mirror of
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor.git
synced 2024-11-28 06:13:31 +01:00
f1e44399d3
svn:r1669
415 lines
20 KiB
Plaintext
415 lines
20 KiB
Plaintext
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Legend:
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SPEC!! - Not specified
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SPEC - Spec not finalized
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NICK - nick claims
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ARMA - arma claims
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- Not done
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* Top priority
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. Partially done
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o Done
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D Deferred
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X Abandoned
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Flag-day changes: (things which are backward incompatible)
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o remove link key from directories, from connection_t.
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(just get it from the tls cert)
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o Generate link keys on startup; don't store them to disk.
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o make onion keys include oaep padding, so you can tell
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if you decrypted it correctly
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o Rotate onion keys as needed
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- Rotate TLS connections [arma]
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- Set expiration times on X509 certs [nickm]
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. add bandwidthrate and bandwidthburst to server descriptor [nickm]
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- directories need to say who signed them. [nickm]
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- what other pieces of the descriptors need to change?
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maybe add a section for who's connected to a given router?
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add a flexible section for reputation info?
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Bugs:
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o we call signal(), but we should be calling sigaction()
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o send socks rejects when things go bad ?
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o on solaris, need to build with
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LDFLAGS="-lsocket -lnsl" ./configure
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o on solaris, we HAVE_UNAME but the uname() call fails?
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. should maybe make clients exit(1) when bad things happen?
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e.g. clock skew.
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o client-side dns cache doesn't appear to be getting populated
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by 'connected' cells. In fact, the 'connected' cells don't even
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include the IP.
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o When it can't resolve any dirservers, it is useless from then on.
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We should make it reload the RouterFile if it has no dirservers.
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o Sometimes it picks a middleman node as the exit for a circuit.
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o if you specify a non-dirserver as exitnode or entrynode, when it
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makes the first few circuits it hasn't yet fetched the directory,
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so it warns that it doesn't know the node.
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o make 'make test' exit(1) if a test fails.
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. fix buffer unit test so it passes
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Short-term:
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- should retry exitpolicy end streams even if the end cell didn't
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resolve the address for you
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o add in 'notice' log level
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X make recommendedversions different for clients and servers.
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e.g. C0.0.3 vs S0.0.3?
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o put IP into the descriptor, so clients don't need to resolve things
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o when you hup, rewrite the router.desc file (and maybe others)
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- consider handling broken socks4 implementations
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o improve how it behaves when i remove a line from the approved-routers files
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- Make tls connections tls_close intentionally
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- Add '[...truncated]' or similar to truncated log entries (like the directory
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in connection_dir_process_inbuf()).
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. Make logs handle it better when writing to them fails.
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o leave server descriptor out of directory if it's too old
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o Rename ACI to circID
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o integrate rep_ok functions, see what breaks
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- update tor faq
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o obey SocksBindAddress, ORBindAddress
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o warn if we're running as root
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o make connection_flush_buf() more obviously obsolete
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o let hup reread the config file, eg so we can get new exit
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policies without restarting
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o Put recommended_versions in a config entry
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X use times(2) rather than gettimeofday to measure how long it
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takes to process a cell
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o Separate trying to rebuild a circuit because you have none from trying
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to rebuild a circuit because the current one is stale
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X Continue reading from socks port even while waiting for connect.
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o Exit policies
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o Spec how to write the exit policies
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o Path selection algorithms
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o Choose path more incrementally
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o Let user request first/last node
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o And disallow certain nodes
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D Choose path by jurisdiction, etc?
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o Make relay end cells have failure status and payload attached
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X let non-approved routers handshake.
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X Dirserver shouldn't put you in running-routers list if you haven't
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uploaded a descriptor recently
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X migrate to using nickname rather than addr:port for routers
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- migrate to using IPv6 sizes everywhere
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o Move from onions to ephemeral DH
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o incremental path building
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o transition circuit-level sendmes to hop-level sendmes
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o implement truncate, truncated
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o move from 192byte DH to 128byte DH, so it isn't so damn slow
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X exiting from not-last hop
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X OP logic to decide to extend/truncate a path
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X make sure exiting from the not-last hop works
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X logic to find last *open* hop, not last hop, in cpath
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o Remember address and port when beginning.
