monero/src/wallet/wallet2.cpp

12957 lines
548 KiB
C++
Raw Normal View History

2019-03-05 22:05:34 +01:00
// Copyright (c) 2014-2019, The Monero Project
2014-07-23 15:03:52 +02:00
//
// All rights reserved.
//
// Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, are
// permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
//
// 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this list of
// conditions and the following disclaimer.
//
// 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list
// of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other
// materials provided with the distribution.
//
// 3. Neither the name of the copyright holder nor the names of its contributors may be
// used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without specific
// prior written permission.
//
// THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY
// EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
// MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL
// THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
// SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
// PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
// INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
// STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF
// THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
//
// Parts of this file are originally copyright (c) 2012-2013 The Cryptonote developers
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
#include <numeric>
#include <random>
#include <tuple>
#include <boost/format.hpp>
#include <boost/optional/optional.hpp>
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
#include <boost/utility/value_init.hpp>
#include <boost/algorithm/string/classification.hpp>
#include <boost/algorithm/string/trim.hpp>
#include <boost/algorithm/string/split.hpp>
#include <boost/algorithm/string/join.hpp>
#include <boost/asio/ip/address.hpp>
#include <boost/range/adaptor/transformed.hpp>
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
#include "include_base_utils.h"
using namespace epee;
#include "cryptonote_config.h"
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
#include "wallet2.h"
#include "cryptonote_basic/cryptonote_format_utils.h"
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
#include "rpc/core_rpc_server_commands_defs.h"
#include "misc_language.h"
#include "cryptonote_basic/cryptonote_basic_impl.h"
#include "multisig/multisig.h"
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
#include "common/boost_serialization_helper.h"
#include "common/command_line.h"
#include "common/threadpool.h"
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
#include "profile_tools.h"
#include "crypto/crypto.h"
#include "serialization/binary_utils.h"
2017-12-22 20:47:12 +01:00
#include "serialization/string.h"
#include "cryptonote_basic/blobdatatype.h"
2014-09-23 13:34:04 +02:00
#include "mnemonics/electrum-words.h"
#include "common/i18n.h"
#include "common/util.h"
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
#include "common/apply_permutation.h"
#include "rapidjson/document.h"
#include "rapidjson/writer.h"
#include "rapidjson/stringbuffer.h"
#include "common/json_util.h"
#include "memwipe.h"
#include "common/base58.h"
#include "common/combinator.h"
#include "common/dns_utils.h"
#include "common/notify.h"
#include "common/perf_timer.h"
#include "ringct/rctSigs.h"
#include "ringdb.h"
2018-08-23 23:50:53 +02:00
#include "device/device_cold.hpp"
#include "device_trezor/device_trezor.hpp"
#include "net/socks_connect.h"
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
2014-08-03 16:58:21 +02:00
extern "C"
{
#include "crypto/keccak.h"
#include "crypto/crypto-ops.h"
}
using namespace std;
using namespace crypto;
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
using namespace cryptonote;
Change logging to easylogging++ This replaces the epee and data_loggers logging systems with a single one, and also adds filename:line and explicit severity levels. Categories may be defined, and logging severity set by category (or set of categories). epee style 0-4 log level maps to a sensible severity configuration. Log files now also rotate when reaching 100 MB. To select which logs to output, use the MONERO_LOGS environment variable, with a comma separated list of categories (globs are supported), with their requested severity level after a colon. If a log matches more than one such setting, the last one in the configuration string applies. A few examples: This one is (mostly) silent, only outputting fatal errors: MONERO_LOGS=*:FATAL This one is very verbose: MONERO_LOGS=*:TRACE This one is totally silent (logwise): MONERO_LOGS="" This one outputs all errors and warnings, except for the "verify" category, which prints just fatal errors (the verify category is used for logs about incoming transactions and blocks, and it is expected that some/many will fail to verify, hence we don't want the spam): MONERO_LOGS=*:WARNING,verify:FATAL Log levels are, in decreasing order of priority: FATAL, ERROR, WARNING, INFO, DEBUG, TRACE Subcategories may be added using prefixes and globs. This example will output net.p2p logs at the TRACE level, but all other net* logs only at INFO: MONERO_LOGS=*:ERROR,net*:INFO,net.p2p:TRACE Logs which are intended for the user (which Monero was using a lot through epee, but really isn't a nice way to go things) should use the "global" category. There are a few helper macros for using this category, eg: MGINFO("this shows up by default") or MGINFO_RED("this is red"), to try to keep a similar look and feel for now. Existing epee log macros still exist, and map to the new log levels, but since they're used as a "user facing" UI element as much as a logging system, they often don't map well to log severities (ie, a log level 0 log may be an error, or may be something we want the user to see, such as an important info). In those cases, I tried to use the new macros. In other cases, I left the existing macros in. When modifying logs, it is probably best to switch to the new macros with explicit levels. The --log-level options and set_log commands now also accept category settings, in addition to the epee style log levels.
2017-01-01 17:34:23 +01:00
#undef MONERO_DEFAULT_LOG_CATEGORY
#define MONERO_DEFAULT_LOG_CATEGORY "wallet.wallet2"
// used to choose when to stop adding outputs to a tx
#define APPROXIMATE_INPUT_BYTES 80
// used to target a given block weight (additional outputs may be added on top to build fee)
#define TX_WEIGHT_TARGET(bytes) (bytes*2/3)
// arbitrary, used to generate different hashes from the same input
#define CHACHA8_KEY_TAIL 0x8c
#define CACHE_KEY_TAIL 0x8d
#define UNSIGNED_TX_PREFIX "Monero unsigned tx set\004"
#define SIGNED_TX_PREFIX "Monero signed tx set\004"
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
#define MULTISIG_UNSIGNED_TX_PREFIX "Monero multisig unsigned tx set\001"
#define RECENT_OUTPUT_RATIO (0.5) // 50% of outputs are from the recent zone
#define RECENT_OUTPUT_DAYS (1.8) // last 1.8 day makes up the recent zone (taken from monerolink.pdf, Miller et al)
#define RECENT_OUTPUT_ZONE ((time_t)(RECENT_OUTPUT_DAYS * 86400))
#define RECENT_OUTPUT_BLOCKS (RECENT_OUTPUT_DAYS * 720)
2016-10-28 22:41:41 +02:00
#define FEE_ESTIMATE_GRACE_BLOCKS 10 // estimate fee valid for that many blocks
#define SECOND_OUTPUT_RELATEDNESS_THRESHOLD 0.0f
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
#define SUBADDRESS_LOOKAHEAD_MAJOR 50
#define SUBADDRESS_LOOKAHEAD_MINOR 200
#define KEY_IMAGE_EXPORT_FILE_MAGIC "Monero key image export\003"
#define MULTISIG_EXPORT_FILE_MAGIC "Monero multisig export\001"
#define OUTPUT_EXPORT_FILE_MAGIC "Monero output export\004"
#define SEGREGATION_FORK_HEIGHT 99999999
#define TESTNET_SEGREGATION_FORK_HEIGHT 99999999
#define STAGENET_SEGREGATION_FORK_HEIGHT 99999999
#define SEGREGATION_FORK_VICINITY 1500 /* blocks */
#define FIRST_REFRESH_GRANULARITY 1024
#define GAMMA_PICK_HALF_WINDOW 5
static const std::string MULTISIG_SIGNATURE_MAGIC = "SigMultisigPkV1";
static const std::string MULTISIG_EXTRA_INFO_MAGIC = "MultisigxV1";
namespace
{
std::string get_default_ringdb_path()
{
boost::filesystem::path dir = tools::get_default_data_dir();
// remove .bitmonero, replace with .shared-ringdb
dir = dir.remove_filename();
dir /= ".shared-ringdb";
return dir.string();
}
std::string pack_multisignature_keys(const std::string& prefix, const std::vector<crypto::public_key>& keys, const crypto::secret_key& signer_secret_key)
{
std::string data;
crypto::public_key signer;
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(crypto::secret_key_to_public_key(signer_secret_key, signer), "Failed to derive public spend key");
data += std::string((const char *)&signer, sizeof(crypto::public_key));
for (const auto &key: keys)
{
data += std::string((const char *)&key, sizeof(crypto::public_key));
}
data.resize(data.size() + sizeof(crypto::signature));
crypto::hash hash;
crypto::cn_fast_hash(data.data(), data.size() - sizeof(crypto::signature), hash);
crypto::signature &signature = *(crypto::signature*)&data[data.size() - sizeof(crypto::signature)];
crypto::generate_signature(hash, signer, signer_secret_key, signature);
return MULTISIG_EXTRA_INFO_MAGIC + tools::base58::encode(data);
}
std::vector<crypto::public_key> secret_keys_to_public_keys(const std::vector<crypto::secret_key>& keys)
{
std::vector<crypto::public_key> public_keys;
public_keys.reserve(keys.size());
std::transform(keys.begin(), keys.end(), std::back_inserter(public_keys), [] (const crypto::secret_key& k) -> crypto::public_key {
crypto::public_key p;
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(crypto::secret_key_to_public_key(k, p), "Failed to derive public spend key");
return p;
});
return public_keys;
}
bool keys_intersect(const std::unordered_set<crypto::public_key>& s1, const std::unordered_set<crypto::public_key>& s2)
{
if (s1.empty() || s2.empty())
return false;
for (const auto& e: s1)
{
if (s2.find(e) != s2.end())
return true;
}
return false;
}
void add_reason(std::string &reasons, const char *reason)
{
if (!reasons.empty())
reasons += ", ";
reasons += reason;
}
std::string get_text_reason(const cryptonote::COMMAND_RPC_SEND_RAW_TX::response &res)
{
std::string reason;
if (res.low_mixin)
add_reason(reason, "bad ring size");
if (res.double_spend)
add_reason(reason, "double spend");
if (res.invalid_input)
add_reason(reason, "invalid input");
if (res.invalid_output)
add_reason(reason, "invalid output");
if (res.too_big)
add_reason(reason, "too big");
if (res.overspend)
add_reason(reason, "overspend");
if (res.fee_too_low)
add_reason(reason, "fee too low");
if (res.not_rct)
add_reason(reason, "tx is not ringct");
if (res.not_relayed)
add_reason(reason, "tx was not relayed");
return reason;
}
}
2014-05-03 18:19:43 +02:00
namespace
{
// Create on-demand to prevent static initialization order fiasco issues.
struct options {
const command_line::arg_descriptor<std::string> daemon_address = {"daemon-address", tools::wallet2::tr("Use daemon instance at <host>:<port>"), ""};
const command_line::arg_descriptor<std::string> daemon_host = {"daemon-host", tools::wallet2::tr("Use daemon instance at host <arg> instead of localhost"), ""};
const command_line::arg_descriptor<std::string> proxy = {"proxy", tools::wallet2::tr("[<ip>:]<port> socks proxy to use for daemon connections"), {}, true};
const command_line::arg_descriptor<bool> trusted_daemon = {"trusted-daemon", tools::wallet2::tr("Enable commands which rely on a trusted daemon"), false};
const command_line::arg_descriptor<bool> untrusted_daemon = {"untrusted-daemon", tools::wallet2::tr("Disable commands which rely on a trusted daemon"), false};
const command_line::arg_descriptor<std::string> password = {"password", tools::wallet2::tr("Wallet password (escape/quote as needed)"), "", true};
const command_line::arg_descriptor<std::string> password_file = {"password-file", tools::wallet2::tr("Wallet password file"), "", true};
const command_line::arg_descriptor<int> daemon_port = {"daemon-port", tools::wallet2::tr("Use daemon instance at port <arg> instead of 18081"), 0};
const command_line::arg_descriptor<std::string> daemon_login = {"daemon-login", tools::wallet2::tr("Specify username[:password] for daemon RPC client"), "", true};
epee: add SSL support RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL. An optional private key and certificate file can be passed, using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as argument a path to a PEM format private private key and certificate, respectively. If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used. SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled. Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the --rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to, by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good certificates. To generate long term certificates: openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096 openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT /tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate, both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway. SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-15 00:44:48 +02:00
const command_line::arg_descriptor<std::string> daemon_ssl = {"daemon-ssl", tools::wallet2::tr("Enable SSL on daemon RPC connections: enabled|disabled|autodetect"), "autodetect"};
const command_line::arg_descriptor<std::string> daemon_ssl_private_key = {"daemon-ssl-private-key", tools::wallet2::tr("Path to a PEM format private key"), ""};
const command_line::arg_descriptor<std::string> daemon_ssl_certificate = {"daemon-ssl-certificate", tools::wallet2::tr("Path to a PEM format certificate"), ""};
const command_line::arg_descriptor<std::vector<std::string>> daemon_ssl_allowed_certificates = {"daemon-ssl-allowed-certificates", tools::wallet2::tr("List of paths to PEM format certificates of allowed RPC servers")};
epee: add SSL support RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL. An optional private key and certificate file can be passed, using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as argument a path to a PEM format private private key and certificate, respectively. If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used. SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled. Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the --rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to, by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good certificates. To generate long term certificates: openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096 openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT /tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate, both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway. SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-15 00:44:48 +02:00
const command_line::arg_descriptor<std::vector<std::string>> daemon_ssl_allowed_fingerprints = {"daemon-ssl-allowed-fingerprints", tools::wallet2::tr("List of valid fingerprints of allowed RPC servers")};
epee: add SSL support RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL. An optional private key and certificate file can be passed, using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as argument a path to a PEM format private private key and certificate, respectively. If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used. SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled. Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the --rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to, by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good certificates. To generate long term certificates: openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096 openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT /tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate, both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway. SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-15 00:44:48 +02:00
const command_line::arg_descriptor<bool> daemon_ssl_allow_any_cert = {"daemon-ssl-allow-any-cert", tools::wallet2::tr("Allow any SSL certificate from the daemon"), false};
const command_line::arg_descriptor<bool> testnet = {"testnet", tools::wallet2::tr("For testnet. Daemon must also be launched with --testnet flag"), false};
2018-02-16 12:04:04 +01:00
const command_line::arg_descriptor<bool> stagenet = {"stagenet", tools::wallet2::tr("For stagenet. Daemon must also be launched with --stagenet flag"), false};
2018-03-27 05:08:28 +02:00
const command_line::arg_descriptor<std::string, false, true, 2> shared_ringdb_dir = {
"shared-ringdb-dir", tools::wallet2::tr("Set shared ring database path"),
get_default_ringdb_path(),
2018-03-27 05:08:28 +02:00
{{ &testnet, &stagenet }},
[](std::array<bool, 2> testnet_stagenet, bool defaulted, std::string val)->std::string {
if (testnet_stagenet[0])
return (boost::filesystem::path(val) / "testnet").string();
2018-03-27 05:08:28 +02:00
else if (testnet_stagenet[1])
return (boost::filesystem::path(val) / "stagenet").string();
return val;
}
};
const command_line::arg_descriptor<uint64_t> kdf_rounds = {"kdf-rounds", tools::wallet2::tr("Number of rounds for the key derivation function"), 1};
const command_line::arg_descriptor<std::string> hw_device = {"hw-device", tools::wallet2::tr("HW device to use"), ""};
const command_line::arg_descriptor<std::string> hw_device_derivation_path = {"hw-device-deriv-path", tools::wallet2::tr("HW device wallet derivation path (e.g., SLIP-10)"), ""};
const command_line::arg_descriptor<std::string> tx_notify = { "tx-notify" , "Run a program for each new incoming transaction, '%s' will be replaced by the transaction hash" , "" };
};
void do_prepare_file_names(const std::string& file_path, std::string& keys_file, std::string& wallet_file, std::string &mms_file)
2014-05-03 18:19:43 +02:00
{
keys_file = file_path;
wallet_file = file_path;
boost::system::error_code e;
if(string_tools::get_extension(keys_file) == "keys")
{//provided keys file name
wallet_file = string_tools::cut_off_extension(wallet_file);
}else
{//provided wallet file name
keys_file += ".keys";
}
mms_file = file_path + ".mms";
2014-05-03 18:19:43 +02:00
}
uint64_t calculate_fee(uint64_t fee_per_kb, size_t bytes, uint64_t fee_multiplier)
2016-03-26 12:44:43 +01:00
{
uint64_t kB = (bytes + 1023) / 1024;
return kB * fee_per_kb * fee_multiplier;
2016-03-26 12:44:43 +01:00
}
uint64_t calculate_fee_from_weight(uint64_t base_fee, uint64_t weight, uint64_t fee_multiplier, uint64_t fee_quantization_mask)
{
uint64_t fee = weight * base_fee * fee_multiplier;
fee = (fee + fee_quantization_mask - 1) / fee_quantization_mask * fee_quantization_mask;
return fee;
}
std::string get_weight_string(size_t weight)
{
return std::to_string(weight) + " weight";
}
std::string get_weight_string(const cryptonote::transaction &tx, size_t blob_size)
{
return get_weight_string(get_transaction_weight(tx, blob_size));
}
std::unique_ptr<tools::wallet2> make_basic(const boost::program_options::variables_map& vm, bool unattended, const options& opts, const std::function<boost::optional<tools::password_container>(const char *, bool)> &password_prompter)
{
namespace ip = boost::asio::ip;
const bool testnet = command_line::get_arg(vm, opts.testnet);
2018-02-16 12:04:04 +01:00
const bool stagenet = command_line::get_arg(vm, opts.stagenet);
const network_type nettype = testnet ? TESTNET : stagenet ? STAGENET : MAINNET;
const uint64_t kdf_rounds = command_line::get_arg(vm, opts.kdf_rounds);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(kdf_rounds == 0, tools::error::wallet_internal_error, "KDF rounds must not be 0");
auto daemon_address = command_line::get_arg(vm, opts.daemon_address);
auto daemon_host = command_line::get_arg(vm, opts.daemon_host);
auto daemon_port = command_line::get_arg(vm, opts.daemon_port);
auto device_name = command_line::get_arg(vm, opts.hw_device);
auto device_derivation_path = command_line::get_arg(vm, opts.hw_device_derivation_path);
epee: add SSL support RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL. An optional private key and certificate file can be passed, using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as argument a path to a PEM format private private key and certificate, respectively. If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used. SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled. Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the --rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to, by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good certificates. To generate long term certificates: openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096 openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT /tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate, both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway. SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-15 00:44:48 +02:00
auto daemon_ssl_private_key = command_line::get_arg(vm, opts.daemon_ssl_private_key);
auto daemon_ssl_certificate = command_line::get_arg(vm, opts.daemon_ssl_certificate);
auto daemon_ssl_allowed_certificates = command_line::get_arg(vm, opts.daemon_ssl_allowed_certificates);
epee: add SSL support RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL. An optional private key and certificate file can be passed, using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as argument a path to a PEM format private private key and certificate, respectively. If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used. SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled. Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the --rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to, by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good certificates. To generate long term certificates: openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096 openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT /tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate, both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway. SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-15 00:44:48 +02:00
auto daemon_ssl_allowed_fingerprints = command_line::get_arg(vm, opts.daemon_ssl_allowed_fingerprints);
epee: add SSL support RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL. An optional private key and certificate file can be passed, using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as argument a path to a PEM format private private key and certificate, respectively. If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used. SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled. Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the --rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to, by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good certificates. To generate long term certificates: openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096 openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT /tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate, both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway. SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-15 00:44:48 +02:00
auto daemon_ssl_allow_any_cert = command_line::get_arg(vm, opts.daemon_ssl_allow_any_cert);
auto daemon_ssl = command_line::get_arg(vm, opts.daemon_ssl);
epee::net_utils::ssl_support_t ssl_support;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!epee::net_utils::ssl_support_from_string(ssl_support, daemon_ssl), tools::error::wallet_internal_error,
tools::wallet2::tr("Invalid argument for ") + std::string(opts.daemon_ssl.name));
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!daemon_address.empty() && !daemon_host.empty() && 0 != daemon_port,
tools::error::wallet_internal_error, tools::wallet2::tr("can't specify daemon host or port more than once"));
boost::optional<epee::net_utils::http::login> login{};
if (command_line::has_arg(vm, opts.daemon_login))
{
auto parsed = tools::login::parse(
command_line::get_arg(vm, opts.daemon_login), false, [password_prompter](bool verify) {
return password_prompter("Daemon client password", verify);
}
);
if (!parsed)
return nullptr;
login.emplace(std::move(parsed->username), std::move(parsed->password).password());
}
if (daemon_host.empty())
daemon_host = "localhost";
if (!daemon_port)
{
daemon_port = get_config(nettype).RPC_DEFAULT_PORT;
}
if (daemon_address.empty())
daemon_address = std::string("http://") + daemon_host + ":" + std::to_string(daemon_port);
boost::asio::ip::tcp::endpoint proxy{};
if (command_line::has_arg(vm, opts.proxy))
{
namespace ip = boost::asio::ip;
const boost::string_ref real_daemon = boost::string_ref{daemon_address}.substr(0, daemon_address.rfind(':'));
// onion and i2p addresses contain information about the server cert
// which both authenticates and encrypts
const bool unencrypted_proxy =
!real_daemon.ends_with(".onion") && !real_daemon.ends_with(".i2p") &&
daemon_ssl_allowed_certificates.empty() && daemon_ssl_allowed_fingerprints.empty();
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(
unencrypted_proxy,
tools::error::wallet_internal_error,
std::string{"Use of --"} + opts.proxy.name + " requires --" + opts.daemon_ssl_allowed_certificates.name + " or --" + opts.daemon_ssl_allowed_fingerprints.name + " or use of a .onion/.i2p domain"
);
const auto proxy_address = command_line::get_arg(vm, opts.proxy);
boost::string_ref proxy_port{proxy_address};
boost::string_ref proxy_host = proxy_port.substr(0, proxy_port.rfind(":"));
if (proxy_port.size() == proxy_host.size())
proxy_host = "127.0.0.1";
else
proxy_port = proxy_port.substr(proxy_host.size() + 1);
uint16_t port_value = 0;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(
!epee::string_tools::get_xtype_from_string(port_value, std::string{proxy_port}),
tools::error::wallet_internal_error,
std::string{"Invalid port specified for --"} + opts.proxy.name
);
boost::system::error_code error{};
proxy = ip::tcp::endpoint{ip::address::from_string(std::string{proxy_host}, error), port_value};
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(bool(error), tools::error::wallet_internal_error, std::string{"Invalid IP address specified for --"} + opts.proxy.name);
}
boost::optional<bool> trusted_daemon;
if (!command_line::is_arg_defaulted(vm, opts.trusted_daemon) || !command_line::is_arg_defaulted(vm, opts.untrusted_daemon))
trusted_daemon = command_line::get_arg(vm, opts.trusted_daemon) && !command_line::get_arg(vm, opts.untrusted_daemon);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!command_line::is_arg_defaulted(vm, opts.trusted_daemon) && !command_line::is_arg_defaulted(vm, opts.untrusted_daemon),
tools::error::wallet_internal_error, tools::wallet2::tr("--trusted-daemon and --untrusted-daemon are both seen, assuming untrusted"));
// set --trusted-daemon if local and not overridden
if (!trusted_daemon)
{
try
{
trusted_daemon = false;
if (tools::is_local_address(daemon_address))
{
MINFO(tools::wallet2::tr("Daemon is local, assuming trusted"));
trusted_daemon = true;
}
}
catch (const std::exception &e) { }
}
epee: add SSL support RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL. An optional private key and certificate file can be passed, using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as argument a path to a PEM format private private key and certificate, respectively. If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used. SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled. Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the --rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to, by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good certificates. To generate long term certificates: openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096 openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT /tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate, both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway. SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-15 00:44:48 +02:00
std::list<std::string> ssl_allowed_certificates;
for (const std::string &path: daemon_ssl_allowed_certificates)
{
ssl_allowed_certificates.push_back({});
if (!epee::file_io_utils::load_file_to_string(path, ssl_allowed_certificates.back()))
{
MERROR("Failed to load certificate: " << path);
ssl_allowed_certificates.back() = std::string();
}
}
epee: add SSL support RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL. An optional private key and certificate file can be passed, using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as argument a path to a PEM format private private key and certificate, respectively. If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used. SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled. Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the --rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to, by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good certificates. To generate long term certificates: openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096 openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT /tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate, both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway. SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-15 00:44:48 +02:00
std::vector<std::vector<uint8_t>> ssl_allowed_fingerprints{ daemon_ssl_allowed_fingerprints.size() };
std::transform(daemon_ssl_allowed_fingerprints.begin(), daemon_ssl_allowed_fingerprints.end(), ssl_allowed_fingerprints.begin(), epee::from_hex::vector);
std::unique_ptr<tools::wallet2> wallet(new tools::wallet2(nettype, kdf_rounds, unattended));
wallet->init(std::move(daemon_address), std::move(login), std::move(proxy), 0, *trusted_daemon, ssl_support, std::make_pair(daemon_ssl_private_key, daemon_ssl_certificate), ssl_allowed_certificates, ssl_allowed_fingerprints, daemon_ssl_allow_any_cert);
boost::filesystem::path ringdb_path = command_line::get_arg(vm, opts.shared_ringdb_dir);
wallet->set_ring_database(ringdb_path.string());
wallet->get_message_store().set_options(vm);
wallet->device_name(device_name);
wallet->device_derivation_path(device_derivation_path);
try
{
if (!command_line::is_arg_defaulted(vm, opts.tx_notify))
wallet->set_tx_notify(std::shared_ptr<tools::Notify>(new tools::Notify(command_line::get_arg(vm, opts.tx_notify).c_str())));
}
catch (const std::exception &e)
{
MERROR("Failed to parse tx notify spec: " << e.what());
}
return wallet;
}
boost::optional<tools::password_container> get_password(const boost::program_options::variables_map& vm, const options& opts, const std::function<boost::optional<tools::password_container>(const char*, bool)> &password_prompter, const bool verify)
{
if (command_line::has_arg(vm, opts.password) && command_line::has_arg(vm, opts.password_file))
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION(tools::error::wallet_internal_error, tools::wallet2::tr("can't specify more than one of --password and --password-file"));
}
if (command_line::has_arg(vm, opts.password))
{
return tools::password_container{command_line::get_arg(vm, opts.password)};
}
if (command_line::has_arg(vm, opts.password_file))
{
std::string password;
bool r = epee::file_io_utils::load_file_to_string(command_line::get_arg(vm, opts.password_file),
password);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!r, tools::error::wallet_internal_error, tools::wallet2::tr("the password file specified could not be read"));
// Remove line breaks the user might have inserted
boost::trim_right_if(password, boost::is_any_of("\r\n"));
return {tools::password_container{std::move(password)}};
}
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!password_prompter, tools::error::wallet_internal_error, tools::wallet2::tr("no password specified; use --prompt-for-password to prompt for a password"));
return password_prompter(verify ? tools::wallet2::tr("Enter a new password for the wallet") : tools::wallet2::tr("Wallet password"), verify);
}
std::pair<std::unique_ptr<tools::wallet2>, tools::password_container> generate_from_json(const std::string& json_file, const boost::program_options::variables_map& vm, bool unattended, const options& opts, const std::function<boost::optional<tools::password_container>(const char *, bool)> &password_prompter)
{
const bool testnet = command_line::get_arg(vm, opts.testnet);
2018-02-16 12:04:04 +01:00
const bool stagenet = command_line::get_arg(vm, opts.stagenet);
const network_type nettype = testnet ? TESTNET : stagenet ? STAGENET : MAINNET;
/* GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR Is a generic macro that can return
false. Gcc will coerce this into unique_ptr(nullptr), but clang correctly
fails. This large wrapper is for the use of that macro */
std::unique_ptr<tools::wallet2> wallet;
epee::wipeable_string password;
const auto do_generate = [&]() -> bool {
std::string buf;
if (!epee::file_io_utils::load_file_to_string(json_file, buf)) {
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION(tools::error::wallet_internal_error, std::string(tools::wallet2::tr("Failed to load file ")) + json_file);
return false;
}
rapidjson::Document json;
if (json.Parse(buf.c_str()).HasParseError()) {
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION(tools::error::wallet_internal_error, tools::wallet2::tr("Failed to parse JSON"));
return false;
}
GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR(json, version, unsigned, Uint, true, 0);
const int current_version = 1;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(field_version > current_version, tools::error::wallet_internal_error,
((boost::format(tools::wallet2::tr("Version %u too new, we can only grok up to %u")) % field_version % current_version)).str());
GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR(json, filename, std::string, String, true, std::string());
GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR(json, scan_from_height, uint64_t, Uint64, false, 0);
const bool recover = true;
GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR(json, password, std::string, String, false, std::string());
GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR(json, viewkey, std::string, String, false, std::string());
crypto::secret_key viewkey;
if (field_viewkey_found)
{
cryptonote::blobdata viewkey_data;
2017-02-14 20:35:44 +01:00
if(!epee::string_tools::parse_hexstr_to_binbuff(field_viewkey, viewkey_data) || viewkey_data.size() != sizeof(crypto::secret_key))
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION(tools::error::wallet_internal_error, tools::wallet2::tr("failed to parse view key secret key"));
}
viewkey = *reinterpret_cast<const crypto::secret_key*>(viewkey_data.data());
crypto::public_key pkey;
if (!crypto::secret_key_to_public_key(viewkey, pkey)) {
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION(tools::error::wallet_internal_error, tools::wallet2::tr("failed to verify view key secret key"));
}
}
GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR(json, spendkey, std::string, String, false, std::string());
crypto::secret_key spendkey;
if (field_spendkey_found)
{
cryptonote::blobdata spendkey_data;
2017-02-14 20:35:44 +01:00
if(!epee::string_tools::parse_hexstr_to_binbuff(field_spendkey, spendkey_data) || spendkey_data.size() != sizeof(crypto::secret_key))
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION(tools::error::wallet_internal_error, tools::wallet2::tr("failed to parse spend key secret key"));
}
spendkey = *reinterpret_cast<const crypto::secret_key*>(spendkey_data.data());
crypto::public_key pkey;
if (!crypto::secret_key_to_public_key(spendkey, pkey)) {
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION(tools::error::wallet_internal_error, tools::wallet2::tr("failed to verify spend key secret key"));
}
}
GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR(json, seed, std::string, String, false, std::string());
std::string old_language;
crypto::secret_key recovery_key;
bool restore_deterministic_wallet = false;
if (field_seed_found)
{
if (!crypto::ElectrumWords::words_to_bytes(field_seed, recovery_key, old_language))
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION(tools::error::wallet_internal_error, tools::wallet2::tr("Electrum-style word list failed verification"));
}
restore_deterministic_wallet = true;
GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR(json, seed_passphrase, std::string, String, false, std::string());
if (field_seed_passphrase_found)
{
if (!field_seed_passphrase.empty())
recovery_key = cryptonote::decrypt_key(recovery_key, field_seed_passphrase);
}
}
GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR(json, address, std::string, String, false, std::string());
GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR(json, create_address_file, int, Int, false, false);
bool create_address_file = field_create_address_file;
// compatibility checks
if (!field_seed_found && !field_viewkey_found && !field_spendkey_found)
{
2018-03-09 23:22:26 +01:00
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION(tools::error::wallet_internal_error, tools::wallet2::tr("At least one of either an Electrum-style word list, private view key, or private spend key must be specified"));
}
if (field_seed_found && (field_viewkey_found || field_spendkey_found))
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION(tools::error::wallet_internal_error, tools::wallet2::tr("Both Electrum-style word list and private key(s) specified"));
}
// if an address was given, we check keys against it, and deduce the spend
// public key if it was not given
if (field_address_found)
{
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
cryptonote::address_parse_info info;
2018-02-16 12:04:04 +01:00
if(!get_account_address_from_str(info, nettype, field_address))
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION(tools::error::wallet_internal_error, tools::wallet2::tr("invalid address"));
}
if (field_viewkey_found)
{
crypto::public_key pkey;
if (!crypto::secret_key_to_public_key(viewkey, pkey)) {
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION(tools::error::wallet_internal_error, tools::wallet2::tr("failed to verify view key secret key"));
}
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
if (info.address.m_view_public_key != pkey) {
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION(tools::error::wallet_internal_error, tools::wallet2::tr("view key does not match standard address"));
}
}
if (field_spendkey_found)
{
crypto::public_key pkey;
if (!crypto::secret_key_to_public_key(spendkey, pkey)) {
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION(tools::error::wallet_internal_error, tools::wallet2::tr("failed to verify spend key secret key"));
}
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
if (info.address.m_spend_public_key != pkey) {
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION(tools::error::wallet_internal_error, tools::wallet2::tr("spend key does not match standard address"));
}
}
}
const bool deprecated_wallet = restore_deterministic_wallet && ((old_language == crypto::ElectrumWords::old_language_name) ||
crypto::ElectrumWords::get_is_old_style_seed(field_seed));
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(deprecated_wallet, tools::error::wallet_internal_error,
tools::wallet2::tr("Cannot generate deprecated wallets from JSON"));
wallet.reset(make_basic(vm, unattended, opts, password_prompter).release());
wallet->set_refresh_from_block_height(field_scan_from_height);
wallet->explicit_refresh_from_block_height(field_scan_from_height_found);
if (!old_language.empty())
wallet->set_seed_language(old_language);
try
{
if (!field_seed.empty())
{
wallet->generate(field_filename, field_password, recovery_key, recover, false, create_address_file);
password = field_password;
}
else if (field_viewkey.empty() && !field_spendkey.empty())
{
wallet->generate(field_filename, field_password, spendkey, recover, false, create_address_file);
password = field_password;
}
else
{
cryptonote::account_public_address address;
if (!crypto::secret_key_to_public_key(viewkey, address.m_view_public_key)) {
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION(tools::error::wallet_internal_error, tools::wallet2::tr("failed to verify view key secret key"));
}
if (field_spendkey.empty())
{
2018-01-19 08:54:14 +01:00
// if we have an address but no spend key, we can deduce the spend public key
// from the address
if (field_address_found)
{
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
cryptonote::address_parse_info info;
2018-02-16 12:04:04 +01:00
if(!get_account_address_from_str(info, nettype, field_address))
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION(tools::error::wallet_internal_error, std::string(tools::wallet2::tr("failed to parse address: ")) + field_address);
}
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
address.m_spend_public_key = info.address.m_spend_public_key;
}
else
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION(tools::error::wallet_internal_error, tools::wallet2::tr("Address must be specified in order to create watch-only wallet"));
}
wallet->generate(field_filename, field_password, address, viewkey, create_address_file);
password = field_password;
}
else
{
if (!crypto::secret_key_to_public_key(spendkey, address.m_spend_public_key)) {
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION(tools::error::wallet_internal_error, tools::wallet2::tr("failed to verify spend key secret key"));
}
wallet->generate(field_filename, field_password, address, spendkey, viewkey, create_address_file);
password = field_password;
}
}
}
catch (const std::exception& e)
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION(tools::error::wallet_internal_error, std::string(tools::wallet2::tr("failed to generate new wallet: ")) + e.what());
}
return true;
};
if (do_generate())
{
return {std::move(wallet), tools::password_container(password)};
}
return {nullptr, tools::password_container{}};
}
std::string strjoin(const std::vector<size_t> &V, const char *sep)
{
std::stringstream ss;
bool first = true;
for (const auto &v: V)
{
if (!first)
ss << sep;
ss << std::to_string(v);
first = false;
}
return ss.str();
}
static bool emplace_or_replace(std::unordered_multimap<crypto::hash, tools::wallet2::pool_payment_details> &container,
const crypto::hash &key, const tools::wallet2::pool_payment_details &pd)
{
auto range = container.equal_range(key);
for (auto i = range.first; i != range.second; ++i)
{
if (i->second.m_pd.m_tx_hash == pd.m_pd.m_tx_hash && i->second.m_pd.m_subaddr_index == pd.m_pd.m_subaddr_index)
{
i->second = pd;
return false;
}
}
container.emplace(key, pd);
return true;
}
void drop_from_short_history(std::list<crypto::hash> &short_chain_history, size_t N)
{
std::list<crypto::hash>::iterator right;
// drop early N off, skipping the genesis block
if (short_chain_history.size() > N) {
right = short_chain_history.end();
std::advance(right,-1);
std::list<crypto::hash>::iterator left = right;
std::advance(left, -N);
short_chain_history.erase(left, right);
}
}
2017-12-02 09:32:39 +01:00
size_t estimate_rct_tx_size(int n_inputs, int mixin, int n_outputs, size_t extra_size, bool bulletproof)
{
size_t size = 0;
// tx prefix
// first few bytes
size += 1 + 6;
// vin
size += n_inputs * (1+6+(mixin+1)*2+32);
// vout
size += n_outputs * (6+32);
// extra
size += extra_size;
// rct signatures
// type
size += 1;
// rangeSigs
2017-12-02 09:32:39 +01:00
if (bulletproof)
{
size_t log_padded_outputs = 0;
while ((1<<log_padded_outputs) < n_outputs)
++log_padded_outputs;
size += (2 * (6 + log_padded_outputs) + 4 + 5) * 32 + 3;
}
2017-12-02 09:32:39 +01:00
else
size += (2*64*32+32+64*32) * n_outputs;
// MGs
size += n_inputs * (64 * (mixin+1) + 32);
// mixRing - not serialized, can be reconstructed
/* size += 2 * 32 * (mixin+1) * n_inputs; */
// pseudoOuts
size += 32 * n_inputs;
// ecdhInfo
size += 2 * 32 * n_outputs;
// outPk - only commitment is saved
size += 32 * n_outputs;
// txnFee
size += 4;
LOG_PRINT_L2("estimated " << (bulletproof ? "bulletproof" : "borromean") << " rct tx size for " << n_inputs << " inputs with ring size " << (mixin+1) << " and " << n_outputs << " outputs: " << size << " (" << ((32 * n_inputs/*+1*/) + 2 * 32 * (mixin+1) * n_inputs + 32 * n_outputs) << " saved)");
return size;
}
2017-12-02 09:32:39 +01:00
size_t estimate_tx_size(bool use_rct, int n_inputs, int mixin, int n_outputs, size_t extra_size, bool bulletproof)
{
if (use_rct)
return estimate_rct_tx_size(n_inputs, mixin, n_outputs, extra_size, bulletproof);
else
return n_inputs * (mixin+1) * APPROXIMATE_INPUT_BYTES + extra_size;
}
uint64_t estimate_tx_weight(bool use_rct, int n_inputs, int mixin, int n_outputs, size_t extra_size, bool bulletproof)
{
size_t size = estimate_tx_size(use_rct, n_inputs, mixin, n_outputs, extra_size, bulletproof);
if (use_rct && bulletproof && n_outputs > 2)
{
const uint64_t bp_base = 368;
size_t log_padded_outputs = 2;
while ((1<<log_padded_outputs) < n_outputs)
++log_padded_outputs;
uint64_t nlr = 2 * (6 + log_padded_outputs);
const uint64_t bp_size = 32 * (9 + nlr);
const uint64_t bp_clawback = (bp_base * (1<<log_padded_outputs) - bp_size) * 4 / 5;
MDEBUG("clawback on size " << size << ": " << bp_clawback);
size += bp_clawback;
}
return size;
}
uint8_t get_bulletproof_fork()
2017-12-02 09:32:39 +01:00
{
return 8;
2017-12-02 09:32:39 +01:00
}
uint64_t estimate_fee(bool use_per_byte_fee, bool use_rct, int n_inputs, int mixin, int n_outputs, size_t extra_size, bool bulletproof, uint64_t base_fee, uint64_t fee_multiplier, uint64_t fee_quantization_mask)
{
if (use_per_byte_fee)
{
const size_t estimated_tx_weight = estimate_tx_weight(use_rct, n_inputs, mixin, n_outputs, extra_size, bulletproof);
return calculate_fee_from_weight(base_fee, estimated_tx_weight, fee_multiplier, fee_quantization_mask);
}
else
{
const size_t estimated_tx_size = estimate_tx_size(use_rct, n_inputs, mixin, n_outputs, extra_size, bulletproof);
return calculate_fee(base_fee, estimated_tx_size, fee_multiplier);
}
}
uint64_t calculate_fee(bool use_per_byte_fee, const cryptonote::transaction &tx, size_t blob_size, uint64_t base_fee, uint64_t fee_multiplier, uint64_t fee_quantization_mask)
{
if (use_per_byte_fee)
return calculate_fee_from_weight(base_fee, cryptonote::get_transaction_weight(tx, blob_size), fee_multiplier, fee_quantization_mask);
else
return calculate_fee(base_fee, blob_size, fee_multiplier);
}
bool get_short_payment_id(crypto::hash8 &payment_id8, const tools::wallet2::pending_tx &ptx, hw::device &hwdev)
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
{
std::vector<tx_extra_field> tx_extra_fields;
parse_tx_extra(ptx.tx.extra, tx_extra_fields); // ok if partially parsed
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
cryptonote::tx_extra_nonce extra_nonce;
if (find_tx_extra_field_by_type(tx_extra_fields, extra_nonce))
{
if(get_encrypted_payment_id_from_tx_extra_nonce(extra_nonce.nonce, payment_id8))
{
if (ptx.dests.empty())
{
MWARNING("Encrypted payment id found, but no destinations public key, cannot decrypt");
return false;
}
return hwdev.decrypt_payment_id(payment_id8, ptx.dests[0].addr.m_view_public_key, ptx.tx_key);
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
}
}
return false;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
}
tools::wallet2::tx_construction_data get_construction_data_with_decrypted_short_payment_id(const tools::wallet2::pending_tx &ptx, hw::device &hwdev)
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
{
tools::wallet2::tx_construction_data construction_data = ptx.construction_data;
crypto::hash8 payment_id = null_hash8;
if (get_short_payment_id(payment_id, ptx, hwdev))
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
{
// Remove encrypted
remove_field_from_tx_extra(construction_data.extra, typeid(cryptonote::tx_extra_nonce));
// Add decrypted
std::string extra_nonce;
set_encrypted_payment_id_to_tx_extra_nonce(extra_nonce, payment_id);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!add_extra_nonce_to_tx_extra(construction_data.extra, extra_nonce),
tools::error::wallet_internal_error, "Failed to add decrypted payment id to tx extra");
LOG_PRINT_L1("Decrypted payment ID: " << payment_id);
}
return construction_data;
}
uint32_t get_subaddress_clamped_sum(uint32_t idx, uint32_t extra)
{
static constexpr uint32_t uint32_max = std::numeric_limits<uint32_t>::max();
if (idx > uint32_max - extra)
return uint32_max;
return idx + extra;
}
2018-08-23 23:50:53 +02:00
static void setup_shim(hw::wallet_shim * shim, tools::wallet2 * wallet)
{
shim->get_tx_pub_key_from_received_outs = boost::bind(&tools::wallet2::get_tx_pub_key_from_received_outs, wallet, _1);
}
bool get_pruned_tx(const cryptonote::COMMAND_RPC_GET_TRANSACTIONS::entry &entry, cryptonote::transaction &tx, crypto::hash &tx_hash)
{
cryptonote::blobdata bd;
// easy case if we have the whole tx
if (!entry.as_hex.empty() || (!entry.prunable_as_hex.empty() && !entry.pruned_as_hex.empty()))
{
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(epee::string_tools::parse_hexstr_to_binbuff(entry.as_hex.empty() ? entry.pruned_as_hex + entry.prunable_as_hex : entry.as_hex, bd), false, "Failed to parse tx data");
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(cryptonote::parse_and_validate_tx_from_blob(bd, tx), false, "Invalid tx data");
tx_hash = cryptonote::get_transaction_hash(tx);
// if the hash was given, check it matches
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(entry.tx_hash.empty() || epee::string_tools::pod_to_hex(tx_hash) == entry.tx_hash, false,
"Response claims a different hash than the data yields");
return true;
}
// case of a pruned tx with its prunable data hash
if (!entry.pruned_as_hex.empty() && !entry.prunable_hash.empty())
{
crypto::hash ph;
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(epee::string_tools::hex_to_pod(entry.prunable_hash, ph), false, "Failed to parse prunable hash");
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(epee::string_tools::parse_hexstr_to_binbuff(entry.pruned_as_hex, bd), false, "Failed to parse pruned data");
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(parse_and_validate_tx_base_from_blob(bd, tx), false, "Invalid base tx data");
// only v2 txes can calculate their txid after pruned
if (bd[0] > 1)
{
tx_hash = cryptonote::get_pruned_transaction_hash(tx, ph);
}
else
{
// for v1, we trust the dameon
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(epee::string_tools::hex_to_pod(entry.tx_hash, tx_hash), false, "Failed to parse tx hash");
}
return true;
}
return false;
}
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
//-----------------------------------------------------------------
2014-05-03 18:19:43 +02:00
} //namespace
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
namespace tools
{
// for now, limit to 30 attempts. TODO: discuss a good number to limit to.
const size_t MAX_SPLIT_ATTEMPTS = 30;
constexpr const std::chrono::seconds wallet2::rpc_timeout;
const char* wallet2::tr(const char* str) { return i18n_translate(str, "tools::wallet2"); }
wallet_keys_unlocker::wallet_keys_unlocker(wallet2 &w, const boost::optional<tools::password_container> &password):
w(w),
locked(password != boost::none)
{
if (!locked || w.is_unattended() || w.ask_password() != tools::wallet2::AskPasswordToDecrypt || w.watch_only())
{
locked = false;
return;
}
const epee::wipeable_string pass = password->password();
w.generate_chacha_key_from_password(pass, key);
w.decrypt_keys(key);
}
wallet_keys_unlocker::wallet_keys_unlocker(wallet2 &w, bool locked, const epee::wipeable_string &password):
w(w),
locked(locked)
{
if (!locked)
return;
w.generate_chacha_key_from_password(password, key);
w.decrypt_keys(key);
}
wallet_keys_unlocker::~wallet_keys_unlocker()
{
if (!locked)
return;
try { w.encrypt_keys(key); }
catch (...)
{
MERROR("Failed to re-encrypt wallet keys");
// do not propagate through dtor, we'd crash
}
}
void wallet_device_callback::on_button_request(uint64_t code)
{
if (wallet)
wallet->on_device_button_request(code);
}
boost::optional<epee::wipeable_string> wallet_device_callback::on_pin_request()
{
if (wallet)
return wallet->on_device_pin_request();
return boost::none;
}
boost::optional<epee::wipeable_string> wallet_device_callback::on_passphrase_request(bool on_device)
{
if (wallet)
return wallet->on_device_passphrase_request(on_device);
return boost::none;
}
void wallet_device_callback::on_progress(const hw::device_progress& event)
{
if (wallet)
wallet->on_device_progress(event);
}
wallet2::wallet2(network_type nettype, uint64_t kdf_rounds, bool unattended):
m_multisig_rescan_info(NULL),
m_multisig_rescan_k(NULL),
m_upper_transaction_weight_limit(0),
m_run(true),
m_callback(0),
m_trusted_daemon(false),
2018-02-16 12:04:04 +01:00
m_nettype(nettype),
m_multisig_rounds_passed(0),
m_always_confirm_transfers(true),
m_print_ring_members(false),
m_store_tx_info(true),
m_default_mixin(0),
m_default_priority(0),
m_refresh_type(RefreshOptimizeCoinbase),
m_auto_refresh(true),
m_first_refresh_done(false),
m_refresh_from_block_height(0),
m_explicit_refresh_from_block_height(true),
m_confirm_missing_payment_id(true),
m_confirm_non_default_ring_size(true),
m_ask_password(AskPasswordToDecrypt),
m_min_output_count(0),
m_min_output_value(0),
m_merge_destinations(false),
m_confirm_backlog(true),
2017-12-19 13:33:01 +01:00
m_confirm_backlog_threshold(0),
m_confirm_export_overwrite(true),
m_auto_low_priority(true),
m_segregate_pre_fork_outputs(true),
m_key_reuse_mitigation2(true),
m_segregation_height(0),
2018-06-28 04:31:50 +02:00
m_ignore_fractional_outputs(true),
m_track_uses(false),
m_is_initialized(false),
m_kdf_rounds(kdf_rounds),
is_old_file_format(false),
m_watch_only(false),
m_multisig(false),
m_multisig_threshold(0),
m_node_rpc_proxy(m_http_client, m_daemon_rpc_mutex),
m_account_public_address{crypto::null_pkey, crypto::null_pkey},
m_subaddress_lookahead_major(SUBADDRESS_LOOKAHEAD_MAJOR),
m_subaddress_lookahead_minor(SUBADDRESS_LOOKAHEAD_MINOR),
m_light_wallet(false),
m_light_wallet_scanned_block_height(0),
m_light_wallet_blockchain_height(0),
m_light_wallet_connected(false),
m_light_wallet_balance(0),
m_light_wallet_unlocked_balance(0),
m_original_keys_available(false),
m_message_store(),
2018-08-16 10:31:48 +02:00
m_key_device_type(hw::device::device_type::SOFTWARE),
m_ring_history_saved(false),
m_ringdb(),
m_last_block_reward(0),
m_encrypt_keys_after_refresh(boost::none),
m_unattended(unattended),
m_devices_registered(false),
m_device_last_key_image_sync(0)
{
}
wallet2::~wallet2()
{
}
bool wallet2::has_testnet_option(const boost::program_options::variables_map& vm)
{
return command_line::get_arg(vm, options().testnet);
}
2018-02-16 12:04:04 +01:00
bool wallet2::has_stagenet_option(const boost::program_options::variables_map& vm)
{
return command_line::get_arg(vm, options().stagenet);
}
std::string wallet2::device_name_option(const boost::program_options::variables_map& vm)
{
return command_line::get_arg(vm, options().hw_device);
}
std::string wallet2::device_derivation_path_option(const boost::program_options::variables_map &vm)
{
return command_line::get_arg(vm, options().hw_device_derivation_path);
}
void wallet2::init_options(boost::program_options::options_description& desc_params)
{
const options opts{};
command_line::add_arg(desc_params, opts.daemon_address);
command_line::add_arg(desc_params, opts.daemon_host);
command_line::add_arg(desc_params, opts.proxy);
command_line::add_arg(desc_params, opts.trusted_daemon);
command_line::add_arg(desc_params, opts.untrusted_daemon);
command_line::add_arg(desc_params, opts.password);
command_line::add_arg(desc_params, opts.password_file);
command_line::add_arg(desc_params, opts.daemon_port);
command_line::add_arg(desc_params, opts.daemon_login);
epee: add SSL support RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL. An optional private key and certificate file can be passed, using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as argument a path to a PEM format private private key and certificate, respectively. If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used. SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled. Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the --rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to, by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good certificates. To generate long term certificates: openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096 openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT /tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate, both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway. SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-15 00:44:48 +02:00
command_line::add_arg(desc_params, opts.daemon_ssl);
command_line::add_arg(desc_params, opts.daemon_ssl_private_key);
command_line::add_arg(desc_params, opts.daemon_ssl_certificate);
command_line::add_arg(desc_params, opts.daemon_ssl_allowed_certificates);
epee: add SSL support RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL. An optional private key and certificate file can be passed, using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as argument a path to a PEM format private private key and certificate, respectively. If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used. SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled. Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the --rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to, by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good certificates. To generate long term certificates: openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096 openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT /tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate, both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway. SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-15 00:44:48 +02:00
command_line::add_arg(desc_params, opts.daemon_ssl_allowed_fingerprints);
epee: add SSL support RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL. An optional private key and certificate file can be passed, using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as argument a path to a PEM format private private key and certificate, respectively. If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used. SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled. Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the --rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to, by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good certificates. To generate long term certificates: openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096 openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT /tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate, both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway. SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-15 00:44:48 +02:00
command_line::add_arg(desc_params, opts.daemon_ssl_allow_any_cert);
command_line::add_arg(desc_params, opts.testnet);
2018-02-16 12:04:04 +01:00
command_line::add_arg(desc_params, opts.stagenet);
command_line::add_arg(desc_params, opts.shared_ringdb_dir);
command_line::add_arg(desc_params, opts.kdf_rounds);
mms::message_store::init_options(desc_params);
command_line::add_arg(desc_params, opts.hw_device);
command_line::add_arg(desc_params, opts.hw_device_derivation_path);
command_line::add_arg(desc_params, opts.tx_notify);
}
std::pair<std::unique_ptr<wallet2>, tools::password_container> wallet2::make_from_json(const boost::program_options::variables_map& vm, bool unattended, const std::string& json_file, const std::function<boost::optional<tools::password_container>(const char *, bool)> &password_prompter)
{
const options opts{};
return generate_from_json(json_file, vm, unattended, opts, password_prompter);
}
std::pair<std::unique_ptr<wallet2>, password_container> wallet2::make_from_file(
const boost::program_options::variables_map& vm, bool unattended, const std::string& wallet_file, const std::function<boost::optional<tools::password_container>(const char *, bool)> &password_prompter)
{
const options opts{};
auto pwd = get_password(vm, opts, password_prompter, false);
if (!pwd)
{
return {nullptr, password_container{}};
}
auto wallet = make_basic(vm, unattended, opts, password_prompter);
if (wallet && !wallet_file.empty())
{
wallet->load(wallet_file, pwd->password());
}
return {std::move(wallet), std::move(*pwd)};
}
std::pair<std::unique_ptr<wallet2>, password_container> wallet2::make_new(const boost::program_options::variables_map& vm, bool unattended, const std::function<boost::optional<password_container>(const char *, bool)> &password_prompter)
{
const options opts{};
auto pwd = get_password(vm, opts, password_prompter, true);
if (!pwd)
{
return {nullptr, password_container{}};
}
return {make_basic(vm, unattended, opts, password_prompter), std::move(*pwd)};
}
std::unique_ptr<wallet2> wallet2::make_dummy(const boost::program_options::variables_map& vm, bool unattended, const std::function<boost::optional<tools::password_container>(const char *, bool)> &password_prompter)
{
const options opts{};
return make_basic(vm, unattended, opts, password_prompter);
}
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
bool wallet2::set_daemon(std::string daemon_address, boost::optional<epee::net_utils::http::login> daemon_login, bool trusted_daemon,
epee::net_utils::ssl_support_t ssl_support, const std::pair<std::string, std::string> &private_key_and_certificate_path,
const std::list<std::string> &allowed_certificates, const std::vector<std::vector<uint8_t>> &allowed_fingerprints,
bool allow_any_cert)
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
{
if(m_http_client.is_connected())
m_http_client.disconnect();
m_daemon_address = std::move(daemon_address);
m_daemon_login = std::move(daemon_login);
m_trusted_daemon = trusted_daemon;
MINFO("setting daemon to " << get_daemon_address());
epee: add SSL support RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL. An optional private key and certificate file can be passed, using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as argument a path to a PEM format private private key and certificate, respectively. If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used. SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled. Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the --rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to, by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good certificates. To generate long term certificates: openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096 openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT /tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate, both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway. SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-15 00:44:48 +02:00
return m_http_client.set_server(get_daemon_address(), get_daemon_login(), ssl_support, private_key_and_certificate_path, allowed_certificates, allowed_fingerprints, allow_any_cert);
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
bool wallet2::init(std::string daemon_address, boost::optional<epee::net_utils::http::login> daemon_login, boost::asio::ip::tcp::endpoint proxy, uint64_t upper_transaction_weight_limit, bool trusted_daemon, epee::net_utils::ssl_support_t ssl_support, const std::pair<std::string, std::string> &private_key_and_certificate_path, const std::list<std::string> &allowed_certificates, const std::vector<std::vector<uint8_t>> &allowed_fingerprints, bool allow_any_cert)
{
m_checkpoints.init_default_checkpoints(m_nettype);
m_is_initialized = true;
m_upper_transaction_weight_limit = upper_transaction_weight_limit;
if (proxy != boost::asio::ip::tcp::endpoint{})
m_http_client.set_connector(net::socks::connector{std::move(proxy)});
return set_daemon(daemon_address, daemon_login, trusted_daemon, ssl_support, private_key_and_certificate_path, allowed_certificates, allowed_fingerprints, allow_any_cert);
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
bool wallet2::is_deterministic() const
{
crypto::secret_key second;
keccak((uint8_t *)&get_account().get_keys().m_spend_secret_key, sizeof(crypto::secret_key), (uint8_t *)&second, sizeof(crypto::secret_key));
sc_reduce32((uint8_t *)&second);
return memcmp(second.data,get_account().get_keys().m_view_secret_key.data, sizeof(crypto::secret_key)) == 0;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
bool wallet2::get_seed(epee::wipeable_string& electrum_words, const epee::wipeable_string &passphrase) const
2014-08-03 16:58:21 +02:00
{
bool keys_deterministic = is_deterministic();
if (!keys_deterministic)
{
std::cout << "This is not a deterministic wallet" << std::endl;
return false;
}
if (seed_language.empty())
{
std::cout << "seed_language not set" << std::endl;
return false;
}
crypto::secret_key key = get_account().get_keys().m_spend_secret_key;
if (!passphrase.empty())
key = cryptonote::encrypt_key(key, passphrase);
if (!crypto::ElectrumWords::bytes_to_words(key, electrum_words, seed_language))
{
std::cout << "Failed to create seed from key for language: " << seed_language << std::endl;
return false;
}
2014-08-03 16:58:21 +02:00
return true;
2014-08-03 16:58:21 +02:00
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
bool wallet2::get_multisig_seed(epee::wipeable_string& seed, const epee::wipeable_string &passphrase, bool raw) const
{
bool ready;
uint32_t threshold, total;
if (!multisig(&ready, &threshold, &total))
{
std::cout << "This is not a multisig wallet" << std::endl;
return false;
}
if (!ready)
{
std::cout << "This multisig wallet is not yet finalized" << std::endl;
return false;
}
if (!raw && seed_language.empty())
{
std::cout << "seed_language not set" << std::endl;
return false;
}
crypto::secret_key skey;
crypto::public_key pkey;
const account_keys &keys = get_account().get_keys();
epee::wipeable_string data;
data.append((const char*)&threshold, sizeof(uint32_t));
data.append((const char*)&total, sizeof(uint32_t));
skey = keys.m_spend_secret_key;
data.append((const char*)&skey, sizeof(skey));
pkey = keys.m_account_address.m_spend_public_key;
data.append((const char*)&pkey, sizeof(pkey));
skey = keys.m_view_secret_key;
data.append((const char*)&skey, sizeof(skey));
pkey = keys.m_account_address.m_view_public_key;
data.append((const char*)&pkey, sizeof(pkey));
for (const auto &skey: keys.m_multisig_keys)
data.append((const char*)&skey, sizeof(skey));
for (const auto &signer: m_multisig_signers)
data.append((const char*)&signer, sizeof(signer));
if (!passphrase.empty())
{
crypto::secret_key key;
crypto::cn_slow_hash(passphrase.data(), passphrase.size(), (crypto::hash&)key);
sc_reduce32((unsigned char*)key.data);
data = encrypt(data, key, true);
}
if (raw)
{
seed = epee::to_hex::wipeable_string({(const unsigned char*)data.data(), data.size()});
}
else
{
if (!crypto::ElectrumWords::bytes_to_words(data.data(), data.size(), seed, seed_language))
{
std::cout << "Failed to encode seed";
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
bool wallet2::reconnect_device()
{
bool r = true;
2018-08-23 23:50:53 +02:00
hw::device &hwdev = lookup_device(m_device_name);
hwdev.set_name(m_device_name);
2018-08-23 23:50:53 +02:00
hwdev.set_network_type(m_nettype);
hwdev.set_derivation_path(m_device_derivation_path);
hwdev.set_callback(get_device_callback());
r = hwdev.init();
if (!r){
MERROR("Could not init device");
return false;
}
r = hwdev.connect();
if (!r){
MERROR("Could not connect to the device");
return false;
}
m_account.set_device(hwdev);
return true;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
/*!
* \brief Gets the seed language
*/
const std::string &wallet2::get_seed_language() const
{
return seed_language;
}
/*!
* \brief Sets the seed language
2014-10-18 19:41:05 +02:00
* \param language Seed language to set to
*/
void wallet2::set_seed_language(const std::string &language)
{
seed_language = language;
}
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
cryptonote::account_public_address wallet2::get_subaddress(const cryptonote::subaddress_index& index) const
{
hw::device &hwdev = m_account.get_device();
return hwdev.get_subaddress(m_account.get_keys(), index);
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
boost::optional<cryptonote::subaddress_index> wallet2::get_subaddress_index(const cryptonote::account_public_address& address) const
{
auto index = m_subaddresses.find(address.m_spend_public_key);
if (index == m_subaddresses.end())
return boost::none;
return index->second;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
crypto::public_key wallet2::get_subaddress_spend_public_key(const cryptonote::subaddress_index& index) const
{
hw::device &hwdev = m_account.get_device();
return hwdev.get_subaddress_spend_public_key(m_account.get_keys(), index);
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
std::string wallet2::get_subaddress_as_str(const cryptonote::subaddress_index& index) const
{
cryptonote::account_public_address address = get_subaddress(index);
2018-02-16 12:04:04 +01:00
return cryptonote::get_account_address_as_str(m_nettype, !index.is_zero(), address);
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
std::string wallet2::get_integrated_address_as_str(const crypto::hash8& payment_id) const
{
2018-02-16 12:04:04 +01:00
return cryptonote::get_account_integrated_address_as_str(m_nettype, get_address(), payment_id);
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
void wallet2::add_subaddress_account(const std::string& label)
{
uint32_t index_major = (uint32_t)get_num_subaddress_accounts();
expand_subaddresses({index_major, 0});
m_subaddress_labels[index_major][0] = label;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
void wallet2::add_subaddress(uint32_t index_major, const std::string& label)
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(index_major >= m_subaddress_labels.size(), error::account_index_outofbound);
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
uint32_t index_minor = (uint32_t)get_num_subaddresses(index_major);
expand_subaddresses({index_major, index_minor});
m_subaddress_labels[index_major][index_minor] = label;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
void wallet2::expand_subaddresses(const cryptonote::subaddress_index& index)
{
hw::device &hwdev = m_account.get_device();
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
if (m_subaddress_labels.size() <= index.major)
{
// add new accounts
cryptonote::subaddress_index index2;
const uint32_t major_end = get_subaddress_clamped_sum(index.major, m_subaddress_lookahead_major);
for (index2.major = m_subaddress_labels.size(); index2.major < major_end; ++index2.major)
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
{
const uint32_t end = get_subaddress_clamped_sum((index2.major == index.major ? index.minor : 0), m_subaddress_lookahead_minor);
const std::vector<crypto::public_key> pkeys = hwdev.get_subaddress_spend_public_keys(m_account.get_keys(), index2.major, 0, end);
for (index2.minor = 0; index2.minor < end; ++index2.minor)
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
{
const crypto::public_key &D = pkeys[index2.minor];
m_subaddresses[D] = index2;
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
}
}
m_subaddress_labels.resize(index.major + 1, {"Untitled account"});
m_subaddress_labels[index.major].resize(index.minor + 1);
get_account_tags();
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
}
else if (m_subaddress_labels[index.major].size() <= index.minor)
{
// add new subaddresses
const uint32_t end = get_subaddress_clamped_sum(index.minor, m_subaddress_lookahead_minor);
const uint32_t begin = m_subaddress_labels[index.major].size();
cryptonote::subaddress_index index2 = {index.major, begin};
const std::vector<crypto::public_key> pkeys = hwdev.get_subaddress_spend_public_keys(m_account.get_keys(), index2.major, index2.minor, end);
for (; index2.minor < end; ++index2.minor)
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
{
const crypto::public_key &D = pkeys[index2.minor - begin];
m_subaddresses[D] = index2;
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
}
m_subaddress_labels[index.major].resize(index.minor + 1);
}
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
std::string wallet2::get_subaddress_label(const cryptonote::subaddress_index& index) const
{
if (index.major >= m_subaddress_labels.size() || index.minor >= m_subaddress_labels[index.major].size())
{
MERROR("Subaddress label doesn't exist");
return "";
}
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
return m_subaddress_labels[index.major][index.minor];
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
void wallet2::set_subaddress_label(const cryptonote::subaddress_index& index, const std::string &label)
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(index.major >= m_subaddress_labels.size(), error::account_index_outofbound);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(index.minor >= m_subaddress_labels[index.major].size(), error::address_index_outofbound);
m_subaddress_labels[index.major][index.minor] = label;
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
void wallet2::set_subaddress_lookahead(size_t major, size_t minor)
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(major > 0xffffffff, error::wallet_internal_error, "Subaddress major lookahead is too large");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(minor > 0xffffffff, error::wallet_internal_error, "Subaddress minor lookahead is too large");
m_subaddress_lookahead_major = major;
m_subaddress_lookahead_minor = minor;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
/*!
* \brief Tells if the wallet file is deprecated.
