mirror of
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor.git
synced 2024-11-11 21:53:48 +01:00
79e8d113d5
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
526 lines
18 KiB
C
526 lines
18 KiB
C
/* Copyright (c) 2017, The Tor Project, Inc. */
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/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
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/**
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* \file hs_circuit.c
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**/
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#include "or.h"
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#include "circpathbias.h"
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#include "circuitbuild.h"
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#include "circuitlist.h"
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#include "circuituse.h"
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#include "config.h"
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#include "relay.h"
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#include "rephist.h"
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#include "router.h"
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#include "hs_cell.h"
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#include "hs_circuit.h"
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#include "hs_ident.h"
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#include "hs_ntor.h"
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#include "hs_service.h"
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/* Trunnel. */
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#include "hs/cell_common.h"
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#include "hs/cell_establish_intro.h"
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/* A circuit is about to become an e2e rendezvous circuit. Check
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* <b>circ_purpose</b> and ensure that it's properly set. Return true iff
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* circuit purpose is properly set, otherwise return false. */
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static int
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circuit_purpose_is_correct_for_rend(unsigned int circ_purpose,
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int is_service_side)
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{
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if (is_service_side) {
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if (circ_purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND) {
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log_warn(LD_BUG,
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"HS e2e circuit setup with wrong purpose (%d)", circ_purpose);
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return 0;
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}
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}
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if (!is_service_side) {
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if (circ_purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY &&
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circ_purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED) {
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log_warn(LD_BUG,
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"Client e2e circuit setup with wrong purpose (%d)", circ_purpose);
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return 0;
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}
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}
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return 1;
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}
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/* Create and return a crypt path for the final hop of a v3 prop224 rendezvous
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* circuit. Initialize the crypt path crypto using the output material from the
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* ntor key exchange at <b>ntor_key_seed</b>.
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*
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* If <b>is_service_side</b> is set, we are the hidden service and the final
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* hop of the rendezvous circuit is the client on the other side. */
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static crypt_path_t *
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create_rend_cpath(const uint8_t *ntor_key_seed, size_t seed_len,
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int is_service_side)
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{
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uint8_t keys[HS_NTOR_KEY_EXPANSION_KDF_OUT_LEN];
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crypt_path_t *cpath = NULL;
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/* Do the key expansion */
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if (hs_ntor_circuit_key_expansion(ntor_key_seed, seed_len,
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keys, sizeof(keys)) < 0) {
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goto err;
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}
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/* Setup the cpath */
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cpath = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(crypt_path_t));
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cpath->magic = CRYPT_PATH_MAGIC;
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if (circuit_init_cpath_crypto(cpath, (char*)keys, sizeof(keys),
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is_service_side, 1) < 0) {
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tor_free(cpath);
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goto err;
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}
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err:
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memwipe(keys, 0, sizeof(keys));
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return cpath;
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}
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/* We are a v2 legacy HS client: Create and return a crypt path for the hidden
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* service on the other side of the rendezvous circuit <b>circ</b>. Initialize
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* the crypt path crypto using the body of the RENDEZVOUS1 cell at
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* <b>rend_cell_body</b> (which must be at least DH_KEY_LEN+DIGEST_LEN bytes).
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*/
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static crypt_path_t *
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create_rend_cpath_legacy(origin_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *rend_cell_body)
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{
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crypt_path_t *hop = NULL;
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char keys[DIGEST_LEN+CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN];
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/* first DH_KEY_LEN bytes are g^y from the service. Finish the dh
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* handshake...*/
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tor_assert(circ->build_state);
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tor_assert(circ->build_state->pending_final_cpath);
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hop = circ->build_state->pending_final_cpath;
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tor_assert(hop->rend_dh_handshake_state);
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if (crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, hop->rend_dh_handshake_state,
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(char*)rend_cell_body, DH_KEY_LEN,
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keys, DIGEST_LEN+CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN)<0) {
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log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Couldn't complete DH handshake.");
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goto err;
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}
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/* ... and set up cpath. */
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if (circuit_init_cpath_crypto(hop,
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keys+DIGEST_LEN, sizeof(keys)-DIGEST_LEN,
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0, 0) < 0)
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goto err;
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/* Check whether the digest is right... */
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if (tor_memneq(keys, rend_cell_body+DH_KEY_LEN, DIGEST_LEN)) {
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log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Incorrect digest of key material.");
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goto err;
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}
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/* clean up the crypto stuff we just made */
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crypto_dh_free(hop->rend_dh_handshake_state);
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hop->rend_dh_handshake_state = NULL;
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goto done;
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err:
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hop = NULL;
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done:
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memwipe(keys, 0, sizeof(keys));
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return hop;
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}
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/* Append the final <b>hop</b> to the cpath of the rend <b>circ</b>, and mark
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* <b>circ</b> ready for use to transfer HS relay cells. */
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static void
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finalize_rend_circuit(origin_circuit_t *circ, crypt_path_t *hop,
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int is_service_side)
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{
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tor_assert(circ);
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tor_assert(hop);
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/* Notify the circuit state machine that we are splicing this circuit */
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int new_circ_purpose = is_service_side ?