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- Extend by nickname/hostname/something, not by IP.
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- Need a relay teardown cell, separate from one-way ends.
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X remove per-connection rate limiting
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- Make it harder to circumvent bandwidth caps: look at number of bytes
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sent across sockets, not number sent inside TLS stream.
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o Audit users of connnection_remove and connection_free outside of
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main.c; many should use mark_for_close instead.
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Rendezvous service:
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o Design and specify protocol
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o Possible preliminary refactoring:
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o Should we break circuits up into "circuit-with-cpath" and
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"circuit-without-cpath"?
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o We need a way to tag circuits as special-purpose circuits for:
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o Connecting from Bob's OP to the introduction point
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o Sending introduction requests from the IPoint to Bob
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o Connecting from Alice to the rendezvous point for Bob
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o Connecting from Bob to the rendezvous point for Alice
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o Waiting at a rendezvous point to be joined
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o Joined to another circuit at the rendezvous point.
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(We should also enumerate all the states that these operations
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can be in.) [NM]
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o Add circuit metadata [NM]
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o Code to configure hidden services [NM] 4 hours
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o Service descriptors
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o OPs need to maintain identity keys for hidden services [NM]
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o Code to generate and parse service descriptors [NM]
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o Advertisement
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o Generate y.onion hostnames [NM]
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o Store y.onion hostnames to disk. [NM]
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o Code to do an HTTP connection over Tor from within Tor [RD]
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o Publish service descriptors to directory [RD]
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o Directory accepts and remembers service descriptors, and
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delivers them as requested
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o Frontend [RD]
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o Backend [NM]
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o Code for OPs to retrieve (and cache?) service descriptors [RD]
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o Rendezvous
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o Code as needed to generate and parse all rendezvous-related
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cell types, and do all handshaking [NM]
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o ORs implement introduction points
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o OPs with hidden services establish introduction points
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o ORs implement rendezvous points
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o OPs notice y.onion URLs, and:
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o Retrieve service descriptors
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o Establish rendezvous points
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o Send introduction requests to introduction points
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o Communication
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o OPs remember which circuits are used for which rendezvous
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points, and can look up circuits by location-hidden service
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o OPs send/handle BEGIN cells for location-hidden services
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o End-to-end communication for location-hidden services
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o a section in the man pages: how to configure hidden services
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o let bob use himself as a rendezvous point
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o let bob choose himself as intro point
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o let bob replenish his intro points and republish
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o alice retries introduction and rendezvous a few times?
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o ORs should not pick themselves while building general circs
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o should alice ever try to refresh her service desc cache entries?
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should she expire them after e.g. 15 mins?
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o race condition: alice has the serverdesc in her cache, she opens
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the circs, serverdesc expires and is flushed, then she goes
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to send the intro cell. should serverdesc cache have a
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last-touched field? are there better fixes?
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o backward compatibility: when only certain nodes know about rend
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protocol, how do we deal? have nodes parse the tor version field?
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force an upgrade? simply be more robust against useless nodes?
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o should expire rend streams when too much time has passed
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o should make failed rend/intro circs count toward alice's
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num_failed circs, to prevent madness when we're offline (But
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don't count failed rend circs toward Bob's total, or Alice
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can bork him.)
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o deal with edge_type in connection_edge.c
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o retry end for certain reasons (resolvefailed, policyfailed)
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- preemptively build and start rendezvous circs
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- preemptively build n-1 hops of intro circs?
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o (n)ack introduction requests?
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- cannibalize general circs?
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D how to set up multiple locations for a hidden service?
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o make bob publish only established intro circs?
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o when bob tries to connect to alice's chosen rend point, but
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can't, but it's not the fault of the last hop in the rend
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circ, then he should retry?
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- fix router_get_by_* functions so they can get ourselves too,
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and audit everything to make sure rend and intro points are
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just as likely to be us as not.
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On-going
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. Better comments for functions!
