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e097bffaed
tor/src/common/tortls.c
George Kadianakis e097bffaed Fix issues pointed out by nickm. 
- Rename tor_tls_got_server_hello() to tor_tls_got_client_hello().
- Replaced some aggressive asserts with LD_BUG logging.

  They were the innocent "I believe I understand how these callbacks
  work, and this assert proves it" type of callbacks, and not the "If
  this statement is not true, computer is exploding." type of
  callbacks.
- Added a changes file.
2011-11-03 22:33:50 +01:00

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/* Copyright (c) 2003, Roger Dingledine.
* Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
* Copyright (c) 2007-2011, The Tor Project, Inc. */
/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
/**
* \file tortls.c
* \brief Wrapper functions to present a consistent interface to
* TLS, SSL, and X.509 functions from OpenSSL.
**/
/* (Unlike other tor functions, these
* are prefixed with tor_ in order to avoid conflicting with OpenSSL
* functions and variables.)
*/
#include "orconfig.h"
#if defined (WINCE)
#include <WinSock2.h>
#endif
#include <assert.h>
#ifdef MS_WINDOWS /*wrkard for dtls1.h >= 0.9.8m of "#include <winsock.h>"*/
#ifndef WIN32_WINNT
#define WIN32_WINNT 0x400
#endif
#ifndef _WIN32_WINNT
#define _WIN32_WINNT 0x400
#endif
#define WIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN
#if defined(_MSC_VER) && (_MSC_VER < 1300)
#include <winsock.h>
#else
#include <winsock2.h>
#include <ws2tcpip.h>
#endif
#endif
#include <openssl/ssl.h>
#include <openssl/ssl3.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/tls1.h>
#include <openssl/asn1.h>
#include <openssl/bio.h>
#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000l
#error "We require OpenSSL >= 0.9.7"
#endif
#ifdef USE_BUFFEREVENTS
#include <event2/bufferevent_ssl.h>
#include <event2/buffer.h>
#include <event2/event.h>
#include "compat_libevent.h"
#endif
#define CRYPTO_PRIVATE /* to import prototypes from crypto.h */
#define TORTLS_PRIVATE
#include "crypto.h"
#include "tortls.h"
#include "util.h"
#include "torlog.h"
#include "container.h"
#include <string.h>
/* Enable the "v2" TLS handshake.
*/
#define V2_HANDSHAKE_SERVER
#define V2_HANDSHAKE_CLIENT
/* Copied from or.h */
#define LEGAL_NICKNAME_CHARACTERS \
"abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789"
/** How long do identity certificates live? (sec) */
#define IDENTITY_CERT_LIFETIME (365*24*60*60)
#define ADDR(tls) (((tls) && (tls)->address) ? tls->address : "peer")
/* We redefine these so that we can run correctly even if the vendor gives us
* a version of OpenSSL that does not match its header files. (Apple: I am
* looking at you.)
*/
#ifndef SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
#define SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION 0x00040000L
#endif
#ifndef SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
#define SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION 0x0010
#endif
/** Does the run-time openssl version look like we need
* SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION? */
static int use_unsafe_renegotiation_op = 0;
/** Does the run-time openssl version look like we need
* SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION? */
static int use_unsafe_renegotiation_flag = 0;
/** Structure that we use for a single certificate. */
struct tor_cert_t {
X509 *cert;
uint8_t *encoded;
size_t encoded_len;
unsigned pkey_digests_set : 1;
digests_t cert_digests;
digests_t pkey_digests;
};
/** Holds a SSL_CTX object and related state used to configure TLS
* connections.
*/
typedef struct tor_tls_context_t {
int refcnt;
SSL_CTX *ctx;
tor_cert_t *my_link_cert;
tor_cert_t *my_id_cert;
tor_cert_t *my_auth_cert;
crypto_pk_env_t *link_key;
crypto_pk_env_t *auth_key;
} tor_tls_context_t;
#define TOR_TLS_MAGIC 0x71571571
/** Holds a SSL object and its associated data. Members are only
* accessed from within tortls.c.