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CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_REND_JOINED : CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED;
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circuit_change_purpose(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), new_circ_purpose);
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/* All is well. Extend the circuit. */
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hop->state = CPATH_STATE_OPEN;
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/* Set the windows to default. */
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hop->package_window = circuit_initial_package_window();
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hop->deliver_window = CIRCWINDOW_START;
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/* Now that this circuit has finished connecting to its destination,
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* make sure circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch is willing to return it
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* so we can actually use it. */
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circ->hs_circ_has_timed_out = 0;
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/* Append the hop to the cpath of this circuit */
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onion_append_to_cpath(&circ->cpath, hop);
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/* In legacy code, 'pending_final_cpath' points to the final hop we just
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* appended to the cpath. We set the original pointer to NULL so that we
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* don't double free it. */
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if (circ->build_state) {
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circ->build_state->pending_final_cpath = NULL;
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}
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/* Finally, mark circuit as ready to be used for client streams */
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if (!is_service_side) {
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circuit_try_attaching_streams(circ);
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}
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}
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/* For a given circuit and a service introduction point object, register the
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* intro circuit to the circuitmap. This supports legacy intro point. */
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static void
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register_intro_circ(const hs_service_intro_point_t *ip,
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origin_circuit_t *circ)
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{
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tor_assert(ip);
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tor_assert(circ);
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if (ip->base.is_only_legacy) {
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uint8_t digest[DIGEST_LEN];
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if (BUG(crypto_pk_get_digest(ip->legacy_key, (char *) digest) < 0)) {
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return;
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}
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hs_circuitmap_register_intro_circ_v2_service_side(circ, digest);
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} else {
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hs_circuitmap_register_intro_circ_v3_service_side(circ,
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&ip->auth_key_kp.pubkey);
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}
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}
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/* Return the number of opened introduction circuit for the given circuit that
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* is matching its identity key. */
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static unsigned int
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count_opened_desc_intro_point_circuits(const hs_service_t *service,
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const hs_service_descriptor_t *desc)
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{
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unsigned int count = 0;
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tor_assert(service);
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tor_assert(desc);
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DIGEST256MAP_FOREACH(desc->intro_points.map, key,
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const hs_service_intro_point_t *, ip) {
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circuit_t *circ;
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origin_circuit_t *ocirc;
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if (ip->base.is_only_legacy) {
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uint8_t digest[DIGEST_LEN];
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if (BUG(crypto_pk_get_digest(ip->legacy_key, (char *) digest) < 0)) {
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continue;
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}
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ocirc = hs_circuitmap_get_intro_circ_v2_service_side(digest);
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} else {
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ocirc =
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hs_circuitmap_get_intro_circ_v3_service_side(&ip->auth_key_kp.pubkey);
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}
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if (ocirc == NULL) {
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continue;
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}
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circ = TO_CIRCUIT(ocirc);
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tor_assert(circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO ||
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circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO);
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/* Having a circuit not for the requested service is really bad. */
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tor_assert(ed25519_pubkey_eq(&service->keys.identity_pk,
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ô->hs_ident->identity_pk));
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/* Only count opened circuit and skip circuit that will be closed. */
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if (!circ->marked_for_close && circ->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN) {
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count++;
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}
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} DIGEST256MAP_FOREACH_END;
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return count;
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}
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/* From a given service and service intro point, create an introduction point
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* circuit identifier. This can't fail. */
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static hs_ident_circuit_t *
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create_intro_circuit_identifier(const hs_service_t *service,
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const hs_service_intro_point_t *ip)
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{
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hs_ident_circuit_t *ident;
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tor_assert(service);
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tor_assert(ip);
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ident = hs_ident_circuit_new(&service->keys.identity_pk,
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HS_IDENT_CIRCUIT_INTRO);
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ed25519_pubkey_copy(&ident->intro_auth_pk, &ip->auth_key_kp.pubkey);
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return ident;
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}
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/* For a given introduction point and an introduction circuit, send the
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* ESTABLISH_INTRO cell. The service object is used for logging. This can fail
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* and if so, the circuit is closed and the intro point object is flagged
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* that the circuit is not established anymore which is important for the
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* retry mechanism. */
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static void