*/
bool wallet2::is_deprecated() const
{
return is_old_file_format;
}
2014-08-03 16:58:21 +02:00
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
void wallet2::set_spent(size_t idx, uint64_t height)
{
transfer_details &td = m_transfers[idx];
LOG_PRINT_L2("Setting SPENT at " << height << ": ki " << td.m_key_image << ", amount " << print_money(td.m_amount));
td.m_spent = true;
td.m_spent_height = height;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
void wallet2::set_unspent(size_t idx)
{
transfer_details &td = m_transfers[idx];
LOG_PRINT_L2("Setting UNSPENT: ki " << td.m_key_image << ", amount " << print_money(td.m_amount));
td.m_spent = false;
td.m_spent_height = 0;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
void wallet2::freeze(size_t idx)
{
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(idx < m_transfers.size(), "Invalid transfer_details index");
transfer_details &td = m_transfers[idx];
td.m_frozen = true;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
void wallet2::thaw(size_t idx)
{
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(idx < m_transfers.size(), "Invalid transfer_details index");
transfer_details &td = m_transfers[idx];
td.m_frozen = false;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
bool wallet2::frozen(size_t idx) const
{
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(idx < m_transfers.size(), "Invalid transfer_details index");
const transfer_details &td = m_transfers[idx];
return td.m_frozen;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
void wallet2::freeze(const crypto::key_image &ki)
{
freeze(get_transfer_details(ki));
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
void wallet2::thaw(const crypto::key_image &ki)
{
thaw(get_transfer_details(ki));
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
bool wallet2::frozen(const crypto::key_image &ki) const
{
return frozen(get_transfer_details(ki));
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
size_t wallet2::get_transfer_details(const crypto::key_image &ki) const
{
for (size_t idx = 0; idx < m_transfers.size(); ++idx)
{
const transfer_details &td = m_transfers[idx];
if (td.m_key_image_known && td.m_key_image == ki)
return idx;
}
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(false, "Key image not found");
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
bool wallet2::frozen(const transfer_details &td) const
{
return td.m_frozen;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
void wallet2::check_acc_out_precomp(const tx_out &o, const crypto::key_derivation &derivation, const std::vector<crypto::key_derivation> &additional_derivations, size_t i, tx_scan_info_t &tx_scan_info) const
{
hw::device &hwdev = m_account.get_device();
boost::unique_lock<hw::device> hwdev_lock (hwdev);
hwdev.set_mode(hw::device::TRANSACTION_PARSE);
if (o.target.type() != typeid(txout_to_key))
{
2017-09-12 13:03:56 +02:00
tx_scan_info.error = true;
LOG_ERROR("wrong type id in transaction out");
return;
}
tx_scan_info.received = is_out_to_acc_precomp(m_subaddresses, boost::get<txout_to_key>(o.target).key, derivation, additional_derivations, i, hwdev);
2017-09-12 13:03:56 +02:00
if(tx_scan_info.received)
{
2017-09-12 13:03:56 +02:00
tx_scan_info.money_transfered = o.amount; // may be 0 for ringct outputs
}
else
{
2017-09-12 13:03:56 +02:00
tx_scan_info.money_transfered = 0;
}
2017-09-12 13:03:56 +02:00
tx_scan_info.error = false;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
void wallet2::check_acc_out_precomp(const tx_out &o, const crypto::key_derivation &derivation, const std::vector<crypto::key_derivation> &additional_derivations, size_t i, const is_out_data *is_out_data, tx_scan_info_t &tx_scan_info) const
{
if (!is_out_data || i >= is_out_data->received.size())
return check_acc_out_precomp(o, derivation, additional_derivations, i, tx_scan_info);
tx_scan_info.received = is_out_data->received[i];
if(tx_scan_info.received)
{
tx_scan_info.money_transfered = o.amount; // may be 0 for ringct outputs
}
else
{
tx_scan_info.money_transfered = 0;
}
tx_scan_info.error = false;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
void wallet2::check_acc_out_precomp_once(const tx_out &o, const crypto::key_derivation &derivation, const std::vector<crypto::key_derivation> &additional_derivations, size_t i, const is_out_data *is_out_data, tx_scan_info_t &tx_scan_info, bool &already_seen) const
{
tx_scan_info.received = boost::none;
if (already_seen)
return;
check_acc_out_precomp(o, derivation, additional_derivations, i, is_out_data, tx_scan_info);
if (tx_scan_info.received)
already_seen = true;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
static uint64_t decodeRct(const rct::rctSig & rv, const crypto::key_derivation &derivation, unsigned int i, rct::key & mask, hw::device &hwdev)
2016-07-10 13:57:22 +02:00
{
crypto::secret_key scalar1;
hwdev.derivation_to_scalar(derivation, i, scalar1);
try
{
switch (rv.type)
{
case rct::RCTTypeSimple:
case rct::RCTTypeBulletproof:
case rct::RCTTypeBulletproof2:
return rct::decodeRctSimple(rv, rct::sk2rct(scalar1), i, mask, hwdev);
case rct::RCTTypeFull:
return rct::decodeRct(rv, rct::sk2rct(scalar1), i, mask, hwdev);
default:
LOG_ERROR("Unsupported rct type: " << rv.type);
return 0;
}
}
catch (const std::exception &e)
{
LOG_ERROR("Failed to decode input " << i);
return 0;
}
2016-07-10 13:57:22 +02:00
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
void wallet2::scan_output(const cryptonote::transaction &tx, bool miner_tx, const crypto::public_key &tx_pub_key, size_t i, tx_scan_info_t &tx_scan_info, int &num_vouts_received, std::unordered_map<cryptonote::subaddress_index, uint64_t> &tx_money_got_in_outs, std::vector<size_t> &outs, bool pool)
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(i >= tx.vout.size(), error::wallet_internal_error, "Invalid vout index");
// if keys are encrypted, ask for password
if (m_ask_password == AskPasswordToDecrypt && !m_unattended && !m_watch_only && !m_multisig_rescan_k)
{
static critical_section password_lock;
CRITICAL_REGION_LOCAL(password_lock);
if (!m_encrypt_keys_after_refresh)
{
boost::optional<epee::wipeable_string> pwd = m_callback->on_get_password(pool ? "output found in pool" : "output received");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!pwd, error::password_needed, tr("Password is needed to compute key image for incoming monero"));
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!verify_password(*pwd), error::password_needed, tr("Invalid password: password is needed to compute key image for incoming monero"));
decrypt_keys(*pwd);
m_encrypt_keys_after_refresh = *pwd;
}
}
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
if (m_multisig)
{
tx_scan_info.in_ephemeral.pub = boost::get<cryptonote::txout_to_key>(tx.vout[i].target).key;
tx_scan_info.in_ephemeral.sec = crypto::null_skey;
tx_scan_info.ki = rct::rct2ki(rct::zero());
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
}
else
{
bool r = cryptonote::generate_key_image_helper_precomp(m_account.get_keys(), boost::get<cryptonote::txout_to_key>(tx.vout[i].target).key, tx_scan_info.received->derivation, i, tx_scan_info.received->index, tx_scan_info.in_ephemeral, tx_scan_info.ki, m_account.get_device());
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!r, error::wallet_internal_error, "Failed to generate key image");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(tx_scan_info.in_ephemeral.pub != boost::get<cryptonote::txout_to_key>(tx.vout[i].target).key,
error::wallet_internal_error, "key_image generated ephemeral public key not matched with output_key");
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
}
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(std::find(outs.begin(), outs.end(), i) != outs.end(), error::wallet_internal_error, "Same output cannot be added twice");
if (tx_scan_info.money_transfered == 0 && !miner_tx)
{
tx_scan_info.money_transfered = tools::decodeRct(tx.rct_signatures, tx_scan_info.received->derivation, i, tx_scan_info.mask, m_account.get_device());
}
if (tx_scan_info.money_transfered == 0)
{
MERROR("Invalid output amount, skipping");
tx_scan_info.error = true;
return;
}
outs.push_back(i);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(tx_money_got_in_outs[tx_scan_info.received->index] >= std::numeric_limits<uint64_t>::max() - tx_scan_info.money_transfered,
error::wallet_internal_error, "Overflow in received amounts");
tx_money_got_in_outs[tx_scan_info.received->index] += tx_scan_info.money_transfered;
2017-09-12 13:03:56 +02:00
tx_scan_info.amount = tx_scan_info.money_transfered;
++num_vouts_received;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
void wallet2::cache_tx_data(const cryptonote::transaction& tx, const crypto::hash &txid, tx_cache_data &tx_cache_data) const
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
{
if(!parse_tx_extra(tx.extra, tx_cache_data.tx_extra_fields))
{
// Extra may only be partially parsed, it's OK if tx_extra_fields contains public key
LOG_PRINT_L0("Transaction extra has unsupported format: " << txid);
if (tx_cache_data.tx_extra_fields.empty())
return;
}
// Don't try to extract tx public key if tx has no ouputs
const bool is_miner = tx.vin.size() == 1 && tx.vin[0].type() == typeid(cryptonote::txin_gen);
if (!is_miner || m_refresh_type != RefreshType::RefreshNoCoinbase)
{
const size_t rec_size = is_miner && m_refresh_type == RefreshType::RefreshOptimizeCoinbase ? 1 : tx.vout.size();
if (!tx.vout.empty())
{
// if tx.vout is not empty, we loop through all tx pubkeys
const std::vector<boost::optional<cryptonote::subaddress_receive_info>> rec(rec_size, boost::none);
tx_extra_pub_key pub_key_field;
size_t pk_index = 0;
while (find_tx_extra_field_by_type(tx_cache_data.tx_extra_fields, pub_key_field, pk_index++))
tx_cache_data.primary.push_back({pub_key_field.pub_key, {}, rec});
// additional tx pubkeys and derivations for multi-destination transfers involving one or more subaddresses
tx_extra_additional_pub_keys additional_tx_pub_keys;
if (find_tx_extra_field_by_type(tx_cache_data.tx_extra_fields, additional_tx_pub_keys))
{
for (size_t i = 0; i < additional_tx_pub_keys.data.size(); ++i)
tx_cache_data.additional.push_back({additional_tx_pub_keys.data[i], {}, {}});
}
}
}
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
void wallet2::process_new_transaction(const crypto::hash &txid, const cryptonote::transaction& tx, const std::vector<uint64_t> &o_indices, uint64_t height, uint64_t ts, bool miner_tx, bool pool, bool double_spend_seen, const tx_cache_data &tx_cache_data, std::map<std::pair<uint64_t, uint64_t>, size_t> *output_tracker_cache)
{
PERF_TIMER(process_new_transaction);
// In this function, tx (probably) only contains the base information
// (that is, the prunable stuff may or may not be included)
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
if (!miner_tx && !pool)
process_unconfirmed(txid, tx, height);
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
std::unordered_map<cryptonote::subaddress_index, uint64_t> tx_money_got_in_outs; // per receiving subaddress index
crypto::public_key tx_pub_key = null_pkey;
bool notify = false;
2014-05-03 18:19:43 +02:00
std::vector<tx_extra_field> local_tx_extra_fields;
if (tx_cache_data.tx_extra_fields.empty())
2014-05-03 18:19:43 +02:00
{
if(!parse_tx_extra(tx.extra, local_tx_extra_fields))
{
// Extra may only be partially parsed, it's OK if tx_extra_fields contains public key
LOG_PRINT_L0("Transaction extra has unsupported format: " << txid);
}
2014-05-03 18:19:43 +02:00
}
const std::vector<tx_extra_field> &tx_extra_fields = tx_cache_data.tx_extra_fields.empty() ? local_tx_extra_fields : tx_cache_data.tx_extra_fields;
2014-05-03 18:19:43 +02:00
// Don't try to extract tx public key if tx has no ouputs
size_t pk_index = 0;
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
std::vector<tx_scan_info_t> tx_scan_info(tx.vout.size());
std::deque<bool> output_found(tx.vout.size(), false);
uint64_t total_received_1 = 0;
while (!tx.vout.empty())
2014-05-03 18:19:43 +02:00
{
std::vector<size_t> outs;
// if tx.vout is not empty, we loop through all tx pubkeys
tx_extra_pub_key pub_key_field;
if(!find_tx_extra_field_by_type(tx_extra_fields, pub_key_field, pk_index++))
{
if (pk_index > 1)
break;
LOG_PRINT_L0("Public key wasn't found in the transaction extra. Skipping transaction " << txid);
if(0 != m_callback)
m_callback->on_skip_transaction(height, txid, tx);
break;
}
if (!tx_cache_data.primary.empty())
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(tx_cache_data.primary.size() < pk_index || pub_key_field.pub_key != tx_cache_data.primary[pk_index - 1].pkey,
error::wallet_internal_error, "tx_cache_data is out of sync");
}
2014-05-03 18:19:43 +02:00
int num_vouts_received = 0;
tx_pub_key = pub_key_field.pub_key;
tools::threadpool& tpool = tools::threadpool::getInstance();
tools::threadpool::waiter waiter;
const cryptonote::account_keys& keys = m_account.get_keys();
crypto::key_derivation derivation;
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
std::vector<crypto::key_derivation> additional_derivations;
tx_extra_additional_pub_keys additional_tx_pub_keys;
const wallet2::is_out_data *is_out_data_ptr = NULL;
if (tx_cache_data.primary.empty())
{
hw::device &hwdev = m_account.get_device();
boost::unique_lock<hw::device> hwdev_lock (hwdev);
hw::reset_mode rst(hwdev);
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
hwdev.set_mode(hw::device::TRANSACTION_PARSE);
if (!hwdev.generate_key_derivation(tx_pub_key, keys.m_view_secret_key, derivation))
{
MWARNING("Failed to generate key derivation from tx pubkey in " << txid << ", skipping");
static_assert(sizeof(derivation) == sizeof(rct::key), "Mismatched sizes of key_derivation and rct::key");
memcpy(&derivation, rct::identity().bytes, sizeof(derivation));
}
if (pk_index == 1)
{
// additional tx pubkeys and derivations for multi-destination transfers involving one or more subaddresses
if (find_tx_extra_field_by_type(tx_extra_fields, additional_tx_pub_keys))
{
for (size_t i = 0; i < additional_tx_pub_keys.data.size(); ++i)
{
additional_derivations.push_back({});
if (!hwdev.generate_key_derivation(additional_tx_pub_keys.data[i], keys.m_view_secret_key, additional_derivations.back()))
{
MWARNING("Failed to generate key derivation from additional tx pubkey in " << txid << ", skipping");
memcpy(&additional_derivations.back(), rct::identity().bytes, sizeof(crypto::key_derivation));
}
}
}
}
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
}
else
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(pk_index - 1 >= tx_cache_data.primary.size(),
error::wallet_internal_error, "pk_index out of range of tx_cache_data");
is_out_data_ptr = &tx_cache_data.primary[pk_index - 1];
derivation = tx_cache_data.primary[pk_index - 1].derivation;
if (pk_index == 1)
{
for (size_t n = 0; n < tx_cache_data.additional.size(); ++n)
{
additional_tx_pub_keys.data.push_back(tx_cache_data.additional[n].pkey);
additional_derivations.push_back(tx_cache_data.additional[n].derivation);
}
}
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
}
if (miner_tx && m_refresh_type == RefreshNoCoinbase)
{
// assume coinbase isn't for us
}
else if (miner_tx && m_refresh_type == RefreshOptimizeCoinbase)
{
check_acc_out_precomp_once(tx.vout[0], derivation, additional_derivations, 0, is_out_data_ptr, tx_scan_info[0], output_found[0]);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(tx_scan_info[0].error, error::acc_outs_lookup_error, tx, tx_pub_key, m_account.get_keys());
// this assumes that the miner tx pays a single address
if (tx_scan_info[0].received)
{
// process the other outs from that tx
// the first one was already checked
for (size_t i = 1; i < tx.vout.size(); ++i)
{
tpool.submit(&waiter, boost::bind(&wallet2::check_acc_out_precomp_once, this, std::cref(tx.vout[i]), std::cref(derivation), std::cref(additional_derivations), i,
std::cref(is_out_data_ptr), std::ref(tx_scan_info[i]), std::ref(output_found[i])), true);
}
waiter.wait(&tpool);
// then scan all outputs from 0
hw::device &hwdev = m_account.get_device();
boost::unique_lock<hw::device> hwdev_lock (hwdev);
hwdev.set_mode(hw::device::NONE);
for (size_t i = 0; i < tx.vout.size(); ++i)
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(tx_scan_info[i].error, error::acc_outs_lookup_error, tx, tx_pub_key, m_account.get_keys());
if (tx_scan_info[i].received)
{
hwdev.conceal_derivation(tx_scan_info[i].received->derivation, tx_pub_key, additional_tx_pub_keys.data, derivation, additional_derivations);
scan_output(tx, miner_tx, tx_pub_key, i, tx_scan_info[i], num_vouts_received, tx_money_got_in_outs, outs, pool);
}
}
}
}
else if (tx.vout.size() > 1 && tools::threadpool::getInstance().get_max_concurrency() > 1 && !is_out_data_ptr)
{
for (size_t i = 0; i < tx.vout.size(); ++i)
{
tpool.submit(&waiter, boost::bind(&wallet2::check_acc_out_precomp_once, this, std::cref(tx.vout[i]), std::cref(derivation), std::cref(additional_derivations), i,
std::cref(is_out_data_ptr), std::ref(tx_scan_info[i]), std::ref(output_found[i])), true);
}
waiter.wait(&tpool);
hw::device &hwdev = m_account.get_device();
boost::unique_lock<hw::device> hwdev_lock (hwdev);
hwdev.set_mode(hw::device::NONE);
for (size_t i = 0; i < tx.vout.size(); ++i)
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(tx_scan_info[i].error, error::acc_outs_lookup_error, tx, tx_pub_key, m_account.get_keys());
2017-09-12 13:03:56 +02:00
if (tx_scan_info[i].received)
{
hwdev.conceal_derivation(tx_scan_info[i].received->derivation, tx_pub_key, additional_tx_pub_keys.data, derivation, additional_derivations);
scan_output(tx, miner_tx, tx_pub_key, i, tx_scan_info[i], num_vouts_received, tx_money_got_in_outs, outs, pool);
}
}
}
else
{
for (size_t i = 0; i < tx.vout.size(); ++i)
{
check_acc_out_precomp_once(tx.vout[i], derivation, additional_derivations, i, is_out_data_ptr, tx_scan_info[i], output_found[i]);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(tx_scan_info[i].error, error::acc_outs_lookup_error, tx, tx_pub_key, m_account.get_keys());
2017-09-12 13:03:56 +02:00
if (tx_scan_info[i].received)
{
hw::device &hwdev = m_account.get_device();
boost::unique_lock<hw::device> hwdev_lock (hwdev);
hwdev.set_mode(hw::device::NONE);
hwdev.conceal_derivation(tx_scan_info[i].received->derivation, tx_pub_key, additional_tx_pub_keys.data, derivation, additional_derivations);
scan_output(tx, miner_tx, tx_pub_key, i, tx_scan_info[i], num_vouts_received, tx_money_got_in_outs, outs, pool);
}
}
}
2014-04-02 18:00:17 +02:00
if(!outs.empty() && num_vouts_received > 0)
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
{
//good news - got money! take care about it
//usually we have only one transfer for user in transaction
if (!pool)
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(tx.vout.size() != o_indices.size(), error::wallet_internal_error,
"transactions outputs size=" + std::to_string(tx.vout.size()) +
" not match with daemon response size=" + std::to_string(o_indices.size()));
}
for(size_t o: outs)
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(tx.vout.size() <= o, error::wallet_internal_error, "wrong out in transaction: internal index=" +
std::to_string(o) + ", total_outs=" + std::to_string(tx.vout.size()));
2017-09-12 13:03:56 +02:00
auto kit = m_pub_keys.find(tx_scan_info[o].in_ephemeral.pub);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(kit != m_pub_keys.end() && kit->second >= m_transfers.size(),
error::wallet_internal_error, std::string("Unexpected transfer index from public key: ")
+ "got " + (kit == m_pub_keys.end() ? "<none>" : boost::lexical_cast<std::string>(kit->second))
+ ", m_transfers.size() is " + boost::lexical_cast<std::string>(m_transfers.size()));
if (kit == m_pub_keys.end())
{
uint64_t amount = tx.vout[o].amount ? tx.vout[o].amount : tx_scan_info[o].amount;
if (!pool)
{
m_transfers.push_back(boost::value_initialized<transfer_details>());
transfer_details& td = m_transfers.back();
td.m_block_height = height;
td.m_internal_output_index = o;
td.m_global_output_index = o_indices[o];
td.m_tx = (const cryptonote::transaction_prefix&)tx;
td.m_txid = txid;
2017-09-12 13:03:56 +02:00
td.m_key_image = tx_scan_info[o].ki;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
td.m_key_image_known = !m_watch_only && !m_multisig;
if (!td.m_key_image_known)
{
// we might have cold signed, and have a mapping to key images
std::unordered_map<crypto::public_key, crypto::key_image>::const_iterator i = m_cold_key_images.find(tx_scan_info[o].in_ephemeral.pub);
if (i != m_cold_key_images.end())
{
td.m_key_image = i->second;
td.m_key_image_known = true;
}
}
if (m_watch_only)
{
// for view wallets, that flag means "we want to request it"
td.m_key_image_request = true;
}
else
{
td.m_key_image_request = false;
}
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
td.m_key_image_partial = m_multisig;
td.m_amount = amount;
td.m_pk_index = pk_index - 1;
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
td.m_subaddr_index = tx_scan_info[o].received->index;
expand_subaddresses(tx_scan_info[o].received->index);
if (tx.vout[o].amount == 0)
{
2017-09-12 13:03:56 +02:00
td.m_mask = tx_scan_info[o].mask;
td.m_rct = true;
}
else if (miner_tx && tx.version == 2)
{
td.m_mask = rct::identity();
td.m_rct = true;
}
else
{
td.m_mask = rct::identity();
td.m_rct = false;
}
td.m_frozen = false;
set_unspent(m_transfers.size()-1);
if (td.m_key_image_known)
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
m_key_images[td.m_key_image] = m_transfers.size()-1;
2017-09-12 13:03:56 +02:00
m_pub_keys[tx_scan_info[o].in_ephemeral.pub] = m_transfers.size()-1;
if (output_tracker_cache)
(*output_tracker_cache)[std::make_pair(tx.vout[o].amount, td.m_global_output_index)] = m_transfers.size() - 1;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
if (m_multisig)
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!m_multisig_rescan_k && m_multisig_rescan_info,
error::wallet_internal_error, "NULL m_multisig_rescan_k");
if (m_multisig_rescan_info && m_multisig_rescan_info->front().size() >= m_transfers.size())
update_multisig_rescan_info(*m_multisig_rescan_k, *m_multisig_rescan_info, m_transfers.size() - 1);
}
LOG_PRINT_L0("Received money: " << print_money(td.amount()) << ", with tx: " << txid);
if (0 != m_callback)
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
m_callback->on_money_received(height, txid, tx, td.m_amount, td.m_subaddr_index);
}
total_received_1 += amount;
notify = true;
}
else if (m_transfers[kit->second].m_spent || m_transfers[kit->second].amount() >= tx_scan_info[o].amount)
{
LOG_ERROR("Public key " << epee::string_tools::pod_to_hex(kit->first)
<< " from received " << print_money(tx_scan_info[o].amount) << " output already exists with "
<< (m_transfers[kit->second].m_spent ? "spent" : "unspent") << " "
<< print_money(m_transfers[kit->second].amount()) << " in tx " << m_transfers[kit->second].m_txid << ", received output ignored");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(tx_money_got_in_outs[tx_scan_info[o].received->index] < tx_scan_info[o].amount,
error::wallet_internal_error, "Unexpected values of new and old outputs");
tx_money_got_in_outs[tx_scan_info[o].received->index] -= tx_scan_info[o].amount;
}
else
{
LOG_ERROR("Public key " << epee::string_tools::pod_to_hex(kit->first)
<< " from received " << print_money(tx_scan_info[o].amount) << " output already exists with "
<< print_money(m_transfers[kit->second].amount()) << ", replacing with new output");
// The new larger output replaced a previous smaller one
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(tx_money_got_in_outs[tx_scan_info[o].received->index] < tx_scan_info[o].amount,
error::wallet_internal_error, "Unexpected values of new and old outputs");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(m_transfers[kit->second].amount() > tx_scan_info[o].amount,
error::wallet_internal_error, "Unexpected values of new and old outputs");
tx_money_got_in_outs[tx_scan_info[o].received->index] -= m_transfers[kit->second].amount();
uint64_t amount = tx.vout[o].amount ? tx.vout[o].amount : tx_scan_info[o].amount;
uint64_t extra_amount = amount - m_transfers[kit->second].amount();
if (!pool)
{
transfer_details &td = m_transfers[kit->second];
td.m_block_height = height;
td.m_internal_output_index = o;
td.m_global_output_index = o_indices[o];
td.m_tx = (const cryptonote::transaction_prefix&)tx;
td.m_txid = txid;
td.m_amount = amount;
td.m_pk_index = pk_index - 1;
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
td.m_subaddr_index = tx_scan_info[o].received->index;
expand_subaddresses(tx_scan_info[o].received->index);
if (tx.vout[o].amount == 0)
{
2017-09-12 13:03:56 +02:00
td.m_mask = tx_scan_info[o].mask;
td.m_rct = true;
}
else if (miner_tx && tx.version == 2)
{
td.m_mask = rct::identity();
td.m_rct = true;
}
else
{
td.m_mask = rct::identity();
td.m_rct = false;
}
if (output_tracker_cache)
(*output_tracker_cache)[std::make_pair(tx.vout[o].amount, td.m_global_output_index)] = kit->second;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
if (m_multisig)
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!m_multisig_rescan_k && m_multisig_rescan_info,
error::wallet_internal_error, "NULL m_multisig_rescan_k");
if (m_multisig_rescan_info && m_multisig_rescan_info->front().size() >= m_transfers.size())
update_multisig_rescan_info(*m_multisig_rescan_k, *m_multisig_rescan_info, m_transfers.size() - 1);
}
2017-09-12 13:03:56 +02:00
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(td.get_public_key() != tx_scan_info[o].in_ephemeral.pub, error::wallet_internal_error, "Inconsistent public keys");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(td.m_spent, error::wallet_internal_error, "Inconsistent spent status");
LOG_PRINT_L0("Received money: " << print_money(td.amount()) << ", with tx: " << txid);
if (0 != m_callback)
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
m_callback->on_money_received(height, txid, tx, td.m_amount, td.m_subaddr_index);
}
total_received_1 += extra_amount;
notify = true;
}
}
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
}
}
2014-05-03 18:19:43 +02:00
uint64_t tx_money_spent_in_ins = 0;
// The line below is equivalent to "boost::optional<uint32_t> subaddr_account;", but avoids the GCC warning: *((void*)& subaddr_account +4) may be used uninitialized in this function
// It's a GCC bug with boost::optional, see https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=47679
auto subaddr_account ([]()->boost::optional<uint32_t> {return boost::none;}());
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
std::set<uint32_t> subaddr_indices;
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
// check all outputs for spending (compare key images)
for(auto& in: tx.vin)
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
{
if(in.type() != typeid(cryptonote::txin_to_key))
continue;
const cryptonote::txin_to_key &in_to_key = boost::get<cryptonote::txin_to_key>(in);
auto it = m_key_images.find(in_to_key.k_image);
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
if(it != m_key_images.end())
{
2014-04-02 18:00:17 +02:00
transfer_details& td = m_transfers[it->second];
uint64_t amount = in_to_key.amount;
if (amount > 0)
{
if(amount != td.amount())
{
MERROR("Inconsistent amount in tx input: got " << print_money(amount) <<
", expected " << print_money(td.amount()));
// this means:
// 1) the same output pub key was used as destination multiple times,
// 2) the wallet set the highest amount among them to transfer_details::m_amount, and
// 3) the wallet somehow spent that output with an amount smaller than the above amount, causing inconsistency
td.m_amount = amount;
}
}
else
{
amount = td.amount();
}
tx_money_spent_in_ins += amount;
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
if (subaddr_account && *subaddr_account != td.m_subaddr_index.major)
LOG_ERROR("spent funds are from different subaddress accounts; count of incoming/outgoing payments will be incorrect");
subaddr_account = td.m_subaddr_index.major;
subaddr_indices.insert(td.m_subaddr_index.minor);
if (!pool)
{
LOG_PRINT_L0("Spent money: " << print_money(amount) << ", with tx: " << txid);
set_spent(it->second, height);
if (0 != m_callback)
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
m_callback->on_money_spent(height, txid, tx, amount, tx, td.m_subaddr_index);
}
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
}
if (!pool && m_track_uses)
{
PERF_TIMER(track_uses);
const uint64_t amount = in_to_key.amount;
std::vector<uint64_t> offsets = cryptonote::relative_output_offsets_to_absolute(in_to_key.key_offsets);
if (output_tracker_cache)
{
for (uint64_t offset: offsets)
{
const std::map<std::pair<uint64_t, uint64_t>, size_t>::const_iterator i = output_tracker_cache->find(std::make_pair(amount, offset));
if (i != output_tracker_cache->end())
{
size_t idx = i->second;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(idx >= m_transfers.size(), error::wallet_internal_error, "Output tracker cache index out of range");
m_transfers[idx].m_uses.push_back(std::make_pair(height, txid));
}
}
}
else for (transfer_details &td: m_transfers)
{
if (amount != in_to_key.amount)
continue;
for (uint64_t offset: offsets)
if (offset == td.m_global_output_index)
td.m_uses.push_back(std::make_pair(height, txid));
}
}
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
}
2014-05-03 18:19:43 +02:00
uint64_t fee = miner_tx ? 0 : tx.version == 1 ? tx_money_spent_in_ins - get_outs_money_amount(tx) : tx.rct_signatures.txnFee;
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
if (tx_money_spent_in_ins > 0 && !pool)
2014-05-03 18:19:43 +02:00
{
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
uint64_t self_received = std::accumulate<decltype(tx_money_got_in_outs.begin()), uint64_t>(tx_money_got_in_outs.begin(), tx_money_got_in_outs.end(), 0,
[&subaddr_account] (uint64_t acc, const std::pair<cryptonote::subaddress_index, uint64_t>& p)
{
return acc + (p.first.major == *subaddr_account ? p.second : 0);
});
process_outgoing(txid, tx, height, ts, tx_money_spent_in_ins, self_received, *subaddr_account, subaddr_indices);
// if sending to yourself at the same subaddress account, set the outgoing payment amount to 0 so that it's less confusing
if (tx_money_spent_in_ins == self_received + fee)
{
auto i = m_confirmed_txs.find(txid);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(i == m_confirmed_txs.end(), error::wallet_internal_error,
"confirmed tx wasn't found: " + string_tools::pod_to_hex(txid));
i->second.m_change = self_received;
}
}
// remove change sent to the spending subaddress account from the list of received funds
uint64_t sub_change = 0;
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
for (auto i = tx_money_got_in_outs.begin(); i != tx_money_got_in_outs.end();)
{
if (subaddr_account && i->first.major == *subaddr_account)
{
sub_change += i->second;
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
i = tx_money_got_in_outs.erase(i);
}
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
else
++i;
}
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
// create payment_details for each incoming transfer to a subaddress index
if (tx_money_got_in_outs.size() > 0)
{
tx_extra_nonce extra_nonce;
crypto::hash payment_id = null_hash;
if (find_tx_extra_field_by_type(tx_extra_fields, extra_nonce))
2014-05-03 18:19:43 +02:00
{
crypto::hash8 payment_id8 = null_hash8;
if(get_encrypted_payment_id_from_tx_extra_nonce(extra_nonce.nonce, payment_id8))
{
// We got a payment ID to go with this tx
LOG_PRINT_L2("Found encrypted payment ID: " << payment_id8);
MINFO("Consider using subaddresses instead of encrypted payment IDs");
if (tx_pub_key != null_pkey)
{
if (!m_account.get_device().decrypt_payment_id(payment_id8, tx_pub_key, m_account.get_keys().m_view_secret_key))
{
LOG_PRINT_L0("Failed to decrypt payment ID: " << payment_id8);
}
else
{
LOG_PRINT_L2("Decrypted payment ID: " << payment_id8);
// put the 64 bit decrypted payment id in the first 8 bytes
memcpy(payment_id.data, payment_id8.data, 8);
// rest is already 0, but guard against code changes above
memset(payment_id.data + 8, 0, 24);
}
}
else
{
LOG_PRINT_L1("No public key found in tx, unable to decrypt payment id");
}
}
else if (get_payment_id_from_tx_extra_nonce(extra_nonce.nonce, payment_id))
{
LOG_PRINT_L2("Found unencrypted payment ID: " << payment_id);
MWARNING("Found unencrypted payment ID: these are bad for privacy, consider using subaddresses instead");
}
2014-05-03 18:19:43 +02:00
}
uint64_t total_received_2 = sub_change;
for (const auto& i : tx_money_got_in_outs)
total_received_2 += i.second;
if (total_received_1 != total_received_2)
{
const el::Level level = el::Level::Warning;
MCLOG_RED(level, "global", "**********************************************************************");
MCLOG_RED(level, "global", "Consistency failure in amounts received");
MCLOG_RED(level, "global", "Check transaction " << txid);
MCLOG_RED(level, "global", "**********************************************************************");
exit(1);
return;
}
bool all_same = true;
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
for (const auto& i : tx_money_got_in_outs)
{
payment_details payment;
payment.m_tx_hash = txid;
payment.m_fee = fee;
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
payment.m_amount = i.second;
payment.m_block_height = height;
payment.m_unlock_time = tx.unlock_time;
payment.m_timestamp = ts;
payment.m_coinbase = miner_tx;
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
payment.m_subaddr_index = i.first;
if (pool) {
if (emplace_or_replace(m_unconfirmed_payments, payment_id, pool_payment_details{payment, double_spend_seen}))
all_same = false;
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
if (0 != m_callback)
m_callback->on_unconfirmed_money_received(height, txid, tx, payment.m_amount, payment.m_subaddr_index);
}
else
m_payments.emplace(payment_id, payment);
LOG_PRINT_L2("Payment found in " << (pool ? "pool" : "block") << ": " << payment_id << " / " << payment.m_tx_hash << " / " << payment.m_amount);
}
// if it's a pool tx and we already had it, don't notify again
if (pool && all_same)
notify = false;
}
if (notify)
{
std::shared_ptr<tools::Notify> tx_notify = m_tx_notify;
if (tx_notify)
2019-01-09 15:28:42 +01:00
tx_notify->notify("%s", epee::string_tools::pod_to_hex(txid).c_str(), NULL);
}
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
void wallet2::process_unconfirmed(const crypto::hash &txid, const cryptonote::transaction& tx, uint64_t height)
2014-04-02 18:00:17 +02:00
{
if (m_unconfirmed_txs.empty())
return;
auto unconf_it = m_unconfirmed_txs.find(txid);
if(unconf_it != m_unconfirmed_txs.end()) {
if (store_tx_info()) {
try {
m_confirmed_txs.insert(std::make_pair(txid, confirmed_transfer_details(unconf_it->second, height)));
}
catch (...) {
// can fail if the tx has unexpected input types
LOG_PRINT_L0("Failed to add outgoing transaction to confirmed transaction map");
}
}
2014-04-02 18:00:17 +02:00
m_unconfirmed_txs.erase(unconf_it);
}
2014-04-02 18:00:17 +02:00
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
void wallet2::process_outgoing(const crypto::hash &txid, const cryptonote::transaction &tx, uint64_t height, uint64_t ts, uint64_t spent, uint64_t received, uint32_t subaddr_account, const std::set<uint32_t>& subaddr_indices)
{
std::pair<std::unordered_map<crypto::hash, confirmed_transfer_details>::iterator, bool> entry = m_confirmed_txs.insert(std::make_pair(txid, confirmed_transfer_details()));
// fill with the info we know, some info might already be there
if (entry.second)
{
// this case will happen if the tx is from our outputs, but was sent by another
// wallet (eg, we're a cold wallet and the hot wallet sent it). For RCT transactions,
// we only see 0 input amounts, so have to deduce amount out from other parameters.
entry.first->second.m_amount_in = spent;
if (tx.version == 1)
entry.first->second.m_amount_out = get_outs_money_amount(tx);
else
entry.first->second.m_amount_out = spent - tx.rct_signatures.txnFee;
entry.first->second.m_change = received;
std::vector<tx_extra_field> tx_extra_fields;
parse_tx_extra(tx.extra, tx_extra_fields); // ok if partially parsed
tx_extra_nonce extra_nonce;
if (find_tx_extra_field_by_type(tx_extra_fields, extra_nonce))
{
// we do not care about failure here
get_payment_id_from_tx_extra_nonce(extra_nonce.nonce, entry.first->second.m_payment_id);
}
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
entry.first->second.m_subaddr_account = subaddr_account;
entry.first->second.m_subaddr_indices = subaddr_indices;
}
entry.first->second.m_rings.clear();
for (const auto &in: tx.vin)
{
if (in.type() != typeid(cryptonote::txin_to_key))
continue;
const auto &txin = boost::get<cryptonote::txin_to_key>(in);
entry.first->second.m_rings.push_back(std::make_pair(txin.k_image, txin.key_offsets));
}
entry.first->second.m_block_height = height;
entry.first->second.m_timestamp = ts;
entry.first->second.m_unlock_time = tx.unlock_time;
add_rings(tx);
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
void wallet2::process_new_blockchain_entry(const cryptonote::block& b, const cryptonote::block_complete_entry& bche, const parsed_block &parsed_block, const crypto::hash& bl_id, uint64_t height, const std::vector<tx_cache_data> &tx_cache_data, size_t tx_cache_data_offset, std::map<std::pair<uint64_t, uint64_t>, size_t> *output_tracker_cache)
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(bche.txs.size() + 1 != parsed_block.o_indices.indices.size(), error::wallet_internal_error,
"block transactions=" + std::to_string(bche.txs.size()) +
" not match with daemon response size=" + std::to_string(parsed_block.o_indices.indices.size()));
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
//handle transactions from new block
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
//optimization: seeking only for blocks that are not older then the wallet creation time plus 1 day. 1 day is for possible user incorrect time setup
if(b.timestamp + 60*60*24 > m_account.get_createtime() && height >= m_refresh_from_block_height)
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
{
TIME_MEASURE_START(miner_tx_handle_time);
if (m_refresh_type != RefreshNoCoinbase)
process_new_transaction(get_transaction_hash(b.miner_tx), b.miner_tx, parsed_block.o_indices.indices[0].indices, height, b.timestamp, true, false, false, tx_cache_data[tx_cache_data_offset], output_tracker_cache);
++tx_cache_data_offset;
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
TIME_MEASURE_FINISH(miner_tx_handle_time);
TIME_MEASURE_START(txs_handle_time);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(bche.txs.size() != b.tx_hashes.size(), error::wallet_internal_error, "Wrong amount of transactions for block");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(bche.txs.size() != parsed_block.txes.size(), error::wallet_internal_error, "Wrong amount of transactions for block");
for (size_t idx = 0; idx < b.tx_hashes.size(); ++idx)
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
{
process_new_transaction(b.tx_hashes[idx], parsed_block.txes[idx], parsed_block.o_indices.indices[idx+1].indices, height, b.timestamp, false, false, false, tx_cache_data[tx_cache_data_offset++], output_tracker_cache);
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
}
TIME_MEASURE_FINISH(txs_handle_time);
m_last_block_reward = cryptonote::get_outs_money_amount(b.miner_tx);
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
LOG_PRINT_L2("Processed block: " << bl_id << ", height " << height << ", " << miner_tx_handle_time + txs_handle_time << "(" << miner_tx_handle_time << "/" << txs_handle_time <<")ms");
}else
{
2018-04-24 02:04:35 +02:00
if (!(height % 128))
2016-04-29 17:50:51 +02:00
LOG_PRINT_L2( "Skipped block by timestamp, height: " << height << ", block time " << b.timestamp << ", account time " << m_account.get_createtime());
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
}
m_blockchain.push_back(bl_id);
2014-04-02 18:00:17 +02:00
if (0 != m_callback)
m_callback->on_new_block(height, b);
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
void wallet2::get_short_chain_history(std::list<crypto::hash>& ids, uint64_t granularity) const
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
{
size_t i = 0;
size_t current_multiplier = 1;
size_t blockchain_size = std::max((size_t)(m_blockchain.size() / granularity * granularity), m_blockchain.offset());
size_t sz = blockchain_size - m_blockchain.offset();
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
if(!sz)
{
ids.push_back(m_blockchain.genesis());
2014-04-02 18:00:17 +02:00
return;
}
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
size_t current_back_offset = 1;
bool base_included = false;
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
while(current_back_offset < sz)
{
ids.push_back(m_blockchain[m_blockchain.offset() + sz-current_back_offset]);
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
if(sz-current_back_offset == 0)
base_included = true;
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
if(i < 10)
{
++current_back_offset;
}else
{
current_back_offset += current_multiplier *= 2;
}
++i;
}
if(!base_included)
ids.push_back(m_blockchain[m_blockchain.offset()]);
if(m_blockchain.offset())
ids.push_back(m_blockchain.genesis());
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
void wallet2::parse_block_round(const cryptonote::blobdata &blob, cryptonote::block &bl, crypto::hash &bl_id, bool &error) const
{
error = !cryptonote::parse_and_validate_block_from_blob(blob, bl);
if (!error)
bl_id = get_block_hash(bl);
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
void wallet2::pull_blocks(uint64_t start_height, uint64_t &blocks_start_height, const std::list<crypto::hash> &short_chain_history, std::vector<cryptonote::block_complete_entry> &blocks, std::vector<cryptonote::COMMAND_RPC_GET_BLOCKS_FAST::block_output_indices> &o_indices)
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
{
cryptonote::COMMAND_RPC_GET_BLOCKS_FAST::request req = AUTO_VAL_INIT(req);
cryptonote::COMMAND_RPC_GET_BLOCKS_FAST::response res = AUTO_VAL_INIT(res);
req.block_ids = short_chain_history;
req.prune = true;
2014-08-01 11:29:55 +02:00
req.start_height = start_height;
req.no_miner_tx = m_refresh_type == RefreshNoCoinbase;
m_daemon_rpc_mutex.lock();
bool r = net_utils::invoke_http_bin("/getblocks.bin", req, res, m_http_client, rpc_timeout);
m_daemon_rpc_mutex.unlock();
2014-04-07 17:02:15 +02:00
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!r, error::no_connection_to_daemon, "getblocks.bin");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(res.status == CORE_RPC_STATUS_BUSY, error::daemon_busy, "getblocks.bin");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(res.status != CORE_RPC_STATUS_OK, error::get_blocks_error, get_rpc_status(res.status));
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(res.blocks.size() != res.output_indices.size(), error::wallet_internal_error,
"mismatched blocks (" + boost::lexical_cast<std::string>(res.blocks.size()) + ") and output_indices (" +
boost::lexical_cast<std::string>(res.output_indices.size()) + ") sizes from daemon");
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
blocks_start_height = res.start_height;
blocks = std::move(res.blocks);
o_indices = std::move(res.output_indices);
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
void wallet2::pull_hashes(uint64_t start_height, uint64_t &blocks_start_height, const std::list<crypto::hash> &short_chain_history, std::vector<crypto::hash> &hashes)
{
cryptonote::COMMAND_RPC_GET_HASHES_FAST::request req = AUTO_VAL_INIT(req);
cryptonote::COMMAND_RPC_GET_HASHES_FAST::response res = AUTO_VAL_INIT(res);
req.block_ids = short_chain_history;
req.start_height = start_height;
m_daemon_rpc_mutex.lock();
bool r = net_utils::invoke_http_bin("/gethashes.bin", req, res, m_http_client, rpc_timeout);
m_daemon_rpc_mutex.unlock();
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!r, error::no_connection_to_daemon, "gethashes.bin");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(res.status == CORE_RPC_STATUS_BUSY, error::daemon_busy, "gethashes.bin");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(res.status != CORE_RPC_STATUS_OK, error::get_hashes_error, get_rpc_status(res.status));
blocks_start_height = res.start_height;
hashes = std::move(res.m_block_ids);
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
void wallet2::process_parsed_blocks(uint64_t start_height, const std::vector<cryptonote::block_complete_entry> &blocks, const std::vector<parsed_block> &parsed_blocks, uint64_t& blocks_added, std::map<std::pair<uint64_t, uint64_t>, size_t> *output_tracker_cache)
{
size_t current_index = start_height;
blocks_added = 0;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(blocks.size() != parsed_blocks.size(), error::wallet_internal_error, "size mismatch");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!m_blockchain.is_in_bounds(current_index), error::out_of_hashchain_bounds_error);
tools::threadpool& tpool = tools::threadpool::getInstance();
tools::threadpool::waiter waiter;
size_t num_txes = 0;
std::vector<tx_cache_data> tx_cache_data;
for (size_t i = 0; i < blocks.size(); ++i)
num_txes += 1 + parsed_blocks[i].txes.size();
tx_cache_data.resize(num_txes);
size_t txidx = 0;
for (size_t i = 0; i < blocks.size(); ++i)
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(parsed_blocks[i].txes.size() != parsed_blocks[i].block.tx_hashes.size(),
error::wallet_internal_error, "Mismatched parsed_blocks[i].txes.size() and parsed_blocks[i].block.tx_hashes.size()");
if (m_refresh_type != RefreshNoCoinbase)
tpool.submit(&waiter, [&, i, txidx](){ cache_tx_data(parsed_blocks[i].block.miner_tx, get_transaction_hash(parsed_blocks[i].block.miner_tx), tx_cache_data[txidx]); });
++txidx;
for (size_t idx = 0; idx < parsed_blocks[i].txes.size(); ++idx)
{
tpool.submit(&waiter, [&, i, idx, txidx](){ cache_tx_data(parsed_blocks[i].txes[idx], parsed_blocks[i].block.tx_hashes[idx], tx_cache_data[txidx]); });
++txidx;
}
}
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(txidx != num_txes, error::wallet_internal_error, "txidx does not match tx_cache_data size");
waiter.wait(&tpool);
hw::device &hwdev = m_account.get_device();
hw::reset_mode rst(hwdev);
hwdev.set_mode(hw::device::TRANSACTION_PARSE);
const cryptonote::account_keys &keys = m_account.get_keys();
auto gender = [&](wallet2::is_out_data &iod) {
if (!hwdev.generate_key_derivation(iod.pkey, keys.m_view_secret_key, iod.derivation))
{
MWARNING("Failed to generate key derivation from tx pubkey, skipping");
static_assert(sizeof(iod.derivation) == sizeof(rct::key), "Mismatched sizes of key_derivation and rct::key");
memcpy(&iod.derivation, rct::identity().bytes, sizeof(iod.derivation));
}
};
for (size_t i = 0; i < tx_cache_data.size(); ++i)
{
tpool.submit(&waiter, [&hwdev, &gender, &tx_cache_data, i]() {
auto &slot = tx_cache_data[i];
boost::unique_lock<hw::device> hwdev_lock(hwdev);
for (auto &iod: slot.primary)
gender(iod);
for (auto &iod: slot.additional)
gender(iod);
}, true);
}
waiter.wait(&tpool);
auto geniod = [&](const cryptonote::transaction &tx, size_t n_vouts, size_t txidx) {
for (size_t k = 0; k < n_vouts; ++k)
{
const auto &o = tx.vout[k];
if (o.target.type() == typeid(cryptonote::txout_to_key))
{
std::vector<crypto::key_derivation> additional_derivations;
for (const auto &iod: tx_cache_data[txidx].additional)
additional_derivations.push_back(iod.derivation);
const auto &key = boost::get<txout_to_key>(o.target).key;
for (size_t l = 0; l < tx_cache_data[txidx].primary.size(); ++l)
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(tx_cache_data[txidx].primary[l].received.size() != n_vouts,
error::wallet_internal_error, "Unexpected received array size");
tx_cache_data[txidx].primary[l].received[k] = is_out_to_acc_precomp(m_subaddresses, key, tx_cache_data[txidx].primary[l].derivation, additional_derivations, k, hwdev);
additional_derivations.clear();
}
}
}
};
txidx = 0;
for (size_t i = 0; i < blocks.size(); ++i)
{
if (m_refresh_type != RefreshType::RefreshNoCoinbase)
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(txidx >= tx_cache_data.size(), error::wallet_internal_error, "txidx out of range");
const size_t n_vouts = m_refresh_type == RefreshType::RefreshOptimizeCoinbase ? 1 : parsed_blocks[i].block.miner_tx.vout.size();
2018-11-22 02:40:13 +01:00
tpool.submit(&waiter, [&, i, n_vouts, txidx](){ geniod(parsed_blocks[i].block.miner_tx, n_vouts, txidx); }, true);
}
++txidx;
for (size_t j = 0; j < parsed_blocks[i].txes.size(); ++j)
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(txidx >= tx_cache_data.size(), error::wallet_internal_error, "txidx out of range");
tpool.submit(&waiter, [&, i, j, txidx](){ geniod(parsed_blocks[i].txes[j], parsed_blocks[i].txes[j].vout.size(), txidx); }, true);
++txidx;
}
}
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(txidx != tx_cache_data.size(), error::wallet_internal_error, "txidx did not reach expected value");
waiter.wait(&tpool);
hwdev.set_mode(hw::device::NONE);
size_t tx_cache_data_offset = 0;
for (size_t i = 0; i < blocks.size(); ++i)
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
{
const crypto::hash &bl_id = parsed_blocks[i].hash;
const cryptonote::block &bl = parsed_blocks[i].block;
2014-04-02 18:00:17 +02:00
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
if(current_index >= m_blockchain.size())
{
process_new_blockchain_entry(bl, blocks[i], parsed_blocks[i], bl_id, current_index, tx_cache_data, tx_cache_data_offset, output_tracker_cache);
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
++blocks_added;
2014-04-02 18:00:17 +02:00
}
else if(bl_id != m_blockchain[current_index])
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
{
2014-04-02 18:00:17 +02:00
//split detected here !!!
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(current_index == start_height, error::wallet_internal_error,
2014-05-03 18:19:43 +02:00
"wrong daemon response: split starts from the first block in response " + string_tools::pod_to_hex(bl_id) +
" (height " + std::to_string(start_height) + "), local block id at this height: " +
2014-04-02 18:00:17 +02:00
string_tools::pod_to_hex(m_blockchain[current_index]));
detach_blockchain(current_index, output_tracker_cache);
process_new_blockchain_entry(bl, blocks[i], parsed_blocks[i], bl_id, current_index, tx_cache_data, tx_cache_data_offset, output_tracker_cache);
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
}
2014-04-02 18:00:17 +02:00
else
{
LOG_PRINT_L2("Block is already in blockchain: " << string_tools::pod_to_hex(bl_id));
}
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
++current_index;
tx_cache_data_offset += 1 + parsed_blocks[i].txes.size();
}
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
void wallet2::refresh(bool trusted_daemon)
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
{
2015-10-30 15:35:55 +01:00
uint64_t blocks_fetched = 0;
refresh(trusted_daemon, 0, blocks_fetched);
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
void wallet2::refresh(bool trusted_daemon, uint64_t start_height, uint64_t & blocks_fetched)
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
{
bool received_money = false;
refresh(trusted_daemon, start_height, blocks_fetched, received_money);
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
void wallet2::pull_and_parse_next_blocks(uint64_t start_height, uint64_t &blocks_start_height, std::list<crypto::hash> &short_chain_history, const std::vector<cryptonote::block_complete_entry> &prev_blocks, const std::vector<parsed_block> &prev_parsed_blocks, std::vector<cryptonote::block_complete_entry> &blocks, std::vector<parsed_block> &parsed_blocks, bool &error)
{
error = false;
try
{
drop_from_short_history(short_chain_history, 3);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(prev_blocks.size() != prev_parsed_blocks.size(), error::wallet_internal_error, "size mismatch");
// prepend the last 3 blocks, should be enough to guard against a block or two's reorg
2018-12-14 15:42:11 +01:00
auto s = std::next(prev_parsed_blocks.rbegin(), std::min((size_t)3, prev_parsed_blocks.size())).base();
for (; s != prev_parsed_blocks.end(); ++s)
{
2018-12-14 15:42:11 +01:00
short_chain_history.push_front(s->hash);
}
// pull the new blocks
std::vector<cryptonote::COMMAND_RPC_GET_BLOCKS_FAST::block_output_indices> o_indices;
pull_blocks(start_height, blocks_start_height, short_chain_history, blocks, o_indices);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(blocks.size() != o_indices.size(), error::wallet_internal_error, "Mismatched sizes of blocks and o_indices");
tools::threadpool& tpool = tools::threadpool::getInstance();
tools::threadpool::waiter waiter;
parsed_blocks.resize(blocks.size());
for (size_t i = 0; i < blocks.size(); ++i)
{
tpool.submit(&waiter, boost::bind(&wallet2::parse_block_round, this, std::cref(blocks[i].block),
std::ref(parsed_blocks[i].block), std::ref(parsed_blocks[i].hash), std::ref(parsed_blocks[i].error)), true);
}
waiter.wait(&tpool);
for (size_t i = 0; i < blocks.size(); ++i)
{
if (parsed_blocks[i].error)
{
error = true;
break;
}
parsed_blocks[i].o_indices = std::move(o_indices[i]);
}
boost::mutex error_lock;
for (size_t i = 0; i < blocks.size(); ++i)
{
parsed_blocks[i].txes.resize(blocks[i].txs.size());
for (size_t j = 0; j < blocks[i].txs.size(); ++j)
{
tpool.submit(&waiter, [&, i, j](){
if (!parse_and_validate_tx_base_from_blob(blocks[i].txs[j], parsed_blocks[i].txes[j]))
{
boost::unique_lock<boost::mutex> lock(error_lock);
error = true;
}
}, true);
}
}
waiter.wait(&tpool);
}
catch(...)
{
error = true;
}
}
void wallet2::remove_obsolete_pool_txs(const std::vector<crypto::hash> &tx_hashes)
{
// remove pool txes to us that aren't in the pool anymore
std::unordered_multimap<crypto::hash, wallet2::pool_payment_details>::iterator uit = m_unconfirmed_payments.begin();
while (uit != m_unconfirmed_payments.end())
{
const crypto::hash &txid = uit->second.m_pd.m_tx_hash;
bool found = false;
for (const auto &it2: tx_hashes)
{
if (it2 == txid)
{
found = true;
break;
}
}
auto pit = uit++;
if (!found)
{
MDEBUG("Removing " << txid << " from unconfirmed payments, not found in pool");
m_unconfirmed_payments.erase(pit);
if (0 != m_callback)
m_callback->on_pool_tx_removed(txid);
}
}
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
void wallet2::update_pool_state(bool refreshed)
{
MTRACE("update_pool_state start");
auto keys_reencryptor = epee::misc_utils::create_scope_leave_handler([&, this]() {
if (m_encrypt_keys_after_refresh)
{
encrypt_keys(*m_encrypt_keys_after_refresh);
m_encrypt_keys_after_refresh = boost::none;
}
});
// get the pool state
cryptonote::COMMAND_RPC_GET_TRANSACTION_POOL_HASHES_BIN::request req;
cryptonote::COMMAND_RPC_GET_TRANSACTION_POOL_HASHES_BIN::response res;
m_daemon_rpc_mutex.lock();
bool r = epee::net_utils::invoke_http_json("/get_transaction_pool_hashes.bin", req, res, m_http_client, rpc_timeout);
m_daemon_rpc_mutex.unlock();
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!r, error::no_connection_to_daemon, "get_transaction_pool_hashes.bin");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(res.status == CORE_RPC_STATUS_BUSY, error::daemon_busy, "get_transaction_pool_hashes.bin");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(res.status != CORE_RPC_STATUS_OK, error::get_tx_pool_error);
MTRACE("update_pool_state got pool");
// remove any pending tx that's not in the pool
std::unordered_map<crypto::hash, wallet2::unconfirmed_transfer_details>::iterator it = m_unconfirmed_txs.begin();
while (it != m_unconfirmed_txs.end())
{
const crypto::hash &txid = it->first;
bool found = false;
for (const auto &it2: res.tx_hashes)
{
if (it2 == txid)
{
found = true;
break;
}
}
auto pit = it++;
if (!found)
{
// we want to avoid a false positive when we ask for the pool just after
// a tx is removed from the pool due to being found in a new block, but
// just before the block is visible by refresh. So we keep a boolean, so
// that the first time we don't see the tx, we set that boolean, and only
// delete it the second time it is checked (but only when refreshed, so
// we're sure we've seen the blockchain state first)
if (pit->second.m_state == wallet2::unconfirmed_transfer_details::pending)
{
LOG_PRINT_L1("Pending txid " << txid << " not in pool, marking as not in pool");
pit->second.m_state = wallet2::unconfirmed_transfer_details::pending_not_in_pool;
}
else if (pit->second.m_state == wallet2::unconfirmed_transfer_details::pending_not_in_pool && refreshed)
{
LOG_PRINT_L1("Pending txid " << txid << " not in pool, marking as failed");
pit->second.m_state = wallet2::unconfirmed_transfer_details::failed;
// the inputs aren't spent anymore, since the tx failed
remove_rings(pit->second.m_tx);
for (size_t vini = 0; vini < pit->second.m_tx.vin.size(); ++vini)
{
if (pit->second.m_tx.vin[vini].type() == typeid(txin_to_key))
{
txin_to_key &tx_in_to_key = boost::get<txin_to_key>(pit->second.m_tx.vin[vini]);
for (size_t i = 0; i < m_transfers.size(); ++i)
{
const transfer_details &td = m_transfers[i];
if (td.m_key_image == tx_in_to_key.k_image)
{
LOG_PRINT_L1("Resetting spent status for output " << vini << ": " << td.m_key_image);
set_unspent(i);
break;
}
}
}
}
}
}
}
MTRACE("update_pool_state done first loop");
// remove pool txes to us that aren't in the pool anymore
// but only if we just refreshed, so that the tx can go in
// the in transfers list instead (or nowhere if it just
// disappeared without being mined)
if (refreshed)
remove_obsolete_pool_txs(res.tx_hashes);
MTRACE("update_pool_state done second loop");
// gather txids of new pool txes to us
std::vector<std::pair<crypto::hash, bool>> txids;
for (const auto &txid: res.tx_hashes)
{
bool txid_found_in_up = false;
for (const auto &up: m_unconfirmed_payments)
{
if (up.second.m_pd.m_tx_hash == txid)
{
txid_found_in_up = true;
break;
}
}
if (m_scanned_pool_txs[0].find(txid) != m_scanned_pool_txs[0].end() || m_scanned_pool_txs[1].find(txid) != m_scanned_pool_txs[1].end())
{
// if it's for us, we want to keep track of whether we saw a double spend, so don't bail out
if (!txid_found_in_up)
{
LOG_PRINT_L2("Already seen " << txid << ", and not for us, skipped");
continue;
}
}
if (!txid_found_in_up)
{
LOG_PRINT_L1("Found new pool tx: " << txid);
bool found = false;
for (const auto &i: m_unconfirmed_txs)
{
if (i.first == txid)
{
found = true;
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
// if this is a payment to yourself at a different subaddress account, don't skip it
// so that you can see the incoming pool tx with 'show_transfers' on that receiving subaddress account
const unconfirmed_transfer_details& utd = i.second;
for (const auto& dst : utd.m_dests)
{
auto subaddr_index = m_subaddresses.find(dst.addr.m_spend_public_key);
if (subaddr_index != m_subaddresses.end() && subaddr_index->second.major != utd.m_subaddr_account)
{
found = false;
break;
}
}
break;
}
}
if (!found)
{
// not one of those we sent ourselves
txids.push_back({txid, false});
}
else
{
LOG_PRINT_L1("We sent that one");
}
}
else
{
LOG_PRINT_L1("Already saw that one, it's for us");
txids.push_back({txid, true});
}
}
// get those txes
if (!txids.empty())
{
cryptonote::COMMAND_RPC_GET_TRANSACTIONS::request req;
cryptonote::COMMAND_RPC_GET_TRANSACTIONS::response res;
for (const auto &p: txids)
req.txs_hashes.push_back(epee::string_tools::pod_to_hex(p.first));
MDEBUG("asking for " << txids.size() << " transactions");
req.decode_as_json = false;
req.prune = true;
m_daemon_rpc_mutex.lock();
bool r = epee::net_utils::invoke_http_json("/gettransactions", req, res, m_http_client, rpc_timeout);
m_daemon_rpc_mutex.unlock();
MDEBUG("Got " << r << " and " << res.status);
if (r && res.status == CORE_RPC_STATUS_OK)
{
if (res.txs.size() == txids.size())
{
for (const auto &tx_entry: res.txs)
{
if (tx_entry.in_pool)
{
cryptonote::transaction tx;
cryptonote::blobdata bd;
crypto::hash tx_hash;
if (get_pruned_tx(tx_entry, tx, tx_hash))
{
const std::vector<std::pair<crypto::hash, bool>>::const_iterator i = std::find_if(txids.begin(), txids.end(),
[tx_hash](const std::pair<crypto::hash, bool> &e) { return e.first == tx_hash; });
if (i != txids.end())
{
process_new_transaction(tx_hash, tx, std::vector<uint64_t>(), 0, time(NULL), false, true, tx_entry.double_spend_seen, {});
m_scanned_pool_txs[0].insert(tx_hash);
if (m_scanned_pool_txs[0].size() > 5000)
{
std::swap(m_scanned_pool_txs[0], m_scanned_pool_txs[1]);
m_scanned_pool_txs[0].clear();
}
}
else
{
MERROR("Got txid " << tx_hash << " which we did not ask for");
}
}
else
{
LOG_PRINT_L0("Failed to parse transaction from daemon");
}
}
else
{
LOG_PRINT_L1("Transaction from daemon was in pool, but is no more");
}
}
}
else
{
LOG_PRINT_L0("Expected " << txids.size() << " tx(es), got " << res.txs.size());
}
}
else
{
LOG_PRINT_L0("Error calling gettransactions daemon RPC: r " << r << ", status " << get_rpc_status(res.status));
}
}
MTRACE("update_pool_state end");
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
void wallet2::fast_refresh(uint64_t stop_height, uint64_t &blocks_start_height, std::list<crypto::hash> &short_chain_history, bool force)
{
std::vector<crypto::hash> hashes;
2016-04-29 07:21:08 +02:00
const uint64_t checkpoint_height = m_checkpoints.get_max_height();
if ((stop_height > checkpoint_height && m_blockchain.size()-1 < checkpoint_height) && !force)
{
// we will drop all these, so don't bother getting them
uint64_t missing_blocks = m_checkpoints.get_max_height() - m_blockchain.size();
while (missing_blocks-- > 0)
m_blockchain.push_back(crypto::null_hash); // maybe a bit suboptimal, but deque won't do huge reallocs like vector
m_blockchain.push_back(m_checkpoints.get_points().at(checkpoint_height));
m_blockchain.trim(checkpoint_height);
short_chain_history.clear();
get_short_chain_history(short_chain_history);
}
size_t current_index = m_blockchain.size();
2016-04-29 07:21:08 +02:00
while(m_run.load(std::memory_order_relaxed) && current_index < stop_height)
{
pull_hashes(0, blocks_start_height, short_chain_history, hashes);
if (hashes.size() <= 3)
return;
if (blocks_start_height < m_blockchain.offset())
{
MERROR("Blocks start before blockchain offset: " << blocks_start_height << " " << m_blockchain.offset());
return;
}
if (hashes.size() + current_index < stop_height) {
drop_from_short_history(short_chain_history, 3);
std::vector<crypto::hash>::iterator right = hashes.end();
// prepend 3 more
for (int i = 0; i<3; i++) {
right--;
short_chain_history.push_front(*right);
}
}
current_index = blocks_start_height;
for(auto& bl_id: hashes)
{
if(current_index >= m_blockchain.size())
{
2018-04-24 02:04:35 +02:00
if (!(current_index % 1024))
2016-04-29 17:50:51 +02:00
LOG_PRINT_L2( "Skipped block by height: " << current_index);
m_blockchain.push_back(bl_id);
if (0 != m_callback)
{ // FIXME: this isn't right, but simplewallet just logs that we got a block.
cryptonote::block dummy;
m_callback->on_new_block(current_index, dummy);
}
}
else if(bl_id != m_blockchain[current_index])
{
//split detected here !!!
return;
}
++current_index;
if (current_index >= stop_height)
return;
}
}
}
2016-12-12 00:42:46 +01:00
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
bool wallet2::add_address_book_row(const cryptonote::account_public_address &address, const crypto::hash &payment_id, const std::string &description, bool is_subaddress)
2016-12-12 00:42:46 +01:00
{
wallet2::address_book_row a;
a.m_address = address;
a.m_payment_id = payment_id;
a.m_description = description;
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
a.m_is_subaddress = is_subaddress;
2016-12-12 00:42:46 +01:00
auto old_size = m_address_book.size();
2016-12-12 21:39:29 +01:00
m_address_book.push_back(a);
if(m_address_book.size() == old_size+1)
return true;
return false;
2016-12-12 00:42:46 +01:00
}
bool wallet2::delete_address_book_row(std::size_t row_id) {
2016-12-12 21:39:29 +01:00
if(m_address_book.size() <= row_id)
return false;
m_address_book.erase(m_address_book.begin()+row_id);
return true;
2016-12-12 00:42:46 +01:00
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
std::shared_ptr<std::map<std::pair<uint64_t, uint64_t>, size_t>> wallet2::create_output_tracker_cache() const
{
std::shared_ptr<std::map<std::pair<uint64_t, uint64_t>, size_t>> cache{new std::map<std::pair<uint64_t, uint64_t>, size_t>()};
for (size_t i = 0; i < m_transfers.size(); ++i)
{
const transfer_details &td = m_transfers[i];
(*cache)[std::make_pair(td.is_rct() ? 0 : td.amount(), td.m_global_output_index)] = i;
}
return cache;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
void wallet2::refresh(bool trusted_daemon, uint64_t start_height, uint64_t & blocks_fetched, bool& received_money, bool check_pool)
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
{
2017-08-04 22:58:23 +02:00
if(m_light_wallet) {
// MyMonero get_address_info needs to be called occasionally to trigger wallet sync.
// This call is not really needed for other purposes and can be removed if mymonero changes their backend.
tools::COMMAND_RPC_GET_ADDRESS_INFO::response res;
2017-08-04 22:58:23 +02:00
// Get basic info
if(light_wallet_get_address_info(res)) {
// Last stored block height
uint64_t prev_height = m_light_wallet_blockchain_height;
// Update lw heights
m_light_wallet_scanned_block_height = res.scanned_block_height;
m_light_wallet_blockchain_height = res.blockchain_height;
// If new height - call new_block callback
if(m_light_wallet_blockchain_height != prev_height)
{
MDEBUG("new block since last time!");
m_callback->on_lw_new_block(m_light_wallet_blockchain_height - 1);
2017-08-04 22:58:23 +02:00
}
m_light_wallet_connected = true;
MDEBUG("lw scanned block height: " << m_light_wallet_scanned_block_height);
MDEBUG("lw blockchain height: " << m_light_wallet_blockchain_height);
MDEBUG(m_light_wallet_blockchain_height-m_light_wallet_scanned_block_height << " blocks behind");
// TODO: add wallet created block info
light_wallet_get_address_txs();
} else
m_light_wallet_connected = false;
// Lighwallet refresh done
return;
}
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
received_money = false;
blocks_fetched = 0;
uint64_t added_blocks = 0;
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
size_t try_count = 0;
crypto::hash last_tx_hash_id = m_transfers.size() ? m_transfers.back().m_txid : null_hash;
std::list<crypto::hash> short_chain_history;
tools::threadpool& tpool = tools::threadpool::getInstance();
tools::threadpool::waiter waiter;
uint64_t blocks_start_height;
std::vector<cryptonote::block_complete_entry> blocks;
std::vector<parsed_block> parsed_blocks;
bool refreshed = false;
std::shared_ptr<std::map<std::pair<uint64_t, uint64_t>, size_t>> output_tracker_cache;
hw::device &hwdev = m_account.get_device();
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
// pull the first set of blocks
get_short_chain_history(short_chain_history, (m_first_refresh_done || trusted_daemon) ? 1 : FIRST_REFRESH_GRANULARITY);
2016-04-29 07:21:08 +02:00
m_run.store(true, std::memory_order_relaxed);
if (start_height > m_blockchain.size() || m_refresh_from_block_height > m_blockchain.size()) {
if (!start_height)
start_height = m_refresh_from_block_height;
// we can shortcut by only pulling hashes up to the start_height
fast_refresh(start_height, blocks_start_height, short_chain_history);
// regenerate the history now that we've got a full set of hashes
short_chain_history.clear();
get_short_chain_history(short_chain_history, (m_first_refresh_done || trusted_daemon) ? 1 : FIRST_REFRESH_GRANULARITY);
start_height = 0;
// and then fall through to regular refresh processing
}
2016-12-27 19:12:18 +01:00
// If stop() is called during fast refresh we don't need to continue
if(!m_run.load(std::memory_order_relaxed))
return;
// always reset start_height to 0 to force short_chain_ history to be used on
// subsequent pulls in this refresh.
start_height = 0;
auto keys_reencryptor = epee::misc_utils::create_scope_leave_handler([&, this]() {
if (m_encrypt_keys_after_refresh)
{
encrypt_keys(*m_encrypt_keys_after_refresh);
m_encrypt_keys_after_refresh = boost::none;
}
});
bool first = true;
while(m_run.load(std::memory_order_relaxed))
{
uint64_t next_blocks_start_height;
std::vector<cryptonote::block_complete_entry> next_blocks;
std::vector<parsed_block> next_parsed_blocks;
bool error;
try
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
{
// pull the next set of blocks while we're processing the current one
error = false;
next_blocks.clear();
next_parsed_blocks.clear();
added_blocks = 0;
if (!first && blocks.empty())
{
refreshed = false;
break;
}
tpool.submit(&waiter, [&]{pull_and_parse_next_blocks(start_height, next_blocks_start_height, short_chain_history, blocks, parsed_blocks, next_blocks, next_parsed_blocks, error);});
if (!first)
{
try
{
process_parsed_blocks(blocks_start_height, blocks, parsed_blocks, added_blocks, output_tracker_cache.get());
}
catch (const tools::error::out_of_hashchain_bounds_error&)
{
MINFO("Daemon claims next refresh block is out of hash chain bounds, resetting hash chain");
uint64_t stop_height = m_blockchain.offset();
std::vector<crypto::hash> tip(m_blockchain.size() - m_blockchain.offset());
for (size_t i = m_blockchain.offset(); i < m_blockchain.size(); ++i)
tip[i - m_blockchain.offset()] = m_blockchain[i];
cryptonote::block b;
generate_genesis(b);
m_blockchain.clear();
m_blockchain.push_back(get_block_hash(b));
short_chain_history.clear();
get_short_chain_history(short_chain_history);
fast_refresh(stop_height, blocks_start_height, short_chain_history, true);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF((m_blockchain.size() == stop_height || (m_blockchain.size() == 1 && stop_height == 0) ? false : true), error::wallet_internal_error, "Unexpected hashchain size");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(m_blockchain.offset() != 0, error::wallet_internal_error, "Unexpected hashchain offset");
for (const auto &h: tip)
m_blockchain.push_back(h);
short_chain_history.clear();
get_short_chain_history(short_chain_history);
start_height = stop_height;
throw std::runtime_error(""); // loop again
}
catch (const std::exception &e)
{
MERROR("Error parsing blocks: " << e.what());
error = true;
}
blocks_fetched += added_blocks;
}
waiter.wait(&tpool);
if(!first && blocks_start_height == next_blocks_start_height)
{
m_node_rpc_proxy.set_height(m_blockchain.size());
refreshed = true;
break;
}
first = false;
// handle error from async fetching thread
if (error)
{
throw std::runtime_error("proxy exception in refresh thread");
2014-04-02 18:00:17 +02:00
}
// if we've got at least 10 blocks to refresh, assume we're starting
// a long refresh, and setup a tracking output cache if we need to
if (m_track_uses && (!output_tracker_cache || output_tracker_cache->empty()) && next_blocks.size() >= 10)
output_tracker_cache = create_output_tracker_cache();
// switch to the new blocks from the daemon
blocks_start_height = next_blocks_start_height;
blocks = std::move(next_blocks);
parsed_blocks = std::move(next_parsed_blocks);
}
catch (const tools::error::password_needed&)
{
blocks_fetched += added_blocks;
waiter.wait(&tpool);
throw;
}
catch (const std::exception&)
{
blocks_fetched += added_blocks;
waiter.wait(&tpool);
if(try_count < 3)
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
{
LOG_PRINT_L1("Another try pull_blocks (try_count=" << try_count << ")...");
first = true;
start_height = 0;
blocks.clear();
parsed_blocks.clear();
short_chain_history.clear();
get_short_chain_history(short_chain_history, 1);
++try_count;
}
else
{
LOG_ERROR("pull_blocks failed, try_count=" << try_count);
throw;
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
}
}
}
if(last_tx_hash_id != (m_transfers.size() ? m_transfers.back().m_txid : null_hash))
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
received_money = true;
try
{
2016-12-27 19:12:18 +01:00
// If stop() is called we don't need to check pending transactions
if (check_pool && m_run.load(std::memory_order_relaxed))
update_pool_state(refreshed);
}
catch (...)
{
LOG_PRINT_L1("Failed to check pending transactions");
}
hwdev.computing_key_images(false);
m_first_refresh_done = true;
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
LOG_PRINT_L1("Refresh done, blocks received: " << blocks_fetched << ", balance (all accounts): " << print_money(balance_all()) << ", unlocked: " << print_money(unlocked_balance_all()));
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
bool wallet2::refresh(bool trusted_daemon, uint64_t & blocks_fetched, bool& received_money, bool& ok)
2014-04-02 18:00:17 +02:00
{
try
{
refresh(trusted_daemon, 0, blocks_fetched, received_money);
2014-04-02 18:00:17 +02:00
ok = true;
}
catch (...)
