Add an entry_guard_describe() function

This function helpfully removes all but one remaining use of
an entry_guard_t private field in pathbias.c
This commit is contained in:
Nick Mathewson 2016-11-14 12:04:42 -05:00
parent be447bc770
commit 823357dbe4
4 changed files with 78 additions and 44 deletions

View File

@ -64,9 +64,9 @@ entry_guard_inc_circ_attempt_count(entry_guard_t *guard)
pathbias_scale_close_rates(guard);
guard->pb.circ_attempts++;
log_info(LD_CIRC, "Got success count %f/%f for guard %s ($%s)",
guard->pb.circ_successes, guard->pb.circ_attempts, guard->nickname,
hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN));
log_info(LD_CIRC, "Got success count %f/%f for guard %s",
guard->pb.circ_successes, guard->pb.circ_attempts,
entry_guard_describe(guard));
return 0;
}
@ -521,9 +521,9 @@ pathbias_count_build_success(origin_circuit_t *circ)
guard->pb.circ_successes++;
entry_guards_changed();
log_info(LD_CIRC, "Got success count %f/%f for guard %s ($%s)",
log_info(LD_CIRC, "Got success count %f/%f for guard %s",
guard->pb.circ_successes, guard->pb.circ_attempts,
guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN));
entry_guard_describe(guard));
} else {
if ((rate_msg = rate_limit_log(&success_notice_limit,
approx_time()))) {
@ -540,9 +540,9 @@ pathbias_count_build_success(origin_circuit_t *circ)
if (guard->pb.circ_attempts < guard->pb.circ_successes) {
log_notice(LD_BUG, "Unexpectedly high successes counts (%f/%f) "
"for guard %s ($%s)",
"for guard %s",
guard->pb.circ_successes, guard->pb.circ_attempts,
guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN));
entry_guard_describe(guard));
}
/* In rare cases, CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING can get converted to
* CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT and have no guards here.
@ -608,10 +608,10 @@ pathbias_count_use_attempt(origin_circuit_t *circ)
entry_guards_changed();
log_debug(LD_CIRC,
"Marked circuit %d (%f/%f) as used for guard %s ($%s).",
"Marked circuit %d (%f/%f) as used for guard %s.",
circ->global_identifier,
guard->pb.use_successes, guard->pb.use_attempts,
guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN));
entry_guard_describe(guard));
}
circ->path_state = PATH_STATE_USE_ATTEMPTED;
@ -718,17 +718,16 @@ pathbias_count_use_success(origin_circuit_t *circ)
if (guard->pb.use_attempts < guard->pb.use_successes) {
log_notice(LD_BUG, "Unexpectedly high use successes counts (%f/%f) "
"for guard %s=%s",
"for guard %s",
guard->pb.use_successes, guard->pb.use_attempts,
guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN));
entry_guard_describe(guard));
}
log_debug(LD_CIRC,
"Marked circuit %d (%f/%f) as used successfully for guard "
"%s ($%s).",
"Marked circuit %d (%f/%f) as used successfully for guard %s",
circ->global_identifier, guard->pb.use_successes,
guard->pb.use_attempts, guard->nickname,
hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN));
guard->pb.use_attempts,
entry_guard_describe(guard));
}
}
@ -1245,7 +1244,7 @@ pathbias_measure_use_rate(entry_guard_t *guard)
if (pathbias_get_dropguards(options)) {
if (!guard->pb.path_bias_disabled) {
log_warn(LD_CIRC,
"Your Guard %s ($%s) is failing to carry an extremely large "
"Your Guard %s is failing to carry an extremely large "
"amount of stream on its circuits. "
"To avoid potential route manipulation attacks, Tor has "
"disabled use of this guard. "
@ -1253,7 +1252,7 @@ pathbias_measure_use_rate(entry_guard_t *guard)
"%ld circuits completed, %ld were unusable, %ld collapsed, "
"and %ld timed out. "
"For reference, your timeout cutoff is %ld seconds.",
guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN),
entry_guard_describe(guard),
tor_lround(pathbias_get_use_success_count(guard)),
tor_lround(guard->pb.use_attempts),
tor_lround(pathbias_get_close_success_count(guard)),
@ -1264,14 +1263,13 @@ pathbias_measure_use_rate(entry_guard_t *guard)
tor_lround(guard->pb.timeouts),
tor_lround(get_circuit_build_close_time_ms()/1000));
guard->pb.path_bias_disabled = 1;
guard->bad_since = approx_time();
entry_guards_changed();
entry_guard_mark_bad(guard);
return;
}
} else if (!guard->pb.path_bias_use_extreme) {
guard->pb.path_bias_use_extreme = 1;
log_warn(LD_CIRC,
"Your Guard %s ($%s) is failing to carry an extremely large "
"Your Guard %s is failing to carry an extremely large "
"amount of streams on its circuits. "
"This could indicate a route manipulation attack, network "
"overload, bad local network connectivity, or a bug. "
@ -1279,7 +1277,7 @@ pathbias_measure_use_rate(entry_guard_t *guard)
"%ld circuits completed, %ld were unusable, %ld collapsed, "
"and %ld timed out. "
"For reference, your timeout cutoff is %ld seconds.",
guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN),
entry_guard_describe(guard),
tor_lround(pathbias_get_use_success_count(guard)),
tor_lround(guard->pb.use_attempts),
tor_lround(pathbias_get_close_success_count(guard)),
@ -1295,7 +1293,7 @@ pathbias_measure_use_rate(entry_guard_t *guard)
if (!guard->pb.path_bias_use_noticed) {
guard->pb.path_bias_use_noticed = 1;
log_notice(LD_CIRC,
"Your Guard %s ($%s) is failing to carry more streams on its "
"Your Guard %s is failing to carry more streams on its "
"circuits than usual. "
"Most likely this means the Tor network is overloaded "
"or your network connection is poor. "
@ -1303,7 +1301,7 @@ pathbias_measure_use_rate(entry_guard_t *guard)
"%ld circuits completed, %ld were unusable, %ld collapsed, "
