tor/src/or/connection_or.c
Roger Dingledine e432d2ceea we should handle the case where the client has no cert, for
backwards compatibility with jap clients.


svn:r3466
2005-01-30 08:02:33 +00:00

500 lines
16 KiB
C

/* Copyright 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
* Copyright 2001-2004 Roger Dingledine.
* Copyright 2004 Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. */
/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
/* $Id$ */
const char connection_or_c_id[] = "$Id$";
/**
* \file connection_or.c
* \brief Functions to handle OR connections, TLS handshaking, and
* cells on the network.
**/
#include "or.h"
/** How much clock skew do we tolerate when checking certificates for
* known routers? (sec) */
#define TIGHT_CERT_ALLOW_SKEW (90*60)
static int connection_tls_finish_handshake(connection_t *conn);
static int connection_or_process_cells_from_inbuf(connection_t *conn);
/**************************************************************/
/** Pack the cell_t host-order structure <b>src</b> into network-order
* in the buffer <b>dest</b>. See tor-spec.txt for details about the
* wire format.
*/
static void cell_pack(char *dest, const cell_t *src) {
*(uint16_t*)dest = htons(src->circ_id);
*(uint8_t*)(dest+2) = src->command;
memcpy(dest+3, src->payload, CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE);
}
/** Unpack the network-order buffer <b>src</b> into a host-order
* cell_t structure <b>dest</b>.
*/
static void cell_unpack(cell_t *dest, const char *src) {
dest->circ_id = ntohs(*(uint16_t*)(src));
dest->command = *(uint8_t*)(src+2);
memcpy(dest->payload, src+3, CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE);
}
int connection_or_reached_eof(connection_t *conn) {
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"OR connection reached EOF. Closing.");
connection_mark_for_close(conn);
return 0;
}
/** Handle any new bytes that have come in on connection <b>conn</b>.
* If conn is in 'open' state, hand it to
* connection_or_process_cells_from_inbuf()
* (else do nothing).
*/
int connection_or_process_inbuf(connection_t *conn) {
tor_assert(conn);
tor_assert(conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR);
if (conn->state != OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN)
return 0; /* don't do anything */
return connection_or_process_cells_from_inbuf(conn);
}
/** Connection <b>conn</b> has finished writing and has no bytes left on
* its outbuf.
*
* Otherwise it's in state "open": stop writing and return.
*
* If <b>conn</b> is broken, mark it for close and return -1, else
* return 0.
*/
int connection_or_finished_flushing(connection_t *conn) {
tor_assert(conn);
tor_assert(conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR);
assert_connection_ok(conn,0);
if (conn->state != OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN) {
log_fn(LOG_WARN,"BUG: called in unexpected state %d",conn->state);
return -1;
}
connection_stop_writing(conn);
return 0;
}
/** Connected handler for OR connections: begin the TLS handshake.
*/
int connection_or_finished_connecting(connection_t *conn)
{
tor_assert(conn);
tor_assert(conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR);
tor_assert(conn->state == OR_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING);
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"OR connect() to router at %s:%u finished.",
conn->address,conn->port);
if (connection_tls_start_handshake(conn, 0) < 0) {
/* TLS handshaking error of some kind. */
connection_mark_for_close(conn);
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
/** Initialize <b>conn</b> to include all the relevant data from <b>router</b>.
* This function is called either from connection_or_connect(), if
* we initiated the connect, or from connection_tls_finish_handshake()
* if the other side initiated it.
