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3dfb943d1f
Remove some completed items from the TODO. svn:r11937
520 lines
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520 lines
24 KiB
Plaintext
$Id$
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Legend:
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SPEC!! - Not specified
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SPEC - Spec not finalized
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N - nick claims
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R - arma claims
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P - phobos claims
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- Not done
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* Top priority
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. Partially done
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o Done
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d Deferrable
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D Deferred
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X Abandoned
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Things we'd like to do in 0.2.0.x:
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- See also Flyspray tasks.
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- See also all items marked XXXX020 and DOCDOC in the code
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- http://tor.eff.org/eff/legal-faq.html#License doesn't mention
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licenses for other components of the bundles.
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- Bugs.
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- Bug reports Roger has heard along that way that don't have enough
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details/attention to solve them yet.
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- tup said that when he set FetchUselessDescriptors, after
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24 or 48 hours he wasn't fetching any descriptors at all
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anymore. This was in 0.2.0 but worked fine in 0.1.2.
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- arma noticed that when his network went away and he tried
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a new guard node and the connect() syscall failed to it,
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the guard wasn't being marked as down. 0.2.0.x.
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- after being without network for 12 hours, arma's tor decided
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it couldn't fetch any network statuses, and never tried again
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even when the network came back and arma clicked on things.
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also 0.2.0.
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- phobos says relaybandwidth* sometimes don't do what we expect.
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http://interloper.org/tmp/2007-06-bw-usage.png
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- this notion of authorities notifying servers that they're
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unreachable is bunk -- it's leftover from the time when all
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servers ran 24/7. now it triggers every time a server goes
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away and then returns before the old descriptor has expired.
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- add a --quiet commandline option that suppresses logs. useful
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for --hashed-password and maybe others.
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- Tor logs the libevent version on startup, for debugging purposes.
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This is great. But it does this before configuring the logs, so
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it only goes to stdout and is then lost.
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- we should do another bandwidth test every 12 hours or something
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if we're showing less than 50KB and our bandwidthrate says we can
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do more than that. I think some servers are forgetting the results
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of their first test, and then never seeing use.
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- Proposals:
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. 101: Voting on the Tor Directory System (plus 103)
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. Finalize proposal
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* Describe schedule in copious detail.
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. Get authorities voting
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- While we're at it, let v3 authorities have fqdns lines.
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- Fix all XXXX020s in vote code
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. Validate information properly.
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- Dump certificates with the wrong time. Or just warn?
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- When checking a consensus, make sure that its times are plausible.
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. Start caching consensus documents once authorities make them;
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start downloading consensus documents once caches serve
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them
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- Code to delay next download while fetching certificates to verify
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a consensus we already got.
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- Code to retry consensus download if we got one we already have.
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- Use if-modified-since on consensus download
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- Use if-modified-since on certificate download
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- Enable for non-caches
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- Code to use v3 networkstatus documents once clients are
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fetching them
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- Implement
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- Enable
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- Controller support
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- GETINFO to get consensus
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- Event when new consensus arrives
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- 105: Version negotiation for the Tor protocol
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. 111: Prioritize local traffic over relayed.
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- Merge into tor-spec.txt.
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- Refactoring:
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. Make cells get buffered on circuit, not on the or_conn.
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. Switch to pool-allocation for cells?
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- Benchmark pool-allocation vs straightforward malloc.
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- Adjust memory allocation logic in pools to favor a little less
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slack memory.
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. Remove socketpair-based bridges conns, and the word "bridge". (Use
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shared (or connected) buffers for communication, rather than sockets.)
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. Implement
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- Handle rate-limiting on directory writes to linked directory
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connections in a more sensible manner.
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- Find more ways to test this.
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- Have clients do TLS connection rotation less often than "every 10
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minutes" in the thrashy case, and more often than "once a week" in the
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extra-stable case.
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- Streamline how we pick entry nodes: Make choose_random_entry() have
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less magic and less control logic.
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- Refactor networkstatus generation:
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- Include "v" line in getinfo values.
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- Bridges:
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. Bridges users (rudimentary version)
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o Ability to specify bridges manually
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o Config option 'UseBridges' that bridge users can turn on.
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o uses bridges as first hop rather than entry guards.
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o if you don't have any routerinfos for your bridges, or you don't
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like the ones you have, ask a new bridge for its server/authority.
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. Ask all directory questions to bridge via BEGIN_DIR.