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send_establish_intro(const hs_service_t *service,
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hs_service_intro_point_t *ip, origin_circuit_t *circ)
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{
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ssize_t cell_len;
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uint8_t payload[RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE];
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tor_assert(service);
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tor_assert(ip);
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tor_assert(circ);
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/* Encode establish intro cell. */
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cell_len = hs_cell_build_establish_intro(circ->cpath->prev->rend_circ_nonce,
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ip, payload);
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if (cell_len < 0) {
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log_warn(LD_REND, "Unable to encode ESTABLISH_INTRO cell for service %s "
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"on circuit %u. Closing circuit.",
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safe_str_client(service->onion_address),
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TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id);
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goto err;
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}
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/* Send the cell on the circuit. */
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if (relay_send_command_from_edge(CONTROL_CELL_ID, TO_CIRCUIT(circ),
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RELAY_COMMAND_ESTABLISH_INTRO,
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(char *) payload, cell_len,
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circ->cpath->prev) < 0) {
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log_info(LD_REND, "Unable to send ESTABLISH_INTRO cell for service %s "
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"on circuit %u.",
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safe_str_client(service->onion_address),
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TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id);
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/* On error, the circuit has been closed. */
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goto done;
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}
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/* Record the attempt to use this circuit. */
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pathbias_count_use_attempt(circ);
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goto done;
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err:
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circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL);
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done:
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memwipe(payload, 0, sizeof(payload));
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}
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/* ========== */
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/* Public API */
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/* ========== */
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/* For a given service and a service intro point, launch a circuit to the
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* extend info ei. If the service is a single onion, a one-hop circuit will be
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* requested. Return 0 if the circuit was successfully launched and tagged
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* with the correct identifier. On error, a negative value is returned. */
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int
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hs_circ_launch_intro_point(hs_service_t *service,
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const hs_service_intro_point_t *ip,
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extend_info_t *ei, time_t now)
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{
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/* Standard flags for introduction circuit. */
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int ret = -1, circ_flags = CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_UPTIME | CIRCLAUNCH_IS_INTERNAL;
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origin_circuit_t *circ;
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tor_assert(service);
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tor_assert(ip);
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tor_assert(ei);
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/* Update circuit flags in case of a single onion service that requires a
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* direct connection. */
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if (service->config.is_single_onion) {
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circ_flags |= CIRCLAUNCH_ONEHOP_TUNNEL;
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}
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log_info(LD_REND, "Launching a circuit to intro point %s for service %s.",
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safe_str_client(extend_info_describe(ei)),
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safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
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/* Note down that we are about to use an internal circuit. */
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rep_hist_note_used_internal(now, circ_flags & CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_UPTIME,
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circ_flags & CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_CAPACITY);
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/* Note down the launch for the retry period. Even if the circuit fails to
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* be launched, we still want to respect the retry period to avoid stress on
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* the circuit subsystem. */
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service->state.num_intro_circ_launched++;
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circ = circuit_launch_by_extend_info(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO,
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ei, circ_flags);
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if (circ == NULL) {
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goto end;
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}
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/* Setup the circuit identifier and attach it to it. */
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circ->hs_ident = create_intro_circuit_identifier(service, ip);
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tor_assert(circ->hs_ident);
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/* Register circuit in the global circuitmap. */
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register_intro_circ(ip, circ);
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/* Success. */
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ret = 0;
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end:
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return ret;
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}
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/* Called when a service introduction point circuit is done building. Given
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* the service and intro point object, this function will send the
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* ESTABLISH_INTRO cell on the circuit. Return 0 on success. Return 1 if the
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* circuit has been repurposed to General because we already have too many
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* opened. */
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int
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hs_circ_service_intro_has_opened(hs_service_t *service,
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hs_service_intro_point_t *ip,
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const hs_service_descriptor_t *desc,
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origin_circuit_t *circ)
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{
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int ret = 0;
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unsigned int num_intro_circ, num_needed_circ;
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tor_assert(service);
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tor_assert(ip);
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tor_assert(desc);
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tor_assert(circ);
