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f2550a52d4
Mark some proposals as written in TODO svn:r16060
685 lines
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685 lines
31 KiB
Plaintext
$Id$
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Legend:
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SPEC!! - Not specified
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SPEC - Spec not finalized
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N - nick claims
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R - arma claims
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P - phobos claims
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S - Steven claims
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E - Matt claims
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M - Mike claims
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J - Jeff claims
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I - ioerror claims
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W - weasel claims
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K - Karsten claims
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- Not done
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* Top priority
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. Partially done
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o Done
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d Deferrable
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D Deferred
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X Abandoned
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=======================================================================
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External constraints:
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- mid July
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W - Take the results from instrumenting directory downloads on Tor
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clients, and analyze/simulate some alternate approaches. Finish
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proposal for how to improve things, iterate based on feedback,
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convince us that the anonymity tradeoffs and/or scalability
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tradeoffs are acceptable.
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- mid August
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KS - Design hidden service improvements, evaluate them and consider
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security properties: write some proposals, get feedback, revise
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them, etc.
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? - nlnet 'user safety contest'. submit torbrowser, others?
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- end of August
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I - Auto update
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o Vidalia learns when Tor thinks it should be updated
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R - Tor status events should suggest a new version to switch to
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I - Figure out a good PKI, document the design, assess security issues:
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"write a proposal"
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- Vidalia fetches the new one via Tor when possible, but fetches
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it without Tor "when necessary", whatever that means.
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- Give an interface for notifying the user, and letting her
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decide to fetch and decide to swap out the old Tor for the new.
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- Do the same for Polipo
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- and for Vidalia itself
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- end of September
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NSE - Write first draft of research study for Paul's research problem.
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This should be at least vaguely related to what was discussed in
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the end-of-May deliverable.
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- mid October
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KS - Finish implementation of hidden service improvements: have a set
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of patches that you think work.
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W - Finish implementation of directory overhead changes: have a set
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of patches that you think work.
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- mid January
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KS - Finish testing, debugging, unit testing, etc the hidden service
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changes. Have it in the development version and in use.
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W - Finish testing, debugging, unit testing, etc the directory overhead
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changes. Have it in the development version and in use.
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=======================================================================
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Other things Roger would be excited to see:
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Nick
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- Finish buffer stuff in libevent; start using it in Tor.
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- Tors start believing the contents of NETINFO cells.
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. Work with Steven and Roger to decide which parts of Paul's project
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he wants to work on.
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- respond to Steven's red-team TLS testing (a.k.a, look at a packet
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dump and compare)
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Matt
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- Fit Vidalia in 640x480 again.
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- When user changes the language in Vidalia, have it change right then.
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- Vidalia should display/edit PlaintextPorts events/config.
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. Vidalia's GUI should let you specify an http proxy that it launches
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for you. Maybe in the general config window next to which Tor it
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launches for you.
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- Vidalia should avoid stomping on your custom exit policy lines
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just because you click on 'save' for a totally different config thing.
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- How much space do we save in TBB by stripping symbols from Vidalia
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first? Good idea or crazy idea?
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ioerror
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- gmail auto responder so you send us an email and we send you a Tor
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binary. Probably needs a proposal first.
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- weather.torproject.org should go live.
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o Learn from Steven how to build/maintain the Tor Browser Bundle.
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- Keep advocating new Tor servers and working with orgs like Mozilla
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to let them like Tor.
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- Start converting critical wiki pages into real Tor wml pages. E.g.,
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https://wiki.torproject.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/VerifyingSignatures
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- Find out what happened to the buildbot and get it back up:
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http://tor-buildbot.freehaven.net:8010/
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- Learn about locking memory pages that have sensitive content. Get
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that started in Tor.
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- Translation portal
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- Vidalia html help files
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- should we i18nize polipo's error messages too?
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- Some of our translated wml files are very old -- so old that they
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are harmful to leave in place. We need some sort of way to notice
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this and disable them.
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Steven
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- Figure out (or give up on) how to run Tor Browser and ordinary
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Firefox side-by-side.
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- Enumerate and analyze traces left when running from USB
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- Write a list of research items Tor would like to see done, for the
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volunteer page. Pick a few you'd like to work on yourself.
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- Move proposal 131 or equivalent forward.
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- Keep bugging us about exploits on the .exit notation.
