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11dc091464
This plugs a privacy leak from the wallet to the daemon, as the daemon could previously see what input is included as a transaction input, which the daemon hadn't previously supplied. Now, the wallet requests a particular set of outputs, including the real one. This can result in transactions that can't be accepted if the wallet happens to select too many outputs with non standard unlock times. The daemon could know this and select another output, but the wallet is blind to it. It's currently very unlikely since I don't think anything uses non default unlock times. The wallet requests more outputs than necessary so it can use spares if any of the returns outputs are still locked. If there are not enough spares to reach the desired mixin, the transaction will fail. |
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| .. | ||
| core_proxy | ||
| core_tests | ||
| crypto | ||
| daemon_tests | ||
| data | ||
| difficulty | ||
| functional_tests | ||
| gtest | ||
| hash | ||
| libwallet_api_tests | ||
| net_load_tests | ||
| performance_tests | ||
| unit_tests | ||
| CMakeLists.txt | ||
| cryptolib.pl | ||
| cryptotest.pl | ||
| hash-target.cpp | ||
| io.h | ||