*/
static void
connection_or_init_conn_from_router(connection_t *conn, routerinfo_t *router) {
conn->addr = router->addr;
conn->port = router->or_port;
conn->receiver_bucket = conn->bandwidth = router->bandwidthburst;
conn->identity_pkey = crypto_pk_dup_key(router->identity_pkey);
crypto_pk_get_digest(conn->identity_pkey, conn->identity_digest);
conn->nickname = tor_strdup(router->nickname);
tor_free(conn->address);
conn->address = tor_strdup(router->address);
}
static void
connection_or_init_conn_from_address(connection_t *conn,
uint32_t addr, uint16_t port,
const char *id_digest)
{
struct in_addr in;
const char *n;
or_options_t *options = get_options();
routerinfo_t *r = router_get_by_digest(id_digest);
if (r) {
connection_or_init_conn_from_router(conn,r);
return;
}
conn->addr = addr;
conn->port = port;
/* This next part isn't really right, but it's good enough for now. */
conn->receiver_bucket = conn->bandwidth = (int)options->BandwidthBurst;
memcpy(conn->identity_digest, id_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
/* If we're an authoritative directory server, we may know a
* nickname for this router. */
n = dirserv_get_nickname_by_digest(id_digest);
if (n) {
conn->nickname = tor_strdup(n);
} else {
conn->nickname = tor_malloc(HEX_DIGEST_LEN+2);
conn->nickname[0] = '$';
base16_encode(conn->nickname+1, HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1,
conn->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
}
tor_free(conn->address);
in.s_addr = htonl(addr);
conn->address = tor_strdup(inet_ntoa(in));
}
void
connection_or_update_nickname(connection_t *conn)
{
routerinfo_t *r;
const char *n;
tor_assert(conn);
tor_assert(conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR);
n = dirserv_get_nickname_by_digest(conn->identity_digest);
if (n) {
if (!conn->nickname || strcmp(conn->nickname, n)) {
tor_free(conn->nickname);
conn->nickname = tor_strdup(n);
}
return;
}
r = router_get_by_digest(conn->identity_digest);
if (r && r->is_verified) {
if (!conn->nickname || strcmp(conn->nickname, r->nickname)) {
tor_free(conn->nickname);
conn->nickname = tor_strdup(r->nickname);
}
return;
}
if (conn->nickname[0] != '$') {
tor_free(conn->nickname);
conn->nickname = tor_malloc(HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1);
base16_encode(conn->nickname, HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1,
conn->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
}
}
/** Launch a new OR connection to <b>addr</b>:<b>port</b> and expect to
* handshake with an OR with identity digest <b>id_digest</b>.
*
* If <b>id_digest</b> is me, do nothing. If we're already connected to it,
* return that connection. If the connect() is in progress, set the
* new conn's state to 'connecting' and return it. If connect() succeeds,
* call * connection_tls_start_handshake() on it.
*
* This function is called from router_retry_connections(), for
* ORs connecting to ORs, and circuit_establish_circuit(), for
* OPs connecting to ORs.
*
* Return the launched conn, or NULL if it failed.
*/
connection_t *connection_or_connect(uint32_t addr, uint16_t port,
const char *id_digest) {
connection_t *conn;
routerinfo_t *me;
tor_assert(id_digest);
if (server_mode(get_options()) && (me=router_get_my_routerinfo()) &&
!memcmp(me->identity_digest, id_digest,DIGEST_LEN)) {
log_fn(LOG_WARN,"Bug: Request to connect to myself! Failing.");
return NULL;
}
/* this function should never be called if we're already connected to
* id_digest, but check first to be sure */
/*XXX this is getting called, at least by dirservers. */
conn = connection_get_by_identity_digest(id_digest, CONN_TYPE_OR);
if (conn) {
tor_assert(conn->nickname);
log_fn(LOG_WARN,"Asked me to connect to router '%s', but there's already a connection.", conn->nickname);
return conn;
}
conn = connection_new(CONN_TYPE_OR);
/* set up conn so it's got all the data we need to remember */
connection_or_init_conn_from_address(conn, addr, port, id_digest);
conn->state = OR_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING;
control_event_or_conn_status(conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_LAUNCHED);
switch (connection_connect(conn, conn->address, addr, port)) {
case -1:
router_mark_as_down(conn->identity_digest);
control_event_or_conn_status(conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_FAILED);
connection_free(conn);
return NULL;
case 0:
connection_watch_events(conn, EV_READ | EV_WRITE);
/* writable indicates finish, readable indicates broken link,
error indicates broken link on windows */
return conn;
/* case 1: fall through */
}
if (connection_tls_start_handshake(conn, 0) >= 0)
return conn;
/* failure */
connection_mark_for_close(conn);
return NULL;
}
/** Begin the tls handshake with <b>conn</b>. <b>receiving</b> is 0 if
* we initiated the connection, else it's 1.
*
* Assign a new tls object to conn->tls, begin reading on <b>conn</b>, and pass
* <b>conn</b> to connection_tls_continue_handshake().
*
* Return -1 if <b>conn</b> is broken, else return 0.
