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ca7c53d3cc
traffic when RelayBandwidthRate is set. (Refines proposal 111.) svn:r10974
2925 lines
97 KiB
C
2925 lines
97 KiB
C
/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
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* Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
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* Copyright (c) 2004-2007, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. */
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/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
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/* $Id$ */
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const char circuitbuild_c_id[] =
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"$Id$";
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/**
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* \file circuitbuild.c
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* \brief The actual details of building circuits.
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**/
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#include "or.h"
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/********* START VARIABLES **********/
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/** A global list of all circuits at this hop. */
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extern circuit_t *global_circuitlist;
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/** An entry_guard_t represents our information about a chosen long-term
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* first hop, known as a "helper" node in the literature. We can't just
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* use a routerinfo_t, since we want to remember these even when we
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* don't have a directory. */
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typedef struct {
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char nickname[MAX_NICKNAME_LEN+1];
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char identity[DIGEST_LEN];
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unsigned int made_contact : 1; /**< 0 if we have never connected to this
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* router, 1 if we have. */
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unsigned int can_retry : 1; /**< Should we retry connecting to this entry,
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* in spite of having it marked as unreachable?*/
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time_t bad_since; /**< 0 if this guard is currently usable, or the time at
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* which it was observed to become (according to the
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* directory or the user configuration) unusable. */
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time_t unreachable_since; /**< 0 if we can connect to this guard, or the
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* time at which we first noticed we couldn't
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* connect to it. */
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time_t last_attempted; /**< 0 if we can connect to this guard, or the time
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* at which we last failed to connect to it. */
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} entry_guard_t;
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/** A list of our chosen entry guards. */
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static smartlist_t *entry_guards = NULL;
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/** A value of 1 means that the entry_guards list has changed
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* and those changes need to be flushed to disk. */
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static int entry_guards_dirty = 0;
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/********* END VARIABLES ************/
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static int circuit_deliver_create_cell(circuit_t *circ,
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uint8_t cell_type, const char *payload);
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static int onion_pick_cpath_exit(origin_circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *exit);
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static crypt_path_t *onion_next_hop_in_cpath(crypt_path_t *cpath);
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static int onion_extend_cpath(origin_circuit_t *circ);
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static int count_acceptable_routers(smartlist_t *routers);
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static int onion_append_hop(crypt_path_t **head_ptr, extend_info_t *choice);
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static void entry_guards_changed(void);
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/** Iterate over values of circ_id, starting from conn-\>next_circ_id,
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* and with the high bit specified by conn-\>circ_id_type, until we get
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* a circ_id that is not in use by any other circuit on that conn.
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*
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* Return it, or 0 if can't get a unique circ_id.
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*/
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static uint16_t
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get_unique_circ_id_by_conn(or_connection_t *conn)
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{
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uint16_t test_circ_id;
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uint16_t attempts=0;
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uint16_t high_bit;
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tor_assert(conn);
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if (conn->circ_id_type == CIRC_ID_TYPE_NEITHER) {
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log_warn(LD_BUG, "Trying to pick a circuit ID for a connection from "
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"a client with no identity.");
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return 0;
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}
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high_bit = (conn->circ_id_type == CIRC_ID_TYPE_HIGHER) ? 1<<15 : 0;
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do {
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/* Sequentially iterate over test_circ_id=1...1<<15-1 until we find a
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* circID such that (high_bit|test_circ_id) is not already used. */
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test_circ_id = conn->next_circ_id++;
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if (test_circ_id == 0 || test_circ_id >= 1<<15) {
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test_circ_id = 1;
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conn->next_circ_id = 2;
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}
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if (++attempts > 1<<15) {
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/* Make sure we don't loop forever if all circ_id's are used. This
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* matters because it's an external DoS opportunity.
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*/
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log_warn(LD_CIRC,"No unused circ IDs. Failing.");
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return 0;
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}
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test_circ_id |= high_bit;
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} while (circuit_get_by_circid_orconn(test_circ_id, conn));
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return test_circ_id;
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}
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/** If <b>verbose</b> is false, allocate and return a comma-separated list of
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* the currently built elements of circuit_t. If <b>verbose</b> is true, also
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* list information about link status in a more verbose format using spaces.
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* If <b>verbose_names</b> is false, give nicknames for Named routers and hex
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* digests for others; if <b>verbose_names</b> is true, use $DIGEST=Name style
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* names.
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*/
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static char *
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circuit_list_path_impl(origin_circuit_t *circ, int verbose, int verbose_names)
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{
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crypt_path_t *hop;
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smartlist_t *elements;
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const char *states[] = {"closed", "waiting for keys", "open"};
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char buf[128];
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char *s;
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elements = smartlist_create();
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if (verbose) {
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const char *nickname = build_state_get_exit_nickname(circ->build_state);
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tor_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s%s circ (length %d%s%s):",
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circ->build_state->is_internal ? "internal" : "exit",
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circ->build_state->need_uptime ? " (high-uptime)" : "",
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circ->build_state->desired_path_len,
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circ->_base.state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN ? "" : ", exit ",
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circ->_base.state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN ? "" :
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(nickname?nickname:"*unnamed*"));
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smartlist_add(elements, tor_strdup(buf));
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}
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hop = circ->cpath;
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do {
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routerinfo_t *ri;
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char *elt;
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if (!hop)
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break;
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if (!verbose && hop->state != CPATH_STATE_OPEN)
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break;
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if (!hop->extend_info)
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break;
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if (verbose_names) {
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elt = tor_malloc(MAX_VERBOSE_NICKNAME_LEN+1);
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if ((ri = router_get_by_digest(hop->extend_info->identity_digest))) {
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router_get_verbose_nickname(elt, ri);
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} else if (hop->extend_info->nickname &&
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is_legal_nickname(hop->extend_info->nickname)) {
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elt[0] = '$';
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base16_encode(elt+1, HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1,
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hop->extend_info->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
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elt[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1]= '~';
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strlcpy(elt+HEX_DIGEST_LEN+2,
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hop->extend_info->nickname, MAX_NICKNAME_LEN+1);
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} else {
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elt[0] = '$';
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base16_encode(elt+1, HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1,
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hop->extend_info->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
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}
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} else { /* ! verbose_names */
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if ((ri = router_get_by_digest(hop->extend_info->identity_digest)) &&
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ri->is_named) {
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elt = tor_strdup(hop->extend_info->nickname);
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} else {
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elt = tor_malloc(HEX_DIGEST_LEN+2);
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elt[0] = '$';
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base16_encode(elt+1, HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1,
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hop->extend_info->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
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}
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}
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tor_assert(elt);
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if (verbose) {
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size_t len = strlen(elt)+2+strlen(states[hop->state])+1;
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char *v = tor_malloc(len);
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tor_assert(hop->state <= 2);
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tor_snprintf(v,len,"%s(%s)",elt,states[hop->state]);
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smartlist_add(elements, v);
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tor_free(elt);
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} else {
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smartlist_add(elements, elt);
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}
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hop = hop->next;
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} while (hop != circ->cpath);
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s = smartlist_join_strings(elements, verbose?" ":",", 0, NULL);
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SMARTLIST_FOREACH(elements, char*, cp, tor_free(cp));
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smartlist_free(elements);
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return s;
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}
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/** If <b>verbose</b> is false, allocate and return a comma-separated
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* list of the currently built elements of circuit_t. If
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* <b>verbose</b> is true, also list information about link status in
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* a more verbose format using spaces.
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*/
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char *
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circuit_list_path(origin_circuit_t *circ, int verbose)
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{
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return circuit_list_path_impl(circ, verbose, 0);
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}
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/** Allocate and return a comma-separated list of the currently built elements
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* of circuit_t, giving each as a verbose nickname.
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*/
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char *
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circuit_list_path_for_controller(origin_circuit_t *circ)
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{
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return circuit_list_path_impl(circ, 0, 1);
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}
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/** Log, at severity <b>severity</b>, the nicknames of each router in
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* circ's cpath. Also log the length of the cpath, and the intended
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* exit point.
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*/
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void
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circuit_log_path(int severity, unsigned int domain, origin_circuit_t *circ)
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{
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char *s = circuit_list_path(circ,1);
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log(severity,domain,"%s",s);
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tor_free(s);
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}
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/** Tell the rep(utation)hist(ory) module about the status of the links
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* in circ. Hops that have become OPEN are marked as successfully
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* extended; the _first_ hop that isn't open (if any) is marked as
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* unable to extend.
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*/
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/* XXXX Someday we should learn from OR circuits too. */
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void
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circuit_rep_hist_note_result(origin_circuit_t *circ)
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{
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crypt_path_t *hop;
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char *prev_digest = NULL;
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routerinfo_t *router;
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hop = circ->cpath;
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if (!hop) /* circuit hasn't started building yet. */
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return;
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if (server_mode(get_options())) {
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routerinfo_t *me = router_get_my_routerinfo();
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if (!me)
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return;
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prev_digest = me->cache_info.identity_digest;
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}
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do {
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router = router_get_by_digest(hop->extend_info->identity_digest);
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if (router) {
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if (prev_digest) {
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if (hop->state == CPATH_STATE_OPEN)
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rep_hist_note_extend_succeeded(prev_digest,
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router->cache_info.identity_digest);
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else {
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rep_hist_note_extend_failed(prev_digest,
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router->cache_info.identity_digest);
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break;
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}
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}
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prev_digest = router->cache_info.identity_digest;
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} else {
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prev_digest = NULL;
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}
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hop=hop->next;
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} while (hop!=circ->cpath);
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}
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/** Pick all the entries in our cpath. Stop and return 0 when we're
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* happy, or return -1 if an error occurs. */
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static int
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onion_populate_cpath(origin_circuit_t *circ)
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{
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int r;
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again:
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r = onion_extend_cpath(circ);
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if (r < 0) {
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log_info(LD_CIRC,"Generating cpath hop failed.");
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return -1;
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}
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if (r == 0)
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goto again;
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return 0; /* if r == 1 */
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}
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/** Create and return a new origin circuit. Initialize its purpose and
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* build-state based on our arguments. */
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origin_circuit_t *
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origin_circuit_init(uint8_t purpose, int onehop_tunnel,
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int need_uptime, int need_capacity, int internal)
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{
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/* sets circ->p_circ_id and circ->p_conn */
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origin_circuit_t *circ = origin_circuit_new();
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circuit_set_state(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), CIRCUIT_STATE_OR_WAIT);
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circ->build_state = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(cpath_build_state_t));
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circ->build_state->onehop_tunnel = onehop_tunnel;
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circ->build_state->need_uptime = need_uptime;
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circ->build_state->need_capacity = need_capacity;
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circ->build_state->is_internal = internal;
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circ->_base.purpose = purpose;
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return circ;
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}
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/** Build a new circuit for <b>purpose</b>. If <b>exit</b>
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* is defined, then use that as your exit router, else choose a suitable
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* exit node.
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*
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* Also launch a connection to the first OR in the chosen path, if
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* it's not open already.
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*/
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origin_circuit_t *
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circuit_establish_circuit(uint8_t purpose, int onehop_tunnel,
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extend_info_t *exit,
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int need_uptime, int need_capacity, int internal)
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{
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origin_circuit_t *circ;
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int err_reason = 0;
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circ = origin_circuit_init(purpose, onehop_tunnel,
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need_uptime, need_capacity, internal);
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if (onion_pick_cpath_exit(circ, exit) < 0 ||
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onion_populate_cpath(circ) < 0) {
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circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_NOPATH);
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return NULL;
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}
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control_event_circuit_status(circ, CIRC_EVENT_LAUNCHED, 0);
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if ((err_reason = circuit_handle_first_hop(circ)) < 0) {
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circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), -err_reason);
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return NULL;
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}
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return circ;
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}
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/** Start establishing the first hop of our circuit. Figure out what
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* OR we should connect to, and if necessary start the connection to
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* it. If we're already connected, then send the 'create' cell.
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* Return 0 for ok, -reason if circ should be marked-for-close. */
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int
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circuit_handle_first_hop(origin_circuit_t *circ)
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{
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crypt_path_t *firsthop;
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or_connection_t *n_conn;
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char tmpbuf[INET_NTOA_BUF_LEN];
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struct in_addr in;
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int err_reason = 0;
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firsthop = onion_next_hop_in_cpath(circ->cpath);
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tor_assert(firsthop);
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tor_assert(firsthop->extend_info);
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/* now see if we're already connected to the first OR in 'route' */
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in.s_addr = htonl(firsthop->extend_info->addr);
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tor_inet_ntoa(&in, tmpbuf, sizeof(tmpbuf));
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log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Looking for firsthop '%s:%u'",tmpbuf,
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firsthop->extend_info->port);
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/* imprint the circuit with its future n_conn->id */
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memcpy(circ->_base.n_conn_id_digest, firsthop->extend_info->identity_digest,
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DIGEST_LEN);
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n_conn = connection_or_get_by_identity_digest(
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firsthop->extend_info->identity_digest);
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/* If we don't have an open conn, or the conn we have is obsolete
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* (i.e. old or broken) and the other side will let us make a second
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* connection without dropping it immediately... */
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if (!n_conn || n_conn->_base.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN ||
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(n_conn->_base.or_is_obsolete &&
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router_digest_version_as_new_as(firsthop->extend_info->identity_digest,
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"0.1.1.9-alpha-cvs"))) {
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/* not currently connected */
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circ->_base.n_addr = firsthop->extend_info->addr;
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circ->_base.n_port = firsthop->extend_info->port;
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if (!n_conn || n_conn->_base.or_is_obsolete) { /* launch the connection */
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n_conn = connection_or_connect(firsthop->extend_info->addr,
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firsthop->extend_info->port,
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firsthop->extend_info->identity_digest);
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if (!n_conn) { /* connect failed, forget the whole thing */
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log_info(LD_CIRC,"connect to firsthop failed. Closing.");
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return -END_CIRC_REASON_CONNECTFAILED;
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}
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}
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log_debug(LD_CIRC,"connecting in progress (or finished). Good.");
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/* return success. The onion/circuit/etc will be taken care of
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* automatically (may already have been) whenever n_conn reaches
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* OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN.