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- use the bridges for dir fetches even when our dirport is open.
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R - drop 'authority' queries if they're to our own identity key; accept
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them otherwise.
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X Design/implement the "local-status" or something like it, from the
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"Descriptor purposes: how to tell them apart" section of
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http://archives.seul.org/or/dev/May-2007/msg00008.html
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o timeout and retry schedules for fetching bridge descriptors
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- give extend_info_t a router_purpose again
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o react faster to download networkstatuses after the first bridge
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descriptor arrives
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o be more robust to bridges being marked as down and leaving us
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stranded without any known "running" bridges.
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- Bridges operators (rudimentary version)
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- Ability to act as dir cache without a dir port.
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o Bridges publish to bridge authorities
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o Fix BEGIN_DIR so that you connect to bridge of which you only
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know IP (and optionally fingerprint), and then use BEGIN_DIR to learn
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more about it.
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- look at server_mode() and decide if it always applies to bridges too.
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- Bridges authorities (rudimentary version)
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o Rudimentary "do not publish networkstatus" option for bridge
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authorities.
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- Clients can ask bridge authorities for more bridges.
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- Bridges
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o Clients can ask bridge authorities for updates on known bridges.
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- More TLS normalization work: make Tor less easily
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fingerprinted.
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- Directory system improvements
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- Misc
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- Make BEGIN_DIR mandatory for asking questions of bridge authorities?
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- Features (other than bridges):
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- Blocking-resistance.
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- Write a proposal; make this part of 105.
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- Audit how much RAM we're using for buffers and cell pools; try to
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trim down a lot.
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- Base relative control socket paths on datadir.
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- We should ship with a list of stable dir mirrors -- they're not
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trusted like the authorities, but they'll provide more robustness
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and diversity for bootstrapping clients.
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- Better estimates in the directory of whether servers have good uptime
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(high expected time to failure) or good guard qualities (high
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fractional uptime).
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- AKA Track uptime as %-of-time-up, as well as time-since-last-down
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o Implement tracking
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- Make uptime info persist too.
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- Base Guard on weighted fractional uptime.
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- Make TrackHostExits expire TrackHostExitsExpire seconds after their
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*last* use, not their *first* use.
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- Limit to 2 dir, 2 OR, N SOCKS connections per IP.
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- Or maybe close connections from same IP when we get a lot from one.
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- Or maybe block IPs that connect too many times at once.
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- add an AuthDirBadexit torrc option if we decide we want one.
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- Testing
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N - Hack up a client that gives out weird/no certificates, so we can
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test to make sure that this doesn't cause servers to crash.
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- Deprecations:
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- can we deprecate 'getinfo network-status'?
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- can we deprecate the FastFirstHopPK config option?
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- Documentation
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- HOWTO for DNSPort.
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- Quietly document NT Service options
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- More prominently, we should have a recommended apps list.
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- recommend pidgin (gaim is renamed)
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- unrecommend IE because of ftp:// bug.
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- we should add a preamble to tor-design saying it's out of date.
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. Document transport and natdport in a good HOWTO.
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- Publicize torel. (What else?
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. Finish path-spec.txt
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P - Packaging:
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P - Can we switch to polipo? Please?
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P - Make documentation realize that location of system configuration file
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will depend on location of system defaults, and isn't always /etc/torrc.
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P - If we haven't replaced privoxy, lock down its configuration in all
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packages, as documented in tor-doc-unix.html
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P - Figure out why dll's compiled in mingw don't work right in WinXP.
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P - Create packages for Nokia 800, requested by Chris Soghoian
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P - Consider creating special Tor-Polipo-Vidalia test packages,
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requested by Dmitri Vitalev
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- Get Vidalia supporting protocolinfo and using auth by default.
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Nice-to-have items for 0.2.0.x, time permitting:
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- Proposals
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- 113: Simplifying directory authority administration
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- 110: prevent infinite-length circuits (phase one)
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. Robust decentralized storage for hidden service descriptors.
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(Karsten is working on this; proposal 114.)
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- 118: Listen on and advertise multiple ports:
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- Tor should be able to have a pool of outgoing IP addresses that it is
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able to rotate through. (maybe. Possible overlap with proposal 118.)
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- config option to publish what ports you listen on, beyond
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ORPort/DirPort. It should support ranges and bit prefixes (?) too.
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(This is very similar to proposal 118.)