*/
struct tor_tls_t {
uint32_t magic;
tor_tls_context_t *context; /** A link to the context object for this tls. */
SSL *ssl; /**< An OpenSSL SSL object. */
int socket; /**< The underlying file descriptor for this TLS connection. */
char *address; /**< An address to log when describing this connection. */
enum {
TOR_TLS_ST_HANDSHAKE, TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN, TOR_TLS_ST_GOTCLOSE,
TOR_TLS_ST_SENTCLOSE, TOR_TLS_ST_CLOSED, TOR_TLS_ST_RENEGOTIATE,
TOR_TLS_ST_BUFFEREVENT
} state : 3; /**< The current SSL state, depending on which operations have
* completed successfully. */
unsigned int isServer:1; /**< True iff this is a server-side connection */
unsigned int wasV2Handshake:1; /**< True iff the original handshake for
* this connection used the updated version
* of the connection protocol (client sends
* different cipher list, server sends only
* one certificate). */
/** True iff we should call negotiated_callback when we're done reading. */
unsigned int got_renegotiate:1;
/** Incremented every time we start the server side of a handshake. */
unsigned int server_handshake_count:2;
size_t wantwrite_n; /**< 0 normally, >0 if we returned wantwrite last
* time. */
/** Last values retrieved from BIO_number_read()/write(); see
* tor_tls_get_n_raw_bytes() for usage.
*/
unsigned long last_write_count;
unsigned long last_read_count;
/** If set, a callback to invoke whenever the client tries to renegotiate
* the handshake. */
void (*negotiated_callback)(tor_tls_t *tls, void *arg);
/** Argument to pass to negotiated_callback. */
void *callback_arg;
};
#ifdef V2_HANDSHAKE_CLIENT
/** An array of fake SSL_CIPHER objects that we use in order to trick OpenSSL
* in client mode into advertising the ciphers we want. See
* rectify_client_ciphers() for details. */
static SSL_CIPHER *CLIENT_CIPHER_DUMMIES = NULL;
/** A stack of SSL_CIPHER objects, some real, some fake.
* See rectify_client_ciphers() for details. */
static STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *CLIENT_CIPHER_STACK = NULL;
#endif
/** The ex_data index in which we store a pointer to an SSL object's
* corresponding tor_tls_t object. */
static int tor_tls_object_ex_data_index = -1;
/** Helper: Allocate tor_tls_object_ex_data_index. */
static void
tor_tls_allocate_tor_tls_object_ex_data_index(void)
{
if (tor_tls_object_ex_data_index == -1) {
tor_tls_object_ex_data_index =
SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
tor_assert(tor_tls_object_ex_data_index != -1);
}
}
/** Helper: given a SSL* pointer, return the tor_tls_t object using that
* pointer. */
static INLINE tor_tls_t *
tor_tls_get_by_ssl(const SSL *ssl)
{
tor_tls_t *result = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, tor_tls_object_ex_data_index);
if (result)
tor_assert(result->magic == TOR_TLS_MAGIC);
return result;
}
static void tor_tls_context_decref(tor_tls_context_t *ctx);
static void tor_tls_context_incref(tor_tls_context_t *ctx);
static X509* tor_tls_create_certificate(crypto_pk_env_t *rsa,
crypto_pk_env_t *rsa_sign,
const char *cname,
const char *cname_sign,
unsigned int lifetime);
static int tor_tls_context_init_one(tor_tls_context_t **ppcontext,
crypto_pk_env_t *identity,
unsigned int key_lifetime);
static tor_tls_context_t *tor_tls_context_new(crypto_pk_env_t *identity,
unsigned int key_lifetime);
static int check_cert_lifetime_internal(const X509 *cert, int tolerance);
/** Global TLS contexts. We keep them here because nobody else needs
* to touch them. */
static tor_tls_context_t *server_tls_context = NULL;
static tor_tls_context_t *client_tls_context = NULL;
/** True iff tor_tls_init() has been called. */
static int tls_library_is_initialized = 0;
/* Module-internal error codes. */
#define _TOR_TLS_SYSCALL (_MIN_TOR_TLS_ERROR_VAL - 2)
#define _TOR_TLS_ZERORETURN (_MIN_TOR_TLS_ERROR_VAL - 1)
#include "tortls_states.h"
/** Return the symbolic name of an OpenSSL state. */
static const char *
ssl_state_to_string(int ssl_state)
{
static char buf[40];
int i;
for (i = 0; state_map[i].name; ++i) {
if (state_map[i].state == ssl_state)
return state_map[i].name;
}
tor_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "Unknown state %d", ssl_state);
return buf;
}
/** Write a description of the current state of <b>tls</b> into the
* <b>sz</b>-byte buffer at <b>buf</b>. */
void
tor_tls_get_state_description(tor_tls_t *tls, char *buf, size_t sz)