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. Go through log messages, reduce confusing error messages.
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. make the logs include more info (fd, etc)
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. Unit tests
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. Update the spec so it matches the code
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Mid-term:
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o Refactor: add own routerinfo to routerlist. Right now, only
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router_get_by_nickname knows about 'this router', as a hack to
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get circuit_launch_new to do the right thing.
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- Rotate tls-level connections -- make new ones, expire old ones.
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So we get actual key rotation, not just symmetric key rotation
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- And learn to transfer a circuit from one conn to another, so we
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can empty conns to expire them.
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o Are there anonymity issues with sequential streamIDs? Sequential
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circIDs? Eg an attacker can learn how many there have been.
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The fix is to initialize them randomly rather than at 1.
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- Look at having smallcells and largecells
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. Redo scheduler
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o fix SSL_read bug for buffered records
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- make round-robining more fair
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- What happens when a circuit's length is 1? What breaks?
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. streams / circuits
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o Implement streams
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o Rotate circuits after N minutes?
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X Circuits should expire when circuit->expire triggers
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NICK . Handle half-open connections
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o openssh is an application that uses half-open connections
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o Figure out what causes connections to close, standardize
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when we mark a connection vs when we tear it down
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o Look at what ssl does to keep from mutating data streams
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o Put CPU workers in separate processes
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o Handle multiple cpu workers (one for each cpu, plus one)
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o Queue for pending tasks if all workers full
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o Support the 'process this onion' task
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D Merge dnsworkers and cpuworkers to some extent
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o Handle cpuworkers dying
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. Scrubbing proxies
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- Find an smtp proxy?
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- Check the old smtp proxy code
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o Find an ftp proxy? wget --passive
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D Wait until there are packet redirectors for Linux
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. Get socks4a support into Mozilla
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. Tests
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o Testing harness/infrastructure
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D System tests (how?)
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- Performance tests, so we know when we've improved
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. webload infrastructure (Bruce)
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. httperf infrastructure (easy to set up)
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. oprofile (installed in RH >8.0)
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NICK . Daemonize and package
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o Teach it to fork and background
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. Red Hat spec file
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o Debian spec file equivalent
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. Portability
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. Which .h files are we actually using?
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. Port to:
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o Linux
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o BSD
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o Solaris
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o Cygwin
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. Win32
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o OS X
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- deal with pollhup / reached_eof on all platforms
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o openssl randomness
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o inet_ntoa
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o stdint.h
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- Make a script to set up a local network on your machine
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o More flexibility in node addressing
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D Support IPv6 rather than just 4
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o Handle multihomed servers (config variable to set IP)
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In the distant future:
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D tunnel tor cell protocol over http, for people who need to
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do http
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D better transport than tcp: reliable is necessary, but
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out-of-order delivery is fine (to some extent).
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D Load balancing between router twins
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D Keep track of load over links/nodes, to
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know who's hosed
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SPEC!! D Non-clique topologies
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D Advanced directory servers
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D Automated reputation management
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SPEC!! D Figure out how to do threshold directory servers
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D jurisdiction info in dirserver entries? other info?
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Older (done) todo stuff:
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For 0.0.2pre17:
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o Put a H(K | handshake) into the onionskin response
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o Make cells 512 bytes
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o Reduce streamid footprint from 7 bytes to 2 bytes
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X Check for collisions in streamid (now possible with
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just 2 bytes), and back up & replace with padding if so
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o Use the 4 reserved bytes in each cell header to keep 1/5
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of a sha1 of the ongoing relay payload (move into stream header)
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o Move length into the stream header too
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o Make length 2 bytes
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D increase DH key length
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D increase RSA key length
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D Spec the stream_id stuff. Clarify that nobody on the backward
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stream should look at stream_id.
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For 0.0.2pre15:
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o don't pick exit nodes which will certainly reject all things.
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o don't pick nodes that the directory says are down
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o choose randomly from running dirservers, not just first one
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o install the man page
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o warn when client-side tries an address/port which no router in the dir accepts.