*/
int connection_tls_start_handshake(connection_t *conn, int receiving) {
conn->state = OR_CONN_STATE_HANDSHAKING;
conn->tls = tor_tls_new(conn->s, receiving, 0);
if (!conn->tls) {
log_fn(LOG_WARN,"tor_tls_new failed. Closing.");
return -1;
}
connection_start_reading(conn);
log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"starting the handshake");
if (connection_tls_continue_handshake(conn) < 0) {
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
/** Move forward with the tls handshake. If it finishes, hand
* <b>conn</b> to connection_tls_finish_handshake().
*
* Return -1 if <b>conn</b> is broken, else return 0.
*/
int connection_tls_continue_handshake(connection_t *conn) {
switch (tor_tls_handshake(conn->tls)) {
case TOR_TLS_ERROR:
case TOR_TLS_CLOSE:
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"tls error. breaking.");
return -1;
case TOR_TLS_DONE:
return connection_tls_finish_handshake(conn);
case TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE:
connection_start_writing(conn);
log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"wanted write");
return 0;
case TOR_TLS_WANTREAD: /* handshaking conns are *always* reading */
log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"wanted read");
return 0;
}
return 0;
}
static char ZERO_DIGEST[] = { 0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0 };
int connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(connection_t *conn)
{
tor_assert(sizeof(ZERO_DIGEST) == DIGEST_LEN);
tor_assert(conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR);
if (!memcmp(ZERO_DIGEST, conn->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN))
return 0;
else
return 1;
}
/** The tls handshake is finished.
*
* Make sure we are happy with the person we just handshaked with:
* If it's an OP (that is, it has no certificate), make sure I'm an OR.
* If it's an OR (it has a certificate), make sure it has a recognized
* nickname, and its cert is signed by the identity key of that nickname.
* If I initiated the connection, make sure it's the right guy; and if
* he initiated the connection, make sure he's not already connected.
*
* If he initiated the conn, also initialize conn from the information
* in router.
*
* If either of us is an OP, set bandwidth to the default OP bandwidth.
*
* If all is successful and he's an OR, then call circuit_n_conn_done()
* to handle events that have been pending on the tls handshake
* completion, and set the directory to be dirty (only matters if I'm
* an authdirserver).
*/
static int
connection_tls_finish_handshake(connection_t *conn) {
routerinfo_t *router;
char nickname[MAX_NICKNAME_LEN+1];
connection_t *c;
crypto_pk_env_t *identity_rcvd=NULL;
char digest_rcvd[DIGEST_LEN];
or_options_t *options = get_options();
conn->state = OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN;
connection_watch_events(conn, EV_READ);
log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"tls handshake done. verifying.");
if (! tor_tls_peer_has_cert(conn->tls)) {
log_fn(LOG_WARN,"Peer didn't send a cert! Closing.");
/* XXX we should handle this case rather than just closing. */
return -1;
}
if (tor_tls_get_peer_cert_nickname(conn->tls, nickname, sizeof(nickname))) {
log_fn(LOG_WARN,"Other side (%s:%d) has a cert without a valid nickname. Closing.",
conn->address, conn->port);
return -1;
}
log_fn(LOG_DEBUG, "Other side (%s:%d) claims to be router '%s'",
conn->address, conn->port, nickname);
if (tor_tls_verify(conn->tls, &identity_rcvd) < 0) {
log_fn(LOG_WARN,"Other side, which claims to be router '%s' (%s:%d), has a cert but it's invalid. Closing.",
nickname, conn->address, conn->port);
return -1;
}
#if 0
if (tor_tls_check_lifetime(conn->tls, LOOSE_CERT_ALLOW_SKEW)<0) {
log_fn(LOG_WARN,"Other side '%s' (%s:%d) has a very highly skewed clock, or an expired certificate. Closing.",
nickname, conn->address, conn->port);
return -1;
}
#endif
log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"The router's cert is valid.");
crypto_pk_get_digest(identity_rcvd, digest_rcvd);
if (crypto_pk_cmp_keys(get_identity_key(), identity_rcvd)<0) {
conn->circ_id_type = CIRC_ID_TYPE_LOWER;