{
const char *ssl_state;
const char *tortls_state;
if (PREDICT_UNLIKELY(!tls || !tls->ssl)) {
strlcpy(buf, "(No SSL object)", sz);
return;
}
ssl_state = ssl_state_to_string(tls->ssl->state);
switch (tls->state) {
#define CASE(st) case TOR_TLS_ST_##st: tortls_state = " in "#st ; break
CASE(HANDSHAKE);
CASE(OPEN);
CASE(GOTCLOSE);
CASE(SENTCLOSE);
CASE(CLOSED);
CASE(RENEGOTIATE);
#undef CASE
case TOR_TLS_ST_BUFFEREVENT:
tortls_state = "";
break;
default:
tortls_state = " in unknown TLS state";
break;
}
tor_snprintf(buf, sz, "%s%s", ssl_state, tortls_state);
}
void
tor_tls_log_one_error(tor_tls_t *tls, unsigned long err,
int severity, int domain, const char *doing)
{
const char *state = NULL, *addr;
const char *msg, *lib, *func;
int st;
st = (tls && tls->ssl) ? tls->ssl->state : -1;
state = (st>=0)?ssl_state_to_string(st):"---";
addr = tls ? tls->address : NULL;
/* Some errors are known-benign, meaning they are the fault of the other
* side of the connection. The caller doesn't know this, so override the
* priority for those cases. */
switch (ERR_GET_REASON(err)) {
case SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST:
case SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST:
case SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH:
case SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE:
case SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL:
case SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL:
severity = LOG_INFO;
break;
default:
break;
}
msg = (const char*)ERR_reason_error_string(err);
lib = (const char*)ERR_lib_error_string(err);
func = (const char*)ERR_func_error_string(err);
if (!msg) msg = "(null)";
if (!lib) lib = "(null)";
if (!func) func = "(null)";
if (doing) {
log(severity, domain, "TLS error while %s%s%s: %s (in %s:%s:%s)",
doing, addr?" with ":"", addr?addr:"",
msg, lib, func, state);
} else {
log(severity, domain, "TLS error%s%s: %s (in %s:%s:%s)",
addr?" with ":"", addr?addr:"",
msg, lib, func, state);
}
}
/** Log all pending tls errors at level <b>severity</b>. Use
* <b>doing</b> to describe our current activities.
*/
static void
tls_log_errors(tor_tls_t *tls, int severity, int domain, const char *doing)
{
unsigned long err;
while ((err = ERR_get_error()) != 0) {
tor_tls_log_one_error(tls, err, severity, domain, doing);
}
}
/** Convert an errno (or a WSAerrno on windows) into a TOR_TLS_* error
* code. */
static int
tor_errno_to_tls_error(int e)
{
#if defined(MS_WINDOWS)
switch (e) {
case WSAECONNRESET: // most common
return TOR_TLS_ERROR_CONNRESET;
case WSAETIMEDOUT:
return TOR_TLS_ERROR_TIMEOUT;
case WSAENETUNREACH:
case WSAEHOSTUNREACH:
return TOR_TLS_ERROR_NO_ROUTE;
case WSAECONNREFUSED:
return TOR_TLS_ERROR_CONNREFUSED; // least common
default:
return TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC;
}
#else
switch (e) {
case ECONNRESET: // most common
return TOR_TLS_ERROR_CONNRESET;
case ETIMEDOUT:
return TOR_TLS_ERROR_TIMEOUT;
case EHOSTUNREACH:
case ENETUNREACH:
return TOR_TLS_ERROR_NO_ROUTE;
case ECONNREFUSED:
return TOR_TLS_ERROR_CONNREFUSED; // least common
default:
return TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC;
}
#endif
}
/** Given a TOR_TLS_* error code, return a string equivalent. */
const char *
tor_tls_err_to_string(int err)
{
if (err >= 0)
return "[Not an error.]";
switch (err) {
case TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC: return "misc error";
case TOR_TLS_ERROR_IO: return "unexpected close";
case TOR_TLS_ERROR_CONNREFUSED: return "connection refused";
case TOR_TLS_ERROR_CONNRESET: return "connection reset";
case TOR_TLS_ERROR_NO_ROUTE: return "host unreachable";
case TOR_TLS_ERROR_TIMEOUT: return "connection timed out";
case TOR_TLS_CLOSE: return "closed";
case TOR_TLS_WANTREAD: return "want to read";
case TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE: return "want to write";
default: return "(unknown error code)";
}
}
#define CATCH_SYSCALL 1
#define CATCH_ZERO 2
/** Given a TLS object and the result of an SSL_* call, use
* SSL_get_error to determine whether an error has occurred, and if so
* which one. Return one of TOR_TLS_{DONE|WANTREAD|WANTWRITE|ERROR}.
* If extra&CATCH_SYSCALL is true, return _TOR_TLS_SYSCALL instead of
* reporting syscall errors. If extra&CATCH_ZERO is true, return
* _TOR_TLS_ZERORETURN instead of reporting zero-return errors.