"and %ld timed out. "
"For reference, your timeout cutoff is %ld seconds.",
guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN),
entry_guard_describe(guard),
tor_lround(pathbias_get_use_success_count(guard)),
tor_lround(guard->pb.use_attempts),
tor_lround(pathbias_get_close_success_count(guard)),
@ -1351,7 +1349,7 @@ pathbias_measure_close_rate(entry_guard_t *guard)
if (pathbias_get_dropguards(options)) {
if (!guard->pb.path_bias_disabled) {
log_warn(LD_CIRC,
"Your Guard %s ($%s) is failing an extremely large "
"Your Guard %s is failing an extremely large "
"amount of circuits. "
"To avoid potential route manipulation attacks, Tor has "
"disabled use of this guard. "
@ -1359,7 +1357,7 @@ pathbias_measure_close_rate(entry_guard_t *guard)
"%ld circuits completed, %ld were unusable, %ld collapsed, "
"and %ld timed out. "
"For reference, your timeout cutoff is %ld seconds.",
guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN),
entry_guard_describe(guard),
tor_lround(pathbias_get_close_success_count(guard)),
tor_lround(guard->pb.circ_attempts),
tor_lround(pathbias_get_use_success_count(guard)),
@ -1370,14 +1368,13 @@ pathbias_measure_close_rate(entry_guard_t *guard)
tor_lround(guard->pb.timeouts),
tor_lround(get_circuit_build_close_time_ms()/1000));
guard->pb.path_bias_disabled = 1;
guard->bad_since = approx_time();
entry_guards_changed();
entry_guard_mark_bad(guard);
return;
}
} else if (!guard->pb.path_bias_extreme) {
guard->pb.path_bias_extreme = 1;
log_warn(LD_CIRC,
"Your Guard %s ($%s) is failing an extremely large "
"Your Guard %s is failing an extremely large "
"amount of circuits. "
"This could indicate a route manipulation attack, "
"extreme network overload, or a bug. "
@ -1385,7 +1382,7 @@ pathbias_measure_close_rate(entry_guard_t *guard)
"%ld circuits completed, %ld were unusable, %ld collapsed, "
"and %ld timed out. "
"For reference, your timeout cutoff is %ld seconds.",
guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN),
entry_guard_describe(guard),
tor_lround(pathbias_get_close_success_count(guard)),
tor_lround(guard->pb.circ_attempts),
tor_lround(pathbias_get_use_success_count(guard)),
@ -1401,7 +1398,7 @@ pathbias_measure_close_rate(entry_guard_t *guard)
if (!guard->pb.path_bias_warned) {
guard->pb.path_bias_warned = 1;
log_warn(LD_CIRC,
"Your Guard %s ($%s) is failing a very large "
"Your Guard %s is failing a very large "
"amount of circuits. "
"Most likely this means the Tor network is "
"overloaded, but it could also mean an attack against "
@ -1410,7 +1407,7 @@ pathbias_measure_close_rate(entry_guard_t *guard)
"%ld circuits completed, %ld were unusable, %ld collapsed, "
"and %ld timed out. "
"For reference, your timeout cutoff is %ld seconds.",
guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN),
entry_guard_describe(guard),
tor_lround(pathbias_get_close_success_count(guard)),
tor_lround(guard->pb.circ_attempts),
tor_lround(pathbias_get_use_success_count(guard)),
@ -1426,14 +1423,14 @@ pathbias_measure_close_rate(entry_guard_t *guard)
if (!guard->pb.path_bias_noticed) {
guard->pb.path_bias_noticed = 1;
log_notice(LD_CIRC,
"Your Guard %s ($%s) is failing more circuits than "
"Your Guard %s is failing more circuits than "
"usual. "
"Most likely this means the Tor network is overloaded. "
"Success counts are %ld/%ld. Use counts are %ld/%ld. "
"%ld circuits completed, %ld were unusable, %ld collapsed, "
"and %ld timed out. "
"For reference, your timeout cutoff is %ld seconds.",
guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN),
entry_guard_describe(guard),
tor_lround(pathbias_get_close_success_count(guard)),
tor_lround(guard->pb.circ_attempts),
tor_lround(pathbias_get_use_success_count(guard)),
@ -1490,19 +1487,19 @@ pathbias_scale_close_rates(entry_guard_t *guard)
log_info(LD_CIRC,
"Scaled pathbias counts to (%f,%f)/%f (%d/%d open) for guard "
"%s ($%s)",
"%s",
guard->pb.circ_successes, guard->pb.successful_circuits_closed,
guard->pb.circ_attempts, opened_built, opened_attempts,
guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN));
entry_guard_describe(guard));
/* Have the counts just become invalid by this scaling attempt? */
if (counts_are_sane && guard->pb.circ_attempts < guard->pb.circ_successes) {
log_notice(LD_BUG,
"Scaling has mangled pathbias counts to %f/%f (%d/%d open) "
"for guard %s ($%s)",
"for guard %s",
guard->pb.circ_successes, guard->pb.circ_attempts, opened_built,
opened_attempts, guard->nickname,
hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN));
opened_attempts,
entry_guard_describe(guard));
}
}
}
@ -1537,18 +1534,17 @@ pathbias_scale_use_rates(entry_guard_t *guard)
guard->pb.use_attempts += opened_attempts;
log_info(LD_CIRC,
"Scaled pathbias use counts to %f/%f (%d open) for guard %s ($%s)",
"Scaled pathbias use counts to %f/%f (%d open) for guard %s",
guard->pb.use_successes, guard->pb.use_attempts, opened_attempts,
guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN));
entry_guard_describe(guard));
/* Have the counts just become invalid by this scaling attempt? */
if (counts_are_sane && guard->pb.use_attempts < guard->pb.use_successes) {
log_notice(LD_BUG,
"Scaling has mangled pathbias usage counts to %f/%f "
"(%d open) for guard %s ($%s)",
"(%d open) for guard %s",
guard->pb.circ_successes, guard->pb.circ_attempts,
opened_attempts, guard->nickname,
hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN));
opened_attempts, entry_guard_describe(guard));
}
entry_guards_changed();