} else {
conn->circ_id_type = CIRC_ID_TYPE_HIGHER;
}
crypto_free_pk_env(identity_rcvd);
router = router_get_by_nickname(nickname);
if (router && /* we know this nickname */
router->is_verified && /* make sure it's the right guy */
memcmp(digest_rcvd, router->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN) != 0) {
log_fn(LOG_WARN, "Identity key not as expected for router claiming to be '%s' (%s:%d) ", nickname, conn->address, conn->port);
return -1;
}
#if 0
if (router_get_by_digest(digest_rcvd)) {
/* This is a known router; don't cut it slack with its clock skew. */
if (tor_tls_check_lifetime(conn->tls, TIGHT_CERT_ALLOW_SKEW)<0) {
log_fn(LOG_WARN,"Router '%s' (%s:%d) has a skewed clock, or an expired certificate; or else our clock is skewed. Closing.",
nickname, conn->address, conn->port);
return -1;
}
}
#endif
if (connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(conn)) {
/* I initiated this connection. */
if (strcasecmp(conn->nickname, nickname)) {
log_fn(authdir_mode(options) ? LOG_WARN : LOG_INFO,
"Other side (%s:%d) is '%s', but we tried to connect to '%s'",
conn->address, conn->port, nickname, conn->nickname);
control_event_or_conn_status(conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_FAILED);
return -1;
}
} else {
if ((c=connection_get_by_identity_digest(digest_rcvd, CONN_TYPE_OR))) {
log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Router '%s' is already connected on fd %d. Dropping fd %d.", nickname, c->s, conn->s);
return -1;
}
connection_or_init_conn_from_address(conn,conn->addr,conn->port,digest_rcvd);
}
if (!server_mode(options)) { /* If I'm an OP... */
conn->receiver_bucket = conn->bandwidth = DEFAULT_BANDWIDTH_OP;
}
directory_set_dirty();
circuit_n_conn_done(conn, 1); /* send the pending creates, if any. */
/* Note the success */
rep_hist_note_connect_succeeded(conn->identity_digest, time(NULL));
control_event_or_conn_status(conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_CONNECTED);
return 0;
}
/** Pack <b>cell</b> into wire-format, and write it onto <b>conn</b>'s
* outbuf.
*
* (Commented out) If it's an OR conn, and an entire TLS record is
* ready, then try to flush the record now.
*/
void connection_or_write_cell_to_buf(const cell_t *cell, connection_t *conn) {
char networkcell[CELL_NETWORK_SIZE];
char *n = networkcell;
tor_assert(cell);
tor_assert(conn);
tor_assert(connection_speaks_cells(conn));
cell_pack(n, cell);
connection_write_to_buf(n, CELL_NETWORK_SIZE, conn);
#if 0 /* commented out -- can we get away with not doing this,
* because we're already round-robining in handle_read?
*/
#define MIN_TLS_FLUSHLEN 15872
/* openssl tls record size is 16383, this is close. The goal here is to
* push data out as soon as we know there's enough for a tls record, so
* during periods of high load we won't read the entire megabyte from
* input before pushing any data out. */
if (conn->outbuf_flushlen-CELL_NETWORK_SIZE < MIN_TLS_FLUSHLEN &&
conn->outbuf_flushlen >= MIN_TLS_FLUSHLEN) {
int extra = conn->outbuf_flushlen - MIN_TLS_FLUSHLEN;
conn->outbuf_flushlen = MIN_TLS_FLUSHLEN;
if (connection_handle_write(conn) < 0) {
log_fn(LOG_WARN,"flushing failed.");
return;
}
if (extra) {
conn->outbuf_flushlen += extra;
connection_start_writing(conn);
}
}
#endif
}
/** Process cells from <b>conn</b>'s inbuf.
*
* Loop: while inbuf contains a cell, pull it off the inbuf, unpack it,
* and hand it to command_process_cell().
*
* Always return 0.
*/
static int connection_or_process_cells_from_inbuf(connection_t *conn) {
char buf[CELL_NETWORK_SIZE];
cell_t cell;
loop:
log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"%d: starting, inbuf_datalen %d (%d pending in tls object).",
conn->s,(int)buf_datalen(conn->inbuf),tor_tls_get_pending_bytes(conn->tls));
if (buf_datalen(conn->inbuf) < CELL_NETWORK_SIZE) /* entire response available? */
return 0; /* not yet */
connection_fetch_from_buf(buf, CELL_NETWORK_SIZE, conn);
/* retrieve cell info from buf (create the host-order struct from the
* network-order string) */
cell_unpack(&cell, buf);
command_process_cell(&cell, conn);
goto loop; /* process the remainder of the buffer */
}