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- If relays have 100KB/s but set relaybandwidthrate to 10KB/s, do your
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interference attacks still work?
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- Mike's question #3 on https://www.torproject.org/volunteer#Research
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- Worthwhile shipping TBB with some local html help files that come
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as bookmarks?
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- Decide whether TBB should use Torbutton's "lock" feature.
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http://archives.seul.org/or/cvs/Jun-2008/msg00186.html
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Andrew
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- Which bundles include Torbutton? Change the docs/tor-doc-foo pages
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so they admit that Torbutton is in them too. Change the download
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page too.
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- The OS X bundle screenshots are from forever ago -- they don't
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include Torbutton, they still say it's tor.eff.org, etc.
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- Should we still be telling you how to use Safari on OS X for Tor,
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given all the holes that Torbutton-dev solves on Firefox?
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Karsten
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o Make a hidden services explanation page with the hidden service
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diagrams. See img/THS-[1-6].png. These need some text to go along
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with them though, so people can follow what's going on.
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- We should consider a single config option TorPrivateNetwork that
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turns on all the config options for running a private test tor
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network. having to keep updating all the tools, and the docs,
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just isn't working.
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Weasel
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- Figure out how to make Vidalia and Tor play nicely on Debian, make
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the necessary modifications, and make some Vidalia debs that pass
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muster.
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- Fix bug 393.
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- Get oftc to switch to Tor dns bulk exitlist. Or tell us why it's
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not suitable yet.
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- Take non-Running entries out of the networkstatus consensus.
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- Move proposal 134 forward.
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- putting port predictions in state file
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- if tor hasn't been used in a while it stops fetching consensus
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documents. Retain that state over restarts.
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Roger
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- Finish tor-doc-bridge.wml
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. Fix FAQ entry on setting up private Tor network
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- Review Karsten's hidden service diagrams
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- Roger should visit Internews DC sometime.
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- Did we actually apply Steven's dkimproxy patch?
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- Brainstorm about safe but effective ways for vidalia to
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auto-update its user's bridges via Tor in the background.
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Mike:
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- Roger wants to get an email every time there's a blog change,
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e.g. a comment. That way spam doesn't go undetected for weeks.
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- Or, maybe just disable linking from blog comments entirely?
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=======================================================================
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Bugs/issues for Tor 0.2.0.x:
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. we should have an off-by-default way for relays to dump geoip data to
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a file in their data directory, for measurement purposes.
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o Basic implementation
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N - Include probability-of-selection
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R d let bridges set relaybandwidthrate as low as 5kb
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R - bridge communities
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. spec
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. deploy
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- man page entries for Alternate*Authority config options
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Documentation for Tor 0.2.0.x:
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- Proposals:
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. 111: Prioritize local traffic over relayed.
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R - Merge into tor-spec.txt.
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- 113: mark as closed close.
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o document the "3/4 and 7/8" business in the clients fetching consensus
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documents timeline.
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R - then document the bridge user download timeline.
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- HOWTO for DNSPort. See tup's wiki page.
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. Document transport and natdport in a good HOWTO.
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- Quietly document NT Service options: revise (or create) FAQ entry
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=======================================================================
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For 0.2.1.2-alpha:
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R d bug: if we launch using bridges, and then stop using bridges, we
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still have our bridges in our entryguards section, and may use them.
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R d add an event to report geoip summaries to vidalia for bridge relays,
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so vidalia can say "recent activity (1-8 users) from sa".
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R - investigate: it looks like if the bridge authority is unreachable,
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we're not falling back on querying bridges directly?
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R - if "no running bridges known", an application request should make
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us retry all our bridges.
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R - get matt to make vidalia do a getinfo status/bootstrap-phase to
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get caught up after it connects.
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R d Setting DirPort when acting as bridge will give false Warnings
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For 0.2.1.x:
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- Proposals to do:
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- 110: avoid infinite-length circuits
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R d 128: families of private bridges
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- 134: handle authority fragmentation.
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- Proposals to write:
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R d Do we want to maintain our own set of entryguards that we use as
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next hop after the bridge?
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X Add an 'exit-address' line in the descriptor for servers that exit
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from something that isn't their published address.
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[I think tordnsel solved this. -RD]
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- Proposal to supersede 117 by adding IPv6 support for exits and entries.