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For 0.0.2pre14:
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o More flexible exit policies (18.*, 18.0.0.0/8)
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o Work to succeed in the precense of exit policy violation
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o Replace desired_path_len with opaque path-selection specifier
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o Client-side DNS caching
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o Add entries to client DNS cache based on END cells
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o Remove port from END_REASON_EXITPOLICY cells
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o Start building new circuits when we get an exit-policy
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failure. (Defer exiting from the middle of existing
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circuits or extending existing circuits for later.)
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o Implement function to check whether a routerinfo_t
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supports a given exit addr.
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o Choose the exit node of an in-progress circuit based on
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pending AP connections.
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o Choose the exit node _first_, then beginning, then
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middle nodes.
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Previous:
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o Get tor to act like a socks server
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o socks4, socks4a
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o socks5
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o routers have identity key, link key, onion key.
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o link key certs are
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D signed by identity key
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D not in descriptor
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o not in config
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D not on disk
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o identity and onion keys are in descriptor (and disk)
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o upon boot, if it doesn't find identity key, generate it and write it.
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o also write a file with the identity key fingerprint in it
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o router generates descriptor: flesh out router_get_my_descriptor()
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o Routers sign descriptors with identity key
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o routers put version number in descriptor
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o routers should maybe have `uname -a` in descriptor?
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o Give nicknames to routers
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o in config
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o in descriptors
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o router posts descriptor
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o when it boots
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o every DirFetchPostPeriod seconds
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D when it changes
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o change tls stuff so certs don't get written to disk, or read from disk
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o make directory.c 'thread'safe
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o dirserver parses descriptor
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o dirserver checks signature
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D client checks signature?
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o dirserver writes directory to file
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o reads that file upon boot
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o directory includes all routers, up and down
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o add "up" line to directory, listing nicknames
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o instruments ORs to report stats
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o average cell fullness
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o average bandwidth used
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o configure log files. separate log file, separate severities.
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o what assumptions break if we fclose(0) when we daemonize?
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o make buffer struct elements opaque outside buffers.c
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o add log convention to the HACKING file
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o make 'make install' do the right thing
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o change binary name to tor
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o change config files so you look at commandline, else look in
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/etc/torrc. no cascading.
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o have an absolute datadir with fixed names for files, and fixed-name
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keydir under that with fixed names
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o Move (most of) the router/directory code out of main.c
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o Simple directory servers
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o Include key in source; sign directories
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o Signed directory backend
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o Document
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o Integrate
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o Add versions to code
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o Have directories list recommended-versions
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o Include line in directories
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o Check for presence of line.
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o Quit if running the wrong version
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o Command-line option to override quit
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o Add more information to directory server entries
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o Exit policies
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o Clearer bandwidth management
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o Do we want to remove bandwidth from OR handshakes?
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o What about OP handshakes?
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X Move away from openssl
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o Abstract out crypto calls
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X Look at nss, others? Just include code?
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o Use a stronger cipher
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o aes now, by including the code ourselves
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X On the fly compression of each stream
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o Clean up the event loop (optimize and sanitize)
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o Remove that awful concept of 'roles'
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o Terminology
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o Circuits, topics, cells stay named that
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o 'Connection' gets divided, or renamed, or something?
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o DNS farm
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o Distribute queries onto the farm, get answers
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o Preemptively grow a new worker before he's needed
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o Prune workers when too many are idle
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o DNS cache
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o Clear DNS cache over time
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D Honor DNS TTL info (how??)
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o Have strategy when all workers are busy
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o Keep track of which connections are in dns_wait
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o Need to cache positives/negatives on the tor side
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o Keep track of which queries have been asked
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o Better error handling when
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o An address doesn't resolve
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o We have max workers running
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o Consider taking the master out of the loop?
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X Implement reply onions
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o Total rate limiting
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o Look at OR handshake in more detail
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o Spec it
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o Merge OR and OP handshakes
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o rearrange connection_or so it doesn't suck so much to read
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D Periodic link key rotation. Spec?
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o wrap malloc with something that explodes when it fails
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o Clean up the number of places that get to look at prkey
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