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*/
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return 0;
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} else { /* it's already open. use it. */
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circ->_base.n_addr = n_conn->_base.addr;
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circ->_base.n_port = n_conn->_base.port;
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circ->_base.n_conn = n_conn;
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log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Conn open. Delivering first onion skin.");
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if ((err_reason = circuit_send_next_onion_skin(circ)) < 0) {
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log_info(LD_CIRC,"circuit_send_next_onion_skin failed.");
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return err_reason;
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}
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}
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return 0;
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}
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/** Find any circuits that are waiting on <b>or_conn</b> to become
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* open and get them to send their create cells forward.
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*
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* Status is 1 if connect succeeded, or 0 if connect failed.
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*/
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void
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circuit_n_conn_done(or_connection_t *or_conn, int status)
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{
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smartlist_t *pending_circs;
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int err_reason = 0;
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log_debug(LD_CIRC,"or_conn to %s, status=%d",
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or_conn->nickname ? or_conn->nickname : "NULL", status);
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pending_circs = smartlist_create();
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circuit_get_all_pending_on_or_conn(pending_circs, or_conn);
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SMARTLIST_FOREACH(pending_circs, circuit_t *, circ,
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{
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/* These checks are redundant wrt get_all_pending_on_or_conn, but I'm
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* leaving them in in case it's possible for the status of a circuit to
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* change as we're going down the list. */
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if (circ->marked_for_close || circ->n_conn ||
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circ->state != CIRCUIT_STATE_OR_WAIT)
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continue;
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if (tor_digest_is_zero(circ->n_conn_id_digest)) {
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/* Look at addr/port. This is an unkeyed connection. */
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if (circ->n_addr != or_conn->_base.addr ||
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circ->n_port != or_conn->_base.port)
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continue;
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/* now teach circ the right identity_digest */
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memcpy(circ->n_conn_id_digest, or_conn->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
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} else {
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/* We expected a key. See if it's the right one. */
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if (memcmp(or_conn->identity_digest,
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circ->n_conn_id_digest, DIGEST_LEN))
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continue;
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}
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if (!status) { /* or_conn failed; close circ */
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log_info(LD_CIRC,"or_conn failed. Closing circ.");
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circuit_mark_for_close(circ, END_CIRC_REASON_OR_CONN_CLOSED);
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continue;
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}
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log_debug(LD_CIRC, "Found circ, sending create cell.");
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/* circuit_deliver_create_cell will set n_circ_id and add us to
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* orconn_circuid_circuit_map, so we don't need to call
|
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* set_circid_orconn here. */
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circ->n_conn = or_conn;
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if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) {
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if ((err_reason =
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circuit_send_next_onion_skin(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ))) < 0) {
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|
log_info(LD_CIRC,
|
|
"send_next_onion_skin failed; circuit marked for closing.");
|
|
circuit_mark_for_close(circ, -err_reason);
|
|
continue;
|
|
/* XXX could this be bad, eg if next_onion_skin failed because conn
|
|
* died? */
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* pull the create cell out of circ->onionskin, and send it */
|
|
tor_assert(circ->onionskin);
|
|
if (circuit_deliver_create_cell(circ,CELL_CREATE,circ->onionskin)<0) {
|
|
circuit_mark_for_close(circ, END_CIRC_REASON_RESOURCELIMIT);
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
tor_free(circ->onionskin);
|
|
circuit_set_state(circ, CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN);
|
|
}
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
smartlist_free(pending_circs);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Find a new circid that isn't currently in use on the circ->n_conn
|
|
* for the outgoing
|
|
* circuit <b>circ</b>, and deliver a cell of type <b>cell_type</b>
|
|
* (either CELL_CREATE or CELL_CREATE_FAST) with payload <b>payload</b>
|
|
* to this circuit.
|
|
* Return -1 if we failed to find a suitable circid, else return 0.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
circuit_deliver_create_cell(circuit_t *circ, uint8_t cell_type,
|
|
const char *payload)
|
|
{
|
|
cell_t cell;
|
|
uint16_t id;
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(circ);
|
|
tor_assert(circ->n_conn);
|
|
tor_assert(payload);
|
|
tor_assert(cell_type == CELL_CREATE || cell_type == CELL_CREATE_FAST);
|
|
|
|
id = get_unique_circ_id_by_conn(circ->n_conn);
|
|
if (!id) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_CIRC,"failed to get unique circID.");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Chosen circID %u.", id);
|
|
circuit_set_n_circid_orconn(circ, id, circ->n_conn);
|
|
|
|
memset(&cell, 0, sizeof(cell_t));
|
|
cell.command = cell_type;
|
|
cell.circ_id = circ->n_circ_id;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(cell.payload, payload, ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN);
|
|
append_cell_to_circuit_queue(circ, circ->n_conn, &cell, CELL_DIRECTION_OUT);
|
|
|
|
/* mark it so it gets better rate limiting treatment. */
|
|
circ->n_conn->client_used = time(NULL);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** We've decided to start our reachability testing. If all
|
|
* is set, log this to the user. Return 1 if we did, or 0 if
|
|
* we chose not to log anything. */
|
|
int
|
|
inform_testing_reachability(void)
|
|
{
|
|
char dirbuf[128];
|
|
routerinfo_t *me = router_get_my_routerinfo();
|
|
if (!me)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
if (me->dir_port)
|
|
tor_snprintf(dirbuf, sizeof(dirbuf), " and DirPort %s:%d",
|
|
me->address, me->dir_port);
|
|
log(LOG_NOTICE, LD_OR, "Now checking whether ORPort %s:%d%s %s reachable... "
|
|
"(this may take up to %d minutes -- look for log "
|
|
"messages indicating success)",
|
|
me->address, me->or_port,
|
|
me->dir_port ? dirbuf : "",
|
|
me->dir_port ? "are" : "is",
|
|
TIMEOUT_UNTIL_UNREACHABILITY_COMPLAINT/60);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Return true iff we should send a create_fast cell to build a circuit
|
|
* starting at <b>router</b>. (If <b>router</b> is NULL, we don't have
|
|
* information on the router, so assume true.) */
|
|
static INLINE int
|
|
should_use_create_fast_for_router(routerinfo_t *router,
|
|
origin_circuit_t *circ)
|
|
{
|
|
or_options_t *options = get_options();
|
|
|
|
if (!options->FastFirstHopPK) /* create_fast is disabled */
|
|
return 0;
|
|
if (router && router->platform &&
|
|
!tor_version_as_new_as(router->platform, "0.1.0.6-rc")) {
|
|
/* known not to work */
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if (server_mode(options) && circ->cpath->extend_info->onion_key) {
|
|
/* We're a server, and we know an onion key. We can choose.
|
|
* Prefer to blend in. */
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** This is the backbone function for building circuits.
|
|
*
|
|
* If circ's first hop is closed, then we need to build a create
|
|
* cell and send it forward.
|
|
*
|
|
* Otherwise, we need to build a relay extend cell and send it
|
|
* forward.
|
|
*
|
|
* Return -reason if we want to tear down circ, else return 0.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
circuit_send_next_onion_skin(origin_circuit_t *circ)
|
|
{
|
|
crypt_path_t *hop;
|
|
routerinfo_t *router;
|
|
char payload[2+4+DIGEST_LEN+ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN];
|
|
char *onionskin;
|
|
size_t payload_len;
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(circ);
|
|
|
|
if (circ->cpath->state == CPATH_STATE_CLOSED) {
|
|
int fast;
|
|
uint8_t cell_type;
|
|
log_debug(LD_CIRC,"First skin; sending create cell.");
|
|
|
|
router = router_get_by_digest(circ->_base.n_conn->identity_digest);
|
|
fast = should_use_create_fast_for_router(router, circ);
|
|
if (!fast && !circ->cpath->extend_info->onion_key) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_CIRC,
|
|
"Can't send create_fast, but have no onion key. Failing.");
|
|
return - END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!fast) {
|
|
/* We are an OR, or we are connecting to an old Tor: we should
|
|
* send an old slow create cell.
|
|
*/
|
|
cell_type = CELL_CREATE;
|
|
if (onion_skin_create(circ->cpath->extend_info->onion_key,
|
|
&(circ->cpath->dh_handshake_state),
|
|
payload) < 0) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_CIRC,"onion_skin_create (first hop) failed.");
|
|
return - END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* We are not an OR, and we're building the first hop of a circuit to a
|
|
* new OR: we can be speedy and use CREATE_FAST to save an RSA operation
|
|
* and a DH operation. */
|
|
cell_type = CELL_CREATE_FAST;
|
|
memset(payload, 0, sizeof(payload));
|
|
crypto_rand(circ->cpath->fast_handshake_state,
|
|
sizeof(circ->cpath->fast_handshake_state));
|
|
memcpy(payload, circ->cpath->fast_handshake_state,
|
|
sizeof(circ->cpath->fast_handshake_state));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (circuit_deliver_create_cell(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), cell_type, payload) < 0)
|
|
return - END_CIRC_REASON_RESOURCELIMIT;
|
|
|
|
circ->cpath->state = CPATH_STATE_AWAITING_KEYS;
|
|
circuit_set_state(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), CIRCUIT_STATE_BUILDING);
|
|
log_info(LD_CIRC,"First hop: finished sending %s cell to '%s'",
|
|
fast ? "CREATE_FAST" : "CREATE",
|
|
router ? router->nickname : "<unnamed>");
|
|
} else {
|
|
tor_assert(circ->cpath->state == CPATH_STATE_OPEN);
|
|
tor_assert(circ->_base.state == CIRCUIT_STATE_BUILDING);
|
|
log_debug(LD_CIRC,"starting to send subsequent skin.");
|
|
hop = onion_next_hop_in_cpath(circ->cpath);
|
|
if (!hop) {
|
|
/* done building the circuit. whew. */
|
|
circuit_set_state(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN);
|
|
log_info(LD_CIRC,"circuit built!");
|
|
circuit_reset_failure_count(0);
|
|
if (!has_completed_circuit && !circ->build_state->onehop_tunnel) {
|
|
or_options_t *options = get_options();
|
|
has_completed_circuit=1;
|
|
/* FFFF Log a count of known routers here */
|
|
log(LOG_NOTICE, LD_GENERAL,
|
|
"Tor has successfully opened a circuit. "
|
|
"Looks like client functionality is working.");
|
|
control_event_client_status(LOG_NOTICE, "CIRCUIT_ESTABLISHED");
|
|
if (server_mode(options) && !check_whether_orport_reachable()) {
|
|
inform_testing_reachability();
|
|
consider_testing_reachability(1, 1);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
circuit_rep_hist_note_result(circ);
|
|
circuit_has_opened(circ); /* do other actions as necessary */
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
set_uint32(payload, htonl(hop->extend_info->addr));
|
|
set_uint16(payload+4, htons(hop->extend_info->port));
|
|
|
|
onionskin = payload+2+4;
|
|
memcpy(payload+2+4+ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN,
|
|
hop->extend_info->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
payload_len = 2+4+ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN+DIGEST_LEN;
|
|
|
|
if (onion_skin_create(hop->extend_info->onion_key,
|
|
&(hop->dh_handshake_state), onionskin) < 0) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_CIRC,"onion_skin_create failed.");
|
|
return - END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
log_info(LD_CIRC,"Sending extend relay cell.");
|
|
/* send it to hop->prev, because it will transfer
|
|
* it to a create cell and then send to hop */
|
|
if (relay_send_command_from_edge(0, TO_CIRCUIT(circ),
|
|
RELAY_COMMAND_EXTEND,
|
|
payload, payload_len, hop->prev) < 0)
|
|
return 0; /* circuit is closed */
|
|
|
|
hop->state = CPATH_STATE_AWAITING_KEYS;
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Our clock just jumped by <b>seconds_elapsed</b>. Assume
|
|
* something has also gone wrong with our network: notify the user,
|
|
* and abandon all not-yet-used circuits. */
|
|
void
|
|
circuit_note_clock_jumped(int seconds_elapsed)
|
|
{
|
|
int severity = server_mode(get_options()) ? LOG_WARN : LOG_NOTICE;
|
|
log(severity, LD_GENERAL, "Your clock just jumped %d seconds %s; "
|
|
"assuming established circuits no longer work.",
|
|
seconds_elapsed >=0 ? seconds_elapsed : -seconds_elapsed,
|
|
seconds_elapsed >=0 ? "forward" : "backward");
|
|
control_event_general_status(LOG_WARN, "CLOCK_JUMPED TIME=%d",
|
|
seconds_elapsed);
|
|
has_completed_circuit=0; /* so it'll log when it works again */
|
|
control_event_client_status(severity, "CIRCUIT_NOT_ESTABLISHED REASON=%s",
|
|
"CLOCK_JUMPED");
|
|
circuit_mark_all_unused_circs();
|
|
circuit_expire_all_dirty_circs();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Take the 'extend' cell, pull out addr/port plus the onion skin. Make
|
|
* sure we're connected to the next hop, and pass it the onion skin using
|
|
* a create cell. Return -1 if we want to warn and tear down the circuit,
|
|
* else return 0.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
circuit_extend(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ)
|
|
{
|
|
or_connection_t *n_conn;
|
|
relay_header_t rh;
|
|
char *onionskin;
|
|
char *id_digest=NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (circ->n_conn) {
|
|
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
|
|
"n_conn already set. Bug/attack. Closing.");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!server_mode(get_options())) {
|
|
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
|
|
"Got an extend cell, but running as a client. Closing.");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
relay_header_unpack(&rh, cell->payload);
|
|
|
|
if (rh.length < 4+2+ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN+DIGEST_LEN) {
|
|
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
|
|
"Wrong length %d on extend cell. Closing circuit.",
|
|
rh.length);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
circ->n_addr = ntohl(get_uint32(cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE));
|
|
circ->n_port = ntohs(get_uint16(cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE+4));
|
|
|
|
onionskin = cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE+4+2;
|
|
id_digest = cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE+4+2+ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN;
|
|
n_conn = connection_or_get_by_identity_digest(id_digest);
|
|
|
|
/* If we don't have an open conn, or the conn we have is obsolete
|
|
* (i.e. old or broken) and the other side will let us make a second
|
|
* connection without dropping it immediately... */
|
|
if (!n_conn || n_conn->_base.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN ||
|
|
(n_conn->_base.or_is_obsolete &&
|
|
router_digest_version_as_new_as(id_digest,"0.1.1.9-alpha-cvs"))) {
|
|
struct in_addr in;
|
|
char tmpbuf[INET_NTOA_BUF_LEN];
|
|
in.s_addr = htonl(circ->n_addr);
|
|
tor_inet_ntoa(&in,tmpbuf,sizeof(tmpbuf));
|
|
log_info(LD_CIRC|LD_OR,"Next router (%s:%d) not connected. Connecting.",
|
|
tmpbuf, circ->n_port);
|
|
|
|
circ->onionskin = tor_malloc(ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN);
|
|
memcpy(circ->onionskin, onionskin, ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN);
|
|
circuit_set_state(circ, CIRCUIT_STATE_OR_WAIT);
|
|
|
|
/* imprint the circuit with its future n_conn->id */
|
|
memcpy(circ->n_conn_id_digest, id_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
|
|
if (n_conn && !n_conn->_base.or_is_obsolete) {
|
|
circ->n_addr = n_conn->_base.addr;
|
|
circ->n_port = n_conn->_base.port;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* we should try to open a connection */
|
|
n_conn = connection_or_connect(circ->n_addr, circ->n_port, id_digest);
|
|
if (!n_conn) {
|
|
log_info(LD_CIRC,"Launching n_conn failed. Closing circuit.");
|
|
circuit_mark_for_close(circ, END_CIRC_REASON_CONNECTFAILED);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
log_debug(LD_CIRC,"connecting in progress (or finished). Good.");
|
|
}
|
|
/* return success. The onion/circuit/etc will be taken care of
|
|
* automatically (may already have been) whenever n_conn reaches
|
|
* OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN.