View File

@ -157,6 +157,26 @@ get_entry_guards(void)
return get_entry_guards_for_guard_selection(get_guard_selection_info());
}
/** Helper: mark an entry guard as not usable. */
void
entry_guard_mark_bad(entry_guard_t *guard)
{
guard->bad_since = approx_time();
entry_guards_changed();
}
/** Return a statically allocated human-readable description of <b>guard</b>
*/
const char *
entry_guard_describe(const entry_guard_t *guard)
{
static char buf[256];
tor_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"%s ($%s)",
guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN));
return buf;
}
/** Check whether the entry guard <b>e</b> is usable, given the directory
* authorities' opinion about the router (stored in <b>ri</b>) and the user's
* configuration (in <b>options</b>). Set <b>e</b>->bad_since

View File

@ -100,10 +100,11 @@ int num_live_entry_guards_for_guard_selection(
guard_selection_t *gs,
int for_directory);
int num_live_entry_guards(int for_directory);
#endif
const node_t *entry_guard_find_node(const entry_guard_t *guard);
void entry_guard_mark_bad(entry_guard_t *guard);
const char *entry_guard_describe(const entry_guard_t *guard);
#ifdef ENTRYNODES_PRIVATE
STATIC const node_t *add_an_entry_guard(guard_selection_t *gs,

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@ -843,6 +843,22 @@ test_node_preferred_orport(void *arg)
UNMOCK(get_options);
}
static void
test_entry_guard_describe(void *arg)
{
(void)arg;
entry_guard_t g;
memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g));
strlcpy(g.nickname, "okefenokee", sizeof(g.nickname));
memcpy(g.identity, "theforestprimeval---", DIGEST_LEN);
tt_str_op(entry_guard_describe(&g), OP_EQ,
"okefenokee ($746865666F726573747072696D6576616C2D2D2D)");
done:
;
}
static const struct testcase_setup_t fake_network = {
fake_network_setup, fake_network_cleanup
};
@ -876,6 +892,7 @@ struct testcase_t entrynodes_tests[] = {
{ "node_preferred_orport",
test_node_preferred_orport,
0, NULL, NULL },
{ "entry_guard_describe", test_entry_guard_describe, 0, NULL, NULL },
END_OF_TESTCASES
};