mirror of
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor.git
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e1e246fa78
svn:r4465
218 lines
9.6 KiB
Plaintext
218 lines
9.6 KiB
Plaintext
$Id$
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Legend:
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SPEC!! - Not specified
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SPEC - Spec not finalized
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NICK - nick claims
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ARMA - arma claims
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PHOBOS - phobos claims
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- Not done
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* Top priority
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. Partially done
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o Done
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D Deferred
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X Abandoned
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Non-Coding, Soon:
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- FAQ entry: why gnutls is bad/not good for tor
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P - flesh out the rest of the section 6 of the faq
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P - gather pointers to livecd distros that include tor
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- put the logo on the website, in source form, so people can put it on
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stickers directly, etc.
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- more pictures from ren. he wants to describe the tor handshake, i want to
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talk about hidden services.
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* clean up the places where our docs are redundant (or worse, obsolete in
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one file and correct elsewhere). agl has a start on a global
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list-of-tor-docs.
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P - update window's docs to clarify which versions of windows, and why a
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DOS window, how it's used, for the less technical users
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NR- write a spec appendix for 'being nice with tor'
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- Hunt for open socks ports on tor servers, send mail
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- tor-in-the-media page
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- Ask schanzle@cas.homelinux.org about a patch for rpm spec fixes against
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tor-0.1.0.7.rc
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- Remove need for HACKING file.
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For 0.1.0.x:
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o Why do solaris cpuworks go dormant?
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(Apparently, disabling threads fixes this.)
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o Fix the remaining flyspray bugs marked for 0.1.0.9
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X Free remaining unfreed memory (arma will run valgrind)
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(Not for a stable release)
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o Note libevent/method/platform combos that are unlikely to work.
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X change torrc to point to abuse-faq (once abuse-faq is posted)
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. Memory use on Linux: what's happening?
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- Is it threading? (Maybe, maybe not)
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- Is it the buf_shrink bug? (Quite possibly)
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- Instrument the 0.1.1 code to figure out where our memory is going;
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apply the results. (all platforms?)
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. Why does kevent barf with EINVAL on some freebsd boxes?
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o Submit libevent patch to Niels
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o Warn on non-repeated EINVAL in Tor (don't die.)
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- Investigate why freebsd kernel actually does this: it doesn't seem
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simple to trigger.
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for 0.1.1.x:
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N . Controller improvements
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o new controller protocol
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o Specify
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o Implement
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. Test, debug
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o add new getinfo options to enumerate things we only find out about
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currently via events.
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o controller should have an event to learn about new addressmappings,
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e.g. when we learn a hostname to IP mapping ?
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. make sure err-level log events get flushed to the controller
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immediately, since tor will exit right after.
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o Implement
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- Test, debug
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- Allow EXTENDCIRCUIT to unknown server.
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. Switch example controllers to use new protocol
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. Python
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o Implement main controller interface
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- Glue code
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- Testing
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- Java
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- switch accountingmax to count total in+out, not either in or
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out. it's easy to move in this direction (not risky), but hard to
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back, out if we decide we prefer it the way it already is. hm.
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. Come up with a coherent strategy for bandwidth buckets and TLS. (The
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logic for reading from TLS sockets is likely to overrun the bandwidth
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buckets under heavy load. (Really, the logic was never right in the
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first place.) Also, we should audit all users of get_pending_bytes().)
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- Make it harder to circumvent bandwidth caps: look at number of bytes
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sent across sockets, not number sent inside TLS stream.
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N - Handle rendezvousing with unverified nodes.
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o Specify: Stick rendezvous point's address and port in INTRODUCE cell.
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- Handle new format.
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- Parse and generate new format (#if0 out the logic to generate it.)
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- Support to extend circuit/target circuit to a chosen combination of
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addr/port/ID/onionkey
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- Verify that new code works.
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- it looks like tor_assert writes to stderr. what happens if
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stderr was closed and is now something else? uh.
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- christian grothoff's attack of infinite-length circuit.
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the solution is to have a separate 'extend-data' cell type
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which is used for the first N data cells, and only
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extend-data cells can be extend requests.
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- Specify, including thought about
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- Implement
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- Destroy and truncated cells should have reasons.
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- Add private:* alias in exit policies to make it easier to ban all the
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fiddly little 192.168.foo addresses.
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(AGL had a patch; consider applying it.)
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- recommended-versions for client / server ?
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- warn if listening for SOCKS on public IP.
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- Forward-compatibility: add "needclientversion" option or "opt critical"
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prefix.