|
|
*/
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* these may be different if the router connected to us from elsewhere */
|
|
circ->n_addr = n_conn->_base.addr;
|
|
circ->n_port = n_conn->_base.port;
|
|
|
|
circ->n_conn = n_conn;
|
|
memcpy(circ->n_conn_id_digest, n_conn->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
log_debug(LD_CIRC,"n_conn is %s:%u",
|
|
n_conn->_base.address,n_conn->_base.port);
|
|
|
|
if (circuit_deliver_create_cell(circ, CELL_CREATE, onionskin) < 0)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Initialize cpath-\>{f|b}_{crypto|digest} from the key material in
|
|
* key_data. key_data must contain CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL bytes, which are
|
|
* used as follows:
|
|
* - 20 to initialize f_digest
|
|
* - 20 to initialize b_digest
|
|
* - 16 to key f_crypto
|
|
* - 16 to key b_crypto
|
|
*
|
|
* (If 'reverse' is true, then f_XX and b_XX are swapped.)
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
circuit_init_cpath_crypto(crypt_path_t *cpath, const char *key_data,
|
|
int reverse)
|
|
{
|
|
crypto_digest_env_t *tmp_digest;
|
|
crypto_cipher_env_t *tmp_crypto;
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(cpath);
|
|
tor_assert(key_data);
|
|
tor_assert(!(cpath->f_crypto || cpath->b_crypto ||
|
|
cpath->f_digest || cpath->b_digest));
|
|
|
|
cpath->f_digest = crypto_new_digest_env();
|
|
crypto_digest_add_bytes(cpath->f_digest, key_data, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
cpath->b_digest = crypto_new_digest_env();
|
|
crypto_digest_add_bytes(cpath->b_digest, key_data+DIGEST_LEN, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
|
|
if (!(cpath->f_crypto =
|
|
crypto_create_init_cipher(key_data+(2*DIGEST_LEN),1))) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG,"Forward cipher initialization failed.");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!(cpath->b_crypto =
|
|
crypto_create_init_cipher(key_data+(2*DIGEST_LEN)+CIPHER_KEY_LEN,0))) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG,"Backward cipher initialization failed.");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (reverse) {
|
|
tmp_digest = cpath->f_digest;
|
|
cpath->f_digest = cpath->b_digest;
|
|
cpath->b_digest = tmp_digest;
|
|
tmp_crypto = cpath->f_crypto;
|
|
cpath->f_crypto = cpath->b_crypto;
|
|
cpath->b_crypto = tmp_crypto;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** A created or extended cell came back to us on the circuit, and it included
|
|
* <b>reply</b> as its body. (If <b>reply_type</b> is CELL_CREATED, the body
|
|
* contains (the second DH key, plus KH). If <b>reply_type</b> is
|
|
* CELL_CREATED_FAST, the body contains a secret y and a hash H(x|y).)
|
|
*
|
|
* Calculate the appropriate keys and digests, make sure KH is
|
|
* correct, and initialize this hop of the cpath.
|
|
*
|
|
* Return - reason if we want to mark circ for close, else return 0.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
circuit_finish_handshake(origin_circuit_t *circ, uint8_t reply_type,
|
|
const char *reply)
|
|
{
|
|
char keys[CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN];
|
|
crypt_path_t *hop;
|
|
|
|
if (circ->cpath->state == CPATH_STATE_AWAITING_KEYS)
|
|
hop = circ->cpath;
|
|
else {
|
|
hop = onion_next_hop_in_cpath(circ->cpath);
|
|
if (!hop) { /* got an extended when we're all done? */
|
|
log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL,"got extended when circ already built? Closing.");
|
|
return - END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
tor_assert(hop->state == CPATH_STATE_AWAITING_KEYS);
|
|
|
|
if (reply_type == CELL_CREATED && hop->dh_handshake_state) {
|
|
if (onion_skin_client_handshake(hop->dh_handshake_state, reply, keys,
|
|
DIGEST_LEN*2+CIPHER_KEY_LEN*2) < 0) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_CIRC,"onion_skin_client_handshake failed.");
|
|
return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Remember hash of g^xy */
|
|
memcpy(hop->handshake_digest, reply+DH_KEY_LEN, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
} else if (reply_type == CELL_CREATED_FAST && !hop->dh_handshake_state) {
|
|
if (fast_client_handshake(hop->fast_handshake_state, reply, keys,
|
|
DIGEST_LEN*2+CIPHER_KEY_LEN*2) < 0) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_CIRC,"fast_client_handshake failed.");
|
|
return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
|
|
}
|
|
memcpy(hop->handshake_digest, reply+DIGEST_LEN, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
} else {
|
|
log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL,"CREATED cell type did not match CREATE cell type.");
|
|
return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (hop->dh_handshake_state) {
|
|
crypto_dh_free(hop->dh_handshake_state); /* don't need it anymore */
|
|
hop->dh_handshake_state = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
memset(hop->fast_handshake_state, 0, sizeof(hop->fast_handshake_state));
|
|
|
|
if (circuit_init_cpath_crypto(hop, keys, 0)<0) {
|
|
return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
hop->state = CPATH_STATE_OPEN;
|
|
log_info(LD_CIRC,"Finished building %scircuit hop:",
|
|
(reply_type == CELL_CREATED_FAST) ? "fast " : "");
|
|
circuit_log_path(LOG_INFO,LD_CIRC,circ);
|
|
control_event_circuit_status(circ, CIRC_EVENT_EXTENDED, 0);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** We received a relay truncated cell on circ.
|
|
*
|
|
* Since we don't ask for truncates currently, getting a truncated
|
|
* means that a connection broke or an extend failed. For now,
|
|
* just give up: for circ to close, and return 0.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
circuit_truncated(origin_circuit_t *circ, crypt_path_t *layer)
|
|
{
|
|
// crypt_path_t *victim;
|
|
// connection_t *stream;
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(circ);
|
|
tor_assert(layer);
|
|
|
|
/* XXX Since we don't ask for truncates currently, getting a truncated
|
|
* means that a connection broke or an extend failed. For now,
|
|
* just give up.
|
|
*/
|
|
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ),
|
|
END_CIRC_REASON_FLAG_REMOTE|END_CIRC_REASON_OR_CONN_CLOSED);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
#if 0
|
|
while (layer->next != circ->cpath) {
|
|
/* we need to clear out layer->next */
|
|
victim = layer->next;
|
|
log_debug(LD_CIRC, "Killing a layer of the cpath.");
|
|
|
|
for (stream = circ->p_streams; stream; stream=stream->next_stream) {
|
|
if (stream->cpath_layer == victim) {
|
|
log_info(LD_APP, "Marking stream %d for close because of truncate.",
|
|
stream->stream_id);
|
|
/* no need to send 'end' relay cells,
|
|
* because the other side's already dead
|
|
*/
|
|
connection_mark_unattached_ap(stream, END_STREAM_REASON_DESTROY);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
layer->next = victim->next;
|
|
circuit_free_cpath_node(victim);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
log_info(LD_CIRC, "finished");
|
|
return 0;
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Given a response payload and keys, initialize, then send a created
|
|
* cell back.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
onionskin_answer(or_circuit_t *circ, uint8_t cell_type, const char *payload,
|
|
const char *keys)
|
|
{
|
|
cell_t cell;
|
|
crypt_path_t *tmp_cpath;
|
|
|
|
tmp_cpath = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(crypt_path_t));
|
|
tmp_cpath->magic = CRYPT_PATH_MAGIC;
|
|
|
|
memset(&cell, 0, sizeof(cell_t));
|
|
cell.command = cell_type;
|
|
cell.circ_id = circ->p_circ_id;
|
|
|
|
circuit_set_state(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN);
|
|
|
|
memcpy(cell.payload, payload,
|
|
cell_type == CELL_CREATED ? ONIONSKIN_REPLY_LEN : DIGEST_LEN*2);
|
|
|
|
log_debug(LD_CIRC,"init digest forward 0x%.8x, backward 0x%.8x.",
|
|
(unsigned int)*(uint32_t*)(keys),
|
|
(unsigned int)*(uint32_t*)(keys+20));
|
|
if (circuit_init_cpath_crypto(tmp_cpath, keys, 0)<0) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG,"Circuit initialization failed");
|
|
tor_free(tmp_cpath);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
circ->n_digest = tmp_cpath->f_digest;
|
|
circ->n_crypto = tmp_cpath->f_crypto;
|
|
circ->p_digest = tmp_cpath->b_digest;
|
|
circ->p_crypto = tmp_cpath->b_crypto;
|
|
tmp_cpath->magic = 0;
|
|
tor_free(tmp_cpath);
|
|
|
|
if (cell_type == CELL_CREATED)
|
|
memcpy(circ->handshake_digest, cell.payload+DH_KEY_LEN, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
else
|
|
memcpy(circ->handshake_digest, cell.payload+DIGEST_LEN, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
|
|
circ->is_first_hop = (cell_type == CELL_CREATED_FAST);
|
|
|
|
append_cell_to_circuit_queue(TO_CIRCUIT(circ),
|
|
circ->p_conn, &cell, CELL_DIRECTION_IN);
|
|
log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Finished sending 'created' cell.");
|
|
|
|
if (!is_local_IP(circ->p_conn->_base.addr) &&
|
|
!connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(circ->p_conn)) {
|
|
/* record that we could process create cells from a non-local conn
|
|
* that we didn't initiate; presumably this means that create cells
|
|
* can reach us too. */
|
|
router_orport_found_reachable();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Choose a length for a circuit of purpose <b>purpose</b>.
|
|
* Default length is 3 + the number of endpoints that would give something
|
|
* away. If the routerlist <b>routers</b> doesn't have enough routers
|
|
* to handle the desired path length, return as large a path length as
|
|
* is feasible, except if it's less than 2, in which case return -1.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
new_route_len(uint8_t purpose, extend_info_t *exit,
|
|
smartlist_t *routers)
|
|
{
|
|
int num_acceptable_routers;
|
|
int routelen;
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(routers);
|
|
|
|
#ifdef TOR_PERF
|
|
routelen = 2;
|
|
#else
|
|
routelen = 3;
|
|
if (exit &&
|
|
purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING &&
|
|
purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO)
|
|
routelen++;
|
|
#endif
|
|
log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Chosen route length %d (%d routers available).",
|
|
routelen, smartlist_len(routers));
|
|
|
|
num_acceptable_routers = count_acceptable_routers(routers);
|
|
|
|
if (num_acceptable_routers < 2) {
|
|
log_info(LD_CIRC,
|
|
"Not enough acceptable routers (%d). Discarding this circuit.",
|
|
num_acceptable_routers);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (num_acceptable_routers < routelen) {
|
|
log_info(LD_CIRC,"Not enough routers: cutting routelen from %d to %d.",
|
|
routelen, num_acceptable_routers);
|
|
routelen = num_acceptable_routers;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return routelen;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Fetch the list of predicted ports, dup it into a smartlist of
|
|
* uint16_t's, remove the ones that are already handled by an
|
|
* existing circuit, and return it.
|
|
*/
|
|
static smartlist_t *
|
|
circuit_get_unhandled_ports(time_t now)
|
|
{
|
|
smartlist_t *source = rep_hist_get_predicted_ports(now);
|
|
smartlist_t *dest = smartlist_create();
|
|
uint16_t *tmp;
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(source); ++i) {
|
|
/*XXXX020 some of these are leaked somewhere.. fix that. */
|
|
tmp = tor_malloc(sizeof(uint16_t));
|
|
memcpy(tmp, smartlist_get(source, i), sizeof(uint16_t));
|
|
smartlist_add(dest, tmp);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
circuit_remove_handled_ports(dest);
|
|
return dest;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Return 1 if we already have circuits present or on the way for
|
|
* all anticipated ports. Return 0 if we should make more.