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- Internal code support for ipv6:
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o Clone ipv6 functions (inet_ntop, inet_pton) where they don't exist.
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- Most address variables need to become tor_addr_t
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- Teach resolving code how to handle ipv6.
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- Teach exit policies about ipv6 (consider ipv4/ipv6 interaction!)
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- 118: Listen on and advertise multiple ports:
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- Tor should be able to have a pool of outgoing IP addresses that it is
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able to rotate through. (maybe. Possible overlap with proposal 118.)
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- config option to publish what ports you listen on, beyond
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ORPort/DirPort. It should support ranges and bit prefixes (?) too.
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(This is very similar to proposal 118.)
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- Fix voting to handle bug 608 case when multiple servers get
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Named.
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d Possibly: revise link protocol to allow big circuit IDs,
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variable-length cells, proposal-110 stuff, and versioned CREATES?
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o Eliminate use of v2 networkstatus documents in v3 authority
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decision-making.
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N . Draft proposal for GeoIP aggregation (see external constraints *)
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o Separate Guard flags for "pick this as a new guard" and "keep this
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as an existing guard". First investigate if we want this.
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. Figure out how to make good use of the fallback consensus file. Right
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now many of the addresses in the fallback consensus will be stale,
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so it will take dozens of minutes to bootstrap from it. This is a
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bad first Tor experience. But if we check the fallback consensus
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file *after* we fail to connect to any authorities, then it may
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still be valuable as a blocking-resistance step.
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o Write the proposal.
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- Patch our tor.spec rpm package so it knows where to put the fallback
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consensus file.
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d Something for bug 469, to limit connections per IP.
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. Put bandwidth weights in the networkstatus? So clients get weight
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their choices even before they have the descriptors; and so
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authorities can put in more accurate numbers in the future.
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d Fetch an updated geoip file from the directory authorities.
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- Tiny designs to write:
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. Better estimate of clock skew; has anonymity implications. Clients
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should estimate their skew as median of skew from servers over last
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N seconds, but for servers this is not so easy, since a server does
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not choose who it connects to.
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- Do TLS connection rotation more often than "once a week" in the
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extra-stable case.
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(One reason not to do it more often is because the old TLS conn
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probably has a circuit on it, and we don't really want to build up
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dozens of TCP connections to all the other extra-stable relays.)
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- If a relay publishes a new descriptor with a significantly lower
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uptime or with a new IP address, then we should consider its current
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"running" interval to have ended even if it hadn't yet failed its
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third reachability test. the interval ended when the new descriptor
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appeared, and a new interval began then too.
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- Use less RAM *
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- Optimize cell pool allocation.
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d Support (or just always use) jemalloc (if it helps)
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- mmap more files.
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- Look into pulling serverdescs off buffers as they arrive.
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- Use less bandwidth
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- Use if-modified-since to download consensuses
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- Handle multi-core cpus better
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- Use information from NETINFO cells
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- Don't extend a circuit over a noncanonical connection with
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mismatched address.
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- Learn our outgoing IP address from netinfo cells?
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- Learn skew from netinfo cells?
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- Testing
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- Better unit test coverage
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- Refactor unit tests into multiple files
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- Verify that write limits to linked connections work.
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- Use more mid-level and high-level libevent APIs
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- For dns?
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- For http?
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- For buffers?
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- Tool improvements:
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- Get IOCP patch into libevent *
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- Security improvements
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- make is-consensus-fresh-enough check way tighter.
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- If we haven't tried downloading a consensus for ages since we're tired,
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try getting a new one before we use old descriptors for a circuit.
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Related to bug 401.
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- Feature removals and deprecations:
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- Get rid of the v1 directory stuff (making, serving, and caching)
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- First verify that the caches won't flip out?
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- If they will, just stop the caches from caching for now
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- perhaps replace it with a "this is a tor server" stock webpage.
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- The v2dir flag isn't used for anything anymore, right? If so, dump it.
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- Even clients run rep_hist_load_mtbf_data(). Does this waste memory?
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Dump it?
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- Unless we start using ftime functions, dump them.
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- can we deprecate 'getinfo network-status'?
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- can we deprecate the FastFirstHopPK config option?
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- Can we deprecate controllers that don't use both features?
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Nice to have for 0.2.1.x:
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- Proposals to write
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- steven's plan for replacing check.torproject.org with a built-in
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answer by tor itself.
