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134 lines
5.6 KiB
Plaintext
134 lines
5.6 KiB
Plaintext
Filename: 165-simple-robust-voting.txt
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Title: Easy migration for voting authority sets
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Author: Nick Mathewson
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Created: 2009-05-28
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Status: Open
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Overview:
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This proposal describes any easy-to-implement, easy-to-verify way to
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change the set of authorities without creating a "flag day" situation.
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Motivation:
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From proposal 134 ("More robust consensus voting with diverse
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authority sets") by Peter Palfrader:
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Right now there are about five authoritative directory servers
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in the Tor network, tho this number is expected to rise to about
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15 eventually.
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Adding a new authority requires synchronized action from all
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operators of directory authorities so that at any time during the
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update at least half of all authorities are running and agree on
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who is an authority. The latter requirement is there so that the
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authorities can arrive at a common consensus: Each authority
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builds the consensus based on the votes from all authorities it
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recognizes, and so a different set of recognized authorities will
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lead to a different consensus document.
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In response to this problem, proposal 134 suggested that every
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candidate authority list in its vote whom it believes to be an
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authority. These A-says-B-is-an-authority relationships form a
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directed graph. Each authority then iteratively finds the largest
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clique in the graph and remove it, until they find one containing
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them. They vote with this clique.
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Proposal 134 had some problems:
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- It had a security problem in that M hostile authorities in a
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clique could effectively kick out M-1 honest authorities. This
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could enable a minority of the original authorities to take over.
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- It was too complex in its implications to analyze well: it took us
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over a year to realize that it was insecure.
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- It tried to solve a bigger problem: general fragmentation of
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authority trust. Really, all we wanted to have was the ability to
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add and remove authorities without forcing a flag day.
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Proposed protocol design:
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A "Voting Set" is a set of authorities. Each authority has a list of
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the voting sets it considers acceptable. These sets are chosen
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manually by the authority operators. They must always contain the
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authority itself. Each authority lists all of these voting sets in
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its votes.
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Authorities exchange votes with every other authority in any of their
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voting sets.
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When it is time to calculate a consensus, an authority votes with
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whichever voting set it lists that is listed by the most members of
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that set. In other words, given two sets S1 and S2 that an authority
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lists, that authority will prefer to vote with S1 over S2 whenever
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the number of other authorities in S1 that themselves list S1 is
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higher than the number of other authorities in S2 that themselves
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list S2.
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For example, suppose authority A recognizes two sets, "A B C D" and
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"A E F G H". Suppose that the first set is recognized by all of A,
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B, C, and D, whereas the second set is recognized only by A, E, and
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F. Because the first set is recognize by more of the authorities in
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it than the other one, A will vote with the first set.
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Ties are broken in favor of some arbitrary function of the identity
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keys of the authorities in the set.
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How to migrate authority sets:
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In steady state, each authority operator should list only the current
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actual voting set as accepted.
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When we want to add an authority, each authority operator configures
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his or her server to list two voting sets: one containing all the old
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authorities, and one containing the old authorities and the new
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authority too. Once all authorities are listing the new set of
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authorities, they will start voting with that set because of its
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size.
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What if one or two authority operators are slow to list the new set?
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Then the other operators can stop listing the old set once there are
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enough authorities listing the new set to make its voting successful.
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(Note that these authorities not listing the new set will still have
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their votes counted, since they themselves will be members of the new
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set. They will only fail to sign the consensus generated by the
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other authorities who are using the new set.)
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When we want to remove an authority, the operators list two voting
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sets: one containing all the authorities, and one omitting the
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authority we want to remove. Once enough authorities list the new
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set as acceptable, we start having authority operators stop listing
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the old set. Once there are more listing the new set than the old
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set, the new set will win.
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Data format changes:
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Add a new 'voting-set' line to the vote document format. Allow it to
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occur any number of times. Its format is:
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voting-set SP 'fingerprint' SP 'fingerprint' ... NL
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where each fingerprint is the hex fingerprint of an identity key of
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an authority. Sort fingerprints in ascending order.
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When the consensus method is at least 'X' (decide this when we
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implement the proposal), add this line to the consensus format as
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well, before the first dir-source line. [This information is not
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redundant with the dir-source sections in the consensus: If an
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authority is recognized but didn't vote, that authority will appear in
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the voting-set line but not in the dir-source sections.]
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We don't need to list other information about authorities in our
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vote.
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Migration issues:
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We should keep track somewhere of which Tor client versions
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recognized which authorities.
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Acknowledgments:
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The design came out of an IRC conversation with Peter Palfrader. He
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had the basic idea first.
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