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- 117: IPv6 Exits
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- Internal code support for ipv6:
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o Clone ipv6 functions (inet_ntop, inet_pton) where they don't exist.
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- Most address variables need to become tor_addr_t
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- Teach resolving code how to handle ipv6.
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- Teach exit policies about ipv6 (consider ipv4/ipv6 interaction!)
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- Features
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- Let controller set router flags for authority to transmit, and for
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client to use.
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- add an 'exit-address' line in the descriptor for servers that exit
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from something that isn't their published address.
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- Clients should estimate their skew as median of skew from servers
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over last N seconds.
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- More work on AvoidDiskWrites?
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- Protocol work
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- MAYBE kill stalled circuits rather than stalled connections. This is
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possible thanks to cell queues, but we need to consider the anonymity
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implications.
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- Implement TLS shutdown properly when possible.
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- Low-priority bugs:
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- we try to build 4 test circuits to break them over different
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servers. but sometimes our entry node is the same for multiple
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test circuits. this defeats the point.
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- If the client's clock is too far in the past, it will drop (or just not
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try to get) descriptors, so it'll never build circuits.
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- Refactoring:
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- Move all status info out of routerinfo into local_routerstatus. Make
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"who can change what" in local_routerstatus explicit. Make
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local_routerstatus (or equivalent) subsume all places to go for "what
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router is this?"
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- Build:
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- Detect correct version of libraries from autoconf script.
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- Documentation:
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- Review torrc.sample to make it more discursive.
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Deferred from 0.2.0.x:
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- Features
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- Make a TCP DNSPort
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- Refactoring
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- Make resolves no longer use edge_connection_t unless they are actually
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_on_ a socks connection: have edge_connection_t and (say)
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dns_request_t both extend an edge_stream_t, and have p_streams and
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n_streams both be linked lists of edge_stream_t.
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- Generate torrc.{complete|sample}.in, tor.1.in, the HTML manual, and the
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online config documentation from a single source.
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- Blocking/scanning-resistance
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- It would be potentially helpful to https requests on the OR port by
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acting like an HTTPS server.
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- Do we want to maintain our own set of entryguards that we use as
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next hop after the bridge? Open research question; let's say no
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for 0.2.0 unless we learn otherwise.
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- Should do reachability testing but only on the purpose==bridge
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descriptors we have.
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- Some mechanism for specifying that we want to stop using a cached
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bridge.
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Future versions:
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- See also Flyspray tasks.
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- See also all OPEN/ACCEPTED proposals.
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- See also all items marked XXXX and FFFF in the code.
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- Protocol:
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- Our current approach to block attempts to use Tor as a single-hop proxy
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is pretty lame; we should get a better one.
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- Allow small cells and large cells on the same network?
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- Cell buffering and resending. This will allow us to handle broken
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circuits as long as the endpoints don't break, plus will allow
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connection (tls session key) rotation.
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- Implement Morphmix, so we can compare its behavior, complexity,
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etc. But see paper breaking morphmix.
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- Other transport. HTTP, udp, rdp, airhook, etc. May have to do our own
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link crypto, unless we can bully DTLS into it.
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- Need a relay teardown cell, separate from one-way ends.
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(Pending a user who needs this)
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- Handle half-open connections: right now we don't support all TCP
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streams, at least according to the protocol. But we handle all that
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we've seen in the wild.
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(Pending a user who needs this)
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- Directory system
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- BEGIN_DIR items
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- turn the received socks addr:port into a digest for setting .exit
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- handle connect-dir streams that don't have a chosen_exit_name set.
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- Have a "Faster" status flag that means it. Fast2, Fast4, Fast8?
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- Add an option (related to AvoidDiskWrites) to disable directory
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caching. (Is this actually a good idea??)
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- Add d64 and fp64 along-side d and fp so people can paste status
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entries into a url. since + is a valid base64 char, only allow one
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at a time. Consider adding to controller as well.
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- Some back-out mechanism for auto-approval on authorities
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- a way of rolling back approvals to before a timestamp
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- Consider minion-like fingerprint file/log combination.
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- Have new people be in limbo and need to demonstrate usefulness
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before we approve them.
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- Hidden services:
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- Standby/hotswap/redundant hidden services.
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. Update the hidden service stuff for the new dir approach. (Much
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of this will be superseded by 114.)
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- switch to an ascii format, maybe sexpr?
