48 hours old, but it only considers whether to dump at most
* once per 48 hours, so we aren't too precise to an observer (see also
* r14780).
*/
char *
extrainfo_get_client_geoip_summary(time_t now)
{
static time_t last_purged_at = 0;
int geoip_purge_interval = 48*60*60;
#ifdef ENABLE_GEOIP_STATS
geoip_purge_interval = DIR_RECORD_USAGE_RETAIN_IPS;
#endif
#ifdef ENABLE_ENTRY_STATS
geoip_purge_interval = ENTRY_RECORD_USAGE_RETAIN_IPS;
#endif
if (now > last_purged_at+geoip_purge_interval) {
/* (Note that this also discards items in the client history with
* action GEOIP_CLIENT_NETWORKSTATUS{_V2}, which doesn't matter
* because bridge and directory stats are independent. Keep in mind
* for future extensions, though.) */
geoip_remove_old_clients(now-geoip_purge_interval);
last_purged_at = now;
}
return geoip_get_client_history(now, GEOIP_CLIENT_CONNECT);
}
/** Return true iff <b>s</b> is a legally valid server nickname. */
int
is_legal_nickname(const char *s)
{
size_t len;
tor_assert(s);
len = strlen(s);
return len > 0 && len <= MAX_NICKNAME_LEN &&
strspn(s,LEGAL_NICKNAME_CHARACTERS) == len;
}
/** Return true iff <b>s</b> is a legally valid server nickname or
* hex-encoded identity-key digest. */
int
is_legal_nickname_or_hexdigest(const char *s)
{
if (*s!='$')
return is_legal_nickname(s);
else
return is_legal_hexdigest(s);
}
/** Return true iff <b>s</b> is a legally valid hex-encoded identity-key
* digest. */
int
is_legal_hexdigest(const char *s)
{
size_t len;
tor_assert(s);
if (s[0] == '$') s++;
len = strlen(s);
if (len > HEX_DIGEST_LEN) {
if (s[HEX_DIGEST_LEN] == '=' ||
s[HEX_DIGEST_LEN] == '~') {
if (!is_legal_nickname(s+HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1))
return 0;
} else {
return 0;
}
}
return (len >= HEX_DIGEST_LEN &&
strspn(s,HEX_CHARACTERS)==HEX_DIGEST_LEN);
}
/** Set <b>buf</b> (which must have MAX_VERBOSE_NICKNAME_LEN+1 bytes) to the
* verbose representation of the identity of <b>router</b>. The format is:
* A dollar sign.
* The upper-case hexadecimal encoding of the SHA1 hash of router's identity.
* A "=" if the router is named; a "~" if it is not.
* The router's nickname.
**/
void
router_get_verbose_nickname(char *buf, const routerinfo_t *router)
{
buf[0] = '$';
base16_encode(buf+1, HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1, router->cache_info.identity_digest,
DIGEST_LEN);
buf[1+HEX_DIGEST_LEN] = router->is_named ? '=' : '~';
strlcpy(buf+1+HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1, router->nickname, MAX_NICKNAME_LEN+1);
}
/** Set <b>buf</b> (which must have MAX_VERBOSE_NICKNAME_LEN+1 bytes) to the
* verbose representation of the identity of <b>router</b>. The format is:
* A dollar sign.
* The upper-case hexadecimal encoding of the SHA1 hash of router's identity.
* A "=" if the router is named; a "~" if it is not.
* The router's nickname.
**/
void
routerstatus_get_verbose_nickname(char *buf, const routerstatus_t *router)
{
buf[0] = '$';
base16_encode(buf+1, HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1, router->identity_digest,
DIGEST_LEN);
buf[1+HEX_DIGEST_LEN] = router->is_named ? '=' : '~';
strlcpy(buf+1+HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1, router->nickname, MAX_NICKNAME_LEN+1);
}
/** Forget that we have issued any router-related warnings, so that we'll
* warn again if we see the same errors. */
void
router_reset_warnings(void)
{
if (warned_nonexistent_family) {
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(warned_nonexistent_family, char *, cp, tor_free(cp));
smartlist_clear(warned_nonexistent_family);
}
}
/** Given a router purpose, convert it to a string. Don't call this on
* ROUTER_PURPOSE_UNKNOWN: The whole point of that value is that we don't
* know its string representation. */
const char *
router_purpose_to_string(uint8_t p)
{
switch (p)
{
case ROUTER_PURPOSE_GENERAL: return "general";
case ROUTER_PURPOSE_BRIDGE: return "bridge";
case ROUTER_PURPOSE_CONTROLLER: return "controller";
default:
tor_assert(0);
}
return NULL;
}
/** Given a string, convert it to a router purpose. */
uint8_t
router_purpose_from_string(const char *s)
{
if (!strcmp(s, "general"))
return ROUTER_PURPOSE_GENERAL;
else if (!strcmp(s, "bridge"))
return ROUTER_PURPOSE_BRIDGE;
else if (!strcmp(s, "controller"))
return ROUTER_PURPOSE_CONTROLLER;
else
return ROUTER_PURPOSE_UNKNOWN;
}
/** Release all static resources held in router.c */
void
router_free_all(void)
{
if (onionkey)
crypto_free_pk_env(onionkey);
if (lastonionkey)
crypto_free_pk_env(lastonionkey);
if (identitykey)
crypto_free_pk_env(identitykey);
if (key_lock)
tor_mutex_free(key_lock);
if (desc_routerinfo)
routerinfo_free(desc_routerinfo);
if (desc_extrainfo)
extrainfo_free(desc_extrainfo);
if (authority_signing_key)
crypto_free_pk_env(authority_signing_key);
if (authority_key_certificate)
authority_cert_free(authority_key_certificate);
if (legacy_signing_key)
crypto_free_pk_env(legacy_signing_key);
if (legacy_key_certificate)
authority_cert_free(legacy_key_certificate);
if (warned_nonexistent_family) {
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(warned_nonexistent_family, char *, cp, tor_free(cp));
smartlist_free(warned_nonexistent_family);
}
}