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- Documentation
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P - Make documentation realize that location of system configuration file
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will depend on location of system defaults, and isn't always /etc/torrc.
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- Small controller features
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- A status event for when tor decides to stop fetching directory info
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if the client hasn't clicked recently: then make the onion change too.
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- Add a status event when new consensus arrives
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- Windows build
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P - Figure out why dll's compiled in mingw don't work right in WinXP.
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P - create a "make win32-bundle" for vidalia-privoxy-tor-torbutton bundle
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- Refactor bad code:
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- Refactor the HTTP logic so the functions aren't so large.
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- Refactor buf_read and buf_write to have sensible ways to return
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error codes after partial writes
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- Router_choose_random_node() has a big pile of args. make it "flags".
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- Streamline how we pick entry nodes: Make choose_random_entry() have
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less magic and less control logic.
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- Don't call time(NULL) so much; instead have a static time_t field
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that gets updated only a handful of times per second.
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- Move all status info out of routerinfo into local_routerstatus. Make
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"who can change what" in local_routerstatus explicit. Make
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local_routerstatus (or equivalent) subsume all places to go for "what
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router is this?"
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- deprecate router_digest_is_trusted_dir() in favor of
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router_get_trusteddirserver_by_digest()
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- Make Tor able to chroot itself
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o allow it to load an entire config file from control interface
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- document LOADCONF
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- log rotation (and FD passing) via control interface
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- chroot yourself, including inhibit trying to read config file
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and reopen logs, unless they are under datadir.
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- Should be trivial:
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- Base relative control socket paths (and other stuff in torrc) on datadir.
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- Tor logs the libevent version on startup, for debugging purposes.
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This is great. But it does this before configuring the logs, so
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it only goes to stdout and is then lost.
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- Make TrackHostExits expire TrackHostExitsExpire seconds after their
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*last* use, not their *first* use.
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- enforce a lower limit on MaxCircuitDirtiness and CircuitBuildTimeout.
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- Make 'safelogging' extend to info-level logs too.
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- don't do dns hijacking tests if we're reject *:* exit policy?
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(deferred until 0.1.1.x is less common)
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- More consistent error checking in router_parse_entry_from_string().
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I can say "banana" as my bandwidthcapacity, and it won't even squeak.
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- Interface for letting SOAT modify flags that authorities assign.
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(How to keep the authority from clobbering them afterwards?
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Later, unless people want to implement them now:
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- Actually use SSL_shutdown to close our TLS connections.
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- Include "v" line in networkstatus getinfo values.
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[Nick: bridge authorities output a networkstatus that is missing
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version numbers. This is inconvenient if we want to make sure
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bridgedb gives out bridges with certain characteristics. -RD]
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[Okay. Is this a separate item, or is it the same issue as the lack of
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a "v" line in response to the controller GETINFO command? -NM]
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- Let tor dir mirrors proxy connections to the tor download site, so
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if you know a bridge you can fetch the tor software.
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- when somebody uses the controlport as an http proxy, give them
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a "tor isn't an http proxy" error too like we do for the socks port.
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- MAYBE kill stalled circuits rather than stalled connections. This is
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possible thanks to cell queues, but we need to consider the anonymity
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implications.
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- Make resolves no longer use edge_connection_t unless they are actually
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_on_ a socks connection: have edge_connection_t and (say)
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dns_request_t both extend an edge_stream_t, and have p_streams and
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n_streams both be linked lists of edge_stream_t.
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- Generate torrc.{complete|sample}.in, tor.1.in, the HTML manual, and the
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online config documentation from a single source.
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- It would be potentially helpful to respond to https requests on
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the OR port by acting like an HTTPS server.
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- Make the timestamp granularity on logs configurable, with default
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of "1 second". This might make some kinds of after-the-fact attack harder.
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Can anybody remember why we wanted to do this and/or what it means?
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- config option __ControllerLimit that hangs up if there are a limit
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of controller connections already.
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[This was mwenge's idea. The idea is that a Tor controller can
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"fill" Tor's controller slot quota, so jerks can't do cross-protocol
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attacks like the http form attack. -RD]
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- Bridge issues
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. Ask all directory questions to bridge via BEGIN_DIR.
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- use the bridges for dir fetches even when our dirport is open.