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- cpu fixes:
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- see if we should make use of truncate to retry
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- hardware accelerator support
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r - kill dns workers more slowly
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- continue decentralizing the directory
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- Specify and design all of the below before implementing any.
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- Figure out what to do about hidden service descriptors.
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M have two router descriptor formats
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- dirservers verify reachability claims
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- find 10 dirservers. (what are criteria to be a dirserver?)
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- some back-out mechanism?
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- dirservers have blacklist of IPs they hate
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- a way of rolling back approvals to before a timestamp
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- have new people be in limbo and need to demonstrate usefulness
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before we approve them
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- other?
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- dirservers publish router-status with all these flags.
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- Servers publish new descriptors when options change, when 12-24 hours
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have passed, when uptime is reset, or when bandwidth changes a lot.
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- alices fetch many router-statuses and update descriptors as needed.
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- add if-newer-than fetch options
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- dirservers allow people to lookup by N descriptors, or to fetch all.
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- alices avoid duplicate class C nodes.
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- everybody with a dirport will give you his descriptor.
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- config option, on by default, to cache all descriptors.
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- Compress router desc sets before transmitting them
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M Analyze how bad the partitioning is or isn't.
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- Naming:
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- Specify and design all of the below before implementing any.
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- some dirservers announce that they manage bindings (a flag in
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router-status).
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- other dirservers mention a binding if there is no conflict for
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that binding among the dirservers that manage it.
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no conflict == any of them bind it and no disagreement.
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- alice can specify a nickname and it will record that name in her
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datadir along with the key *if* it is bound. otherwise her specifying
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will fail (loudly we hope).
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- thus when a binding vanishes (e.g. conflict) alice will keep using
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the one she meant.
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- if the binding changes keys, the entry in her datadir will silently
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get corrected.
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- packaging and ui stuff:
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- multiple sample torrc files (tyranix?)
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- uninstallers
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. for os x
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- something, anything, for sys tray on Windows.
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- figure out how to make nt service stuff work?
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. Document it.
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N - Vet all pending installer patches
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- Win32 installer plus privoxy, sockscap/freecap, etc.
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- Vet win32 systray helper code
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N . Make logs go into platform default locations.
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o OSX
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- Windows. (?)
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Reach (deferrable) items for 0.1.1.x:
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- Start using create-fast cells as clients
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- Let more config options (e.g. ORPort) change dynamically.
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- start handling server descriptors without a socksport?
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For 0.1.1.x, if we can figure out how:
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- rewrite how libevent does select() on win32 so it's not so very slow.
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- helper nodes (at least preliminary)
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- enclaves (at least preliminary)
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- Write limiting; separate token bucket for write
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- Audit everything to make sure rend and intro points are just as likely to
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be us as not.
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- Do something to prevent spurious EXTEND cells from making middleman
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nodes connect all over. Rate-limit failed connections, perhaps?
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Future version:
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- Limit to 2 dir, 2 OR, N SOCKS connections per IP.
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- Handle full buffers without totally borking
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- Rate-limit OR and directory connections overall and per-IP and
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maybe per subnet.
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- Hold-open-until-flushed now works by accident; it should work by
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design.
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- DoS protection: TLS puzzles, public key ops, bandwidth exhaustion.
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- Specify?
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- tor-resolve script should use socks5 to get better error messages.
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- make min uptime a function of the available choices (say, choose 60th
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percentile, not 1 day.)
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- config option to publish what ports you listen on, beyond ORPort/DirPort
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- hidserv offerers shouldn't need to define a SocksPort
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* figure out what breaks for this, and do it.
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- auth mechanisms to let hidden service midpoint and responder filter
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connection requests.
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- Relax clique assumptions.
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- tor should be able to have a pool of outgoing IP addresses
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that it is able to rotate through. (maybe)
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Blue-sky:
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- Patch privoxy and socks protocol to pass strings to the browser.
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- Standby/hotswap/redundant hidden services.
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- Robust decentralized storage for hidden service descriptors.
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- The "China problem"
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- Allow small cells and large cells on the same network?
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- Cell buffering and resending. This will allow us to handle broken
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circuits as long as the endpoints don't break, plus will allow
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connection (tls session key) rotation.
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- Implement Morphmix, so we can compare its behavior, complexity, etc.
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- Other transport. HTTP, udp, rdp, airhook, etc. May have to do our own
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link crypto, unless we can bully openssl into it.
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- Conn key rotation.
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- Need a relay teardown cell, separate from one-way ends.
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(Pending a user who needs this)
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- Handle half-open connections: right now we don't support all TCP
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streams, at least according to the protocol. But we handle all that
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we've seen in the wild.
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(Pending a user who needs this)
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