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4812441d34
When we "fixed" #18280 in 4e4a7d2b0c
in 0291 it appears that we introduced a bug: The base32_encode
function can read off the end of the input buffer, if the input
buffer size modulo 5 is not equal to 0 or 3.
This is not completely horrible, for two reasons:
* The extra bits that are read are never actually used: so this
is only a crash when asan is enabled, in the worst case. Not a
data leak.
* The input sizes passed to base32_encode are only ever multiples
of 5. They are all either DIGEST_LEN (20), REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN
(10), sizeof(rand_bytes) in addressmap.c (10), or an input in
crypto.c that is forced to a multiple of 5.
So this bug can't actually trigger in today's Tor.
Closes bug 21894; bugfix on 0.2.9.1-alpha.
6 lines
235 B
Plaintext
6 lines
235 B
Plaintext
o Minor bugfixes (crash prevention):
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- Fix an (currently untriggerable, but potentially dangerous) crash
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bug when base32-encoding inputs whose sizes are not a multiple of
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5. Fixes bug 21894; bugfix on 0.2.9.1-alpha.
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