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- drop 'authority' queries if they're to our own identity key; accept
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them otherwise.
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- give extend_info_t a router_purpose again
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If somebody wants to do this in some version, they should:
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- Create packages for Nokia 800, requested by Chris Soghoian
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- More work on AvoidDiskWrites
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- Make DNSPort support TCP DNS.
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* * * * Roger, please sort these: * * * *
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- bridge communities with local bridge authorities:
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- clients who have a password configured decide to ask their bridge
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authority for a networkstatus
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- be able to have bridges that aren't in your torrc. save them in
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state file, etc.
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- Consider if we can solve: the Tor client doesn't know what flags
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its bridge has (since it only gets the descriptor), so it can't
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make decisions based on Fast or Stable.
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- Some mechanism for specifying that we want to stop using a cached
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bridge.
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=======================================================================
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Future versions:
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- Protocol
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- Our current approach to block attempts to use Tor as a single-hop proxy
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is pretty lame; we should get a better one.
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- Allow small cells and large cells on the same network?
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- Cell buffering and resending. This will allow us to handle broken
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circuits as long as the endpoints don't break, plus will allow
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connection (tls session key) rotation.
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- Implement Morphmix, so we can compare its behavior, complexity,
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etc. But see paper breaking morphmix.
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- Other transport. HTTP, udp, rdp, airhook, etc. May have to do our own
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link crypto, unless we can bully DTLS into it.
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- Need a relay teardown cell, separate from one-way ends.
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(Pending a user who needs this)
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- Handle half-open connections: right now we don't support all TCP
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streams, at least according to the protocol. But we handle all that
|
|
we've seen in the wild.
|
|
(Pending a user who needs this)
|
|
|
|
- Directory system
|
|
- BEGIN_DIR items
|
|
- handle connect-dir streams that don't have a chosen_exit_name set.
|
|
- Have a "Faster" status flag that means it. Fast2, Fast4, Fast8?
|
|
- Add an option (related to AvoidDiskWrites) to disable directory
|
|
caching. (Is this actually a good idea??)
|
|
X Add d64 and fp64 along-side d and fp so people can paste status
|
|
entries into a url. since + is a valid base64 char, only allow one
|
|
at a time. Consider adding to controller as well.
|
|
[abandoned for lack of demand]
|
|
- Some back-out mechanism for auto-approval on authorities
|
|
- a way of rolling back approvals to before a timestamp
|
|
- Consider minion-like fingerprint file/log combination.
|
|
X Have new people be in limbo and need to demonstrate usefulness
|
|
before we approve them.
|
|
|
|
- Hidden services:
|
|
d Standby/hotswap/redundant hidden services: needs a proposal.
|
|
- you can insert a hidserv descriptor via the controller.
|
|
- auth mechanisms to let hidden service midpoint and responder filter
|
|
connection requests: proposal 121.
|
|
- Let each hidden service (or other thing) specify its own
|
|
OutboundBindAddress?
|
|
|
|
- Server operation
|
|
- If the server is spewing complaints about raising your ulimit -n,
|
|
we should add a note about this to the server descriptor so other
|
|
people can notice too.
|
|
- When we hit a funny error from a dir request (eg 403 forbidden),
|
|
but tor is working and happy otherwise, and we haven't seen many
|
|
such errors recently, then don't warn about it.
|
|
|
|
- Controller
|
|
- Implement missing status events and accompanying getinfos
|
|
- DIR_REACHABLE
|
|
- BAD_DIR_RESPONSE (Unexpected directory response; maybe we're behind
|
|
a firewall.)
|
|
- BAD_PROXY (Bad http or https proxy)
|
|
- UNRECOGNIZED_ROUTER (a nickname we asked for is unavailable)
|
|
- Status events related to hibernation
|
|
- something about failing to parse our address?
|
|
from resolve_my_address() in config.c
|
|
- sketchy OS, sketchy threading
|
|
- too many onions queued: threading problems or slow CPU?
|
|
- Implement missing status event fields:
|
|
- TIMEOUT on CHECKING_REACHABILITY
|
|
- GETINFO status/client, status/server, status/general: There should be
|
|
some way to learn which status events are currently "in effect."
|
|
We should specify which these are, what format they appear in, and so
|
|
on.
