tor/src/or/entrynodes.h

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/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
* Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
* Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
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* Copyright (c) 2007-2016, The Tor Project, Inc. */
/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
/**
* \file entrynodes.h
* \brief Header file for circuitbuild.c.
**/
#ifndef TOR_ENTRYNODES_H
#define TOR_ENTRYNODES_H
/* Forward declare for guard_selection_t; entrynodes.c has the real struct */
typedef struct guard_selection_s guard_selection_t;
/* Forward declare for entry_guard_t; the real declaration is private. */
typedef struct entry_guard_t entry_guard_t;
#define GUARD_REACHABLE_NO 0
#define GUARD_REACHABLE_YES 1
#define GUARD_REACHABLE_MAYBE 2
/* Information about a guard's pathbias status.
* These fields are used in circpathbias.c to try to detect entry
* nodes that are failing circuits at a suspicious frequency.
*/
typedef struct guard_pathbias_t {
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unsigned int path_bias_noticed : 1; /**< Did we alert the user about path
* bias for this node already? */
unsigned int path_bias_warned : 1; /**< Did we alert the user about path bias
* for this node already? */
unsigned int path_bias_extreme : 1; /**< Did we alert the user about path
* bias for this node already? */
unsigned int path_bias_disabled : 1; /**< Have we disabled this node because
* of path bias issues? */
unsigned int path_bias_use_noticed : 1; /**< Did we alert the user about path
* use bias for this node already? */
unsigned int path_bias_use_extreme : 1; /**< Did we alert the user about path
* use bias for this node already? */
double circ_attempts; /**< Number of circuits this guard has "attempted" */
double circ_successes; /**< Number of successfully built circuits using
* this guard as first hop. */
double successful_circuits_closed; /**< Number of circuits that carried
* streams successfully. */
double collapsed_circuits; /**< Number of fully built circuits that were
* remotely closed before any streams were
* attempted. */
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double unusable_circuits; /**< Number of circuits for which streams were
* attempted, but none succeeded. */
double timeouts; /**< Number of 'right-censored' circuit timeouts for this
* guard. */
double use_attempts; /**< Number of circuits we tried to use with streams */
double use_successes; /**< Number of successfully used circuits using
* this guard as first hop. */
} guard_pathbias_t;
#if defined(ENTRYNODES_PRIVATE)
/** An entry_guard_t represents our information about a chosen long-term
* first hop, known as a "helper" node in the literature. We can't just
* use a node_t, since we want to remember these even when we
* don't have any directory info. */
struct entry_guard_t {
char nickname[MAX_HEX_NICKNAME_LEN+1];
char identity[DIGEST_LEN];
ed25519_public_key_t ed_id;
/* XXXX prop271 DOCDOC document all these fields better */
/* Persistent fields, present for all sampled guards. */
time_t sampled_on_date;
time_t unlisted_since_date; // can be zero
char *sampled_by_version;
unsigned currently_listed : 1;
/* Persistent fields, for confirmed guards. */
time_t confirmed_on_date; /* 0 if not confirmed */
int confirmed_idx; /* -1 if not confirmed; otherwise the order that this
* item should occur in the CONFIRMED_GUARDS ordered
* list */
/* ==== Non-persistent fields. */
/* == These are used by sampled guards */
time_t last_tried_to_connect;
unsigned is_reachable : 2; /* One of GUARD_REACHABLE_{NO,YES,MAYBE} */
unsigned is_pending : 1;
time_t failing_since;
/* These determine presence in filtered guards and usable-filtered-guards
* respectively. */
unsigned is_filtered_guard : 1;
unsigned is_usable_filtered_guard : 1;
/** This string holds any fields that we are maintaining because
* we saw them in the state, even if we don't understand them. */
char *extra_state_fields;
/**
* @name legacy guard selection algorithm fields
*
* These are used and maintained by the legacy (pre-prop271) entry guard
* algorithm. Most of them we will remove as prop271 gets implemented.
* The rest we'll migrate over, if they are 100% semantically identical to
* their prop271 equivalents. XXXXprop271
*/
/**@{*/
time_t chosen_on_date; /**< Approximately when was this guard added?