|
|
*
|
|
* If we're returning 0, set need_uptime and need_capacity to
|
|
* indicate any requirements that the unhandled ports have.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
circuit_all_predicted_ports_handled(time_t now, int *need_uptime,
|
|
int *need_capacity)
|
|
{
|
|
int i, enough;
|
|
uint16_t *port;
|
|
smartlist_t *sl = circuit_get_unhandled_ports(now);
|
|
smartlist_t *LongLivedServices = get_options()->LongLivedPorts;
|
|
tor_assert(need_uptime);
|
|
tor_assert(need_capacity);
|
|
enough = (smartlist_len(sl) == 0);
|
|
for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(sl); ++i) {
|
|
port = smartlist_get(sl, i);
|
|
if (smartlist_string_num_isin(LongLivedServices, *port))
|
|
*need_uptime = 1;
|
|
tor_free(port);
|
|
}
|
|
smartlist_free(sl);
|
|
return enough;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Return 1 if <b>router</b> can handle one or more of the ports in
|
|
* <b>needed_ports</b>, else return 0.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
router_handles_some_port(routerinfo_t *router, smartlist_t *needed_ports)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
uint16_t port;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(needed_ports); ++i) {
|
|
addr_policy_result_t r;
|
|
port = *(uint16_t *)smartlist_get(needed_ports, i);
|
|
tor_assert(port);
|
|
r = compare_addr_to_addr_policy(0, port, router->exit_policy);
|
|
if (r != ADDR_POLICY_REJECTED && r != ADDR_POLICY_PROBABLY_REJECTED)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Return true iff <b>conn</b> needs another general circuit to be
|
|
* built. */
|
|
static int
|
|
ap_stream_wants_exit_attention(connection_t *conn)
|
|
{
|
|
if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_AP &&
|
|
conn->state == AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT &&
|
|
!conn->marked_for_close &&
|
|
!connection_edge_is_rendezvous_stream(TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)) &&
|
|
!circuit_stream_is_being_handled(TO_EDGE_CONN(conn), 0,
|
|
MIN_CIRCUITS_HANDLING_STREAM))
|
|
return 1;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Return a pointer to a suitable router to be the exit node for the
|
|
* general-purpose circuit we're about to build.
|
|
*
|
|
* Look through the connection array, and choose a router that maximizes
|
|
* the number of pending streams that can exit from this router.
|
|
*
|
|
* Return NULL if we can't find any suitable routers.
|
|
*/
|
|
static routerinfo_t *
|
|
choose_good_exit_server_general(routerlist_t *dir, int need_uptime,
|
|
int need_capacity)
|
|
{
|
|
int *n_supported;
|
|
int i;
|
|
int n_pending_connections = 0;
|
|
smartlist_t *connections;
|
|
int best_support = -1;
|
|
int n_best_support=0;
|
|
smartlist_t *sl, *preferredexits, *excludedexits;
|
|
routerinfo_t *router;
|
|
or_options_t *options = get_options();
|
|
|
|
connections = get_connection_array();
|
|
|
|
/* Count how many connections are waiting for a circuit to be built.
|
|
* We use this for log messages now, but in the future we may depend on it.
|
|
*/
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(connections, connection_t *, conn,
|
|
{
|
|
if (ap_stream_wants_exit_attention(conn))
|
|
++n_pending_connections;
|
|
});
|
|
// log_fn(LOG_DEBUG, "Choosing exit node; %d connections are pending",
|
|
// n_pending_connections);
|
|
/* Now we count, for each of the routers in the directory, how many
|
|
* of the pending connections could possibly exit from that
|
|
* router (n_supported[i]). (We can't be sure about cases where we
|
|
* don't know the IP address of the pending connection.)
|
|
*/
|
|
n_supported = tor_malloc(sizeof(int)*smartlist_len(dir->routers));
|
|
for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(dir->routers); ++i) {/* iterate over routers */
|
|
router = smartlist_get(dir->routers, i);
|
|
if (router_is_me(router)) {
|
|
n_supported[i] = -1;
|
|
// log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Skipping node %s -- it's me.", router->nickname);
|
|
/* XXX there's probably a reverse predecessor attack here, but
|
|
* it's slow. should we take this out? -RD
|
|
*/
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!router->is_running || router->is_bad_exit) {
|
|
n_supported[i] = -1;
|
|
continue; /* skip routers that are known to be down or bad exits */
|
|
}
|
|
if (router_is_unreliable(router, need_uptime, need_capacity, 0)) {
|
|
n_supported[i] = -1;
|
|
continue; /* skip routers that are not suitable */
|
|
}
|
|
if (!(router->is_valid || options->_AllowInvalid & ALLOW_INVALID_EXIT)) {
|
|
/* if it's invalid and we don't want it */
|
|
n_supported[i] = -1;
|
|
// log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Skipping node %s (index %d) -- invalid router.",
|
|
// router->nickname, i);
|
|
continue; /* skip invalid routers */
|
|
}
|
|
if (router_exit_policy_rejects_all(router)) {
|
|
n_supported[i] = -1;
|
|
// log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Skipping node %s (index %d) -- it rejects all.",
|
|
// router->nickname, i);
|
|
continue; /* skip routers that reject all */
|
|
}
|
|
n_supported[i] = 0;
|
|
/* iterate over connections */
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(connections, connection_t *, conn,
|
|
{
|
|
if (!ap_stream_wants_exit_attention(conn))
|
|
continue; /* Skip everything but APs in CIRCUIT_WAIT */
|
|
if (connection_ap_can_use_exit(TO_EDGE_CONN(conn), router)) {
|
|
++n_supported[i];
|
|
// log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"%s is supported. n_supported[%d] now %d.",
|
|
// router->nickname, i, n_supported[i]);
|
|
} else {
|
|
// log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"%s (index %d) would reject this stream.",
|
|
// router->nickname, i);
|
|
}
|
|
}); /* End looping over connections. */
|
|
if (n_supported[i] > best_support) {
|
|
/* If this router is better than previous ones, remember its index
|
|
* and goodness, and start counting how many routers are this good. */
|
|
best_support = n_supported[i]; n_best_support=1;
|
|
// log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"%s is new best supported option so far.",
|
|
// router->nickname);
|
|
} else if (n_supported[i] == best_support) {
|
|
/* If this router is _as good_ as the best one, just increment the
|
|
* count of equally good routers.*/
|
|
++n_best_support;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
log_info(LD_CIRC,
|
|
"Found %d servers that might support %d/%d pending connections.",
|
|
n_best_support, best_support >= 0 ? best_support : 0,
|
|
n_pending_connections);
|
|
|
|
preferredexits = smartlist_create();
|
|
add_nickname_list_to_smartlist(preferredexits,options->ExitNodes,1);
|
|
|
|
excludedexits = smartlist_create();
|
|
add_nickname_list_to_smartlist(excludedexits,options->ExcludeNodes,0);
|
|
|
|
sl = smartlist_create();
|
|
|
|
/* If any routers definitely support any pending connections, choose one
|
|
* at random. */
|
|
if (best_support > 0) {
|
|
for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(dir->routers); i++)
|
|
if (n_supported[i] == best_support)
|
|
smartlist_add(sl, smartlist_get(dir->routers, i));
|
|
|
|
smartlist_subtract(sl,excludedexits);
|
|
if (options->StrictExitNodes || smartlist_overlap(sl,preferredexits))
|
|
smartlist_intersect(sl,preferredexits);
|
|
router = routerlist_sl_choose_by_bandwidth(sl, 1);
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* Either there are no pending connections, or no routers even seem to
|
|
* possibly support any of them. Choose a router at random that satisfies
|
|
* at least one predicted exit port. */
|
|
|
|
int try;
|
|
smartlist_t *needed_ports = circuit_get_unhandled_ports(time(NULL));
|
|
|
|
if (best_support == -1) {
|
|
if (need_uptime || need_capacity) {
|
|
log_info(LD_CIRC,
|
|
"We couldn't find any live%s%s routers; falling back "
|
|
"to list of all routers.",
|
|
need_capacity?", fast":"",
|
|
need_uptime?", stable":"");
|
|
smartlist_free(preferredexits);
|
|
smartlist_free(excludedexits);
|
|
smartlist_free(sl);
|
|
tor_free(n_supported);
|
|
return choose_good_exit_server_general(dir, 0, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
log_notice(LD_CIRC, "All routers are down or won't exit -- choosing a "
|
|
"doomed exit at random.");
|
|
}
|
|
for (try = 0; try < 2; try++) {
|
|
/* try once to pick only from routers that satisfy a needed port,
|
|
* then if there are none, pick from any that support exiting. */
|
|
for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(dir->routers); i++) {
|
|
router = smartlist_get(dir->routers, i);
|
|
if (n_supported[i] != -1 &&
|
|
(try || router_handles_some_port(router, needed_ports))) {
|
|
// log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Try %d: '%s' is a possibility.",
|
|
// try, router->nickname);
|
|
smartlist_add(sl, router);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
smartlist_subtract(sl,excludedexits);
|
|
if (options->StrictExitNodes || smartlist_overlap(sl,preferredexits))
|
|
smartlist_intersect(sl,preferredexits);
|
|
/* XXX sometimes the above results in null, when the requested
|
|
* exit node is down. we should pick it anyway. */
|
|
router = routerlist_sl_choose_by_bandwidth(sl, 1);
|
|
if (router)
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(needed_ports, uint16_t *, cp, tor_free(cp));
|
|
smartlist_free(needed_ports);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
smartlist_free(preferredexits);
|
|
smartlist_free(excludedexits);
|
|
smartlist_free(sl);
|
|
tor_free(n_supported);
|
|
if (router) {
|
|
log_info(LD_CIRC, "Chose exit server '%s'", router->nickname);
|
|
return router;
|
|
}
|
|
if (options->StrictExitNodes) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_CIRC,
|
|
"No specified exit routers seem to be running, and "
|
|
"StrictExitNodes is set: can't choose an exit.");
|
|
}
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Return a pointer to a suitable router to be the exit node for the
|
|
* circuit of purpose <b>purpose</b> that we're about to build (or NULL
|
|
* if no router is suitable).
|
|
*
|
|
* For general-purpose circuits, pass it off to
|
|
* choose_good_exit_server_general()
|
|
*
|
|
* For client-side rendezvous circuits, choose a random node, weighted
|
|
* toward the preferences in 'options'.
|
|
*/
|
|
static routerinfo_t *
|
|
choose_good_exit_server(uint8_t purpose, routerlist_t *dir,
|
|
int need_uptime, int need_capacity, int is_internal)
|
|
{
|
|
or_options_t *options = get_options();
|
|
switch (purpose) {
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL:
|
|
if (is_internal) /* pick it like a middle hop */
|
|
return router_choose_random_node(NULL, get_options()->ExcludeNodes,
|
|
NULL, need_uptime, need_capacity, 0,
|
|
get_options()->_AllowInvalid & ALLOW_INVALID_MIDDLE, 0, 0);
|
|
else
|
|
return choose_good_exit_server_general(dir,need_uptime,need_capacity);
|
|
case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND:
|
|
return router_choose_random_node(
|
|
options->RendNodes, options->RendExcludeNodes,
|
|
NULL, need_uptime, need_capacity, 0,
|
|
options->_AllowInvalid & ALLOW_INVALID_RENDEZVOUS, 0, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG,"Unhandled purpose %d", purpose);
|
|
tor_fragile_assert();
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Decide a suitable length for circ's cpath, and pick an exit
|
|
* router (or use <b>exit</b> if provided). Store these in the
|
|
* cpath. Return 0 if ok, -1 if circuit should be closed. */
|
|
static int
|
|
onion_pick_cpath_exit(origin_circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *exit)
|
|
{
|
|
cpath_build_state_t *state = circ->build_state;
|
|
routerlist_t *rl = router_get_routerlist();
|
|
|
|
if (state->onehop_tunnel) {
|
|
log_debug(LD_CIRC, "Launching a one-hop circuit for dir tunnel.");
|
|
state->desired_path_len = 1;
|
|
} else {
|
|
int r = new_route_len(circ->_base.purpose, exit, rl->routers);
|
|
if (r < 1) /* must be at least 1 */
|
|
return -1;
|
|
state->desired_path_len = r;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (exit) { /* the circuit-builder pre-requested one */
|
|
log_info(LD_CIRC,"Using requested exit node '%s'", exit->nickname);
|
|
exit = extend_info_dup(exit);
|
|
} else { /* we have to decide one */
|
|
routerinfo_t *router =
|
|
choose_good_exit_server(circ->_base.purpose, rl, state->need_uptime,
|
|
state->need_capacity, state->is_internal);
|
|
if (!router) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_CIRC,"failed to choose an exit server");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
exit = extend_info_from_router(router);
|
|
}
|
|
state->chosen_exit = exit;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Give <b>circ</b> a new exit destination to <b>exit</b>, and add a
|
|
* hop to the cpath reflecting this. Don't send the next extend cell --
|
|
* the caller will do this if it wants to.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
circuit_append_new_exit(origin_circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *exit)
|
|
{
|
|
cpath_build_state_t *state;
|
|
tor_assert(exit);
|
|
tor_assert(circ);
|
|
|
|
state = circ->build_state;
|
|
tor_assert(state);
|
|
if (state->chosen_exit)
|
|
extend_info_free(state->chosen_exit);
|
|
state->chosen_exit = extend_info_dup(exit);
|
|
|
|
++circ->build_state->desired_path_len;
|
|
onion_append_hop(&circ->cpath, exit);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Take an open <b>circ</b>, and add a new hop at the end, based on
|
|
* <b>info</b>. Set its state back to CIRCUIT_STATE_BUILDING, and then
|
|
* send the next extend cell to begin connecting to that hop.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
circuit_extend_to_new_exit(origin_circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *exit)
|
|
{
|
|
int err_reason = 0;
|
|
circuit_append_new_exit(circ, exit);
|
|
circuit_set_state(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), CIRCUIT_STATE_BUILDING);
|
|
if ((err_reason = circuit_send_next_onion_skin(circ))<0) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_CIRC, "Couldn't extend circuit to new point '%s'.",
|
|
exit->nickname);
|
|
circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), -err_reason);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Return the number of routers in <b>routers</b> that are currently up
|
|
* and available for building circuits through.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
count_acceptable_routers(smartlist_t *routers)
|
|
{
|
|
int i, n;
|
|
int num=0;
|
|
routerinfo_t *r;
|
|
|
|
n = smartlist_len(routers);
|
|
for (i=0;i<n;i++) {
|
|
r = smartlist_get(routers, i);
|
|
// log_debug(LD_CIRC,
|
|
// "Contemplating whether router %d (%s) is a new option.",
|
|
// i, r->nickname);
|
|
if (r->is_running == 0) {
|
|
// log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Nope, the directory says %d is not running.",i);
|
|
goto next_i_loop;
|
|
}
|
|
if (r->is_valid == 0) {
|
|
// log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Nope, the directory says %d is not valid.",i);
|
|
goto next_i_loop;
|
|
/* XXX This clause makes us count incorrectly: if AllowInvalidRouters
|
|
* allows this node in some places, then we're getting an inaccurate
|
|
* count. For now, be conservative and don't count it. But later we
|
|
* should try to be smarter. */
|
|
}
|
|
num++;
|
|
// log_debug(LD_CIRC,"I like %d. num_acceptable_routers now %d.",i, num);
|
|
next_i_loop:
|
|
; /* C requires an explicit statement after the label */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return num;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Add <b>new_hop</b> to the end of the doubly-linked-list <b>head_ptr</b>.
|
|
* This function is used to extend cpath by another hop.