{
ok = false;
}
return ok;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
bool wallet2::get_rct_distribution(uint64_t &start_height, std::vector<uint64_t> &distribution)
{
uint32_t rpc_version;
boost::optional<std::string> result = m_node_rpc_proxy.get_rpc_version(rpc_version);
// no error
if (!!result)
{
// empty string -> not connection
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(result->empty(), tools::error::no_connection_to_daemon, "getversion");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(*result == CORE_RPC_STATUS_BUSY, tools::error::daemon_busy, "getversion");
if (*result != CORE_RPC_STATUS_OK)
{
MDEBUG("Cannot determine daemon RPC version, not requesting rct distribution");
return false;
}
}
else
{
if (rpc_version >= MAKE_CORE_RPC_VERSION(1, 19))
{
MDEBUG("Daemon is recent enough, requesting rct distribution");
}
else
{
MDEBUG("Daemon is too old, not requesting rct distribution");
return false;
}
}
cryptonote::COMMAND_RPC_GET_OUTPUT_DISTRIBUTION::request req = AUTO_VAL_INIT(req);
cryptonote::COMMAND_RPC_GET_OUTPUT_DISTRIBUTION::response res = AUTO_VAL_INIT(res);
req.amounts.push_back(0);
req.from_height = 0;
req.cumulative = false;
req.binary = true;
req.compress = true;
m_daemon_rpc_mutex.lock();
bool r = net_utils::invoke_http_bin("/get_output_distribution.bin", req, res, m_http_client, rpc_timeout);
m_daemon_rpc_mutex.unlock();
if (!r)
{
MWARNING("Failed to request output distribution: no connection to daemon");
return false;
}
if (res.status == CORE_RPC_STATUS_BUSY)
{
MWARNING("Failed to request output distribution: daemon is busy");
return false;
}
if (res.status != CORE_RPC_STATUS_OK)
{
MWARNING("Failed to request output distribution: " << res.status);
return false;
}
if (res.distributions.size() != 1)
{
MWARNING("Failed to request output distribution: not the expected single result");
return false;
}
if (res.distributions[0].amount != 0)
{
MWARNING("Failed to request output distribution: results are not for amount 0");
return false;
}
for (size_t i = 1; i < res.distributions[0].data.distribution.size(); ++i)
res.distributions[0].data.distribution[i] += res.distributions[0].data.distribution[i-1];
start_height = res.distributions[0].data.start_height;
distribution = std::move(res.distributions[0].data.distribution);
return true;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
void wallet2::detach_blockchain(uint64_t height, std::map<std::pair<uint64_t, uint64_t>, size_t> *output_tracker_cache)
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
{
LOG_PRINT_L0("Detaching blockchain on height " << height);
// size 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
// block 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
// C
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(height < m_blockchain.offset() && m_blockchain.size() > m_blockchain.offset(),
error::wallet_internal_error, "Daemon claims reorg below last checkpoint");
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
size_t transfers_detached = 0;
for (size_t i = 0; i < m_transfers.size(); ++i)
{
wallet2::transfer_details &td = m_transfers[i];
if (td.m_spent && td.m_spent_height >= height)
{
LOG_PRINT_L1("Resetting spent/frozen status for output " << i << ": " << td.m_key_image);
set_unspent(i);
thaw(i);
}
}
for (transfer_details &td: m_transfers)
{
while (!td.m_uses.empty() && td.m_uses.back().first >= height)
td.m_uses.pop_back();
}
if (output_tracker_cache)
output_tracker_cache->clear();
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
auto it = std::find_if(m_transfers.begin(), m_transfers.end(), [&](const transfer_details& td){return td.m_block_height >= height;});
size_t i_start = it - m_transfers.begin();
for(size_t i = i_start; i!= m_transfers.size();i++)
{
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
if (!m_transfers[i].m_key_image_known || m_transfers[i].m_key_image_partial)
continue;
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
auto it_ki = m_key_images.find(m_transfers[i].m_key_image);
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(it_ki == m_key_images.end(), error::wallet_internal_error, "key image not found: index " + std::to_string(i) + ", ki " + epee::string_tools::pod_to_hex(m_transfers[i].m_key_image) + ", " + std::to_string(m_key_images.size()) + " key images known");
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
m_key_images.erase(it_ki);
}
for(size_t i = i_start; i!= m_transfers.size();i++)
{
auto it_pk = m_pub_keys.find(m_transfers[i].get_public_key());
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(it_pk == m_pub_keys.end(), error::wallet_internal_error, "public key not found");
m_pub_keys.erase(it_pk);
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
}
m_transfers.erase(it, m_transfers.end());
size_t blocks_detached = m_blockchain.size() - height;
m_blockchain.crop(height);
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
2014-05-03 18:19:43 +02:00
for (auto it = m_payments.begin(); it != m_payments.end(); )
{
if(height <= it->second.m_block_height)
it = m_payments.erase(it);
else
++it;
}
for (auto it = m_confirmed_txs.begin(); it != m_confirmed_txs.end(); )
{
if(height <= it->second.m_block_height)
it = m_confirmed_txs.erase(it);
else
++it;
}
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
LOG_PRINT_L0("Detached blockchain on height " << height << ", transfers detached " << transfers_detached << ", blocks detached " << blocks_detached);
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
bool wallet2::deinit()
{
m_is_initialized=false;
unlock_keys_file();
2018-08-23 23:50:53 +02:00
m_account.deinit();
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
return true;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
bool wallet2::clear()
{
m_blockchain.clear();
m_transfers.clear();
m_key_images.clear();
m_pub_keys.clear();
m_unconfirmed_txs.clear();
m_payments.clear();
m_tx_keys.clear();
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
m_additional_tx_keys.clear();
m_confirmed_txs.clear();
m_unconfirmed_payments.clear();
m_scanned_pool_txs[0].clear();
m_scanned_pool_txs[1].clear();
m_address_book.clear();
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
m_subaddresses.clear();
m_subaddress_labels.clear();
m_multisig_rounds_passed = 0;
m_device_last_key_image_sync = 0;
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
return true;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
void wallet2::clear_soft(bool keep_key_images)
{
m_blockchain.clear();
m_transfers.clear();
if (!keep_key_images)
m_key_images.clear();
m_pub_keys.clear();
m_unconfirmed_txs.clear();
m_payments.clear();
m_confirmed_txs.clear();
m_unconfirmed_payments.clear();
m_scanned_pool_txs[0].clear();
m_scanned_pool_txs[1].clear();
cryptonote::block b;
generate_genesis(b);
m_blockchain.push_back(get_block_hash(b));
m_last_block_reward = cryptonote::get_outs_money_amount(b.miner_tx);
}
2014-10-18 19:41:05 +02:00
/*!
2014-10-18 21:38:21 +02:00
* \brief Stores wallet information to wallet file.
* \param keys_file_name Name of wallet file
* \param password Password of wallet file
* \param watch_only true to save only view key, false to save both spend and view keys
2014-10-18 21:38:21 +02:00
* \return Whether it was successful.
2014-10-18 19:41:05 +02:00
*/
bool wallet2::store_keys(const std::string& keys_file_name, const epee::wipeable_string& password, bool watch_only)
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
{
std::string account_data;
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
std::string multisig_signers;
std::string multisig_derivations;
cryptonote::account_base account = m_account;
crypto::chacha_key key;
crypto::generate_chacha_key(password.data(), password.size(), key, m_kdf_rounds);
if (m_ask_password == AskPasswordToDecrypt && !m_unattended && !m_watch_only)
{
account.encrypt_viewkey(key);
account.decrypt_keys(key);
}
if (watch_only)
account.forget_spend_key();
account.encrypt_keys(key);
bool r = epee::serialization::store_t_to_binary(account, account_data);
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(r, false, "failed to serialize wallet keys");
wallet2::keys_file_data keys_file_data = boost::value_initialized<wallet2::keys_file_data>();
// Create a JSON object with "key_data" and "seed_language" as keys.
rapidjson::Document json;
json.SetObject();
rapidjson::Value value(rapidjson::kStringType);
value.SetString(account_data.c_str(), account_data.length());
json.AddMember("key_data", value, json.GetAllocator());
if (!seed_language.empty())
{
value.SetString(seed_language.c_str(), seed_language.length());
json.AddMember("seed_language", value, json.GetAllocator());
}
rapidjson::Value value2(rapidjson::kNumberType);
2018-08-16 10:31:48 +02:00
value2.SetInt(m_key_device_type);
json.AddMember("key_on_device", value2, json.GetAllocator());
value2.SetInt(watch_only ? 1 :0); // WTF ? JSON has different true and false types, and not boolean ??
json.AddMember("watch_only", value2, json.GetAllocator());
value2.SetInt(m_multisig ? 1 :0);
json.AddMember("multisig", value2, json.GetAllocator());
value2.SetUint(m_multisig_threshold);
json.AddMember("multisig_threshold", value2, json.GetAllocator());
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
if (m_multisig)
{
bool r = ::serialization::dump_binary(m_multisig_signers, multisig_signers);
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(r, false, "failed to serialize wallet multisig signers");
value.SetString(multisig_signers.c_str(), multisig_signers.length());
json.AddMember("multisig_signers", value, json.GetAllocator());
r = ::serialization::dump_binary(m_multisig_derivations, multisig_derivations);
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(r, false, "failed to serialize wallet multisig derivations");
value.SetString(multisig_derivations.c_str(), multisig_derivations.length());
json.AddMember("multisig_derivations", value, json.GetAllocator());
value2.SetUint(m_multisig_rounds_passed);
json.AddMember("multisig_rounds_passed", value2, json.GetAllocator());
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
}
value2.SetInt(m_always_confirm_transfers ? 1 :0);
json.AddMember("always_confirm_transfers", value2, json.GetAllocator());
value2.SetInt(m_print_ring_members ? 1 :0);
json.AddMember("print_ring_members", value2, json.GetAllocator());
value2.SetInt(m_store_tx_info ? 1 :0);
json.AddMember("store_tx_info", value2, json.GetAllocator());
value2.SetUint(m_default_mixin);
json.AddMember("default_mixin", value2, json.GetAllocator());
value2.SetUint(m_default_priority);
json.AddMember("default_priority", value2, json.GetAllocator());
value2.SetInt(m_auto_refresh ? 1 :0);
json.AddMember("auto_refresh", value2, json.GetAllocator());
value2.SetInt(m_refresh_type);
json.AddMember("refresh_type", value2, json.GetAllocator());
value2.SetUint64(m_refresh_from_block_height);
json.AddMember("refresh_height", value2, json.GetAllocator());
value2.SetInt(m_confirm_missing_payment_id ? 1 :0);
json.AddMember("confirm_missing_payment_id", value2, json.GetAllocator());
value2.SetInt(m_confirm_non_default_ring_size ? 1 :0);
json.AddMember("confirm_non_default_ring_size", value2, json.GetAllocator());
value2.SetInt(m_ask_password);
json.AddMember("ask_password", value2, json.GetAllocator());
value2.SetUint(m_min_output_count);
json.AddMember("min_output_count", value2, json.GetAllocator());
value2.SetUint64(m_min_output_value);
json.AddMember("min_output_value", value2, json.GetAllocator());
value2.SetInt(cryptonote::get_default_decimal_point());
json.AddMember("default_decimal_point", value2, json.GetAllocator());
value2.SetInt(m_merge_destinations ? 1 :0);
json.AddMember("merge_destinations", value2, json.GetAllocator());
value2.SetInt(m_confirm_backlog ? 1 :0);
json.AddMember("confirm_backlog", value2, json.GetAllocator());
value2.SetUint(m_confirm_backlog_threshold);
json.AddMember("confirm_backlog_threshold", value2, json.GetAllocator());
value2.SetInt(m_confirm_export_overwrite ? 1 :0);
json.AddMember("confirm_export_overwrite", value2, json.GetAllocator());
value2.SetInt(m_auto_low_priority ? 1 : 0);
json.AddMember("auto_low_priority", value2, json.GetAllocator());
2018-02-16 12:04:04 +01:00
value2.SetUint(m_nettype);
json.AddMember("nettype", value2, json.GetAllocator());
value2.SetInt(m_segregate_pre_fork_outputs ? 1 : 0);
json.AddMember("segregate_pre_fork_outputs", value2, json.GetAllocator());
value2.SetInt(m_key_reuse_mitigation2 ? 1 : 0);
json.AddMember("key_reuse_mitigation2", value2, json.GetAllocator());
value2.SetUint(m_segregation_height);
json.AddMember("segregation_height", value2, json.GetAllocator());
2018-06-28 04:31:50 +02:00
value2.SetInt(m_ignore_fractional_outputs ? 1 : 0);
json.AddMember("ignore_fractional_outputs", value2, json.GetAllocator());
value2.SetInt(m_track_uses ? 1 : 0);
json.AddMember("track_uses", value2, json.GetAllocator());
value2.SetUint(m_subaddress_lookahead_major);
json.AddMember("subaddress_lookahead_major", value2, json.GetAllocator());
value2.SetUint(m_subaddress_lookahead_minor);
json.AddMember("subaddress_lookahead_minor", value2, json.GetAllocator());
value2.SetInt(m_original_keys_available ? 1 : 0);
json.AddMember("original_keys_available", value2, json.GetAllocator());
value2.SetUint(1);
json.AddMember("encrypted_secret_keys", value2, json.GetAllocator());
value.SetString(m_device_name.c_str(), m_device_name.size());
json.AddMember("device_name", value, json.GetAllocator());
value.SetString(m_device_derivation_path.c_str(), m_device_derivation_path.size());
json.AddMember("device_derivation_path", value, json.GetAllocator());
std::string original_address;
std::string original_view_secret_key;
if (m_original_keys_available)
{
original_address = get_account_address_as_str(m_nettype, false, m_original_address);
value.SetString(original_address.c_str(), original_address.length());
json.AddMember("original_address", value, json.GetAllocator());
original_view_secret_key = epee::string_tools::pod_to_hex(m_original_view_secret_key);
value.SetString(original_view_secret_key.c_str(), original_view_secret_key.length());
json.AddMember("original_view_secret_key", value, json.GetAllocator());
}
// Serialize the JSON object
rapidjson::StringBuffer buffer;
rapidjson::Writer<rapidjson::StringBuffer> writer(buffer);
json.Accept(writer);
account_data = buffer.GetString();
// Encrypt the entire JSON object.
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
std::string cipher;
cipher.resize(account_data.size());
keys_file_data.iv = crypto::rand<crypto::chacha_iv>();
crypto::chacha20(account_data.data(), account_data.size(), key, keys_file_data.iv, &cipher[0]);
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
keys_file_data.account_data = cipher;
std::string tmp_file_name = keys_file_name + ".new";
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
std::string buf;
r = ::serialization::dump_binary(keys_file_data, buf);
r = r && epee::file_io_utils::save_string_to_file(tmp_file_name, buf);
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(r, false, "failed to generate wallet keys file " << tmp_file_name);
unlock_keys_file();
std::error_code e = tools::replace_file(tmp_file_name, keys_file_name);
lock_keys_file();
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
if (e) {
boost::filesystem::remove(tmp_file_name);
LOG_ERROR("failed to update wallet keys file " << keys_file_name);
return false;
}
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
return true;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
void wallet2::setup_keys(const epee::wipeable_string &password)
{
crypto::chacha_key key;
crypto::generate_chacha_key(password.data(), password.size(), key, m_kdf_rounds);
// re-encrypt, but keep viewkey unencrypted
if (m_ask_password == AskPasswordToDecrypt && !m_unattended && !m_watch_only)
{
m_account.encrypt_keys(key);
m_account.decrypt_viewkey(key);
}
static_assert(HASH_SIZE == sizeof(crypto::chacha_key), "Mismatched sizes of hash and chacha key");
epee::mlocked<tools::scrubbed_arr<char, HASH_SIZE+1>> cache_key_data;
memcpy(cache_key_data.data(), &key, HASH_SIZE);
cache_key_data[HASH_SIZE] = CACHE_KEY_TAIL;
cn_fast_hash(cache_key_data.data(), HASH_SIZE+1, (crypto::hash&)m_cache_key);
get_ringdb_key();
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
void wallet2::change_password(const std::string &filename, const epee::wipeable_string &original_password, const epee::wipeable_string &new_password)
{
if (m_ask_password == AskPasswordToDecrypt && !m_unattended && !m_watch_only)
decrypt_keys(original_password);
setup_keys(new_password);
rewrite(filename, new_password);
if (!filename.empty())
store();
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2014-10-18 19:41:05 +02:00
/*!
2014-10-18 21:38:21 +02:00
* \brief Load wallet information from wallet file.
* \param keys_file_name Name of wallet file
* \param password Password of wallet file
2014-10-18 19:41:05 +02:00
*/
bool wallet2::load_keys(const std::string& keys_file_name, const epee::wipeable_string& password)
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
{
rapidjson::Document json;
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
wallet2::keys_file_data keys_file_data;
std::string buf;
bool encrypted_secret_keys = false;
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
bool r = epee::file_io_utils::load_file_to_string(keys_file_name, buf);
2014-04-07 17:02:15 +02:00
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!r, error::file_read_error, keys_file_name);
// Decrypt the contents
2014-04-02 18:00:17 +02:00
r = ::serialization::parse_binary(buf, keys_file_data);
2014-04-07 17:02:15 +02:00
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!r, error::wallet_internal_error, "internal error: failed to deserialize \"" + keys_file_name + '\"');
crypto::chacha_key key;
crypto::generate_chacha_key(password.data(), password.size(), key, m_kdf_rounds);
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
std::string account_data;
account_data.resize(keys_file_data.account_data.size());
crypto::chacha20(keys_file_data.account_data.data(), keys_file_data.account_data.size(), key, keys_file_data.iv, &account_data[0]);
if (json.Parse(account_data.c_str()).HasParseError() || !json.IsObject())
crypto::chacha8(keys_file_data.account_data.data(), keys_file_data.account_data.size(), key, keys_file_data.iv, &account_data[0]);
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
// The contents should be JSON if the wallet follows the new format.
if (json.Parse(account_data.c_str()).HasParseError())
{
is_old_file_format = true;
m_watch_only = false;
m_multisig = false;
m_multisig_threshold = 0;
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
m_multisig_signers.clear();
m_multisig_rounds_passed = 0;
m_multisig_derivations.clear();
m_always_confirm_transfers = false;
m_print_ring_members = false;
m_store_tx_info = true;
m_default_mixin = 0;
m_default_priority = 0;
m_auto_refresh = true;
m_refresh_type = RefreshType::RefreshDefault;
m_refresh_from_block_height = 0;
m_confirm_missing_payment_id = true;
m_confirm_non_default_ring_size = true;
m_ask_password = AskPasswordToDecrypt;
cryptonote::set_default_decimal_point(CRYPTONOTE_DISPLAY_DECIMAL_POINT);
m_min_output_count = 0;
m_min_output_value = 0;
m_merge_destinations = false;
m_confirm_backlog = true;
m_confirm_backlog_threshold = 0;
m_confirm_export_overwrite = true;
m_auto_low_priority = true;
m_segregate_pre_fork_outputs = true;
m_key_reuse_mitigation2 = true;
m_segregation_height = 0;
2018-06-28 04:31:50 +02:00
m_ignore_fractional_outputs = true;
m_track_uses = false;
m_subaddress_lookahead_major = SUBADDRESS_LOOKAHEAD_MAJOR;
m_subaddress_lookahead_minor = SUBADDRESS_LOOKAHEAD_MINOR;
m_original_keys_available = false;
m_device_name = "";
m_device_derivation_path = "";
2018-08-16 10:31:48 +02:00
m_key_device_type = hw::device::device_type::SOFTWARE;
encrypted_secret_keys = false;
}
2017-12-04 10:07:32 +01:00
else if(json.IsObject())
{
if (!json.HasMember("key_data"))
{
LOG_ERROR("Field key_data not found in JSON");
return false;
}
if (!json["key_data"].IsString())
{
LOG_ERROR("Field key_data found in JSON, but not String");
return false;
}
const char *field_key_data = json["key_data"].GetString();
account_data = std::string(field_key_data, field_key_data + json["key_data"].GetStringLength());
if (json.HasMember("key_on_device"))
{
2018-08-16 10:31:48 +02:00
GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR(json, key_on_device, int, Int, false, hw::device::device_type::SOFTWARE);
m_key_device_type = static_cast<hw::device::device_type>(field_key_on_device);
}
GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR(json, seed_language, std::string, String, false, std::string());
if (field_seed_language_found)
{
set_seed_language(field_seed_language);
}
GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR(json, watch_only, int, Int, false, false);
m_watch_only = field_watch_only;
GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR(json, multisig, int, Int, false, false);
m_multisig = field_multisig;
GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR(json, multisig_threshold, unsigned int, Uint, m_multisig, 0);
m_multisig_threshold = field_multisig_threshold;
GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR(json, multisig_rounds_passed, unsigned int, Uint, false, 0);
m_multisig_rounds_passed = field_multisig_rounds_passed;
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
if (m_multisig)
{
if (!json.HasMember("multisig_signers"))
{
LOG_ERROR("Field multisig_signers not found in JSON");
return false;
}
if (!json["multisig_signers"].IsString())
{
LOG_ERROR("Field multisig_signers found in JSON, but not String");
return false;
}
const char *field_multisig_signers = json["multisig_signers"].GetString();
std::string multisig_signers = std::string(field_multisig_signers, field_multisig_signers + json["multisig_signers"].GetStringLength());
r = ::serialization::parse_binary(multisig_signers, m_multisig_signers);
if (!r)
{
LOG_ERROR("Field multisig_signers found in JSON, but failed to parse");
return false;
}
//previous version of multisig does not have this field
if (json.HasMember("multisig_derivations"))
{
if (!json["multisig_derivations"].IsString())
{
LOG_ERROR("Field multisig_derivations found in JSON, but not String");
return false;
}
const char *field_multisig_derivations = json["multisig_derivations"].GetString();
std::string multisig_derivations = std::string(field_multisig_derivations, field_multisig_derivations + json["multisig_derivations"].GetStringLength());
r = ::serialization::parse_binary(multisig_derivations, m_multisig_derivations);
if (!r)
{
LOG_ERROR("Field multisig_derivations found in JSON, but failed to parse");
return false;
}
}
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
}
GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR(json, always_confirm_transfers, int, Int, false, true);
m_always_confirm_transfers = field_always_confirm_transfers;
GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR(json, print_ring_members, int, Int, false, true);
m_print_ring_members = field_print_ring_members;
GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR(json, store_tx_keys, int, Int, false, true);
GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR(json, store_tx_info, int, Int, false, true);
m_store_tx_info = ((field_store_tx_keys != 0) || (field_store_tx_info != 0));
GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR(json, default_mixin, unsigned int, Uint, false, 0);
m_default_mixin = field_default_mixin;
GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR(json, default_priority, unsigned int, Uint, false, 0);
if (field_default_priority_found)
{
m_default_priority = field_default_priority;
}
else
{
GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR(json, default_fee_multiplier, unsigned int, Uint, false, 0);
if (field_default_fee_multiplier_found)
m_default_priority = field_default_fee_multiplier;
else
m_default_priority = 0;
}
GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR(json, auto_refresh, int, Int, false, true);
m_auto_refresh = field_auto_refresh;
GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR(json, refresh_type, int, Int, false, RefreshType::RefreshDefault);
m_refresh_type = RefreshType::RefreshDefault;
if (field_refresh_type_found)
{
if (field_refresh_type == RefreshFull || field_refresh_type == RefreshOptimizeCoinbase || field_refresh_type == RefreshNoCoinbase)
m_refresh_type = (RefreshType)field_refresh_type;
else
LOG_PRINT_L0("Unknown refresh-type value (" << field_refresh_type << "), using default");
}
GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR(json, refresh_height, uint64_t, Uint64, false, 0);
m_refresh_from_block_height = field_refresh_height;
GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR(json, confirm_missing_payment_id, int, Int, false, true);
m_confirm_missing_payment_id = field_confirm_missing_payment_id;
GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR(json, confirm_non_default_ring_size, int, Int, false, true);
m_confirm_non_default_ring_size = field_confirm_non_default_ring_size;
GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR(json, ask_password, AskPasswordType, Int, false, AskPasswordToDecrypt);
m_ask_password = field_ask_password;
GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR(json, default_decimal_point, int, Int, false, CRYPTONOTE_DISPLAY_DECIMAL_POINT);
cryptonote::set_default_decimal_point(field_default_decimal_point);
GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR(json, min_output_count, uint32_t, Uint, false, 0);
m_min_output_count = field_min_output_count;
GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR(json, min_output_value, uint64_t, Uint64, false, 0);
m_min_output_value = field_min_output_value;
GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR(json, merge_destinations, int, Int, false, false);
m_merge_destinations = field_merge_destinations;
GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR(json, confirm_backlog, int, Int, false, true);
m_confirm_backlog = field_confirm_backlog;
GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR(json, confirm_backlog_threshold, uint32_t, Uint, false, 0);
m_confirm_backlog_threshold = field_confirm_backlog_threshold;
GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR(json, confirm_export_overwrite, int, Int, false, true);
m_confirm_export_overwrite = field_confirm_export_overwrite;
GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR(json, auto_low_priority, int, Int, false, true);
m_auto_low_priority = field_auto_low_priority;
2018-02-16 12:04:04 +01:00
GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR(json, nettype, uint8_t, Uint, false, static_cast<uint8_t>(m_nettype));
// The network type given in the program argument is inconsistent with the network type saved in the wallet
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(static_cast<uint8_t>(m_nettype) != field_nettype, error::wallet_internal_error,
2018-03-01 12:36:19 +01:00
(boost::format("%s wallet cannot be opened as %s wallet")
% (field_nettype == 0 ? "Mainnet" : field_nettype == 1 ? "Testnet" : "Stagenet")
% (m_nettype == MAINNET ? "mainnet" : m_nettype == TESTNET ? "testnet" : "stagenet")).str());
GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR(json, segregate_pre_fork_outputs, int, Int, false, true);
m_segregate_pre_fork_outputs = field_segregate_pre_fork_outputs;
GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR(json, key_reuse_mitigation2, int, Int, false, true);
m_key_reuse_mitigation2 = field_key_reuse_mitigation2;
GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR(json, segregation_height, int, Uint, false, 0);
m_segregation_height = field_segregation_height;
2018-06-28 04:31:50 +02:00
GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR(json, ignore_fractional_outputs, int, Int, false, true);
m_ignore_fractional_outputs = field_ignore_fractional_outputs;
GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR(json, track_uses, int, Int, false, false);
m_track_uses = field_track_uses;
GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR(json, subaddress_lookahead_major, uint32_t, Uint, false, SUBADDRESS_LOOKAHEAD_MAJOR);
m_subaddress_lookahead_major = field_subaddress_lookahead_major;
GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR(json, subaddress_lookahead_minor, uint32_t, Uint, false, SUBADDRESS_LOOKAHEAD_MINOR);
m_subaddress_lookahead_minor = field_subaddress_lookahead_minor;
GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR(json, encrypted_secret_keys, uint32_t, Uint, false, false);
encrypted_secret_keys = field_encrypted_secret_keys;
GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR(json, device_name, std::string, String, false, std::string());
if (m_device_name.empty())
{
if (field_device_name_found)
{
m_device_name = field_device_name;
}
else
{
m_device_name = m_key_device_type == hw::device::device_type::LEDGER ? "Ledger" : "default";
}
}
GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR(json, device_derivation_path, std::string, String, false, std::string());
m_device_derivation_path = field_device_derivation_path;
if (json.HasMember("original_keys_available"))
{
GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR(json, original_keys_available, int, Int, false, false);
m_original_keys_available = field_original_keys_available;
if (m_original_keys_available)
{
GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR(json, original_address, std::string, String, true, std::string());
address_parse_info info;
bool ok = get_account_address_from_str(info, m_nettype, field_original_address);
if (!ok)
{
LOG_ERROR("Failed to parse original_address from JSON");
return false;
}
m_original_address = info.address;
GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR(json, original_view_secret_key, std::string, String, true, std::string());
ok = epee::string_tools::hex_to_pod(field_original_view_secret_key, m_original_view_secret_key);
if (!ok)
{
LOG_ERROR("Failed to parse original_view_secret_key from JSON");
return false;
}
}
}
else
{
m_original_keys_available = false;
}
}
2017-12-04 10:07:32 +01:00
else
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION(error::wallet_internal_error, "invalid password");
return false;
}
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
r = epee::serialization::load_t_from_binary(m_account, account_data);
2018-08-16 10:31:48 +02:00
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!r, error::invalid_password);
2018-08-23 23:50:53 +02:00
if (m_key_device_type == hw::device::device_type::LEDGER || m_key_device_type == hw::device::device_type::TREZOR) {
LOG_PRINT_L0("Account on device. Initing device...");
2018-08-23 23:50:53 +02:00
hw::device &hwdev = lookup_device(m_device_name);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!hwdev.set_name(m_device_name), error::wallet_internal_error, "Could not set device name " + m_device_name);
hwdev.set_network_type(m_nettype);
hwdev.set_derivation_path(m_device_derivation_path);
hwdev.set_callback(get_device_callback());
2018-08-23 23:50:53 +02:00
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!hwdev.init(), error::wallet_internal_error, "Could not initialize the device " + m_device_name);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!hwdev.connect(), error::wallet_internal_error, "Could not connect to the device " + m_device_name);
m_account.set_device(hwdev);
2018-08-23 23:50:53 +02:00
account_public_address device_account_public_address;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!hwdev.get_public_address(device_account_public_address), error::wallet_internal_error, "Cannot get a device address");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(device_account_public_address != m_account.get_keys().m_account_address, error::wallet_internal_error, "Device wallet does not match wallet address. "
"Device address: " + cryptonote::get_account_address_as_str(m_nettype, false, device_account_public_address) +
", wallet address: " + m_account.get_public_address_str(m_nettype));
LOG_PRINT_L0("Device inited...");
2018-08-16 10:31:48 +02:00
} else if (key_on_device()) {
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION(error::wallet_internal_error, "hardware device not supported");
}
if (r)
{
if (encrypted_secret_keys)
{
m_account.decrypt_keys(key);
}
else
{
// rewrite with encrypted keys, ignore errors
if (m_ask_password == AskPasswordToDecrypt && !m_unattended && !m_watch_only)
encrypt_keys(key);
bool saved_ret = store_keys(keys_file_name, password, m_watch_only);
if (!saved_ret)
{
// just moan a bit, but not fatal
MERROR("Error saving keys file with encrypted keys, not fatal");
}
if (m_ask_password == AskPasswordToDecrypt && !m_unattended && !m_watch_only)
decrypt_keys(key);
m_keys_file_locker.reset();
}
}
const cryptonote::account_keys& keys = m_account.get_keys();
hw::device &hwdev = m_account.get_device();
r = r && hwdev.verify_keys(keys.m_view_secret_key, keys.m_account_address.m_view_public_key);
2018-08-23 23:50:53 +02:00
if(!m_watch_only && !m_multisig && hwdev.device_protocol() != hw::device::PROTOCOL_COLD)
r = r && hwdev.verify_keys(keys.m_spend_secret_key, keys.m_account_address.m_spend_public_key);
2014-04-07 17:02:15 +02:00
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!r, error::invalid_password);
if (r)
setup_keys(password);
return true;
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
}
2014-10-18 19:41:05 +02:00
/*!
* \brief verify password for default wallet keys file.
* \param password Password to verify
* \return true if password is correct
*
* for verification only
* should not mutate state, unlike load_keys()
* can be used prior to rewriting wallet keys file, to ensure user has entered the correct password
*
*/
bool wallet2::verify_password(const epee::wipeable_string& password)
{
// this temporary unlocking is necessary for Windows (otherwise the file couldn't be loaded).
unlock_keys_file();
2018-08-23 23:50:53 +02:00
bool r = verify_password(m_keys_file, password, m_account.get_device().device_protocol() == hw::device::PROTOCOL_COLD || m_watch_only || m_multisig, m_account.get_device(), m_kdf_rounds);
lock_keys_file();
return r;
}
/*!
* \brief verify password for specified wallet keys file.
* \param keys_file_name Keys file to verify password for
* \param password Password to verify
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
* \param no_spend_key If set = only verify view keys, otherwise also spend keys
* \param hwdev The hardware device to use
* \return true if password is correct
*
* for verification only
* should not mutate state, unlike load_keys()
* can be used prior to rewriting wallet keys file, to ensure user has entered the correct password
*
*/
bool wallet2::verify_password(const std::string& keys_file_name, const epee::wipeable_string& password, bool no_spend_key, hw::device &hwdev, uint64_t kdf_rounds)
{
rapidjson::Document json;
wallet2::keys_file_data keys_file_data;
std::string buf;
bool encrypted_secret_keys = false;
bool r = epee::file_io_utils::load_file_to_string(keys_file_name, buf);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!r, error::file_read_error, keys_file_name);
// Decrypt the contents
r = ::serialization::parse_binary(buf, keys_file_data);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!r, error::wallet_internal_error, "internal error: failed to deserialize \"" + keys_file_name + '\"');
crypto::chacha_key key;
crypto::generate_chacha_key(password.data(), password.size(), key, kdf_rounds);
std::string account_data;
account_data.resize(keys_file_data.account_data.size());
crypto::chacha20(keys_file_data.account_data.data(), keys_file_data.account_data.size(), key, keys_file_data.iv, &account_data[0]);
if (json.Parse(account_data.c_str()).HasParseError() || !json.IsObject())
crypto::chacha8(keys_file_data.account_data.data(), keys_file_data.account_data.size(), key, keys_file_data.iv, &account_data[0]);
// The contents should be JSON if the wallet follows the new format.
if (json.Parse(account_data.c_str()).HasParseError())
{
// old format before JSON wallet key file format
}
else
{
account_data = std::string(json["key_data"].GetString(), json["key_data"].GetString() +
json["key_data"].GetStringLength());
GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR(json, encrypted_secret_keys, uint32_t, Uint, false, false);
encrypted_secret_keys = field_encrypted_secret_keys;
}
cryptonote::account_base account_data_check;
r = epee::serialization::load_t_from_binary(account_data_check, account_data);
if (encrypted_secret_keys)
account_data_check.decrypt_keys(key);
const cryptonote::account_keys& keys = account_data_check.get_keys();
r = r && hwdev.verify_keys(keys.m_view_secret_key, keys.m_account_address.m_view_public_key);
if(!no_spend_key)
r = r && hwdev.verify_keys(keys.m_spend_secret_key, keys.m_account_address.m_spend_public_key);
return r;
}
void wallet2::encrypt_keys(const crypto::chacha_key &key)
{
m_account.encrypt_keys(key);
m_account.decrypt_viewkey(key);
}
void wallet2::decrypt_keys(const crypto::chacha_key &key)
{
m_account.encrypt_viewkey(key);
m_account.decrypt_keys(key);
}
void wallet2::encrypt_keys(const epee::wipeable_string &password)
{
crypto::chacha_key key;
crypto::generate_chacha_key(password.data(), password.size(), key, m_kdf_rounds);
encrypt_keys(key);
}
void wallet2::decrypt_keys(const epee::wipeable_string &password)
{
crypto::chacha_key key;
crypto::generate_chacha_key(password.data(), password.size(), key, m_kdf_rounds);
decrypt_keys(key);
}
2018-09-03 12:48:28 +02:00
void wallet2::setup_new_blockchain()
{
cryptonote::block b;
generate_genesis(b);
m_blockchain.push_back(get_block_hash(b));
m_last_block_reward = cryptonote::get_outs_money_amount(b.miner_tx);
add_subaddress_account(tr("Primary account"));
}
void wallet2::create_keys_file(const std::string &wallet_, bool watch_only, const epee::wipeable_string &password, bool create_address_file)
{
if (!wallet_.empty())
{
bool r = store_keys(m_keys_file, password, watch_only);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!r, error::file_save_error, m_keys_file);
if (create_address_file)
{
r = file_io_utils::save_string_to_file(m_wallet_file + ".address.txt", m_account.get_public_address_str(m_nettype));
if(!r) MERROR("String with address text not saved");
}
}
}
2018-08-16 10:31:48 +02:00
/*!
* \brief determine the key storage for the specified wallet file
* \param device_type (OUT) wallet backend as enumerated in hw::device::device_type
* \param keys_file_name Keys file to verify password for
* \param password Password to verify
* \return true if password correct, else false
*
* for verification only - determines key storage hardware
*
*/
bool wallet2::query_device(hw::device::device_type& device_type, const std::string& keys_file_name, const epee::wipeable_string& password, uint64_t kdf_rounds)
{
rapidjson::Document json;
wallet2::keys_file_data keys_file_data;
std::string buf;
bool r = epee::file_io_utils::load_file_to_string(keys_file_name, buf);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!r, error::file_read_error, keys_file_name);
// Decrypt the contents
r = ::serialization::parse_binary(buf, keys_file_data);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!r, error::wallet_internal_error, "internal error: failed to deserialize \"" + keys_file_name + '\"');
crypto::chacha_key key;
crypto::generate_chacha_key(password.data(), password.size(), key, kdf_rounds);
std::string account_data;
account_data.resize(keys_file_data.account_data.size());
crypto::chacha20(keys_file_data.account_data.data(), keys_file_data.account_data.size(), key, keys_file_data.iv, &account_data[0]);
if (json.Parse(account_data.c_str()).HasParseError() || !json.IsObject())
crypto::chacha8(keys_file_data.account_data.data(), keys_file_data.account_data.size(), key, keys_file_data.iv, &account_data[0]);
2018-10-12 20:58:27 +02:00
device_type = hw::device::device_type::SOFTWARE;
2018-08-16 10:31:48 +02:00
// The contents should be JSON if the wallet follows the new format.
if (json.Parse(account_data.c_str()).HasParseError())
{
// old format before JSON wallet key file format
}
else
{
account_data = std::string(json["key_data"].GetString(), json["key_data"].GetString() +
json["key_data"].GetStringLength());
if (json.HasMember("key_on_device"))
{
GET_FIELD_FROM_JSON_RETURN_ON_ERROR(json, key_on_device, int, Int, false, hw::device::device_type::SOFTWARE);
device_type = static_cast<hw::device::device_type>(field_key_on_device);
}
}
cryptonote::account_base account_data_check;
r = epee::serialization::load_t_from_binary(account_data_check, account_data);
if (!r) return false;
return true;
}
/*!
* \brief Generates a wallet or restores one.
* \param wallet_ Name of wallet file
* \param password Password of wallet file
* \param multisig_data The multisig restore info and keys
* \param create_address_file Whether to create an address file
*/
void wallet2::generate(const std::string& wallet_, const epee::wipeable_string& password,
const epee::wipeable_string& multisig_data, bool create_address_file)
{
clear();
prepare_file_names(wallet_);
if (!wallet_.empty())
{
boost::system::error_code ignored_ec;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(boost::filesystem::exists(m_wallet_file, ignored_ec), error::file_exists, m_wallet_file);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(boost::filesystem::exists(m_keys_file, ignored_ec), error::file_exists, m_keys_file);
}
m_account.generate(rct::rct2sk(rct::zero()), true, false);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(multisig_data.size() < 32, error::invalid_multisig_seed);
size_t offset = 0;
uint32_t threshold = *(uint32_t*)(multisig_data.data() + offset);
offset += sizeof(uint32_t);
uint32_t total = *(uint32_t*)(multisig_data.data() + offset);
offset += sizeof(uint32_t);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(threshold < 2, error::invalid_multisig_seed);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(total != threshold && total != threshold + 1, error::invalid_multisig_seed);
const size_t n_multisig_keys = total == threshold ? 1 : threshold;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(multisig_data.size() != 8 + 32 * (4 + n_multisig_keys + total), error::invalid_multisig_seed);
std::vector<crypto::secret_key> multisig_keys;
std::vector<crypto::public_key> multisig_signers;
crypto::secret_key spend_secret_key = *(crypto::secret_key*)(multisig_data.data() + offset);
offset += sizeof(crypto::secret_key);
crypto::public_key spend_public_key = *(crypto::public_key*)(multisig_data.data() + offset);
offset += sizeof(crypto::public_key);
crypto::secret_key view_secret_key = *(crypto::secret_key*)(multisig_data.data() + offset);
offset += sizeof(crypto::secret_key);
crypto::public_key view_public_key = *(crypto::public_key*)(multisig_data.data() + offset);
offset += sizeof(crypto::public_key);
for (size_t n = 0; n < n_multisig_keys; ++n)
{
multisig_keys.push_back(*(crypto::secret_key*)(multisig_data.data() + offset));
offset += sizeof(crypto::secret_key);
}
for (size_t n = 0; n < total; ++n)
{
multisig_signers.push_back(*(crypto::public_key*)(multisig_data.data() + offset));
offset += sizeof(crypto::public_key);
}
crypto::public_key calculated_view_public_key;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!crypto::secret_key_to_public_key(view_secret_key, calculated_view_public_key), error::invalid_multisig_seed);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(view_public_key != calculated_view_public_key, error::invalid_multisig_seed);
crypto::public_key local_signer;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!crypto::secret_key_to_public_key(spend_secret_key, local_signer), error::invalid_multisig_seed);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(std::find(multisig_signers.begin(), multisig_signers.end(), local_signer) == multisig_signers.end(), error::invalid_multisig_seed);
rct::key skey = rct::zero();
for (const auto &msk: multisig_keys)
sc_add(skey.bytes, skey.bytes, rct::sk2rct(msk).bytes);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!(rct::rct2sk(skey) == spend_secret_key), error::invalid_multisig_seed);
memwipe(&skey, sizeof(rct::key));
m_account.make_multisig(view_secret_key, spend_secret_key, spend_public_key, multisig_keys);
m_account.finalize_multisig(spend_public_key);
m_account_public_address = m_account.get_keys().m_account_address;
m_watch_only = false;
m_multisig = true;
m_multisig_threshold = threshold;
m_multisig_signers = multisig_signers;
2018-08-16 10:31:48 +02:00
m_key_device_type = hw::device::device_type::SOFTWARE;
setup_keys(password);
// Not possible to restore a multisig wallet that is able to activate the MMS
// (because the original keys are not (yet) part of the restore info)
m_original_keys_available = false;
create_keys_file(wallet_, false, password, m_nettype != MAINNET || create_address_file);
2018-09-03 12:48:28 +02:00
setup_new_blockchain();
if (!wallet_.empty())
store();
}
2014-10-18 19:41:05 +02:00
/*!
2014-10-18 21:38:21 +02:00
* \brief Generates a wallet or restores one.
* \param wallet_ Name of wallet file
* \param password Password of wallet file
* \param recovery_param If it is a restore, the recovery key
* \param recover Whether it is a restore
* \param two_random Whether it is a non-deterministic wallet
* \param create_address_file Whether to create an address file
* \return The secret key of the generated wallet
2014-10-18 19:41:05 +02:00
*/
crypto::secret_key wallet2::generate(const std::string& wallet_, const epee::wipeable_string& password,
const crypto::secret_key& recovery_param, bool recover, bool two_random, bool create_address_file)
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
{
clear();
prepare_file_names(wallet_);
2014-04-02 18:00:17 +02:00
if (!wallet_.empty())
{
boost::system::error_code ignored_ec;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(boost::filesystem::exists(m_wallet_file, ignored_ec), error::file_exists, m_wallet_file);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(boost::filesystem::exists(m_keys_file, ignored_ec), error::file_exists, m_keys_file);
}
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
crypto::secret_key retval = m_account.generate(recovery_param, recover, two_random);
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
m_account_public_address = m_account.get_keys().m_account_address;
m_watch_only = false;
m_multisig = false;
m_multisig_threshold = 0;
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
m_multisig_signers.clear();
m_original_keys_available = false;
2018-08-16 10:31:48 +02:00
m_key_device_type = hw::device::device_type::SOFTWARE;
setup_keys(password);
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
// calculate a starting refresh height
if(m_refresh_from_block_height == 0 && !recover){
m_refresh_from_block_height = estimate_blockchain_height();
}
create_keys_file(wallet_, false, password, m_nettype != MAINNET || create_address_file);
2014-04-02 18:00:17 +02:00
2018-09-03 12:48:28 +02:00
setup_new_blockchain();
if (!wallet_.empty())
store();
return retval;
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
}
2014-10-18 21:30:18 +02:00
uint64_t wallet2::estimate_blockchain_height()
{
// -1 month for fluctuations in block time and machine date/time setup.
// avg seconds per block
const int seconds_per_block = DIFFICULTY_TARGET_V2;
// ~num blocks per month
const uint64_t blocks_per_month = 60*60*24*30/seconds_per_block;
// try asking the daemon first
std::string err;
uint64_t height = 0;
// we get the max of approximated height and local height.
// approximated height is the least of daemon target height
// (the max of what the other daemons are claiming is their
// height) and the theoretical height based on the local
// clock. This will be wrong only if both the local clock
// is bad *and* a peer daemon claims a highest height than
// the real chain.
// local height is the height the local daemon is currently
// synced to, it will be lower than the real chain height if
// the daemon is currently syncing.
// If we use the approximate height we subtract one month as
// a safety margin.
height = get_approximate_blockchain_height();
uint64_t target_height = get_daemon_blockchain_target_height(err);
if (err.empty()) {
if (target_height < height)
height = target_height;
} else {
// if we couldn't talk to the daemon, check safety margin.
if (height > blocks_per_month)
height -= blocks_per_month;
else
height = 0;
}
uint64_t local_height = get_daemon_blockchain_height(err);
if (err.empty() && local_height > height)
height = local_height;
return height;
}
/*!
* \brief Creates a watch only wallet from a public address and a view secret key.
* \param wallet_ Name of wallet file
* \param password Password of wallet file
* \param account_public_address The account's public address
* \param viewkey view secret key
* \param create_address_file Whether to create an address file
*/
void wallet2::generate(const std::string& wallet_, const epee::wipeable_string& password,
const cryptonote::account_public_address &account_public_address,
const crypto::secret_key& viewkey, bool create_address_file)
{
clear();
prepare_file_names(wallet_);
if (!wallet_.empty())
{
boost::system::error_code ignored_ec;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(boost::filesystem::exists(m_wallet_file, ignored_ec), error::file_exists, m_wallet_file);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(boost::filesystem::exists(m_keys_file, ignored_ec), error::file_exists, m_keys_file);
}
m_account.create_from_viewkey(account_public_address, viewkey);
m_account_public_address = account_public_address;
m_watch_only = true;
m_multisig = false;
m_multisig_threshold = 0;
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
m_multisig_signers.clear();
m_original_keys_available = false;
2018-08-16 10:31:48 +02:00
m_key_device_type = hw::device::device_type::SOFTWARE;
setup_keys(password);
create_keys_file(wallet_, true, password, m_nettype != MAINNET || create_address_file);
2018-09-03 12:48:28 +02:00
setup_new_blockchain();
if (!wallet_.empty())
store();
}
/*!
* \brief Creates a wallet from a public address and a spend/view secret key pair.
* \param wallet_ Name of wallet file
* \param password Password of wallet file
* \param account_public_address The account's public address
* \param spendkey spend secret key
* \param viewkey view secret key
* \param create_address_file Whether to create an address file
*/
void wallet2::generate(const std::string& wallet_, const epee::wipeable_string& password,
const cryptonote::account_public_address &account_public_address,
const crypto::secret_key& spendkey, const crypto::secret_key& viewkey, bool create_address_file)
{
clear();
prepare_file_names(wallet_);
if (!wallet_.empty())
{
boost::system::error_code ignored_ec;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(boost::filesystem::exists(m_wallet_file, ignored_ec), error::file_exists, m_wallet_file);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(boost::filesystem::exists(m_keys_file, ignored_ec), error::file_exists, m_keys_file);
}
m_account.create_from_keys(account_public_address, spendkey, viewkey);
m_account_public_address = account_public_address;
m_watch_only = false;
m_multisig = false;
m_multisig_threshold = 0;
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
m_multisig_signers.clear();
m_original_keys_available = false;
2018-08-16 10:31:48 +02:00
m_key_device_type = hw::device::device_type::SOFTWARE;
setup_keys(password);
create_keys_file(wallet_, false, password, create_address_file);
2018-09-03 12:48:28 +02:00
setup_new_blockchain();
if (!wallet_.empty())
store();
}
/*!
* \brief Creates a wallet from a device
* \param wallet_ Name of wallet file
* \param password Password of wallet file
* \param device_name device string address
*/
void wallet2::restore(const std::string& wallet_, const epee::wipeable_string& password, const std::string &device_name, bool create_address_file)
{
clear();
prepare_file_names(wallet_);
boost::system::error_code ignored_ec;
if (!wallet_.empty()) {
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(boost::filesystem::exists(m_wallet_file, ignored_ec), error::file_exists, m_wallet_file);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(boost::filesystem::exists(m_keys_file, ignored_ec), error::file_exists, m_keys_file);
}
2018-08-23 23:50:53 +02:00
auto &hwdev = lookup_device(device_name);
hwdev.set_name(device_name);
2018-08-23 23:50:53 +02:00
hwdev.set_network_type(m_nettype);
hwdev.set_derivation_path(m_device_derivation_path);
hwdev.set_callback(get_device_callback());
m_account.create_from_device(hwdev);
2018-08-16 10:31:48 +02:00
m_key_device_type = m_account.get_device().get_type();
m_account_public_address = m_account.get_keys().m_account_address;
m_watch_only = false;
m_multisig = false;
m_multisig_threshold = 0;
m_multisig_signers.clear();
m_original_keys_available = false;
setup_keys(password);
m_device_name = device_name;
create_keys_file(wallet_, false, password, m_nettype != MAINNET || create_address_file);
if (m_subaddress_lookahead_major == SUBADDRESS_LOOKAHEAD_MAJOR && m_subaddress_lookahead_minor == SUBADDRESS_LOOKAHEAD_MINOR)
{
// the default lookahead setting (50:200) is clearly too much for hardware wallet
m_subaddress_lookahead_major = 5;
m_subaddress_lookahead_minor = 20;
}
2018-09-03 12:48:28 +02:00
setup_new_blockchain();
if (!wallet_.empty()) {
store();
}
}
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
std::string wallet2::make_multisig(const epee::wipeable_string &password,
const std::vector<crypto::secret_key> &view_keys,
const std::vector<crypto::public_key> &spend_keys,
uint32_t threshold)
{
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(!view_keys.empty(), "empty view keys");
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(view_keys.size() == spend_keys.size(), "Mismatched view/spend key sizes");
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(threshold > 1 && threshold <= spend_keys.size() + 1, "Invalid threshold");
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
std::string extra_multisig_info;
std::vector<crypto::secret_key> multisig_keys;
rct::key spend_pkey = rct::identity();
rct::key spend_skey;
std::vector<crypto::public_key> multisig_signers;
// decrypt keys
epee::misc_utils::auto_scope_leave_caller keys_reencryptor;
if (m_ask_password == AskPasswordToDecrypt && !m_unattended && !m_watch_only)
{
crypto::chacha_key chacha_key;
crypto::generate_chacha_key(password.data(), password.size(), chacha_key, m_kdf_rounds);
m_account.encrypt_viewkey(chacha_key);
m_account.decrypt_keys(chacha_key);
keys_reencryptor = epee::misc_utils::create_scope_leave_handler([&, this, chacha_key]() { m_account.encrypt_keys(chacha_key); m_account.decrypt_viewkey(chacha_key); });
}
// In common multisig scheme there are 4 types of key exchange rounds:
// 1. First round is exchange of view secret keys and public spend keys.
// 2. Middle round is exchange of derivations: Ki = b * Mj, where b - spend secret key,
// M - public multisig key (in first round it equals to public spend key), K - new public multisig key.
// 3. Secret spend establishment round sets your secret multisig keys as follows: kl = H(Ml), where M - is *your* public multisig key,
// k - secret multisig key used to sign transactions. k and M are sets of keys, of course.
// And secret spend key as the sum of all participant's secret multisig keys
// 4. Last round establishes multisig wallet's public spend key. Participants exchange their public multisig keys
// and calculate common spend public key as sum of all unique participants' public multisig keys.
// Note that N/N scheme has only first round. N-1/N has 2 rounds: first and last. Common M/N has all 4 rounds.
// IMPORTANT: wallet's public spend key is not equal to secret_spend_key * G!
// Wallet's public spend key is the sum of unique public multisig keys of all participants.
// secret_spend_key * G = public signer key
if (threshold == spend_keys.size() + 1)
{
// In N / N case we only need to do one round and calculate secret multisig keys and new secret spend key
MINFO("Creating spend key...");
// Calculates all multisig keys and spend key
cryptonote::generate_multisig_N_N(get_account().get_keys(), spend_keys, multisig_keys, spend_skey, spend_pkey);
// Our signer key is b * G, where b is secret spend key.
multisig_signers = spend_keys;
multisig_signers.push_back(get_multisig_signer_public_key(get_account().get_keys().m_spend_secret_key));
}
else
{
// We just got public spend keys of all participants and deriving multisig keys (set of Mi = b * Bi).
// note that derivations are public keys as DH exchange suppose it to be
auto derivations = cryptonote::generate_multisig_derivations(get_account().get_keys(), spend_keys);
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
spend_pkey = rct::identity();
multisig_signers = std::vector<crypto::public_key>(spend_keys.size() + 1, crypto::null_pkey);
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
if (threshold == spend_keys.size())
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
{
// N - 1 / N case
// We need an extra step, so we package all the composite public keys
// we know about, and make a signed string out of them
MINFO("Creating spend key...");
// Calculating set of our secret multisig keys as follows: mi = H(Mi),
// where mi - secret multisig key, Mi - others' participants public multisig key
multisig_keys = cryptonote::calculate_multisig_keys(derivations);
// calculating current participant's spend secret key as sum of all secret multisig keys for current participant.
// IMPORTANT: participant's secret spend key is not an entire wallet's secret spend!
// Entire wallet's secret spend is sum of all unique secret multisig keys
// among all of participants and is not held by anyone!
spend_skey = rct::sk2rct(cryptonote::calculate_multisig_signer_key(multisig_keys));
// Preparing data for the last round to calculate common public spend key. The data contains public multisig keys.
extra_multisig_info = pack_multisignature_keys(MULTISIG_EXTRA_INFO_MAGIC, secret_keys_to_public_keys(multisig_keys), rct::rct2sk(spend_skey));
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
}
else
{
// M / N case
MINFO("Preparing keys for next exchange round...");
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
// Preparing data for middle round - packing new public multisig keys to exchage with others.
extra_multisig_info = pack_multisignature_keys(MULTISIG_EXTRA_INFO_MAGIC, derivations, m_account.get_keys().m_spend_secret_key);
spend_skey = rct::sk2rct(m_account.get_keys().m_spend_secret_key);
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
// Need to store middle keys to be able to proceed in case of wallet shutdown.
m_multisig_derivations = derivations;
}
}
if (!m_original_keys_available)
{
// Save the original i.e. non-multisig keys so the MMS can continue to use them to encrypt and decrypt messages
// (making a wallet multisig overwrites those keys, see account_base::make_multisig)
m_original_address = m_account.get_keys().m_account_address;
m_original_view_secret_key = m_account.get_keys().m_view_secret_key;
m_original_keys_available = true;
}
clear();
MINFO("Creating view key...");
crypto::secret_key view_skey = cryptonote::generate_multisig_view_secret_key(get_account().get_keys().m_view_secret_key, view_keys);
MINFO("Creating multisig address...");
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(m_account.make_multisig(view_skey, rct::rct2sk(spend_skey), rct::rct2pk(spend_pkey), multisig_keys),
"Failed to create multisig wallet due to bad keys");
memwipe(&spend_skey, sizeof(rct::key));
m_account_public_address = m_account.get_keys().m_account_address;
m_watch_only = false;
m_multisig = true;
2018-08-16 10:31:48 +02:00
m_key_device_type = hw::device::device_type::SOFTWARE;
m_multisig_threshold = threshold;
m_multisig_signers = multisig_signers;
++m_multisig_rounds_passed;
// re-encrypt keys
keys_reencryptor = epee::misc_utils::auto_scope_leave_caller();
create_keys_file(m_wallet_file, false, password, boost::filesystem::exists(m_wallet_file + ".address.txt"));
2018-09-03 12:48:28 +02:00
setup_new_blockchain();
if (!m_wallet_file.empty())
store();
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
return extra_multisig_info;
}
std::string wallet2::exchange_multisig_keys(const epee::wipeable_string &password,
const std::vector<std::string> &info)
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(info.empty(),
error::wallet_internal_error, "Empty multisig info");
if (info[0].substr(0, MULTISIG_EXTRA_INFO_MAGIC.size()) != MULTISIG_EXTRA_INFO_MAGIC)
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(false,
error::wallet_internal_error, "Unsupported info string");
}
std::vector<crypto::public_key> signers;
std::unordered_set<crypto::public_key> pkeys;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!unpack_extra_multisig_info(info, signers, pkeys),
error::wallet_internal_error, "Bad extra multisig info");
return exchange_multisig_keys(password, pkeys, signers);
}
std::string wallet2::exchange_multisig_keys(const epee::wipeable_string &password,
std::unordered_set<crypto::public_key> derivations,
std::vector<crypto::public_key> signers)
{
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(!derivations.empty(), "empty pkeys");
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(!signers.empty(), "empty signers");
bool ready = false;
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(multisig(&ready), "The wallet is not multisig");
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(!ready, "Multisig wallet creation process has already been finished");
// keys are decrypted
epee::misc_utils::auto_scope_leave_caller keys_reencryptor;
if (m_ask_password == AskPasswordToDecrypt && !m_unattended && !m_watch_only)
{
crypto::chacha_key chacha_key;
crypto::generate_chacha_key(password.data(), password.size(), chacha_key, m_kdf_rounds);
m_account.encrypt_viewkey(chacha_key);
m_account.decrypt_keys(chacha_key);
keys_reencryptor = epee::misc_utils::create_scope_leave_handler([&, this, chacha_key]() { m_account.encrypt_keys(chacha_key); m_account.decrypt_viewkey(chacha_key); });
}
if (m_multisig_rounds_passed == multisig_rounds_required(m_multisig_signers.size(), m_multisig_threshold) - 1)
{
// the last round is passed and we have to calculate spend public key
// add ours if not included
crypto::public_key local_signer = get_multisig_signer_public_key();
if (std::find(signers.begin(), signers.end(), local_signer) == signers.end())
{
signers.push_back(local_signer);
for (const auto &msk: get_account().get_multisig_keys())
{
derivations.insert(rct::rct2pk(rct::scalarmultBase(rct::sk2rct(msk))));
}
}
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(signers.size() == m_multisig_signers.size(), "Bad signers size");
// Summing all of unique public multisig keys to calculate common public spend key
crypto::public_key spend_public_key = cryptonote::generate_multisig_M_N_spend_public_key(std::vector<crypto::public_key>(derivations.begin(), derivations.end()));
m_account_public_address.m_spend_public_key = spend_public_key;
m_account.finalize_multisig(spend_public_key);
m_multisig_signers = signers;
std::sort(m_multisig_signers.begin(), m_multisig_signers.end(), [](const crypto::public_key &e0, const crypto::public_key &e1){ return memcmp(&e0, &e1, sizeof(e0)); });
++m_multisig_rounds_passed;
m_multisig_derivations.clear();
// keys are encrypted again
keys_reencryptor = epee::misc_utils::auto_scope_leave_caller();
if (!m_wallet_file.empty())
{
bool r = store_keys(m_keys_file, password, false);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!r, error::file_save_error, m_keys_file);
if (boost::filesystem::exists(m_wallet_file + ".address.txt"))
{
r = file_io_utils::save_string_to_file(m_wallet_file + ".address.txt", m_account.get_public_address_str(m_nettype));
if(!r) MERROR("String with address text not saved");
}
}
m_subaddresses.clear();
m_subaddress_labels.clear();
add_subaddress_account(tr("Primary account"));
if (!m_wallet_file.empty())
store();
return {};
}
// Below are either middle or secret spend key establishment rounds
for (const auto& key: m_multisig_derivations)
derivations.erase(key);
// Deriving multisig keys (set of Mi = b * Bi) according to DH from other participants' multisig keys.
auto new_derivations = cryptonote::generate_multisig_derivations(get_account().get_keys(), std::vector<crypto::public_key>(derivations.begin(), derivations.end()));
std::string extra_multisig_info;
if (m_multisig_rounds_passed == multisig_rounds_required(m_multisig_signers.size(), m_multisig_threshold) - 2) // next round is last
{
// Next round is last therefore we are performing secret spend establishment round as described above.
MINFO("Creating spend key...");
// Calculating our secret multisig keys by hashing our public multisig keys.
auto multisig_keys = cryptonote::calculate_multisig_keys(std::vector<crypto::public_key>(new_derivations.begin(), new_derivations.end()));
// And summing it to get personal secret spend key
crypto::secret_key spend_skey = cryptonote::calculate_multisig_signer_key(multisig_keys);
m_account.make_multisig(m_account.get_keys().m_view_secret_key, spend_skey, rct::rct2pk(rct::identity()), multisig_keys);
// Packing public multisig keys to exchange with others and calculate common public spend key in the last round
extra_multisig_info = pack_multisignature_keys(MULTISIG_EXTRA_INFO_MAGIC, secret_keys_to_public_keys(multisig_keys), spend_skey);
}
else
{
// This is just middle round
MINFO("Preparing keys for next exchange round...");
extra_multisig_info = pack_multisignature_keys(MULTISIG_EXTRA_INFO_MAGIC, new_derivations, m_account.get_keys().m_spend_secret_key);
m_multisig_derivations = new_derivations;
}
++m_multisig_rounds_passed;
create_keys_file(m_wallet_file, false, password, boost::filesystem::exists(m_wallet_file + ".address.txt"));
return extra_multisig_info;
}
void wallet2::unpack_multisig_info(const std::vector<std::string>& info,
std::vector<crypto::public_key> &public_keys,
std::vector<crypto::secret_key> &secret_keys) const
2017-11-18 12:24:38 +01:00
{
// parse all multisig info
public_keys.resize(info.size());
secret_keys.resize(info.size());
2017-11-18 12:24:38 +01:00
for (size_t i = 0; i < info.size(); ++i)
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!verify_multisig_info(info[i], secret_keys[i], public_keys[i]),
error::wallet_internal_error, "Bad multisig info: " + info[i]);
}
// remove duplicates
for (size_t i = 0; i < secret_keys.size(); ++i)
{
for (size_t j = i + 1; j < secret_keys.size(); ++j)
{
if (rct::sk2rct(secret_keys[i]) == rct::sk2rct(secret_keys[j]))
{
MDEBUG("Duplicate key found, ignoring");
secret_keys[j] = secret_keys.back();
public_keys[j] = public_keys.back();
secret_keys.pop_back();
public_keys.pop_back();
--j;
}
}
}
// people may include their own, weed it out
const crypto::secret_key local_skey = cryptonote::get_multisig_blinded_secret_key(get_account().get_keys().m_view_secret_key);
const crypto::public_key local_pkey = get_multisig_signer_public_key(get_account().get_keys().m_spend_secret_key);
for (size_t i = 0; i < secret_keys.size(); ++i)
{
if (secret_keys[i] == local_skey)
{
MDEBUG("Local key is present, ignoring");
secret_keys[i] = secret_keys.back();
public_keys[i] = public_keys.back();
secret_keys.pop_back();
public_keys.pop_back();
--i;
}
else
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(public_keys[i] == local_pkey, error::wallet_internal_error,
"Found local spend public key, but not local view secret key - something very weird");
}
}
}
2017-11-18 12:24:38 +01:00
std::string wallet2::make_multisig(const epee::wipeable_string &password,
const std::vector<std::string> &info,
uint32_t threshold)
{
std::vector<crypto::secret_key> secret_keys(info.size());
std::vector<crypto::public_key> public_keys(info.size());
unpack_multisig_info(info, public_keys, secret_keys);
2017-11-18 12:24:38 +01:00
return make_multisig(password, secret_keys, public_keys, threshold);
}
bool wallet2::finalize_multisig(const epee::wipeable_string &password, const std::unordered_set<crypto::public_key> &pkeys, std::vector<crypto::public_key> signers)
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
{
bool ready;
uint32_t threshold, total;
if (!multisig(&ready, &threshold, &total))
{
MERROR("This is not a multisig wallet");
return false;
}
if (ready)
{
MERROR("This multisig wallet is already finalized");
return false;
}
if (threshold + 1 != total)
{
MERROR("finalize_multisig should only be used for N-1/N wallets, use exchange_multisig_keys instead");
return false;
}
exchange_multisig_keys(password, pkeys, signers);
return true;
}
bool wallet2::unpack_extra_multisig_info(const std::vector<std::string>& info,
std::vector<crypto::public_key> &signers,
std::unordered_set<crypto::public_key> &pkeys) const
{
// parse all multisig info
signers.resize(info.size(), crypto::null_pkey);
for (size_t i = 0; i < info.size(); ++i)
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
{
if (!verify_extra_multisig_info(info[i], pkeys, signers[i]))
{
return false;
}
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
}
return true;
}
bool wallet2::finalize_multisig(const epee::wipeable_string &password, const std::vector<std::string> &info)
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
{
std::unordered_set<crypto::public_key> public_keys;
std::vector<crypto::public_key> signers;
if (!unpack_extra_multisig_info(info, signers, public_keys))
{
MERROR("Bad multisig info");
return false;
}
return finalize_multisig(password, public_keys, signers);
}
std::string wallet2::get_multisig_info() const
{
// It's a signed package of private view key and public spend key
const crypto::secret_key skey = cryptonote::get_multisig_blinded_secret_key(get_account().get_keys().m_view_secret_key);
const crypto::public_key pkey = get_multisig_signer_public_key(get_account().get_keys().m_spend_secret_key);
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
crypto::hash hash;
std::string data;
data += std::string((const char *)&skey, sizeof(crypto::secret_key));
data += std::string((const char *)&pkey, sizeof(crypto::public_key));
data.resize(data.size() + sizeof(crypto::signature));
crypto::cn_fast_hash(data.data(), data.size() - sizeof(signature), hash);
crypto::signature &signature = *(crypto::signature*)&data[data.size() - sizeof(crypto::signature)];
crypto::generate_signature(hash, pkey, get_multisig_blinded_secret_key(get_account().get_keys().m_spend_secret_key), signature);
return std::string("MultisigV1") + tools::base58::encode(data);
}
bool wallet2::verify_multisig_info(const std::string &data, crypto::secret_key &skey, crypto::public_key &pkey)
{
const size_t header_len = strlen("MultisigV1");
if (data.size() < header_len || data.substr(0, header_len) != "MultisigV1")
{
MERROR("Multisig info header check error");
return false;
}
std::string decoded;
if (!tools::base58::decode(data.substr(header_len), decoded))
{
MERROR("Multisig info decoding error");
return false;
}
if (decoded.size() != sizeof(crypto::secret_key) + sizeof(crypto::public_key) + sizeof(crypto::signature))
{
MERROR("Multisig info is corrupt");
return false;
}
size_t offset = 0;
skey = *(const crypto::secret_key*)(decoded.data() + offset);
offset += sizeof(skey);
pkey = *(const crypto::public_key*)(decoded.data() + offset);
offset += sizeof(pkey);
const crypto::signature &signature = *(const crypto::signature*)(decoded.data() + offset);
crypto::hash hash;
crypto::cn_fast_hash(decoded.data(), decoded.size() - sizeof(signature), hash);
if (!crypto::check_signature(hash, pkey, signature))
{
MERROR("Multisig info signature is invalid");
return false;
}
return true;
}
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
bool wallet2::verify_extra_multisig_info(const std::string &data, std::unordered_set<crypto::public_key> &pkeys, crypto::public_key &signer)
{
if (data.size() < MULTISIG_EXTRA_INFO_MAGIC.size() || data.substr(0, MULTISIG_EXTRA_INFO_MAGIC.size()) != MULTISIG_EXTRA_INFO_MAGIC)
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
{
MERROR("Multisig info header check error");
return false;
}
std::string decoded;
if (!tools::base58::decode(data.substr(MULTISIG_EXTRA_INFO_MAGIC.size()), decoded))
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
{
MERROR("Multisig info decoding error");
return false;
}
if (decoded.size() < sizeof(crypto::public_key) + sizeof(crypto::signature))
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
{
MERROR("Multisig info is corrupt");
return false;
}
if ((decoded.size() - (sizeof(crypto::public_key) + sizeof(crypto::signature))) % sizeof(crypto::public_key))
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
{
MERROR("Multisig info is corrupt");
return false;
}
const size_t n_keys = (decoded.size() - (sizeof(crypto::public_key) + sizeof(crypto::signature))) / sizeof(crypto::public_key);
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
size_t offset = 0;
signer = *(const crypto::public_key*)(decoded.data() + offset);
offset += sizeof(signer);
const crypto::signature &signature = *(const crypto::signature*)(decoded.data() + offset + n_keys * sizeof(crypto::public_key));
crypto::hash hash;
crypto::cn_fast_hash(decoded.data(), decoded.size() - sizeof(signature), hash);
if (!crypto::check_signature(hash, signer, signature))
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
{
MERROR("Multisig info signature is invalid");
return false;
}
for (size_t n = 0; n < n_keys; ++n)
{
crypto::public_key mspk = *(const crypto::public_key*)(decoded.data() + offset);
pkeys.insert(mspk);
offset += sizeof(mspk);
}
return true;
}
bool wallet2::multisig(bool *ready, uint32_t *threshold, uint32_t *total) const
{
if (!m_multisig)
return false;
if (threshold)
*threshold = m_multisig_threshold;
if (total)
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
*total = m_multisig_signers.size();
if (ready)
*ready = !(get_account().get_keys().m_account_address.m_spend_public_key == rct::rct2pk(rct::identity()));
return true;
}
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
bool wallet2::has_multisig_partial_key_images() const
{
if (!m_multisig)
return false;
for (const auto &td: m_transfers)
if (td.m_key_image_partial)
return true;
return false;
}
bool wallet2::has_unknown_key_images() const
{
for (const auto &td: m_transfers)
if (!td.m_key_image_known)
return true;
return false;
}
2014-10-18 21:38:21 +02:00
/*!