*
* If an error has occurred, log it at level <b>severity</b> and describe the
* current action as <b>doing</b>.
*/
static int
tor_tls_get_error(tor_tls_t *tls, int r, int extra,
const char *doing, int severity, int domain)
{
int err = SSL_get_error(tls->ssl, r);
int tor_error = TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC;
switch (err) {
case SSL_ERROR_NONE:
return TOR_TLS_DONE;
case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
return TOR_TLS_WANTREAD;
case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
return TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE;
case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
if (extra&CATCH_SYSCALL)
return _TOR_TLS_SYSCALL;
if (r == 0) {
log(severity, LD_NET, "TLS error: unexpected close while %s (%s)",
doing, ssl_state_to_string(tls->ssl->state));
tor_error = TOR_TLS_ERROR_IO;
} else {
int e = tor_socket_errno(tls->socket);
log(severity, LD_NET,
"TLS error: <syscall error while %s> (errno=%d: %s; state=%s)",
doing, e, tor_socket_strerror(e),
ssl_state_to_string(tls->ssl->state));
tor_error = tor_errno_to_tls_error(e);
}
tls_log_errors(tls, severity, domain, doing);
return tor_error;
case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
if (extra&CATCH_ZERO)
return _TOR_TLS_ZERORETURN;
log(severity, LD_NET, "TLS connection closed while %s in state %s",
doing, ssl_state_to_string(tls->ssl->state));
tls_log_errors(tls, severity, domain, doing);
return TOR_TLS_CLOSE;
default:
tls_log_errors(tls, severity, domain, doing);
return TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC;
}
}
/** Initialize OpenSSL, unless it has already been initialized.
*/
static void
tor_tls_init(void)
{
if (!tls_library_is_initialized) {
long version;
SSL_library_init();
SSL_load_error_strings();
version = SSLeay();
/* OpenSSL 0.9.8l introduced SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION
* here, but without thinking too hard about it: it turns out that the
* flag in question needed to be set at the last minute, and that it
* conflicted with an existing flag number that had already been added
* in the OpenSSL 1.0.0 betas. OpenSSL 0.9.8m thoughtfully replaced
* the flag with an option and (it seems) broke anything that used
* SSL3_FLAGS_* for the purpose. So we need to know how to do both,
* and we mustn't use the SSL3_FLAGS option with anything besides
* OpenSSL 0.9.8l.
*
* No, we can't just set flag 0x0010 everywhere. It breaks Tor with
* OpenSSL 1.0.0beta3 and later. On the other hand, we might be able to
* set option 0x00040000L everywhere.
*
* No, we can't simply detect whether the flag or the option is present
* in the headers at build-time: some vendors (notably Apple) like to
* leave their headers out of sync with their libraries.
*
* Yes, it _is_ almost as if the OpenSSL developers decided that no
* program should be allowed to use renegotiation unless it first passed
* a test of intelligence and determination.
*/
if (version >= 0x009080c0L && version < 0x009080d0L) {
log_notice(LD_GENERAL, "OpenSSL %s looks like version 0.9.8l; "
"I will try SSL3_FLAGS to enable renegotation.",
SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION));
use_unsafe_renegotiation_flag = 1;
use_unsafe_renegotiation_op = 1;
} else if (version >= 0x009080d0L) {
log_notice(LD_GENERAL, "OpenSSL %s looks like version 0.9.8m or later; "
"I will try SSL_OP to enable renegotiation",
SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION));
use_unsafe_renegotiation_op = 1;
} else if (version < 0x009080c0L) {
log_notice(LD_GENERAL, "OpenSSL %s [%lx] looks like it's older than "
"0.9.8l, but some vendors have backported 0.9.8l's "
"renegotiation code to earlier versions, and some have "
"backported the code from 0.9.8m or 0.9.8n. I'll set both "
"SSL3_FLAGS and SSL_OP just to be safe.",
SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION), version);
use_unsafe_renegotiation_flag = 1;
use_unsafe_renegotiation_op = 1;
} else {
log_info(LD_GENERAL, "OpenSSL %s has version %lx",
SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION), version);
}
tor_tls_allocate_tor_tls_object_ex_data_index();
tls_library_is_initialized = 1;
}
}
/** Free all global TLS structures. */
void
tor_tls_free_all(void)
{
if (server_tls_context) {
tor_tls_context_t *ctx = server_tls_context;
server_tls_context = NULL;
tor_tls_context_decref(ctx);
}
if (client_tls_context) {
tor_tls_context_t *ctx = client_tls_context;
client_tls_context = NULL;
tor_tls_context_decref(ctx);
}
#ifdef V2_HANDSHAKE_CLIENT
if (CLIENT_CIPHER_DUMMIES)
tor_free(CLIENT_CIPHER_DUMMIES);
if (CLIENT_CIPHER_STACK)
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(CLIENT_CIPHER_STACK);
#endif
}
/** We need to give OpenSSL a callback to verify certificates. This is
* it: We always accept peer certs and complete the handshake. We
* don't validate them until later.
