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Whenever we rotate our TLS context, we change our Ed25519 Signing->Link certificate. But if we've already started a TLS connection, then we've already sent the old X509 link certificate, so the new Ed25519 Signing->Link certificate won't match it. To fix this, we now store a copy of the Signing->Link certificate when we initialize the handshake state, and send that certificate as part of our CERTS cell. Fixes one case of bug22460; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha.
17 lines
875 B
Plaintext
17 lines
875 B
Plaintext
o Major bugfixes (relays, key management):
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- Regenerate link and authentication certificates whenever the key that
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signs them changes; also, regenerate link certificates whenever the
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signed key changes. Previously, these processes were only weakly
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coupled, and we relays could (for minutes to hours) wind up with an
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inconsistent set of keys and certificates, which other relays
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would not accept. Fixes two cases of bug 22460; bugfix on
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0.3.0.1-alpha.
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- When sending an Ed25519 signing->link certificate in a CERTS cell,
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send the certificate that matches the x509 certificate that we used
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on the TLS connection. Previously, there was a race condition if
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the TLS context rotated after we began the TLS handshake but
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before we sent the CERTS cell. Fixes a case of bug 22460; bugfix
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on 0.3.0.1-alpha.
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