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
onion_append_to_cpath(crypt_path_t **head_ptr, crypt_path_t *new_hop)
|
|
{
|
|
if (*head_ptr) {
|
|
new_hop->next = (*head_ptr);
|
|
new_hop->prev = (*head_ptr)->prev;
|
|
(*head_ptr)->prev->next = new_hop;
|
|
(*head_ptr)->prev = new_hop;
|
|
} else {
|
|
*head_ptr = new_hop;
|
|
new_hop->prev = new_hop->next = new_hop;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Pick a random server digest that's running a Tor version that
|
|
* doesn't have the reachability bug. These are versions 0.1.1.21-cvs+
|
|
* and 0.1.2.1-alpha+. Avoid picking authorities, since we're
|
|
* probably already connected to them.
|
|
*
|
|
* We only return one, so this doesn't become stupid when the
|
|
* whole network has upgraded. */
|
|
static char *
|
|
compute_preferred_testing_list(const char *answer)
|
|
{
|
|
smartlist_t *choices;
|
|
routerlist_t *rl = router_get_routerlist();
|
|
routerinfo_t *router;
|
|
char *s;
|
|
|
|
if (answer) /* they have one in mind -- easy */
|
|
return tor_strdup(answer);
|
|
|
|
choices = smartlist_create();
|
|
/* now count up our choices */
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(rl->routers, routerinfo_t *, r,
|
|
if (r->is_running && r->is_valid &&
|
|
((tor_version_as_new_as(r->platform,"0.1.1.21-cvs") &&
|
|
!tor_version_as_new_as(r->platform,"0.1.2.0-alpha-cvs")) ||
|
|
tor_version_as_new_as(r->platform,"0.1.2.1-alpha")) &&
|
|
!is_local_IP(r->addr) &&
|
|
!router_get_trusteddirserver_by_digest(r->cache_info.identity_digest))
|
|
smartlist_add(choices, r));
|
|
router = smartlist_choose(choices);
|
|
smartlist_free(choices);
|
|
if (!router) {
|
|
log_info(LD_CIRC, "Looking for middle server that doesn't have the "
|
|
"reachability bug, but didn't find one. Oh well.");
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
log_info(LD_CIRC, "Looking for middle server that doesn't have the "
|
|
"reachability bug, and chose '%s'. Great.", router->nickname);
|
|
s = tor_malloc(HEX_DIGEST_LEN+2);
|
|
s[0] = '$';
|
|
base16_encode(s+1, HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1,
|
|
router->cache_info.identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
return s;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** A helper function used by onion_extend_cpath(). Use <b>purpose</b>
|
|
* and <b>state</b> and the cpath <b>head</b> (currently populated only
|
|
* to length <b>cur_len</b> to decide a suitable middle hop for a
|
|
* circuit. In particular, make sure we don't pick the exit node or its
|
|
* family, and make sure we don't duplicate any previous nodes or their
|
|
* families. */
|
|
static routerinfo_t *
|
|
choose_good_middle_server(uint8_t purpose,
|
|
cpath_build_state_t *state,
|
|
crypt_path_t *head,
|
|
int cur_len)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
routerinfo_t *r, *choice;
|
|
crypt_path_t *cpath;
|
|
smartlist_t *excluded;
|
|
or_options_t *options = get_options();
|
|
char *preferred = NULL;
|
|
tor_assert(_CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_MIN <= purpose &&
|
|
purpose <= _CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_MAX);
|
|
|
|
log_debug(LD_CIRC, "Contemplating intermediate hop: random choice.");
|
|
excluded = smartlist_create();
|
|
if ((r = build_state_get_exit_router(state))) {
|
|
smartlist_add(excluded, r);
|
|
routerlist_add_family(excluded, r);
|
|
}
|
|
if ((r = routerlist_find_my_routerinfo())) {
|
|
smartlist_add(excluded, r);
|
|
routerlist_add_family(excluded, r);
|
|
}
|
|
for (i = 0, cpath = head; i < cur_len; ++i, cpath=cpath->next) {
|
|
if ((r = router_get_by_digest(cpath->extend_info->identity_digest))) {
|
|
smartlist_add(excluded, r);
|
|
routerlist_add_family(excluded, r);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING)
|
|
preferred = compute_preferred_testing_list(options->TestVia);
|
|
choice = router_choose_random_node(preferred,
|
|
options->ExcludeNodes, excluded,
|
|
state->need_uptime, state->need_capacity, 0,
|
|
options->_AllowInvalid & ALLOW_INVALID_MIDDLE, 0, 0);
|
|
tor_free(preferred);
|
|
smartlist_free(excluded);
|
|
return choice;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Pick a good entry server for the circuit to be built according to
|
|
* <b>state</b>. Don't reuse a chosen exit (if any), don't use this
|
|
* router (if we're an OR), and respect firewall settings; if we're
|
|
* configured to use entry guards, return one.
|
|
*
|
|
* If <b>state</b> is NULL, we're choosing a router to serve as an entry
|
|
* guard, not for any particular circuit.
|
|
*/
|
|
static routerinfo_t *
|
|
choose_good_entry_server(uint8_t purpose, cpath_build_state_t *state)
|
|
{
|
|
routerinfo_t *r, *choice;
|
|
smartlist_t *excluded;
|
|
or_options_t *options = get_options();
|
|
(void)purpose; /* not used yet. */
|
|
|
|
if (state && options->UseEntryGuards) {
|
|
return choose_random_entry(state);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
excluded = smartlist_create();
|
|
|
|
if (state && (r = build_state_get_exit_router(state))) {
|
|
smartlist_add(excluded, r);
|
|
routerlist_add_family(excluded, r);
|
|
}
|
|
if ((r = routerlist_find_my_routerinfo())) {
|
|
smartlist_add(excluded, r);
|
|
routerlist_add_family(excluded, r);
|
|
}
|
|
if (firewall_is_fascist_or()) {
|
|
/* exclude all ORs that listen on the wrong port */
|
|
routerlist_t *rl = router_get_routerlist();
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
for (i=0; i < smartlist_len(rl->routers); i++) {
|
|
r = smartlist_get(rl->routers, i);
|
|
if (!fascist_firewall_allows_address_or(r->addr,r->or_port))
|
|
smartlist_add(excluded, r);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* and exclude current entry guards, if applicable */
|
|
if (options->UseEntryGuards && entry_guards) {
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, entry,
|
|
{
|
|
if ((r = router_get_by_digest(entry->identity)))
|
|
smartlist_add(excluded, r);
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
choice = router_choose_random_node(
|
|
NULL, options->ExcludeNodes,
|
|
excluded, state ? state->need_uptime : 0,
|
|
state ? state->need_capacity : 0,
|
|
state ? 0 : 1,
|
|
options->_AllowInvalid & ALLOW_INVALID_ENTRY, 0, 0);
|
|
smartlist_free(excluded);
|
|
return choice;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Return the first non-open hop in cpath, or return NULL if all
|
|
* hops are open. */
|
|
static crypt_path_t *
|
|
onion_next_hop_in_cpath(crypt_path_t *cpath)
|
|
{
|
|
crypt_path_t *hop = cpath;
|
|
do {
|
|
if (hop->state != CPATH_STATE_OPEN)
|
|
return hop;
|
|
hop = hop->next;
|
|
} while (hop != cpath);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Choose a suitable next hop in the cpath <b>head_ptr</b>,
|
|
* based on <b>state</b>. Append the hop info to head_ptr.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
onion_extend_cpath(origin_circuit_t *circ)
|
|
{
|
|
uint8_t purpose = circ->_base.purpose;
|
|
cpath_build_state_t *state = circ->build_state;
|
|
int cur_len = circuit_get_cpath_len(circ);
|
|
extend_info_t *info = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (cur_len >= state->desired_path_len) {
|
|
log_debug(LD_CIRC, "Path is complete: %d steps long",
|
|
state->desired_path_len);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
log_debug(LD_CIRC, "Path is %d long; we want %d", cur_len,
|
|
state->desired_path_len);
|
|
|
|
if (cur_len == state->desired_path_len - 1) { /* Picking last node */
|
|
info = extend_info_dup(state->chosen_exit);
|
|
} else if (cur_len == 0) { /* picking first node */
|
|
routerinfo_t *r = choose_good_entry_server(purpose, state);
|
|
if (r)
|
|
info = extend_info_from_router(r);
|
|
} else {
|
|
routerinfo_t *r =
|
|
choose_good_middle_server(purpose, state, circ->cpath, cur_len);
|
|
if (r)
|
|
info = extend_info_from_router(r);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!info) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_CIRC,"Failed to find node for hop %d of our path. Discarding "
|
|
"this circuit.", cur_len);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Chose router %s for hop %d (exit is %s)",
|
|
info->nickname, cur_len+1, build_state_get_exit_nickname(state));
|
|
|
|
onion_append_hop(&circ->cpath, info);
|
|
extend_info_free(info);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Create a new hop, annotate it with information about its
|
|
* corresponding router <b>choice</b>, and append it to the
|
|
* end of the cpath <b>head_ptr</b>. */
|
|
static int
|
|
onion_append_hop(crypt_path_t **head_ptr, extend_info_t *choice)
|
|
{
|
|
crypt_path_t *hop = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(crypt_path_t));
|
|
|
|
/* link hop into the cpath, at the end. */
|
|
onion_append_to_cpath(head_ptr, hop);
|
|
|
|
hop->magic = CRYPT_PATH_MAGIC;
|
|
hop->state = CPATH_STATE_CLOSED;
|
|
|
|
hop->extend_info = extend_info_dup(choice);
|
|
|
|
hop->package_window = CIRCWINDOW_START;
|
|
hop->deliver_window = CIRCWINDOW_START;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Allocate a new extend_info object based on the various arguments. */
|
|
extend_info_t *
|
|
extend_info_alloc(const char *nickname, const char *digest,
|
|
crypto_pk_env_t *onion_key,
|
|
uint32_t addr, uint16_t port)
|
|
{
|
|
extend_info_t *info = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(extend_info_t));
|
|
memcpy(info->identity_digest, digest, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
strlcpy(info->nickname, nickname, sizeof(info->nickname));
|
|
if (onion_key)
|
|
info->onion_key = crypto_pk_dup_key(onion_key);
|
|
info->addr = addr;
|
|
info->port = port;
|
|
return info;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Allocate and return a new extend_info_t that can be used to build a
|
|
* circuit to or through the router <b>r</b>. */
|
|
extend_info_t *
|
|
extend_info_from_router(routerinfo_t *r)
|
|
{
|
|
tor_assert(r);
|
|
return extend_info_alloc(r->nickname, r->cache_info.identity_digest,
|
|
r->onion_pkey, r->addr, r->or_port);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if 0
|
|
/** What router purpose is <b>digest</b>?
|
|
* It's a general purpose router unless it's on our bridges list.
|
|
*/
|
|
static uint8_t
|
|
get_router_purpose_from_digest(char *digest)
|
|
{
|
|
if (digest_is_a_bridge(digest))
|
|
return ROUTER_PURPOSE_BRIDGE;
|
|
return ROUTER_PURPOSE_GENERAL;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if 0
|
|
/** Allocate and return a new extend_info_t that can be used to build a
|
|
* circuit to or through the router <b>r</b>. */
|
|
extend_info_t *
|
|
extend_info_from_routerstatus(routerstatus_t *s)
|
|
{
|
|
tor_assert(s);
|
|
/* routerstatus doesn't know onion_key; leave it NULL */
|
|
return extend_info_alloc(s->nickname, s->identity_digest,
|
|
NULL, s->addr, s->or_port);
|
|
// get_router_purpose_from_digest(s->identity_digest));
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/** Release storage held by an extend_info_t struct. */
|
|
void
|
|
extend_info_free(extend_info_t *info)
|
|
{
|
|
tor_assert(info);
|
|
if (info->onion_key)
|
|
crypto_free_pk_env(info->onion_key);
|
|
tor_free(info);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Allocate and return a new extend_info_t with the same contents as
|
|
* <b>info</b>. */
|
|
extend_info_t *
|
|
extend_info_dup(extend_info_t *info)
|
|
{
|
|
extend_info_t *newinfo;
|
|
tor_assert(info);
|
|
newinfo = tor_malloc(sizeof(extend_info_t));
|
|
memcpy(newinfo, info, sizeof(extend_info_t));
|
|
if (info->onion_key)
|
|
newinfo->onion_key = crypto_pk_dup_key(info->onion_key);
|
|
else
|
|
newinfo->onion_key = NULL;
|
|
return newinfo;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Return the routerinfo_t for the chosen exit router in <b>state</b>.