* "0" if we don't know. */
char *chosen_by_version; /**< What tor version added this guard? NULL
* if we don't know. */
unsigned int made_contact : 1; /**< 0 if we have never connected to this
* router, 1 if we have. */
unsigned int can_retry : 1; /**< Should we retry connecting to this entry,
* in spite of having it marked as unreachable?*/
unsigned int is_dir_cache : 1; /**< Is this node a directory cache? */
time_t bad_since; /**< 0 if this guard is currently usable, or the time at
* which it was observed to become (according to the
* directory or the user configuration) unusable. */
time_t unreachable_since; /**< 0 if we can connect to this guard, or the
* time at which we first noticed we couldn't
* connect to it. */
time_t last_attempted; /**< 0 if we can connect to this guard, or the time
* at which we last failed to connect to it. */
/**}@*/
/** Path bias information for this guard. */
guard_pathbias_t pb;
};
#endif
#if 1
/* XXXX NM I would prefer that all of this stuff be private to
* entrynodes.c. */
entry_guard_t *entry_guard_get_by_id_digest_for_guard_selection(
guard_selection_t *gs, const char *digest);
entry_guard_t *entry_guard_get_by_id_digest(const char *digest);
void entry_guards_changed_for_guard_selection(guard_selection_t *gs);
void entry_guards_changed(void);
guard_selection_t * get_guard_selection_info(void);
const smartlist_t *get_entry_guards_for_guard_selection(
guard_selection_t *gs);
const smartlist_t *get_entry_guards(void);
int num_live_entry_guards_for_guard_selection(
guard_selection_t *gs,
int for_directory);
int num_live_entry_guards(int for_directory);
#endif
const node_t *entry_guard_find_node(const entry_guard_t *guard);
void entry_guard_mark_bad(entry_guard_t *guard);
const char *entry_guard_get_rsa_id_digest(const entry_guard_t *guard);
const char *entry_guard_describe(const entry_guard_t *guard);
guard_pathbias_t *entry_guard_get_pathbias_state(entry_guard_t *guard);
/* Used by bridges.c only. */
void add_bridge_as_entry_guard(guard_selection_t *gs,
const node_t *chosen);
int num_bridges_usable(void);
#ifdef ENTRYNODES_PRIVATE
STATIC time_t randomize_time(time_t now, time_t max_backdate);
STATIC void entry_guard_add_to_sample(guard_selection_t *gs,
node_t *node);
STATIC char *entry_guard_encode_for_state(entry_guard_t *guard);
STATIC entry_guard_t *entry_guard_parse_from_state(const char *s);
STATIC void entry_guard_free(entry_guard_t *e);
STATIC const node_t *add_an_entry_guard(guard_selection_t *gs,
const node_t *chosen,
int reset_status, int prepend,
int for_discovery, int for_directory);
STATIC int populate_live_entry_guards(smartlist_t *live_entry_guards,
const smartlist_t *all_entry_guards,
const node_t *chosen_exit,
dirinfo_type_t dirinfo_type,
int for_directory,
int need_uptime, int need_capacity);
STATIC int decide_num_guards(const or_options_t *options, int for_directory);
STATIC void entry_guards_set_from_config(guard_selection_t *gs,
const or_options_t *options);
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/** Flags to be passed to entry_is_live() to indicate what kind of
* entry nodes we are looking for. */
typedef enum {
ENTRY_NEED_UPTIME = 1<<0,
ENTRY_NEED_CAPACITY = 1<<1,
ENTRY_ASSUME_REACHABLE = 1<<2,
ENTRY_NEED_DESCRIPTOR = 1<<3,
} entry_is_live_flags_t;
STATIC const node_t *entry_is_live(const entry_guard_t *e,
entry_is_live_flags_t flags,
const char **msg);
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STATIC int entry_is_time_to_retry(const entry_guard_t *e, time_t now);
#endif
void remove_all_entry_guards_for_guard_selection(guard_selection_t *gs);
void remove_all_entry_guards(void);
void entry_guards_compute_status_for_guard_selection(
guard_selection_t *gs, const or_options_t *options, time_t now);
void entry_guards_compute_status(const or_options_t *options, time_t now);
int entry_guard_register_connect_status_for_guard_selection(
guard_selection_t *gs, const char *digest, int succeeded,
int mark_relay_status, time_t now);
int entry_guard_register_connect_status(const char *digest, int succeeded,
int mark_relay_status, time_t now);
void entry_nodes_should_be_added_for_guard_selection(guard_selection_t *gs);
void entry_nodes_should_be_added(void);
int entry_list_is_constrained(const or_options_t *options);
const node_t *choose_random_entry(cpath_build_state_t *state);
const node_t *choose_random_dirguard(dirinfo_type_t t);
int entry_guards_parse_state_for_guard_selection(
guard_selection_t *gs, or_state_t *state, int set, char **msg);
int entry_guards_parse_state(or_state_t *state, int set, char **msg);
void entry_guards_update_state(or_state_t *state);
int getinfo_helper_entry_guards(control_connection_t *conn,
const char *question, char **answer,
const char **errmsg);
int is_node_used_as_guard_for_guard_selection(guard_selection_t *gs,
const node_t *node);
MOCK_DECL(int, is_node_used_as_guard, (const node_t *node));
int entries_known_but_down(const or_options_t *options);
void entries_retry_all(const or_options_t *options);
void entry_guards_free_all(void);
double pathbias_get_close_success_count(entry_guard_t *guard);
double pathbias_get_use_success_count(entry_guard_t *guard);
/** Contains the bandwidth of a relay as a guard and as a non-guard
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* after the guardfraction has been considered. */
typedef struct guardfraction_bandwidth_t {
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/** Bandwidth as a guard after guardfraction has been considered. */
int guard_bw;
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/** Bandwidth as a non-guard after guardfraction has been considered. */
int non_guard_bw;
} guardfraction_bandwidth_t;
int should_apply_guardfraction(const networkstatus_t *ns);
void
guard_get_guardfraction_bandwidth(guardfraction_bandwidth_t *guardfraction_bw,
int orig_bandwidth,
uint32_t guardfraction_percentage);
#endif