* \brief Rewrites to the wallet file for wallet upgrade (doesn't generate key, assumes it's already there)
* \param wallet_name Name of wallet file (should exist)
* \param password Password for wallet file
*/
void wallet2::rewrite(const std::string& wallet_name, const epee::wipeable_string& password)
2014-10-18 21:30:18 +02:00
{
if (wallet_name.empty())
return;
2014-10-18 21:30:18 +02:00
prepare_file_names(wallet_name);
boost::system::error_code ignored_ec;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!boost::filesystem::exists(m_keys_file, ignored_ec), error::file_not_found, m_keys_file);
bool r = store_keys(m_keys_file, password, m_watch_only);
2014-10-18 21:30:18 +02:00
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!r, error::file_save_error, m_keys_file);
}
/*!
* \brief Writes to a file named based on the normal wallet (doesn't generate key, assumes it's already there)
* \param wallet_name Base name of wallet file
* \param password Password for wallet file
* \param new_keys_filename [OUT] Name of new keys file
*/
void wallet2::write_watch_only_wallet(const std::string& wallet_name, const epee::wipeable_string& password, std::string &new_keys_filename)
{
prepare_file_names(wallet_name);
boost::system::error_code ignored_ec;
new_keys_filename = m_wallet_file + "-watchonly.keys";
bool watch_only_keys_file_exists = boost::filesystem::exists(new_keys_filename, ignored_ec);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(watch_only_keys_file_exists, error::file_save_error, new_keys_filename);
bool r = store_keys(new_keys_filename, password, true);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!r, error::file_save_error, new_keys_filename);
}
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2014-05-25 19:06:40 +02:00
void wallet2::wallet_exists(const std::string& file_path, bool& keys_file_exists, bool& wallet_file_exists)
2014-05-03 18:19:43 +02:00
{
std::string keys_file, wallet_file, mms_file;
do_prepare_file_names(file_path, keys_file, wallet_file, mms_file);
2014-05-03 18:19:43 +02:00
boost::system::error_code ignore;
keys_file_exists = boost::filesystem::exists(keys_file, ignore);
2014-05-25 19:06:40 +02:00
wallet_file_exists = boost::filesystem::exists(wallet_file, ignore);
2014-05-03 18:19:43 +02:00
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
bool wallet2::wallet_valid_path_format(const std::string& file_path)
{
return !file_path.empty();
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
bool wallet2::parse_long_payment_id(const std::string& payment_id_str, crypto::hash& payment_id)
{
cryptonote::blobdata payment_id_data;
if(!epee::string_tools::parse_hexstr_to_binbuff(payment_id_str, payment_id_data))
return false;
if(sizeof(crypto::hash) != payment_id_data.size())
return false;
payment_id = *reinterpret_cast<const crypto::hash*>(payment_id_data.data());
return true;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
bool wallet2::parse_short_payment_id(const std::string& payment_id_str, crypto::hash8& payment_id)
{
cryptonote::blobdata payment_id_data;
if(!epee::string_tools::parse_hexstr_to_binbuff(payment_id_str, payment_id_data))
return false;
if(sizeof(crypto::hash8) != payment_id_data.size())
return false;
payment_id = *reinterpret_cast<const crypto::hash8*>(payment_id_data.data());
return true;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
bool wallet2::parse_payment_id(const std::string& payment_id_str, crypto::hash& payment_id)
{
if (parse_long_payment_id(payment_id_str, payment_id))
return true;
crypto::hash8 payment_id8;
if (parse_short_payment_id(payment_id_str, payment_id8))
{
memcpy(payment_id.data, payment_id8.data, 8);
memset(payment_id.data + 8, 0, 24);
return true;
}
return false;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
bool wallet2::prepare_file_names(const std::string& file_path)
{
do_prepare_file_names(file_path, m_keys_file, m_wallet_file, m_mms_file);
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
return true;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
epee: add SSL support RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL. An optional private key and certificate file can be passed, using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as argument a path to a PEM format private private key and certificate, respectively. If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used. SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled. Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the --rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to, by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good certificates. To generate long term certificates: openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096 openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT /tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate, both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway. SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-15 00:44:48 +02:00
bool wallet2::check_connection(uint32_t *version, bool *ssl, uint32_t timeout)
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!m_is_initialized, error::wallet_not_initialized);
boost::lock_guard<boost::mutex> lock(m_daemon_rpc_mutex);
// TODO: Add light wallet version check.
if(m_light_wallet) {
epee: add SSL support RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL. An optional private key and certificate file can be passed, using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as argument a path to a PEM format private private key and certificate, respectively. If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used. SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled. Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the --rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to, by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good certificates. To generate long term certificates: openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096 openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT /tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate, both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway. SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-15 00:44:48 +02:00
if (version)
*version = 0;
if (ssl)
*ssl = m_light_wallet_connected; // light wallet is always SSL
return m_light_wallet_connected;
}
epee: add SSL support RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL. An optional private key and certificate file can be passed, using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as argument a path to a PEM format private private key and certificate, respectively. If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used. SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled. Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the --rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to, by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good certificates. To generate long term certificates: openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096 openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT /tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate, both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway. SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-15 00:44:48 +02:00
if(!m_http_client.is_connected(ssl))
{
m_node_rpc_proxy.invalidate();
if (!m_http_client.connect(std::chrono::milliseconds(timeout)))
return false;
epee: add SSL support RPC connections now have optional tranparent SSL. An optional private key and certificate file can be passed, using the --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-private-key and --{rpc,daemon}-ssl-certificate options. Those have as argument a path to a PEM format private private key and certificate, respectively. If not given, a temporary self signed certificate will be used. SSL can be enabled or disabled using --{rpc}-ssl, which accepts autodetect (default), disabled or enabled. Access can be restricted to particular certificates using the --rpc-ssl-allowed-certificates, which takes a list of paths to PEM encoded certificates. This can allow a wallet to connect to only the daemon they think they're connected to, by forcing SSL and listing the paths to the known good certificates. To generate long term certificates: openssl genrsa -out /tmp/KEY 4096 openssl req -new -key /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/REQ openssl x509 -req -days 999999 -sha256 -in /tmp/REQ -signkey /tmp/KEY -out /tmp/CERT /tmp/KEY is the private key, and /tmp/CERT is the certificate, both in PEM format. /tmp/REQ can be removed. Adjust the last command to set expiration date, etc, as needed. It doesn't make a whole lot of sense for monero anyway, since most servers will run with one time temporary self signed certificates anyway. SSL support is transparent, so all communication is done on the existing ports, with SSL autodetection. This means you can start using an SSL daemon now, but you should not enforce SSL yet or nothing will talk to you.
2018-06-15 00:44:48 +02:00
if(!m_http_client.is_connected(ssl))
return false;
}
if (version)
2014-09-08 19:07:15 +02:00
{
cryptonote::COMMAND_RPC_GET_VERSION::request req_t = AUTO_VAL_INIT(req_t);
cryptonote::COMMAND_RPC_GET_VERSION::response resp_t = AUTO_VAL_INIT(resp_t);
bool r = net_utils::invoke_http_json_rpc("/json_rpc", "get_version", req_t, resp_t, m_http_client);
if(!r) {
*version = 0;
return false;
}
if (resp_t.status != CORE_RPC_STATUS_OK)
*version = 0;
else
*version = resp_t.version;
2014-09-08 19:07:15 +02:00
}
return true;
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
bool wallet2::generate_chacha_key_from_secret_keys(crypto::chacha_key &key) const
{
hw::device &hwdev = m_account.get_device();
return hwdev.generate_chacha_key(m_account.get_keys(), key, m_kdf_rounds);
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
void wallet2::generate_chacha_key_from_password(const epee::wipeable_string &pass, crypto::chacha_key &key) const
{
crypto::generate_chacha_key(pass.data(), pass.size(), key, m_kdf_rounds);
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
void wallet2::load(const std::string& wallet_, const epee::wipeable_string& password)
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
{
clear();
prepare_file_names(wallet_);
2014-04-02 18:00:17 +02:00
boost::system::error_code e;
bool exists = boost::filesystem::exists(m_keys_file, e);
2014-04-07 17:02:15 +02:00
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(e || !exists, error::file_not_found, m_keys_file);
lock_keys_file();
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!is_keys_file_locked(), error::wallet_internal_error, "internal error: \"" + m_keys_file + "\" is opened by another wallet program");
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
// this temporary unlocking is necessary for Windows (otherwise the file couldn't be loaded).
unlock_keys_file();
if (!load_keys(m_keys_file, password))
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(true, error::file_read_error, m_keys_file);
}
2018-02-16 12:04:04 +01:00
LOG_PRINT_L0("Loaded wallet keys file, with public address: " << m_account.get_public_address_str(m_nettype));
lock_keys_file();
2014-04-02 18:00:17 +02:00
wallet_keys_unlocker unlocker(*this, m_ask_password == AskPasswordToDecrypt && !m_unattended && !m_watch_only, password);
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
//keys loaded ok!
//try to load wallet file. but even if we failed, it is not big problem
if(!boost::filesystem::exists(m_wallet_file, e) || e)
{
LOG_PRINT_L0("file not found: " << m_wallet_file << ", starting with empty blockchain");
m_account_public_address = m_account.get_keys().m_account_address;
}
else
{
wallet2::cache_file_data cache_file_data;
std::string buf;
bool r = epee::file_io_utils::load_file_to_string(m_wallet_file, buf, std::numeric_limits<size_t>::max());
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!r, error::file_read_error, m_wallet_file);
// try to read it as an encrypted cache
try
{
LOG_PRINT_L1("Trying to decrypt cache data");
r = ::serialization::parse_binary(buf, cache_file_data);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!r, error::wallet_internal_error, "internal error: failed to deserialize \"" + m_wallet_file + '\"');
std::string cache_data;
cache_data.resize(cache_file_data.cache_data.size());
crypto::chacha20(cache_file_data.cache_data.data(), cache_file_data.cache_data.size(), m_cache_key, cache_file_data.iv, &cache_data[0]);
try {
std::stringstream iss;
iss << cache_data;
boost::archive::portable_binary_iarchive ar(iss);
ar >> *this;
}
catch(...)
{
// try with previous scheme: direct from keys
crypto::chacha_key key;
generate_chacha_key_from_secret_keys(key);
crypto::chacha20(cache_file_data.cache_data.data(), cache_file_data.cache_data.size(), key, cache_file_data.iv, &cache_data[0]);
try {
std::stringstream iss;
iss << cache_data;
boost::archive::portable_binary_iarchive ar(iss);
ar >> *this;
}
catch (...)
{
crypto::chacha8(cache_file_data.cache_data.data(), cache_file_data.cache_data.size(), key, cache_file_data.iv, &cache_data[0]);
try
{
std::stringstream iss;
iss << cache_data;
boost::archive::portable_binary_iarchive ar(iss);
ar >> *this;
}
catch (...)
{
LOG_PRINT_L0("Failed to open portable binary, trying unportable");
boost::filesystem::copy_file(m_wallet_file, m_wallet_file + ".unportable", boost::filesystem::copy_option::overwrite_if_exists);
std::stringstream iss;
iss.str("");
iss << cache_data;
boost::archive::binary_iarchive ar(iss);
ar >> *this;
}
}
}
}
catch (...)
{
LOG_PRINT_L1("Failed to load encrypted cache, trying unencrypted");
try {
std::stringstream iss;
iss << buf;
boost::archive::portable_binary_iarchive ar(iss);
ar >> *this;
}
catch (...)
{
LOG_PRINT_L0("Failed to open portable binary, trying unportable");
boost::filesystem::copy_file(m_wallet_file, m_wallet_file + ".unportable", boost::filesystem::copy_option::overwrite_if_exists);
std::stringstream iss;
iss.str("");
iss << buf;
boost::archive::binary_iarchive ar(iss);
ar >> *this;
}
}
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(
m_account_public_address.m_spend_public_key != m_account.get_keys().m_account_address.m_spend_public_key ||
m_account_public_address.m_view_public_key != m_account.get_keys().m_account_address.m_view_public_key,
error::wallet_files_doesnt_correspond, m_keys_file, m_wallet_file);
}
2014-04-02 18:00:17 +02:00
cryptonote::block genesis;
generate_genesis(genesis);
crypto::hash genesis_hash = get_block_hash(genesis);
if (m_blockchain.empty())
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
{
m_blockchain.push_back(genesis_hash);
m_last_block_reward = cryptonote::get_outs_money_amount(genesis.miner_tx);
}
else
{
check_genesis(genesis_hash);
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
}
trim_hashchain();
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
if (get_num_subaddress_accounts() == 0)
add_subaddress_account(tr("Primary account"));
try
{
find_and_save_rings(false);
}
catch (const std::exception &e)
{
MERROR("Failed to save rings, will try again next time");
}
try
{
m_message_store.read_from_file(get_multisig_wallet_state(), m_mms_file);
}
catch (const std::exception &e)
{
MERROR("Failed to initialize MMS, it will be unusable");
}
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
void wallet2::trim_hashchain()
{
uint64_t height = m_checkpoints.get_max_height();
for (const transfer_details &td: m_transfers)
if (td.m_block_height < height)
height = td.m_block_height;
if (!m_blockchain.empty() && m_blockchain.size() == m_blockchain.offset())
{
MINFO("Fixing empty hashchain");
cryptonote::COMMAND_RPC_GET_BLOCK_HEADER_BY_HEIGHT::request req = AUTO_VAL_INIT(req);
cryptonote::COMMAND_RPC_GET_BLOCK_HEADER_BY_HEIGHT::response res = AUTO_VAL_INIT(res);
m_daemon_rpc_mutex.lock();
req.height = m_blockchain.size() - 1;
bool r = net_utils::invoke_http_json_rpc("/json_rpc", "getblockheaderbyheight", req, res, m_http_client, rpc_timeout);
m_daemon_rpc_mutex.unlock();
if (r && res.status == CORE_RPC_STATUS_OK)
{
crypto::hash hash;
epee::string_tools::hex_to_pod(res.block_header.hash, hash);
m_blockchain.refill(hash);
}
else
{
MERROR("Failed to request block header from daemon, hash chain may be unable to sync till the wallet is loaded with a usable daemon");
}
}
if (height > 0 && m_blockchain.size() > height)
{
--height;
MDEBUG("trimming to " << height << ", offset " << m_blockchain.offset());
m_blockchain.trim(height);
}
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
void wallet2::check_genesis(const crypto::hash& genesis_hash) const {
2018-02-16 12:04:04 +01:00
std::string what("Genesis block mismatch. You probably use wallet without testnet (or stagenet) flag with blockchain from test (or stage) network or vice versa");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(genesis_hash != m_blockchain.genesis(), error::wallet_internal_error, what);
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
std::string wallet2::path() const
{
return m_wallet_file;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2014-04-02 18:00:17 +02:00
void wallet2::store()
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
{
if (!m_wallet_file.empty())
store_to("", epee::wipeable_string());
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
void wallet2::store_to(const std::string &path, const epee::wipeable_string &password)
{
trim_hashchain();
// if file is the same, we do:
// 1. save wallet to the *.new file
// 2. remove old wallet file
// 3. rename *.new to wallet_name
// handle if we want just store wallet state to current files (ex store() replacement);
bool same_file = true;
if (!path.empty())
{
std::string canonical_path = boost::filesystem::canonical(m_wallet_file).string();
size_t pos = canonical_path.find(path);
same_file = pos != std::string::npos;
}
if (!same_file)
{
// check if we want to store to directory which doesn't exists yet
boost::filesystem::path parent_path = boost::filesystem::path(path).parent_path();
// if path is not exists, try to create it
if (!parent_path.empty() && !boost::filesystem::exists(parent_path))
{
boost::system::error_code ec;
if (!boost::filesystem::create_directories(parent_path, ec))
{
throw std::logic_error(ec.message());
}
}
}
// preparing wallet data
std::stringstream oss;
boost::archive::portable_binary_oarchive ar(oss);
ar << *this;
wallet2::cache_file_data cache_file_data = boost::value_initialized<wallet2::cache_file_data>();
cache_file_data.cache_data = oss.str();
std::string cipher;
cipher.resize(cache_file_data.cache_data.size());
cache_file_data.iv = crypto::rand<crypto::chacha_iv>();
crypto::chacha20(cache_file_data.cache_data.data(), cache_file_data.cache_data.size(), m_cache_key, cache_file_data.iv, &cipher[0]);
cache_file_data.cache_data = cipher;
const std::string new_file = same_file ? m_wallet_file + ".new" : path;
const std::string old_file = m_wallet_file;
const std::string old_keys_file = m_keys_file;
const std::string old_address_file = m_wallet_file + ".address.txt";
const std::string old_mms_file = m_mms_file;
// save keys to the new file
// if we here, main wallet file is saved and we only need to save keys and address files
if (!same_file) {
prepare_file_names(path);
bool r = store_keys(m_keys_file, password, false);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!r, error::file_save_error, m_keys_file);
if (boost::filesystem::exists(old_address_file))
{
// save address to the new file
const std::string address_file = m_wallet_file + ".address.txt";
r = file_io_utils::save_string_to_file(address_file, m_account.get_public_address_str(m_nettype));
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!r, error::file_save_error, m_wallet_file);
}
// remove old wallet file
r = boost::filesystem::remove(old_file);
if (!r) {
LOG_ERROR("error removing file: " << old_file);
}
// remove old keys file
r = boost::filesystem::remove(old_keys_file);
if (!r) {
LOG_ERROR("error removing file: " << old_keys_file);
}
// remove old address file
r = boost::filesystem::remove(old_address_file);
if (!r) {
LOG_ERROR("error removing file: " << old_address_file);
}
// remove old message store file
if (boost::filesystem::exists(old_mms_file))
{
r = boost::filesystem::remove(old_mms_file);
if (!r) {
LOG_ERROR("error removing file: " << old_mms_file);
}
}
} else {
// save to new file
#ifdef WIN32
// On Windows avoid using std::ofstream which does not work with UTF-8 filenames
// The price to pay is temporary higher memory consumption for string stream + binary archive
std::ostringstream oss;
binary_archive<true> oar(oss);
bool success = ::serialization::serialize(oar, cache_file_data);
if (success) {
success = epee::file_io_utils::save_string_to_file(new_file, oss.str());
}
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!success, error::file_save_error, new_file);
#else
std::ofstream ostr;
ostr.open(new_file, std::ios_base::binary | std::ios_base::out | std::ios_base::trunc);
binary_archive<true> oar(ostr);
bool success = ::serialization::serialize(oar, cache_file_data);
ostr.close();
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!success || !ostr.good(), error::file_save_error, new_file);
#endif
// here we have "*.new" file, we need to rename it to be without ".new"
std::error_code e = tools::replace_file(new_file, m_wallet_file);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(e, error::file_save_error, m_wallet_file, e);
}
if (m_message_store.get_active())
{
// While the "m_message_store" object of course always exist, a file for the message
// store should only exist if the MMS is really active
m_message_store.write_to_file(get_multisig_wallet_state(), m_mms_file);
}
}
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
uint64_t wallet2::balance(uint32_t index_major) const
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
{
uint64_t amount = 0;
if(m_light_wallet)
return m_light_wallet_unlocked_balance;
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
for (const auto& i : balance_per_subaddress(index_major))
amount += i.second;
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
return amount;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
uint64_t wallet2::unlocked_balance(uint32_t index_major) const
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
{
uint64_t amount = 0;
if(m_light_wallet)
return m_light_wallet_balance;
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
for (const auto& i : unlocked_balance_per_subaddress(index_major))
amount += i.second;
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
return amount;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
std::map<uint32_t, uint64_t> wallet2::balance_per_subaddress(uint32_t index_major) const
{
std::map<uint32_t, uint64_t> amount_per_subaddr;
for (const auto& td: m_transfers)
{
if (td.m_subaddr_index.major == index_major && !td.m_spent && !td.m_frozen)
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
{
auto found = amount_per_subaddr.find(td.m_subaddr_index.minor);
if (found == amount_per_subaddr.end())
amount_per_subaddr[td.m_subaddr_index.minor] = td.amount();
else
found->second += td.amount();
}
}
for (const auto& utx: m_unconfirmed_txs)
{
if (utx.second.m_subaddr_account == index_major && utx.second.m_state != wallet2::unconfirmed_transfer_details::failed)
{
// all changes go to 0-th subaddress (in the current subaddress account)
auto found = amount_per_subaddr.find(0);
if (found == amount_per_subaddr.end())
amount_per_subaddr[0] = utx.second.m_change;
else
found->second += utx.second.m_change;
}
}
return amount_per_subaddr;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
std::map<uint32_t, uint64_t> wallet2::unlocked_balance_per_subaddress(uint32_t index_major) const
{
std::map<uint32_t, uint64_t> amount_per_subaddr;
for(const transfer_details& td: m_transfers)
{
if(td.m_subaddr_index.major == index_major && !td.m_spent && !td.m_frozen && is_transfer_unlocked(td))
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
{
auto found = amount_per_subaddr.find(td.m_subaddr_index.minor);
if (found == amount_per_subaddr.end())
amount_per_subaddr[td.m_subaddr_index.minor] = td.amount();
else
found->second += td.amount();
}
}
return amount_per_subaddr;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
uint64_t wallet2::balance_all() const
{
uint64_t r = 0;
for (uint32_t index_major = 0; index_major < get_num_subaddress_accounts(); ++index_major)
r += balance(index_major);
return r;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
uint64_t wallet2::unlocked_balance_all() const
{
uint64_t r = 0;
for (uint32_t index_major = 0; index_major < get_num_subaddress_accounts(); ++index_major)
r += unlocked_balance(index_major);
return r;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2014-04-02 18:00:17 +02:00
void wallet2::get_transfers(wallet2::transfer_container& incoming_transfers) const
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
{
incoming_transfers = m_transfers;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
void wallet2::get_payments(const crypto::hash& payment_id, std::list<wallet2::payment_details>& payments, uint64_t min_height, const boost::optional<uint32_t>& subaddr_account, const std::set<uint32_t>& subaddr_indices) const
2014-05-03 18:19:43 +02:00
{
auto range = m_payments.equal_range(payment_id);
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
std::for_each(range.first, range.second, [&payments, &min_height, &subaddr_account, &subaddr_indices](const payment_container::value_type& x) {
if (min_height < x.second.m_block_height &&
(!subaddr_account || *subaddr_account == x.second.m_subaddr_index.major) &&
(subaddr_indices.empty() || subaddr_indices.count(x.second.m_subaddr_index.minor) == 1))
2014-07-22 18:00:25 +02:00
{
payments.push_back(x.second);
}
2014-05-03 18:19:43 +02:00
});
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
void wallet2::get_payments(std::list<std::pair<crypto::hash,wallet2::payment_details>>& payments, uint64_t min_height, uint64_t max_height, const boost::optional<uint32_t>& subaddr_account, const std::set<uint32_t>& subaddr_indices) const
{
auto range = std::make_pair(m_payments.begin(), m_payments.end());
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
std::for_each(range.first, range.second, [&payments, &min_height, &max_height, &subaddr_account, &subaddr_indices](const payment_container::value_type& x) {
if (min_height < x.second.m_block_height && max_height >= x.second.m_block_height &&
(!subaddr_account || *subaddr_account == x.second.m_subaddr_index.major) &&
(subaddr_indices.empty() || subaddr_indices.count(x.second.m_subaddr_index.minor) == 1))
{
payments.push_back(x);
}
});
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
void wallet2::get_payments_out(std::list<std::pair<crypto::hash,wallet2::confirmed_transfer_details>>& confirmed_payments,
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
uint64_t min_height, uint64_t max_height, const boost::optional<uint32_t>& subaddr_account, const std::set<uint32_t>& subaddr_indices) const
{
for (auto i = m_confirmed_txs.begin(); i != m_confirmed_txs.end(); ++i) {
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
if (i->second.m_block_height <= min_height || i->second.m_block_height > max_height)
continue;
if (subaddr_account && *subaddr_account != i->second.m_subaddr_account)
continue;
if (!subaddr_indices.empty() && std::count_if(i->second.m_subaddr_indices.begin(), i->second.m_subaddr_indices.end(), [&subaddr_indices](uint32_t index) { return subaddr_indices.count(index) == 1; }) == 0)
continue;
confirmed_payments.push_back(*i);
}
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
void wallet2::get_unconfirmed_payments_out(std::list<std::pair<crypto::hash,wallet2::unconfirmed_transfer_details>>& unconfirmed_payments, const boost::optional<uint32_t>& subaddr_account, const std::set<uint32_t>& subaddr_indices) const
{
for (auto i = m_unconfirmed_txs.begin(); i != m_unconfirmed_txs.end(); ++i) {
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
if (subaddr_account && *subaddr_account != i->second.m_subaddr_account)
continue;
if (!subaddr_indices.empty() && std::count_if(i->second.m_subaddr_indices.begin(), i->second.m_subaddr_indices.end(), [&subaddr_indices](uint32_t index) { return subaddr_indices.count(index) == 1; }) == 0)
continue;
unconfirmed_payments.push_back(*i);
}
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
void wallet2::get_unconfirmed_payments(std::list<std::pair<crypto::hash,wallet2::pool_payment_details>>& unconfirmed_payments, const boost::optional<uint32_t>& subaddr_account, const std::set<uint32_t>& subaddr_indices) const
{
for (auto i = m_unconfirmed_payments.begin(); i != m_unconfirmed_payments.end(); ++i) {
if ((!subaddr_account || *subaddr_account == i->second.m_pd.m_subaddr_index.major) &&
(subaddr_indices.empty() || subaddr_indices.count(i->second.m_pd.m_subaddr_index.minor) == 1))
unconfirmed_payments.push_back(*i);
}
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
void wallet2::rescan_spent()
{
// This is RPC call that can take a long time if there are many outputs,
// so we call it several times, in stripes, so we don't time out spuriously
std::vector<int> spent_status;
spent_status.reserve(m_transfers.size());
const size_t chunk_size = 1000;
for (size_t start_offset = 0; start_offset < m_transfers.size(); start_offset += chunk_size)
{
const size_t n_outputs = std::min<size_t>(chunk_size, m_transfers.size() - start_offset);
MDEBUG("Calling is_key_image_spent on " << start_offset << " - " << (start_offset + n_outputs - 1) << ", out of " << m_transfers.size());
COMMAND_RPC_IS_KEY_IMAGE_SPENT::request req = AUTO_VAL_INIT(req);
COMMAND_RPC_IS_KEY_IMAGE_SPENT::response daemon_resp = AUTO_VAL_INIT(daemon_resp);
for (size_t n = start_offset; n < start_offset + n_outputs; ++n)
req.key_images.push_back(string_tools::pod_to_hex(m_transfers[n].m_key_image));
m_daemon_rpc_mutex.lock();
bool r = epee::net_utils::invoke_http_json("/is_key_image_spent", req, daemon_resp, m_http_client, rpc_timeout);
m_daemon_rpc_mutex.unlock();
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!r, error::no_connection_to_daemon, "is_key_image_spent");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(daemon_resp.status == CORE_RPC_STATUS_BUSY, error::daemon_busy, "is_key_image_spent");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(daemon_resp.status != CORE_RPC_STATUS_OK, error::is_key_image_spent_error, get_rpc_status(daemon_resp.status));
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(daemon_resp.spent_status.size() != n_outputs, error::wallet_internal_error,
"daemon returned wrong response for is_key_image_spent, wrong amounts count = " +
std::to_string(daemon_resp.spent_status.size()) + ", expected " + std::to_string(n_outputs));
std::copy(daemon_resp.spent_status.begin(), daemon_resp.spent_status.end(), std::back_inserter(spent_status));
}
// update spent status
for (size_t i = 0; i < m_transfers.size(); ++i)
{
transfer_details& td = m_transfers[i];
// a view wallet may not know about key images
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
if (!td.m_key_image_known || td.m_key_image_partial)
continue;
if (td.m_spent != (spent_status[i] != COMMAND_RPC_IS_KEY_IMAGE_SPENT::UNSPENT))
{
if (td.m_spent)
{
LOG_PRINT_L0("Marking output " << i << "(" << td.m_key_image << ") as unspent, it was marked as spent");
set_unspent(i);
td.m_spent_height = 0;
}
else
{
LOG_PRINT_L0("Marking output " << i << "(" << td.m_key_image << ") as spent, it was marked as unspent");
set_spent(i, td.m_spent_height);
// unknown height, if this gets reorged, it might still be missed
}
}
}
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
void wallet2::rescan_blockchain(bool hard, bool refresh, bool keep_key_images)
{
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(!hard || !keep_key_images, "Cannot preserve key images on hard rescan");
const size_t transfers_cnt = m_transfers.size();
crypto::hash transfers_hash{};
if(hard)
{
clear();
setup_new_blockchain();
}
else
{
if (keep_key_images && refresh)
hash_m_transfers((int64_t) transfers_cnt, transfers_hash);
clear_soft(keep_key_images);
}
if (refresh)
this->refresh(false);
if (refresh && keep_key_images)
finish_rescan_bc_keep_key_images(transfers_cnt, transfers_hash);
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
bool wallet2::is_transfer_unlocked(const transfer_details& td) const
{
return is_transfer_unlocked(td.m_tx.unlock_time, td.m_block_height);
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
bool wallet2::is_transfer_unlocked(uint64_t unlock_time, uint64_t block_height) const
{
if(!is_tx_spendtime_unlocked(unlock_time, block_height))
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
return false;
if(block_height + CRYPTONOTE_DEFAULT_TX_SPENDABLE_AGE > get_blockchain_current_height())
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
return false;
return true;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
bool wallet2::is_tx_spendtime_unlocked(uint64_t unlock_time, uint64_t block_height) const
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
{
if(unlock_time < CRYPTONOTE_MAX_BLOCK_NUMBER)
{
//interpret as block index
if(get_blockchain_current_height()-1 + CRYPTONOTE_LOCKED_TX_ALLOWED_DELTA_BLOCKS >= unlock_time)
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
return true;
else
return false;
}else
{
//interpret as time
uint64_t current_time = static_cast<uint64_t>(time(NULL));
// XXX: this needs to be fast, so we'd need to get the starting heights
// from the daemon to be correct once voting kicks in
uint64_t v2height = m_nettype == TESTNET ? 624634 : m_nettype == STAGENET ? 32000 : 1009827;
uint64_t leeway = block_height < v2height ? CRYPTONOTE_LOCKED_TX_ALLOWED_DELTA_SECONDS_V1 : CRYPTONOTE_LOCKED_TX_ALLOWED_DELTA_SECONDS_V2;
if(current_time + leeway >= unlock_time)
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
return true;
else
return false;
}
return false;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
namespace
{
template<typename T>
T pop_index(std::vector<T>& vec, size_t idx)
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
{
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(!vec.empty(), T(), "Vector must be non-empty");
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(idx < vec.size(), T(), "idx out of bounds");
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
T res = vec[idx];
if (idx + 1 != vec.size())
{
vec[idx] = vec.back();
}
vec.resize(vec.size() - 1);
return res;
}
template<typename T>
T pop_random_value(std::vector<T>& vec)
{
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(!vec.empty(), T(), "Vector must be non-empty");
size_t idx = crypto::rand<size_t>() % vec.size();
return pop_index (vec, idx);
}
template<typename T>
T pop_back(std::vector<T>& vec)
{
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(!vec.empty(), T(), "Vector must be non-empty");
T res = vec.back();
vec.pop_back();
return res;
}
template<typename T>
void pop_if_present(std::vector<T>& vec, T e)
{
for (size_t i = 0; i < vec.size(); ++i)
{
if (e == vec[i])
{
pop_index (vec, i);
return;
}
}
}
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
// This returns a handwavy estimation of how much two outputs are related
// If they're from the same tx, then they're fully related. From close block
// heights, they're kinda related. The actual values don't matter, just
// their ordering, but it could become more murky if we add scores later.
float wallet2::get_output_relatedness(const transfer_details &td0, const transfer_details &td1) const
{
int dh;
// expensive test, and same tx will fall onto the same block height below
if (td0.m_txid == td1.m_txid)
return 1.0f;
// same block height -> possibly tx burst, or same tx (since above is disabled)
dh = td0.m_block_height > td1.m_block_height ? td0.m_block_height - td1.m_block_height : td1.m_block_height - td0.m_block_height;
if (dh == 0)
return 0.9f;
// adjacent blocks -> possibly tx burst
if (dh == 1)
return 0.8f;
// could extract the payment id, and compare them, but this is a bit expensive too
// similar block heights
if (dh < 10)
return 0.2f;
// don't think these are particularly related
return 0.0f;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
size_t wallet2::pop_best_value_from(const transfer_container &transfers, std::vector<size_t> &unused_indices, const std::vector<size_t>& selected_transfers, bool smallest) const
{
std::vector<size_t> candidates;
float best_relatedness = 1.0f;
for (size_t n = 0; n < unused_indices.size(); ++n)
{
const transfer_details &candidate = transfers[unused_indices[n]];
float relatedness = 0.0f;
for (std::vector<size_t>::const_iterator i = selected_transfers.begin(); i != selected_transfers.end(); ++i)
{
float r = get_output_relatedness(candidate, transfers[*i]);
if (r > relatedness)
{
relatedness = r;
if (relatedness == 1.0f)
break;
}
}
if (relatedness < best_relatedness)
{
best_relatedness = relatedness;
candidates.clear();
}
if (relatedness == best_relatedness)
candidates.push_back(n);
}
// we have all the least related outputs in candidates, so we can pick either
// the smallest, or a random one, depending on request
size_t idx;
if (smallest)
{
idx = 0;
for (size_t n = 0; n < candidates.size(); ++n)
{
const transfer_details &td = transfers[unused_indices[candidates[n]]];
if (td.amount() < transfers[unused_indices[candidates[idx]]].amount())
idx = n;
}
}
else
{
idx = crypto::rand<size_t>() % candidates.size();
}
return pop_index (unused_indices, candidates[idx]);
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
size_t wallet2::pop_best_value(std::vector<size_t> &unused_indices, const std::vector<size_t>& selected_transfers, bool smallest) const
{
return pop_best_value_from(m_transfers, unused_indices, selected_transfers, smallest);
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2014-06-13 20:05:15 +02:00
// Select random input sources for transaction.
// returns:
// direct return: amount of money found
// modified reference: selected_transfers, a list of iterators/indices of input sources
uint64_t wallet2::select_transfers(uint64_t needed_money, std::vector<size_t> unused_transfers_indices, std::vector<size_t>& selected_transfers) const
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
{
uint64_t found_money = 0;
selected_transfers.reserve(unused_transfers_indices.size());
while (found_money < needed_money && !unused_transfers_indices.empty())
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
{
size_t idx = pop_best_value(unused_transfers_indices, selected_transfers);
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
const transfer_container::const_iterator it = m_transfers.begin() + idx;
selected_transfers.push_back(idx);
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
found_money += it->amount();
}
return found_money;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
void wallet2::add_unconfirmed_tx(const cryptonote::transaction& tx, uint64_t amount_in, const std::vector<cryptonote::tx_destination_entry> &dests, const crypto::hash &payment_id, uint64_t change_amount, uint32_t subaddr_account, const std::set<uint32_t>& subaddr_indices)
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
{
2014-04-02 18:00:17 +02:00
unconfirmed_transfer_details& utd = m_unconfirmed_txs[cryptonote::get_transaction_hash(tx)];
utd.m_amount_in = amount_in;
utd.m_amount_out = 0;
for (const auto &d: dests)
utd.m_amount_out += d.amount;
utd.m_amount_out += change_amount; // dests does not contain change
2014-04-02 18:00:17 +02:00
utd.m_change = change_amount;
utd.m_sent_time = time(NULL);
utd.m_tx = (const cryptonote::transaction_prefix&)tx;
utd.m_dests = dests;
utd.m_payment_id = payment_id;
utd.m_state = wallet2::unconfirmed_transfer_details::pending;
utd.m_timestamp = time(NULL);
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
utd.m_subaddr_account = subaddr_account;
utd.m_subaddr_indices = subaddr_indices;
for (const auto &in: tx.vin)
{
if (in.type() != typeid(cryptonote::txin_to_key))
continue;
const auto &txin = boost::get<cryptonote::txin_to_key>(in);
utd.m_rings.push_back(std::make_pair(txin.k_image, txin.key_offsets));
}
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
crypto::hash wallet2::get_payment_id(const pending_tx &ptx) const
{
std::vector<tx_extra_field> tx_extra_fields;
parse_tx_extra(ptx.tx.extra, tx_extra_fields); // ok if partially parsed
tx_extra_nonce extra_nonce;
crypto::hash payment_id = null_hash;
if (find_tx_extra_field_by_type(tx_extra_fields, extra_nonce))
{
crypto::hash8 payment_id8 = null_hash8;
if(get_encrypted_payment_id_from_tx_extra_nonce(extra_nonce.nonce, payment_id8))
{
if (ptx.dests.empty())
{
MWARNING("Encrypted payment id found, but no destinations public key, cannot decrypt");
return crypto::null_hash;
}
if (m_account.get_device().decrypt_payment_id(payment_id8, ptx.dests[0].addr.m_view_public_key, ptx.tx_key))
{
memcpy(payment_id.data, payment_id8.data, 8);
}
}
else if (!get_payment_id_from_tx_extra_nonce(extra_nonce.nonce, payment_id))
{
2017-09-10 18:35:59 +02:00
payment_id = crypto::null_hash;
}
}
return payment_id;
}
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
// take a pending tx and actually send it to the daemon
void wallet2::commit_tx(pending_tx& ptx)
{
using namespace cryptonote;
if(m_light_wallet)
{
cryptonote::COMMAND_RPC_SUBMIT_RAW_TX::request oreq;
cryptonote::COMMAND_RPC_SUBMIT_RAW_TX::response ores;
2018-02-16 12:04:04 +01:00
oreq.address = get_account().get_public_address_str(m_nettype);
oreq.view_key = string_tools::pod_to_hex(get_account().get_keys().m_view_secret_key);
oreq.tx = epee::string_tools::buff_to_hex_nodelimer(tx_to_blob(ptx.tx));
m_daemon_rpc_mutex.lock();
bool r = epee::net_utils::invoke_http_json("/submit_raw_tx", oreq, ores, m_http_client, rpc_timeout, "POST");
m_daemon_rpc_mutex.unlock();
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!r, error::no_connection_to_daemon, "submit_raw_tx");
// MyMonero and OpenMonero use different status strings
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(ores.status != "OK" && ores.status != "success" , error::tx_rejected, ptx.tx, get_rpc_status(ores.status), ores.error);
}
else
{
// Normal submit
COMMAND_RPC_SEND_RAW_TX::request req;
req.tx_as_hex = epee::string_tools::buff_to_hex_nodelimer(tx_to_blob(ptx.tx));
req.do_not_relay = false;
COMMAND_RPC_SEND_RAW_TX::response daemon_send_resp;
m_daemon_rpc_mutex.lock();
bool r = epee::net_utils::invoke_http_json("/sendrawtransaction", req, daemon_send_resp, m_http_client, rpc_timeout);
m_daemon_rpc_mutex.unlock();
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!r, error::no_connection_to_daemon, "sendrawtransaction");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(daemon_send_resp.status == CORE_RPC_STATUS_BUSY, error::daemon_busy, "sendrawtransaction");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(daemon_send_resp.status != CORE_RPC_STATUS_OK, error::tx_rejected, ptx.tx, get_rpc_status(daemon_send_resp.status), get_text_reason(daemon_send_resp));
// sanity checks
for (size_t idx: ptx.selected_transfers)
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(idx >= m_transfers.size(), error::wallet_internal_error,
"Bad output index in selected transfers: " + boost::lexical_cast<std::string>(idx));
}
}
crypto::hash txid;
txid = get_transaction_hash(ptx.tx);
2017-09-10 18:35:59 +02:00
crypto::hash payment_id = crypto::null_hash;
std::vector<cryptonote::tx_destination_entry> dests;
uint64_t amount_in = 0;
if (store_tx_info())
{
payment_id = get_payment_id(ptx);
dests = ptx.dests;
for(size_t idx: ptx.selected_transfers)
amount_in += m_transfers[idx].amount();
}
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
add_unconfirmed_tx(ptx.tx, amount_in, dests, payment_id, ptx.change_dts.amount, ptx.construction_data.subaddr_account, ptx.construction_data.subaddr_indices);
if (store_tx_info())
2016-07-12 00:14:58 +02:00
{
m_tx_keys.insert(std::make_pair(txid, ptx.tx_key));
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
m_additional_tx_keys.insert(std::make_pair(txid, ptx.additional_tx_keys));
2016-07-12 00:14:58 +02:00
}
LOG_PRINT_L2("transaction " << txid << " generated ok and sent to daemon, key_images: [" << ptx.key_images << "]");
for(size_t idx: ptx.selected_transfers)
{
set_spent(idx, 0);
}
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
// tx generated, get rid of used k values
for (size_t idx: ptx.selected_transfers)
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
m_transfers[idx].m_multisig_k.clear();
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
//fee includes dust if dust policy specified it.
LOG_PRINT_L1("Transaction successfully sent. <" << txid << ">" << ENDL
<< "Commission: " << print_money(ptx.fee) << " (dust sent to dust addr: " << print_money((ptx.dust_added_to_fee ? 0 : ptx.dust)) << ")" << ENDL
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
<< "Balance: " << print_money(balance(ptx.construction_data.subaddr_account)) << ENDL
<< "Unlocked: " << print_money(unlocked_balance(ptx.construction_data.subaddr_account)) << ENDL
<< "Please, wait for confirmation for your balance to be unlocked.");
}
void wallet2::commit_tx(std::vector<pending_tx>& ptx_vector)
{
for (auto & ptx : ptx_vector)
{
commit_tx(ptx);
}
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
bool wallet2::save_tx(const std::vector<pending_tx>& ptx_vector, const std::string &filename) const
{
LOG_PRINT_L0("saving " << ptx_vector.size() << " transactions");
std::string ciphertext = dump_tx_to_str(ptx_vector);
if (ciphertext.empty())
return false;
return epee::file_io_utils::save_string_to_file(filename, ciphertext);
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
std::string wallet2::dump_tx_to_str(const std::vector<pending_tx> &ptx_vector) const
{
LOG_PRINT_L0("saving " << ptx_vector.size() << " transactions");
unsigned_tx_set txs;
for (auto &tx: ptx_vector)
{
// Short payment id is encrypted with tx_key.
// Since sign_tx() generates new tx_keys and encrypts the payment id, we need to save the decrypted payment ID
// Save tx construction_data to unsigned_tx_set
txs.txes.push_back(get_construction_data_with_decrypted_short_payment_id(tx, m_account.get_device()));
}
txs.transfers = export_outputs();
// save as binary
std::ostringstream oss;
boost::archive::portable_binary_oarchive ar(oss);
try
{
ar << txs;
}
catch (...)
{
return std::string();
}
LOG_PRINT_L2("Saving unsigned tx data: " << oss.str());
std::string ciphertext = encrypt_with_view_secret_key(oss.str());
return std::string(UNSIGNED_TX_PREFIX) + ciphertext;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
bool wallet2::load_unsigned_tx(const std::string &unsigned_filename, unsigned_tx_set &exported_txs) const
{
std::string s;
boost::system::error_code errcode;
if (!boost::filesystem::exists(unsigned_filename, errcode))
{
LOG_PRINT_L0("File " << unsigned_filename << " does not exist: " << errcode);
return false;
}
if (!epee::file_io_utils::load_file_to_string(unsigned_filename.c_str(), s))
{
LOG_PRINT_L0("Failed to load from " << unsigned_filename);
return false;
}
return parse_unsigned_tx_from_str(s, exported_txs);
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
bool wallet2::parse_unsigned_tx_from_str(const std::string &unsigned_tx_st, unsigned_tx_set &exported_txs) const
{
std::string s = unsigned_tx_st;
const size_t magiclen = strlen(UNSIGNED_TX_PREFIX) - 1;
if (strncmp(s.c_str(), UNSIGNED_TX_PREFIX, magiclen))
{
LOG_PRINT_L0("Bad magic from unsigned tx");
return false;
}
s = s.substr(magiclen);
const char version = s[0];
s = s.substr(1);
if (version == '\003')
{
try
{
std::istringstream iss(s);
boost::archive::portable_binary_iarchive ar(iss);
ar >> exported_txs;
}
catch (...)
{
LOG_PRINT_L0("Failed to parse data from unsigned tx");
return false;
}
}
else if (version == '\004')
{
try
{
s = decrypt_with_view_secret_key(s);
try
{
std::istringstream iss(s);
boost::archive::portable_binary_iarchive ar(iss);
ar >> exported_txs;
}
catch (...)
{
LOG_PRINT_L0("Failed to parse data from unsigned tx");
return false;
}
}
catch (const std::exception &e)
{
LOG_PRINT_L0("Failed to decrypt unsigned tx: " << e.what());
return false;
}
}
else
{
LOG_PRINT_L0("Unsupported version in unsigned tx");
return false;
}
LOG_PRINT_L1("Loaded tx unsigned data from binary: " << exported_txs.txes.size() << " transactions");
2017-01-08 13:17:09 +01:00
return true;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
bool wallet2::sign_tx(const std::string &unsigned_filename, const std::string &signed_filename, std::vector<wallet2::pending_tx> &txs, std::function<bool(const unsigned_tx_set&)> accept_func, bool export_raw)
2017-01-08 13:17:09 +01:00
{
unsigned_tx_set exported_txs;
if(!load_unsigned_tx(unsigned_filename, exported_txs))
return false;
if (accept_func && !accept_func(exported_txs))
{
LOG_PRINT_L1("Transactions rejected by callback");
return false;
}
return sign_tx(exported_txs, signed_filename, txs, export_raw);
2017-01-08 13:17:09 +01:00
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
bool wallet2::sign_tx(unsigned_tx_set &exported_txs, std::vector<wallet2::pending_tx> &txs, signed_tx_set &signed_txes)
2017-01-08 13:17:09 +01:00
{
import_outputs(exported_txs.transfers);
// sign the transactions
for (size_t n = 0; n < exported_txs.txes.size(); ++n)
{
tools::wallet2::tx_construction_data &sd = exported_txs.txes[n];
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(sd.sources.empty(), error::wallet_internal_error, "Empty sources");
LOG_PRINT_L1(" " << (n+1) << ": " << sd.sources.size() << " inputs, ring size " << sd.sources[0].outputs.size());
signed_txes.ptx.push_back(pending_tx());
tools::wallet2::pending_tx &ptx = signed_txes.ptx.back();
rct::RCTConfig rct_config = sd.rct_config;
crypto::secret_key tx_key;
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
std::vector<crypto::secret_key> additional_tx_keys;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
rct::multisig_out msout;
bool r = cryptonote::construct_tx_and_get_tx_key(m_account.get_keys(), m_subaddresses, sd.sources, sd.splitted_dsts, sd.change_dts.addr, sd.extra, ptx.tx, sd.unlock_time, tx_key, additional_tx_keys, sd.use_rct, rct_config, m_multisig ? &msout : NULL);
2018-02-16 12:04:04 +01:00
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!r, error::tx_not_constructed, sd.sources, sd.splitted_dsts, sd.unlock_time, m_nettype);
// we don't test tx size, because we don't know the current limit, due to not having a blockchain,
// and it's a bit pointless to fail there anyway, since it'd be a (good) guess only. We sign anyway,
// and if we really go over limit, the daemon will reject when it gets submitted. Chances are it's
// OK anyway since it was generated in the first place, and rerolling should be within a few bytes.
// normally, the tx keys are saved in commit_tx, when the tx is actually sent to the daemon.
// we can't do that here since the tx will be sent from the compromised wallet, which we don't want
// to see that info, so we save it here
if (store_tx_info())
{
const crypto::hash txid = get_transaction_hash(ptx.tx);
m_tx_keys.insert(std::make_pair(txid, tx_key));
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
m_additional_tx_keys.insert(std::make_pair(txid, additional_tx_keys));
}
std::string key_images;
bool all_are_txin_to_key = std::all_of(ptx.tx.vin.begin(), ptx.tx.vin.end(), [&](const txin_v& s_e) -> bool
{
CHECKED_GET_SPECIFIC_VARIANT(s_e, const txin_to_key, in, false);
key_images += boost::to_string(in.k_image) + " ";
return true;
});
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!all_are_txin_to_key, error::unexpected_txin_type, ptx.tx);
ptx.key_images = key_images;
ptx.fee = 0;
for (const auto &i: sd.sources) ptx.fee += i.amount;
for (const auto &i: sd.splitted_dsts) ptx.fee -= i.amount;
ptx.dust = 0;
ptx.dust_added_to_fee = false;
ptx.change_dts = sd.change_dts;
ptx.selected_transfers = sd.selected_transfers;
ptx.tx_key = rct::rct2sk(rct::identity()); // don't send it back to the untrusted view wallet
ptx.dests = sd.dests;
ptx.construction_data = sd;
txs.push_back(ptx);
// add tx keys only to ptx
txs.back().tx_key = tx_key;
txs.back().additional_tx_keys = additional_tx_keys;
}
// add key image mapping for these txes
const account_keys &keys = get_account().get_keys();
hw::device &hwdev = m_account.get_device();
for (size_t n = 0; n < exported_txs.txes.size(); ++n)
{
const cryptonote::transaction &tx = signed_txes.ptx[n].tx;
crypto::key_derivation derivation;
std::vector<crypto::key_derivation> additional_derivations;
// compute public keys from out secret keys
crypto::public_key tx_pub_key;
crypto::secret_key_to_public_key(txs[n].tx_key, tx_pub_key);
std::vector<crypto::public_key> additional_tx_pub_keys;
for (const crypto::secret_key &skey: txs[n].additional_tx_keys)
{
additional_tx_pub_keys.resize(additional_tx_pub_keys.size() + 1);
crypto::secret_key_to_public_key(skey, additional_tx_pub_keys.back());
}
// compute derivations
hwdev.set_mode(hw::device::TRANSACTION_PARSE);
if (!hwdev.generate_key_derivation(tx_pub_key, keys.m_view_secret_key, derivation))
{
MWARNING("Failed to generate key derivation from tx pubkey in " << cryptonote::get_transaction_hash(tx) << ", skipping");
static_assert(sizeof(derivation) == sizeof(rct::key), "Mismatched sizes of key_derivation and rct::key");
memcpy(&derivation, rct::identity().bytes, sizeof(derivation));
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < additional_tx_pub_keys.size(); ++i)
{
additional_derivations.push_back({});
if (!hwdev.generate_key_derivation(additional_tx_pub_keys[i], keys.m_view_secret_key, additional_derivations.back()))
{
MWARNING("Failed to generate key derivation from additional tx pubkey in " << cryptonote::get_transaction_hash(tx) << ", skipping");
memcpy(&additional_derivations.back(), rct::identity().bytes, sizeof(crypto::key_derivation));
}
}
for (size_t i = 0; i < tx.vout.size(); ++i)
{
if (tx.vout[i].target.type() != typeid(cryptonote::txout_to_key))
continue;
const cryptonote::txout_to_key &out = boost::get<cryptonote::txout_to_key>(tx.vout[i].target);
// if this output is back to this wallet, we can calculate its key image already
if (!is_out_to_acc_precomp(m_subaddresses, out.key, derivation, additional_derivations, i, hwdev))
continue;
crypto::key_image ki;
cryptonote::keypair in_ephemeral;
if (generate_key_image_helper(keys, m_subaddresses, out.key, tx_pub_key, additional_tx_pub_keys, i, in_ephemeral, ki, hwdev))
signed_txes.tx_key_images[out.key] = ki;
else
MERROR("Failed to calculate key image");
}
}
// add key images
signed_txes.key_images.resize(m_transfers.size());
for (size_t i = 0; i < m_transfers.size(); ++i)
{
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
if (!m_transfers[i].m_key_image_known || m_transfers[i].m_key_image_partial)
LOG_PRINT_L0("WARNING: key image not known in signing wallet at index " << i);
signed_txes.key_images[i] = m_transfers[i].m_key_image;
}
return true;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
bool wallet2::sign_tx(unsigned_tx_set &exported_txs, const std::string &signed_filename, std::vector<wallet2::pending_tx> &txs, bool export_raw)
{
// sign the transactions
signed_tx_set signed_txes;
std::string ciphertext = sign_tx_dump_to_str(exported_txs, txs, signed_txes);
if (ciphertext.empty())
{
LOG_PRINT_L0("Failed to sign unsigned_tx_set");
return false;
}
if (!epee::file_io_utils::save_string_to_file(signed_filename, ciphertext))
{
LOG_PRINT_L0("Failed to save file to " << signed_filename);
return false;
}
// export signed raw tx without encryption
if (export_raw)
{
for (size_t i = 0; i < signed_txes.ptx.size(); ++i)
{
std::string tx_as_hex = epee::string_tools::buff_to_hex_nodelimer(tx_to_blob(signed_txes.ptx[i].tx));
std::string raw_filename = signed_filename + "_raw" + (signed_txes.ptx.size() == 1 ? "" : ("_" + std::to_string(i)));
if (!epee::file_io_utils::save_string_to_file(raw_filename, tx_as_hex))
{
LOG_PRINT_L0("Failed to save file to " << raw_filename);
return false;
}
}
}
return true;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
std::string wallet2::sign_tx_dump_to_str(unsigned_tx_set &exported_txs, std::vector<wallet2::pending_tx> &ptx, signed_tx_set &signed_txes)
{
// sign the transactions
bool r = sign_tx(exported_txs, ptx, signed_txes);
if (!r)
{
LOG_PRINT_L0("Failed to sign unsigned_tx_set");
return std::string();
}
// save as binary
std::ostringstream oss;
boost::archive::portable_binary_oarchive ar(oss);
try
{
ar << signed_txes;
}
catch(...)
{
return std::string();
}
LOG_PRINT_L3("Saving signed tx data (with encryption): " << oss.str());
std::string ciphertext = encrypt_with_view_secret_key(oss.str());
return std::string(SIGNED_TX_PREFIX) + ciphertext;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
bool wallet2::load_tx(const std::string &signed_filename, std::vector<tools::wallet2::pending_tx> &ptx, std::function<bool(const signed_tx_set&)> accept_func)
{
std::string s;
boost::system::error_code errcode;
signed_tx_set signed_txs;
if (!boost::filesystem::exists(signed_filename, errcode))
{
LOG_PRINT_L0("File " << signed_filename << " does not exist: " << errcode);
return false;
}
if (!epee::file_io_utils::load_file_to_string(signed_filename.c_str(), s))
{
LOG_PRINT_L0("Failed to load from " << signed_filename);
return false;
}
return parse_tx_from_str(s, ptx, accept_func);
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
bool wallet2::parse_tx_from_str(const std::string &signed_tx_st, std::vector<tools::wallet2::pending_tx> &ptx, std::function<bool(const signed_tx_set &)> accept_func)
{
std::string s = signed_tx_st;
boost::system::error_code errcode;
signed_tx_set signed_txs;
const size_t magiclen = strlen(SIGNED_TX_PREFIX) - 1;
if (strncmp(s.c_str(), SIGNED_TX_PREFIX, magiclen))
{
LOG_PRINT_L0("Bad magic from signed transaction");
return false;
}
s = s.substr(magiclen);
const char version = s[0];
s = s.substr(1);
if (version == '\003')
{
try
{
std::istringstream iss(s);
boost::archive::portable_binary_iarchive ar(iss);
ar >> signed_txs;
}
catch (...)
{
LOG_PRINT_L0("Failed to parse data from signed transaction");
return false;
}
}
else if (version == '\004')
{
try
{
s = decrypt_with_view_secret_key(s);
try
{
std::istringstream iss(s);
boost::archive::portable_binary_iarchive ar(iss);
ar >> signed_txs;
}
catch (...)
{
LOG_PRINT_L0("Failed to parse decrypted data from signed transaction");
return false;
}
}
catch (const std::exception &e)
{
LOG_PRINT_L0("Failed to decrypt signed transaction: " << e.what());
return false;
}
}
else
{
LOG_PRINT_L0("Unsupported version in signed transaction");
return false;
}
LOG_PRINT_L0("Loaded signed tx data from binary: " << signed_txs.ptx.size() << " transactions");
for (auto &c_ptx: signed_txs.ptx) LOG_PRINT_L0(cryptonote::obj_to_json_str(c_ptx.tx));
if (accept_func && !accept_func(signed_txs))
{
LOG_PRINT_L1("Transactions rejected by callback");
return false;
}
// import key images
2018-08-23 23:50:53 +02:00
bool r = import_key_images(signed_txs.key_images);
if (!r) return false;
// remember key images for this tx, for when we get those txes from the blockchain
for (const auto &e: signed_txs.tx_key_images)
m_cold_key_images.insert(e);
ptx = signed_txs.ptx;
return true;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017-11-27 21:09:04 +01:00
std::string wallet2::save_multisig_tx(multisig_tx_set txs)
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
{
LOG_PRINT_L0("saving " << txs.m_ptx.size() << " multisig transactions");
// txes generated, get rid of used k values
for (size_t n = 0; n < txs.m_ptx.size(); ++n)
for (size_t idx: txs.m_ptx[n].construction_data.selected_transfers)
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
m_transfers[idx].m_multisig_k.clear();
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
// zero out some data we don't want to share
for (auto &ptx: txs.m_ptx)
{
for (auto &e: ptx.construction_data.sources)
e.multisig_kLRki.k = rct::zero();
}
for (auto &ptx: txs.m_ptx)
{
// Get decrypted payment id from pending_tx
ptx.construction_data = get_construction_data_with_decrypted_short_payment_id(ptx, m_account.get_device());
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
}
// save as binary
std::ostringstream oss;
boost::archive::portable_binary_oarchive ar(oss);
try
{
ar << txs;
}
catch (...)
{
2017-11-27 21:09:04 +01:00
return std::string();
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
}
LOG_PRINT_L2("Saving multisig unsigned tx data: " << oss.str());
std::string ciphertext = encrypt_with_view_secret_key(oss.str());
2017-11-27 21:09:04 +01:00
return std::string(MULTISIG_UNSIGNED_TX_PREFIX) + ciphertext;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017-11-27 21:09:04 +01:00
bool wallet2::save_multisig_tx(const multisig_tx_set &txs, const std::string &filename)
{
std::string ciphertext = save_multisig_tx(txs);
if (ciphertext.empty())
return false;
return epee::file_io_utils::save_string_to_file(filename, ciphertext);
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
wallet2::multisig_tx_set wallet2::make_multisig_tx_set(const std::vector<pending_tx>& ptx_vector) const
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
{
multisig_tx_set txs;
txs.m_ptx = ptx_vector;
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
for (const auto &msk: get_account().get_multisig_keys())
{
crypto::public_key pkey = get_multisig_signing_public_key(msk);
for (auto &ptx: txs.m_ptx) for (auto &sig: ptx.multisig_sigs) sig.signing_keys.insert(pkey);
}
txs.m_signers.insert(get_multisig_signer_public_key());
return txs;
}
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
std::string wallet2::save_multisig_tx(const std::vector<pending_tx>& ptx_vector)
{
return save_multisig_tx(make_multisig_tx_set(ptx_vector));
2017-11-27 21:09:04 +01:00
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
bool wallet2::save_multisig_tx(const std::vector<pending_tx>& ptx_vector, const std::string &filename)
{
std::string ciphertext = save_multisig_tx(ptx_vector);
if (ciphertext.empty())
return false;
return epee::file_io_utils::save_string_to_file(filename, ciphertext);
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
bool wallet2::parse_multisig_tx_from_str(std::string multisig_tx_st, multisig_tx_set &exported_txs) const
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
{
const size_t magiclen = strlen(MULTISIG_UNSIGNED_TX_PREFIX);
if (strncmp(multisig_tx_st.c_str(), MULTISIG_UNSIGNED_TX_PREFIX, magiclen))
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
{
2017-11-27 21:09:16 +01:00
LOG_PRINT_L0("Bad magic from multisig tx data");
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
return false;
}
try
{
multisig_tx_st = decrypt_with_view_secret_key(std::string(multisig_tx_st, magiclen));
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
}
catch (const std::exception &e)
{
2017-11-27 21:09:16 +01:00
LOG_PRINT_L0("Failed to decrypt multisig tx data: " << e.what());
return false;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
}
try
{
std::istringstream iss(multisig_tx_st);
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
boost::archive::portable_binary_iarchive ar(iss);
ar >> exported_txs;
}
catch (...)