|
|
* If there is no chosen exit, or if we don't know the routerinfo_t for
|
|
* the chosen exit, return NULL.
|
|
*/
|
|
routerinfo_t *
|
|
build_state_get_exit_router(cpath_build_state_t *state)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!state || !state->chosen_exit)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
return router_get_by_digest(state->chosen_exit->identity_digest);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Return the nickname for the chosen exit router in <b>state</b>. If
|
|
* there is no chosen exit, or if we don't know the routerinfo_t for the
|
|
* chosen exit, return NULL.
|
|
*/
|
|
const char *
|
|
build_state_get_exit_nickname(cpath_build_state_t *state)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!state || !state->chosen_exit)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
return state->chosen_exit->nickname;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Check whether the entry guard <b>e</b> is usable, given the directory
|
|
* authorities' opinion about the router (stored in <b>ri</b>) and the user's
|
|
* configuration (in <b>options</b>). Set <b>e</b>->bad_since
|
|
* accordingly. Return true iff the entry guard's status changes. */
|
|
static int
|
|
entry_guard_set_status(entry_guard_t *e, routerinfo_t *ri,
|
|
time_t now, or_options_t *options)
|
|
{
|
|
const char *reason = NULL;
|
|
char buf[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
|
|
int changed = 0;
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(options);
|
|
|
|
/* Do we want to mark this guard as bad? */
|
|
if (!ri)
|
|
reason = "unlisted";
|
|
else if (!ri->is_running)
|
|
reason = "down";
|
|
else if (options->UseBridges && ri->purpose != ROUTER_PURPOSE_BRIDGE)
|
|
reason = "not a bridge";
|
|
else if (!options->UseBridges && !ri->is_possible_guard &&
|
|
!router_nickname_is_in_list(ri, options->EntryNodes))
|
|
reason = "not recommended as a guard";
|
|
else if (router_nickname_is_in_list(ri, options->ExcludeNodes))
|
|
reason = "excluded";
|
|
|
|
if (reason && ! e->bad_since) {
|
|
/* Router is newly bad. */
|
|
base16_encode(buf, sizeof(buf), e->identity, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
log_info(LD_CIRC, "Entry guard %s (%s) is %s: marking as unusable.",
|
|
e->nickname, buf, reason);
|
|
|
|
e->bad_since = now;
|
|
control_event_guard(e->nickname, e->identity, "BAD");
|
|
changed = 1;
|
|
} else if (!reason && e->bad_since) {
|
|
/* There's nothing wrong with the router any more. */
|
|
base16_encode(buf, sizeof(buf), e->identity, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
log_info(LD_CIRC, "Entry guard %s (%s) is no longer unusable: "
|
|
"marking as ok.", e->nickname, buf);
|
|
|
|
e->bad_since = 0;
|
|
control_event_guard(e->nickname, e->identity, "GOOD");
|
|
changed = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return changed;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Return true iff enough time has passed since we last tried to connect
|
|
* to the unreachable guard <b>e</b> that we're willing to try again. */
|
|
static int
|
|
entry_is_time_to_retry(entry_guard_t *e, time_t now)
|
|
{
|
|
long diff;
|
|
if (e->last_attempted < e->unreachable_since)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
diff = now - e->unreachable_since;
|
|
if (diff < 6*60*60)
|
|
return now > (e->last_attempted + 60*60);
|
|
else if (diff < 3*24*60*60)
|
|
return now > (e->last_attempted + 4*60*60);
|
|
else if (diff < 7*24*60*60)
|
|
return now > (e->last_attempted + 18*60*60);
|
|
else
|
|
return now > (e->last_attempted + 36*60*60);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Return the router corresponding to <b>e</b>, if <b>e</b> is
|
|
* working well enough that we are willing to use it as an entry
|
|
* right now. (Else return NULL.) In particular, it must be
|
|
* - Listed as either up or never yet contacted;
|
|
* - Present in the routerlist;
|
|
* - Listed as 'stable' or 'fast' by the current dirserver concensus,
|
|
* if demanded by <b>need_uptime</b> or <b>need_capacity</b>;
|
|
* (This check is currently redundant with the Guard flag, but in
|
|
* the future that might change. Best to leave it in for now.)
|
|
* - Allowed by our current ReachableORAddresses config option; and
|
|
* - Currently thought to be reachable by us (unless assume_reachable
|
|
* is true).
|
|
*/
|
|
static INLINE routerinfo_t *
|
|
entry_is_live(entry_guard_t *e, int need_uptime, int need_capacity,
|
|
int assume_reachable)
|
|
{
|
|
routerinfo_t *r;
|
|
if (e->bad_since)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
/* no good if it's unreachable, unless assume_unreachable or can_retry. */
|
|
if ((!assume_reachable && !e->can_retry) &&
|
|
e->unreachable_since && !entry_is_time_to_retry(e, time(NULL)))
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
r = router_get_by_digest(e->identity);
|
|
if (!r)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
if (get_options()->UseBridges && r->purpose != ROUTER_PURPOSE_BRIDGE)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
if (!get_options()->UseBridges && r->purpose != ROUTER_PURPOSE_GENERAL)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
if (router_is_unreliable(r, need_uptime, need_capacity, 0))
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
if (!fascist_firewall_allows_address_or(r->addr,r->or_port))
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
return r;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Return the number of entry guards that we think are usable. */
|
|
static int
|
|
num_live_entry_guards(void)
|
|
{
|
|
int n = 0;
|
|
if (! entry_guards)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, entry,
|
|
{
|
|
if (entry_is_live(entry, 0, 1, 0))
|
|
++n;
|
|
});
|
|
return n;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** If <b>digest</b> matches the identity of any node in the
|
|
* entry_guards list, return that node. Else return NULL. */
|
|
static INLINE entry_guard_t *
|
|
is_an_entry_guard(const char *digest)
|
|
{
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, entry,
|
|
if (!memcmp(digest, entry->identity, DIGEST_LEN))
|
|
return entry;
|
|
);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Dump a description of our list of entry guards to the log at level
|
|
* <b>severity</b>. */
|
|
static void
|
|
log_entry_guards(int severity)
|
|
{
|
|
smartlist_t *elements = smartlist_create();
|
|
char buf[1024];
|
|
char *s;
|
|
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, e,
|
|
{
|
|
tor_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s (%s%s)",
|
|
e->nickname,
|
|
e->bad_since ? "down " : "up ",
|
|
e->made_contact ? "made-contact" : "never-contacted");
|
|
smartlist_add(elements, tor_strdup(buf));
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
s = smartlist_join_strings(elements, ",", 0, NULL);
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(elements, char*, cp, tor_free(cp));
|
|
smartlist_free(elements);
|
|
log_fn(severity,LD_CIRC,"%s",s);
|
|
tor_free(s);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Called when one or more guards that we would previously have used for some
|
|
* purpose are no longer in use because a higher-priority guard has become
|
|
* useable again. */
|
|
static void
|
|
control_event_guard_deferred(void)
|
|
{
|
|
/* XXXX We don't actually have a good way to figure out _how many_ entries
|
|
* are live for some purpose. We need an entry_is_even_slightly_live()
|
|
* function for this to work right. NumEntryGuards isn't reliable: if we
|
|
* need guards with weird properties, we can have more than that number
|
|
* live.
|
|
**/
|
|
#if 0
|
|
int n = 0;
|
|
or_options_t *options = get_options();
|
|
if (!entry_guards)
|
|
return;
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, entry,
|
|
{
|
|
if (entry_is_live(entry, 0, 1, 0)) {
|
|
if (n++ == options->NumEntryGuards) {
|
|
control_event_guard(entry->nickname, entry->identity, "DEFERRED");
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
});
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Add a new (preferably stable and fast) router to our
|
|
* entry_guards list. Return a pointer to the router if we succeed,
|
|
* or NULL if we can't find any more suitable entries.
|
|
*
|
|
* If <b>chosen</b> is defined, use that one, and if it's not
|
|
* already in our entry_guards list, put it at the *beginning*.
|
|
* Else, put the one we pick at the end of the list. */
|
|
static routerinfo_t *
|
|
add_an_entry_guard(routerinfo_t *chosen, int reset_status)
|
|
{
|
|
routerinfo_t *router;
|
|
entry_guard_t *entry;
|
|
|
|
if (chosen) {
|
|
router = chosen;
|
|
entry = is_an_entry_guard(router->cache_info.identity_digest);
|
|
if (entry) {
|
|
if (reset_status)
|
|
entry->bad_since = 0;
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
router = choose_good_entry_server(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL, NULL);
|
|
if (!router)
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
entry = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(entry_guard_t));
|
|
log_info(LD_CIRC, "Chose '%s' as new entry guard.", router->nickname);
|
|
strlcpy(entry->nickname, router->nickname, sizeof(entry->nickname));
|
|
memcpy(entry->identity, router->cache_info.identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
if (chosen) /* prepend */
|
|
smartlist_insert(entry_guards, 0, entry);
|
|
else /* append */
|
|
smartlist_add(entry_guards, entry);
|
|
control_event_guard(entry->nickname, entry->identity, "NEW");
|
|
control_event_guard_deferred();
|
|
log_entry_guards(LOG_INFO);
|
|
return router;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** If the use of entry guards is configured, choose more entry guards
|
|
* until we have enough in the list. */
|
|
static void
|
|
pick_entry_guards(void)
|
|
{
|
|
or_options_t *options = get_options();
|
|
int changed = 0;
|
|
|
|
tor_assert(entry_guards);
|
|
|
|
while (num_live_entry_guards() < options->NumEntryGuards) {
|
|
if (!add_an_entry_guard(NULL, 0))
|
|
break;
|
|
changed = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
if (changed)
|
|
entry_guards_changed();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** How long (in seconds) do we allow an entry guard to be nonfunctional,
|
|
* unlisted, excluded, or otherwise nonusable before we give up on it? */
|
|
#define ENTRY_GUARD_REMOVE_AFTER (30*24*60*60)
|
|
|
|
/** Remove all entry guards that have been down or unlisted for so
|
|
* long that we don't think they'll come up again. Return 1 if we
|
|
* removed any, or 0 if we did nothing. */
|
|
static int
|
|
remove_dead_entries(void)
|
|
{
|
|
char dbuf[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
|
|
char tbuf[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
|
|
time_t now = time(NULL);
|
|
int i;
|
|
int changed = 0;
|
|
|
|
for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(entry_guards); ) {
|
|
entry_guard_t *entry = smartlist_get(entry_guards, i);
|
|
if (entry->bad_since &&
|
|
entry->bad_since + ENTRY_GUARD_REMOVE_AFTER < now) {
|
|
|
|
base16_encode(dbuf, sizeof(dbuf), entry->identity, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
format_local_iso_time(tbuf, entry->bad_since);
|
|
log_info(LD_CIRC, "Entry guard '%s' (%s) has been down or unlisted "
|
|
"since %s local time; removing.",
|
|
entry->nickname, dbuf, tbuf);
|
|
control_event_guard(entry->nickname, entry->identity, "DROPPED");
|
|
tor_free(entry);
|
|
smartlist_del_keeporder(entry_guards, i);
|
|
log_entry_guards(LOG_INFO);
|
|
changed = 1;
|
|
} else
|
|
++i;
|
|
}
|
|
return changed ? 1 : 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** A new directory or router-status has arrived; update the down/listed
|
|
* status of the entry guards.
|
|
*
|
|
* An entry is 'down' if the directory lists it as nonrunning.
|
|
* An entry is 'unlisted' if the directory doesn't include it.
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
entry_guards_compute_status(void)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Don't call this on startup; only on a fresh download. Otherwise we'll
|
|
* think that things are unlisted. */
|
|
time_t now;
|
|
int changed = 0;
|
|
int severity = LOG_INFO;
|
|
or_options_t *options;
|
|
if (! entry_guards)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
options = get_options();
|
|
|
|
now = time(NULL);
|
|
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, entry,
|
|
{
|
|
routerinfo_t *r = router_get_by_digest(entry->identity);
|
|
if (entry_guard_set_status(entry, r, now, options))
|
|
changed = 1;
|
|
|
|
log_info(LD_CIRC, "Summary: Entry '%s' is %s, %s and %s.",
|
|
entry->nickname,
|
|
entry->unreachable_since ? "unreachable" : "reachable",
|
|
entry->bad_since ? "unusable" : "usable",
|
|
entry_is_live(entry, 0, 1, 0) ? "live" : "not live");
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
if (remove_dead_entries())
|
|
changed = 1;
|
|
|
|
if (changed) {
|
|
log_fn(severity, LD_CIRC, " (%d/%d entry guards are usable/new)",
|
|
num_live_entry_guards(), smartlist_len(entry_guards));
|
|
log_entry_guards(LOG_INFO);
|
|
entry_guards_changed();
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Called when a connection to an OR with the identity digest <b>digest</b>
|
|
* is established (<b>succeeded</b>==1) or has failed (<b>succeeded</b>==0).
|
|
* If the OR is an entry, change that entry's up/down status.