|
|
- More information in events:
|
|
- Include bandwidth breakdown by conn->type in BW events.
|
|
- Change circuit status events to give more details, like purpose,
|
|
whether they're internal, when they become dirty, when they become
|
|
too dirty for further circuits, etc.
|
|
- Change stream status events analogously.
|
|
- Expose more information via getinfo:
|
|
- import and export rendezvous descriptors
|
|
- Review all static fields for additional candidates
|
|
- Allow EXTENDCIRCUIT to unknown server.
|
|
- We need some way to adjust server status, and to tell tor not to
|
|
download directories/network-status, and a way to force a download.
|
|
- Make everything work with hidden services
|
|
|
|
- Performance/resources
|
|
- per-conn write buckets
|
|
- separate config options for read vs write limiting
|
|
(It's hard to support read > write, since we need better
|
|
congestion control to avoid overfull buffers there. So,
|
|
defer the whole thing.)
|
|
- Rate limit exit connections to a given destination -- this helps
|
|
us play nice with websites when Tor users want to crawl them; it
|
|
also introduces DoS opportunities.
|
|
- Consider truncating rather than destroying failed circuits,
|
|
in order to save the effort of restarting. There are security
|
|
issues here that need thinking, though.
|
|
- Handle full buffers without totally borking
|
|
- Rate-limit OR and directory connections overall and per-IP and
|
|
maybe per subnet.
|
|
|
|
- Misc
|
|
- Hold-open-until-flushed now works by accident; it should work by
|
|
design.
|
|
- Display the reasons in 'destroy' and 'truncated' cells under
|
|
some circumstances?
|
|
- Make router_is_general_exit() a bit smarter once we're sure what
|
|
it's for.
|
|
- Automatically determine what ports are reachable and start using
|
|
those, if circuits aren't working and it's a pattern we
|
|
recognize ("port 443 worked once and port 9001 keeps not
|
|
working").
|
|
|
|
- Security
|
|
- some better fix for bug #516?
|
|
- Directory guards
|
|
- Mini-SoaT:
|
|
- Servers might check certs for known-good ssl websites, and if
|
|
they come back self-signed, declare themselves to be
|
|
non-exits. Similar to how we test for broken/evil dns now.
|
|
- Authorities should try using exits for http to connect to some
|
|
URLS (specified in a configuration file, so as not to make the
|
|
List Of Things Not To Censor completely obvious) and ask them
|
|
for results. Exits that don't give good answers should have
|
|
the BadExit flag set.
|
|
- Alternatively, authorities should be able to import opinions
|
|
from Snakes on a Tor.
|
|
- Bind to random port when making outgoing connections to Tor servers,
|
|
to reduce remote sniping attacks.
|
|
- Audit everything to make sure rend and intro points are just as
|
|
likely to be us as not.
|
|
- Do something to prevent spurious EXTEND cells from making
|
|
middleman nodes connect all over. Rate-limit failed
|
|
connections, perhaps?
|
|
- DoS protection: TLS puzzles, public key ops, bandwidth exhaustion.
|
|
|
|
- Needs thinking
|
|
- Now that we're avoiding exits when picking non-exit positions,
|
|
we need to consider how to pick nodes for internal circuits. If
|
|
we avoid exits for all positions, we skew the load balancing. If
|
|
we accept exits for all positions, we leak whether it's an
|
|
internal circuit at every step. If we accept exits only at the
|
|
last hop, we reintroduce Lasse's attacks from the Oakland paper.
|
|
|
|
- Windows server usability
|
|
- Solve the ENOBUFS problem.
|
|
- make tor's use of openssl operate on buffers rather than sockets,
|
|
so we can make use of libevent's buffer paradigm once it has one.
|
|
- make tor's use of libevent tolerate either the socket or the
|
|
buffer paradigm; includes unifying the functions in connect.c.
|
|
- We need a getrlimit equivalent on Windows so we can reserve some
|
|
file descriptors for saving files, etc. Otherwise we'll trigger
|
|
asserts when we're out of file descriptors and crash.
|
|
|
|
- Documentation
|
|
- a way to generate the website diagrams from source, so we can
|
|
translate them as utf-8 text rather than with gimp. (svg? or
|
|
imagemagick?)
|
|
. Flesh out options_description array in src/or/config.c
|
|
. multiple sample torrc files
|
|
- Refactor tor man page to divide generally useful options from
|
|
less useful ones?