{
2017-11-27 21:09:16 +01:00
LOG_PRINT_L0("Failed to parse multisig tx data");
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
return false;
}
// sanity checks
for (const auto &ptx: exported_txs.m_ptx)
{
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(ptx.selected_transfers.size() == ptx.tx.vin.size(), false, "Mismatched selected_transfers/vin sizes");
for (size_t idx: ptx.selected_transfers)
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(idx < m_transfers.size(), false, "Transfer index out of range");
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(ptx.construction_data.selected_transfers.size() == ptx.tx.vin.size(), false, "Mismatched cd selected_transfers/vin sizes");
for (size_t idx: ptx.construction_data.selected_transfers)
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(idx < m_transfers.size(), false, "Transfer index out of range");
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(ptx.construction_data.sources.size() == ptx.tx.vin.size(), false, "Mismatched sources/vin sizes");
}
return true;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
bool wallet2::load_multisig_tx(cryptonote::blobdata s, multisig_tx_set &exported_txs, std::function<bool(const multisig_tx_set&)> accept_func)
{
if(!parse_multisig_tx_from_str(s, exported_txs))
{
LOG_PRINT_L0("Failed to parse multisig transaction from string");
return false;
}
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
LOG_PRINT_L1("Loaded multisig tx unsigned data from binary: " << exported_txs.m_ptx.size() << " transactions");
for (auto &ptx: exported_txs.m_ptx) LOG_PRINT_L0(cryptonote::obj_to_json_str(ptx.tx));
if (accept_func && !accept_func(exported_txs))
{
LOG_PRINT_L1("Transactions rejected by callback");
return false;
}
const bool is_signed = exported_txs.m_signers.size() >= m_multisig_threshold;
if (is_signed)
{
for (const auto &ptx: exported_txs.m_ptx)
{
const crypto::hash txid = get_transaction_hash(ptx.tx);
if (store_tx_info())
{
m_tx_keys.insert(std::make_pair(txid, ptx.tx_key));
m_additional_tx_keys.insert(std::make_pair(txid, ptx.additional_tx_keys));
}
}
}
return true;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017-11-27 21:09:16 +01:00
bool wallet2::load_multisig_tx_from_file(const std::string &filename, multisig_tx_set &exported_txs, std::function<bool(const multisig_tx_set&)> accept_func)
{
std::string s;
boost::system::error_code errcode;
if (!boost::filesystem::exists(filename, errcode))
{
LOG_PRINT_L0("File " << filename << " does not exist: " << errcode);
return false;
}
if (!epee::file_io_utils::load_file_to_string(filename.c_str(), s))
{
LOG_PRINT_L0("Failed to load from " << filename);
return false;
}
if (!load_multisig_tx(s, exported_txs, accept_func))
{
LOG_PRINT_L0("Failed to parse multisig tx data from " << filename);
return false;
}
return true;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
bool wallet2::sign_multisig_tx(multisig_tx_set &exported_txs, std::vector<crypto::hash> &txids)
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(exported_txs.m_ptx.empty(), error::wallet_internal_error, "No tx found");
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
const crypto::public_key local_signer = get_multisig_signer_public_key();
2017-11-27 21:09:16 +01:00
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(exported_txs.m_signers.find(local_signer) != exported_txs.m_signers.end(),
error::wallet_internal_error, "Transaction already signed by this private key");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(exported_txs.m_signers.size() > m_multisig_threshold,
error::wallet_internal_error, "Transaction was signed by too many signers");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(exported_txs.m_signers.size() == m_multisig_threshold,
error::wallet_internal_error, "Transaction is already fully signed");
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
txids.clear();
// sign the transactions
for (size_t n = 0; n < exported_txs.m_ptx.size(); ++n)
{
tools::wallet2::pending_tx &ptx = exported_txs.m_ptx[n];
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(ptx.multisig_sigs.empty(), error::wallet_internal_error, "No signatures found in multisig tx");
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
tools::wallet2::tx_construction_data &sd = ptx.construction_data;
LOG_PRINT_L1(" " << (n+1) << ": " << sd.sources.size() << " inputs, mixin " << (sd.sources[0].outputs.size()-1) <<
", signed by " << exported_txs.m_signers.size() << "/" << m_multisig_threshold);
cryptonote::transaction tx;
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
rct::multisig_out msout = ptx.multisig_sigs.front().msout;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
auto sources = sd.sources;
rct::RCTConfig rct_config = sd.rct_config;
bool r = cryptonote::construct_tx_with_tx_key(m_account.get_keys(), m_subaddresses, sources, sd.splitted_dsts, ptx.change_dts.addr, sd.extra, tx, sd.unlock_time, ptx.tx_key, ptx.additional_tx_keys, sd.use_rct, rct_config, &msout, false);
2018-02-16 12:04:04 +01:00
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!r, error::tx_not_constructed, sd.sources, sd.splitted_dsts, sd.unlock_time, m_nettype);
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(get_transaction_prefix_hash (tx) != get_transaction_prefix_hash(ptx.tx),
error::wallet_internal_error, "Transaction prefix does not match data");
// Tests passed, sign
std::vector<unsigned int> indices;
for (const auto &source: sources)
indices.push_back(source.real_output);
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
for (auto &sig: ptx.multisig_sigs)
{
if (sig.ignore.find(local_signer) == sig.ignore.end())
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
{
ptx.tx.rct_signatures = sig.sigs;
rct::keyV k;
for (size_t idx: sd.selected_transfers)
k.push_back(get_multisig_k(idx, sig.used_L));
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
rct::key skey = rct::zero();
for (const auto &msk: get_account().get_multisig_keys())
{
crypto::public_key pmsk = get_multisig_signing_public_key(msk);
if (sig.signing_keys.find(pmsk) == sig.signing_keys.end())
{
sc_add(skey.bytes, skey.bytes, rct::sk2rct(msk).bytes);
sig.signing_keys.insert(pmsk);
}
}
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!rct::signMultisig(ptx.tx.rct_signatures, indices, k, sig.msout, skey),
error::wallet_internal_error, "Failed signing, transaction likely malformed");
sig.sigs = ptx.tx.rct_signatures;
}
}
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
const bool is_last = exported_txs.m_signers.size() + 1 >= m_multisig_threshold;
if (is_last)
{
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
// when the last signature on a multisig tx is made, we select the right
// signature to plug into the final tx
bool found = false;
for (const auto &sig: ptx.multisig_sigs)
{
if (sig.ignore.find(local_signer) == sig.ignore.end() && !keys_intersect(sig.ignore, exported_txs.m_signers))
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(found, error::wallet_internal_error, "More than one transaction is final");
ptx.tx.rct_signatures = sig.sigs;
found = true;
}
}
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!found, error::wallet_internal_error,
"Final signed transaction not found: this transaction was likely made without our export data, so we cannot sign it");
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
const crypto::hash txid = get_transaction_hash(ptx.tx);
if (store_tx_info())
{
m_tx_keys.insert(std::make_pair(txid, ptx.tx_key));
m_additional_tx_keys.insert(std::make_pair(txid, ptx.additional_tx_keys));
}
txids.push_back(txid);
}
}
// txes generated, get rid of used k values
for (size_t n = 0; n < exported_txs.m_ptx.size(); ++n)
for (size_t idx: exported_txs.m_ptx[n].construction_data.selected_transfers)
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
m_transfers[idx].m_multisig_k.clear();
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
exported_txs.m_signers.insert(get_multisig_signer_public_key());
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
return true;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
bool wallet2::sign_multisig_tx_to_file(multisig_tx_set &exported_txs, const std::string &filename, std::vector<crypto::hash> &txids)
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
{
bool r = sign_multisig_tx(exported_txs, txids);
if (!r)
return false;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
return save_multisig_tx(exported_txs, filename);
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
bool wallet2::sign_multisig_tx_from_file(const std::string &filename, std::vector<crypto::hash> &txids, std::function<bool(const multisig_tx_set&)> accept_func)
{
multisig_tx_set exported_txs;
if(!load_multisig_tx_from_file(filename, exported_txs))
return false;
if (accept_func && !accept_func(exported_txs))
{
LOG_PRINT_L1("Transactions rejected by callback");
return false;
}
return sign_multisig_tx_to_file(exported_txs, filename, txids);
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
uint64_t wallet2::get_fee_multiplier(uint32_t priority, int fee_algorithm) const
{
static const struct
{
size_t count;
uint64_t multipliers[4];
}
multipliers[] =
{
{ 3, {1, 2, 3} },
{ 3, {1, 20, 166} },
{ 4, {1, 4, 20, 166} },
{ 4, {1, 5, 25, 1000} },
};
if (fee_algorithm == -1)
fee_algorithm = get_fee_algorithm();
// 0 -> default (here, x1 till fee algorithm 2, x4 from it)
if (priority == 0)
priority = m_default_priority;
if (priority == 0)
{
if (fee_algorithm >= 2)
priority = 2;
else
priority = 1;
}
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(fee_algorithm < 0 || fee_algorithm > 3, error::invalid_priority);
// 1 to 3/4 are allowed as priorities
const uint32_t max_priority = multipliers[fee_algorithm].count;
if (priority >= 1 && priority <= max_priority)
{
return multipliers[fee_algorithm].multipliers[priority-1];
}
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF (false, error::invalid_priority);
return 1;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
uint64_t wallet2::get_dynamic_base_fee_estimate() const
2016-10-28 22:41:41 +02:00
{
uint64_t fee;
boost::optional<std::string> result = m_node_rpc_proxy.get_dynamic_base_fee_estimate(FEE_ESTIMATE_GRACE_BLOCKS, fee);
if (!result)
return fee;
const uint64_t base_fee = use_fork_rules(HF_VERSION_PER_BYTE_FEE) ? FEE_PER_BYTE : FEE_PER_KB;
LOG_PRINT_L1("Failed to query base fee, using " << print_money(base_fee));
return base_fee;
2016-10-28 22:41:41 +02:00
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
uint64_t wallet2::get_base_fee() const
2016-10-28 22:41:41 +02:00
{
if(m_light_wallet)
{
if (use_fork_rules(HF_VERSION_PER_BYTE_FEE))
return m_light_wallet_per_kb_fee / 1024;
else
return m_light_wallet_per_kb_fee;
}
bool use_dyn_fee = use_fork_rules(HF_VERSION_DYNAMIC_FEE, -720 * 1);
2016-10-28 22:41:41 +02:00
if (!use_dyn_fee)
return FEE_PER_KB;
return get_dynamic_base_fee_estimate();
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
uint64_t wallet2::get_fee_quantization_mask() const
{
if(m_light_wallet)
{
return 1; // TODO
}
bool use_per_byte_fee = use_fork_rules(HF_VERSION_PER_BYTE_FEE, 0);
if (!use_per_byte_fee)
return 1;
uint64_t fee_quantization_mask;
boost::optional<std::string> result = m_node_rpc_proxy.get_fee_quantization_mask(fee_quantization_mask);
if (result)
return 1;
return fee_quantization_mask;
2016-10-28 22:41:41 +02:00
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
int wallet2::get_fee_algorithm() const
{
// changes at v3, v5, v8
if (use_fork_rules(HF_VERSION_PER_BYTE_FEE, 0))
return 3;
if (use_fork_rules(5, 0))
return 2;
if (use_fork_rules(3, -720 * 14))
return 1;
return 0;
}
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
uint64_t wallet2::get_min_ring_size() const
{
if (use_fork_rules(8, 10))
return 11;
if (use_fork_rules(7, 10))
return 7;
if (use_fork_rules(6, 10))
return 5;
if (use_fork_rules(2, 10))
return 3;
return 0;
}
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
uint64_t wallet2::get_max_ring_size() const
{
if (use_fork_rules(8, 10))
return 11;
return 0;
}
//------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
uint64_t wallet2::adjust_mixin(uint64_t mixin) const
{
const uint64_t min_ring_size = get_min_ring_size();
if (mixin + 1 < min_ring_size)
{
MWARNING("Requested ring size " << (mixin + 1) << " too low, using " << min_ring_size);
mixin = min_ring_size-1;
}
const uint64_t max_ring_size = get_max_ring_size();
if (max_ring_size && mixin + 1 > max_ring_size)
{
MWARNING("Requested ring size " << (mixin + 1) << " too high, using " << max_ring_size);
mixin = max_ring_size-1;
}
return mixin;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
uint32_t wallet2::adjust_priority(uint32_t priority)
{
if (priority == 0 && m_default_priority == 0 && auto_low_priority())
{
try
{
// check if there's a backlog in the tx pool
const bool use_per_byte_fee = use_fork_rules(HF_VERSION_PER_BYTE_FEE, 0);
const uint64_t base_fee = get_base_fee();
const uint64_t fee_multiplier = get_fee_multiplier(1);
const double fee_level = fee_multiplier * base_fee * (use_per_byte_fee ? 1 : (12/(double)13 / (double)1024));
const std::vector<std::pair<uint64_t, uint64_t>> blocks = estimate_backlog({std::make_pair(fee_level, fee_level)});
if (blocks.size() != 1)
{
MERROR("Bad estimated backlog array size");
return priority;
}
else if (blocks[0].first > 0)
{
MINFO("We don't use the low priority because there's a backlog in the tx pool.");
return priority;
}
// get the current full reward zone
uint64_t block_weight_limit = 0;
const auto result = m_node_rpc_proxy.get_block_weight_limit(block_weight_limit);
throw_on_rpc_response_error(result, "get_info");
const uint64_t full_reward_zone = block_weight_limit / 2;
// get the last N block headers and sum the block sizes
const size_t N = 10;
if (m_blockchain.size() < N)
{
MERROR("The blockchain is too short");
return priority;
}
cryptonote::COMMAND_RPC_GET_BLOCK_HEADERS_RANGE::request getbh_req = AUTO_VAL_INIT(getbh_req);
cryptonote::COMMAND_RPC_GET_BLOCK_HEADERS_RANGE::response getbh_res = AUTO_VAL_INIT(getbh_res);
m_daemon_rpc_mutex.lock();
getbh_req.start_height = m_blockchain.size() - N;
getbh_req.end_height = m_blockchain.size() - 1;
bool r = net_utils::invoke_http_json_rpc("/json_rpc", "getblockheadersrange", getbh_req, getbh_res, m_http_client, rpc_timeout);
m_daemon_rpc_mutex.unlock();
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!r, error::no_connection_to_daemon, "getblockheadersrange");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(getbh_res.status == CORE_RPC_STATUS_BUSY, error::daemon_busy, "getblockheadersrange");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(getbh_res.status != CORE_RPC_STATUS_OK, error::get_blocks_error, get_rpc_status(getbh_res.status));
if (getbh_res.headers.size() != N)
{
MERROR("Bad blockheaders size");
return priority;
}
size_t block_weight_sum = 0;
for (const cryptonote::block_header_response &i : getbh_res.headers)
{
block_weight_sum += i.block_weight;
}
// estimate how 'full' the last N blocks are
const size_t P = 100 * block_weight_sum / (N * full_reward_zone);
MINFO((boost::format("The last %d blocks fill roughly %d%% of the full reward zone.") % N % P).str());
if (P > 80)
{
MINFO("We don't use the low priority because recent blocks are quite full.");
return priority;
}
MINFO("We'll use the low priority because probably it's safe to do so.");
return 1;
}
catch (const std::exception &e)
{
MERROR(e.what());
}
}
return priority;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
bool wallet2::set_ring_database(const std::string &filename)
{
m_ring_database = filename;
MINFO("ringdb path set to " << filename);
m_ringdb.reset();
if (!m_ring_database.empty())
{
try
{
cryptonote::block b;
generate_genesis(b);
m_ringdb.reset(new tools::ringdb(m_ring_database, epee::string_tools::pod_to_hex(get_block_hash(b))));
}
catch (const std::exception &e)
{
MERROR("Failed to initialize ringdb: " << e.what());
m_ring_database = "";
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
crypto::chacha_key wallet2::get_ringdb_key()
{
if (!m_ringdb_key)
{
MINFO("caching ringdb key");
crypto::chacha_key key;
generate_chacha_key_from_secret_keys(key);
m_ringdb_key = key;
}
return *m_ringdb_key;
}
2018-08-23 23:50:53 +02:00
void wallet2::register_devices(){
hw::trezor::register_all();
}
hw::device& wallet2::lookup_device(const std::string & device_descriptor){
if (!m_devices_registered){
m_devices_registered = true;
register_devices();
}
return hw::get_device(device_descriptor);
}
bool wallet2::add_rings(const crypto::chacha_key &key, const cryptonote::transaction_prefix &tx)
{
if (!m_ringdb)
return false;
try { return m_ringdb->add_rings(key, tx); }
catch (const std::exception &e) { return false; }
}
bool wallet2::add_rings(const cryptonote::transaction_prefix &tx)
{
try { return add_rings(get_ringdb_key(), tx); }
catch (const std::exception &e) { return false; }
}
bool wallet2::remove_rings(const cryptonote::transaction_prefix &tx)
{
if (!m_ringdb)
return false;
try { return m_ringdb->remove_rings(get_ringdb_key(), tx); }
catch (const std::exception &e) { return false; }
}
bool wallet2::get_ring(const crypto::chacha_key &key, const crypto::key_image &key_image, std::vector<uint64_t> &outs)
{
if (!m_ringdb)
return false;
try { return m_ringdb->get_ring(key, key_image, outs); }
catch (const std::exception &e) { return false; }
}
bool wallet2::get_rings(const crypto::hash &txid, std::vector<std::pair<crypto::key_image, std::vector<uint64_t>>> &outs)
{
for (auto i: m_confirmed_txs)
{
if (txid == i.first)
{
for (const auto &x: i.second.m_rings)
outs.push_back({x.first, cryptonote::relative_output_offsets_to_absolute(x.second)});
return true;
}
}
for (auto i: m_unconfirmed_txs)
{
if (txid == i.first)
{
for (const auto &x: i.second.m_rings)
outs.push_back({x.first, cryptonote::relative_output_offsets_to_absolute(x.second)});
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
bool wallet2::get_ring(const crypto::key_image &key_image, std::vector<uint64_t> &outs)
{
try { return get_ring(get_ringdb_key(), key_image, outs); }
catch (const std::exception &e) { return false; }
}
bool wallet2::set_ring(const crypto::key_image &key_image, const std::vector<uint64_t> &outs, bool relative)
{
if (!m_ringdb)
return false;
try { return m_ringdb->set_ring(get_ringdb_key(), key_image, outs, relative); }
catch (const std::exception &e) { return false; }
}
bool wallet2::find_and_save_rings(bool force)
{
if (!force && m_ring_history_saved)
return true;
if (!m_ringdb)
return false;
COMMAND_RPC_GET_TRANSACTIONS::request req = AUTO_VAL_INIT(req);
COMMAND_RPC_GET_TRANSACTIONS::response res = AUTO_VAL_INIT(res);
MDEBUG("Finding and saving rings...");
// get payments we made
std::vector<crypto::hash> txs_hashes;
std::list<std::pair<crypto::hash,wallet2::confirmed_transfer_details>> payments;
get_payments_out(payments, 0, std::numeric_limits<uint64_t>::max(), boost::none, std::set<uint32_t>());
for (const std::pair<crypto::hash,wallet2::confirmed_transfer_details> &entry: payments)
{
const crypto::hash &txid = entry.first;
txs_hashes.push_back(txid);
}
MDEBUG("Found " << std::to_string(txs_hashes.size()) << " transactions");
// get those transactions from the daemon
auto it = txs_hashes.begin();
static const size_t SLICE_SIZE = 200;
for (size_t slice = 0; slice < txs_hashes.size(); slice += SLICE_SIZE)
{
req.decode_as_json = false;
req.prune = true;
req.txs_hashes.clear();
size_t ntxes = slice + SLICE_SIZE > txs_hashes.size() ? txs_hashes.size() - slice : SLICE_SIZE;
for (size_t s = slice; s < slice + ntxes; ++s)
req.txs_hashes.push_back(epee::string_tools::pod_to_hex(txs_hashes[s]));
bool r;
{
const boost::lock_guard<boost::mutex> lock{m_daemon_rpc_mutex};
r = epee::net_utils::invoke_http_json("/gettransactions", req, res, m_http_client, rpc_timeout);
}
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!r, error::no_connection_to_daemon, "gettransactions");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(res.status == CORE_RPC_STATUS_BUSY, error::daemon_busy, "gettransactions");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(res.status != CORE_RPC_STATUS_OK, error::wallet_internal_error, "gettransactions");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(res.txs.size() != req.txs_hashes.size(), error::wallet_internal_error,
"daemon returned wrong response for gettransactions, wrong txs count = " +
std::to_string(res.txs.size()) + ", expected " + std::to_string(req.txs_hashes.size()));
MDEBUG("Scanning " << res.txs.size() << " transactions");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(slice + res.txs.size() > txs_hashes.size(), error::wallet_internal_error, "Unexpected tx array size");
for (size_t i = 0; i < res.txs.size(); ++i, ++it)
{
const auto &tx_info = res.txs[i];
cryptonote::transaction tx;
crypto::hash tx_hash;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!get_pruned_tx(tx_info, tx, tx_hash), error::wallet_internal_error,
"Failed to get transaction from daemon");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!(tx_hash == *it), error::wallet_internal_error, "Wrong txid received");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!add_rings(get_ringdb_key(), tx), error::wallet_internal_error, "Failed to save ring");
}
}
MINFO("Found and saved rings for " << txs_hashes.size() << " transactions");
m_ring_history_saved = true;
return true;
}
2017-08-04 23:12:37 +02:00
bool wallet2::blackball_output(const std::pair<uint64_t, uint64_t> &output)
{
if (!m_ringdb)
return false;
try { return m_ringdb->blackball(output); }
catch (const std::exception &e) { return false; }
}
bool wallet2::set_blackballed_outputs(const std::vector<std::pair<uint64_t, uint64_t>> &outputs, bool add)
{
if (!m_ringdb)
return false;
try
{
bool ret = true;
if (!add)
ret &= m_ringdb->clear_blackballs();
ret &= m_ringdb->blackball(outputs);
return ret;
}
catch (const std::exception &e) { return false; }
}
bool wallet2::unblackball_output(const std::pair<uint64_t, uint64_t> &output)
{
if (!m_ringdb)
return false;
try { return m_ringdb->unblackball(output); }
catch (const std::exception &e) { return false; }
}
bool wallet2::is_output_blackballed(const std::pair<uint64_t, uint64_t> &output) const
{
if (!m_ringdb)
return false;
try { return m_ringdb->blackballed(output); }
catch (const std::exception &e) { return false; }
}
bool wallet2::lock_keys_file()
{
if (m_keys_file_locker)
{
MDEBUG(m_keys_file << " is already locked.");
return false;
}
m_keys_file_locker.reset(new tools::file_locker(m_keys_file));
return true;
}
bool wallet2::unlock_keys_file()
{
if (!m_keys_file_locker)
{
MDEBUG(m_keys_file << " is already unlocked.");
return false;
}
m_keys_file_locker.reset();
return true;
}
bool wallet2::is_keys_file_locked() const
{
return m_keys_file_locker->locked();
}
bool wallet2::tx_add_fake_output(std::vector<std::vector<tools::wallet2::get_outs_entry>> &outs, uint64_t global_index, const crypto::public_key& output_public_key, const rct::key& mask, uint64_t real_index, bool unlocked) const
2017-08-04 23:12:37 +02:00
{
if (!unlocked) // don't add locked outs
return false;
if (global_index == real_index) // don't re-add real one
return false;
auto item = std::make_tuple(global_index, output_public_key, mask);
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(!outs.empty(), false, "internal error: outs is empty");
2017-08-04 23:12:37 +02:00
if (std::find(outs.back().begin(), outs.back().end(), item) != outs.back().end()) // don't add duplicates
return false;
// check the keys are valid
if (!rct::isInMainSubgroup(rct::pk2rct(output_public_key)))
{
MWARNING("Key " << output_public_key << " at index " << global_index << " is not in the main subgroup");
return false;
}
if (!rct::isInMainSubgroup(mask))
{
MWARNING("Commitment " << mask << " at index " << global_index << " is not in the main subgroup");
return false;
}
// if (is_output_blackballed(output_public_key)) // don't add blackballed outputs
// return false;
2017-08-04 23:12:37 +02:00
outs.back().push_back(item);
return true;
}
void wallet2::light_wallet_get_outs(std::vector<std::vector<tools::wallet2::get_outs_entry>> &outs, const std::vector<size_t> &selected_transfers, size_t fake_outputs_count) {
2017-08-04 23:12:37 +02:00
MDEBUG("LIGHTWALLET - Getting random outs");
cryptonote::COMMAND_RPC_GET_RANDOM_OUTS::request oreq;
cryptonote::COMMAND_RPC_GET_RANDOM_OUTS::response ores;
size_t light_wallet_requested_outputs_count = (size_t)((fake_outputs_count + 1) * 1.5 + 1);
// Amounts to ask for
// MyMonero api handle amounts and fees as strings
for(size_t idx: selected_transfers) {
const uint64_t ask_amount = m_transfers[idx].is_rct() ? 0 : m_transfers[idx].amount();
std::ostringstream amount_ss;
amount_ss << ask_amount;
oreq.amounts.push_back(amount_ss.str());
}
oreq.count = light_wallet_requested_outputs_count;
m_daemon_rpc_mutex.lock();
bool r = epee::net_utils::invoke_http_json("/get_random_outs", oreq, ores, m_http_client, rpc_timeout, "POST");
m_daemon_rpc_mutex.unlock();
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!r, error::no_connection_to_daemon, "get_random_outs");
2018-01-19 08:54:14 +01:00
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(ores.amount_outs.empty() , error::wallet_internal_error, "No outputs received from light wallet node. Error: " + ores.Error);
2017-08-04 23:12:37 +02:00
// Check if we got enough outputs for each amount
for(auto& out: ores.amount_outs) {
const uint64_t out_amount = boost::lexical_cast<uint64_t>(out.amount);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(out.outputs.size() < light_wallet_requested_outputs_count , error::wallet_internal_error, "Not enough outputs for amount: " + boost::lexical_cast<std::string>(out.amount));
MDEBUG(out.outputs.size() << " outputs for amount "+ boost::lexical_cast<std::string>(out.amount) + " received from light wallet node");
}
MDEBUG("selected transfers size: " << selected_transfers.size());
for(size_t idx: selected_transfers)
{
// Create new index
outs.push_back(std::vector<get_outs_entry>());
outs.back().reserve(fake_outputs_count + 1);
// add real output first
const transfer_details &td = m_transfers[idx];
const uint64_t amount = td.is_rct() ? 0 : td.amount();
outs.back().push_back(std::make_tuple(td.m_global_output_index, td.get_public_key(), rct::commit(td.amount(), td.m_mask)));
MDEBUG("added real output " << string_tools::pod_to_hex(td.get_public_key()));
// Even if the lightwallet server returns random outputs, we pick them randomly.
std::vector<size_t> order;
order.resize(light_wallet_requested_outputs_count);
for (size_t n = 0; n < order.size(); ++n)
order[n] = n;
std::shuffle(order.begin(), order.end(), std::default_random_engine(crypto::rand<unsigned>()));
LOG_PRINT_L2("Looking for " << (fake_outputs_count+1) << " outputs with amounts " << print_money(td.is_rct() ? 0 : td.amount()));
MDEBUG("OUTS SIZE: " << outs.back().size());
for (size_t o = 0; o < light_wallet_requested_outputs_count && outs.back().size() < fake_outputs_count + 1; ++o)
{
// Random pick
size_t i = order[o];
// Find which random output key to use
bool found_amount = false;
size_t amount_key;
for(amount_key = 0; amount_key < ores.amount_outs.size(); ++amount_key)
{
if(boost::lexical_cast<uint64_t>(ores.amount_outs[amount_key].amount) == amount) {
found_amount = true;
break;
}
}
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!found_amount , error::wallet_internal_error, "Outputs for amount " + boost::lexical_cast<std::string>(ores.amount_outs[amount_key].amount) + " not found" );
LOG_PRINT_L2("Index " << i << "/" << light_wallet_requested_outputs_count << ": idx " << ores.amount_outs[amount_key].outputs[i].global_index << " (real " << td.m_global_output_index << "), unlocked " << "(always in light)" << ", key " << ores.amount_outs[0].outputs[i].public_key);
// Convert light wallet string data to proper data structures
crypto::public_key tx_public_key;
rct::key mask = AUTO_VAL_INIT(mask); // decrypted mask - not used here
rct::key rct_commit = AUTO_VAL_INIT(rct_commit);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(string_tools::validate_hex(64, ores.amount_outs[amount_key].outputs[i].public_key), error::wallet_internal_error, "Invalid public_key");
string_tools::hex_to_pod(ores.amount_outs[amount_key].outputs[i].public_key, tx_public_key);
const uint64_t global_index = ores.amount_outs[amount_key].outputs[i].global_index;
if(!light_wallet_parse_rct_str(ores.amount_outs[amount_key].outputs[i].rct, tx_public_key, 0, mask, rct_commit, false))
rct_commit = rct::zeroCommit(td.amount());
if (tx_add_fake_output(outs, global_index, tx_public_key, rct_commit, td.m_global_output_index, true)) {
MDEBUG("added fake output " << ores.amount_outs[amount_key].outputs[i].public_key);
MDEBUG("index " << global_index);
}
}
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(outs.back().size() < fake_outputs_count + 1 , error::wallet_internal_error, "Not enough fake outputs found" );
// Real output is the first. Shuffle outputs
MTRACE(outs.back().size() << " outputs added. Sorting outputs by index:");
std::sort(outs.back().begin(), outs.back().end(), [](const get_outs_entry &a, const get_outs_entry &b) { return std::get<0>(a) < std::get<0>(b); });
// Print output order
for(auto added_out: outs.back())
MTRACE(std::get<0>(added_out));
}
}
void wallet2::get_outs(std::vector<std::vector<tools::wallet2::get_outs_entry>> &outs, const std::vector<size_t> &selected_transfers, size_t fake_outputs_count)
{
LOG_PRINT_L2("fake_outputs_count: " << fake_outputs_count);
outs.clear();
2017-08-04 23:12:37 +02:00
if(m_light_wallet && fake_outputs_count > 0) {
light_wallet_get_outs(outs, selected_transfers, fake_outputs_count);
return;
}
if (fake_outputs_count > 0)
{
uint64_t segregation_fork_height = get_segregation_fork_height();
// check whether we're shortly after the fork
uint64_t height;
boost::optional<std::string> result = m_node_rpc_proxy.get_height(height);
throw_on_rpc_response_error(result, "get_info");
bool is_shortly_after_segregation_fork = height >= segregation_fork_height && height < segregation_fork_height + SEGREGATION_FORK_VICINITY;
bool is_after_segregation_fork = height >= segregation_fork_height;
// if we have at least one rct out, get the distribution, or fall back to the previous system
uint64_t rct_start_height;
std::vector<uint64_t> rct_offsets;
bool has_rct = false;
uint64_t max_rct_index = 0;
for (size_t idx: selected_transfers)
if (m_transfers[idx].is_rct())
{
has_rct = true;
max_rct_index = std::max(max_rct_index, m_transfers[idx].m_global_output_index);
}
const bool has_rct_distribution = has_rct && get_rct_distribution(rct_start_height, rct_offsets);
if (has_rct_distribution)
{
// check we're clear enough of rct start, to avoid corner cases below
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(rct_offsets.size() <= CRYPTONOTE_DEFAULT_TX_SPENDABLE_AGE,
error::get_output_distribution, "Not enough rct outputs");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(rct_offsets.back() <= max_rct_index,
error::get_output_distribution, "Daemon reports suspicious number of rct outputs");
}
// get histogram for the amounts we need
cryptonote::COMMAND_RPC_GET_OUTPUT_HISTOGRAM::request req_t = AUTO_VAL_INIT(req_t);
cryptonote::COMMAND_RPC_GET_OUTPUT_HISTOGRAM::response resp_t = AUTO_VAL_INIT(resp_t);
// request histogram for all outputs, except 0 if we have the rct distribution
for(size_t idx: selected_transfers)
if (!m_transfers[idx].is_rct() || !has_rct_distribution)
req_t.amounts.push_back(m_transfers[idx].is_rct() ? 0 : m_transfers[idx].amount());
if (!req_t.amounts.empty())
{
std::sort(req_t.amounts.begin(), req_t.amounts.end());
auto end = std::unique(req_t.amounts.begin(), req_t.amounts.end());
req_t.amounts.resize(std::distance(req_t.amounts.begin(), end));
req_t.unlocked = true;
req_t.recent_cutoff = time(NULL) - RECENT_OUTPUT_ZONE;
m_daemon_rpc_mutex.lock();
bool r = net_utils::invoke_http_json_rpc("/json_rpc", "get_output_histogram", req_t, resp_t, m_http_client, rpc_timeout);
m_daemon_rpc_mutex.unlock();
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!r, error::no_connection_to_daemon, "transfer_selected");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(resp_t.status == CORE_RPC_STATUS_BUSY, error::daemon_busy, "get_output_histogram");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(resp_t.status != CORE_RPC_STATUS_OK, error::get_histogram_error, get_rpc_status(resp_t.status));
}
// if we want to segregate fake outs pre or post fork, get distribution
std::unordered_map<uint64_t, std::pair<uint64_t, uint64_t>> segregation_limit;
if (is_after_segregation_fork && (m_segregate_pre_fork_outputs || m_key_reuse_mitigation2))
{
cryptonote::COMMAND_RPC_GET_OUTPUT_DISTRIBUTION::request req_t = AUTO_VAL_INIT(req_t);
cryptonote::COMMAND_RPC_GET_OUTPUT_DISTRIBUTION::response resp_t = AUTO_VAL_INIT(resp_t);
for(size_t idx: selected_transfers)
req_t.amounts.push_back(m_transfers[idx].is_rct() ? 0 : m_transfers[idx].amount());
std::sort(req_t.amounts.begin(), req_t.amounts.end());
auto end = std::unique(req_t.amounts.begin(), req_t.amounts.end());
req_t.amounts.resize(std::distance(req_t.amounts.begin(), end));
req_t.from_height = std::max<uint64_t>(segregation_fork_height, RECENT_OUTPUT_BLOCKS) - RECENT_OUTPUT_BLOCKS;
req_t.to_height = segregation_fork_height + 1;
req_t.cumulative = true;
req_t.binary = true;
m_daemon_rpc_mutex.lock();
bool r = net_utils::invoke_http_json_rpc("/json_rpc", "get_output_distribution", req_t, resp_t, m_http_client, rpc_timeout * 1000);
m_daemon_rpc_mutex.unlock();
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!r, error::no_connection_to_daemon, "transfer_selected");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(resp_t.status == CORE_RPC_STATUS_BUSY, error::daemon_busy, "get_output_distribution");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(resp_t.status != CORE_RPC_STATUS_OK, error::get_output_distribution, get_rpc_status(resp_t.status));
// check we got all data
for(size_t idx: selected_transfers)
{
const uint64_t amount = m_transfers[idx].is_rct() ? 0 : m_transfers[idx].amount();
bool found = false;
for (const auto &d: resp_t.distributions)
{
if (d.amount == amount)
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(d.data.start_height > segregation_fork_height, error::get_output_distribution, "Distribution start_height too high");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(segregation_fork_height - d.data.start_height >= d.data.distribution.size(), error::get_output_distribution, "Distribution size too small");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(segregation_fork_height - RECENT_OUTPUT_BLOCKS - d.data.start_height >= d.data.distribution.size(), error::get_output_distribution, "Distribution size too small");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(segregation_fork_height <= RECENT_OUTPUT_BLOCKS, error::wallet_internal_error, "Fork height too low");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(segregation_fork_height - RECENT_OUTPUT_BLOCKS < d.data.start_height, error::get_output_distribution, "Bad start height");
uint64_t till_fork = d.data.distribution[segregation_fork_height - d.data.start_height];
uint64_t recent = till_fork - d.data.distribution[segregation_fork_height - RECENT_OUTPUT_BLOCKS - d.data.start_height];
segregation_limit[amount] = std::make_pair(till_fork, recent);
found = true;
break;
}
}
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!found, error::get_output_distribution, "Requested amount not found in response");
}
}
// we ask for more, to have spares if some outputs are still locked
size_t base_requested_outputs_count = (size_t)((fake_outputs_count + 1) * 1.5 + 1);
LOG_PRINT_L2("base_requested_outputs_count: " << base_requested_outputs_count);
// generate output indices to request
COMMAND_RPC_GET_OUTPUTS_BIN::request req = AUTO_VAL_INIT(req);
COMMAND_RPC_GET_OUTPUTS_BIN::response daemon_resp = AUTO_VAL_INIT(daemon_resp);
struct gamma_engine
{
typedef uint64_t result_type;
static constexpr result_type min() { return 0; }
static constexpr result_type max() { return std::numeric_limits<result_type>::max(); }
result_type operator()() { return crypto::rand<result_type>(); }
} engine;
static const double shape = 19.28/*16.94*/;
//static const double shape = m_testnet ? 17.02 : 17.28;
static const double scale = 1/1.61;
std::gamma_distribution<double> gamma(shape, scale);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(rct_offsets.size() <= CRYPTONOTE_DEFAULT_TX_SPENDABLE_AGE, error::wallet_internal_error, "Bad offset calculation");
uint64_t last_usable_block = rct_offsets.size() - 1;
auto pick_gamma = [&]()
{
double x = gamma(engine);
x = exp(x);
uint64_t block_offset = x / DIFFICULTY_TARGET_V2; // this assumes constant target over the whole rct range
if (block_offset > last_usable_block - CRYPTONOTE_DEFAULT_TX_SPENDABLE_AGE)
return std::numeric_limits<uint64_t>::max(); // bad pick
block_offset = last_usable_block - block_offset;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(block_offset > last_usable_block, error::wallet_internal_error, "Bad offset calculation");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(block_offset > 0 && rct_offsets[block_offset] < rct_offsets[block_offset - 1],
error::get_output_distribution, "Decreasing offsets in rct distribution: " +
std::to_string(block_offset - 1) + ": " + std::to_string(rct_offsets[block_offset - 1]) + ", " +
std::to_string(block_offset) + ": " + std::to_string(rct_offsets[block_offset]));
uint64_t first_block_offset = block_offset, last_block_offset = block_offset;
for (size_t half_window = 0; half_window <= GAMMA_PICK_HALF_WINDOW; ++half_window)
{
// end when we have a non empty block
uint64_t cum0 = first_block_offset > 0 ? rct_offsets[first_block_offset] - rct_offsets[first_block_offset - 1] : rct_offsets[0];
if (cum0 > 1)
break;
uint64_t cum1 = last_block_offset > 0 ? rct_offsets[last_block_offset] - rct_offsets[last_block_offset - 1] : rct_offsets[0];
if (cum1 > 1)
break;
if (first_block_offset == 0 && last_block_offset >= last_usable_block)
break;
// expand up to bounds
if (first_block_offset > 0)
--first_block_offset;
else
return std::numeric_limits<uint64_t>::max(); // bad pick
if (last_block_offset < last_usable_block - CRYPTONOTE_DEFAULT_TX_SPENDABLE_AGE)
++last_block_offset;
else
return std::numeric_limits<uint64_t>::max(); // bad pick
}
const uint64_t first_rct = first_block_offset == 0 ? 0 : rct_offsets[first_block_offset - 1];
const uint64_t n_rct = rct_offsets[last_block_offset] - first_rct;
if (n_rct == 0)
return rct_offsets[block_offset] ? rct_offsets[block_offset] - 1 : 0;
MDEBUG("Picking 1/" << n_rct << " in " << (last_block_offset - first_block_offset + 1) << " blocks centered around " << block_offset + rct_start_height);
return first_rct + crypto::rand<uint64_t>() % n_rct;
};
size_t num_selected_transfers = 0;
for(size_t idx: selected_transfers)
{
++num_selected_transfers;
const transfer_details &td = m_transfers[idx];
const uint64_t amount = td.is_rct() ? 0 : td.amount();
std::unordered_set<uint64_t> seen_indices;
// request more for rct in base recent (locked) coinbases are picked, since they're locked for longer
size_t requested_outputs_count = base_requested_outputs_count + (td.is_rct() ? CRYPTONOTE_MINED_MONEY_UNLOCK_WINDOW - CRYPTONOTE_DEFAULT_TX_SPENDABLE_AGE : 0);
size_t start = req.outputs.size();
bool use_histogram = amount != 0 || !has_rct_distribution;
const bool output_is_pre_fork = td.m_block_height < segregation_fork_height;
uint64_t num_outs = 0, num_recent_outs = 0;
uint64_t num_post_fork_outs = 0;
float pre_fork_num_out_ratio = 0.0f;
float post_fork_num_out_ratio = 0.0f;
if (is_after_segregation_fork && m_segregate_pre_fork_outputs && output_is_pre_fork)
{
num_outs = segregation_limit[amount].first;
num_recent_outs = segregation_limit[amount].second;
}
else
{
// if there are just enough outputs to mix with, use all of them.
// Eventually this should become impossible.
for (const auto &he: resp_t.histogram)
{
if (he.amount == amount)
{
LOG_PRINT_L2("Found " << print_money(amount) << ": " << he.total_instances << " total, "
<< he.unlocked_instances << " unlocked, " << he.recent_instances << " recent");
num_outs = he.unlocked_instances;
num_recent_outs = he.recent_instances;
break;
}
}
if (is_after_segregation_fork && m_key_reuse_mitigation2)
{
if (output_is_pre_fork)
{
if (is_shortly_after_segregation_fork)
{
pre_fork_num_out_ratio = 33.4/100.0f * (1.0f - RECENT_OUTPUT_RATIO);
}
else
{
pre_fork_num_out_ratio = 33.4/100.0f * (1.0f - RECENT_OUTPUT_RATIO);
post_fork_num_out_ratio = 33.4/100.0f * (1.0f - RECENT_OUTPUT_RATIO);
}
}
else
{
if (is_shortly_after_segregation_fork)
{
}
else
{
post_fork_num_out_ratio = 67.8/100.0f * (1.0f - RECENT_OUTPUT_RATIO);
}
}
}
num_post_fork_outs = num_outs - segregation_limit[amount].first;
}
if (use_histogram)
{
LOG_PRINT_L1("" << num_outs << " unlocked outputs of size " << print_money(amount));
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(num_outs == 0, error::wallet_internal_error,
"histogram reports no unlocked outputs for " + boost::lexical_cast<std::string>(amount) + ", not even ours");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(num_recent_outs > num_outs, error::wallet_internal_error,
"histogram reports more recent outs than outs for " + boost::lexical_cast<std::string>(amount));
}
else
{
// the base offset of the first rct output in the first unlocked block (or the one to be if there's none)
num_outs = rct_offsets[rct_offsets.size() - CRYPTONOTE_DEFAULT_TX_SPENDABLE_AGE];
LOG_PRINT_L1("" << num_outs << " unlocked rct outputs");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(num_outs == 0, error::wallet_internal_error,
"histogram reports no unlocked rct outputs, not even ours");
}
// how many fake outs to draw on a pre-fork distribution
size_t pre_fork_outputs_count = requested_outputs_count * pre_fork_num_out_ratio;
size_t post_fork_outputs_count = requested_outputs_count * post_fork_num_out_ratio;
// how many fake outs to draw otherwise
size_t normal_output_count = requested_outputs_count - pre_fork_outputs_count - post_fork_outputs_count;
size_t recent_outputs_count = 0;
if (use_histogram)
{
// X% of those outs are to be taken from recent outputs
recent_outputs_count = normal_output_count * RECENT_OUTPUT_RATIO;
if (recent_outputs_count == 0)
recent_outputs_count = 1; // ensure we have at least one, if possible
if (recent_outputs_count > num_recent_outs)
recent_outputs_count = num_recent_outs;
if (td.m_global_output_index >= num_outs - num_recent_outs && recent_outputs_count > 0)
--recent_outputs_count; // if the real out is recent, pick one less recent fake out
}
LOG_PRINT_L1("Fake output makeup: " << requested_outputs_count << " requested: " << recent_outputs_count << " recent, " <<
pre_fork_outputs_count << " pre-fork, " << post_fork_outputs_count << " post-fork, " <<
(requested_outputs_count - recent_outputs_count - pre_fork_outputs_count - post_fork_outputs_count) << " full-chain");
uint64_t num_found = 0;
// if we have a known ring, use it
bool existing_ring_found = false;
if (td.m_key_image_known && !td.m_key_image_partial)
{
std::vector<uint64_t> ring;
if (get_ring(get_ringdb_key(), td.m_key_image, ring))
{
MINFO("This output has a known ring, reusing (size " << ring.size() << ")");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(ring.size() > fake_outputs_count + 1, error::wallet_internal_error,
"An output in this transaction was previously spent on another chain with ring size " +
std::to_string(ring.size()) + ", it cannot be spent now with ring size " +
std::to_string(fake_outputs_count + 1) + " as it is smaller: use a higher ring size");
bool own_found = false;
existing_ring_found = true;
for (const auto &out: ring)
{
MINFO("Ring has output " << out);
if (out < num_outs)
{
MINFO("Using it");
req.outputs.push_back({amount, out});
++num_found;
seen_indices.emplace(out);
if (out == td.m_global_output_index)
{
MINFO("This is the real output");
own_found = true;
}
}
else
{
MINFO("Ignoring output " << out << ", too recent");
}
}
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!own_found, error::wallet_internal_error,
"Known ring does not include the spent output: " + std::to_string(td.m_global_output_index));
}
}
if (num_outs <= requested_outputs_count && !existing_ring_found)
{
for (uint64_t i = 0; i < num_outs; i++)
req.outputs.push_back({amount, i});
// duplicate to make up shortfall: this will be caught after the RPC call,
// so we can also output the amounts for which we can't reach the required
// mixin after checking the actual unlockedness
for (uint64_t i = num_outs; i < requested_outputs_count; ++i)
req.outputs.push_back({amount, num_outs - 1});
}
else
{
// start with real one
if (num_found == 0)
{
num_found = 1;
seen_indices.emplace(td.m_global_output_index);
req.outputs.push_back({amount, td.m_global_output_index});
LOG_PRINT_L1("Selecting real output: " << td.m_global_output_index << " for " << print_money(amount));
}
std::unordered_map<const char*, std::set<uint64_t>> picks;
// while we still need more mixins
uint64_t num_usable_outs = num_outs;
bool allow_blackballed = false;
while (num_found < requested_outputs_count)
{
// if we've gone through every possible output, we've gotten all we can
if (seen_indices.size() == num_usable_outs)
{
// there is a first pass which rejects blackballed outputs, then a second pass
// which allows them if we don't have enough non blackballed outputs to reach
// the required amount of outputs (since consensus does not care about blackballed
// outputs, we still need to reach the minimum ring size)
if (allow_blackballed)
break;
MINFO("Not enough output not marked as spent, we'll allow outputs marked as spent");
allow_blackballed = true;
num_usable_outs = num_outs;
}
// get a random output index from the DB. If we've already seen it,
// return to the top of the loop and try again, otherwise add it to the
// list of output indices we've seen.
uint64_t i;
const char *type = "";
if (amount == 0 && has_rct_distribution)
{
// gamma distribution
if (num_found -1 < recent_outputs_count + pre_fork_outputs_count)
{
do i = pick_gamma(); while (i >= segregation_limit[amount].first);
type = "pre-fork gamma";
}
else if (num_found -1 < recent_outputs_count + pre_fork_outputs_count + post_fork_outputs_count)
{
do i = pick_gamma(); while (i < segregation_limit[amount].first || i >= num_outs);
type = "post-fork gamma";
}
else
{
do i = pick_gamma(); while (i >= num_outs);
type = "gamma";
}
}
else if (num_found - 1 < recent_outputs_count) // -1 to account for the real one we seeded with
{
// triangular distribution over [a,b) with a=0, mode c=b=up_index_limit
uint64_t r = crypto::rand<uint64_t>() % ((uint64_t)1 << 53);
double frac = std::sqrt((double)r / ((uint64_t)1 << 53));
i = (uint64_t)(frac*num_recent_outs) + num_outs - num_recent_outs;
// just in case rounding up to 1 occurs after calc
if (i == num_outs)
--i;
type = "recent";
}
else if (num_found -1 < recent_outputs_count + pre_fork_outputs_count)
{
// triangular distribution over [a,b) with a=0, mode c=b=up_index_limit
uint64_t r = crypto::rand<uint64_t>() % ((uint64_t)1 << 53);
double frac = std::sqrt((double)r / ((uint64_t)1 << 53));
i = (uint64_t)(frac*segregation_limit[amount].first);
// just in case rounding up to 1 occurs after calc
if (i == num_outs)
--i;
type = " pre-fork";
}
else if (num_found -1 < recent_outputs_count + pre_fork_outputs_count + post_fork_outputs_count)
{
// triangular distribution over [a,b) with a=0, mode c=b=up_index_limit
uint64_t r = crypto::rand<uint64_t>() % ((uint64_t)1 << 53);
double frac = std::sqrt((double)r / ((uint64_t)1 << 53));
i = (uint64_t)(frac*num_post_fork_outs) + segregation_limit[amount].first;
// just in case rounding up to 1 occurs after calc
if (i == num_post_fork_outs+segregation_limit[amount].first)
--i;
type = "post-fork";
}
else
{
// triangular distribution over [a,b) with a=0, mode c=b=up_index_limit
uint64_t r = crypto::rand<uint64_t>() % ((uint64_t)1 << 53);
double frac = std::sqrt((double)r / ((uint64_t)1 << 53));
i = (uint64_t)(frac*num_outs);
// just in case rounding up to 1 occurs after calc
if (i == num_outs)
--i;
type = "triangular";
}
if (seen_indices.count(i))
continue;
if (!allow_blackballed && is_output_blackballed(std::make_pair(amount, i))) // don't add blackballed outputs
{
--num_usable_outs;
continue;
}
seen_indices.emplace(i);
picks[type].insert(i);
req.outputs.push_back({amount, i});
++num_found;
}
for (const auto &pick: picks)
MDEBUG("picking " << pick.first << " outputs: " <<
boost::join(pick.second | boost::adaptors::transformed([](uint64_t out){return std::to_string(out);}), " "));
// if we had enough unusable outputs, we might fall off here and still
// have too few outputs, so we stuff with one to keep counts good, and
// we'll error out later
while (num_found < requested_outputs_count)
{
req.outputs.push_back({amount, 0});
++num_found;
}
}
2018-01-19 08:54:14 +01:00
// sort the subsection, to ensure the daemon doesn't know which output is ours
std::sort(req.outputs.begin() + start, req.outputs.end(),
[](const get_outputs_out &a, const get_outputs_out &b) { return a.index < b.index; });
}
if (ELPP->vRegistry()->allowed(el::Level::Debug, MONERO_DEFAULT_LOG_CATEGORY))
{
std::map<uint64_t, std::set<uint64_t>> outs;
for (const auto &i: req.outputs)
outs[i.amount].insert(i.index);
for (const auto &o: outs)
MDEBUG("asking for outputs with amount " << print_money(o.first) << ": " <<
boost::join(o.second | boost::adaptors::transformed([](uint64_t out){return std::to_string(out);}), " "));
}
// get the keys for those
2018-11-07 22:13:00 +01:00
req.get_txid = false;
m_daemon_rpc_mutex.lock();
bool r = epee::net_utils::invoke_http_bin("/get_outs.bin", req, daemon_resp, m_http_client, rpc_timeout);
m_daemon_rpc_mutex.unlock();
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!r, error::no_connection_to_daemon, "get_outs.bin");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(daemon_resp.status == CORE_RPC_STATUS_BUSY, error::daemon_busy, "get_outs.bin");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(daemon_resp.status != CORE_RPC_STATUS_OK, error::get_outs_error, get_rpc_status(daemon_resp.status));
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(daemon_resp.outs.size() != req.outputs.size(), error::wallet_internal_error,
"daemon returned wrong response for get_outs.bin, wrong amounts count = " +
std::to_string(daemon_resp.outs.size()) + ", expected " + std::to_string(req.outputs.size()));
std::unordered_map<uint64_t, uint64_t> scanty_outs;
size_t base = 0;
outs.reserve(num_selected_transfers);
for(size_t idx: selected_transfers)
{
const transfer_details &td = m_transfers[idx];
size_t requested_outputs_count = base_requested_outputs_count + (td.is_rct() ? CRYPTONOTE_MINED_MONEY_UNLOCK_WINDOW - CRYPTONOTE_DEFAULT_TX_SPENDABLE_AGE : 0);
outs.push_back(std::vector<get_outs_entry>());
outs.back().reserve(fake_outputs_count + 1);
const rct::key mask = td.is_rct() ? rct::commit(td.amount(), td.m_mask) : rct::zeroCommit(td.amount());
uint64_t num_outs = 0;
const uint64_t amount = td.is_rct() ? 0 : td.amount();
const bool output_is_pre_fork = td.m_block_height < segregation_fork_height;
if (is_after_segregation_fork && m_segregate_pre_fork_outputs && output_is_pre_fork)
num_outs = segregation_limit[amount].first;
else for (const auto &he: resp_t.histogram)
{
if (he.amount == amount)
{
num_outs = he.unlocked_instances;
break;
}
}
bool use_histogram = amount != 0 || !has_rct_distribution;
if (!use_histogram)
num_outs = rct_offsets[rct_offsets.size() - CRYPTONOTE_DEFAULT_TX_SPENDABLE_AGE];
// make sure the real outputs we asked for are really included, along
// with the correct key and mask: this guards against an active attack
// where the node sends dummy data for all outputs, and we then send
// the real one, which the node can then tell from the fake outputs,
// as it has different data than the dummy data it had sent earlier
bool real_out_found = false;
for (size_t n = 0; n < requested_outputs_count; ++n)
{
size_t i = base + n;
if (req.outputs[i].index == td.m_global_output_index)
if (daemon_resp.outs[i].key == boost::get<txout_to_key>(td.m_tx.vout[td.m_internal_output_index].target).key)
if (daemon_resp.outs[i].mask == mask)
real_out_found = true;
}
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!real_out_found, error::wallet_internal_error,
"Daemon response did not include the requested real output");
// pick real out first (it will be sorted when done)
outs.back().push_back(std::make_tuple(td.m_global_output_index, boost::get<txout_to_key>(td.m_tx.vout[td.m_internal_output_index].target).key, mask));
// then pick outs from an existing ring, if any
bool existing_ring_found = false;
if (td.m_key_image_known && !td.m_key_image_partial)
{
std::vector<uint64_t> ring;
if (get_ring(get_ringdb_key(), td.m_key_image, ring))
{
for (uint64_t out: ring)
{
if (out < num_outs)
{
if (out != td.m_global_output_index)
{
bool found = false;
for (size_t o = 0; o < requested_outputs_count; ++o)
{
size_t i = base + o;
if (req.outputs[i].index == out)
{
LOG_PRINT_L2("Index " << i << "/" << requested_outputs_count << ": idx " << req.outputs[i].index << " (real " << td.m_global_output_index << "), unlocked " << daemon_resp.outs[i].unlocked << ", key " << daemon_resp.outs[i].key << " (from existing ring)");
tx_add_fake_output(outs, req.outputs[i].index, daemon_resp.outs[i].key, daemon_resp.outs[i].mask, td.m_global_output_index, daemon_resp.outs[i].unlocked);
found = true;
break;
}
}
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!found, error::wallet_internal_error, "Falied to find existing ring output in daemon out data");
}
}
}
}
}
// then pick others in random order till we reach the required number
// since we use an equiprobable pick here, we don't upset the triangular distribution
std::vector<size_t> order;
order.resize(requested_outputs_count);
for (size_t n = 0; n < order.size(); ++n)
order[n] = n;
std::shuffle(order.begin(), order.end(), std::default_random_engine(crypto::rand<unsigned>()));
LOG_PRINT_L2("Looking for " << (fake_outputs_count+1) << " outputs of size " << print_money(td.is_rct() ? 0 : td.amount()));
for (size_t o = 0; o < requested_outputs_count && outs.back().size() < fake_outputs_count + 1; ++o)
{
size_t i = base + order[o];
LOG_PRINT_L2("Index " << i << "/" << requested_outputs_count << ": idx " << req.outputs[i].index << " (real " << td.m_global_output_index << "), unlocked " << daemon_resp.outs[i].unlocked << ", key " << daemon_resp.outs[i].key);
2017-08-04 23:12:37 +02:00
tx_add_fake_output(outs, req.outputs[i].index, daemon_resp.outs[i].key, daemon_resp.outs[i].mask, td.m_global_output_index, daemon_resp.outs[i].unlocked);
}
if (outs.back().size() < fake_outputs_count + 1)
{
scanty_outs[td.is_rct() ? 0 : td.amount()] = outs.back().size();
}
else
{
// sort the subsection, so any spares are reset in order
std::sort(outs.back().begin(), outs.back().end(), [](const get_outs_entry &a, const get_outs_entry &b) { return std::get<0>(a) < std::get<0>(b); });
}
base += requested_outputs_count;
}
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!scanty_outs.empty(), error::not_enough_outs_to_mix, scanty_outs, fake_outputs_count);
}
else
{
for (size_t idx: selected_transfers)
{
const transfer_details &td = m_transfers[idx];
std::vector<get_outs_entry> v;
const rct::key mask = td.is_rct() ? rct::commit(td.amount(), td.m_mask) : rct::zeroCommit(td.amount());
2017-08-04 23:12:37 +02:00
v.push_back(std::make_tuple(td.m_global_output_index, td.get_public_key(), mask));
outs.push_back(v);
}
}
// save those outs in the ringdb for reuse
for (size_t i = 0; i < selected_transfers.size(); ++i)
{
const size_t idx = selected_transfers[i];
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(idx >= m_transfers.size(), error::wallet_internal_error, "selected_transfers entry out of range");
const transfer_details &td = m_transfers[idx];
std::vector<uint64_t> ring;
ring.reserve(outs[i].size());
for (const auto &e: outs[i])
ring.push_back(std::get<0>(e));
if (!set_ring(td.m_key_image, ring, false))
MERROR("Failed to set ring for " << td.m_key_image);
}
}
template<typename T>
void wallet2::transfer_selected(const std::vector<cryptonote::tx_destination_entry>& dsts, const std::vector<size_t>& selected_transfers, size_t fake_outputs_count,
std::vector<std::vector<tools::wallet2::get_outs_entry>> &outs,
uint64_t unlock_time, uint64_t fee, const std::vector<uint8_t>& extra, T destination_split_strategy, const tx_dust_policy& dust_policy, cryptonote::transaction& tx, pending_tx &ptx)
{
using namespace cryptonote;
// throw if attempting a transaction with no destinations
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(dsts.empty(), error::zero_destination);
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(m_multisig, error::wallet_internal_error, "Multisig wallets cannot spend non rct outputs");
uint64_t upper_transaction_weight_limit = get_upper_transaction_weight_limit();
uint64_t needed_money = fee;
LOG_PRINT_L2("transfer: starting with fee " << print_money (needed_money));
// calculate total amount being sent to all destinations
// throw if total amount overflows uint64_t
for(auto& dt: dsts)
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(0 == dt.amount, error::zero_destination);
needed_money += dt.amount;
LOG_PRINT_L2("transfer: adding " << print_money(dt.amount) << ", for a total of " << print_money (needed_money));
2018-02-16 12:04:04 +01:00
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(needed_money < dt.amount, error::tx_sum_overflow, dsts, fee, m_nettype);
}
uint64_t found_money = 0;
for(size_t idx: selected_transfers)
{
found_money += m_transfers[idx].amount();
}
LOG_PRINT_L2("wanted " << print_money(needed_money) << ", found " << print_money(found_money) << ", fee " << print_money(fee));
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(found_money < needed_money, error::not_enough_unlocked_money, found_money, needed_money - fee, fee);
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
uint32_t subaddr_account = m_transfers[*selected_transfers.begin()].m_subaddr_index.major;
for (auto i = ++selected_transfers.begin(); i != selected_transfers.end(); ++i)
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(subaddr_account != m_transfers[*i].m_subaddr_index.major, error::wallet_internal_error, "the tx uses funds from multiple accounts");
if (outs.empty())
get_outs(outs, selected_transfers, fake_outputs_count); // may throw
//prepare inputs
LOG_PRINT_L2("preparing outputs");
typedef cryptonote::tx_source_entry::output_entry tx_output_entry;
size_t i = 0, out_index = 0;
std::vector<cryptonote::tx_source_entry> sources;
for(size_t idx: selected_transfers)
{
sources.resize(sources.size()+1);
cryptonote::tx_source_entry& src = sources.back();
const transfer_details& td = m_transfers[idx];
src.amount = td.amount();
src.rct = td.is_rct();
//paste keys (fake and real)
for (size_t n = 0; n < fake_outputs_count + 1; ++n)
{
tx_output_entry oe;
oe.first = std::get<0>(outs[out_index][n]);
oe.second.dest = rct::pk2rct(std::get<1>(outs[out_index][n]));
oe.second.mask = std::get<2>(outs[out_index][n]);
src.outputs.push_back(oe);
++i;
}
//paste real transaction to the random index
auto it_to_replace = std::find_if(src.outputs.begin(), src.outputs.end(), [&](const tx_output_entry& a)
{
return a.first == td.m_global_output_index;
});
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(it_to_replace == src.outputs.end(), error::wallet_internal_error,
"real output not found");
tx_output_entry real_oe;
real_oe.first = td.m_global_output_index;
real_oe.second.dest = rct::pk2rct(boost::get<txout_to_key>(td.m_tx.vout[td.m_internal_output_index].target).key);
real_oe.second.mask = rct::commit(td.amount(), td.m_mask);
*it_to_replace = real_oe;
src.real_out_tx_key = get_tx_pub_key_from_extra(td.m_tx, td.m_pk_index);
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
src.real_out_additional_tx_keys = get_additional_tx_pub_keys_from_extra(td.m_tx);
src.real_output = it_to_replace - src.outputs.begin();
src.real_output_in_tx_index = td.m_internal_output_index;
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
src.multisig_kLRki = rct::multisig_kLRki({rct::zero(), rct::zero(), rct::zero(), rct::zero()});
detail::print_source_entry(src);
++out_index;
}
LOG_PRINT_L2("outputs prepared");
cryptonote::tx_destination_entry change_dts = AUTO_VAL_INIT(change_dts);
if (needed_money < found_money)
{
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
change_dts.addr = get_subaddress({subaddr_account, 0});
change_dts.amount = found_money - needed_money;
}
std::vector<cryptonote::tx_destination_entry> splitted_dsts, dust_dsts;
uint64_t dust = 0;
destination_split_strategy(dsts, change_dts, dust_policy.dust_threshold, splitted_dsts, dust_dsts);
for(auto& d: dust_dsts) {
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(dust_policy.dust_threshold < d.amount, error::wallet_internal_error, "invalid dust value: dust = " +
std::to_string(d.amount) + ", dust_threshold = " + std::to_string(dust_policy.dust_threshold));
}
for(auto& d: dust_dsts) {
if (!dust_policy.add_to_fee)
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
splitted_dsts.push_back(cryptonote::tx_destination_entry(d.amount, dust_policy.addr_for_dust, d.is_subaddress));
dust += d.amount;
}
crypto::secret_key tx_key;
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
std::vector<crypto::secret_key> additional_tx_keys;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
rct::multisig_out msout;
LOG_PRINT_L2("constructing tx");
bool r = cryptonote::construct_tx_and_get_tx_key(m_account.get_keys(), m_subaddresses, sources, splitted_dsts, change_dts.addr, extra, tx, unlock_time, tx_key, additional_tx_keys, false, {}, m_multisig ? &msout : NULL);
LOG_PRINT_L2("constructed tx, r="<<r);
2018-02-16 12:04:04 +01:00
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!r, error::tx_not_constructed, sources, splitted_dsts, unlock_time, m_nettype);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(upper_transaction_weight_limit <= get_transaction_weight(tx), error::tx_too_big, tx, upper_transaction_weight_limit);
std::string key_images;
bool all_are_txin_to_key = std::all_of(tx.vin.begin(), tx.vin.end(), [&](const txin_v& s_e) -> bool
{
CHECKED_GET_SPECIFIC_VARIANT(s_e, const txin_to_key, in, false);
key_images += boost::to_string(in.k_image) + " ";
return true;
});
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!all_are_txin_to_key, error::unexpected_txin_type, tx);
bool dust_sent_elsewhere = (dust_policy.addr_for_dust.m_view_public_key != change_dts.addr.m_view_public_key
|| dust_policy.addr_for_dust.m_spend_public_key != change_dts.addr.m_spend_public_key);
if (dust_policy.add_to_fee || dust_sent_elsewhere) change_dts.amount -= dust;
ptx.key_images = key_images;
ptx.fee = (dust_policy.add_to_fee ? fee+dust : fee);
ptx.dust = ((dust_policy.add_to_fee || dust_sent_elsewhere) ? dust : 0);
ptx.dust_added_to_fee = dust_policy.add_to_fee;
ptx.tx = tx;
ptx.change_dts = change_dts;
ptx.selected_transfers = selected_transfers;
ptx.tx_key = tx_key;
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
ptx.additional_tx_keys = additional_tx_keys;
ptx.dests = dsts;
ptx.construction_data.sources = sources;
ptx.construction_data.change_dts = change_dts;
ptx.construction_data.splitted_dsts = splitted_dsts;
ptx.construction_data.selected_transfers = selected_transfers;
ptx.construction_data.extra = tx.extra;
ptx.construction_data.unlock_time = unlock_time;
ptx.construction_data.use_rct = false;
ptx.construction_data.rct_config = { rct::RangeProofBorromean, 0 };
ptx.construction_data.dests = dsts;
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
// record which subaddress indices are being used as inputs
ptx.construction_data.subaddr_account = subaddr_account;
ptx.construction_data.subaddr_indices.clear();
for (size_t idx: selected_transfers)
ptx.construction_data.subaddr_indices.insert(m_transfers[idx].m_subaddr_index.minor);
LOG_PRINT_L2("transfer_selected done");
}
void wallet2::transfer_selected_rct(std::vector<cryptonote::tx_destination_entry> dsts, const std::vector<size_t>& selected_transfers, size_t fake_outputs_count,
std::vector<std::vector<tools::wallet2::get_outs_entry>> &outs,
uint64_t unlock_time, uint64_t fee, const std::vector<uint8_t>& extra, cryptonote::transaction& tx, pending_tx &ptx, const rct::RCTConfig &rct_config)
{
using namespace cryptonote;
// throw if attempting a transaction with no destinations
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(dsts.empty(), error::zero_destination);
uint64_t upper_transaction_weight_limit = get_upper_transaction_weight_limit();
uint64_t needed_money = fee;
LOG_PRINT_L2("transfer_selected_rct: starting with fee " << print_money (needed_money));
2017-11-13 20:53:38 +01:00
LOG_PRINT_L2("selected transfers: " << strjoin(selected_transfers, " "));
// calculate total amount being sent to all destinations
// throw if total amount overflows uint64_t
for(auto& dt: dsts)
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(0 == dt.amount, error::zero_destination);
needed_money += dt.amount;
LOG_PRINT_L2("transfer: adding " << print_money(dt.amount) << ", for a total of " << print_money (needed_money));
2018-02-16 12:04:04 +01:00
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(needed_money < dt.amount, error::tx_sum_overflow, dsts, fee, m_nettype);
}
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
// if this is a multisig wallet, create a list of multisig signers we can use
std::deque<crypto::public_key> multisig_signers;
size_t n_multisig_txes = 0;
std::vector<std::unordered_set<crypto::public_key>> ignore_sets;
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
if (m_multisig && !m_transfers.empty())
{
const crypto::public_key local_signer = get_multisig_signer_public_key();
size_t n_available_signers = 1;
// At this step we need to define set of participants available for signature,
// i.e. those of them who exchanged with multisig info's
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
for (const crypto::public_key &signer: m_multisig_signers)
{
if (signer == local_signer)
continue;
for (const auto &i: m_transfers[0].m_multisig_info)
{
if (i.m_signer == signer)
{
multisig_signers.push_back(signer);
++n_available_signers;
break;
}
}
}
// n_available_signers includes the transaction creator, but multisig_signers doesn't
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
MDEBUG("We can use " << n_available_signers << "/" << m_multisig_signers.size() << " other signers");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(n_available_signers < m_multisig_threshold, error::multisig_import_needed);
if (n_available_signers > m_multisig_threshold)
{
// If there more potential signers (those who exchanged with multisig info)
// than threshold needed some of them should be skipped since we don't know
// who will sign tx and who won't. Hence we don't contribute their LR pairs to the signature.
// We create as many transactions as many combinations of excluded signers may be.
// For example, if we have 2/4 wallet and wallets are: A, B, C and D. Let A be
// transaction creator, so we need just 1 signature from set of B, C, D.
// Using "excluding" logic here we have to exclude 2-of-3 wallets. Combinations go as follows:
// BC, BD, and CD. We save these sets to use later and counting the number of required txs.
tools::Combinator<crypto::public_key> c(std::vector<crypto::public_key>(multisig_signers.begin(), multisig_signers.end()));
auto ignore_combinations = c.combine(multisig_signers.size() + 1 - m_multisig_threshold);
for (const auto& combination: ignore_combinations)
{
ignore_sets.push_back(std::unordered_set<crypto::public_key>(combination.begin(), combination.end()));
}
n_multisig_txes = ignore_sets.size();
}
else
{
// If we have exact count of signers just to fit in threshold we don't exclude anyone and create 1 transaction
n_multisig_txes = 1;
}
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
MDEBUG("We will create " << n_multisig_txes << " txes");
}
uint64_t found_money = 0;
for(size_t idx: selected_transfers)
{
found_money += m_transfers[idx].amount();
}
LOG_PRINT_L2("wanted " << print_money(needed_money) << ", found " << print_money(found_money) << ", fee " << print_money(fee));
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(found_money < needed_money, error::not_enough_unlocked_money, found_money, needed_money - fee, fee);
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
uint32_t subaddr_account = m_transfers[*selected_transfers.begin()].m_subaddr_index.major;
for (auto i = ++selected_transfers.begin(); i != selected_transfers.end(); ++i)
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(subaddr_account != m_transfers[*i].m_subaddr_index.major, error::wallet_internal_error, "the tx uses funds from multiple accounts");
if (outs.empty())
get_outs(outs, selected_transfers, fake_outputs_count); // may throw
//prepare inputs
LOG_PRINT_L2("preparing outputs");
size_t i = 0, out_index = 0;
std::vector<cryptonote::tx_source_entry> sources;
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
std::unordered_set<rct::key> used_L;
for(size_t idx: selected_transfers)
{
sources.resize(sources.size()+1);
cryptonote::tx_source_entry& src = sources.back();
const transfer_details& td = m_transfers[idx];
src.amount = td.amount();
src.rct = td.is_rct();
//paste mixin transaction
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(outs.size() < out_index + 1 , error::wallet_internal_error, "outs.size() < out_index + 1");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(outs[out_index].size() < fake_outputs_count , error::wallet_internal_error, "fake_outputs_count > random outputs found");
typedef cryptonote::tx_source_entry::output_entry tx_output_entry;
for (size_t n = 0; n < fake_outputs_count + 1; ++n)
{
tx_output_entry oe;
oe.first = std::get<0>(outs[out_index][n]);
oe.second.dest = rct::pk2rct(std::get<1>(outs[out_index][n]));
oe.second.mask = std::get<2>(outs[out_index][n]);
src.outputs.push_back(oe);
}
++i;
//paste real transaction to the random index
auto it_to_replace = std::find_if(src.outputs.begin(), src.outputs.end(), [&](const tx_output_entry& a)
{
return a.first == td.m_global_output_index;
});
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(it_to_replace == src.outputs.end(), error::wallet_internal_error,
"real output not found");
tx_output_entry real_oe;
real_oe.first = td.m_global_output_index;
2017-08-04 23:12:37 +02:00
real_oe.second.dest = rct::pk2rct(td.get_public_key());
real_oe.second.mask = rct::commit(td.amount(), td.m_mask);
*it_to_replace = real_oe;
src.real_out_tx_key = get_tx_pub_key_from_extra(td.m_tx, td.m_pk_index);
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
src.real_out_additional_tx_keys = get_additional_tx_pub_keys_from_extra(td.m_tx);
src.real_output = it_to_replace - src.outputs.begin();
src.real_output_in_tx_index = td.m_internal_output_index;
src.mask = td.m_mask;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
if (m_multisig)
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
{
auto ignore_set = ignore_sets.empty() ? std::unordered_set<crypto::public_key>() : ignore_sets.front();
src.multisig_kLRki = get_multisig_composite_kLRki(idx, ignore_set, used_L, used_L);
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
}
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
else
src.multisig_kLRki = rct::multisig_kLRki({rct::zero(), rct::zero(), rct::zero(), rct::zero()});
detail::print_source_entry(src);
++out_index;
}
LOG_PRINT_L2("outputs prepared");
// we still keep a copy, since we want to keep dsts free of change for user feedback purposes
std::vector<cryptonote::tx_destination_entry> splitted_dsts = dsts;
cryptonote::tx_destination_entry change_dts = AUTO_VAL_INIT(change_dts);
change_dts.amount = found_money - needed_money;
if (change_dts.amount == 0)
{
if (splitted_dsts.size() == 1)
{
// If the change is 0, send it to a random address, to avoid confusing
// the sender with a 0 amount output. We send a 0 amount in order to avoid
// letting the destination be able to work out which of the inputs is the
// real one in our rings
LOG_PRINT_L2("generating dummy address for 0 change");
cryptonote::account_base dummy;
dummy.generate();
change_dts.addr = dummy.get_keys().m_account_address;
LOG_PRINT_L2("generated dummy address for 0 change");
splitted_dsts.push_back(change_dts);
}
}
else
2016-08-27 11:41:25 +02:00
{
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
change_dts.addr = get_subaddress({subaddr_account, 0});
change_dts.is_subaddress = subaddr_account != 0;
splitted_dsts.push_back(change_dts);
2016-08-27 11:41:25 +02:00
}
crypto::secret_key tx_key;
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
std::vector<crypto::secret_key> additional_tx_keys;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
rct::multisig_out msout;
LOG_PRINT_L2("constructing tx");
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
auto sources_copy = sources;
bool r = cryptonote::construct_tx_and_get_tx_key(m_account.get_keys(), m_subaddresses, sources, splitted_dsts, change_dts.addr, extra, tx, unlock_time, tx_key, additional_tx_keys, true, rct_config, m_multisig ? &msout : NULL);
LOG_PRINT_L2("constructed tx, r="<<r);
2018-02-16 12:04:04 +01:00
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!r, error::tx_not_constructed, sources, dsts, unlock_time, m_nettype);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(upper_transaction_weight_limit <= get_transaction_weight(tx), error::tx_too_big, tx, upper_transaction_weight_limit);
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
// work out the permutation done on sources
std::vector<size_t> ins_order;
for (size_t n = 0; n < sources.size(); ++n)
{
for (size_t idx = 0; idx < sources_copy.size(); ++idx)
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF((size_t)sources_copy[idx].real_output >= sources_copy[idx].outputs.size(),
error::wallet_internal_error, "Invalid real_output");
if (sources_copy[idx].outputs[sources_copy[idx].real_output].second.dest == sources[n].outputs[sources[n].real_output].second.dest)
ins_order.push_back(idx);
}
}
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(ins_order.size() != sources.size(), error::wallet_internal_error, "Failed to work out sources permutation");
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
std::vector<tools::wallet2::multisig_sig> multisig_sigs;
if (m_multisig)
{
auto ignore = ignore_sets.empty() ? std::unordered_set<crypto::public_key>() : ignore_sets.front();
multisig_sigs.push_back({tx.rct_signatures, ignore, used_L, std::unordered_set<crypto::public_key>(), msout});
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
if (m_multisig_threshold < m_multisig_signers.size())
{
const crypto::hash prefix_hash = cryptonote::get_transaction_prefix_hash(tx);
// create the other versions, one for every other participant (the first one's already done above)
for (size_t ignore_index = 1; ignore_index < ignore_sets.size(); ++ignore_index)
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
{
std::unordered_set<rct::key> new_used_L;
size_t src_idx = 0;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(selected_transfers.size() != sources.size(), error::wallet_internal_error, "mismatched selected_transfers and sources sixes");
for(size_t idx: selected_transfers)
{
cryptonote::tx_source_entry& src = sources_copy[src_idx];
src.multisig_kLRki = get_multisig_composite_kLRki(idx, ignore_sets[ignore_index], used_L, new_used_L);
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
++src_idx;
}
LOG_PRINT_L2("Creating supplementary multisig transaction");
cryptonote::transaction ms_tx;
auto sources_copy_copy = sources_copy;
bool r = cryptonote::construct_tx_with_tx_key(m_account.get_keys(), m_subaddresses, sources_copy_copy, splitted_dsts, change_dts.addr, extra, ms_tx, unlock_time,tx_key, additional_tx_keys, true, rct_config, &msout, false);
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
LOG_PRINT_L2("constructed tx, r="<<r);
2018-02-16 12:04:04 +01:00
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!r, error::tx_not_constructed, sources, splitted_dsts, unlock_time, m_nettype);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(upper_transaction_weight_limit <= get_transaction_weight(tx), error::tx_too_big, tx, upper_transaction_weight_limit);
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(cryptonote::get_transaction_prefix_hash(ms_tx) != prefix_hash, error::wallet_internal_error, "Multisig txes do not share prefix");
multisig_sigs.push_back({ms_tx.rct_signatures, ignore_sets[ignore_index], new_used_L, std::unordered_set<crypto::public_key>(), msout});
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
ms_tx.rct_signatures = tx.rct_signatures;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(cryptonote::get_transaction_hash(ms_tx) != cryptonote::get_transaction_hash(tx), error::wallet_internal_error, "Multisig txes differ by more than the signatures");
}
}
}
LOG_PRINT_L2("gathering key images");
std::string key_images;
bool all_are_txin_to_key = std::all_of(tx.vin.begin(), tx.vin.end(), [&](const txin_v& s_e) -> bool
{
CHECKED_GET_SPECIFIC_VARIANT(s_e, const txin_to_key, in, false);
key_images += boost::to_string(in.k_image) + " ";
return true;
});
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!all_are_txin_to_key, error::unexpected_txin_type, tx);
LOG_PRINT_L2("gathered key images");
ptx.key_images = key_images;
ptx.fee = fee;
ptx.dust = 0;
ptx.dust_added_to_fee = false;
ptx.tx = tx;
ptx.change_dts = change_dts;
ptx.selected_transfers = selected_transfers;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
tools::apply_permutation(ins_order, ptx.selected_transfers);
ptx.tx_key = tx_key;
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
ptx.additional_tx_keys = additional_tx_keys;
ptx.dests = dsts;
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
ptx.multisig_sigs = multisig_sigs;
ptx.construction_data.sources = sources_copy;
ptx.construction_data.change_dts = change_dts;
ptx.construction_data.splitted_dsts = splitted_dsts;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
ptx.construction_data.selected_transfers = ptx.selected_transfers;
ptx.construction_data.extra = tx.extra;
ptx.construction_data.unlock_time = unlock_time;
ptx.construction_data.use_rct = true;
ptx.construction_data.rct_config = { tx.rct_signatures.p.bulletproofs.empty() ? rct::RangeProofBorromean : rct::RangeProofPaddedBulletproof, use_fork_rules(HF_VERSION_SMALLER_BP, -10) ? 2 : 1};
ptx.construction_data.dests = dsts;
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
// record which subaddress indices are being used as inputs
ptx.construction_data.subaddr_account = subaddr_account;
ptx.construction_data.subaddr_indices.clear();
for (size_t idx: selected_transfers)
ptx.construction_data.subaddr_indices.insert(m_transfers[idx].m_subaddr_index.minor);
LOG_PRINT_L2("transfer_selected_rct done");
}
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
std::vector<size_t> wallet2::pick_preferred_rct_inputs(uint64_t needed_money, uint32_t subaddr_account, const std::set<uint32_t> &subaddr_indices) const
{
std::vector<size_t> picks;
float current_output_relatdness = 1.0f;
2016-12-04 14:13:54 +01:00
LOG_PRINT_L2("pick_preferred_rct_inputs: needed_money " << print_money(needed_money));
// try to find a rct input of enough size
for (size_t i = 0; i < m_transfers.size(); ++i)
{
const transfer_details& td = m_transfers[i];
if (!td.m_spent && !td.m_frozen && td.is_rct() && td.amount() >= needed_money && is_transfer_unlocked(td) && td.m_subaddr_index.major == subaddr_account && subaddr_indices.count(td.m_subaddr_index.minor) == 1)
{
LOG_PRINT_L2("We can use " << i << " alone: " << print_money(td.amount()));
picks.push_back(i);
return picks;
}
}
// then try to find two outputs
// this could be made better by picking one of the outputs to be a small one, since those
// are less useful since often below the needed money, so if one can be used in a pair,
// it gets rid of it for the future
for (size_t i = 0; i < m_transfers.size(); ++i)
{
const transfer_details& td = m_transfers[i];
if (!td.m_spent && !td.m_frozen && !td.m_key_image_partial && td.is_rct() && is_transfer_unlocked(td) && td.m_subaddr_index.major == subaddr_account && subaddr_indices.count(td.m_subaddr_index.minor) == 1)
{
LOG_PRINT_L2("Considering input " << i << ", " << print_money(td.amount()));
for (size_t j = i + 1; j < m_transfers.size(); ++j)
{
const transfer_details& td2 = m_transfers[j];
if (!td2.m_spent && !td2.m_frozen && !td.m_key_image_partial && td2.is_rct() && td.amount() + td2.amount() >= needed_money && is_transfer_unlocked(td2) && td2.m_subaddr_index == td.m_subaddr_index)
{
// update our picks if those outputs are less related than any we
// already found. If the same, don't update, and oldest suitable outputs
// will be used in preference.
float relatedness = get_output_relatedness(td, td2);
LOG_PRINT_L2(" with input " << j << ", " << print_money(td2.amount()) << ", relatedness " << relatedness);
if (relatedness < current_output_relatdness)
{
// reset the current picks with those, and return them directly
// if they're unrelated. If they are related, we'll end up returning
// them if we find nothing better
picks.clear();
picks.push_back(i);
picks.push_back(j);
LOG_PRINT_L0("we could use " << i << " and " << j);
if (relatedness == 0.0f)
return picks;
current_output_relatdness = relatedness;
}
}
}
}
}
return picks;
}
bool wallet2::should_pick_a_second_output(bool use_rct, size_t n_transfers, const std::vector<size_t> &unused_transfers_indices, const std::vector<size_t> &unused_dust_indices) const
{
if (!use_rct)
return false;
if (n_transfers > 1)
return false;
if (unused_dust_indices.empty() && unused_transfers_indices.empty())
return false;
// we want at least one free rct output to avoid a corner case where
// we'd choose a non rct output which doesn't have enough "siblings"
// value-wise on the chain, and thus can't be mixed
bool found = false;
for (auto i: unused_dust_indices)
{
if (m_transfers[i].is_rct())
{
found = true;
break;
}
}
if (!found) for (auto i: unused_transfers_indices)
{
if (m_transfers[i].is_rct())
{
found = true;
break;
}
}
if (!found)
return false;
return true;
}
std::vector<size_t> wallet2::get_only_rct(const std::vector<size_t> &unused_dust_indices, const std::vector<size_t> &unused_transfers_indices) const
{
std::vector<size_t> indices;
for (size_t n: unused_dust_indices)
if (m_transfers[n].is_rct())
indices.push_back(n);
for (size_t n: unused_transfers_indices)
if (m_transfers[n].is_rct())
indices.push_back(n);
return indices;
}
static uint32_t get_count_above(const std::vector<wallet2::transfer_details> &transfers, const std::vector<size_t> &indices, uint64_t threshold)
{
uint32_t count = 0;
for (size_t idx: indices)
if (transfers[idx].amount() >= threshold)
++count;
return count;
}
2017-08-04 23:58:08 +02:00
bool wallet2::light_wallet_login(bool &new_address)
{
MDEBUG("Light wallet login request");
m_light_wallet_connected = false;
tools::COMMAND_RPC_LOGIN::request request;
tools::COMMAND_RPC_LOGIN::response response;
2018-02-16 12:04:04 +01:00
request.address = get_account().get_public_address_str(m_nettype);
2017-08-04 23:58:08 +02:00
request.view_key = string_tools::pod_to_hex(get_account().get_keys().m_view_secret_key);
2018-01-19 08:54:14 +01:00
// Always create account if it doesn't exist.