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- authdirservers publish blobs of them.
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- other authdirservers fetch these blobs.
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- hidserv people have the option of not uploading their blobs.
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- you can insert a blob via the controller.
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- and there's some amount of backwards compatibility.
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- teach clients, intro points, and hidservs about auth mechanisms.
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- come up with a few more auth mechanisms.
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- auth mechanisms to let hidden service midpoint and responder filter
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connection requests.
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- Let each hidden service (or other thing) specify its own
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OutboundBindAddress?
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- Hidserv offerers shouldn't need to define a SocksPort
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- Server operation
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- When we notice a 'Rejected: There is already a named server with
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this nickname' message... or maybe instead when we see in the
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networkstatuses that somebody else is Named with the name we
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want: warn the user, send a STATUS_SERVER message, and fall back
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to unnamed.
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- If the server is spewing complaints about raising your ulimit -n,
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we should add a note about this to the server descriptor so other
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people can notice too.
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- When we hit a funny error from a dir request (eg 403 forbidden),
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but tor is working and happy otherwise, and we haven't seen many
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such errors recently, then don't warn about it.
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- Controller
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- A way to adjust router flags from the controller. (How do we
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prevent the authority from clobbering them soon afterward?)
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- Implement missing status events and accompanying getinfos
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- DIR_REACHABLE
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- BAD_DIR_RESPONSE (Unexpected directory response; maybe we're behind
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a firewall.)
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- BAD_PROXY (Bad http or https proxy)
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- UNRECOGNIZED_ROUTER (a nickname we asked for is unavailable)
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- Status events related to hibernation
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- something about failing to parse our address?
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from resolve_my_address() in config.c
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- sketchy OS, sketchy threading
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- too many onions queued: threading problems or slow CPU?
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- Implement missing status event fields:
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- TIMEOUT on CHECKING_REACHABILITY
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- GETINFO status/client, status/server, status/general: There should be
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some way to learn which status events are currently "in effect."
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We should specify which these are, what format they appear in, and so
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on.
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- More information in events:
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- Include bandwidth breakdown by conn->type in BW events.
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- Change circuit status events to give more details, like purpose,
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whether they're internal, when they become dirty, when they become
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too dirty for further circuits, etc.
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- Change stream status events analogously.
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- Expose more information via getinfo:
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- import and export rendezvous descriptors
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- Review all static fields for additional candidates
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- Allow EXTENDCIRCUIT to unknown server.
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- We need some way to adjust server status, and to tell tor not to
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download directories/network-status, and a way to force a download.
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- Make everything work with hidden services
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- Performance/resources
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- per-conn write buckets
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- separate config options for read vs write limiting
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(It's hard to support read > write, since we need better
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congestion control to avoid overfull buffers there. So,
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defer the whole thing.)
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- Investigate RAM use in directory authorities.
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- Look into pulling serverdescs off buffers as they arrive.
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- Rate limit exit connections to a given destination -- this helps
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us play nice with websites when Tor users want to crawl them; it
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also introduces DoS opportunities.
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- Consider truncating rather than destroying failed circuits,
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in order to save the effort of restarting. There are security
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issues here that need thinking, though.
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- Handle full buffers without totally borking
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- Rate-limit OR and directory connections overall and per-IP and
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maybe per subnet.
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- Misc
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- Hold-open-until-flushed now works by accident; it should work by
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design.
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- Display the reasons in 'destroy' and 'truncated' cells under
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some circumstances?
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- Make router_is_general_exit() a bit smarter once we're sure what
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it's for.
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- Automatically determine what ports are reachable and start using
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those, if circuits aren't working and it's a pattern we
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recognize ("port 443 worked once and port 9001 keeps not
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working").
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- Security
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- some better fix for bug #516?
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- don't do dns hijacking tests if we're reject *:* exit policy?
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(deferred until 0.1.1.x is less common)
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- Directory guards
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- Mini-SoaT:
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- Servers might check certs for known-good ssl websites, and if
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they come back self-signed, declare themselves to be
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non-exits. Similar to how we test for broken/evil dns now.
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- Authorities should try using exits for http to connect to some
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URLS (specified in a configuration file, so as not to make the
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List Of Things Not To Censor completely obvious) and ask them
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for results. Exits that don't give good answers should have
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the BadExit flag set.
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- Alternatively, authorities should be able to import opinions
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from Snakes on a Tor.