|
|
- Add a doxygen style checker to make check-spaces so nick doesn't drift
|
|
too far from arma's undocumented styleguide. Also, document that
|
|
styleguide in HACKING. (See r9634 for example.)
|
|
- exactly one space at beginning and at end of comments, except i
|
|
guess when there's line-length pressure.
|
|
- if we refer to a function name, put a () after it.
|
|
- only write <b>foo</b> when foo is an argument to this function.
|
|
- doxygen comments must always end in some form of punctuation.
|
|
- capitalize the first sentence in the doxygen comment, except
|
|
when you shouldn't.
|
|
- avoid spelling errors and incorrect comments. ;)
|
|
|
|
- Packaging
|
|
- The Debian package now uses --verify-config when (re)starting,
|
|
to distinguish configuration errors from other errors. Perhaps
|
|
the RPM and other startup scripts should too?
|
|
- add a "default.action" file to the tor/vidalia bundle so we can
|
|
fix the https thing in the default configuration:
|
|
http://wiki.noreply.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#PrivoxyWeirdSSLPort
|
|
|
|
|
|
=======================================================================
|
|
|
|
Documentation, non-version-specific.
|
|
- Specs
|
|
- Mark up spec; note unclear points about servers
|
|
NR - write a spec appendix for 'being nice with tor'
|
|
- Specify the keys and key rotation schedules and stuff
|
|
. Finish path-spec.txt
|
|
- Mention controller libs someplace.
|
|
- Remove need for HACKING file.
|
|
- document http://wiki.noreply.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TransparentProxy on freebsd and osx
|
|
P - figure out why x86_64 won't build rpms from tor.spec
|
|
P - figure out rpm spec files for bundles of vidalia-tor-polipo
|
|
P - figure out polipo install scripts for bundles of vidalia-tor-polipo on osx, win32
|
|
- figure out selinux policy for tor
|
|
P - change packaging system to more automated and specific for each
|
|
platform, suggested by Paul Wouter
|
|
P - Setup repos for redhat and suse rpms & start signing the rpms the
|
|
way package management apps prefer
|
|
|
|
Website:
|
|
J . tor-in-the-media page
|
|
P - Figure out licenses for website material.
|
|
(Phobos reccomends the Open Publication License with Option A at
|
|
http://opencontent.org/openpub/)
|
|
P - put the logo on the website, in source form, so people can put it on
|
|
stickers directly, etc.
|
|
P - put the source image for the stickers on the website, so people can
|
|
print their own
|
|
P - figure out a license for the logos and docs we publish (trademark
|
|
figures into this)
|
|
(Phobos reccomends the Open Publication License with Option A at
|
|
http://opencontent.org/openpub/)
|
|
P - ask Jan/Jens to be the translation coordinator? add to volunteer page.
|
|
I - add a page for localizing all tor's components.
|
|
- It would be neat if we had a single place that described _all_ the
|
|
tor-related tools you can use, and what they give you, and how well they
|
|
work. Right now, we don't give a lot of guidance wrt
|
|
torbutton/foxproxy/privoxy/polipo in any consistent place.
|
|
P - create a 'blog badge' for tor fans to link to and feature on their
|
|
blogs. A sample is at http://interloper.org/tmp/tor/tor-button.png
|
|
- More prominently, we should have a recommended apps list.
|
|
- recommend pidgin (gaim is renamed)
|
|
- unrecommend IE because of ftp:// bug.
|
|
- Addenda to tor-design
|
|
- we should add a preamble to tor-design saying it's out of date.
|
|
- we should add an appendix or errata on what's changed.
|
|
|
|
- Tor mirrors
|
|
- make a mailing list with the mirror operators
|
|
o make an automated tool to check /project/trace/ at mirrors to
|
|
learn which ones are lagging behind.
|
|
- auto (or manually) cull the mirrors that are broken; and
|
|
contact their operator?
|
|
- a set of instructions for mirror operators to make their apaches
|
|
serve our charsets correctly, and bonus points for language
|
|
negotiation.
|
|
- figure out how to load-balance the downloads across mirrors?
|
|
- ponder how to get users to learn that they should google for
|
|
"tor mirrors" if the main site is blocked.
|
|
- find a mirror volunteer to coordinate all of this
|