2017-08-04 23:58:08 +02:00
request.create_account = true;
m_daemon_rpc_mutex.lock();
bool connected = epee::net_utils::invoke_http_json("/login", request, response, m_http_client, rpc_timeout, "POST");
m_daemon_rpc_mutex.unlock();
// MyMonero doesn't send any status message. OpenMonero does.
m_light_wallet_connected = connected && (response.status.empty() || response.status == "success");
new_address = response.new_address;
MDEBUG("Status: " << response.status);
MDEBUG("Reason: " << response.reason);
MDEBUG("New wallet: " << response.new_address);
if(m_light_wallet_connected)
{
2018-01-19 08:54:14 +01:00
// Clear old data on successful login.
2017-08-04 23:58:08 +02:00
// m_transfers.clear();
// m_payments.clear();
// m_unconfirmed_payments.clear();
}
return m_light_wallet_connected;
}
bool wallet2::light_wallet_import_wallet_request(tools::COMMAND_RPC_IMPORT_WALLET_REQUEST::response &response)
2017-08-04 23:58:08 +02:00
{
MDEBUG("Light wallet import wallet request");
tools::COMMAND_RPC_IMPORT_WALLET_REQUEST::request oreq;
2018-02-16 12:04:04 +01:00
oreq.address = get_account().get_public_address_str(m_nettype);
2017-08-04 23:58:08 +02:00
oreq.view_key = string_tools::pod_to_hex(get_account().get_keys().m_view_secret_key);
m_daemon_rpc_mutex.lock();
bool r = epee::net_utils::invoke_http_json("/import_wallet_request", oreq, response, m_http_client, rpc_timeout, "POST");
m_daemon_rpc_mutex.unlock();
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!r, error::no_connection_to_daemon, "import_wallet_request");
return true;
}
void wallet2::light_wallet_get_unspent_outs()
{
MDEBUG("Getting unspent outs");
tools::COMMAND_RPC_GET_UNSPENT_OUTS::request oreq;
tools::COMMAND_RPC_GET_UNSPENT_OUTS::response ores;
2017-08-04 23:58:08 +02:00
oreq.amount = "0";
2018-02-16 12:04:04 +01:00
oreq.address = get_account().get_public_address_str(m_nettype);
2017-08-04 23:58:08 +02:00
oreq.view_key = string_tools::pod_to_hex(get_account().get_keys().m_view_secret_key);
// openMonero specific
oreq.dust_threshold = boost::lexical_cast<std::string>(::config::DEFAULT_DUST_THRESHOLD);
// below are required by openMonero api - but are not used.
oreq.mixin = 0;
oreq.use_dust = true;
m_daemon_rpc_mutex.lock();
bool r = epee::net_utils::invoke_http_json("/get_unspent_outs", oreq, ores, m_http_client, rpc_timeout, "POST");
m_daemon_rpc_mutex.unlock();
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!r, error::no_connection_to_daemon, "get_unspent_outs");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(ores.status == "error", error::wallet_internal_error, ores.reason);
m_light_wallet_per_kb_fee = ores.per_kb_fee;
std::unordered_map<crypto::hash,bool> transfers_txs;
for(const auto &t: m_transfers)
transfers_txs.emplace(t.m_txid,t.m_spent);
MDEBUG("FOUND " << ores.outputs.size() <<" outputs");
// return if no outputs found
if(ores.outputs.empty())
return;
// Clear old outputs
m_transfers.clear();
for (const auto &o: ores.outputs) {
bool spent = false;
bool add_transfer = true;
crypto::key_image unspent_key_image;
crypto::public_key tx_public_key = AUTO_VAL_INIT(tx_public_key);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(string_tools::validate_hex(64, o.tx_pub_key), error::wallet_internal_error, "Invalid tx_pub_key field");
string_tools::hex_to_pod(o.tx_pub_key, tx_public_key);
for (const std::string &ski: o.spend_key_images) {
spent = false;
// Check if key image is ours
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(string_tools::validate_hex(64, ski), error::wallet_internal_error, "Invalid key image");
string_tools::hex_to_pod(ski, unspent_key_image);
if(light_wallet_key_image_is_ours(unspent_key_image, tx_public_key, o.index)){
MTRACE("Output " << o.public_key << " is spent. Key image: " << ski);
spent = true;
break;
} {
MTRACE("Unspent output found. " << o.public_key);
}
}
// Check if tx already exists in m_transfers.
crypto::hash txid;
crypto::public_key tx_pub_key;
crypto::public_key public_key;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(string_tools::validate_hex(64, o.tx_hash), error::wallet_internal_error, "Invalid tx_hash field");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(string_tools::validate_hex(64, o.public_key), error::wallet_internal_error, "Invalid public_key field");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(string_tools::validate_hex(64, o.tx_pub_key), error::wallet_internal_error, "Invalid tx_pub_key field");
string_tools::hex_to_pod(o.tx_hash, txid);
string_tools::hex_to_pod(o.public_key, public_key);
string_tools::hex_to_pod(o.tx_pub_key, tx_pub_key);
for(auto &t: m_transfers){
if(t.get_public_key() == public_key) {
t.m_spent = spent;
add_transfer = false;
break;
}
}
if(!add_transfer)
continue;
m_transfers.push_back(boost::value_initialized<transfer_details>());
transfer_details& td = m_transfers.back();
td.m_block_height = o.height;
td.m_global_output_index = o.global_index;
td.m_txid = txid;
// Add to extra
add_tx_pub_key_to_extra(td.m_tx, tx_pub_key);
td.m_key_image = unspent_key_image;
td.m_key_image_known = !m_watch_only && !m_multisig;
td.m_key_image_request = false;
td.m_key_image_partial = m_multisig;
2017-08-04 23:58:08 +02:00
td.m_amount = o.amount;
td.m_pk_index = 0;
td.m_internal_output_index = o.index;
td.m_spent = spent;
td.m_frozen = false;
2017-08-04 23:58:08 +02:00
tx_out txout;
txout.target = txout_to_key(public_key);
txout.amount = td.m_amount;
td.m_tx.vout.resize(td.m_internal_output_index + 1);
td.m_tx.vout[td.m_internal_output_index] = txout;
// Add unlock time and coinbase bool got from get_address_txs api call
std::unordered_map<crypto::hash,address_tx>::const_iterator found = m_light_wallet_address_txs.find(txid);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(found == m_light_wallet_address_txs.end(), error::wallet_internal_error, "Lightwallet: tx not found in m_light_wallet_address_txs");
bool miner_tx = found->second.m_coinbase;
td.m_tx.unlock_time = found->second.m_unlock_time;
if (!o.rct.empty())
{
// Coinbase tx's
if(miner_tx)
{
td.m_mask = rct::identity();
}
else
{
// rct txs
// decrypt rct mask, calculate commit hash and compare against blockchain commit hash
rct::key rct_commit;
light_wallet_parse_rct_str(o.rct, tx_pub_key, td.m_internal_output_index, td.m_mask, rct_commit, true);
bool valid_commit = (rct_commit == rct::commit(td.amount(), td.m_mask));
if(!valid_commit)
{
MDEBUG("output index: " << o.global_index);
MDEBUG("mask: " + string_tools::pod_to_hex(td.m_mask));
MDEBUG("calculated commit: " + string_tools::pod_to_hex(rct::commit(td.amount(), td.m_mask)));
MDEBUG("expected commit: " + string_tools::pod_to_hex(rct_commit));
MDEBUG("amount: " << td.amount());
}
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!valid_commit, error::wallet_internal_error, "Lightwallet: rct commit hash mismatch!");
}
td.m_rct = true;
}
else
{
td.m_mask = rct::identity();
td.m_rct = false;
}
if(!spent)
set_unspent(m_transfers.size()-1);
m_key_images[td.m_key_image] = m_transfers.size()-1;
m_pub_keys[td.get_public_key()] = m_transfers.size()-1;
}
}
bool wallet2::light_wallet_get_address_info(tools::COMMAND_RPC_GET_ADDRESS_INFO::response &response)
2017-08-04 23:58:08 +02:00
{
MTRACE(__FUNCTION__);
tools::COMMAND_RPC_GET_ADDRESS_INFO::request request;
2017-08-04 23:58:08 +02:00
2018-02-16 12:04:04 +01:00
request.address = get_account().get_public_address_str(m_nettype);
2017-08-04 23:58:08 +02:00
request.view_key = string_tools::pod_to_hex(get_account().get_keys().m_view_secret_key);
m_daemon_rpc_mutex.lock();
bool r = epee::net_utils::invoke_http_json("/get_address_info", request, response, m_http_client, rpc_timeout, "POST");
m_daemon_rpc_mutex.unlock();
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!r, error::no_connection_to_daemon, "get_address_info");
// TODO: Validate result
return true;
}
void wallet2::light_wallet_get_address_txs()
{
MDEBUG("Refreshing light wallet");
tools::COMMAND_RPC_GET_ADDRESS_TXS::request ireq;
tools::COMMAND_RPC_GET_ADDRESS_TXS::response ires;
2017-08-04 23:58:08 +02:00
2018-02-16 12:04:04 +01:00
ireq.address = get_account().get_public_address_str(m_nettype);
2017-08-04 23:58:08 +02:00
ireq.view_key = string_tools::pod_to_hex(get_account().get_keys().m_view_secret_key);
m_daemon_rpc_mutex.lock();
bool r = epee::net_utils::invoke_http_json("/get_address_txs", ireq, ires, m_http_client, rpc_timeout, "POST");
m_daemon_rpc_mutex.unlock();
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!r, error::no_connection_to_daemon, "get_address_txs");
//OpenMonero sends status=success, Mymonero doesn't.
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF((!ires.status.empty() && ires.status != "success"), error::no_connection_to_daemon, "get_address_txs");
// Abort if no transactions
if(ires.transactions.empty())
return;
// Create searchable vectors
std::vector<crypto::hash> payments_txs;
for(const auto &p: m_payments)
payments_txs.push_back(p.second.m_tx_hash);
std::vector<crypto::hash> unconfirmed_payments_txs;
for(const auto &up: m_unconfirmed_payments)
unconfirmed_payments_txs.push_back(up.second.m_pd.m_tx_hash);
2017-08-04 23:58:08 +02:00
// for balance calculation
uint64_t wallet_total_sent = 0;
// txs in pool
std::vector<crypto::hash> pool_txs;
for (const auto &t: ires.transactions) {
const uint64_t total_received = t.total_received;
uint64_t total_sent = t.total_sent;
// Check key images - subtract fake outputs from total_sent
for(const auto &so: t.spent_outputs)
{
crypto::public_key tx_public_key;
crypto::key_image key_image;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(string_tools::validate_hex(64, so.tx_pub_key), error::wallet_internal_error, "Invalid tx_pub_key field");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(string_tools::validate_hex(64, so.key_image), error::wallet_internal_error, "Invalid key_image field");
string_tools::hex_to_pod(so.tx_pub_key, tx_public_key);
string_tools::hex_to_pod(so.key_image, key_image);
if(!light_wallet_key_image_is_ours(key_image, tx_public_key, so.out_index)) {
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(so.amount > t.total_sent, error::wallet_internal_error, "Lightwallet: total sent is negative!");
total_sent -= so.amount;
}
}
// Do not add tx if empty.
if(total_sent == 0 && total_received == 0)
continue;
crypto::hash payment_id = null_hash;
crypto::hash tx_hash;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(string_tools::validate_hex(64, t.payment_id), error::wallet_internal_error, "Invalid payment_id field");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(string_tools::validate_hex(64, t.hash), error::wallet_internal_error, "Invalid hash field");
string_tools::hex_to_pod(t.payment_id, payment_id);
string_tools::hex_to_pod(t.hash, tx_hash);
// lightwallet specific info
bool incoming = (total_received > total_sent);
address_tx address_tx;
address_tx.m_tx_hash = tx_hash;
address_tx.m_incoming = incoming;
address_tx.m_amount = incoming ? total_received - total_sent : total_sent - total_received;
address_tx.m_fee = 0; // TODO
2017-08-04 23:58:08 +02:00
address_tx.m_block_height = t.height;
address_tx.m_unlock_time = t.unlock_time;
address_tx.m_timestamp = t.timestamp;
address_tx.m_coinbase = t.coinbase;
address_tx.m_mempool = t.mempool;
m_light_wallet_address_txs.emplace(tx_hash,address_tx);
// populate data needed for history (m_payments, m_unconfirmed_payments, m_confirmed_txs)
// INCOMING transfers
if(total_received > total_sent) {
payment_details payment;
payment.m_tx_hash = tx_hash;
payment.m_amount = total_received - total_sent;
payment.m_fee = 0; // TODO
2017-08-04 23:58:08 +02:00
payment.m_block_height = t.height;
payment.m_unlock_time = t.unlock_time;
payment.m_timestamp = t.timestamp;
payment.m_coinbase = t.coinbase;
2017-08-04 23:58:08 +02:00
if (t.mempool) {
if (std::find(unconfirmed_payments_txs.begin(), unconfirmed_payments_txs.end(), tx_hash) == unconfirmed_payments_txs.end()) {
pool_txs.push_back(tx_hash);
// assume false as we don't get that info from the light wallet server
crypto::hash payment_id;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!epee::string_tools::hex_to_pod(t.payment_id, payment_id),
error::wallet_internal_error, "Failed to parse payment id");
emplace_or_replace(m_unconfirmed_payments, payment_id, pool_payment_details{payment, false});
2017-08-04 23:58:08 +02:00
if (0 != m_callback) {
m_callback->on_lw_unconfirmed_money_received(t.height, payment.m_tx_hash, payment.m_amount);
2017-08-04 23:58:08 +02:00
}
}
} else {
if (std::find(payments_txs.begin(), payments_txs.end(), tx_hash) == payments_txs.end()) {
m_payments.emplace(tx_hash, payment);
if (0 != m_callback) {
m_callback->on_lw_money_received(t.height, payment.m_tx_hash, payment.m_amount);
2017-08-04 23:58:08 +02:00
}
}
}
// Outgoing transfers
} else {
uint64_t amount_sent = total_sent - total_received;
cryptonote::transaction dummy_tx; // not used by light wallet
// increase wallet total sent
wallet_total_sent += total_sent;
if (t.mempool)
{
// Handled by add_unconfirmed_tx in commit_tx
// If sent from another wallet instance we need to add it
if(m_unconfirmed_txs.find(tx_hash) == m_unconfirmed_txs.end())
{
unconfirmed_transfer_details utd;
utd.m_amount_in = amount_sent;
utd.m_amount_out = amount_sent;
utd.m_change = 0;
utd.m_payment_id = payment_id;
utd.m_timestamp = t.timestamp;
utd.m_state = wallet2::unconfirmed_transfer_details::pending;
m_unconfirmed_txs.emplace(tx_hash,utd);
}
}
else
{
// Only add if new
auto confirmed_tx = m_confirmed_txs.find(tx_hash);
if(confirmed_tx == m_confirmed_txs.end()) {
// tx is added to m_unconfirmed_txs - move to confirmed
if(m_unconfirmed_txs.find(tx_hash) != m_unconfirmed_txs.end())
{
process_unconfirmed(tx_hash, dummy_tx, t.height);
}
// Tx sent by another wallet instance
else
{
confirmed_transfer_details ctd;
ctd.m_amount_in = amount_sent;
ctd.m_amount_out = amount_sent;
ctd.m_change = 0;
ctd.m_payment_id = payment_id;
ctd.m_block_height = t.height;
ctd.m_timestamp = t.timestamp;
m_confirmed_txs.emplace(tx_hash,ctd);
}
if (0 != m_callback)
{
m_callback->on_lw_money_spent(t.height, tx_hash, amount_sent);
2017-08-04 23:58:08 +02:00
}
}
// If not new - check the amount and update if necessary.
// when sending a tx to same wallet the receiving amount has to be credited
else
{
if(confirmed_tx->second.m_amount_in != amount_sent || confirmed_tx->second.m_amount_out != amount_sent)
{
MDEBUG("Adjusting amount sent/received for tx: <" + t.hash + ">. Is tx sent to own wallet? " << print_money(amount_sent) << " != " << print_money(confirmed_tx->second.m_amount_in));
confirmed_tx->second.m_amount_in = amount_sent;
confirmed_tx->second.m_amount_out = amount_sent;
confirmed_tx->second.m_change = 0;
}
}
}
}
}
// TODO: purge old unconfirmed_txs
remove_obsolete_pool_txs(pool_txs);
// Calculate wallet balance
m_light_wallet_balance = ires.total_received-wallet_total_sent;
2018-01-19 08:54:14 +01:00
// MyMonero doesn't send unlocked balance
2017-08-04 23:58:08 +02:00
if(ires.total_received_unlocked > 0)
m_light_wallet_unlocked_balance = ires.total_received_unlocked-wallet_total_sent;
else
m_light_wallet_unlocked_balance = m_light_wallet_balance;
}
bool wallet2::light_wallet_parse_rct_str(const std::string& rct_string, const crypto::public_key& tx_pub_key, uint64_t internal_output_index, rct::key& decrypted_mask, rct::key& rct_commit, bool decrypt) const
{
// rct string is empty if output is non RCT
if (rct_string.empty())
return false;
// rct_string is a string with length 64+64+64 (<rct commit> + <encrypted mask> + <rct amount>)
rct::key encrypted_mask;
std::string rct_commit_str = rct_string.substr(0,64);
std::string encrypted_mask_str = rct_string.substr(64,64);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(string_tools::validate_hex(64, rct_commit_str), error::wallet_internal_error, "Invalid rct commit hash: " + rct_commit_str);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(string_tools::validate_hex(64, encrypted_mask_str), error::wallet_internal_error, "Invalid rct mask: " + encrypted_mask_str);
string_tools::hex_to_pod(rct_commit_str, rct_commit);
string_tools::hex_to_pod(encrypted_mask_str, encrypted_mask);
if (decrypt) {
// Decrypt the mask
crypto::key_derivation derivation;
bool r = generate_key_derivation(tx_pub_key, get_account().get_keys().m_view_secret_key, derivation);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!r, error::wallet_internal_error, "Failed to generate key derivation");
2017-08-04 23:58:08 +02:00
crypto::secret_key scalar;
crypto::derivation_to_scalar(derivation, internal_output_index, scalar);
sc_sub(decrypted_mask.bytes,encrypted_mask.bytes,rct::hash_to_scalar(rct::sk2rct(scalar)).bytes);
}
return true;
}
bool wallet2::light_wallet_key_image_is_ours(const crypto::key_image& key_image, const crypto::public_key& tx_public_key, uint64_t out_index)
{
// Lookup key image from cache
std::map<uint64_t, crypto::key_image> index_keyimage_map;
std::unordered_map<crypto::public_key, std::map<uint64_t, crypto::key_image> >::const_iterator found_pub_key = m_key_image_cache.find(tx_public_key);
if(found_pub_key != m_key_image_cache.end()) {
// pub key found. key image for index cached?
index_keyimage_map = found_pub_key->second;
std::map<uint64_t,crypto::key_image>::const_iterator index_found = index_keyimage_map.find(out_index);
if(index_found != index_keyimage_map.end())
return key_image == index_found->second;
}
// Not in cache - calculate key image
crypto::key_image calculated_key_image;
cryptonote::keypair in_ephemeral;
// Subaddresses aren't supported in mymonero/openmonero yet. Roll out the original scheme:
// compute D = a*R
// compute P = Hs(D || i)*G + B
// compute x = Hs(D || i) + b (and check if P==x*G)
// compute I = x*Hp(P)
const account_keys& ack = get_account().get_keys();
crypto::key_derivation derivation;
bool r = crypto::generate_key_derivation(tx_public_key, ack.m_view_secret_key, derivation);
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(r, false, "failed to generate_key_derivation(" << tx_public_key << ", " << ack.m_view_secret_key << ")");
r = crypto::derive_public_key(derivation, out_index, ack.m_account_address.m_spend_public_key, in_ephemeral.pub);
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(r, false, "failed to derive_public_key (" << derivation << ", " << out_index << ", " << ack.m_account_address.m_spend_public_key << ")");
crypto::derive_secret_key(derivation, out_index, ack.m_spend_secret_key, in_ephemeral.sec);
crypto::public_key out_pkey_test;
r = crypto::secret_key_to_public_key(in_ephemeral.sec, out_pkey_test);
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(r, false, "failed to secret_key_to_public_key(" << in_ephemeral.sec << ")");
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(in_ephemeral.pub == out_pkey_test, false, "derived secret key doesn't match derived public key");
crypto::generate_key_image(in_ephemeral.pub, in_ephemeral.sec, calculated_key_image);
2017-08-04 23:58:08 +02:00
index_keyimage_map.emplace(out_index, calculated_key_image);
m_key_image_cache.emplace(tx_public_key, index_keyimage_map);
return key_image == calculated_key_image;
}
// Another implementation of transaction creation that is hopefully better
// While there is anything left to pay, it goes through random outputs and tries
// to fill the next destination/amount. If it fully fills it, it will use the
// remainder to try to fill the next one as well.
// The tx size if roughly estimated as a linear function of only inputs, and a
// new tx will be created when that size goes above a given fraction of the
// max tx size. At that point, more outputs may be added if the fee cannot be
// satisfied.
// If the next output in the next tx would go to the same destination (ie, we
// cut off at a tx boundary in the middle of paying a given destination), the
// fee will be carved out of the current input if possible, to avoid having to
// add another output just for the fee and getting change.
// This system allows for sending (almost) the entire balance, since it does
// not generate spurious change in all txes, thus decreasing the instantaneous
// usable balance.
std::vector<wallet2::pending_tx> wallet2::create_transactions_2(std::vector<cryptonote::tx_destination_entry> dsts, const size_t fake_outs_count, const uint64_t unlock_time, uint32_t priority, const std::vector<uint8_t>& extra, uint32_t subaddr_account, std::set<uint32_t> subaddr_indices)
{
//ensure device is let in NONE mode in any case
hw::device &hwdev = m_account.get_device();
boost::unique_lock<hw::device> hwdev_lock (hwdev);
hw::reset_mode rst(hwdev);
auto original_dsts = dsts;
if(m_light_wallet) {
// Populate m_transfers
light_wallet_get_unspent_outs();
}
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
std::vector<std::pair<uint32_t, std::vector<size_t>>> unused_transfers_indices_per_subaddr;
std::vector<std::pair<uint32_t, std::vector<size_t>>> unused_dust_indices_per_subaddr;
uint64_t needed_money;
uint64_t accumulated_fee, accumulated_outputs, accumulated_change;
struct TX {
std::vector<size_t> selected_transfers;
std::vector<cryptonote::tx_destination_entry> dsts;
cryptonote::transaction tx;
pending_tx ptx;
size_t weight;
uint64_t needed_fee;
std::vector<std::vector<tools::wallet2::get_outs_entry>> outs;
TX() : weight(0), needed_fee(0) {}
void add(const cryptonote::tx_destination_entry &de, uint64_t amount, unsigned int original_output_index, bool merge_destinations) {
if (merge_destinations)
{
std::vector<cryptonote::tx_destination_entry>::iterator i;
i = std::find_if(dsts.begin(), dsts.end(), [&](const cryptonote::tx_destination_entry &d) { return !memcmp (&d.addr, &de.addr, sizeof(de.addr)); });
if (i == dsts.end())
{
dsts.push_back(de);
i = dsts.end() - 1;
i->amount = 0;
}
i->amount += amount;
}
else
{
2017-09-20 11:35:15 +02:00
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(original_output_index > dsts.size(), error::wallet_internal_error,
std::string("original_output_index too large: ") + std::to_string(original_output_index) + " > " + std::to_string(dsts.size()));
if (original_output_index == dsts.size())
{
dsts.push_back(de);
dsts.back().amount = 0;
}
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(memcmp(&dsts[original_output_index].addr, &de.addr, sizeof(de.addr)), error::wallet_internal_error, "Mismatched destination address");
dsts[original_output_index].amount += amount;
}
}
};
std::vector<TX> txes;
bool adding_fee; // true if new outputs go towards fee, rather than destinations
uint64_t needed_fee, available_for_fee = 0;
uint64_t upper_transaction_weight_limit = get_upper_transaction_weight_limit();
const bool use_per_byte_fee = use_fork_rules(HF_VERSION_PER_BYTE_FEE, 0);
const bool use_rct = use_fork_rules(4, 0);
const bool bulletproof = use_fork_rules(get_bulletproof_fork(), 0);
const rct::RCTConfig rct_config {
bulletproof ? rct::RangeProofPaddedBulletproof : rct::RangeProofBorromean,
bulletproof ? (use_fork_rules(HF_VERSION_SMALLER_BP, -10) ? 2 : 1) : 0
};
const uint64_t base_fee = get_base_fee();
const uint64_t fee_multiplier = get_fee_multiplier(priority, get_fee_algorithm());
const uint64_t fee_quantization_mask = get_fee_quantization_mask();
// throw if attempting a transaction with no destinations
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(dsts.empty(), error::zero_destination);
// calculate total amount being sent to all destinations
// throw if total amount overflows uint64_t
needed_money = 0;
for(auto& dt: dsts)
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(0 == dt.amount, error::zero_destination);
needed_money += dt.amount;
LOG_PRINT_L2("transfer: adding " << print_money(dt.amount) << ", for a total of " << print_money (needed_money));
2018-02-16 12:04:04 +01:00
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(needed_money < dt.amount, error::tx_sum_overflow, dsts, 0, m_nettype);
}
// throw if attempting a transaction with no money
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(needed_money == 0, error::zero_destination);
2017-11-07 18:27:41 +01:00
std::map<uint32_t, uint64_t> unlocked_balance_per_subaddr = unlocked_balance_per_subaddress(subaddr_account);
std::map<uint32_t, uint64_t> balance_per_subaddr = balance_per_subaddress(subaddr_account);
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
2017-11-07 18:27:41 +01:00
if (subaddr_indices.empty()) // "index=<N1>[,<N2>,...]" wasn't specified -> use all the indices with non-zero unlocked balance
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
{
for (const auto& i : balance_per_subaddr)
subaddr_indices.insert(i.first);
}
// early out if we know we can't make it anyway
// we could also check for being within FEE_PER_KB, but if the fee calculation
// ever changes, this might be missed, so let this go through
const uint64_t min_fee = (fee_multiplier * base_fee * estimate_tx_size(use_rct, 1, fake_outs_count, 2, extra.size(), bulletproof));
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
uint64_t balance_subtotal = 0;
2017-11-07 18:27:41 +01:00
uint64_t unlocked_balance_subtotal = 0;
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
for (uint32_t index_minor : subaddr_indices)
2017-11-07 18:27:41 +01:00
{
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
balance_subtotal += balance_per_subaddr[index_minor];
2017-11-07 18:27:41 +01:00
unlocked_balance_subtotal += unlocked_balance_per_subaddr[index_minor];
}
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(needed_money + min_fee > balance_subtotal, error::not_enough_money,
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
balance_subtotal, needed_money, 0);
2017-11-07 18:27:41 +01:00
// first check overall balance is enough, then unlocked one, so we throw distinct exceptions
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(needed_money + min_fee > unlocked_balance_subtotal, error::not_enough_unlocked_money,
2017-11-07 18:27:41 +01:00
unlocked_balance_subtotal, needed_money, 0);
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
for (uint32_t i : subaddr_indices)
LOG_PRINT_L2("Candidate subaddress index for spending: " << i);
2018-06-28 04:31:50 +02:00
// determine threshold for fractional amount
const size_t tx_weight_one_ring = estimate_tx_weight(use_rct, 1, fake_outs_count, 2, 0, bulletproof);
const size_t tx_weight_two_rings = estimate_tx_weight(use_rct, 2, fake_outs_count, 2, 0, bulletproof);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(tx_weight_one_ring > tx_weight_two_rings, error::wallet_internal_error, "Estimated tx weight with 1 input is larger than with 2 inputs!");
const size_t tx_weight_per_ring = tx_weight_two_rings - tx_weight_one_ring;
const uint64_t fractional_threshold = (fee_multiplier * base_fee * tx_weight_per_ring) / (use_per_byte_fee ? 1 : 1024);
2018-06-28 04:31:50 +02:00
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
// gather all dust and non-dust outputs belonging to specified subaddresses
size_t num_nondust_outputs = 0;
size_t num_dust_outputs = 0;
for (size_t i = 0; i < m_transfers.size(); ++i)
{
const transfer_details& td = m_transfers[i];
2018-06-28 04:31:50 +02:00
if (m_ignore_fractional_outputs && td.amount() < fractional_threshold)
{
MDEBUG("Ignoring output " << i << " of amount " << print_money(td.amount()) << " which is below threshold " << print_money(fractional_threshold));
continue;
}
if (!td.m_spent && !td.m_frozen && !td.m_key_image_partial && (use_rct ? true : !td.is_rct()) && is_transfer_unlocked(td) && td.m_subaddr_index.major == subaddr_account && subaddr_indices.count(td.m_subaddr_index.minor) == 1)
{
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
const uint32_t index_minor = td.m_subaddr_index.minor;
auto find_predicate = [&index_minor](const std::pair<uint32_t, std::vector<size_t>>& x) { return x.first == index_minor; };
if ((td.is_rct()) || is_valid_decomposed_amount(td.amount()))
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
{
auto found = std::find_if(unused_transfers_indices_per_subaddr.begin(), unused_transfers_indices_per_subaddr.end(), find_predicate);
if (found == unused_transfers_indices_per_subaddr.end())
{
unused_transfers_indices_per_subaddr.push_back({index_minor, {i}});
}
else
{
found->second.push_back(i);
}
++num_nondust_outputs;
}
else
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
{
auto found = std::find_if(unused_dust_indices_per_subaddr.begin(), unused_dust_indices_per_subaddr.end(), find_predicate);
if (found == unused_dust_indices_per_subaddr.end())
{
unused_dust_indices_per_subaddr.push_back({index_minor, {i}});
}
else
{
found->second.push_back(i);
}
++num_dust_outputs;
}
}
}
// sort output indices
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
{
2017-11-07 18:27:41 +01:00
auto sort_predicate = [&unlocked_balance_per_subaddr] (const std::pair<uint32_t, std::vector<size_t>>& x, const std::pair<uint32_t, std::vector<size_t>>& y)
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
{
2017-11-07 18:27:41 +01:00
return unlocked_balance_per_subaddr[x.first] > unlocked_balance_per_subaddr[y.first];
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
};
std::sort(unused_transfers_indices_per_subaddr.begin(), unused_transfers_indices_per_subaddr.end(), sort_predicate);
std::sort(unused_dust_indices_per_subaddr.begin(), unused_dust_indices_per_subaddr.end(), sort_predicate);
}
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
LOG_PRINT_L2("Starting with " << num_nondust_outputs << " non-dust outputs and " << num_dust_outputs << " dust outputs");
if (unused_dust_indices_per_subaddr.empty() && unused_transfers_indices_per_subaddr.empty())
return std::vector<wallet2::pending_tx>();
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
// if empty, put dummy entry so that the front can be referenced later in the loop
if (unused_dust_indices_per_subaddr.empty())
unused_dust_indices_per_subaddr.push_back({});
if (unused_transfers_indices_per_subaddr.empty())
unused_transfers_indices_per_subaddr.push_back({});
// start with an empty tx
txes.push_back(TX());
accumulated_fee = 0;
accumulated_outputs = 0;
accumulated_change = 0;
adding_fee = false;
needed_fee = 0;
std::vector<std::vector<tools::wallet2::get_outs_entry>> outs;
// for rct, since we don't see the amounts, we will try to make all transactions
// look the same, with 1 or 2 inputs, and 2 outputs. One input is preferable, as
// this prevents linking to another by provenance analysis, but two is ok if we
// try to pick outputs not from the same block. We will get two outputs, one for
// the destination, and one for change.
LOG_PRINT_L2("checking preferred");
2017-07-05 09:53:16 +02:00
std::vector<size_t> preferred_inputs;
uint64_t rct_outs_needed = 2 * (fake_outs_count + 1);
rct_outs_needed += 100; // some fudge factor since we don't know how many are locked
if (use_rct)
{
// this is used to build a tx that's 1 or 2 inputs, and 2 outputs, which
// will get us a known fee.
uint64_t estimated_fee = estimate_fee(use_per_byte_fee, use_rct, 2, fake_outs_count, 2, extra.size(), bulletproof, base_fee, fee_multiplier, fee_quantization_mask);
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
preferred_inputs = pick_preferred_rct_inputs(needed_money + estimated_fee, subaddr_account, subaddr_indices);
2017-07-05 09:53:16 +02:00
if (!preferred_inputs.empty())
{
string s;
2017-11-13 20:53:38 +01:00
for (auto i: preferred_inputs) s += boost::lexical_cast<std::string>(i) + " (" + print_money(m_transfers[i].amount()) + ") ";
2018-01-19 08:54:14 +01:00
LOG_PRINT_L1("Found preferred rct inputs for rct tx: " << s);
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
// bring the list of available outputs stored by the same subaddress index to the front of the list
uint32_t index_minor = m_transfers[preferred_inputs[0]].m_subaddr_index.minor;
for (size_t i = 1; i < unused_transfers_indices_per_subaddr.size(); ++i)
{
if (unused_transfers_indices_per_subaddr[i].first == index_minor)
{
std::swap(unused_transfers_indices_per_subaddr[0], unused_transfers_indices_per_subaddr[i]);
break;
}
}
for (size_t i = 1; i < unused_dust_indices_per_subaddr.size(); ++i)
{
if (unused_dust_indices_per_subaddr[i].first == index_minor)
{
std::swap(unused_dust_indices_per_subaddr[0], unused_dust_indices_per_subaddr[i]);
break;
}
}
}
}
LOG_PRINT_L2("done checking preferred");
// while:
// - we have something to send
// - or we need to gather more fee
// - or we have just one input in that tx, which is rct (to try and make all/most rct txes 2/2)
unsigned int original_output_index = 0;
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
std::vector<size_t>* unused_transfers_indices = &unused_transfers_indices_per_subaddr[0].second;
std::vector<size_t>* unused_dust_indices = &unused_dust_indices_per_subaddr[0].second;
hwdev.set_mode(hw::device::TRANSACTION_CREATE_FAKE);
while ((!dsts.empty() && dsts[0].amount > 0) || adding_fee || !preferred_inputs.empty() || should_pick_a_second_output(use_rct, txes.back().selected_transfers.size(), *unused_transfers_indices, *unused_dust_indices)) {
TX &tx = txes.back();
LOG_PRINT_L2("Start of loop with " << unused_transfers_indices->size() << " " << unused_dust_indices->size() << ", tx.dsts.size() " << tx.dsts.size());
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
LOG_PRINT_L2("unused_transfers_indices: " << strjoin(*unused_transfers_indices, " "));
2017-11-13 20:53:38 +01:00
LOG_PRINT_L2("unused_dust_indices: " << strjoin(*unused_dust_indices, " "));
LOG_PRINT_L2("dsts size " << dsts.size() << ", first " << (dsts.empty() ? "-" : cryptonote::print_money(dsts[0].amount)));
LOG_PRINT_L2("adding_fee " << adding_fee << ", use_rct " << use_rct);
// if we need to spend money and don't have any left, we fail
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
if (unused_dust_indices->empty() && unused_transfers_indices->empty()) {
LOG_PRINT_L2("No more outputs to choose from");
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(1, error::tx_not_possible, unlocked_balance(subaddr_account), needed_money, accumulated_fee + needed_fee);
}
// get a random unspent output and use it to pay part (or all) of the current destination (and maybe next one, etc)
// This could be more clever, but maybe at the cost of making probabilistic inferences easier
size_t idx;
if (!preferred_inputs.empty()) {
idx = pop_back(preferred_inputs);
pop_if_present(*unused_transfers_indices, idx);
pop_if_present(*unused_dust_indices, idx);
} else if ((dsts.empty() || dsts[0].amount == 0) && !adding_fee) {
// the "make rct txes 2/2" case - we pick a small value output to "clean up" the wallet too
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
std::vector<size_t> indices = get_only_rct(*unused_dust_indices, *unused_transfers_indices);
idx = pop_best_value(indices, tx.selected_transfers, true);
// we might not want to add it if it's a large output and we don't have many left
if (m_transfers[idx].amount() >= m_min_output_value) {
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
if (get_count_above(m_transfers, *unused_transfers_indices, m_min_output_value) < m_min_output_count) {
LOG_PRINT_L2("Second output was not strictly needed, and we're running out of outputs above " << print_money(m_min_output_value) << ", not adding");
break;
}
}
// since we're trying to add a second output which is not strictly needed,
// we only add it if it's unrelated enough to the first one
float relatedness = get_output_relatedness(m_transfers[idx], m_transfers[tx.selected_transfers.front()]);
if (relatedness > SECOND_OUTPUT_RELATEDNESS_THRESHOLD)
{
LOG_PRINT_L2("Second output was not strictly needed, and relatedness " << relatedness << ", not adding");
break;
}
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
pop_if_present(*unused_transfers_indices, idx);
pop_if_present(*unused_dust_indices, idx);
} else
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
idx = pop_best_value(unused_transfers_indices->empty() ? *unused_dust_indices : *unused_transfers_indices, tx.selected_transfers);
const transfer_details &td = m_transfers[idx];
LOG_PRINT_L2("Picking output " << idx << ", amount " << print_money(td.amount()) << ", ki " << td.m_key_image);
// add this output to the list to spend
tx.selected_transfers.push_back(idx);
uint64_t available_amount = td.amount();
accumulated_outputs += available_amount;
// clear any fake outs we'd already gathered, since we'll need a new set
outs.clear();
if (adding_fee)
{
LOG_PRINT_L2("We need more fee, adding it to fee");
available_for_fee += available_amount;
}
else
{
while (!dsts.empty() && dsts[0].amount <= available_amount && estimate_tx_weight(use_rct, tx.selected_transfers.size(), fake_outs_count, tx.dsts.size()+1, extra.size(), bulletproof) < TX_WEIGHT_TARGET(upper_transaction_weight_limit))
{
// we can fully pay that destination
2018-02-16 12:04:04 +01:00
LOG_PRINT_L2("We can fully pay " << get_account_address_as_str(m_nettype, dsts[0].is_subaddress, dsts[0].addr) <<
" for " << print_money(dsts[0].amount));
tx.add(dsts[0], dsts[0].amount, original_output_index, m_merge_destinations);
available_amount -= dsts[0].amount;
dsts[0].amount = 0;
pop_index(dsts, 0);
++original_output_index;
}
if (available_amount > 0 && !dsts.empty() && estimate_tx_weight(use_rct, tx.selected_transfers.size(), fake_outs_count, tx.dsts.size()+1, extra.size(), bulletproof) < TX_WEIGHT_TARGET(upper_transaction_weight_limit)) {
// we can partially fill that destination
2018-02-16 12:04:04 +01:00
LOG_PRINT_L2("We can partially pay " << get_account_address_as_str(m_nettype, dsts[0].is_subaddress, dsts[0].addr) <<
" for " << print_money(available_amount) << "/" << print_money(dsts[0].amount));
tx.add(dsts[0], available_amount, original_output_index, m_merge_destinations);
dsts[0].amount -= available_amount;
available_amount = 0;
}
}
// here, check if we need to sent tx and start a new one
LOG_PRINT_L2("Considering whether to create a tx now, " << tx.selected_transfers.size() << " inputs, tx limit "
<< upper_transaction_weight_limit);
bool try_tx = false;
// if we have preferred picks, but haven't yet used all of them, continue
if (preferred_inputs.empty())
{
if (adding_fee)
{
/* might not actually be enough if adding this output bumps size to next kB, but we need to try */
try_tx = available_for_fee >= needed_fee;
}
else
{
const size_t estimated_rct_tx_weight = estimate_tx_weight(use_rct, tx.selected_transfers.size(), fake_outs_count, tx.dsts.size()+1, extra.size(), bulletproof);
try_tx = dsts.empty() || (estimated_rct_tx_weight >= TX_WEIGHT_TARGET(upper_transaction_weight_limit));
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(try_tx && tx.dsts.empty(), error::tx_too_big, estimated_rct_tx_weight, upper_transaction_weight_limit);
}
}
if (try_tx) {
cryptonote::transaction test_tx;
pending_tx test_ptx;
needed_fee = estimate_fee(use_per_byte_fee, use_rct ,tx.selected_transfers.size(), fake_outs_count, tx.dsts.size()+1, extra.size(), bulletproof, base_fee, fee_multiplier, fee_quantization_mask);
uint64_t inputs = 0, outputs = needed_fee;
for (size_t idx: tx.selected_transfers) inputs += m_transfers[idx].amount();
for (const auto &o: tx.dsts) outputs += o.amount;
if (inputs < outputs)
{
LOG_PRINT_L2("We don't have enough for the basic fee, switching to adding_fee");
adding_fee = true;
goto skip_tx;
}
LOG_PRINT_L2("Trying to create a tx now, with " << tx.dsts.size() << " outputs and " <<
tx.selected_transfers.size() << " inputs");
if (use_rct)
transfer_selected_rct(tx.dsts, tx.selected_transfers, fake_outs_count, outs, unlock_time, needed_fee, extra,
test_tx, test_ptx, rct_config);
else
transfer_selected(tx.dsts, tx.selected_transfers, fake_outs_count, outs, unlock_time, needed_fee, extra,
detail::digit_split_strategy, tx_dust_policy(::config::DEFAULT_DUST_THRESHOLD), test_tx, test_ptx);
auto txBlob = t_serializable_object_to_blob(test_ptx.tx);
needed_fee = calculate_fee(use_per_byte_fee, test_ptx.tx, txBlob.size(), base_fee, fee_multiplier, fee_quantization_mask);
available_for_fee = test_ptx.fee + test_ptx.change_dts.amount + (!test_ptx.dust_added_to_fee ? test_ptx.dust : 0);
LOG_PRINT_L2("Made a " << get_weight_string(test_ptx.tx, txBlob.size()) << " tx, with " << print_money(available_for_fee) << " available for fee (" <<
print_money(needed_fee) << " needed)");
if (needed_fee > available_for_fee && !dsts.empty() && dsts[0].amount > 0)
{
// we don't have enough for the fee, but we've only partially paid the current address,
// so we can take the fee from the paid amount, since we'll have to make another tx anyway
std::vector<cryptonote::tx_destination_entry>::iterator i;
i = std::find_if(tx.dsts.begin(), tx.dsts.end(),
[&](const cryptonote::tx_destination_entry &d) { return !memcmp (&d.addr, &dsts[0].addr, sizeof(dsts[0].addr)); });
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(i == tx.dsts.end(), error::wallet_internal_error, "paid address not found in outputs");
if (i->amount > needed_fee)
{
uint64_t new_paid_amount = i->amount /*+ test_ptx.fee*/ - needed_fee;
2018-02-16 12:04:04 +01:00
LOG_PRINT_L2("Adjusting amount paid to " << get_account_address_as_str(m_nettype, i->is_subaddress, i->addr) << " from " <<
2017-07-05 09:53:16 +02:00
print_money(i->amount) << " to " << print_money(new_paid_amount) << " to accommodate " <<
print_money(needed_fee) << " fee");
dsts[0].amount += i->amount - new_paid_amount;
i->amount = new_paid_amount;
test_ptx.fee = needed_fee;
available_for_fee = needed_fee;
}
}
if (needed_fee > available_for_fee)
{
LOG_PRINT_L2("We could not make a tx, switching to fee accumulation");
adding_fee = true;
}
else
{
LOG_PRINT_L2("We made a tx, adjusting fee and saving it, we need " << print_money(needed_fee) << " and we have " << print_money(test_ptx.fee));
while (needed_fee > test_ptx.fee) {
if (use_rct)
transfer_selected_rct(tx.dsts, tx.selected_transfers, fake_outs_count, outs, unlock_time, needed_fee, extra,
test_tx, test_ptx, rct_config);
else
transfer_selected(tx.dsts, tx.selected_transfers, fake_outs_count, outs, unlock_time, needed_fee, extra,
detail::digit_split_strategy, tx_dust_policy(::config::DEFAULT_DUST_THRESHOLD), test_tx, test_ptx);
txBlob = t_serializable_object_to_blob(test_ptx.tx);
needed_fee = calculate_fee(use_per_byte_fee, test_ptx.tx, txBlob.size(), base_fee, fee_multiplier, fee_quantization_mask);
LOG_PRINT_L2("Made an attempt at a final " << get_weight_string(test_ptx.tx, txBlob.size()) << " tx, with " << print_money(test_ptx.fee) <<
" fee and " << print_money(test_ptx.change_dts.amount) << " change");
}
LOG_PRINT_L2("Made a final " << get_weight_string(test_ptx.tx, txBlob.size()) << " tx, with " << print_money(test_ptx.fee) <<
" fee and " << print_money(test_ptx.change_dts.amount) << " change");
tx.tx = test_tx;
tx.ptx = test_ptx;
tx.weight = get_transaction_weight(test_tx, txBlob.size());
tx.outs = outs;
tx.needed_fee = needed_fee;
accumulated_fee += test_ptx.fee;
accumulated_change += test_ptx.change_dts.amount;
adding_fee = false;
if (!dsts.empty())
{
LOG_PRINT_L2("We have more to pay, starting another tx");
txes.push_back(TX());
2017-09-20 11:35:15 +02:00
original_output_index = 0;
}
}
}
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
skip_tx:
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
// if unused_*_indices is empty while unused_*_indices_per_subaddr has multiple elements, and if we still have something to pay,
// pop front of unused_*_indices_per_subaddr and have unused_*_indices point to the front of unused_*_indices_per_subaddr
if ((!dsts.empty() && dsts[0].amount > 0) || adding_fee)
{
if (unused_transfers_indices->empty() && unused_transfers_indices_per_subaddr.size() > 1)
{
unused_transfers_indices_per_subaddr.erase(unused_transfers_indices_per_subaddr.begin());
unused_transfers_indices = &unused_transfers_indices_per_subaddr[0].second;
}
if (unused_dust_indices->empty() && unused_dust_indices_per_subaddr.size() > 1)
{
unused_dust_indices_per_subaddr.erase(unused_dust_indices_per_subaddr.begin());
unused_dust_indices = &unused_dust_indices_per_subaddr[0].second;
}
}
}
if (adding_fee)
{
LOG_PRINT_L1("We ran out of outputs while trying to gather final fee");
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(1, error::tx_not_possible, unlocked_balance(subaddr_account), needed_money, accumulated_fee + needed_fee);
}
LOG_PRINT_L1("Done creating " << txes.size() << " transactions, " << print_money(accumulated_fee) <<
" total fee, " << print_money(accumulated_change) << " total change");
hwdev.set_mode(hw::device::TRANSACTION_CREATE_REAL);
for (std::vector<TX>::iterator i = txes.begin(); i != txes.end(); ++i)
{
TX &tx = *i;
cryptonote::transaction test_tx;
pending_tx test_ptx;
if (use_rct) {
transfer_selected_rct(tx.dsts, /* NOMOD std::vector<cryptonote::tx_destination_entry> dsts,*/
tx.selected_transfers, /* const std::list<size_t> selected_transfers */
fake_outs_count, /* CONST size_t fake_outputs_count, */
tx.outs, /* MOD std::vector<std::vector<tools::wallet2::get_outs_entry>> &outs, */
unlock_time, /* CONST uint64_t unlock_time, */
tx.needed_fee, /* CONST uint64_t fee, */
extra, /* const std::vector<uint8_t>& extra, */
test_tx, /* OUT cryptonote::transaction& tx, */
test_ptx, /* OUT cryptonote::transaction& tx, */
rct_config);
} else {
transfer_selected(tx.dsts,
tx.selected_transfers,
fake_outs_count,
tx.outs,
unlock_time,
tx.needed_fee,
extra,
detail::digit_split_strategy,
tx_dust_policy(::config::DEFAULT_DUST_THRESHOLD),
test_tx,
test_ptx);
}
auto txBlob = t_serializable_object_to_blob(test_ptx.tx);
tx.tx = test_tx;
tx.ptx = test_ptx;
tx.weight = get_transaction_weight(test_tx, txBlob.size());
}
std::vector<wallet2::pending_tx> ptx_vector;
for (std::vector<TX>::iterator i = txes.begin(); i != txes.end(); ++i)
{
TX &tx = *i;
uint64_t tx_money = 0;
for (size_t idx: tx.selected_transfers)
tx_money += m_transfers[idx].amount();
LOG_PRINT_L1(" Transaction " << (1+std::distance(txes.begin(), i)) << "/" << txes.size() <<
" " << get_transaction_hash(tx.ptx.tx) << ": " << get_weight_string(tx.weight) << ", sending " << print_money(tx_money) << " in " << tx.selected_transfers.size() <<
" outputs to " << tx.dsts.size() << " destination(s), including " <<
print_money(tx.ptx.fee) << " fee, " << print_money(tx.ptx.change_dts.amount) << " change");
ptx_vector.push_back(tx.ptx);
}
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!sanity_check(ptx_vector, original_dsts), error::wallet_internal_error, "Created transaction(s) failed sanity check");
// if we made it this far, we're OK to actually send the transactions
return ptx_vector;
}
bool wallet2::sanity_check(const std::vector<wallet2::pending_tx> &ptx_vector, std::vector<cryptonote::tx_destination_entry> dsts) const
{
MDEBUG("sanity_check: " << ptx_vector.size() << " txes, " << dsts.size() << " destinations");
hw::device &hwdev = m_account.get_device();
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(ptx_vector.empty(), error::wallet_internal_error, "No transactions");
// check every party in there does receive at least the required amount
std::unordered_map<account_public_address, std::pair<uint64_t, bool>> required;
for (const auto &d: dsts)
{
required[d.addr].first += d.amount;
required[d.addr].second = d.is_subaddress;
}
// add change
uint64_t change = 0;
for (const auto &ptx: ptx_vector)
{
for (size_t idx: ptx.selected_transfers)
change += m_transfers[idx].amount();
change -= ptx.fee;
}
for (const auto &r: required)
change -= r.second.first;
MDEBUG("Adding " << cryptonote::print_money(change) << " expected change");
for (const pending_tx &ptx: ptx_vector)
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(ptx.change_dts.addr != ptx_vector[0].change_dts.addr, error::wallet_internal_error,
"Change goes to several different addresses");
const auto it = m_subaddresses.find(ptx_vector[0].change_dts.addr.m_spend_public_key);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(change > 0 && it == m_subaddresses.end(), error::wallet_internal_error, "Change address is not ours");
required[ptx_vector[0].change_dts.addr].first += change;
required[ptx_vector[0].change_dts.addr].second = ptx_vector[0].change_dts.is_subaddress;
for (const auto &r: required)
{
const account_public_address &address = r.first;
const crypto::public_key &view_pkey = address.m_view_public_key;
uint64_t total_received = 0;
for (const auto &ptx: ptx_vector)
{
uint64_t received = 0;
try
{
std::string proof = get_tx_proof(ptx.tx, ptx.tx_key, ptx.additional_tx_keys, address, r.second.second, "automatic-sanity-check");
check_tx_proof(ptx.tx, address, r.second.second, "automatic-sanity-check", proof, received);
}
catch (const std::exception &e) { received = 0; }
total_received += received;
}
std::stringstream ss;
ss << "Total received by " << cryptonote::get_account_address_as_str(m_nettype, r.second.second, address) << ": "
<< cryptonote::print_money(total_received) << ", expected " << cryptonote::print_money(r.second.first);
MDEBUG(ss.str());
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(total_received < r.second.first, error::wallet_internal_error, ss.str());
}
return true;
}
std::vector<wallet2::pending_tx> wallet2::create_transactions_all(uint64_t below, const cryptonote::account_public_address &address, bool is_subaddress, const size_t outputs, const size_t fake_outs_count, const uint64_t unlock_time, uint32_t priority, const std::vector<uint8_t>& extra, uint32_t subaddr_account, std::set<uint32_t> subaddr_indices)
{
std::vector<size_t> unused_transfers_indices;
std::vector<size_t> unused_dust_indices;
const bool use_rct = use_fork_rules(4, 0);
2017-11-07 15:04:40 +01:00
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(unlocked_balance(subaddr_account) == 0, error::wallet_internal_error, "No unlocked balance in the entire wallet");
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
std::map<uint32_t, std::pair<std::vector<size_t>, std::vector<size_t>>> unused_transfer_dust_indices_per_subaddr;
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
// gather all dust and non-dust outputs of specified subaddress (if any) and below specified threshold (if any)
bool fund_found = false;
for (size_t i = 0; i < m_transfers.size(); ++i)
{
const transfer_details& td = m_transfers[i];
if (!td.m_spent && !td.m_frozen && !td.m_key_image_partial && (use_rct ? true : !td.is_rct()) && is_transfer_unlocked(td) && td.m_subaddr_index.major == subaddr_account && (subaddr_indices.empty() || subaddr_indices.count(td.m_subaddr_index.minor) == 1))
{
fund_found = true;
if (below == 0 || td.amount() < below)
{
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
if ((td.is_rct()) || is_valid_decomposed_amount(td.amount()))
unused_transfer_dust_indices_per_subaddr[td.m_subaddr_index.minor].first.push_back(i);
else
unused_transfer_dust_indices_per_subaddr[td.m_subaddr_index.minor].second.push_back(i);
}
}
}
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!fund_found, error::wallet_internal_error, "No unlocked balance in the specified subaddress(es)");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(unused_transfer_dust_indices_per_subaddr.empty(), error::wallet_internal_error, "The smallest amount found is not below the specified threshold");
if (subaddr_indices.empty())
{
// in case subaddress index wasn't specified, choose non-empty subaddress randomly (with index=0 being chosen last)
if (unused_transfer_dust_indices_per_subaddr.count(0) == 1 && unused_transfer_dust_indices_per_subaddr.size() > 1)
unused_transfer_dust_indices_per_subaddr.erase(0);
auto i = unused_transfer_dust_indices_per_subaddr.begin();
std::advance(i, crypto::rand<size_t>() % unused_transfer_dust_indices_per_subaddr.size());
unused_transfers_indices = i->second.first;
unused_dust_indices = i->second.second;
LOG_PRINT_L2("Spending from subaddress index " << i->first);
}
else
{
for (const auto& p : unused_transfer_dust_indices_per_subaddr)
{
unused_transfers_indices.insert(unused_transfers_indices.end(), p.second.first.begin(), p.second.first.end());
unused_dust_indices.insert(unused_dust_indices.end(), p.second.second.begin(), p.second.second.end());
LOG_PRINT_L2("Spending from subaddress index " << p.first);
}
}
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
return create_transactions_from(address, is_subaddress, outputs, unused_transfers_indices, unused_dust_indices, fake_outs_count, unlock_time, priority, extra);
}
std::vector<wallet2::pending_tx> wallet2::create_transactions_single(const crypto::key_image &ki, const cryptonote::account_public_address &address, bool is_subaddress, const size_t outputs, const size_t fake_outs_count, const uint64_t unlock_time, uint32_t priority, const std::vector<uint8_t>& extra)
2017-10-11 03:32:06 +02:00
{
std::vector<size_t> unused_transfers_indices;
std::vector<size_t> unused_dust_indices;
const bool use_rct = use_fork_rules(4, 0);
// find output with the given key image
for (size_t i = 0; i < m_transfers.size(); ++i)
{
const transfer_details& td = m_transfers[i];
if (td.m_key_image_known && td.m_key_image == ki && !td.m_spent && !td.m_frozen && (use_rct ? true : !td.is_rct()) && is_transfer_unlocked(td))
2017-10-11 03:32:06 +02:00
{
if (td.is_rct() || is_valid_decomposed_amount(td.amount()))
unused_transfers_indices.push_back(i);
else
unused_dust_indices.push_back(i);
break;
}
}
return create_transactions_from(address, is_subaddress, outputs, unused_transfers_indices, unused_dust_indices, fake_outs_count, unlock_time, priority, extra);
2017-10-11 03:32:06 +02:00
}
std::vector<wallet2::pending_tx> wallet2::create_transactions_from(const cryptonote::account_public_address &address, bool is_subaddress, const size_t outputs, std::vector<size_t> unused_transfers_indices, std::vector<size_t> unused_dust_indices, const size_t fake_outs_count, const uint64_t unlock_time, uint32_t priority, const std::vector<uint8_t>& extra)
{
//ensure device is let in NONE mode in any case
hw::device &hwdev = m_account.get_device();
boost::unique_lock<hw::device> hwdev_lock (hwdev);
hw::reset_mode rst(hwdev);
uint64_t accumulated_fee, accumulated_outputs, accumulated_change;
struct TX {
std::vector<size_t> selected_transfers;
std::vector<cryptonote::tx_destination_entry> dsts;
cryptonote::transaction tx;
pending_tx ptx;
size_t weight;
uint64_t needed_fee;
std::vector<std::vector<get_outs_entry>> outs;
TX() : weight(0), needed_fee(0) {}
};
std::vector<TX> txes;
uint64_t needed_fee, available_for_fee = 0;
uint64_t upper_transaction_weight_limit = get_upper_transaction_weight_limit();
std::vector<std::vector<get_outs_entry>> outs;
const bool use_per_byte_fee = use_fork_rules(HF_VERSION_PER_BYTE_FEE);
const bool use_rct = fake_outs_count > 0 && use_fork_rules(4, 0);
const bool bulletproof = use_fork_rules(get_bulletproof_fork(), 0);
const rct::RCTConfig rct_config {
bulletproof ? rct::RangeProofPaddedBulletproof : rct::RangeProofBorromean,
bulletproof ? (use_fork_rules(HF_VERSION_SMALLER_BP, -10) ? 2 : 1) : 0,
};
const uint64_t base_fee = get_base_fee();
const uint64_t fee_multiplier = get_fee_multiplier(priority, get_fee_algorithm());
const uint64_t fee_quantization_mask = get_fee_quantization_mask();
LOG_PRINT_L2("Starting with " << unused_transfers_indices.size() << " non-dust outputs and " << unused_dust_indices.size() << " dust outputs");
if (unused_dust_indices.empty() && unused_transfers_indices.empty())
return std::vector<wallet2::pending_tx>();
// start with an empty tx
txes.push_back(TX());
accumulated_fee = 0;
accumulated_outputs = 0;
accumulated_change = 0;
needed_fee = 0;
// while we have something to send
hwdev.set_mode(hw::device::TRANSACTION_CREATE_FAKE);
while (!unused_dust_indices.empty() || !unused_transfers_indices.empty()) {
TX &tx = txes.back();
// get a random unspent output and use it to pay next chunk. We try to alternate
// dust and non dust to ensure we never get with only dust, from which we might
// get a tx that can't pay for itself
uint64_t fee_dust_threshold;
if (use_fork_rules(HF_VERSION_PER_BYTE_FEE))
{
const uint64_t estimated_tx_weight_with_one_extra_output = estimate_tx_weight(use_rct, tx.selected_transfers.size() + 1, fake_outs_count, tx.dsts.size()+1, extra.size(), bulletproof);
fee_dust_threshold = calculate_fee_from_weight(base_fee, estimated_tx_weight_with_one_extra_output, fee_multiplier, fee_quantization_mask);
}
else
{
fee_dust_threshold = base_fee * fee_multiplier * (upper_transaction_weight_limit + 1023) / 1024;
}
size_t idx =
unused_transfers_indices.empty()
? pop_best_value(unused_dust_indices, tx.selected_transfers)
: unused_dust_indices.empty()
? pop_best_value(unused_transfers_indices, tx.selected_transfers)
: ((tx.selected_transfers.size() & 1) || accumulated_outputs > fee_dust_threshold)
? pop_best_value(unused_dust_indices, tx.selected_transfers)
: pop_best_value(unused_transfers_indices, tx.selected_transfers);
const transfer_details &td = m_transfers[idx];
LOG_PRINT_L2("Picking output " << idx << ", amount " << print_money(td.amount()));
// add this output to the list to spend
tx.selected_transfers.push_back(idx);
uint64_t available_amount = td.amount();
accumulated_outputs += available_amount;
// clear any fake outs we'd already gathered, since we'll need a new set
outs.clear();
// here, check if we need to sent tx and start a new one
LOG_PRINT_L2("Considering whether to create a tx now, " << tx.selected_transfers.size() << " inputs, tx limit "
<< upper_transaction_weight_limit);
const size_t estimated_rct_tx_weight = estimate_tx_weight(use_rct, tx.selected_transfers.size(), fake_outs_count, tx.dsts.size() + 2, extra.size(), bulletproof);
bool try_tx = (unused_dust_indices.empty() && unused_transfers_indices.empty()) || ( estimated_rct_tx_weight >= TX_WEIGHT_TARGET(upper_transaction_weight_limit));
if (try_tx) {
cryptonote::transaction test_tx;
pending_tx test_ptx;
needed_fee = estimate_fee(use_per_byte_fee, use_rct, tx.selected_transfers.size(), fake_outs_count, tx.dsts.size()+1, extra.size(), bulletproof, base_fee, fee_multiplier, fee_quantization_mask);
// add N - 1 outputs for correct initial fee estimation
for (size_t i = 0; i < ((outputs > 1) ? outputs - 1 : outputs); ++i)
tx.dsts.push_back(tx_destination_entry(1, address, is_subaddress));
LOG_PRINT_L2("Trying to create a tx now, with " << tx.dsts.size() << " destinations and " <<
tx.selected_transfers.size() << " outputs");
if (use_rct)
transfer_selected_rct(tx.dsts, tx.selected_transfers, fake_outs_count, outs, unlock_time, needed_fee, extra,
test_tx, test_ptx, rct_config);
else
transfer_selected(tx.dsts, tx.selected_transfers, fake_outs_count, outs, unlock_time, needed_fee, extra,
detail::digit_split_strategy, tx_dust_policy(::config::DEFAULT_DUST_THRESHOLD), test_tx, test_ptx);
auto txBlob = t_serializable_object_to_blob(test_ptx.tx);
needed_fee = calculate_fee(use_per_byte_fee, test_ptx.tx, txBlob.size(), base_fee, fee_multiplier, fee_quantization_mask);
available_for_fee = test_ptx.fee + test_ptx.change_dts.amount;
for (auto &dt: test_ptx.dests)
available_for_fee += dt.amount;
LOG_PRINT_L2("Made a " << get_weight_string(test_ptx.tx, txBlob.size()) << " tx, with " << print_money(available_for_fee) << " available for fee (" <<
print_money(needed_fee) << " needed)");
// add last output, missed for fee estimation
if (outputs > 1)
tx.dsts.push_back(tx_destination_entry(1, address, is_subaddress));
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(needed_fee > available_for_fee, error::wallet_internal_error, "Transaction cannot pay for itself");
do {
LOG_PRINT_L2("We made a tx, adjusting fee and saving it");
// distribute total transferred amount between outputs
uint64_t amount_transferred = available_for_fee - needed_fee;
uint64_t dt_amount = amount_transferred / outputs;
// residue is distributed as one atomic unit per output until it reaches zero
uint64_t residue = amount_transferred % outputs;
for (auto &dt: tx.dsts)
{
uint64_t dt_residue = 0;
if (residue > 0)
{
dt_residue = 1;
residue -= 1;
}
dt.amount = dt_amount + dt_residue;
}
if (use_rct)
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
transfer_selected_rct(tx.dsts, tx.selected_transfers, fake_outs_count, outs, unlock_time, needed_fee, extra,
test_tx, test_ptx, rct_config);
else
transfer_selected(tx.dsts, tx.selected_transfers, fake_outs_count, outs, unlock_time, needed_fee, extra,
detail::digit_split_strategy, tx_dust_policy(::config::DEFAULT_DUST_THRESHOLD), test_tx, test_ptx);
txBlob = t_serializable_object_to_blob(test_ptx.tx);
needed_fee = calculate_fee(use_per_byte_fee, test_ptx.tx, txBlob.size(), base_fee, fee_multiplier, fee_quantization_mask);
LOG_PRINT_L2("Made an attempt at a final " << get_weight_string(test_ptx.tx, txBlob.size()) << " tx, with " << print_money(test_ptx.fee) <<
" fee and " << print_money(test_ptx.change_dts.amount) << " change");
} while (needed_fee > test_ptx.fee);
LOG_PRINT_L2("Made a final " << get_weight_string(test_ptx.tx, txBlob.size()) << " tx, with " << print_money(test_ptx.fee) <<
" fee and " << print_money(test_ptx.change_dts.amount) << " change");
tx.tx = test_tx;
tx.ptx = test_ptx;
tx.weight = get_transaction_weight(test_tx, txBlob.size());
tx.outs = outs;
tx.needed_fee = needed_fee;
accumulated_fee += test_ptx.fee;
accumulated_change += test_ptx.change_dts.amount;
if (!unused_transfers_indices.empty() || !unused_dust_indices.empty())
{
LOG_PRINT_L2("We have more to pay, starting another tx");
txes.push_back(TX());
}
}
}
LOG_PRINT_L1("Done creating " << txes.size() << " transactions, " << print_money(accumulated_fee) <<
" total fee, " << print_money(accumulated_change) << " total change");
hwdev.set_mode(hw::device::TRANSACTION_CREATE_REAL);
for (std::vector<TX>::iterator i = txes.begin(); i != txes.end(); ++i)
{
TX &tx = *i;
cryptonote::transaction test_tx;
pending_tx test_ptx;
if (use_rct) {
transfer_selected_rct(tx.dsts, tx.selected_transfers, fake_outs_count, tx.outs, unlock_time, tx.needed_fee, extra,
test_tx, test_ptx, rct_config);
} else {
transfer_selected(tx.dsts, tx.selected_transfers, fake_outs_count, tx.outs, unlock_time, tx.needed_fee, extra,
detail::digit_split_strategy, tx_dust_policy(::config::DEFAULT_DUST_THRESHOLD), test_tx, test_ptx);
}
auto txBlob = t_serializable_object_to_blob(test_ptx.tx);
tx.tx = test_tx;
tx.ptx = test_ptx;
tx.weight = get_transaction_weight(test_tx, txBlob.size());
}
std::vector<wallet2::pending_tx> ptx_vector;
for (std::vector<TX>::iterator i = txes.begin(); i != txes.end(); ++i)
{
TX &tx = *i;
uint64_t tx_money = 0;
for (size_t idx: tx.selected_transfers)
tx_money += m_transfers[idx].amount();
LOG_PRINT_L1(" Transaction " << (1+std::distance(txes.begin(), i)) << "/" << txes.size() <<
" " << get_transaction_hash(tx.ptx.tx) << ": " << get_weight_string(tx.weight) << ", sending " << print_money(tx_money) << " in " << tx.selected_transfers.size() <<
" outputs to " << tx.dsts.size() << " destination(s), including " <<
print_money(tx.ptx.fee) << " fee, " << print_money(tx.ptx.change_dts.amount) << " change");
ptx_vector.push_back(tx.ptx);
}
uint64_t a = 0;
for (const TX &tx: txes)
{
for (size_t idx: tx.selected_transfers)
{
a += m_transfers[idx].amount();
}
a -= tx.ptx.fee;
}
std::vector<cryptonote::tx_destination_entry> synthetic_dsts(1, cryptonote::tx_destination_entry("", a, address, is_subaddress));
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!sanity_check(ptx_vector, synthetic_dsts), error::wallet_internal_error, "Created transaction(s) failed sanity check");
// if we made it this far, we're OK to actually send the transactions
return ptx_vector;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2018-08-23 23:50:53 +02:00
void wallet2::cold_tx_aux_import(const std::vector<pending_tx> & ptx, const std::vector<std::string> & tx_device_aux)
{
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(ptx.size() == tx_device_aux.size(), "TX aux has invalid size");
for (size_t i = 0; i < ptx.size(); ++i){
crypto::hash txid;
txid = get_transaction_hash(ptx[i].tx);
set_tx_device_aux(txid, tx_device_aux[i]);
}
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
void wallet2::cold_sign_tx(const std::vector<pending_tx>& ptx_vector, signed_tx_set &exported_txs, std::vector<cryptonote::address_parse_info> &dsts_info, std::vector<std::string> & tx_device_aux)
{
auto & hwdev = get_account().get_device();
if (!hwdev.has_tx_cold_sign()){
throw std::invalid_argument("Device does not support cold sign protocol");
}
unsigned_tx_set txs;
for (auto &tx: ptx_vector)
{
txs.txes.push_back(get_construction_data_with_decrypted_short_payment_id(tx, m_account.get_device()));
}
txs.transfers = std::make_pair(0, m_transfers);
2018-08-23 23:50:53 +02:00
auto dev_cold = dynamic_cast<::hw::device_cold*>(&hwdev);
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(dev_cold, "Device does not implement cold signing interface");
hw::tx_aux_data aux_data;
hw::wallet_shim wallet_shim;
setup_shim(&wallet_shim, this);
aux_data.tx_recipients = dsts_info;
aux_data.bp_version = use_fork_rules(HF_VERSION_SMALLER_BP, -10) ? 2 : 1;
2018-08-23 23:50:53 +02:00
dev_cold->tx_sign(&wallet_shim, txs, exported_txs, aux_data);
tx_device_aux = aux_data.tx_device_aux;
MDEBUG("Signed tx data from hw: " << exported_txs.ptx.size() << " transactions");
for (auto &c_ptx: exported_txs.ptx) LOG_PRINT_L0(cryptonote::obj_to_json_str(c_ptx.tx));
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
uint64_t wallet2::cold_key_image_sync(uint64_t &spent, uint64_t &unspent) {
auto & hwdev = get_account().get_device();
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(hwdev.has_ki_cold_sync(), "Device does not support cold ki sync protocol");
2018-08-23 23:50:53 +02:00
auto dev_cold = dynamic_cast<::hw::device_cold*>(&hwdev);
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(dev_cold, "Device does not implement cold signing interface");
std::vector<std::pair<crypto::key_image, crypto::signature>> ski;
hw::wallet_shim wallet_shim;
setup_shim(&wallet_shim, this);
dev_cold->ki_sync(&wallet_shim, m_transfers, ski);
// Call COMMAND_RPC_IS_KEY_IMAGE_SPENT only if daemon is trusted.