|
|
* Return 0 normally, or -1 if we want to tear down the new connection.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
entry_guard_register_connect_status(const char *digest, int succeeded,
|
|
time_t now)
|
|
{
|
|
int changed = 0;
|
|
int refuse_conn = 0;
|
|
int first_contact = 0;
|
|
entry_guard_t *entry = NULL;
|
|
int idx = -1;
|
|
char buf[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
|
|
|
|
if (! entry_guards)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, e,
|
|
{
|
|
if (!memcmp(e->identity, digest, DIGEST_LEN)) {
|
|
entry = e;
|
|
idx = e_sl_idx;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
if (!entry)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
base16_encode(buf, sizeof(buf), entry->identity, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
|
|
if (succeeded) {
|
|
if (entry->unreachable_since) {
|
|
log_info(LD_CIRC, "Entry guard '%s' (%s) is now reachable again. Good.",
|
|
entry->nickname, buf);
|
|
entry->can_retry = 0;
|
|
entry->unreachable_since = 0;
|
|
entry->last_attempted = now;
|
|
control_event_guard(entry->nickname, entry->identity, "UP");
|
|
changed = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!entry->made_contact) {
|
|
entry->made_contact = 1;
|
|
first_contact = changed = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
} else { /* ! succeeded */
|
|
if (!entry->made_contact) {
|
|
/* We've never connected to this one. */
|
|
log_info(LD_CIRC,
|
|
"Connection to never-contacted entry guard '%s' (%s) failed. "
|
|
"Removing from the list. %d/%d entry guards usable/new.",
|
|
entry->nickname, buf,
|
|
num_live_entry_guards()-1, smartlist_len(entry_guards)-1);
|
|
tor_free(entry);
|
|
smartlist_del_keeporder(entry_guards, idx);
|
|
log_entry_guards(LOG_INFO);
|
|
changed = 1;
|
|
} else if (!entry->unreachable_since) {
|
|
log_info(LD_CIRC, "Unable to connect to entry guard '%s' (%s). "
|
|
"Marking as unreachable.", entry->nickname, buf);
|
|
entry->unreachable_since = entry->last_attempted = now;
|
|
control_event_guard(entry->nickname, entry->identity, "DOWN");
|
|
changed = 1;
|
|
} else {
|
|
char tbuf[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
|
|
format_iso_time(tbuf, entry->unreachable_since);
|
|
log_debug(LD_CIRC, "Failed to connect to unreachable entry guard "
|
|
"'%s' (%s). It has been unreachable since %s.",
|
|
entry->nickname, buf, tbuf);
|
|
entry->last_attempted = now;
|
|
}
|
|
if (entry)
|
|
entry->can_retry = 0; /* We gave it an early chance; no good. */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (first_contact) {
|
|
/* We've just added a new long-term entry guard. Perhaps the network just
|
|
* came back? We should give our earlier entries another try too,
|
|
* and close this connection so we don't use it before we've given
|
|
* the others a shot. */
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, e, {
|
|
if (e == entry)
|
|
break;
|
|
if (e->made_contact) {
|
|
routerinfo_t *r = entry_is_live(e, 0, 1, 1);
|
|
if (r && e->unreachable_since) {
|
|
refuse_conn = 1;
|
|
e->can_retry = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
});
|
|
if (refuse_conn) {
|
|
log_info(LD_CIRC,
|
|
"Connected to new entry guard '%s' (%s). Marking earlier "
|
|
"entry guards up. %d/%d entry guards usable/new.",
|
|
entry->nickname, buf,
|
|
num_live_entry_guards(), smartlist_len(entry_guards));
|
|
log_entry_guards(LOG_INFO);
|
|
changed = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (changed)
|
|
entry_guards_changed();
|
|
return refuse_conn ? -1 : 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** When we try to choose an entry guard, should we parse and add
|
|
* config's EntryNodes first? */
|
|
static int should_add_entry_nodes = 0;
|
|
|
|
/** Called when the value of EntryNodes changes in our configuration. */
|
|
void
|
|
entry_nodes_should_be_added(void)
|
|
{
|
|
log_info(LD_CIRC, "New EntryNodes config option detected. Will use.");
|
|
should_add_entry_nodes = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Add all nodes in EntryNodes that aren't currently guard nodes to the list
|
|
* of guard nodes, at the front. */
|
|
static void
|
|
entry_guards_prepend_from_config(void)
|
|
{
|
|
or_options_t *options = get_options();
|
|
smartlist_t *entry_routers, *entry_fps;
|
|
smartlist_t *old_entry_guards_on_list, *old_entry_guards_not_on_list;
|
|
tor_assert(entry_guards);
|
|
|
|
should_add_entry_nodes = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (!options->EntryNodes) {
|
|
/* It's possible that a controller set EntryNodes, thus making
|
|
* should_add_entry_nodes set, then cleared it again, all before the
|
|
* call to choose_random_entry() that triggered us. If so, just return.
|
|
*/
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
log_info(LD_CIRC,"Adding configured EntryNodes '%s'.",
|
|
options->EntryNodes);
|
|
|
|
entry_routers = smartlist_create();
|
|
entry_fps = smartlist_create();
|
|
old_entry_guards_on_list = smartlist_create();
|
|
old_entry_guards_not_on_list = smartlist_create();
|
|
|
|
/* Split entry guards into those on the list and those not. */
|
|
add_nickname_list_to_smartlist(entry_routers, options->EntryNodes, 0);
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_routers, routerinfo_t *, ri,
|
|
smartlist_add(entry_fps,ri->cache_info.identity_digest));
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, e, {
|
|
if (smartlist_digest_isin(entry_fps, e->identity))
|
|
smartlist_add(old_entry_guards_on_list, e);
|
|
else
|
|
smartlist_add(old_entry_guards_not_on_list, e);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
/* Remove all currently configured entry guards from entry_routers. */
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_routers, routerinfo_t *, ri, {
|
|
if (is_an_entry_guard(ri->cache_info.identity_digest)) {
|
|
SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(entry_routers, ri);
|
|
}
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
/* Now build the new entry_guards list. */
|
|
smartlist_clear(entry_guards);
|
|
/* First, the previously configured guards that are in EntryNodes. */
|
|
smartlist_add_all(entry_guards, old_entry_guards_on_list);
|
|
/* Next, the rest of EntryNodes */
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_routers, routerinfo_t *, ri, {
|
|
add_an_entry_guard(ri, 0);
|
|
});
|
|
/* Finally, the remaining EntryNodes, unless we're strict */
|
|
if (options->StrictEntryNodes) {
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(old_entry_guards_not_on_list, entry_guard_t *, e,
|
|
tor_free(e));
|
|
} else {
|
|
smartlist_add_all(entry_guards, old_entry_guards_not_on_list);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
smartlist_free(entry_routers);
|
|
smartlist_free(entry_fps);
|
|
smartlist_free(old_entry_guards_on_list);
|
|
smartlist_free(old_entry_guards_not_on_list);
|
|
entry_guards_changed();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Return 1 if we're fine adding arbitrary routers out of the
|
|
* directory to our entry guard list. Else return 0. */
|
|
static int
|
|
can_grow_entry_list(or_options_t *options)
|
|
{
|
|
if (options->StrictEntryNodes)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
if (options->UseBridges)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Pick a live (up and listed) entry guard from entry_guards. If
|
|
* <b>state</b> is non-NULL, this is for a specific circuit --
|
|
* make sure not to pick this circuit's exit or any node in the
|
|
* exit's family. If <b>state</b> is NULL, we're looking for a random
|
|
* guard (likely a bridge). */
|
|
routerinfo_t *
|
|
choose_random_entry(cpath_build_state_t *state)
|
|
{
|
|
or_options_t *options = get_options();
|
|
smartlist_t *live_entry_guards = smartlist_create();
|
|
smartlist_t *exit_family = smartlist_create();
|
|
routerinfo_t *chosen_exit = state?build_state_get_exit_router(state) : NULL;
|
|
routerinfo_t *r = NULL;
|
|
int need_uptime = state ? state->need_uptime : 0;
|
|
int need_capacity = state ? state->need_capacity : 0;
|
|
|
|
if (chosen_exit) {
|
|
smartlist_add(exit_family, chosen_exit);
|
|
routerlist_add_family(exit_family, chosen_exit);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!entry_guards)
|
|
entry_guards = smartlist_create();
|
|
|
|
if (should_add_entry_nodes)
|
|
entry_guards_prepend_from_config();
|
|
|
|
if (can_grow_entry_list(options) &&
|
|
(! entry_guards ||
|
|
smartlist_len(entry_guards) < options->NumEntryGuards))
|
|
pick_entry_guards();
|
|
|
|
retry:
|
|
smartlist_clear(live_entry_guards);
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, entry,
|
|
{
|
|
r = entry_is_live(entry, need_uptime, need_capacity, 0);
|
|
if (r && !smartlist_isin(exit_family, r)) {
|
|
smartlist_add(live_entry_guards, r);
|
|
if (!entry->made_contact) {
|
|
/* Always start with the first not-yet-contacted entry
|
|
* guard. Otherwise we might add several new ones, pick
|
|
* the second new one, and now we've expanded our entry
|
|
* guard list without needing to. */
|
|
goto choose_and_finish;
|
|
}
|
|
if (smartlist_len(live_entry_guards) >= options->NumEntryGuards)
|
|
break; /* we have enough */
|
|
}
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
/* Try to have at least 2 choices available. This way we don't
|
|
* get stuck with a single live-but-crummy entry and just keep
|
|
* using him.
|
|
* (We might get 2 live-but-crummy entry guards, but so be it.) */
|
|
if (smartlist_len(live_entry_guards) < 2) {
|
|
if (can_grow_entry_list(options)) {
|
|
/* still no? try adding a new entry then */
|
|
/* XXX if guard doesn't imply fast and stable, then we need
|
|
* to tell add_an_entry_guard below what we want, or it might
|
|
* be a long time til we get it. -RD */
|
|
r = add_an_entry_guard(NULL, 0);
|
|
if (r) {
|
|
smartlist_add(live_entry_guards, r);
|
|
entry_guards_changed();
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (!r && need_uptime) {
|
|
need_uptime = 0; /* try without that requirement */
|
|
goto retry;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!r && need_capacity) {
|
|
/* still no? last attempt, try without requiring capacity */
|
|
need_capacity = 0;
|
|
goto retry;
|
|
}
|
|
/* live_entry_guards may be empty below. Oh well, we tried. */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
choose_and_finish:
|
|
r = smartlist_choose(live_entry_guards);
|
|
smartlist_free(live_entry_guards);
|
|
smartlist_free(exit_family);
|
|
return r;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Parse <b>state</b> and learn about the entry guards it describes.
|
|
* If <b>set</b> is true, and there are no errors, replace the global
|
|
* entry_list with what we find.
|
|
* On success, return 0. On failure, alloc into *<b>msg</b> a string
|
|
* describing the error, and return -1.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
entry_guards_parse_state(or_state_t *state, int set, char **msg)
|
|
{
|
|
entry_guard_t *node = NULL;
|
|
smartlist_t *new_entry_guards = smartlist_create();
|
|
config_line_t *line;
|
|
|
|
*msg = NULL;
|
|
for (line = state->EntryGuards; line; line = line->next) {
|
|
if (!strcasecmp(line->key, "EntryGuard")) {
|
|
smartlist_t *args = smartlist_create();
|
|
node = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(entry_guard_t));
|
|
/* all entry guards on disk have been contacted */
|
|
node->made_contact = 1;
|
|
smartlist_add(new_entry_guards, node);
|
|
smartlist_split_string(args, line->value, " ",
|
|
SPLIT_SKIP_SPACE|SPLIT_IGNORE_BLANK, 0);
|
|
if (smartlist_len(args)<2) {
|
|
*msg = tor_strdup("Unable to parse entry nodes: "
|
|
"Too few arguments to EntryGuard");
|
|
} else if (!is_legal_nickname(smartlist_get(args,0))) {
|
|
*msg = tor_strdup("Unable to parse entry nodes: "
|
|
"Bad nickname for EntryGuard");
|
|
} else {
|
|
strlcpy(node->nickname, smartlist_get(args,0), MAX_NICKNAME_LEN+1);
|
|
if (base16_decode(node->identity, DIGEST_LEN, smartlist_get(args,1),
|
|
strlen(smartlist_get(args,1)))<0) {
|
|
*msg = tor_strdup("Unable to parse entry nodes: "
|
|
"Bad hex digest for EntryGuard");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(args, char*, cp, tor_free(cp));
|
|
smartlist_free(args);
|
|
if (*msg)
|
|
break;
|
|
} else {
|
|
time_t when;
|
|
time_t last_try = 0;
|
|
if (!node) {
|
|
*msg = tor_strdup("Unable to parse entry nodes: "
|
|
"EntryGuardDownSince/UnlistedSince without EntryGuard");
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
if (parse_iso_time(line->value, &when)<0) {
|
|
*msg = tor_strdup("Unable to parse entry nodes: "
|
|
"Bad time in EntryGuardDownSince/UnlistedSince");
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
if (strlen(line->value) >= ISO_TIME_LEN+ISO_TIME_LEN+1) {
|
|
/* ignore failure */
|
|
parse_iso_time(line->value+ISO_TIME_LEN+1, &last_try);
|
|
}
|
|
if (!strcasecmp(line->key, "EntryGuardDownSince")) {
|
|
node->unreachable_since = when;
|
|
node->last_attempted = last_try;
|
|
} else {
|
|
node->bad_since = when;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (*msg || !set) {
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(new_entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, e, tor_free(e));
|
|
smartlist_free(new_entry_guards);
|
|
} else { /* !*err && set */
|
|
if (entry_guards) {
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, e, tor_free(e));
|
|
smartlist_free(entry_guards);
|
|
}
|
|
entry_guards = new_entry_guards;
|
|
entry_guards_dirty = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
return *msg ? -1 : 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Our list of entry guards has changed, or some element of one
|
|
* of our entry guards has changed. Write the changes to disk within
|
|
* the next few minutes.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void
|
|
entry_guards_changed(void)
|
|
{
|
|
time_t when;
|
|
entry_guards_dirty = 1;
|
|
|
|
/* or_state_save() will call entry_guards_update_state(). */
|
|
when = get_options()->AvoidDiskWrites ? time(NULL) + 3600 : time(NULL)+600;
|
|
or_state_mark_dirty(get_or_state(), when);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** If the entry guard info has not changed, do nothing and return.
|
|
* Otherwise, free the EntryGuards piece of <b>state</b> and create
|
|
* a new one out of the global entry_guards list, and then mark
|
|
* <b>state</b> dirty so it will get saved to disk.