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- More consistent error checking in router_parse_entry_from_string().
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I can say "banana" as my bandwidthcapacity, and it won't even squeak.
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- Bind to random port when making outgoing connections to Tor servers,
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to reduce remote sniping attacks.
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- Audit everything to make sure rend and intro points are just as
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likely to be us as not.
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- Do something to prevent spurious EXTEND cells from making
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middleman nodes connect all over. Rate-limit failed
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connections, perhaps?
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- DoS protection: TLS puzzles, public key ops, bandwidth exhaustion.
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- Bridges
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- Tolerate clock skew on bridge relays.
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- Needs thinking
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- Now that we're avoiding exits when picking non-exit positions,
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we need to consider how to pick nodes for internal circuits. If
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we avoid exits for all positions, we skew the load balancing. If
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we accept exits for all positions, we leak whether it's an
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internal circuit at every step. If we accept exits only at the
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last hop, we reintroduce Lasse's attacks from the Oakland paper.
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- Windows server usability
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- Solve the ENOBUFS problem.
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- make tor's use of openssl operate on buffers rather than sockets,
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so we can make use of libevent's buffer paradigm once it has one.
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- make tor's use of libevent tolerate either the socket or the
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buffer paradigm; includes unifying the functions in connect.c.
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- We need a getrlimit equivalent on Windows so we can reserve some
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file descriptors for saving files, etc. Otherwise we'll trigger
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asserts when we're out of file descriptors and crash.
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- Merge code from Urz into libevent
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- Make Tor use evbuffers.
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- Documentation
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- a way to generate the website diagrams from source, so we can
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translate them as utf-8 text rather than with gimp. (svg? or
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imagemagick?)
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. Flesh out options_description array in src/or/config.c
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. multiple sample torrc files
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. figure out how to make nt service stuff work?
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. Document it.
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- Refactor tor man page to divide generally useful options from
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less useful ones?
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- Add a doxygen style checker to make check-spaces so nick doesn't drift
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too far from arma's undocumented styleguide. Also, document that
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styleguide in HACKING. (See r9634 for example.)
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- exactly one space at beginning and at end of comments, except i
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guess when there's line-length pressure.
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- if we refer to a function name, put a () after it.
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- only write <b>foo</b> when foo is an argument to this function.
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- doxygen comments must always end in some form of punctuation.
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- capitalize the first sentence in the doxygen comment, except
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when you shouldn't.
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- avoid spelling errors and incorrect comments. ;)
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- Packaging
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- The Debian package now uses --verify-config when (re)starting,
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to distinguish configuration errors from other errors. Perhaps
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the RPM and other startup scripts should too?
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- add a "default.action" file to the tor/vidalia bundle so we can
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fix the https thing in the default configuration:
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http://wiki.noreply.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#PrivoxyWeirdSSLPort
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- Related tools
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- Patch privoxy and socks protocol to pass strings to the browser.
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Documentation, non-version-specific.
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- Specs
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- Mark up spec; note unclear points about servers
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NR - write a spec appendix for 'being nice with tor'
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- Specify the keys and key rotation schedules and stuff
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- Mention controller libs someplace.
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- Remove need for HACKING file.
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P - document http://wiki.noreply.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TransparentProxy on freebsd and osx
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P - figure out why x86_64 won't build rpms from tor.spec
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P - figure out spec files for bundles of vidalia-tor-polipo
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P - figure out polipo install scripts for bundles of vidalia-tor-polipo on osx, win32
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P - figure out selinux policy for tor
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P - change packaging system to more automated and specific for each
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platform, suggested by Paul Wouter
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P - Setup repos for redhat and suse rpms & start signing the rpms the
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way package management apps prefer
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Website:
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P - tor-in-the-media page
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- more pictures from ren. he wants to describe the tor handshake
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- Figure out licenses for website material.
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P - put the logo on the website, in source form, so people can put it on
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stickers directly, etc.
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P - put the source image for the stickers on the website, so people can
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print their own
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P - figure out a license for the logos and docs we publish
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R - make a page with the hidden service diagrams.
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P - ask Jan/Jens to be the translation coordinator? add to volunteer page.
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- add a page for localizing all tor's components.
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- It would be neat if we had a single place that described _all_ the
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tor-related tools you can use, and what they give you, and how well they
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work. Right now, we don't give a lot of guidance wrt
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torbutton/foxproxy/privoxy/polipo in any consistent place.
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