uint64_t import_res = import_key_images(ski, 0, spent, unspent, is_trusted_daemon());
m_device_last_key_image_sync = time(NULL);
return import_res;
2018-08-23 23:50:53 +02:00
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
void wallet2::get_hard_fork_info(uint8_t version, uint64_t &earliest_height) const
{
boost::optional<std::string> result = m_node_rpc_proxy.get_earliest_height(version, earliest_height);
throw_on_rpc_response_error(result, "get_hard_fork_info");
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
bool wallet2::use_fork_rules(uint8_t version, int64_t early_blocks) const
{
// TODO: How to get fork rule info from light wallet node?
if(m_light_wallet)
return true;
uint64_t height, earliest_height;
boost::optional<std::string> result = m_node_rpc_proxy.get_height(height);
throw_on_rpc_response_error(result, "get_info");
result = m_node_rpc_proxy.get_earliest_height(version, earliest_height);
throw_on_rpc_response_error(result, "get_hard_fork_info");
bool close_enough = (int64_t)height >= (int64_t)earliest_height - early_blocks && earliest_height != std::numeric_limits<uint64_t>::max(); // start using the rules that many blocks beforehand
if (close_enough)
LOG_PRINT_L2("Using v" << (unsigned)version << " rules");
else
LOG_PRINT_L2("Not using v" << (unsigned)version << " rules");
return close_enough;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
uint64_t wallet2::get_upper_transaction_weight_limit() const
{
if (m_upper_transaction_weight_limit > 0)
return m_upper_transaction_weight_limit;
uint64_t full_reward_zone = use_fork_rules(5, 10) ? CRYPTONOTE_BLOCK_GRANTED_FULL_REWARD_ZONE_V5 : use_fork_rules(2, 10) ? CRYPTONOTE_BLOCK_GRANTED_FULL_REWARD_ZONE_V2 : CRYPTONOTE_BLOCK_GRANTED_FULL_REWARD_ZONE_V1;
if (use_fork_rules(8, 10))
return full_reward_zone / 2 - CRYPTONOTE_COINBASE_BLOB_RESERVED_SIZE;
else
return full_reward_zone - CRYPTONOTE_COINBASE_BLOB_RESERVED_SIZE;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
std::vector<size_t> wallet2::select_available_outputs(const std::function<bool(const transfer_details &td)> &f) const
{
std::vector<size_t> outputs;
size_t n = 0;
for (transfer_container::const_iterator i = m_transfers.begin(); i != m_transfers.end(); ++i, ++n)
{
if (i->m_spent)
continue;
if (i->m_frozen)
continue;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
if (i->m_key_image_partial)
continue;
if (!is_transfer_unlocked(*i))
continue;
if (f(*i))
outputs.push_back(n);
}
return outputs;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
std::vector<uint64_t> wallet2::get_unspent_amounts_vector() const
{
std::set<uint64_t> set;
for (const auto &td: m_transfers)
{
if (!td.m_spent && !td.m_frozen)
set.insert(td.is_rct() ? 0 : td.amount());
}
std::vector<uint64_t> vector;
vector.reserve(set.size());
for (const auto &i: set)
{
vector.push_back(i);
}
return vector;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
std::vector<size_t> wallet2::select_available_outputs_from_histogram(uint64_t count, bool atleast, bool unlocked, bool allow_rct)
{
cryptonote::COMMAND_RPC_GET_OUTPUT_HISTOGRAM::request req_t = AUTO_VAL_INIT(req_t);
cryptonote::COMMAND_RPC_GET_OUTPUT_HISTOGRAM::response resp_t = AUTO_VAL_INIT(resp_t);
m_daemon_rpc_mutex.lock();
if (is_trusted_daemon())
req_t.amounts = get_unspent_amounts_vector();
req_t.min_count = count;
req_t.max_count = 0;
req_t.unlocked = unlocked;
req_t.recent_cutoff = 0;
bool r = net_utils::invoke_http_json_rpc("/json_rpc", "get_output_histogram", req_t, resp_t, m_http_client, rpc_timeout);
m_daemon_rpc_mutex.unlock();
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!r, error::no_connection_to_daemon, "select_available_outputs_from_histogram");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(resp_t.status == CORE_RPC_STATUS_BUSY, error::daemon_busy, "get_output_histogram");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(resp_t.status != CORE_RPC_STATUS_OK, error::get_histogram_error, resp_t.status);
std::set<uint64_t> mixable;
for (const auto &i: resp_t.histogram)
{
mixable.insert(i.amount);
}
return select_available_outputs([mixable, atleast, allow_rct](const transfer_details &td) {
if (!allow_rct && td.is_rct())
return false;
const uint64_t amount = td.is_rct() ? 0 : td.amount();
if (atleast) {
if (mixable.find(amount) != mixable.end())
return true;
}
else {
if (mixable.find(amount) == mixable.end())
return true;
}
return false;
});
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
uint64_t wallet2::get_num_rct_outputs()
{
cryptonote::COMMAND_RPC_GET_OUTPUT_HISTOGRAM::request req_t = AUTO_VAL_INIT(req_t);
cryptonote::COMMAND_RPC_GET_OUTPUT_HISTOGRAM::response resp_t = AUTO_VAL_INIT(resp_t);
m_daemon_rpc_mutex.lock();
req_t.amounts.push_back(0);
req_t.min_count = 0;
req_t.max_count = 0;
req_t.unlocked = true;
req_t.recent_cutoff = 0;
bool r = net_utils::invoke_http_json_rpc("/json_rpc", "get_output_histogram", req_t, resp_t, m_http_client, rpc_timeout);
m_daemon_rpc_mutex.unlock();
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!r, error::no_connection_to_daemon, "get_num_rct_outputs");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(resp_t.status == CORE_RPC_STATUS_BUSY, error::daemon_busy, "get_output_histogram");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(resp_t.status != CORE_RPC_STATUS_OK, error::get_histogram_error, resp_t.status);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(resp_t.histogram.size() != 1, error::get_histogram_error, "Expected exactly one response");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(resp_t.histogram[0].amount != 0, error::get_histogram_error, "Expected 0 amount");
return resp_t.histogram[0].total_instances;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
const wallet2::transfer_details &wallet2::get_transfer_details(size_t idx) const
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(idx >= m_transfers.size(), error::wallet_internal_error, "Bad transfer index");
return m_transfers[idx];
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
std::vector<size_t> wallet2::select_available_unmixable_outputs()
{
// request all outputs with less instances than the min ring size
return select_available_outputs_from_histogram(get_min_ring_size(), false, true, false);
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
std::vector<size_t> wallet2::select_available_mixable_outputs()
{
// request all outputs with at least as many instances as the min ring size
return select_available_outputs_from_histogram(get_min_ring_size(), true, true, true);
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
std::vector<wallet2::pending_tx> wallet2::create_unmixable_sweep_transactions()
{
// From hard fork 1, we don't consider small amounts to be dust anymore
const bool hf1_rules = use_fork_rules(2, 10); // first hard fork has version 2
tx_dust_policy dust_policy(hf1_rules ? 0 : ::config::DEFAULT_DUST_THRESHOLD);
const uint64_t base_fee = get_base_fee();
// may throw
std::vector<size_t> unmixable_outputs = select_available_unmixable_outputs();
size_t num_dust_outputs = unmixable_outputs.size();
if (num_dust_outputs == 0)
{
return std::vector<wallet2::pending_tx>();
}
// split in "dust" and "non dust" to make it easier to select outputs
std::vector<size_t> unmixable_transfer_outputs, unmixable_dust_outputs;
for (auto n: unmixable_outputs)
{
if (m_transfers[n].amount() < base_fee)
unmixable_dust_outputs.push_back(n);
else
unmixable_transfer_outputs.push_back(n);
}
return create_transactions_from(m_account_public_address, false, 1, unmixable_transfer_outputs, unmixable_dust_outputs, 0 /*fake_outs_count */, 0 /* unlock_time */, 1 /*priority */, std::vector<uint8_t>());
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
void wallet2::discard_unmixable_outputs()
{
// may throw
std::vector<size_t> unmixable_outputs = select_available_unmixable_outputs();
for (size_t idx : unmixable_outputs)
{
freeze(idx);
}
}
bool wallet2::get_tx_key_cached(const crypto::hash &txid, crypto::secret_key &tx_key, std::vector<crypto::secret_key> &additional_tx_keys) const
{
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
additional_tx_keys.clear();
const std::unordered_map<crypto::hash, crypto::secret_key>::const_iterator i = m_tx_keys.find(txid);
if (i == m_tx_keys.end())
return false;
tx_key = i->second;
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
const auto j = m_additional_tx_keys.find(txid);
if (j != m_additional_tx_keys.end())
additional_tx_keys = j->second;
return true;
}
2017-08-28 17:34:17 +02:00
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
bool wallet2::get_tx_key(const crypto::hash &txid, crypto::secret_key &tx_key, std::vector<crypto::secret_key> &additional_tx_keys)
{
bool r = get_tx_key_cached(txid, tx_key, additional_tx_keys);
if (r)
{
return true;
}
auto & hwdev = get_account().get_device();
// So far only Cold protocol devices are supported.
if (hwdev.device_protocol() != hw::device::PROTOCOL_COLD)
{
return false;
}
const auto tx_data_it = m_tx_device.find(txid);
if (tx_data_it == m_tx_device.end())
{
MDEBUG("Aux data not found for txid: " << txid);
return false;
}
auto dev_cold = dynamic_cast<::hw::device_cold*>(&hwdev);
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(dev_cold, "Device does not implement cold signing interface");
if (!dev_cold->is_get_tx_key_supported())
{
MDEBUG("get_tx_key not supported by the device");
return false;
}
hw::device_cold::tx_key_data_t tx_key_data;
dev_cold->load_tx_key_data(tx_key_data, tx_data_it->second);
// Load missing tx prefix hash
if (tx_key_data.tx_prefix_hash.empty())
{
COMMAND_RPC_GET_TRANSACTIONS::request req;
COMMAND_RPC_GET_TRANSACTIONS::response res;
req.txs_hashes.push_back(epee::string_tools::pod_to_hex(txid));
req.decode_as_json = false;
req.prune = true;
m_daemon_rpc_mutex.lock();
bool ok = epee::net_utils::invoke_http_json("/gettransactions", req, res, m_http_client);
m_daemon_rpc_mutex.unlock();
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!ok || (res.txs.size() != 1 && res.txs_as_hex.size() != 1),
error::wallet_internal_error, "Failed to get transaction from daemon");
cryptonote::transaction tx;
crypto::hash tx_hash{};
cryptonote::blobdata tx_data;
crypto::hash tx_prefix_hash{};
ok = string_tools::parse_hexstr_to_binbuff(res.txs_as_hex.front(), tx_data);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!ok, error::wallet_internal_error, "Failed to parse transaction from daemon");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!cryptonote::parse_and_validate_tx_from_blob(tx_data, tx, tx_hash, tx_prefix_hash),
error::wallet_internal_error, "Failed to validate transaction from daemon");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(tx_hash != txid, error::wallet_internal_error,
"Failed to get the right transaction from daemon");
tx_key_data.tx_prefix_hash = std::string(tx_prefix_hash.data, 32);
}
std::vector<crypto::secret_key> tx_keys;
dev_cold->get_tx_key(tx_keys, tx_key_data, m_account.get_keys().m_view_secret_key);
if (tx_keys.empty())
{
return false;
}
tx_key = tx_keys[0];
tx_keys.erase(tx_keys.begin());
additional_tx_keys = tx_keys;
return true;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
void wallet2::set_tx_key(const crypto::hash &txid, const crypto::secret_key &tx_key, const std::vector<crypto::secret_key> &additional_tx_keys)
{
// fetch tx from daemon and check if secret keys agree with corresponding public keys
COMMAND_RPC_GET_TRANSACTIONS::request req = AUTO_VAL_INIT(req);
req.txs_hashes.push_back(epee::string_tools::pod_to_hex(txid));
req.decode_as_json = false;
req.prune = true;
COMMAND_RPC_GET_TRANSACTIONS::response res = AUTO_VAL_INIT(res);
bool r;
{
const boost::lock_guard<boost::mutex> lock{m_daemon_rpc_mutex};
r = epee::net_utils::invoke_http_json("/gettransactions", req, res, m_http_client, rpc_timeout);
}
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!r, error::no_connection_to_daemon, "gettransactions");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(res.status == CORE_RPC_STATUS_BUSY, error::daemon_busy, "gettransactions");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(res.status != CORE_RPC_STATUS_OK, error::wallet_internal_error, "gettransactions");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(res.txs.size() != 1, error::wallet_internal_error,
"daemon returned wrong response for gettransactions, wrong txs count = " +
std::to_string(res.txs.size()) + ", expected 1");
cryptonote::transaction tx;
crypto::hash tx_hash;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!get_pruned_tx(res.txs[0], tx, tx_hash), error::wallet_internal_error,
"Failed to get transaction from daemon");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(tx_hash != txid, error::wallet_internal_error, "txid mismatch");
std::vector<tx_extra_field> tx_extra_fields;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!parse_tx_extra(tx.extra, tx_extra_fields), error::wallet_internal_error, "Transaction extra has unsupported format");
tx_extra_pub_key pub_key_field;
bool found = false;
size_t index = 0;
while (find_tx_extra_field_by_type(tx_extra_fields, pub_key_field, index++))
{
crypto::public_key calculated_pub_key;
crypto::secret_key_to_public_key(tx_key, calculated_pub_key);
if (calculated_pub_key == pub_key_field.pub_key)
{
found = true;
break;
}
}
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!found, error::wallet_internal_error, "Given tx secret key doesn't agree with the tx public key in the blockchain");
tx_extra_additional_pub_keys additional_tx_pub_keys;
find_tx_extra_field_by_type(tx_extra_fields, additional_tx_pub_keys);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(additional_tx_keys.size() != additional_tx_pub_keys.data.size(), error::wallet_internal_error, "The number of additional tx secret keys doesn't agree with the number of additional tx public keys in the blockchain" );
m_tx_keys.insert(std::make_pair(txid, tx_key));
m_additional_tx_keys.insert(std::make_pair(txid, additional_tx_keys));
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017-08-28 17:34:17 +02:00
std::string wallet2::get_spend_proof(const crypto::hash &txid, const std::string &message)
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(m_watch_only, error::wallet_internal_error,
"get_spend_proof requires spend secret key and is not available for a watch-only wallet");
// fetch tx from daemon
COMMAND_RPC_GET_TRANSACTIONS::request req = AUTO_VAL_INIT(req);
req.txs_hashes.push_back(epee::string_tools::pod_to_hex(txid));
req.decode_as_json = false;
req.prune = true;
2017-08-28 17:34:17 +02:00
COMMAND_RPC_GET_TRANSACTIONS::response res = AUTO_VAL_INIT(res);
bool r;
{
const boost::lock_guard<boost::mutex> lock{m_daemon_rpc_mutex};
r = epee::net_utils::invoke_http_json("/gettransactions", req, res, m_http_client, rpc_timeout);
}
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!r, error::no_connection_to_daemon, "gettransactions");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(res.status == CORE_RPC_STATUS_BUSY, error::daemon_busy, "gettransactions");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(res.status != CORE_RPC_STATUS_OK, error::wallet_internal_error, "gettransactions");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(res.txs.size() != 1, error::wallet_internal_error,
"daemon returned wrong response for gettransactions, wrong txs count = " +
std::to_string(res.txs.size()) + ", expected 1");
2017-08-28 17:34:17 +02:00
cryptonote::transaction tx;
crypto::hash tx_hash;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!get_pruned_tx(res.txs[0], tx, tx_hash), error::wallet_internal_error, "Failed to get tx from daemon");
2017-08-28 17:34:17 +02:00
std::vector<std::vector<crypto::signature>> signatures;
// get signature prefix hash
std::string sig_prefix_data((const char*)&txid, sizeof(crypto::hash));
sig_prefix_data += message;
crypto::hash sig_prefix_hash;
crypto::cn_fast_hash(sig_prefix_data.data(), sig_prefix_data.size(), sig_prefix_hash);
for(size_t i = 0; i < tx.vin.size(); ++i)
{
const txin_to_key* const in_key = boost::get<txin_to_key>(std::addressof(tx.vin[i]));
if (in_key == nullptr)
continue;
// check if the key image belongs to us
const auto found = m_key_images.find(in_key->k_image);
if(found == m_key_images.end())
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(i > 0, error::wallet_internal_error, "subset of key images belong to us, very weird!");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(true, error::wallet_internal_error, "This tx wasn't generated by this wallet!");
}
// derive the real output keypair
const transfer_details& in_td = m_transfers[found->second];
const txout_to_key* const in_tx_out_pkey = boost::get<txout_to_key>(std::addressof(in_td.m_tx.vout[in_td.m_internal_output_index].target));
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(in_tx_out_pkey == nullptr, error::wallet_internal_error, "Output is not txout_to_key");
const crypto::public_key in_tx_pub_key = get_tx_pub_key_from_extra(in_td.m_tx, in_td.m_pk_index);
const std::vector<crypto::public_key> in_additionakl_tx_pub_keys = get_additional_tx_pub_keys_from_extra(in_td.m_tx);
keypair in_ephemeral;
crypto::key_image in_img;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!generate_key_image_helper(m_account.get_keys(), m_subaddresses, in_tx_out_pkey->key, in_tx_pub_key, in_additionakl_tx_pub_keys, in_td.m_internal_output_index, in_ephemeral, in_img, m_account.get_device()),
2017-08-28 17:34:17 +02:00
error::wallet_internal_error, "failed to generate key image");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(in_key->k_image != in_img, error::wallet_internal_error, "key image mismatch");
// get output pubkeys in the ring
const std::vector<uint64_t> absolute_offsets = cryptonote::relative_output_offsets_to_absolute(in_key->key_offsets);
const size_t ring_size = in_key->key_offsets.size();
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(absolute_offsets.size() != ring_size, error::wallet_internal_error, "absolute offsets size is wrong");
COMMAND_RPC_GET_OUTPUTS_BIN::request req = AUTO_VAL_INIT(req);
req.outputs.resize(ring_size);
for (size_t j = 0; j < ring_size; ++j)
{
req.outputs[j].amount = in_key->amount;
req.outputs[j].index = absolute_offsets[j];
}
COMMAND_RPC_GET_OUTPUTS_BIN::response res = AUTO_VAL_INIT(res);
bool r;
{
const boost::lock_guard<boost::mutex> lock{m_daemon_rpc_mutex};
r = epee::net_utils::invoke_http_bin("/get_outs.bin", req, res, m_http_client, rpc_timeout);
}
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!r, error::no_connection_to_daemon, "get_outs.bin");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(res.status == CORE_RPC_STATUS_BUSY, error::daemon_busy, "get_outs.bin");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(res.status != CORE_RPC_STATUS_OK, error::wallet_internal_error, "get_outs.bin");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(res.outs.size() != ring_size, error::wallet_internal_error,
"daemon returned wrong response for get_outs.bin, wrong amounts count = " +
std::to_string(res.outs.size()) + ", expected " + std::to_string(ring_size));
// copy pubkey pointers
std::vector<const crypto::public_key *> p_output_keys;
for (const COMMAND_RPC_GET_OUTPUTS_BIN::outkey &out : res.outs)
p_output_keys.push_back(&out.key);
// figure out real output index and secret key
size_t sec_index = -1;
for (size_t j = 0; j < ring_size; ++j)
{
if (res.outs[j].key == in_ephemeral.pub)
{
sec_index = j;
break;
}
}
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(sec_index >= ring_size, error::wallet_internal_error, "secret index not found");
// generate ring sig for this input
signatures.push_back(std::vector<crypto::signature>());
std::vector<crypto::signature>& sigs = signatures.back();
sigs.resize(in_key->key_offsets.size());
crypto::generate_ring_signature(sig_prefix_hash, in_key->k_image, p_output_keys, in_ephemeral.sec, sec_index, sigs.data());
}
std::string sig_str = "SpendProofV1";
for (const std::vector<crypto::signature>& ring_sig : signatures)
for (const crypto::signature& sig : ring_sig)
sig_str += tools::base58::encode(std::string((const char *)&sig, sizeof(crypto::signature)));
return sig_str;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
bool wallet2::check_spend_proof(const crypto::hash &txid, const std::string &message, const std::string &sig_str)
{
const std::string header = "SpendProofV1";
const size_t header_len = header.size();
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(sig_str.size() < header_len || sig_str.substr(0, header_len) != header, error::wallet_internal_error,
"Signature header check error");
// fetch tx from daemon
COMMAND_RPC_GET_TRANSACTIONS::request req = AUTO_VAL_INIT(req);
req.txs_hashes.push_back(epee::string_tools::pod_to_hex(txid));
req.decode_as_json = false;
req.prune = true;
2017-08-28 17:34:17 +02:00
COMMAND_RPC_GET_TRANSACTIONS::response res = AUTO_VAL_INIT(res);
bool r;
{
const boost::lock_guard<boost::mutex> lock{m_daemon_rpc_mutex};
r = epee::net_utils::invoke_http_json("/gettransactions", req, res, m_http_client, rpc_timeout);
}
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!r, error::no_connection_to_daemon, "gettransactions");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(res.status == CORE_RPC_STATUS_BUSY, error::daemon_busy, "gettransactions");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(res.status != CORE_RPC_STATUS_OK, error::wallet_internal_error, "gettransactions");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(res.txs.size() != 1, error::wallet_internal_error,
"daemon returned wrong response for gettransactions, wrong txs count = " +
std::to_string(res.txs.size()) + ", expected 1");
2017-08-28 17:34:17 +02:00
cryptonote::transaction tx;
crypto::hash tx_hash;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!get_pruned_tx(res.txs[0], tx, tx_hash), error::wallet_internal_error, "failed to get tx from daemon");
2017-08-28 17:34:17 +02:00
// check signature size
size_t num_sigs = 0;
for(size_t i = 0; i < tx.vin.size(); ++i)
{
const txin_to_key* const in_key = boost::get<txin_to_key>(std::addressof(tx.vin[i]));
if (in_key != nullptr)
num_sigs += in_key->key_offsets.size();
}
std::vector<std::vector<crypto::signature>> signatures = { std::vector<crypto::signature>(1) };
const size_t sig_len = tools::base58::encode(std::string((const char *)&signatures[0][0], sizeof(crypto::signature))).size();
if( sig_str.size() != header_len + num_sigs * sig_len ) {
return false;
}
2017-08-28 17:34:17 +02:00
// decode base58
signatures.clear();
size_t offset = header_len;
for(size_t i = 0; i < tx.vin.size(); ++i)
{
const txin_to_key* const in_key = boost::get<txin_to_key>(std::addressof(tx.vin[i]));
if (in_key == nullptr)
continue;
signatures.resize(signatures.size() + 1);
signatures.back().resize(in_key->key_offsets.size());
for (size_t j = 0; j < in_key->key_offsets.size(); ++j)
{
std::string sig_decoded;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!tools::base58::decode(sig_str.substr(offset, sig_len), sig_decoded), error::wallet_internal_error, "Signature decoding error");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(sizeof(crypto::signature) != sig_decoded.size(), error::wallet_internal_error, "Signature decoding error");
memcpy(&signatures.back()[j], sig_decoded.data(), sizeof(crypto::signature));
offset += sig_len;
}
}
// get signature prefix hash
std::string sig_prefix_data((const char*)&txid, sizeof(crypto::hash));
sig_prefix_data += message;
crypto::hash sig_prefix_hash;
crypto::cn_fast_hash(sig_prefix_data.data(), sig_prefix_data.size(), sig_prefix_hash);
std::vector<std::vector<crypto::signature>>::const_iterator sig_iter = signatures.cbegin();
for(size_t i = 0; i < tx.vin.size(); ++i)
{
const txin_to_key* const in_key = boost::get<txin_to_key>(std::addressof(tx.vin[i]));
if (in_key == nullptr)
continue;
// get output pubkeys in the ring
COMMAND_RPC_GET_OUTPUTS_BIN::request req = AUTO_VAL_INIT(req);
const std::vector<uint64_t> absolute_offsets = cryptonote::relative_output_offsets_to_absolute(in_key->key_offsets);
req.outputs.resize(absolute_offsets.size());
for (size_t j = 0; j < absolute_offsets.size(); ++j)
{
req.outputs[j].amount = in_key->amount;
req.outputs[j].index = absolute_offsets[j];
}
COMMAND_RPC_GET_OUTPUTS_BIN::response res = AUTO_VAL_INIT(res);
bool r;
{
const boost::lock_guard<boost::mutex> lock{m_daemon_rpc_mutex};
r = epee::net_utils::invoke_http_bin("/get_outs.bin", req, res, m_http_client, rpc_timeout);
}
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!r, error::no_connection_to_daemon, "get_outs.bin");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(res.status == CORE_RPC_STATUS_BUSY, error::daemon_busy, "get_outs.bin");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(res.status != CORE_RPC_STATUS_OK, error::wallet_internal_error, "get_outs.bin");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(res.outs.size() != req.outputs.size(), error::wallet_internal_error,
"daemon returned wrong response for get_outs.bin, wrong amounts count = " +
std::to_string(res.outs.size()) + ", expected " + std::to_string(req.outputs.size()));
// copy pointers
std::vector<const crypto::public_key *> p_output_keys;
for (const COMMAND_RPC_GET_OUTPUTS_BIN::outkey &out : res.outs)
p_output_keys.push_back(&out.key);
// check this ring
if (!crypto::check_ring_signature(sig_prefix_hash, in_key->k_image, p_output_keys, sig_iter->data()))
return false;
++sig_iter;
}
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(sig_iter != signatures.cend(), error::wallet_internal_error, "Signature iterator didn't reach the end");
return true;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
void wallet2::check_tx_key(const crypto::hash &txid, const crypto::secret_key &tx_key, const std::vector<crypto::secret_key> &additional_tx_keys, const cryptonote::account_public_address &address, uint64_t &received, bool &in_pool, uint64_t &confirmations)
{
crypto::key_derivation derivation;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!crypto::generate_key_derivation(address.m_view_public_key, tx_key, derivation), error::wallet_internal_error,
"Failed to generate key derivation from supplied parameters");
std::vector<crypto::key_derivation> additional_derivations;
additional_derivations.resize(additional_tx_keys.size());
for (size_t i = 0; i < additional_tx_keys.size(); ++i)
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!crypto::generate_key_derivation(address.m_view_public_key, additional_tx_keys[i], additional_derivations[i]), error::wallet_internal_error,
"Failed to generate key derivation from supplied parameters");
check_tx_key_helper(txid, derivation, additional_derivations, address, received, in_pool, confirmations);
}
void wallet2::check_tx_key_helper(const cryptonote::transaction &tx, const crypto::key_derivation &derivation, const std::vector<crypto::key_derivation> &additional_derivations, const cryptonote::account_public_address &address, uint64_t &received) const
{
received = 0;
for (size_t n = 0; n < tx.vout.size(); ++n)
{
const cryptonote::txout_to_key* const out_key = boost::get<cryptonote::txout_to_key>(std::addressof(tx.vout[n].target));
if (!out_key)
continue;
crypto::public_key derived_out_key;
bool r = crypto::derive_public_key(derivation, n, address.m_spend_public_key, derived_out_key);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!r, error::wallet_internal_error, "Failed to derive public key");
bool found = out_key->key == derived_out_key;
crypto::key_derivation found_derivation = derivation;
if (!found && !additional_derivations.empty())
{
r = crypto::derive_public_key(additional_derivations[n], n, address.m_spend_public_key, derived_out_key);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!r, error::wallet_internal_error, "Failed to derive public key");
found = out_key->key == derived_out_key;
found_derivation = additional_derivations[n];
}
if (found)
{
uint64_t amount;
if (tx.version == 1 || tx.rct_signatures.type == rct::RCTTypeNull)
{
amount = tx.vout[n].amount;
}
else
{
crypto::secret_key scalar1;
crypto::derivation_to_scalar(found_derivation, n, scalar1);
rct::ecdhTuple ecdh_info = tx.rct_signatures.ecdhInfo[n];
rct::ecdhDecode(ecdh_info, rct::sk2rct(scalar1), tx.rct_signatures.type == rct::RCTTypeBulletproof2);
const rct::key C = tx.rct_signatures.outPk[n].mask;
rct::key Ctmp;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(sc_check(ecdh_info.mask.bytes) != 0, error::wallet_internal_error, "Bad ECDH input mask");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(sc_check(ecdh_info.amount.bytes) != 0, error::wallet_internal_error, "Bad ECDH input amount");
rct::addKeys2(Ctmp, ecdh_info.mask, ecdh_info.amount, rct::H);
if (rct::equalKeys(C, Ctmp))
amount = rct::h2d(ecdh_info.amount);
else
amount = 0;
}
received += amount;
}
}
}
void wallet2::check_tx_key_helper(const crypto::hash &txid, const crypto::key_derivation &derivation, const std::vector<crypto::key_derivation> &additional_derivations, const cryptonote::account_public_address &address, uint64_t &received, bool &in_pool, uint64_t &confirmations)
{
COMMAND_RPC_GET_TRANSACTIONS::request req;
COMMAND_RPC_GET_TRANSACTIONS::response res;
req.txs_hashes.push_back(epee::string_tools::pod_to_hex(txid));
req.decode_as_json = false;
req.prune = true;
m_daemon_rpc_mutex.lock();
bool ok = epee::net_utils::invoke_http_json("/gettransactions", req, res, m_http_client);
m_daemon_rpc_mutex.unlock();
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!ok || (res.txs.size() != 1 && res.txs_as_hex.size() != 1),
error::wallet_internal_error, "Failed to get transaction from daemon");
cryptonote::transaction tx;
crypto::hash tx_hash;
if (res.txs.size() == 1)
{
ok = get_pruned_tx(res.txs.front(), tx, tx_hash);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!ok, error::wallet_internal_error, "Failed to parse transaction from daemon");
}
else
{
cryptonote::blobdata tx_data;
ok = string_tools::parse_hexstr_to_binbuff(res.txs_as_hex.front(), tx_data);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!ok, error::wallet_internal_error, "Failed to parse transaction from daemon");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!cryptonote::parse_and_validate_tx_from_blob(tx_data, tx),
error::wallet_internal_error, "Failed to validate transaction from daemon");
tx_hash = cryptonote::get_transaction_hash(tx);
}
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(tx_hash != txid, error::wallet_internal_error,
"Failed to get the right transaction from daemon");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!additional_derivations.empty() && additional_derivations.size() != tx.vout.size(), error::wallet_internal_error,
"The size of additional derivations is wrong");
check_tx_key_helper(tx, derivation, additional_derivations, address, received);
in_pool = res.txs.front().in_pool;
confirmations = (uint64_t)-1;
if (!in_pool)
{
std::string err;
uint64_t bc_height = get_daemon_blockchain_height(err);
if (err.empty())
confirmations = bc_height - (res.txs.front().block_height + 1);
}
}
std::string wallet2::get_tx_proof(const crypto::hash &txid, const cryptonote::account_public_address &address, bool is_subaddress, const std::string &message)
{
// fetch tx pubkey from the daemon
COMMAND_RPC_GET_TRANSACTIONS::request req;
COMMAND_RPC_GET_TRANSACTIONS::response res;
req.txs_hashes.push_back(epee::string_tools::pod_to_hex(txid));
req.decode_as_json = false;
req.prune = true;
m_daemon_rpc_mutex.lock();
bool ok = net_utils::invoke_http_json("/gettransactions", req, res, m_http_client);
m_daemon_rpc_mutex.unlock();
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!ok || (res.txs.size() != 1 && res.txs_as_hex.size() != 1),
error::wallet_internal_error, "Failed to get transaction from daemon");
cryptonote::transaction tx;
crypto::hash tx_hash;
if (res.txs.size() == 1)
{
ok = get_pruned_tx(res.txs.front(), tx, tx_hash);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!ok, error::wallet_internal_error, "Failed to parse transaction from daemon");
}
else
{
cryptonote::blobdata tx_data;
ok = string_tools::parse_hexstr_to_binbuff(res.txs_as_hex.front(), tx_data);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!ok, error::wallet_internal_error, "Failed to parse transaction from daemon");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!cryptonote::parse_and_validate_tx_from_blob(tx_data, tx),
error::wallet_internal_error, "Failed to validate transaction from daemon");
tx_hash = cryptonote::get_transaction_hash(tx);
}
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(tx_hash != txid, error::wallet_internal_error, "Failed to get the right transaction from daemon");
// determine if the address is found in the subaddress hash table (i.e. whether the proof is outbound or inbound)
crypto::secret_key tx_key = crypto::null_skey;
std::vector<crypto::secret_key> additional_tx_keys;
const bool is_out = m_subaddresses.count(address.m_spend_public_key) == 0;
if (is_out)
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!get_tx_key(txid, tx_key, additional_tx_keys), error::wallet_internal_error, "Tx secret key wasn't found in the wallet file.");
}
return get_tx_proof(tx, tx_key, additional_tx_keys, address, is_subaddress, message);
}
std::string wallet2::get_tx_proof(const cryptonote::transaction &tx, const crypto::secret_key &tx_key, const std::vector<crypto::secret_key> &additional_tx_keys, const cryptonote::account_public_address &address, bool is_subaddress, const std::string &message) const
{
hw::device &hwdev = m_account.get_device();
rct::key aP;
// determine if the address is found in the subaddress hash table (i.e. whether the proof is outbound or inbound)
const bool is_out = m_subaddresses.count(address.m_spend_public_key) == 0;
const crypto::hash txid = cryptonote::get_transaction_hash(tx);
std::string prefix_data((const char*)&txid, sizeof(crypto::hash));
prefix_data += message;
crypto::hash prefix_hash;
crypto::cn_fast_hash(prefix_data.data(), prefix_data.size(), prefix_hash);
std::vector<crypto::public_key> shared_secret;
std::vector<crypto::signature> sig;
std::string sig_str;
if (is_out)
{
const size_t num_sigs = 1 + additional_tx_keys.size();
shared_secret.resize(num_sigs);
sig.resize(num_sigs);
hwdev.scalarmultKey(aP, rct::pk2rct(address.m_view_public_key), rct::sk2rct(tx_key));
shared_secret[0] = rct::rct2pk(aP);
crypto::public_key tx_pub_key;
if (is_subaddress)
{
hwdev.scalarmultKey(aP, rct::pk2rct(address.m_spend_public_key), rct::sk2rct(tx_key));
tx_pub_key = rct2pk(aP);
hwdev.generate_tx_proof(prefix_hash, tx_pub_key, address.m_view_public_key, address.m_spend_public_key, shared_secret[0], tx_key, sig[0]);
}
else
{
hwdev.secret_key_to_public_key(tx_key, tx_pub_key);
hwdev.generate_tx_proof(prefix_hash, tx_pub_key, address.m_view_public_key, boost::none, shared_secret[0], tx_key, sig[0]);
}
for (size_t i = 1; i < num_sigs; ++i)
{
hwdev.scalarmultKey(aP, rct::pk2rct(address.m_view_public_key), rct::sk2rct(additional_tx_keys[i - 1]));
shared_secret[i] = rct::rct2pk(aP);
if (is_subaddress)
{
hwdev.scalarmultKey(aP, rct::pk2rct(address.m_spend_public_key), rct::sk2rct(additional_tx_keys[i - 1]));
tx_pub_key = rct2pk(aP);
hwdev.generate_tx_proof(prefix_hash, tx_pub_key, address.m_view_public_key, address.m_spend_public_key, shared_secret[i], additional_tx_keys[i - 1], sig[i]);
}
else
{
hwdev.secret_key_to_public_key(additional_tx_keys[i - 1], tx_pub_key);
hwdev.generate_tx_proof(prefix_hash, tx_pub_key, address.m_view_public_key, boost::none, shared_secret[i], additional_tx_keys[i - 1], sig[i]);
}
}
sig_str = std::string("OutProofV1");
}
else
{
crypto::public_key tx_pub_key = get_tx_pub_key_from_extra(tx);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(tx_pub_key == null_pkey, error::wallet_internal_error, "Tx pubkey was not found");
std::vector<crypto::public_key> additional_tx_pub_keys = get_additional_tx_pub_keys_from_extra(tx);
const size_t num_sigs = 1 + additional_tx_pub_keys.size();
shared_secret.resize(num_sigs);
sig.resize(num_sigs);
const crypto::secret_key& a = m_account.get_keys().m_view_secret_key;
hwdev.scalarmultKey(aP, rct::pk2rct(tx_pub_key), rct::sk2rct(a));
shared_secret[0] = rct2pk(aP);
if (is_subaddress)
{
hwdev.generate_tx_proof(prefix_hash, address.m_view_public_key, tx_pub_key, address.m_spend_public_key, shared_secret[0], a, sig[0]);
}
else
{
hwdev.generate_tx_proof(prefix_hash, address.m_view_public_key, tx_pub_key, boost::none, shared_secret[0], a, sig[0]);
}
for (size_t i = 1; i < num_sigs; ++i)
{
hwdev.scalarmultKey(aP,rct::pk2rct(additional_tx_pub_keys[i - 1]), rct::sk2rct(a));
shared_secret[i] = rct2pk(aP);
if (is_subaddress)
{
hwdev.generate_tx_proof(prefix_hash, address.m_view_public_key, additional_tx_pub_keys[i - 1], address.m_spend_public_key, shared_secret[i], a, sig[i]);
}
else
{
hwdev.generate_tx_proof(prefix_hash, address.m_view_public_key, additional_tx_pub_keys[i - 1], boost::none, shared_secret[i], a, sig[i]);
}
}
sig_str = std::string("InProofV1");
}
const size_t num_sigs = shared_secret.size();
// check if this address actually received any funds
crypto::key_derivation derivation;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!crypto::generate_key_derivation(shared_secret[0], rct::rct2sk(rct::I), derivation), error::wallet_internal_error, "Failed to generate key derivation");
std::vector<crypto::key_derivation> additional_derivations(num_sigs - 1);
for (size_t i = 1; i < num_sigs; ++i)
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!crypto::generate_key_derivation(shared_secret[i], rct::rct2sk(rct::I), additional_derivations[i - 1]), error::wallet_internal_error, "Failed to generate key derivation");
uint64_t received;
check_tx_key_helper(tx, derivation, additional_derivations, address, received);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!received, error::wallet_internal_error, tr("No funds received in this tx."));
// concatenate all signature strings
for (size_t i = 0; i < num_sigs; ++i)
sig_str +=
tools::base58::encode(std::string((const char *)&shared_secret[i], sizeof(crypto::public_key))) +
tools::base58::encode(std::string((const char *)&sig[i], sizeof(crypto::signature)));
return sig_str;
}
bool wallet2::check_tx_proof(const crypto::hash &txid, const cryptonote::account_public_address &address, bool is_subaddress, const std::string &message, const std::string &sig_str, uint64_t &received, bool &in_pool, uint64_t &confirmations)
{
// fetch tx pubkey from the daemon
COMMAND_RPC_GET_TRANSACTIONS::request req;
COMMAND_RPC_GET_TRANSACTIONS::response res;
req.txs_hashes.push_back(epee::string_tools::pod_to_hex(txid));
req.decode_as_json = false;
req.prune = true;
m_daemon_rpc_mutex.lock();
bool ok = net_utils::invoke_http_json("/gettransactions", req, res, m_http_client);
m_daemon_rpc_mutex.unlock();
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!ok || (res.txs.size() != 1 && res.txs_as_hex.size() != 1),
error::wallet_internal_error, "Failed to get transaction from daemon");
cryptonote::transaction tx;
crypto::hash tx_hash;
if (res.txs.size() == 1)
{
ok = get_pruned_tx(res.txs.front(), tx, tx_hash);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!ok, error::wallet_internal_error, "Failed to parse transaction from daemon");
}
else
{
cryptonote::blobdata tx_data;
ok = string_tools::parse_hexstr_to_binbuff(res.txs_as_hex.front(), tx_data);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!ok, error::wallet_internal_error, "Failed to parse transaction from daemon");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!cryptonote::parse_and_validate_tx_from_blob(tx_data, tx),
error::wallet_internal_error, "Failed to validate transaction from daemon");
tx_hash = cryptonote::get_transaction_hash(tx);
}
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(tx_hash != txid, error::wallet_internal_error, "Failed to get the right transaction from daemon");
if (!check_tx_proof(tx, address, is_subaddress, message, sig_str, received))
return false;
in_pool = res.txs.front().in_pool;
confirmations = (uint64_t)-1;
if (!in_pool)
{
std::string err;
uint64_t bc_height = get_daemon_blockchain_height(err);
if (err.empty())
confirmations = bc_height - (res.txs.front().block_height + 1);
}
return true;
}
bool wallet2::check_tx_proof(const cryptonote::transaction &tx, const cryptonote::account_public_address &address, bool is_subaddress, const std::string &message, const std::string &sig_str, uint64_t &received) const
{
const bool is_out = sig_str.substr(0, 3) == "Out";
const std::string header = is_out ? "OutProofV1" : "InProofV1";
const size_t header_len = header.size();
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(sig_str.size() < header_len || sig_str.substr(0, header_len) != header, error::wallet_internal_error,
"Signature header check error");
// decode base58
std::vector<crypto::public_key> shared_secret(1);
std::vector<crypto::signature> sig(1);
const size_t pk_len = tools::base58::encode(std::string((const char *)&shared_secret[0], sizeof(crypto::public_key))).size();
const size_t sig_len = tools::base58::encode(std::string((const char *)&sig[0], sizeof(crypto::signature))).size();
const size_t num_sigs = (sig_str.size() - header_len) / (pk_len + sig_len);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(sig_str.size() != header_len + num_sigs * (pk_len + sig_len), error::wallet_internal_error,
"Wrong signature size");
shared_secret.resize(num_sigs);
sig.resize(num_sigs);
for (size_t i = 0; i < num_sigs; ++i)
{
std::string pk_decoded;
std::string sig_decoded;
const size_t offset = header_len + i * (pk_len + sig_len);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!tools::base58::decode(sig_str.substr(offset, pk_len), pk_decoded), error::wallet_internal_error,
"Signature decoding error");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!tools::base58::decode(sig_str.substr(offset + pk_len, sig_len), sig_decoded), error::wallet_internal_error,
"Signature decoding error");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(sizeof(crypto::public_key) != pk_decoded.size() || sizeof(crypto::signature) != sig_decoded.size(), error::wallet_internal_error,
"Signature decoding error");
memcpy(&shared_secret[i], pk_decoded.data(), sizeof(crypto::public_key));
memcpy(&sig[i], sig_decoded.data(), sizeof(crypto::signature));
}
crypto::public_key tx_pub_key = get_tx_pub_key_from_extra(tx);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(tx_pub_key == null_pkey, error::wallet_internal_error, "Tx pubkey was not found");
std::vector<crypto::public_key> additional_tx_pub_keys = get_additional_tx_pub_keys_from_extra(tx);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(additional_tx_pub_keys.size() + 1 != num_sigs, error::wallet_internal_error, "Signature size mismatch with additional tx pubkeys");
const crypto::hash txid = cryptonote::get_transaction_hash(tx);
std::string prefix_data((const char*)&txid, sizeof(crypto::hash));
prefix_data += message;
crypto::hash prefix_hash;
crypto::cn_fast_hash(prefix_data.data(), prefix_data.size(), prefix_hash);
// check signature
std::vector<int> good_signature(num_sigs, 0);
if (is_out)
{
good_signature[0] = is_subaddress ?
crypto::check_tx_proof(prefix_hash, tx_pub_key, address.m_view_public_key, address.m_spend_public_key, shared_secret[0], sig[0]) :
crypto::check_tx_proof(prefix_hash, tx_pub_key, address.m_view_public_key, boost::none, shared_secret[0], sig[0]);
for (size_t i = 0; i < additional_tx_pub_keys.size(); ++i)
{
good_signature[i + 1] = is_subaddress ?
crypto::check_tx_proof(prefix_hash, additional_tx_pub_keys[i], address.m_view_public_key, address.m_spend_public_key, shared_secret[i + 1], sig[i + 1]) :
crypto::check_tx_proof(prefix_hash, additional_tx_pub_keys[i], address.m_view_public_key, boost::none, shared_secret[i + 1], sig[i + 1]);
}
}
else
{
good_signature[0] = is_subaddress ?
crypto::check_tx_proof(prefix_hash, address.m_view_public_key, tx_pub_key, address.m_spend_public_key, shared_secret[0], sig[0]) :
crypto::check_tx_proof(prefix_hash, address.m_view_public_key, tx_pub_key, boost::none, shared_secret[0], sig[0]);
for (size_t i = 0; i < additional_tx_pub_keys.size(); ++i)
{
good_signature[i + 1] = is_subaddress ?
crypto::check_tx_proof(prefix_hash, address.m_view_public_key, additional_tx_pub_keys[i], address.m_spend_public_key, shared_secret[i + 1], sig[i + 1]) :
crypto::check_tx_proof(prefix_hash, address.m_view_public_key, additional_tx_pub_keys[i], boost::none, shared_secret[i + 1], sig[i + 1]);
}
}
if (std::any_of(good_signature.begin(), good_signature.end(), [](int i) { return i > 0; }))
{
// obtain key derivation by multiplying scalar 1 to the shared secret
crypto::key_derivation derivation;
if (good_signature[0])
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!crypto::generate_key_derivation(shared_secret[0], rct::rct2sk(rct::I), derivation), error::wallet_internal_error, "Failed to generate key derivation");
std::vector<crypto::key_derivation> additional_derivations(num_sigs - 1);
for (size_t i = 1; i < num_sigs; ++i)
if (good_signature[i])
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!crypto::generate_key_derivation(shared_secret[i], rct::rct2sk(rct::I), additional_derivations[i - 1]), error::wallet_internal_error, "Failed to generate key derivation");
check_tx_key_helper(tx, derivation, additional_derivations, address, received);
return true;
}
return false;
}
2017-12-28 14:50:10 +01:00
std::string wallet2::get_reserve_proof(const boost::optional<std::pair<uint32_t, uint64_t>> &account_minreserve, const std::string &message)
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(m_watch_only || m_multisig, error::wallet_internal_error, "Reserve proof can only be generated by a full wallet");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(balance_all() == 0, error::wallet_internal_error, "Zero balance");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(account_minreserve && balance(account_minreserve->first) < account_minreserve->second, error::wallet_internal_error,
"Not enough balance in this account for the requested minimum reserve amount");
// determine which outputs to include in the proof
std::vector<size_t> selected_transfers;
for (size_t i = 0; i < m_transfers.size(); ++i)
{
const transfer_details &td = m_transfers[i];
if (!td.m_spent && !td.m_frozen && (!account_minreserve || account_minreserve->first == td.m_subaddr_index.major))
2017-12-28 14:50:10 +01:00
selected_transfers.push_back(i);
}
if (account_minreserve)
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(account_minreserve->second == 0, error::wallet_internal_error, "Proved amount must be greater than 0");
2017-12-28 14:50:10 +01:00
// minimize the number of outputs included in the proof, by only picking the N largest outputs that can cover the requested min reserve amount
std::sort(selected_transfers.begin(), selected_transfers.end(), [&](const size_t a, const size_t b)
{ return m_transfers[a].amount() > m_transfers[b].amount(); });
while (selected_transfers.size() >= 2 && m_transfers[selected_transfers[1]].amount() >= account_minreserve->second)
selected_transfers.erase(selected_transfers.begin());
size_t sz = 0;
uint64_t total = 0;
while (total < account_minreserve->second)
{
total += m_transfers[selected_transfers[sz]].amount();
++sz;
}
selected_transfers.resize(sz);
}
// compute signature prefix hash
std::string prefix_data = message;
prefix_data.append((const char*)&m_account.get_keys().m_account_address, sizeof(cryptonote::account_public_address));
for (size_t i = 0; i < selected_transfers.size(); ++i)
{
prefix_data.append((const char*)&m_transfers[selected_transfers[i]].m_key_image, sizeof(crypto::key_image));
}
crypto::hash prefix_hash;
crypto::cn_fast_hash(prefix_data.data(), prefix_data.size(), prefix_hash);
// generate proof entries
std::vector<reserve_proof_entry> proofs(selected_transfers.size());
std::unordered_set<cryptonote::subaddress_index> subaddr_indices = { {0,0} };
for (size_t i = 0; i < selected_transfers.size(); ++i)
{
const transfer_details &td = m_transfers[selected_transfers[i]];
reserve_proof_entry& proof = proofs[i];
proof.txid = td.m_txid;
proof.index_in_tx = td.m_internal_output_index;
proof.key_image = td.m_key_image;
subaddr_indices.insert(td.m_subaddr_index);
// get tx pub key
const crypto::public_key tx_pub_key = get_tx_pub_key_from_extra(td.m_tx, td.m_pk_index);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(tx_pub_key == crypto::null_pkey, error::wallet_internal_error, "The tx public key isn't found");
const std::vector<crypto::public_key> additional_tx_pub_keys = get_additional_tx_pub_keys_from_extra(td.m_tx);
// determine which tx pub key was used for deriving the output key
const crypto::public_key *tx_pub_key_used = &tx_pub_key;
for (int i = 0; i < 2; ++i)
{
proof.shared_secret = rct::rct2pk(rct::scalarmultKey(rct::pk2rct(*tx_pub_key_used), rct::sk2rct(m_account.get_keys().m_view_secret_key)));
crypto::key_derivation derivation;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!crypto::generate_key_derivation(proof.shared_secret, rct::rct2sk(rct::I), derivation),
error::wallet_internal_error, "Failed to generate key derivation");
crypto::public_key subaddress_spendkey;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!derive_subaddress_public_key(td.get_public_key(), derivation, proof.index_in_tx, subaddress_spendkey),
error::wallet_internal_error, "Failed to derive subaddress public key");
if (m_subaddresses.count(subaddress_spendkey) == 1)
break;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(additional_tx_pub_keys.empty(), error::wallet_internal_error,
"Normal tx pub key doesn't derive the expected output, while the additional tx pub keys are empty");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(i == 1, error::wallet_internal_error,
"Neither normal tx pub key nor additional tx pub key derive the expected output key");
tx_pub_key_used = &additional_tx_pub_keys[proof.index_in_tx];
}
// generate signature for shared secret
crypto::generate_tx_proof(prefix_hash, m_account.get_keys().m_account_address.m_view_public_key, *tx_pub_key_used, boost::none, proof.shared_secret, m_account.get_keys().m_view_secret_key, proof.shared_secret_sig);
// derive ephemeral secret key
crypto::key_image ki;
cryptonote::keypair ephemeral;
const bool r = cryptonote::generate_key_image_helper(m_account.get_keys(), m_subaddresses, td.get_public_key(), tx_pub_key, additional_tx_pub_keys, td.m_internal_output_index, ephemeral, ki, m_account.get_device());
2017-12-28 14:50:10 +01:00
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!r, error::wallet_internal_error, "Failed to generate key image");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(ephemeral.pub != td.get_public_key(), error::wallet_internal_error, "Derived public key doesn't agree with the stored one");
// generate signature for key image
const std::vector<const crypto::public_key*> pubs = { &ephemeral.pub };
crypto::generate_ring_signature(prefix_hash, td.m_key_image, &pubs[0], 1, ephemeral.sec, 0, &proof.key_image_sig);
}
// collect all subaddress spend keys that received those outputs and generate their signatures
std::unordered_map<crypto::public_key, crypto::signature> subaddr_spendkeys;
for (const cryptonote::subaddress_index &index : subaddr_indices)
{
crypto::secret_key subaddr_spend_skey = m_account.get_keys().m_spend_secret_key;
if (!index.is_zero())
{
crypto::secret_key m = m_account.get_device().get_subaddress_secret_key(m_account.get_keys().m_view_secret_key, index);
2017-12-28 14:50:10 +01:00
crypto::secret_key tmp = subaddr_spend_skey;
sc_add((unsigned char*)&subaddr_spend_skey, (unsigned char*)&m, (unsigned char*)&tmp);
}
crypto::public_key subaddr_spend_pkey;
secret_key_to_public_key(subaddr_spend_skey, subaddr_spend_pkey);
crypto::generate_signature(prefix_hash, subaddr_spend_pkey, subaddr_spend_skey, subaddr_spendkeys[subaddr_spend_pkey]);
}
// serialize & encode
std::ostringstream oss;
boost::archive::portable_binary_oarchive ar(oss);
ar << proofs << subaddr_spendkeys;
return "ReserveProofV1" + tools::base58::encode(oss.str());
}
bool wallet2::check_reserve_proof(const cryptonote::account_public_address &address, const std::string &message, const std::string &sig_str, uint64_t &total, uint64_t &spent)
{
uint32_t rpc_version;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!check_connection(&rpc_version), error::wallet_internal_error, "Failed to connect to daemon: " + get_daemon_address());
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(rpc_version < MAKE_CORE_RPC_VERSION(1, 0), error::wallet_internal_error, "Daemon RPC version is too old");
static constexpr char header[] = "ReserveProofV1";
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!boost::string_ref{sig_str}.starts_with(header), error::wallet_internal_error,
"Signature header check error");
std::string sig_decoded;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!tools::base58::decode(sig_str.substr(std::strlen(header)), sig_decoded), error::wallet_internal_error,
"Signature decoding error");
std::istringstream iss(sig_decoded);
boost::archive::portable_binary_iarchive ar(iss);
std::vector<reserve_proof_entry> proofs;
std::unordered_map<crypto::public_key, crypto::signature> subaddr_spendkeys;
ar >> proofs >> subaddr_spendkeys;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(subaddr_spendkeys.count(address.m_spend_public_key) == 0, error::wallet_internal_error,
"The given address isn't found in the proof");
// compute signature prefix hash
std::string prefix_data = message;
prefix_data.append((const char*)&address, sizeof(cryptonote::account_public_address));
for (size_t i = 0; i < proofs.size(); ++i)
{
prefix_data.append((const char*)&proofs[i].key_image, sizeof(crypto::key_image));
}
crypto::hash prefix_hash;
crypto::cn_fast_hash(prefix_data.data(), prefix_data.size(), prefix_hash);
// fetch txes from daemon
COMMAND_RPC_GET_TRANSACTIONS::request gettx_req;
COMMAND_RPC_GET_TRANSACTIONS::response gettx_res;
for (size_t i = 0; i < proofs.size(); ++i)
gettx_req.txs_hashes.push_back(epee::string_tools::pod_to_hex(proofs[i].txid));
gettx_req.decode_as_json = false;
gettx_req.prune = true;
2017-12-28 14:50:10 +01:00
m_daemon_rpc_mutex.lock();
bool ok = net_utils::invoke_http_json("/gettransactions", gettx_req, gettx_res, m_http_client);
m_daemon_rpc_mutex.unlock();
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!ok || gettx_res.txs.size() != proofs.size(),
error::wallet_internal_error, "Failed to get transaction from daemon");
// check spent status
COMMAND_RPC_IS_KEY_IMAGE_SPENT::request kispent_req;
COMMAND_RPC_IS_KEY_IMAGE_SPENT::response kispent_res;
for (size_t i = 0; i < proofs.size(); ++i)
kispent_req.key_images.push_back(epee::string_tools::pod_to_hex(proofs[i].key_image));
m_daemon_rpc_mutex.lock();
ok = epee::net_utils::invoke_http_json("/is_key_image_spent", kispent_req, kispent_res, m_http_client, rpc_timeout);
m_daemon_rpc_mutex.unlock();
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!ok || kispent_res.spent_status.size() != proofs.size(),
error::wallet_internal_error, "Failed to get key image spent status from daemon");
total = spent = 0;
for (size_t i = 0; i < proofs.size(); ++i)
{
const reserve_proof_entry& proof = proofs[i];
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(gettx_res.txs[i].in_pool, error::wallet_internal_error, "Tx is unconfirmed");
cryptonote::transaction tx;
crypto::hash tx_hash;
ok = get_pruned_tx(gettx_res.txs[i], tx, tx_hash);
2017-12-28 14:50:10 +01:00
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!ok, error::wallet_internal_error, "Failed to parse transaction from daemon");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(tx_hash != proof.txid, error::wallet_internal_error, "Failed to get the right transaction from daemon");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(proof.index_in_tx >= tx.vout.size(), error::wallet_internal_error, "index_in_tx is out of bound");
const cryptonote::txout_to_key* const out_key = boost::get<cryptonote::txout_to_key>(std::addressof(tx.vout[proof.index_in_tx].target));
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!out_key, error::wallet_internal_error, "Output key wasn't found")
// get tx pub key
const crypto::public_key tx_pub_key = get_tx_pub_key_from_extra(tx);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(tx_pub_key == crypto::null_pkey, error::wallet_internal_error, "The tx public key isn't found");
const std::vector<crypto::public_key> additional_tx_pub_keys = get_additional_tx_pub_keys_from_extra(tx);
// check singature for shared secret
ok = crypto::check_tx_proof(prefix_hash, address.m_view_public_key, tx_pub_key, boost::none, proof.shared_secret, proof.shared_secret_sig);
if (!ok && additional_tx_pub_keys.size() == tx.vout.size())
ok = crypto::check_tx_proof(prefix_hash, address.m_view_public_key, additional_tx_pub_keys[proof.index_in_tx], boost::none, proof.shared_secret, proof.shared_secret_sig);
if (!ok)
return false;
// check signature for key image
const std::vector<const crypto::public_key*> pubs = { &out_key->key };
ok = crypto::check_ring_signature(prefix_hash, proof.key_image, &pubs[0], 1, &proof.key_image_sig);
if (!ok)
return false;
// check if the address really received the fund
crypto::key_derivation derivation;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!crypto::generate_key_derivation(proof.shared_secret, rct::rct2sk(rct::I), derivation), error::wallet_internal_error, "Failed to generate key derivation");
crypto::public_key subaddr_spendkey;
crypto::derive_subaddress_public_key(out_key->key, derivation, proof.index_in_tx, subaddr_spendkey);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(subaddr_spendkeys.count(subaddr_spendkey) == 0, error::wallet_internal_error,
"The address doesn't seem to have received the fund");
// check amount
uint64_t amount = tx.vout[proof.index_in_tx].amount;
if (amount == 0)
{
// decode rct
crypto::secret_key shared_secret;
crypto::derivation_to_scalar(derivation, proof.index_in_tx, shared_secret);
rct::ecdhTuple ecdh_info = tx.rct_signatures.ecdhInfo[proof.index_in_tx];
rct::ecdhDecode(ecdh_info, rct::sk2rct(shared_secret), tx.rct_signatures.type == rct::RCTTypeBulletproof2);
2017-12-28 14:50:10 +01:00
amount = rct::h2d(ecdh_info.amount);
}
total += amount;
if (kispent_res.spent_status[i])
spent += amount;
}
// check signatures for all subaddress spend keys
for (const auto &i : subaddr_spendkeys)
{
if (!crypto::check_signature(prefix_hash, i.first, i.second))
return false;
}
return true;
}
std::string wallet2::get_wallet_file() const
{
return m_wallet_file;
}
std::string wallet2::get_keys_file() const
{
return m_keys_file;
}
2016-03-25 15:06:30 +01:00
std::string wallet2::get_daemon_address() const
{
2016-09-26 22:29:53 +02:00
return m_daemon_address;
}
uint64_t wallet2::get_daemon_blockchain_height(string &err) const
{
uint64_t height;
boost::optional<std::string> result = m_node_rpc_proxy.get_height(height);
if (result)
2016-09-26 22:39:30 +02:00
{
if (m_trusted_daemon)
err = *result;
else
err = "daemon error";
return 0;
2016-09-26 22:39:30 +02:00
}
err = "";
return height;
2016-03-25 15:06:30 +01:00
}
uint64_t wallet2::get_daemon_blockchain_target_height(string &err)
{
err = "";
uint64_t target_height = 0;
const auto result = m_node_rpc_proxy.get_target_height(target_height);
if (result && *result != CORE_RPC_STATUS_OK)
{
if (m_trusted_daemon)
err = *result;
else
err = "daemon error";
return 0;
}
return target_height;
}
uint64_t wallet2::get_approximate_blockchain_height() const
{
// time of v2 fork
const time_t fork_time = m_nettype == TESTNET ? 1448285909 : m_nettype == STAGENET ? 1520937818 : 1458748658;
// v2 fork block
const uint64_t fork_block = m_nettype == TESTNET ? 624634 : m_nettype == STAGENET ? 32000 : 1009827;
// avg seconds per block
const int seconds_per_block = DIFFICULTY_TARGET_V2;
// Calculated blockchain height
uint64_t approx_blockchain_height = fork_block + (time(NULL) - fork_time)/seconds_per_block;
// testnet got some huge rollbacks, so the estimation is way off
static const uint64_t approximate_testnet_rolled_back_blocks = 303967;
2018-02-16 12:04:04 +01:00
if (m_nettype == TESTNET && approx_blockchain_height > approximate_testnet_rolled_back_blocks)
2018-01-14 23:48:22 +01:00
approx_blockchain_height -= approximate_testnet_rolled_back_blocks;
LOG_PRINT_L2("Calculated blockchain height: " << approx_blockchain_height);
return approx_blockchain_height;
}
2016-04-20 19:19:42 +02:00
void wallet2::set_tx_note(const crypto::hash &txid, const std::string &note)
{
m_tx_notes[txid] = note;
}
std::string wallet2::get_tx_note(const crypto::hash &txid) const
{
std::unordered_map<crypto::hash, std::string>::const_iterator i = m_tx_notes.find(txid);
if (i == m_tx_notes.end())
return std::string();
return i->second;
}
2018-08-23 23:50:53 +02:00
void wallet2::set_tx_device_aux(const crypto::hash &txid, const std::string &aux)
{
m_tx_device[txid] = aux;
}
std::string wallet2::get_tx_device_aux(const crypto::hash &txid) const
{
std::unordered_map<crypto::hash, std::string>::const_iterator i = m_tx_device.find(txid);
if (i == m_tx_device.end())
return std::string();
return i->second;
}
void wallet2::set_attribute(const std::string &key, const std::string &value)
{
m_attributes[key] = value;
}
std::string wallet2::get_attribute(const std::string &key) const
{
std::unordered_map<std::string, std::string>::const_iterator i = m_attributes.find(key);
if (i == m_attributes.end())
return std::string();
return i->second;
}
void wallet2::set_description(const std::string &description)
{
set_attribute(ATTRIBUTE_DESCRIPTION, description);
}
std::string wallet2::get_description() const
{
return get_attribute(ATTRIBUTE_DESCRIPTION);
}
2017-12-15 04:08:36 +01:00
const std::pair<std::map<std::string, std::string>, std::vector<std::string>>& wallet2::get_account_tags()
{
// ensure consistency
if (m_account_tags.second.size() != get_num_subaddress_accounts())
m_account_tags.second.resize(get_num_subaddress_accounts(), "");
for (const std::string& tag : m_account_tags.second)
{
if (!tag.empty() && m_account_tags.first.count(tag) == 0)
m_account_tags.first.insert({tag, ""});
}
for (auto i = m_account_tags.first.begin(); i != m_account_tags.first.end(); )
{
if (std::find(m_account_tags.second.begin(), m_account_tags.second.end(), i->first) == m_account_tags.second.end())
i = m_account_tags.first.erase(i);
else
++i;
}
return m_account_tags;
}
void wallet2::set_account_tag(const std::set<uint32_t> &account_indices, const std::string& tag)
2017-12-15 04:08:36 +01:00
{
for (uint32_t account_index : account_indices)
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(account_index >= get_num_subaddress_accounts(), error::wallet_internal_error, "Account index out of bound");
if (m_account_tags.second[account_index] == tag)
MDEBUG("This tag is already assigned to this account");
else
m_account_tags.second[account_index] = tag;
}
get_account_tags();
}
void wallet2::set_account_tag_description(const std::string& tag, const std::string& description)
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(tag.empty(), error::wallet_internal_error, "Tag must not be empty");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(m_account_tags.first.count(tag) == 0, error::wallet_internal_error, "Tag is unregistered");
m_account_tags.first[tag] = description;
}
std::string wallet2::sign(const std::string &data) const
{
crypto::hash hash;
crypto::cn_fast_hash(data.data(), data.size(), hash);
const cryptonote::account_keys &keys = m_account.get_keys();
crypto::signature signature;
crypto::generate_signature(hash, keys.m_account_address.m_spend_public_key, keys.m_spend_secret_key, signature);
return std::string("SigV1") + tools::base58::encode(std::string((const char *)&signature, sizeof(signature)));
}
bool wallet2::verify(const std::string &data, const cryptonote::account_public_address &address, const std::string &signature) const
{
const size_t header_len = strlen("SigV1");
if (signature.size() < header_len || signature.substr(0, header_len) != "SigV1") {
LOG_PRINT_L0("Signature header check error");
return false;
}
crypto::hash hash;
crypto::cn_fast_hash(data.data(), data.size(), hash);
std::string decoded;
if (!tools::base58::decode(signature.substr(header_len), decoded)) {
LOG_PRINT_L0("Signature decoding error");
return false;
}
crypto::signature s;
if (sizeof(s) != decoded.size()) {
LOG_PRINT_L0("Signature decoding error");
return false;
}
memcpy(&s, decoded.data(), sizeof(s));
return crypto::check_signature(hash, address.m_spend_public_key, s);
}
std::string wallet2::sign_multisig_participant(const std::string& data) const
{
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(m_multisig, "Wallet is not multisig");
crypto::hash hash;
crypto::cn_fast_hash(data.data(), data.size(), hash);
const cryptonote::account_keys &keys = m_account.get_keys();
crypto::signature signature;
crypto::generate_signature(hash, get_multisig_signer_public_key(), keys.m_spend_secret_key, signature);
return MULTISIG_SIGNATURE_MAGIC + tools::base58::encode(std::string((const char *)&signature, sizeof(signature)));
}
bool wallet2::verify_with_public_key(const std::string &data, const crypto::public_key &public_key, const std::string &signature) const
{
if (signature.size() < MULTISIG_SIGNATURE_MAGIC.size() || signature.substr(0, MULTISIG_SIGNATURE_MAGIC.size()) != MULTISIG_SIGNATURE_MAGIC) {
MERROR("Signature header check error");
return false;
}
crypto::hash hash;
crypto::cn_fast_hash(data.data(), data.size(), hash);
std::string decoded;
if (!tools::base58::decode(signature.substr(MULTISIG_SIGNATURE_MAGIC.size()), decoded)) {
MERROR("Signature decoding error");
return false;
}
crypto::signature s;
if (sizeof(s) != decoded.size()) {
MERROR("Signature decoding error");
return false;
}
memcpy(&s, decoded.data(), sizeof(s));
return crypto::check_signature(hash, public_key, s);
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
crypto::public_key wallet2::get_tx_pub_key_from_received_outs(const tools::wallet2::transfer_details &td) const
{
std::vector<tx_extra_field> tx_extra_fields;
if(!parse_tx_extra(td.m_tx.extra, tx_extra_fields))
{
// Extra may only be partially parsed, it's OK if tx_extra_fields contains public key
}
// Due to a previous bug, there might be more than one tx pubkey in extra, one being
// the result of a previously discarded signature.