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
entry_guards_update_state(or_state_t *state)
|
|
{
|
|
config_line_t **next, *line;
|
|
if (! entry_guards_dirty)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
config_free_lines(state->EntryGuards);
|
|
next = &state->EntryGuards;
|
|
*next = NULL;
|
|
if (!entry_guards)
|
|
entry_guards = smartlist_create();
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, e,
|
|
{
|
|
char dbuf[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
|
|
if (!e->made_contact)
|
|
continue; /* don't write this one to disk */
|
|
*next = line = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(config_line_t));
|
|
line->key = tor_strdup("EntryGuard");
|
|
line->value = tor_malloc(HEX_DIGEST_LEN+MAX_NICKNAME_LEN+2);
|
|
base16_encode(dbuf, sizeof(dbuf), e->identity, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
tor_snprintf(line->value,HEX_DIGEST_LEN+MAX_NICKNAME_LEN+2,
|
|
"%s %s", e->nickname, dbuf);
|
|
next = &(line->next);
|
|
if (e->unreachable_since) {
|
|
*next = line = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(config_line_t));
|
|
line->key = tor_strdup("EntryGuardDownSince");
|
|
line->value = tor_malloc(ISO_TIME_LEN+1+ISO_TIME_LEN+1);
|
|
format_iso_time(line->value, e->unreachable_since);
|
|
if (e->last_attempted) {
|
|
line->value[ISO_TIME_LEN] = ' ';
|
|
format_iso_time(line->value+ISO_TIME_LEN+1, e->last_attempted);
|
|
}
|
|
next = &(line->next);
|
|
}
|
|
if (e->bad_since) {
|
|
*next = line = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(config_line_t));
|
|
line->key = tor_strdup("EntryGuardUnlistedSince");
|
|
line->value = tor_malloc(ISO_TIME_LEN+1);
|
|
format_iso_time(line->value, e->bad_since);
|
|
next = &(line->next);
|
|
}
|
|
});
|
|
if (!get_options()->AvoidDiskWrites)
|
|
or_state_mark_dirty(get_or_state(), 0);
|
|
entry_guards_dirty = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** If <b>question</b> is the string "entry-guards", then dump
|
|
* to *<b>answer</b> a newly allocated string describing all of
|
|
* the nodes in the global entry_guards list. See control-spec.txt
|
|
* for details.
|
|
* For backward compatibility, we also handle the string "helper-nodes".
|
|
* */
|
|
int
|
|
getinfo_helper_entry_guards(control_connection_t *conn,
|
|
const char *question, char **answer)
|
|
{
|
|
int use_long_names = conn->use_long_names;
|
|
|
|
if (!strcmp(question,"entry-guards") ||
|
|
!strcmp(question,"helper-nodes")) {
|
|
smartlist_t *sl = smartlist_create();
|
|
char tbuf[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
|
|
char nbuf[MAX_VERBOSE_NICKNAME_LEN+1];
|
|
if (!entry_guards)
|
|
entry_guards = smartlist_create();
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, e,
|
|
{
|
|
size_t len = MAX_VERBOSE_NICKNAME_LEN+ISO_TIME_LEN+32;
|
|
char *c = tor_malloc(len);
|
|
const char *status = NULL;
|
|
time_t when = 0;
|
|
if (!e->made_contact) {
|
|
status = "never-connected";
|
|
} else if (e->bad_since) {
|
|
when = e->bad_since;
|
|
status = "unusable";
|
|
} else {
|
|
status = "up";
|
|
}
|
|
if (use_long_names) {
|
|
routerinfo_t *ri = router_get_by_digest(e->identity);
|
|
if (ri) {
|
|
router_get_verbose_nickname(nbuf, ri);
|
|
} else {
|
|
nbuf[0] = '$';
|
|
base16_encode(nbuf+1, sizeof(nbuf)-1, e->identity, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
/* e->nickname field is not very reliable if we don't know about
|
|
* this router any longer; don't include it. */
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
base16_encode(nbuf, sizeof(nbuf), e->identity, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
}
|
|
if (when) {
|
|
format_iso_time(tbuf, when);
|
|
tor_snprintf(c, len, "%s %s %s\n", nbuf, status, tbuf);
|
|
} else {
|
|
tor_snprintf(c, len, "%s %s\n", nbuf, status);
|
|
}
|
|
smartlist_add(sl, c);
|
|
});
|
|
*answer = smartlist_join_strings(sl, "", 0, NULL);
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(sl, char *, c, tor_free(c));
|
|
smartlist_free(sl);
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
typedef struct {
|
|
uint32_t addr;
|
|
uint16_t port;
|
|
char identity[DIGEST_LEN];
|
|
download_status_t fetch_status;
|
|
} bridge_info_t;
|
|
|
|
/** A list of known bridges. */
|
|
static smartlist_t *bridge_list = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/** Initialize the bridge list to empty, creating it if needed. */
|
|
void
|
|
clear_bridge_list(void)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!bridge_list)
|
|
bridge_list = smartlist_create();
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(bridge_list, bridge_info_t *, b, tor_free(b));
|
|
smartlist_clear(bridge_list);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if 0
|
|
/** Return 1 if <b>digest</b> is one of our known bridges. */
|
|
int
|
|
identity_digest_is_a_bridge(const char *digest)
|
|
{
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(bridge_list, bridge_info_t *, bridge,
|
|
{
|
|
if (!memcmp(bridge->identity, digest, DIGEST_LEN))
|
|
return 1;
|
|
});
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/** Return a bridge pointer if <b>ri</b> is one of our known bridges
|
|
* (either by comparing keys if possible, else by comparing addr/port).
|
|
* Else return NULL. */
|
|
static bridge_info_t *
|
|
routerinfo_get_configured_bridge(routerinfo_t *ri)
|
|
{
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(bridge_list, bridge_info_t *, bridge,
|
|
{
|
|
if (tor_digest_is_zero(bridge->identity) &&
|
|
bridge->addr == ri->addr && bridge->port == ri->or_port)
|
|
return bridge;
|
|
if (!memcmp(bridge->identity, ri->cache_info.identity_digest,
|
|
DIGEST_LEN))
|
|
return bridge;
|
|
});
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Return 1 if <b>ri</b> is one of our known bridges, else 0. */
|
|
int
|
|
routerinfo_is_a_configured_bridge(routerinfo_t *ri)
|
|
{
|
|
return routerinfo_get_configured_bridge(ri) ? 1 : 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Remember a new bridge at <b>addr</b>:<b>port</b>. If <b>digest</b>
|
|
* is set, it tells us the identity key too. */
|
|
void
|
|
bridge_add_from_config(uint32_t addr, uint16_t port, char *digest)
|
|
{
|
|
bridge_info_t *b = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(bridge_info_t));
|
|
b->addr = addr;
|
|
b->port = port;
|
|
if (digest)
|
|
memcpy(b->identity, digest, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
if (!bridge_list)
|
|
bridge_list = smartlist_create();
|
|
smartlist_add(bridge_list, b);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Schedule the next fetch for <b>bridge</b>, based on
|
|
* some retry schedule. */
|
|
static void
|
|
bridge_fetch_status_increment(bridge_info_t *bridge, time_t now)
|
|
{
|
|
switch (bridge->fetch_status.n_download_failures) {
|
|
case 0: bridge->fetch_status.next_attempt_at = now+60*15; break;
|
|
case 1: bridge->fetch_status.next_attempt_at = now+60*15; break;
|
|
default: bridge->fetch_status.next_attempt_at = now+60*60; break;
|
|
}
|
|
if (bridge->fetch_status.n_download_failures < 10)
|
|
bridge->fetch_status.n_download_failures++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** We just got a new descriptor for <b>bridge</b>. Reschedule the
|
|
* next fetch for a long time from <b>now</b>. */
|
|
static void
|
|
bridge_fetch_status_arrived(bridge_info_t *bridge, time_t now)
|
|
{
|
|
bridge->fetch_status.next_attempt_at = now+60*60;
|
|
bridge->fetch_status.n_download_failures = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** For each bridge in our list for which we don't currently have a
|
|
* descriptor, fetch a new copy of its descriptor -- either directly
|
|
* from the bridge or via a bridge authority. */
|
|
void
|
|
fetch_bridge_descriptors(time_t now)
|
|
{
|
|
char address_buf[INET_NTOA_BUF_LEN+1];
|
|
struct in_addr in;
|
|
or_options_t *options = get_options();
|
|
int num_bridge_auths = get_n_authorities(BRIDGE_AUTHORITY);
|
|
int ask_bridge_directly;
|
|
|
|
if (!bridge_list)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(bridge_list, bridge_info_t *, bridge,
|
|
{
|
|
if (bridge->fetch_status.next_attempt_at > now)
|
|
continue; /* don't bother, no need to retry yet */
|
|
|
|
/* schedule another fetch as if this one will fail, in case it does */
|
|
bridge_fetch_status_increment(bridge, now);
|
|
|
|
in.s_addr = htonl(bridge->addr);
|
|
tor_inet_ntoa(&in, address_buf, sizeof(address_buf));
|
|
|
|
ask_bridge_directly = tor_digest_is_zero(bridge->identity) ||
|
|
!options->UpdateBridgesFromAuthority ||
|
|
!num_bridge_auths;
|
|
|
|
if (ask_bridge_directly &&
|
|
!fascist_firewall_allows_address_or(bridge->addr, bridge->port)) {
|
|
log_notice(LD_DIR, "Bridge at '%s:%d' isn't reachable by our "
|
|
"firewall policy. %s.", address_buf, bridge->port,
|
|
num_bridge_auths ? "Asking bridge authority instead" :
|
|
"Skipping");
|
|
ask_bridge_directly = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (ask_bridge_directly) {
|
|
if (!connection_get_by_type_addr_port_purpose(
|
|
CONN_TYPE_DIR, bridge->addr, bridge->port,
|
|
DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_SERVERDESC)) {
|
|
/* we need to ask the bridge itself for its descriptor. */
|
|
directory_initiate_command(address_buf, bridge->addr,
|
|
bridge->port, 0,
|
|
1, bridge->identity,
|
|
DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_SERVERDESC,
|
|
ROUTER_PURPOSE_BRIDGE,
|
|
0, "authority.z", NULL, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* We have a digest and we want to ask an authority. We could
|
|
* combine all the requests into one, but that may give more
|
|
* hints to the bridge authority than we want to give. */
|
|
char resource[10 + HEX_DIGEST_LEN];
|
|
memcpy(resource, "fp/", 3);
|
|
base16_encode(resource+3, HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1,
|
|
bridge->identity, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
memcpy(resource+3+HEX_DIGEST_LEN, ".z", 3);
|
|
log_info(LD_DIR, "Fetching bridge info '%s' from bridge authority.",
|
|
resource);
|
|
directory_get_from_dirserver(DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_SERVERDESC,
|
|
ROUTER_PURPOSE_BRIDGE, resource, 1);
|
|
}
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** We just learned a descriptor for a bridge. See if that
|
|
* digest is in our entry guard list, and add it if not. */
|
|
void
|
|
learned_bridge_descriptor(routerinfo_t *ri)
|
|
{
|
|
tor_assert(ri);
|
|
tor_assert(ri->purpose == ROUTER_PURPOSE_BRIDGE);
|
|
if (get_options()->UseBridges) {
|
|
int first = !any_bridge_descriptors_known();
|
|
bridge_info_t *bridge = routerinfo_get_configured_bridge(ri);
|
|
time_t now = time(NULL);
|
|
ri->is_running = 1;
|
|
|
|
/* it's here; schedule its re-fetch for a long time from now. */
|
|
bridge_fetch_status_arrived(bridge, now);
|
|
|
|
add_an_entry_guard(ri, 1);
|
|
log_notice(LD_DIR, "new bridge descriptor '%s'", ri->nickname);
|
|
if (first)
|
|
routerlist_retry_directory_downloads(now);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Return 1 if any of our entry guards have descriptors that
|
|
* are marked with purpose 'bridge' and are running. Else return 0.
|
|
*
|
|
* We use this function to decide if we're ready to start building
|
|
* circuits through our bridges, or if we need to wait until the
|
|
* directory "server/authority" requests finish. */
|
|
int
|
|
any_bridge_descriptors_known(void)
|
|
{
|
|
tor_assert(get_options()->UseBridges);
|
|
return choose_random_entry(NULL)!=NULL ? 1 : 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Return 1 if we have at least one descriptor for a bridge and
|
|
* all descriptors we know are down. Else return 0. If <b>act</b> is
|
|
* 1, then mark the down bridges up; else just observe and report. */
|
|
static int
|
|
bridges_retry_helper(int act)
|
|
{
|
|
routerinfo_t *ri;
|
|
int any_known = 0;
|
|
int any_running = 0;
|
|
if (!entry_guards)
|
|
entry_guards = smartlist_create();
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, e,
|
|
{
|
|
ri = router_get_by_digest(e->identity);
|
|
if (ri && ri->purpose == ROUTER_PURPOSE_BRIDGE) {
|
|
any_known = 1;
|
|
if (ri->is_running)
|
|
any_running = 1; /* some bridge is both known and running */
|
|
else if (act) { /* mark it for retry */
|
|
ri->is_running = 1;
|
|
e->can_retry = 1;
|
|
e->bad_since = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
});
|
|
return any_known && !any_running;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Do we know any descriptors for our bridges, and are they all
|
|
* down? */
|
|
int
|
|
bridges_should_be_retried(void)
|
|
{
|
|
return bridges_retry_helper(0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Mark all down known bridges up. */
|
|
void
|
|
bridges_retry_all(void)
|
|
{
|
|
bridges_retry_helper(1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Release all storage held by the list of entry guards and related
|
|
* memory structs. */
|
|
void
|
|
entry_guards_free_all(void)
|
|
{
|
|
if (entry_guards) {
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, e, tor_free(e));
|
|
smartlist_free(entry_guards);
|
|
entry_guards = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
clear_bridge_list();
|
|
smartlist_free(bridge_list);
|
|
bridge_list = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|