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num_intro_circ = count_opened_desc_intro_point_circuits(service, desc);
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num_needed_circ = service->config.num_intro_points;
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if (num_intro_circ > num_needed_circ) {
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/* There are too many opened valid intro circuit for what the service
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* needs so repurpose this one. */
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/* XXX: Legacy code checks options->ExcludeNodes and if not NULL it just
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* closes the circuit. I have NO idea why it does that so it hasn't been
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* added here. I can only assume in case our ExcludeNodes list changes but
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* in that case, all circuit are flagged unusable (config.c). --dgoulet */
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log_info(LD_CIRC | LD_REND, "Introduction circuit just opened but we "
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"have enough for service %s. Repurposing "
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"it to general and leaving internal.",
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safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
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tor_assert(circ->build_state->is_internal);
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/* Remove it from the circuitmap. */
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hs_circuitmap_remove_circuit(TO_CIRCUIT(circ));
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/* Cleaning up the hidden service identifier and repurpose. */
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hs_ident_circuit_free(circ->hs_ident);
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circ->hs_ident = NULL;
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circuit_change_purpose(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL);
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/* Inform that this circuit just opened for this new purpose. */
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circuit_has_opened(circ);
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/* This return value indicate to the caller that the IP object should be
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* removed from the service because it's corresponding circuit has just
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* been repurposed. */
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ret = 1;
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goto done;
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}
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log_info(LD_REND, "Introduction circuit %u established for service %s.",
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TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id,
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safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
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circuit_log_path(LOG_INFO, LD_REND, circ);
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/* Time to send an ESTABLISH_INTRO cell on this circuit. On error, this call
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* makes sure the circuit gets closed. */
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send_establish_intro(service, ip, circ);
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done:
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return ret;
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}
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/* Handle an INTRO_ESTABLISHED cell payload of length payload_len arriving on
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* the given introduction circuit circ. The service is only used for logging
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* purposes. Return 0 on success else a negative value. */
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int
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hs_circ_handle_intro_established(const hs_service_t *service,
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const hs_service_intro_point_t *ip,
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origin_circuit_t *circ,
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const uint8_t *payload, size_t payload_len)
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{
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int ret = -1;
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tor_assert(service);
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tor_assert(ip);
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tor_assert(circ);
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tor_assert(payload);
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/* Try to parse the payload into a cell making sure we do actually have a
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* valid cell. For a legacy node, it's an empty payload so as long as we
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* have the cell, we are good. */
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if (!ip->base.is_only_legacy &&
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hs_cell_parse_intro_established(payload, payload_len) < 0) {
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log_warn(LD_REND, "Unable to parse the INTRO_ESTABLISHED cell on "
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"circuit %u for service %s",
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TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id,
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safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
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goto done;
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}
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/* Switch the purpose to a fully working intro point. */
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circuit_change_purpose(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO);
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/* Getting a valid INTRODUCE_ESTABLISHED means we've successfully used the
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* circuit so update our pathbias subsystem. */
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pathbias_mark_use_success(circ);
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/* Success. */
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ret = 0;
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done:
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return ret;
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}
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/* Circuit <b>circ</b> just finished the rend ntor key exchange. Use the key
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* exchange output material at <b>ntor_key_seed</b> and setup <b>circ</b> to
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* serve as a rendezvous end-to-end circuit between the client and the
|
|
* service. If <b>is_service_side</b> is set, then we are the hidden service
|
|
* and the other side is the client.
|
|
*
|
|
* Return 0 if the operation went well; in case of error return -1. */
|
|
int
|
|
hs_circuit_setup_e2e_rend_circ(origin_circuit_t *circ,
|
|
const uint8_t *ntor_key_seed, size_t seed_len,
|
|
int is_service_side)
|
|
{
|
|
if (BUG(!circuit_purpose_is_correct_for_rend(TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose,
|
|
is_service_side))) {
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
crypt_path_t *hop = create_rend_cpath(ntor_key_seed, seed_len,
|
|
is_service_side);
|
|
if (!hop) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_REND, "Couldn't get v3 %s cpath!",
|
|
is_service_side ? "service-side" : "client-side");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
finalize_rend_circuit(circ, hop, is_service_side);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* We are a v2 legacy HS client and we just received a RENDEZVOUS1 cell
|
|
* <b>rend_cell_body</b> on <b>circ</b>. Finish up the DH key exchange and then
|
|
* extend the crypt path of <b>circ</b> so that the hidden service is on the
|
|
* other side. */
|
|
int
|
|
hs_circuit_setup_e2e_rend_circ_legacy_client(origin_circuit_t *circ,
|
|
const uint8_t *rend_cell_body)
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
if (BUG(!circuit_purpose_is_correct_for_rend(
|
|
TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->purpose, 0))) {
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
crypt_path_t *hop = create_rend_cpath_legacy(circ, rend_cell_body);
|
|
if (!hop) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Couldn't get v2 cpath.");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
finalize_rend_circuit(circ, hop, 0);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|