// For speed, since scanning for outputs is a slow process, we check whether extra
// contains more than one pubkey. If not, the first one is returned. If yes, they're
// checked for whether they yield at least one output
tx_extra_pub_key pub_key_field;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!find_tx_extra_field_by_type(tx_extra_fields, pub_key_field, 0), error::wallet_internal_error,
"Public key wasn't found in the transaction extra");
const crypto::public_key tx_pub_key = pub_key_field.pub_key;
bool two_found = find_tx_extra_field_by_type(tx_extra_fields, pub_key_field, 1);
if (!two_found) {
// easy case, just one found
return tx_pub_key;
}
// more than one, loop and search
const cryptonote::account_keys& keys = m_account.get_keys();
size_t pk_index = 0;
hw::device &hwdev = m_account.get_device();
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
while (find_tx_extra_field_by_type(tx_extra_fields, pub_key_field, pk_index++)) {
const crypto::public_key tx_pub_key = pub_key_field.pub_key;
crypto::key_derivation derivation;
bool r = hwdev.generate_key_derivation(tx_pub_key, keys.m_view_secret_key, derivation);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!r, error::wallet_internal_error, "Failed to generate key derivation");
for (size_t i = 0; i < td.m_tx.vout.size(); ++i)
{
2017-09-12 13:03:56 +02:00
tx_scan_info_t tx_scan_info;
check_acc_out_precomp(td.m_tx.vout[i], derivation, {}, i, tx_scan_info);
2017-09-12 13:03:56 +02:00
if (!tx_scan_info.error && tx_scan_info.received)
return tx_pub_key;
}
}
// we found no key yielding an output, but it might be in the additional
// tx pub keys only, which we do not need to check, so return the first one
return tx_pub_key;
}
bool wallet2::export_key_images(const std::string &filename) const
{
PERF_TIMER(export_key_images);
std::pair<size_t, std::vector<std::pair<crypto::key_image, crypto::signature>>> ski = export_key_images();
std::string magic(KEY_IMAGE_EXPORT_FILE_MAGIC, strlen(KEY_IMAGE_EXPORT_FILE_MAGIC));
const cryptonote::account_public_address &keys = get_account().get_keys().m_account_address;
const uint32_t offset = ski.first;
std::string data;
data.reserve(4 + ski.second.size() * (sizeof(crypto::key_image) + sizeof(crypto::signature)) + 2 * sizeof(crypto::public_key));
data.resize(4);
data[0] = offset & 0xff;
data[1] = (offset >> 8) & 0xff;
data[2] = (offset >> 16) & 0xff;
data[3] = (offset >> 24) & 0xff;
data += std::string((const char *)&keys.m_spend_public_key, sizeof(crypto::public_key));
data += std::string((const char *)&keys.m_view_public_key, sizeof(crypto::public_key));
for (const auto &i: ski.second)
{
data += std::string((const char *)&i.first, sizeof(crypto::key_image));
data += std::string((const char *)&i.second, sizeof(crypto::signature));
}
// encrypt data, keep magic plaintext
PERF_TIMER(export_key_images_encrypt);
std::string ciphertext = encrypt_with_view_secret_key(data);
return epee::file_io_utils::save_string_to_file(filename, magic + ciphertext);
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
std::pair<size_t, std::vector<std::pair<crypto::key_image, crypto::signature>>> wallet2::export_key_images(bool all) const
{
PERF_TIMER(export_key_images_raw);
std::vector<std::pair<crypto::key_image, crypto::signature>> ski;
size_t offset = 0;
if (!all)
{
while (offset < m_transfers.size() && !m_transfers[offset].m_key_image_request)
++offset;
}
ski.reserve(m_transfers.size() - offset);
for (size_t n = offset; n < m_transfers.size(); ++n)
{
const transfer_details &td = m_transfers[n];
// get ephemeral public key
const cryptonote::tx_out &out = td.m_tx.vout[td.m_internal_output_index];
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(out.target.type() != typeid(txout_to_key), error::wallet_internal_error,
"Output is not txout_to_key");
const cryptonote::txout_to_key &o = boost::get<const cryptonote::txout_to_key>(out.target);
const crypto::public_key pkey = o.key;
// get tx pub key
std::vector<tx_extra_field> tx_extra_fields;
if(!parse_tx_extra(td.m_tx.extra, tx_extra_fields))
{
// Extra may only be partially parsed, it's OK if tx_extra_fields contains public key
}
crypto::public_key tx_pub_key = get_tx_pub_key_from_received_outs(td);
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
const std::vector<crypto::public_key> additional_tx_pub_keys = get_additional_tx_pub_keys_from_extra(td.m_tx);
// generate ephemeral secret key
crypto::key_image ki;
cryptonote::keypair in_ephemeral;
bool r = cryptonote::generate_key_image_helper(m_account.get_keys(), m_subaddresses, pkey, tx_pub_key, additional_tx_pub_keys, td.m_internal_output_index, in_ephemeral, ki, m_account.get_device());
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!r, error::wallet_internal_error, "Failed to generate key image");
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(td.m_key_image_known && !td.m_key_image_partial && ki != td.m_key_image,
error::wallet_internal_error, "key_image generated not matched with cached key image");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(in_ephemeral.pub != pkey,
error::wallet_internal_error, "key_image generated ephemeral public key not matched with output_key");
// sign the key image with the output secret key
crypto::signature signature;
std::vector<const crypto::public_key*> key_ptrs;
key_ptrs.push_back(&pkey);
crypto::generate_ring_signature((const crypto::hash&)td.m_key_image, td.m_key_image, key_ptrs, in_ephemeral.sec, 0, &signature);
ski.push_back(std::make_pair(td.m_key_image, signature));
}
return std::make_pair(offset, ski);
}
uint64_t wallet2::import_key_images(const std::string &filename, uint64_t &spent, uint64_t &unspent)
{
PERF_TIMER(import_key_images_fsu);
std::string data;
bool r = epee::file_io_utils::load_file_to_string(filename, data);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!r, error::wallet_internal_error, std::string(tr("failed to read file ")) + filename);
const size_t magiclen = strlen(KEY_IMAGE_EXPORT_FILE_MAGIC);
if (data.size() < magiclen || memcmp(data.data(), KEY_IMAGE_EXPORT_FILE_MAGIC, magiclen))
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION(error::wallet_internal_error, std::string("Bad key image export file magic in ") + filename);
}
try
{
PERF_TIMER(import_key_images_decrypt);
data = decrypt_with_view_secret_key(std::string(data, magiclen));
}
catch (const std::exception &e)
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION(error::wallet_internal_error, std::string("Failed to decrypt ") + filename + ": " + e.what());
}
const size_t headerlen = 4 + 2 * sizeof(crypto::public_key);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(data.size() < headerlen, error::wallet_internal_error, std::string("Bad data size from file ") + filename);
const uint32_t offset = (uint8_t)data[0] | (((uint8_t)data[1]) << 8) | (((uint8_t)data[2]) << 16) | (((uint8_t)data[3]) << 24);
const crypto::public_key &public_spend_key = *(const crypto::public_key*)&data[4];
const crypto::public_key &public_view_key = *(const crypto::public_key*)&data[4 + sizeof(crypto::public_key)];
const cryptonote::account_public_address &keys = get_account().get_keys().m_account_address;
if (public_spend_key != keys.m_spend_public_key || public_view_key != keys.m_view_public_key)
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION(error::wallet_internal_error, std::string( "Key images from ") + filename + " are for a different account");
}
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(offset > m_transfers.size(), error::wallet_internal_error, "Offset larger than known outputs");
const size_t record_size = sizeof(crypto::key_image) + sizeof(crypto::signature);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF((data.size() - headerlen) % record_size,
error::wallet_internal_error, std::string("Bad data size from file ") + filename);
size_t nki = (data.size() - headerlen) / record_size;
std::vector<std::pair<crypto::key_image, crypto::signature>> ski;
ski.reserve(nki);
for (size_t n = 0; n < nki; ++n)
{
crypto::key_image key_image = *reinterpret_cast<const crypto::key_image*>(&data[headerlen + n * record_size]);
crypto::signature signature = *reinterpret_cast<const crypto::signature*>(&data[headerlen + n * record_size + sizeof(crypto::key_image)]);
ski.push_back(std::make_pair(key_image, signature));
}
return import_key_images(ski, offset, spent, unspent);
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
uint64_t wallet2::import_key_images(const std::vector<std::pair<crypto::key_image, crypto::signature>> &signed_key_images, size_t offset, uint64_t &spent, uint64_t &unspent, bool check_spent)
{
PERF_TIMER(import_key_images_lots);
COMMAND_RPC_IS_KEY_IMAGE_SPENT::request req = AUTO_VAL_INIT(req);
COMMAND_RPC_IS_KEY_IMAGE_SPENT::response daemon_resp = AUTO_VAL_INIT(daemon_resp);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(offset > m_transfers.size(), error::wallet_internal_error, "Offset larger than known outputs");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(signed_key_images.size() > m_transfers.size() - offset, error::wallet_internal_error,
"The blockchain is out of date compared to the signed key images");
if (signed_key_images.empty() && offset == 0)
{
spent = 0;
unspent = 0;
return 0;
}
req.key_images.reserve(signed_key_images.size());
PERF_TIMER_START(import_key_images_A);
for (size_t n = 0; n < signed_key_images.size(); ++n)
{
const transfer_details &td = m_transfers[n + offset];
const crypto::key_image &key_image = signed_key_images[n].first;
const crypto::signature &signature = signed_key_images[n].second;
// get ephemeral public key
const cryptonote::tx_out &out = td.m_tx.vout[td.m_internal_output_index];
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(out.target.type() != typeid(txout_to_key), error::wallet_internal_error,
"Non txout_to_key output found");
const cryptonote::txout_to_key &o = boost::get<cryptonote::txout_to_key>(out.target);
const crypto::public_key pkey = o.key;
if (!td.m_key_image_known || !(key_image == td.m_key_image))
{
std::vector<const crypto::public_key*> pkeys;
pkeys.push_back(&pkey);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!(rct::scalarmultKey(rct::ki2rct(key_image), rct::curveOrder()) == rct::identity()),
error::wallet_internal_error, "Key image out of validity domain: input " + boost::lexical_cast<std::string>(n + offset) + "/"
+ boost::lexical_cast<std::string>(signed_key_images.size()) + ", key image " + epee::string_tools::pod_to_hex(key_image));
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!crypto::check_ring_signature((const crypto::hash&)key_image, key_image, pkeys, &signature),
error::signature_check_failed, boost::lexical_cast<std::string>(n + offset) + "/"
+ boost::lexical_cast<std::string>(signed_key_images.size()) + ", key image " + epee::string_tools::pod_to_hex(key_image)
+ ", signature " + epee::string_tools::pod_to_hex(signature) + ", pubkey " + epee::string_tools::pod_to_hex(*pkeys[0]));
}
req.key_images.push_back(epee::string_tools::pod_to_hex(key_image));
}
PERF_TIMER_STOP(import_key_images_A);
PERF_TIMER_START(import_key_images_B);
for (size_t n = 0; n < signed_key_images.size(); ++n)
{
m_transfers[n + offset].m_key_image = signed_key_images[n].first;
m_key_images[m_transfers[n + offset].m_key_image] = n + offset;
m_transfers[n + offset].m_key_image_known = true;
m_transfers[n + offset].m_key_image_request = false;
m_transfers[n + offset].m_key_image_partial = false;
}
PERF_TIMER_STOP(import_key_images_B);
if(check_spent)
{
PERF_TIMER(import_key_images_RPC);
m_daemon_rpc_mutex.lock();
bool r = epee::net_utils::invoke_http_json("/is_key_image_spent", req, daemon_resp, m_http_client, rpc_timeout);
m_daemon_rpc_mutex.unlock();
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!r, error::no_connection_to_daemon, "is_key_image_spent");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(daemon_resp.status == CORE_RPC_STATUS_BUSY, error::daemon_busy, "is_key_image_spent");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(daemon_resp.status != CORE_RPC_STATUS_OK, error::is_key_image_spent_error, daemon_resp.status);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(daemon_resp.spent_status.size() != signed_key_images.size(), error::wallet_internal_error,
"daemon returned wrong response for is_key_image_spent, wrong amounts count = " +
std::to_string(daemon_resp.spent_status.size()) + ", expected " + std::to_string(signed_key_images.size()));
for (size_t n = 0; n < daemon_resp.spent_status.size(); ++n)
{
transfer_details &td = m_transfers[n + offset];
td.m_spent = daemon_resp.spent_status[n] != COMMAND_RPC_IS_KEY_IMAGE_SPENT::UNSPENT;
}
}
spent = 0;
unspent = 0;
std::unordered_set<crypto::hash> spent_txids; // For each spent key image, search for a tx in m_transfers that uses it as input.
std::vector<size_t> swept_transfers; // If such a spending tx wasn't found in m_transfers, this means the spending tx
// was created by sweep_all, so we can't know the spent height and other detailed info.
std::unordered_map<crypto::key_image, crypto::hash> spent_key_images;
PERF_TIMER_START(import_key_images_C);
for (const transfer_details &td: m_transfers)
{
for (const cryptonote::txin_v& in : td.m_tx.vin)
{
if (in.type() == typeid(cryptonote::txin_to_key))
spent_key_images.insert(std::make_pair(boost::get<cryptonote::txin_to_key>(in).k_image, td.m_txid));
}
}
PERF_TIMER_STOP(import_key_images_C);
// accumulate outputs before the updated data
for(size_t i = 0; i < offset; ++i)
{
const transfer_details &td = m_transfers[i];
if (td.m_frozen)
continue;
uint64_t amount = td.amount();
if (td.m_spent)
spent += amount;
else
unspent += amount;
}
PERF_TIMER_START(import_key_images_D);
for(size_t i = 0; i < signed_key_images.size(); ++i)
{
const transfer_details &td = m_transfers[i + offset];
if (td.m_frozen)
continue;
uint64_t amount = td.amount();
if (td.m_spent)
spent += amount;
else
unspent += amount;
LOG_PRINT_L2("Transfer " << i << ": " << print_money(amount) << " (" << td.m_global_output_index << "): "
<< (td.m_spent ? "spent" : "unspent") << " (key image " << req.key_images[i] << ")");
if (i < daemon_resp.spent_status.size() && daemon_resp.spent_status[i] == COMMAND_RPC_IS_KEY_IMAGE_SPENT::SPENT_IN_BLOCKCHAIN)
{
const std::unordered_map<crypto::key_image, crypto::hash>::const_iterator skii = spent_key_images.find(td.m_key_image);
if (skii == spent_key_images.end())
swept_transfers.push_back(i);
else
spent_txids.insert(skii->second);
}
}
PERF_TIMER_STOP(import_key_images_D);
MDEBUG("Total: " << print_money(spent) << " spent, " << print_money(unspent) << " unspent");
if (check_spent)
{
// query outgoing txes
COMMAND_RPC_GET_TRANSACTIONS::request gettxs_req;
COMMAND_RPC_GET_TRANSACTIONS::response gettxs_res;
gettxs_req.decode_as_json = false;
gettxs_req.prune = true;
gettxs_req.txs_hashes.reserve(spent_txids.size());
for (const crypto::hash& spent_txid : spent_txids)
gettxs_req.txs_hashes.push_back(epee::string_tools::pod_to_hex(spent_txid));
PERF_TIMER_START(import_key_images_E);
m_daemon_rpc_mutex.lock();
bool r = epee::net_utils::invoke_http_json("/gettransactions", gettxs_req, gettxs_res, m_http_client, rpc_timeout);
m_daemon_rpc_mutex.unlock();
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!r, error::no_connection_to_daemon, "gettransactions");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(gettxs_res.status == CORE_RPC_STATUS_BUSY, error::daemon_busy, "gettransactions");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(gettxs_res.txs.size() != spent_txids.size(), error::wallet_internal_error,
"daemon returned wrong response for gettransactions, wrong count = " + std::to_string(gettxs_res.txs.size()) + ", expected " + std::to_string(spent_txids.size()));
PERF_TIMER_STOP(import_key_images_E);
// process each outgoing tx
PERF_TIMER_START(import_key_images_F);
auto spent_txid = spent_txids.begin();
hw::device &hwdev = m_account.get_device();
auto it = spent_txids.begin();
for (const COMMAND_RPC_GET_TRANSACTIONS::entry& e : gettxs_res.txs)
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(e.in_pool, error::wallet_internal_error, "spent tx isn't supposed to be in txpool");
cryptonote::transaction spent_tx;
crypto::hash spnet_txid_parsed;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!get_pruned_tx(e, spent_tx, spnet_txid_parsed), error::wallet_internal_error, "Failed to get tx from daemon");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!(spnet_txid_parsed == *it), error::wallet_internal_error, "parsed txid mismatch");
++it;
// get received (change) amount
uint64_t tx_money_got_in_outs = 0;
const cryptonote::account_keys& keys = m_account.get_keys();
const crypto::public_key tx_pub_key = get_tx_pub_key_from_extra(spent_tx);
crypto::key_derivation derivation;
bool r = hwdev.generate_key_derivation(tx_pub_key, keys.m_view_secret_key, derivation);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!r, error::wallet_internal_error, "Failed to generate key derivation");
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
const std::vector<crypto::public_key> additional_tx_pub_keys = get_additional_tx_pub_keys_from_extra(spent_tx);
std::vector<crypto::key_derivation> additional_derivations;
for (size_t i = 0; i < additional_tx_pub_keys.size(); ++i)
{
additional_derivations.push_back({});
r = hwdev.generate_key_derivation(additional_tx_pub_keys[i], keys.m_view_secret_key, additional_derivations.back());
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!r, error::wallet_internal_error, "Failed to generate key derivation");
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
}
size_t output_index = 0;
bool miner_tx = cryptonote::is_coinbase(spent_tx);
for (const cryptonote::tx_out& out : spent_tx.vout)
{
2017-09-12 13:03:56 +02:00
tx_scan_info_t tx_scan_info;
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
check_acc_out_precomp(out, derivation, additional_derivations, output_index, tx_scan_info);
2017-09-12 13:03:56 +02:00
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(tx_scan_info.error, error::wallet_internal_error, "check_acc_out_precomp failed");
if (tx_scan_info.received)
{
if (tx_scan_info.money_transfered == 0 && !miner_tx)
{
rct::key mask;
tx_scan_info.money_transfered = tools::decodeRct(spent_tx.rct_signatures, tx_scan_info.received->derivation, output_index, mask, hwdev);
}
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(tx_money_got_in_outs >= std::numeric_limits<uint64_t>::max() - tx_scan_info.money_transfered,
error::wallet_internal_error, "Overflow in received amounts");
2017-09-12 13:03:56 +02:00
tx_money_got_in_outs += tx_scan_info.money_transfered;
}
++output_index;
}
// get spent amount
uint64_t tx_money_spent_in_ins = 0;
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
uint32_t subaddr_account = (uint32_t)-1;
std::set<uint32_t> subaddr_indices;
for (const cryptonote::txin_v& in : spent_tx.vin)
{
if (in.type() != typeid(cryptonote::txin_to_key))
continue;
auto it = m_key_images.find(boost::get<cryptonote::txin_to_key>(in).k_image);
if (it != m_key_images.end())
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(it->second >= m_transfers.size(), error::wallet_internal_error, std::string("Key images cache contains illegal transfer offset: ") + std::to_string(it->second) + std::string(" m_transfers.size() = ") + std::to_string(m_transfers.size()));
const transfer_details& td = m_transfers[it->second];
uint64_t amount = boost::get<cryptonote::txin_to_key>(in).amount;
if (amount > 0)
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(amount != td.amount(), error::wallet_internal_error,
std::string("Inconsistent amount in tx input: got ") + print_money(amount) +
std::string(", expected ") + print_money(td.amount()));
}
amount = td.amount();
tx_money_spent_in_ins += amount;
LOG_PRINT_L0("Spent money: " << print_money(amount) << ", with tx: " << *spent_txid);
set_spent(it->second, e.block_height);
if (m_callback)
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
m_callback->on_money_spent(e.block_height, *spent_txid, spent_tx, amount, spent_tx, td.m_subaddr_index);
if (subaddr_account != (uint32_t)-1 && subaddr_account != td.m_subaddr_index.major)
LOG_PRINT_L0("WARNING: This tx spends outputs received by different subaddress accounts, which isn't supposed to happen");
subaddr_account = td.m_subaddr_index.major;
subaddr_indices.insert(td.m_subaddr_index.minor);
}
}
// create outgoing payment
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
process_outgoing(*spent_txid, spent_tx, e.block_height, e.block_timestamp, tx_money_spent_in_ins, tx_money_got_in_outs, subaddr_account, subaddr_indices);
// erase corresponding incoming payment
for (auto j = m_payments.begin(); j != m_payments.end(); ++j)
{
if (j->second.m_tx_hash == *spent_txid)
{
m_payments.erase(j);
break;
}
}
++spent_txid;
}
PERF_TIMER_STOP(import_key_images_F);
PERF_TIMER_START(import_key_images_G);
for (size_t n : swept_transfers)
{
const transfer_details& td = m_transfers[n];
confirmed_transfer_details pd;
pd.m_change = (uint64_t)-1; // change is unknown
pd.m_amount_in = pd.m_amount_out = td.amount(); // fee is unknown
pd.m_block_height = 0; // spent block height is unknown
const crypto::hash &spent_txid = crypto::null_hash; // spent txid is unknown
m_confirmed_txs.insert(std::make_pair(spent_txid, pd));
}
PERF_TIMER_STOP(import_key_images_G);
}
// this can be 0 if we do not know the height
return m_transfers[signed_key_images.size() + offset - 1].m_block_height;
}
2018-08-23 23:50:53 +02:00
bool wallet2::import_key_images(std::vector<crypto::key_image> key_images, size_t offset, boost::optional<std::unordered_set<size_t>> selected_transfers)
2018-08-23 23:50:53 +02:00
{
if (key_images.size() + offset > m_transfers.size())
2018-08-23 23:50:53 +02:00
{
LOG_PRINT_L1("More key images returned that we know outputs for");
return false;
}
for (size_t ki_idx = 0; ki_idx < key_images.size(); ++ki_idx)
2018-08-23 23:50:53 +02:00
{
const size_t transfer_idx = ki_idx + offset;
if (selected_transfers && selected_transfers.get().find(transfer_idx) == selected_transfers.get().end())
continue;
transfer_details &td = m_transfers[transfer_idx];
if (td.m_key_image_known && !td.m_key_image_partial && td.m_key_image != key_images[ki_idx])
LOG_PRINT_L0("WARNING: imported key image differs from previously known key image at index " << ki_idx << ": trusting imported one");
td.m_key_image = key_images[ki_idx];
m_key_images[td.m_key_image] = transfer_idx;
2018-08-23 23:50:53 +02:00
td.m_key_image_known = true;
td.m_key_image_request = false;
2018-08-23 23:50:53 +02:00
td.m_key_image_partial = false;
m_pub_keys[td.get_public_key()] = transfer_idx;
2018-08-23 23:50:53 +02:00
}
return true;
}
bool wallet2::import_key_images(signed_tx_set & signed_tx, size_t offset, bool only_selected_transfers)
{
std::unordered_set<size_t> selected_transfers;
if (only_selected_transfers)
{
for (const pending_tx & ptx : signed_tx.ptx)
{
for (const size_t s: ptx.selected_transfers)
selected_transfers.insert(s);
}
}
return import_key_images(signed_tx.key_images, offset, only_selected_transfers ? boost::make_optional(selected_transfers) : boost::none);
}
wallet2::payment_container wallet2::export_payments() const
{
payment_container payments;
for (auto const &p : m_payments)
{
payments.emplace(p);
}
return payments;
}
void wallet2::import_payments(const payment_container &payments)
{
m_payments.clear();
for (auto const &p : payments)
{
m_payments.emplace(p);
}
}
void wallet2::import_payments_out(const std::list<std::pair<crypto::hash,wallet2::confirmed_transfer_details>> &confirmed_payments)
{
m_confirmed_txs.clear();
for (auto const &p : confirmed_payments)
{
m_confirmed_txs.emplace(p);
}
}
std::tuple<size_t,crypto::hash,std::vector<crypto::hash>> wallet2::export_blockchain() const
{
std::tuple<size_t, crypto::hash, std::vector<crypto::hash>> bc;
std::get<0>(bc) = m_blockchain.offset();
std::get<1>(bc) = m_blockchain.empty() ? crypto::null_hash: m_blockchain.genesis();
for (size_t n = m_blockchain.offset(); n < m_blockchain.size(); ++n)
{
std::get<2>(bc).push_back(m_blockchain[n]);
}
return bc;
}
void wallet2::import_blockchain(const std::tuple<size_t, crypto::hash, std::vector<crypto::hash>> &bc)
{
m_blockchain.clear();
if (std::get<0>(bc))
{
for (size_t n = std::get<0>(bc); n > 0; --n)
m_blockchain.push_back(std::get<1>(bc));
m_blockchain.trim(std::get<0>(bc));
}
for (auto const &b : std::get<2>(bc))
{
m_blockchain.push_back(b);
}
cryptonote::block genesis;
generate_genesis(genesis);
crypto::hash genesis_hash = get_block_hash(genesis);
check_genesis(genesis_hash);
m_last_block_reward = cryptonote::get_outs_money_amount(genesis.miner_tx);
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
std::pair<size_t, std::vector<tools::wallet2::transfer_details>> wallet2::export_outputs() const
{
PERF_TIMER(export_outputs);
std::vector<tools::wallet2::transfer_details> outs;
size_t offset = 0;
while (offset < m_transfers.size() && (m_transfers[offset].m_key_image_known && !m_transfers[offset].m_key_image_request))
++offset;
outs.reserve(m_transfers.size() - offset);
for (size_t n = offset; n < m_transfers.size(); ++n)
{
const transfer_details &td = m_transfers[n];
outs.push_back(td);
}
return std::make_pair(offset, outs);
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
std::string wallet2::export_outputs_to_str() const
{
PERF_TIMER(export_outputs_to_str);
std::stringstream oss;
boost::archive::portable_binary_oarchive ar(oss);
const auto& outputs = export_outputs();
ar << outputs;
std::string magic(OUTPUT_EXPORT_FILE_MAGIC, strlen(OUTPUT_EXPORT_FILE_MAGIC));
const cryptonote::account_public_address &keys = get_account().get_keys().m_account_address;
std::string header;
header += std::string((const char *)&keys.m_spend_public_key, sizeof(crypto::public_key));
header += std::string((const char *)&keys.m_view_public_key, sizeof(crypto::public_key));
PERF_TIMER(export_outputs_encryption);
std::string ciphertext = encrypt_with_view_secret_key(header + oss.str());
return magic + ciphertext;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
size_t wallet2::import_outputs(const std::pair<size_t, std::vector<tools::wallet2::transfer_details>> &outputs)
{
PERF_TIMER(import_outputs);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(outputs.first > m_transfers.size(), error::wallet_internal_error,
"Imported outputs omit more outputs that we know of");
const size_t offset = outputs.first;
const size_t original_size = m_transfers.size();
m_transfers.resize(offset + outputs.second.size());
for (size_t i = 0; i < offset; ++i)
m_transfers[i].m_key_image_request = false;
for (size_t i = 0; i < outputs.second.size(); ++i)
{
transfer_details td = outputs.second[i];
// skip those we've already imported, or which have different data
if (i + offset < original_size)
{
// compare the data used to create the key image below
const transfer_details &org_td = m_transfers[i + offset];
if (!org_td.m_key_image_known)
goto process;
#define CMPF(f) if (!(td.f == org_td.f)) goto process
CMPF(m_txid);
CMPF(m_key_image);
CMPF(m_internal_output_index);
#undef CMPF
if (!(get_transaction_prefix_hash(td.m_tx) == get_transaction_prefix_hash(org_td.m_tx)))
goto process;
// copy anyway, since the comparison does not include ancillary fields which may have changed
m_transfers[i + offset] = std::move(td);
continue;
}
process:
// the hot wallet wouldn't have known about key images (except if we already exported them)
cryptonote::keypair in_ephemeral;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(td.m_tx.vout.empty(), error::wallet_internal_error, "tx with no outputs at index " + boost::lexical_cast<std::string>(i + offset));
crypto::public_key tx_pub_key = get_tx_pub_key_from_received_outs(td);
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
const std::vector<crypto::public_key> additional_tx_pub_keys = get_additional_tx_pub_keys_from_extra(td.m_tx);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(td.m_tx.vout[td.m_internal_output_index].target.type() != typeid(cryptonote::txout_to_key),
error::wallet_internal_error, "Unsupported output type");
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
const crypto::public_key& out_key = boost::get<cryptonote::txout_to_key>(td.m_tx.vout[td.m_internal_output_index].target).key;
bool r = cryptonote::generate_key_image_helper(m_account.get_keys(), m_subaddresses, out_key, tx_pub_key, additional_tx_pub_keys, td.m_internal_output_index, in_ephemeral, td.m_key_image, m_account.get_device());
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!r, error::wallet_internal_error, "Failed to generate key image");
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
expand_subaddresses(td.m_subaddr_index);
td.m_key_image_known = true;
td.m_key_image_request = true;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
td.m_key_image_partial = false;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(in_ephemeral.pub != out_key,
error::wallet_internal_error, "key_image generated ephemeral public key not matched with output_key at index " + boost::lexical_cast<std::string>(i + offset));
m_key_images[td.m_key_image] = i + offset;
m_pub_keys[td.get_public_key()] = i + offset;
m_transfers[i + offset] = std::move(td);
}
return m_transfers.size();
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
size_t wallet2::import_outputs_from_str(const std::string &outputs_st)
{
PERF_TIMER(import_outputs_from_str);
std::string data = outputs_st;
const size_t magiclen = strlen(OUTPUT_EXPORT_FILE_MAGIC);
if (data.size() < magiclen || memcmp(data.data(), OUTPUT_EXPORT_FILE_MAGIC, magiclen))
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION(error::wallet_internal_error, std::string("Bad magic from outputs"));
}
try
{
PERF_TIMER(import_outputs_decrypt);
data = decrypt_with_view_secret_key(std::string(data, magiclen));
}
catch (const std::exception &e)
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION(error::wallet_internal_error, std::string("Failed to decrypt outputs: ") + e.what());
}
const size_t headerlen = 2 * sizeof(crypto::public_key);
if (data.size() < headerlen)
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION(error::wallet_internal_error, std::string("Bad data size for outputs"));
}
const crypto::public_key &public_spend_key = *(const crypto::public_key*)&data[0];
const crypto::public_key &public_view_key = *(const crypto::public_key*)&data[sizeof(crypto::public_key)];
const cryptonote::account_public_address &keys = get_account().get_keys().m_account_address;
if (public_spend_key != keys.m_spend_public_key || public_view_key != keys.m_view_public_key)
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION(error::wallet_internal_error, std::string("Outputs from are for a different account"));
}
size_t imported_outputs = 0;
try
{
std::string body(data, headerlen);
std::stringstream iss;
iss << body;
std::pair<size_t, std::vector<tools::wallet2::transfer_details>> outputs;
try
{
boost::archive::portable_binary_iarchive ar(iss);
ar >> outputs;
}
catch (...)
{
iss.str("");
iss << body;
boost::archive::binary_iarchive ar(iss);
ar >> outputs;
}
imported_outputs = import_outputs(outputs);
}
catch (const std::exception &e)
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION(error::wallet_internal_error, std::string("Failed to import outputs") + e.what());
}
return imported_outputs;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
crypto::public_key wallet2::get_multisig_signer_public_key(const crypto::secret_key &spend_skey) const
{
crypto::public_key pkey;
crypto::secret_key_to_public_key(get_multisig_blinded_secret_key(spend_skey), pkey);
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
return pkey;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
crypto::public_key wallet2::get_multisig_signer_public_key() const
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
{
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(m_multisig, "Wallet is not multisig");
crypto::public_key signer;
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(crypto::secret_key_to_public_key(get_account().get_keys().m_spend_secret_key, signer), "Failed to generate signer public key");
return signer;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
crypto::public_key wallet2::get_multisig_signing_public_key(const crypto::secret_key &msk) const
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
{
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(m_multisig, "Wallet is not multisig");
crypto::public_key pkey;
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(crypto::secret_key_to_public_key(msk, pkey), "Failed to derive public key");
return pkey;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
crypto::public_key wallet2::get_multisig_signing_public_key(size_t idx) const
{
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(m_multisig, "Wallet is not multisig");
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(idx < get_account().get_multisig_keys().size(), "Multisig signing key index out of range");
return get_multisig_signing_public_key(get_account().get_multisig_keys()[idx]);
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
rct::key wallet2::get_multisig_k(size_t idx, const std::unordered_set<rct::key> &used_L) const
{
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(m_multisig, "Wallet is not multisig");
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(idx < m_transfers.size(), "idx out of range");
for (const auto &k: m_transfers[idx].m_multisig_k)
{
rct::key L;
rct::scalarmultBase(L, k);
if (used_L.find(L) != used_L.end())
return k;
}
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION(tools::error::multisig_export_needed);
return rct::zero();
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
rct::multisig_kLRki wallet2::get_multisig_kLRki(size_t n, const rct::key &k) const
{
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(n < m_transfers.size(), "Bad m_transfers index");
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
rct::multisig_kLRki kLRki;
kLRki.k = k;
cryptonote::generate_multisig_LR(m_transfers[n].get_public_key(), rct::rct2sk(kLRki.k), (crypto::public_key&)kLRki.L, (crypto::public_key&)kLRki.R);
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
kLRki.ki = rct::ki2rct(m_transfers[n].m_key_image);
return kLRki;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
rct::multisig_kLRki wallet2::get_multisig_composite_kLRki(size_t n, const std::unordered_set<crypto::public_key> &ignore_set, std::unordered_set<rct::key> &used_L, std::unordered_set<rct::key> &new_used_L) const
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
{
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(n < m_transfers.size(), "Bad transfer index");
const transfer_details &td = m_transfers[n];
rct::multisig_kLRki kLRki = get_multisig_kLRki(n, rct::skGen());
// pick a L/R pair from every other participant but one
size_t n_signers_used = 1;
for (const auto &p: m_transfers[n].m_multisig_info)
{
if (ignore_set.find(p.m_signer) != ignore_set.end())
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
continue;
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
for (const auto &lr: p.m_LR)
{
if (used_L.find(lr.m_L) != used_L.end())
continue;
used_L.insert(lr.m_L);
new_used_L.insert(lr.m_L);
rct::addKeys(kLRki.L, kLRki.L, lr.m_L);
rct::addKeys(kLRki.R, kLRki.R, lr.m_R);
++n_signers_used;
break;
}
}
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(n_signers_used >= m_multisig_threshold, "LR not found for enough participants");
return kLRki;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
crypto::key_image wallet2::get_multisig_composite_key_image(size_t n) const
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
{
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(n < m_transfers.size(), "Bad output index");
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
const transfer_details &td = m_transfers[n];
const crypto::public_key tx_key = get_tx_pub_key_from_received_outs(td);
const std::vector<crypto::public_key> additional_tx_keys = cryptonote::get_additional_tx_pub_keys_from_extra(td.m_tx);
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
crypto::key_image ki;
std::vector<crypto::key_image> pkis;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
for (const auto &info: td.m_multisig_info)
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
for (const auto &pki: info.m_partial_key_images)
pkis.push_back(pki);
bool r = cryptonote::generate_multisig_composite_key_image(get_account().get_keys(), m_subaddresses, td.get_public_key(), tx_key, additional_tx_keys, td.m_internal_output_index, pkis, ki);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!r, error::wallet_internal_error, "Failed to generate key image");
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
return ki;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
cryptonote::blobdata wallet2::export_multisig()
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
{
std::vector<tools::wallet2::multisig_info> info;
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
const crypto::public_key signer = get_multisig_signer_public_key();
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
info.resize(m_transfers.size());
for (size_t n = 0; n < m_transfers.size(); ++n)
{
transfer_details &td = m_transfers[n];
crypto::key_image ki;
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
td.m_multisig_k.clear();
info[n].m_LR.clear();
info[n].m_partial_key_images.clear();
for (size_t m = 0; m < get_account().get_multisig_keys().size(); ++m)
{
// we want to export the partial key image, not the full one, so we can't use td.m_key_image
bool r = generate_multisig_key_image(get_account().get_keys(), m, td.get_public_key(), ki);
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(r, "Failed to generate key image");
info[n].m_partial_key_images.push_back(ki);
}
// Wallet tries to create as many transactions as many signers combinations. We calculate the maximum number here as follows:
// if we have 2/4 wallet with signers: A, B, C, D and A is a transaction creator it will need to pick up 1 signer from 3 wallets left.
// That means counting combinations for excluding 2-of-3 wallets (k = total signers count - threshold, n = total signers count - 1).
size_t nlr = tools::combinations_count(m_multisig_signers.size() - m_multisig_threshold, m_multisig_signers.size() - 1);
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
for (size_t m = 0; m < nlr; ++m)
{
td.m_multisig_k.push_back(rct::skGen());
const rct::multisig_kLRki kLRki = get_multisig_kLRki(n, td.m_multisig_k.back());
info[n].m_LR.push_back({kLRki.L, kLRki.R});
}
info[n].m_signer = signer;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
}
std::stringstream oss;
boost::archive::portable_binary_oarchive ar(oss);
ar << info;
const cryptonote::account_public_address &keys = get_account().get_keys().m_account_address;
std::string header;
header += std::string((const char *)&keys.m_spend_public_key, sizeof(crypto::public_key));
header += std::string((const char *)&keys.m_view_public_key, sizeof(crypto::public_key));
header += std::string((const char *)&signer, sizeof(crypto::public_key));
std::string ciphertext = encrypt_with_view_secret_key(header + oss.str());
return MULTISIG_EXPORT_FILE_MAGIC + ciphertext;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
void wallet2::update_multisig_rescan_info(const std::vector<std::vector<rct::key>> &multisig_k, const std::vector<std::vector<tools::wallet2::multisig_info>> &info, size_t n)
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
{
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(n < m_transfers.size(), "Bad index in update_multisig_info");
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(multisig_k.size() >= m_transfers.size(), "Mismatched sizes of multisig_k and info");
MDEBUG("update_multisig_rescan_info: updating index " << n);
transfer_details &td = m_transfers[n];
td.m_multisig_info.clear();
for (const auto &pi: info)
{
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(n < pi.size(), "Bad pi size");
td.m_multisig_info.push_back(pi[n]);
}
m_key_images.erase(td.m_key_image);
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
td.m_key_image = get_multisig_composite_key_image(n);
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
td.m_key_image_known = true;
td.m_key_image_request = false;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
td.m_key_image_partial = false;
td.m_multisig_k = multisig_k[n];
m_key_images[td.m_key_image] = n;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
size_t wallet2::import_multisig(std::vector<cryptonote::blobdata> blobs)
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
{
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(m_multisig, "Wallet is not multisig");
std::vector<std::vector<tools::wallet2::multisig_info>> info;
std::unordered_set<crypto::public_key> seen;
for (cryptonote::blobdata &data: blobs)
{
const size_t magiclen = strlen(MULTISIG_EXPORT_FILE_MAGIC);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(data.size() < magiclen || memcmp(data.data(), MULTISIG_EXPORT_FILE_MAGIC, magiclen),
error::wallet_internal_error, "Bad multisig info file magic in ");
data = decrypt_with_view_secret_key(std::string(data, magiclen));
const size_t headerlen = 3 * sizeof(crypto::public_key);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(data.size() < headerlen, error::wallet_internal_error, "Bad data size");
const crypto::public_key &public_spend_key = *(const crypto::public_key*)&data[0];
const crypto::public_key &public_view_key = *(const crypto::public_key*)&data[sizeof(crypto::public_key)];
const crypto::public_key &signer = *(const crypto::public_key*)&data[2*sizeof(crypto::public_key)];
const cryptonote::account_public_address &keys = get_account().get_keys().m_account_address;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(public_spend_key != keys.m_spend_public_key || public_view_key != keys.m_view_public_key,
error::wallet_internal_error, "Multisig info is for a different account");
if (get_multisig_signer_public_key() == signer)
{
MINFO("Multisig info from this wallet ignored");
continue;
}
if (seen.find(signer) != seen.end())
{
MINFO("Duplicate multisig info ignored");
continue;
}
seen.insert(signer);
std::string body(data, headerlen);
std::istringstream iss(body);
std::vector<tools::wallet2::multisig_info> i;
boost::archive::portable_binary_iarchive ar(iss);
ar >> i;
MINFO(boost::format("%u outputs found") % boost::lexical_cast<std::string>(i.size()));
info.push_back(std::move(i));
}
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(info.size() + 1 <= m_multisig_signers.size() && info.size() + 1 >= m_multisig_threshold, "Wrong number of multisig sources");
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
std::vector<std::vector<rct::key>> k;
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
k.reserve(m_transfers.size());
for (const auto &td: m_transfers)
k.push_back(td.m_multisig_k);
// how many outputs we're going to update
size_t n_outputs = m_transfers.size();
for (const auto &pi: info)
if (pi.size() < n_outputs)
n_outputs = pi.size();
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
if (n_outputs == 0)
return 0;
// check signers are consistent
for (const auto &pi: info)
{
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(std::find(m_multisig_signers.begin(), m_multisig_signers.end(), pi[0].m_signer) != m_multisig_signers.end(),
"Signer is not a member of this multisig wallet");
for (size_t n = 1; n < n_outputs; ++n)
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(pi[n].m_signer == pi[0].m_signer, "Mismatched signers in imported multisig info");
}
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
// trim data we don't have info for from all participants
for (auto &pi: info)
pi.resize(n_outputs);
2017-08-13 16:29:31 +02:00
// sort by signer
if (!info.empty() && !info.front().empty())
{
std::sort(info.begin(), info.end(), [](const std::vector<tools::wallet2::multisig_info> &i0, const std::vector<tools::wallet2::multisig_info> &i1){ return memcmp(&i0[0].m_signer, &i1[0].m_signer, sizeof(i0[0].m_signer)); });
}
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
// first pass to determine where to detach the blockchain
for (size_t n = 0; n < n_outputs; ++n)
{
const transfer_details &td = m_transfers[n];
if (!td.m_key_image_partial)
continue;
MINFO("Multisig info importing from block height " << td.m_block_height);
detach_blockchain(td.m_block_height);
break;
}
for (size_t n = 0; n < n_outputs && n < m_transfers.size(); ++n)
{
update_multisig_rescan_info(k, info, n);
}
m_multisig_rescan_k = &k;
m_multisig_rescan_info = &info;
try
{
refresh(false);
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
}
catch (...)
{
m_multisig_rescan_info = NULL;
m_multisig_rescan_k = NULL;
throw;
}
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing Scheme by luigi1111: Multisig for RingCT on Monero 2 of 2 User A (coordinator): Spendkey b,B Viewkey a,A (shared) User B: Spendkey c,C Viewkey a,A (shared) Public Address: C+B, A Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants) A and B watch for incoming outputs B creates "half" key images for discovered output D: I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D) B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D), and sending the pubkeys with I2_D. A also creates "half" key images: I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D) Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction). A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R). At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r, which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo). B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well). B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well. NOTE: A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively. Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible: A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B. B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A. The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time! The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature). 2 of 3 User A (coordinator) Shared viewkey a,A "spendkey" j,J User B "spendkey" k,K User C "spendkey" m,M A collects K and M from B and C B collects J and M from A and C C collects J and K from A and B A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK) A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM) B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK) B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate Address: N+O+P, A The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two. Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties: A gives j to B B gives k to C C gives m to A Address: J+K+M, A 3 of 3 Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others. The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it or send it back to A. N-1 of N Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around (using either the secure or insecure method). For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up): [4 of 5] User: spendkey A: a B: b C: c D: d E: e a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys. Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each. Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning: 1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image) 2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use. You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format. You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc. The process is somewhat cumbersome: To create a N/N multisig wallet: - each participant creates a normal wallet - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N) As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent: - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants Then, a transaction may be initiated: - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT" - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file - the initiator sends this file to another participant - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx" - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-06-03 23:34:26 +02:00
m_multisig_rescan_info = NULL;
m_multisig_rescan_k = NULL;
return n_outputs;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
std::string wallet2::encrypt(const char *plaintext, size_t len, const crypto::secret_key &skey, bool authenticated) const
{
crypto::chacha_key key;
crypto::generate_chacha_key(&skey, sizeof(skey), key, m_kdf_rounds);
std::string ciphertext;
crypto::chacha_iv iv = crypto::rand<crypto::chacha_iv>();
ciphertext.resize(len + sizeof(iv) + (authenticated ? sizeof(crypto::signature) : 0));
crypto::chacha20(plaintext, len, key, iv, &ciphertext[sizeof(iv)]);
memcpy(&ciphertext[0], &iv, sizeof(iv));
if (authenticated)
{
crypto::hash hash;
crypto::cn_fast_hash(ciphertext.data(), ciphertext.size() - sizeof(signature), hash);
crypto::public_key pkey;
crypto::secret_key_to_public_key(skey, pkey);
crypto::signature &signature = *(crypto::signature*)&ciphertext[ciphertext.size() - sizeof(crypto::signature)];
crypto::generate_signature(hash, pkey, skey, signature);
}
return ciphertext;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
std::string wallet2::encrypt(const epee::span<char> &plaintext, const crypto::secret_key &skey, bool authenticated) const
{
return encrypt(plaintext.data(), plaintext.size(), skey, authenticated);
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
std::string wallet2::encrypt(const std::string &plaintext, const crypto::secret_key &skey, bool authenticated) const
{
return encrypt(plaintext.data(), plaintext.size(), skey, authenticated);
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
std::string wallet2::encrypt(const epee::wipeable_string &plaintext, const crypto::secret_key &skey, bool authenticated) const
{
return encrypt(plaintext.data(), plaintext.size(), skey, authenticated);
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
std::string wallet2::encrypt_with_view_secret_key(const std::string &plaintext, bool authenticated) const
{
return encrypt(plaintext, get_account().get_keys().m_view_secret_key, authenticated);
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
template<typename T>
T wallet2::decrypt(const std::string &ciphertext, const crypto::secret_key &skey, bool authenticated) const
{
const size_t prefix_size = sizeof(chacha_iv) + (authenticated ? sizeof(crypto::signature) : 0);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(ciphertext.size() < prefix_size,
error::wallet_internal_error, "Unexpected ciphertext size");
crypto::chacha_key key;
crypto::generate_chacha_key(&skey, sizeof(skey), key, m_kdf_rounds);
const crypto::chacha_iv &iv = *(const crypto::chacha_iv*)&ciphertext[0];
if (authenticated)
{
crypto::hash hash;
crypto::cn_fast_hash(ciphertext.data(), ciphertext.size() - sizeof(signature), hash);
crypto::public_key pkey;
crypto::secret_key_to_public_key(skey, pkey);
const crypto::signature &signature = *(const crypto::signature*)&ciphertext[ciphertext.size() - sizeof(crypto::signature)];
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!crypto::check_signature(hash, pkey, signature),
error::wallet_internal_error, "Failed to authenticate ciphertext");
}
std::unique_ptr<char[]> buffer{new char[ciphertext.size() - prefix_size]};
auto wiper = epee::misc_utils::create_scope_leave_handler([&]() { memwipe(buffer.get(), ciphertext.size() - prefix_size); });
crypto::chacha20(ciphertext.data() + sizeof(iv), ciphertext.size() - prefix_size, key, iv, buffer.get());
return T(buffer.get(), ciphertext.size() - prefix_size);
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
template epee::wipeable_string wallet2::decrypt(const std::string &ciphertext, const crypto::secret_key &skey, bool authenticated) const;
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
std::string wallet2::decrypt_with_view_secret_key(const std::string &ciphertext, bool authenticated) const
{
return decrypt(ciphertext, get_account().get_keys().m_view_secret_key, authenticated);
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
std::string wallet2::make_uri(const std::string &address, const std::string &payment_id, uint64_t amount, const std::string &tx_description, const std::string &recipient_name, std::string &error) const
{
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
cryptonote::address_parse_info info;
2018-02-16 12:04:04 +01:00
if(!get_account_address_from_str(info, nettype(), address))
{
error = std::string("wrong address: ") + address;
return std::string();
}
// we want only one payment id
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
if (info.has_payment_id && !payment_id.empty())
{
error = "A single payment id is allowed";
return std::string();
}
if (!payment_id.empty())
{
crypto::hash pid32;
crypto::hash8 pid8;
if (!wallet2::parse_long_payment_id(payment_id, pid32) && !wallet2::parse_short_payment_id(payment_id, pid8))
{
error = "Invalid payment id";
return std::string();
}
}
std::string uri = "monero:" + address;
unsigned int n_fields = 0;
if (!payment_id.empty())
{
uri += (n_fields++ ? "&" : "?") + std::string("tx_payment_id=") + payment_id;
}
if (amount > 0)
{
// URI encoded amount is in decimal units, not atomic units
uri += (n_fields++ ? "&" : "?") + std::string("tx_amount=") + cryptonote::print_money(amount);
}
if (!recipient_name.empty())
{
uri += (n_fields++ ? "&" : "?") + std::string("recipient_name=") + epee::net_utils::conver_to_url_format(recipient_name);
}
if (!tx_description.empty())
{
uri += (n_fields++ ? "&" : "?") + std::string("tx_description=") + epee::net_utils::conver_to_url_format(tx_description);
}
return uri;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
bool wallet2::parse_uri(const std::string &uri, std::string &address, std::string &payment_id, uint64_t &amount, std::string &tx_description, std::string &recipient_name, std::vector<std::string> &unknown_parameters, std::string &error)
{
if (uri.substr(0, 7) != "monero:")
{
error = std::string("URI has wrong scheme (expected \"monero:\"): ") + uri;
return false;
}
std::string remainder = uri.substr(7);
const char *ptr = strchr(remainder.c_str(), '?');
address = ptr ? remainder.substr(0, ptr-remainder.c_str()) : remainder;
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
cryptonote::address_parse_info info;
2018-02-16 12:04:04 +01:00
if(!get_account_address_from_str(info, nettype(), address))
{
error = std::string("URI has wrong address: ") + address;
return false;
}
if (!strchr(remainder.c_str(), '?'))
return true;
std::vector<std::string> arguments;
std::string body = remainder.substr(address.size() + 1);
if (body.empty())
return true;
boost::split(arguments, body, boost::is_any_of("&"));
std::set<std::string> have_arg;
for (const auto &arg: arguments)
{
std::vector<std::string> kv;
boost::split(kv, arg, boost::is_any_of("="));
if (kv.size() != 2)
{
error = std::string("URI has wrong parameter: ") + arg;
return false;
}
if (have_arg.find(kv[0]) != have_arg.end())
{
error = std::string("URI has more than one instance of " + kv[0]);
return false;
}
have_arg.insert(kv[0]);
if (kv[0] == "tx_amount")
{
amount = 0;
if (!cryptonote::parse_amount(amount, kv[1]))
{
error = std::string("URI has invalid amount: ") + kv[1];
return false;
}
}
else if (kv[0] == "tx_payment_id")
{
2017-02-19 03:42:10 +01:00
if (info.has_payment_id)
{
error = "Separate payment id given with an integrated address";
return false;
}
crypto::hash hash;
crypto::hash8 hash8;
if (!wallet2::parse_long_payment_id(kv[1], hash) && !wallet2::parse_short_payment_id(kv[1], hash8))
{
error = "Invalid payment id: " + kv[1];
return false;
}
payment_id = kv[1];
}
else if (kv[0] == "recipient_name")
{
recipient_name = epee::net_utils::convert_from_url_format(kv[1]);
}
else if (kv[0] == "tx_description")
{
tx_description = epee::net_utils::convert_from_url_format(kv[1]);
}
else
{
unknown_parameters.push_back(arg);
}
}
return true;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
uint64_t wallet2::get_blockchain_height_by_date(uint16_t year, uint8_t month, uint8_t day)
{
uint32_t version;
if (!check_connection(&version))
{
throw std::runtime_error("failed to connect to daemon: " + get_daemon_address());
}
if (version < MAKE_CORE_RPC_VERSION(1, 6))
{
throw std::runtime_error("this function requires RPC version 1.6 or higher");
}
std::tm date = { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 };
date.tm_year = year - 1900;
date.tm_mon = month - 1;
date.tm_mday = day;
if (date.tm_mon < 0 || 11 < date.tm_mon || date.tm_mday < 1 || 31 < date.tm_mday)
{
throw std::runtime_error("month or day out of range");
}
uint64_t timestamp_target = std::mktime(&date);
std::string err;
uint64_t height_min = 0;
uint64_t height_max = get_daemon_blockchain_height(err) - 1;
if (!err.empty())
{
throw std::runtime_error("failed to get blockchain height");
}
while (true)
{
COMMAND_RPC_GET_BLOCKS_BY_HEIGHT::request req;
COMMAND_RPC_GET_BLOCKS_BY_HEIGHT::response res;
uint64_t height_mid = (height_min + height_max) / 2;
req.heights =
{
height_min,
height_mid,
height_max
};
bool r = net_utils::invoke_http_bin("/getblocks_by_height.bin", req, res, m_http_client, rpc_timeout);
if (!r || res.status != CORE_RPC_STATUS_OK)
{
std::ostringstream oss;
oss << "failed to get blocks by heights: ";
for (auto height : req.heights)
oss << height << ' ';
oss << endl << "reason: ";
if (!r)
oss << "possibly lost connection to daemon";
else if (res.status == CORE_RPC_STATUS_BUSY)
oss << "daemon is busy";
else
oss << get_rpc_status(res.status);
throw std::runtime_error(oss.str());
}
cryptonote::block blk_min, blk_mid, blk_max;
if (res.blocks.size() < 3) throw std::runtime_error("Not enough blocks returned from daemon");
if (!parse_and_validate_block_from_blob(res.blocks[0].block, blk_min)) throw std::runtime_error("failed to parse blob at height " + std::to_string(height_min));
if (!parse_and_validate_block_from_blob(res.blocks[1].block, blk_mid)) throw std::runtime_error("failed to parse blob at height " + std::to_string(height_mid));
if (!parse_and_validate_block_from_blob(res.blocks[2].block, blk_max)) throw std::runtime_error("failed to parse blob at height " + std::to_string(height_max));
uint64_t timestamp_min = blk_min.timestamp;
uint64_t timestamp_mid = blk_mid.timestamp;
uint64_t timestamp_max = blk_max.timestamp;
if (!(timestamp_min <= timestamp_mid && timestamp_mid <= timestamp_max))
{
// the timestamps are not in the chronological order.
// assuming they're sufficiently close to each other, simply return the smallest height
return std::min({height_min, height_mid, height_max});
}
if (timestamp_target > timestamp_max)
{
throw std::runtime_error("specified date is in the future");
}
if (timestamp_target <= timestamp_min + 2 * 24 * 60 * 60) // two days of "buffer" period
{
return height_min;
}
if (timestamp_target <= timestamp_mid)
height_max = height_mid;
else
height_min = height_mid;
if (height_max - height_min <= 2 * 24 * 30) // don't divide the height range finer than two days
{
return height_min;
}
}
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2017-08-02 15:44:19 +02:00
bool wallet2::is_synced() const
{
uint64_t height;
boost::optional<std::string> result = m_node_rpc_proxy.get_target_height(height);
if (result && *result != CORE_RPC_STATUS_OK)
return false;
return get_blockchain_current_height() >= height;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
std::vector<std::pair<uint64_t, uint64_t>> wallet2::estimate_backlog(const std::vector<std::pair<double, double>> &fee_levels)
{
for (const auto &fee_level: fee_levels)
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(fee_level.first == 0.0, error::wallet_internal_error, "Invalid 0 fee");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(fee_level.second == 0.0, error::wallet_internal_error, "Invalid 0 fee");
}
// get txpool backlog
cryptonote::COMMAND_RPC_GET_TRANSACTION_POOL_BACKLOG::request req = AUTO_VAL_INIT(req);
cryptonote::COMMAND_RPC_GET_TRANSACTION_POOL_BACKLOG::response res = AUTO_VAL_INIT(res);
m_daemon_rpc_mutex.lock();
bool r = net_utils::invoke_http_json_rpc("/json_rpc", "get_txpool_backlog", req, res, m_http_client, rpc_timeout);
m_daemon_rpc_mutex.unlock();
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!r, error::no_connection_to_daemon, "Failed to connect to daemon");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(res.status == CORE_RPC_STATUS_BUSY, error::daemon_busy, "get_txpool_backlog");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(res.status != CORE_RPC_STATUS_OK, error::get_tx_pool_error);
uint64_t block_weight_limit = 0;
const auto result = m_node_rpc_proxy.get_block_weight_limit(block_weight_limit);
throw_on_rpc_response_error(result, "get_info");
uint64_t full_reward_zone = block_weight_limit / 2;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(full_reward_zone == 0, error::wallet_internal_error, "Invalid block weight limit from daemon");
std::vector<std::pair<uint64_t, uint64_t>> blocks;
for (const auto &fee_level: fee_levels)
{
const double our_fee_byte_min = fee_level.first;
const double our_fee_byte_max = fee_level.second;
uint64_t priority_weight_min = 0, priority_weight_max = 0;
for (const auto &i: res.backlog)
{
if (i.weight == 0)
{
MWARNING("Got 0 weight tx from txpool, ignored");
continue;
}
double this_fee_byte = i.fee / (double)i.weight;
if (this_fee_byte >= our_fee_byte_min)
priority_weight_min += i.weight;
if (this_fee_byte >= our_fee_byte_max)
priority_weight_max += i.weight;
}
uint64_t nblocks_min = priority_weight_min / full_reward_zone;
uint64_t nblocks_max = priority_weight_max / full_reward_zone;
MDEBUG("estimate_backlog: priority_weight " << priority_weight_min << " - " << priority_weight_max << " for "
<< our_fee_byte_min << " - " << our_fee_byte_max << " piconero byte fee, "
<< nblocks_min << " - " << nblocks_max << " blocks at block weight " << full_reward_zone);
blocks.push_back(std::make_pair(nblocks_min, nblocks_max));
}
return blocks;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
std::vector<std::pair<uint64_t, uint64_t>> wallet2::estimate_backlog(uint64_t min_tx_weight, uint64_t max_tx_weight, const std::vector<uint64_t> &fees)
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(min_tx_weight == 0, error::wallet_internal_error, "Invalid 0 fee");
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(max_tx_weight == 0, error::wallet_internal_error, "Invalid 0 fee");
for (uint64_t fee: fees)
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(fee == 0, error::wallet_internal_error, "Invalid 0 fee");
}
std::vector<std::pair<double, double>> fee_levels;
for (uint64_t fee: fees)
{
double our_fee_byte_min = fee / (double)min_tx_weight, our_fee_byte_max = fee / (double)max_tx_weight;
fee_levels.emplace_back(our_fee_byte_min, our_fee_byte_max);
}
return estimate_backlog(fee_levels);
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
uint64_t wallet2::get_segregation_fork_height() const
{
if (m_nettype == TESTNET)
return TESTNET_SEGREGATION_FORK_HEIGHT;
if (m_nettype == STAGENET)
return STAGENET_SEGREGATION_FORK_HEIGHT;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(m_nettype != MAINNET, tools::error::wallet_internal_error, "Invalid network type");
if (m_segregation_height > 0)
return m_segregation_height;
static const bool use_dns = true;
if (use_dns)
{
// All four MoneroPulse domains have DNSSEC on and valid
static const std::vector<std::string> dns_urls = {
"segheights.moneropulse.org",
"segheights.moneropulse.net",
"segheights.moneropulse.co",
"segheights.moneropulse.se"
};
const uint64_t current_height = get_blockchain_current_height();
uint64_t best_diff = std::numeric_limits<uint64_t>::max(), best_height = 0;
std::vector<std::string> records;
if (tools::dns_utils::load_txt_records_from_dns(records, dns_urls))
{
for (const auto& record : records)
{
std::vector<std::string> fields;
boost::split(fields, record, boost::is_any_of(":"));
if (fields.size() != 2)
continue;
uint64_t height;
if (!string_tools::get_xtype_from_string(height, fields[1]))
continue;
MINFO("Found segregation height via DNS: " << fields[0] << " fork height at " << height);
uint64_t diff = height > current_height ? height - current_height : current_height - height;
if (diff < best_diff)
{
best_diff = diff;
best_height = height;
}
}
if (best_height)
return best_height;
}
}
return SEGREGATION_FORK_HEIGHT;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
void wallet2::generate_genesis(cryptonote::block& b) const {
cryptonote::generate_genesis_block(b, get_config(m_nettype).GENESIS_TX, get_config(m_nettype).GENESIS_NONCE);
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
mms::multisig_wallet_state wallet2::get_multisig_wallet_state() const
{
mms::multisig_wallet_state state;
state.nettype = m_nettype;
state.multisig = multisig(&state.multisig_is_ready);
state.has_multisig_partial_key_images = has_multisig_partial_key_images();
state.multisig_rounds_passed = m_multisig_rounds_passed;
state.num_transfer_details = m_transfers.size();
if (state.multisig)
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(!m_original_keys_available, error::wallet_internal_error, "MMS use not possible because own original Monero address not available");
state.address = m_original_address;
state.view_secret_key = m_original_view_secret_key;
}
else
{
state.address = m_account.get_keys().m_account_address;
state.view_secret_key = m_account.get_keys().m_view_secret_key;
}
state.mms_file=m_mms_file;
return state;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
wallet_device_callback * wallet2::get_device_callback()
{
if (!m_device_callback){
m_device_callback.reset(new wallet_device_callback(this));
}
return m_device_callback.get();
}//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
void wallet2::on_device_button_request(uint64_t code)
{
if (nullptr != m_callback)
m_callback->on_device_button_request(code);
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
boost::optional<epee::wipeable_string> wallet2::on_device_pin_request()
{
if (nullptr != m_callback)
return m_callback->on_device_pin_request();
return boost::none;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
boost::optional<epee::wipeable_string> wallet2::on_device_passphrase_request(bool on_device)
{
if (nullptr != m_callback)
return m_callback->on_device_passphrase_request(on_device);
return boost::none;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
void wallet2::on_device_progress(const hw::device_progress& event)
{
if (nullptr != m_callback)
m_callback->on_device_progress(event);
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
std::string wallet2::get_rpc_status(const std::string &s) const
{
if (m_trusted_daemon)
return s;
return "<error>";
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
void wallet2::throw_on_rpc_response_error(const boost::optional<std::string> &status, const char *method) const
{
// no error
if (!status)
return;
MERROR("RPC error: " << method << ": status " << *status);
// empty string -> not connection
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(status->empty(), tools::error::no_connection_to_daemon, method);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(*status == CORE_RPC_STATUS_BUSY, tools::error::daemon_busy, method);
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(*status != CORE_RPC_STATUS_OK, tools::error::wallet_generic_rpc_error, method, m_trusted_daemon ? *status : "daemon error");
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
void wallet2::hash_m_transfer(const transfer_details & transfer, crypto::hash &hash) const
{
KECCAK_CTX state;
keccak_init(&state);
keccak_update(&state, (const uint8_t *) transfer.m_txid.data, sizeof(transfer.m_txid.data));
keccak_update(&state, (const uint8_t *) transfer.m_internal_output_index, sizeof(transfer.m_internal_output_index));
keccak_update(&state, (const uint8_t *) transfer.m_global_output_index, sizeof(transfer.m_global_output_index));
keccak_update(&state, (const uint8_t *) transfer.m_amount, sizeof(transfer.m_amount));
keccak_finish(&state, (uint8_t *) hash.data);
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
uint64_t wallet2::hash_m_transfers(int64_t transfer_height, crypto::hash &hash) const
{
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(transfer_height > (int64_t)m_transfers.size(), "Hash height is greater than number of transfers");
KECCAK_CTX state;
crypto::hash tmp_hash{};
uint64_t current_height = 0;
keccak_init(&state);
for(const transfer_details & transfer : m_transfers){
if (transfer_height >= 0 && current_height >= (uint64_t)transfer_height){
break;
}
hash_m_transfer(transfer, tmp_hash);
keccak_update(&state, (const uint8_t *) transfer.m_block_height, sizeof(transfer.m_block_height));
keccak_update(&state, (const uint8_t *) tmp_hash.data, sizeof(tmp_hash.data));
current_height += 1;
}
keccak_finish(&state, (uint8_t *) hash.data);
return current_height;
}
//----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
void wallet2::finish_rescan_bc_keep_key_images(uint64_t transfer_height, const crypto::hash &hash)
{
// Compute hash of m_transfers, if differs there had to be BC reorg.
crypto::hash new_transfers_hash{};
hash_m_transfers((int64_t) transfer_height, new_transfers_hash);
if (new_transfers_hash != hash)
{
// Soft-Reset to avoid inconsistency in case of BC reorg.
clear_soft(false); // keep_key_images works only with soft reset.
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(true, error::wallet_internal_error, "Transfers changed during rescan, soft or hard rescan is needed");
}
// Restore key images in m_transfers from m_key_images
for(auto it = m_key_images.begin(); it != m_key_images.end(); it++)
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF(it->second >= m_transfers.size(), error::wallet_internal_error, "Key images cache contains illegal transfer offset");
m_transfers[it->second].m_key_image = it->first;
m_transfers[it->second].m_key_image_known = true;
}
}
2014-03-03 23:07:58 +01:00
}