*/
static int
always_accept_verify_cb(int preverify_ok,
X509_STORE_CTX *x509_ctx)
{
(void) preverify_ok;
(void) x509_ctx;
return 1;
}
/** Return a newly allocated X509 name with commonName <b>cname</b>. */
static X509_NAME *
tor_x509_name_new(const char *cname)
{
int nid;
X509_NAME *name;
if (!(name = X509_NAME_new()))
return NULL;
if ((nid = OBJ_txt2nid("commonName")) == NID_undef) goto error;
if (!(X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID(name, nid, MBSTRING_ASC,
(unsigned char*)cname, -1, -1, 0)))
goto error;
return name;
error:
X509_NAME_free(name);
return NULL;
}
/** Generate and sign an X509 certificate with the public key <b>rsa</b>,
* signed by the private key <b>rsa_sign</b>. The commonName of the
* certificate will be <b>cname</b>; the commonName of the issuer will be
* <b>cname_sign</b>. The cert will be valid for <b>cert_lifetime</b> seconds
* starting from now. Return a certificate on success, NULL on
* failure.
*/
static X509 *
tor_tls_create_certificate(crypto_pk_env_t *rsa,
crypto_pk_env_t *rsa_sign,
const char *cname,
const char *cname_sign,
unsigned int cert_lifetime)
{
time_t start_time, end_time;
EVP_PKEY *sign_pkey = NULL, *pkey=NULL;
X509 *x509 = NULL;
X509_NAME *name = NULL, *name_issuer=NULL;
tor_tls_init();
start_time = time(NULL);
tor_assert(rsa);
tor_assert(cname);
tor_assert(rsa_sign);
tor_assert(cname_sign);
if (!(sign_pkey = _crypto_pk_env_get_evp_pkey(rsa_sign,1)))
goto error;
if (!(pkey = _crypto_pk_env_get_evp_pkey(rsa,0)))
goto error;
if (!(x509 = X509_new()))
goto error;
if (!(X509_set_version(x509, 2)))
goto error;
if (!(ASN1_INTEGER_set(X509_get_serialNumber(x509), (long)start_time)))
goto error;
if (!(name = tor_x509_name_new(cname)))
goto error;
if (!(X509_set_subject_name(x509, name)))
goto error;
if (!(name_issuer = tor_x509_name_new(cname_sign)))
goto error;
if (!(X509_set_issuer_name(x509, name_issuer)))
goto error;
if (!X509_time_adj(X509_get_notBefore(x509),0,&start_time))
goto error;
end_time = start_time + cert_lifetime;
if (!X509_time_adj(X509_get_notAfter(x509),0,&end_time))
goto error;
if (!X509_set_pubkey(x509, pkey))
goto error;
if (!X509_sign(x509, sign_pkey, EVP_sha1()))
goto error;
goto done;
error:
if (x509) {
X509_free(x509);
x509 = NULL;
}
done:
tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "generating certificate");
if (sign_pkey)
EVP_PKEY_free(sign_pkey);
if (pkey)
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
if (name)
X509_NAME_free(name);
if (name_issuer)
X509_NAME_free(name_issuer);
return x509;
}
/** List of ciphers that servers should select from.*/
#define SERVER_CIPHER_LIST \
(TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA ":" \
TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA ":" \
SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA)
/* Note: to set up your own private testing network with link crypto
* disabled, set your Tors' cipher list to
* (SSL3_TXT_RSA_NULL_SHA). If you do this, you won't be able to communicate
* with any of the "real" Tors, though. */
#ifdef V2_HANDSHAKE_CLIENT
#define CIPHER(id, name) name ":"
#define XCIPHER(id, name)
/** List of ciphers that clients should advertise, omitting items that
* our OpenSSL doesn't know about. */
static const char CLIENT_CIPHER_LIST[] =
#include "./ciphers.inc"
;
#undef CIPHER
#undef XCIPHER
/** Holds a cipher that we want to advertise, and its 2-byte ID. */
typedef struct cipher_info_t { unsigned id; const char *name; } cipher_info_t;
/** A list of all the ciphers that clients should advertise, including items
* that OpenSSL might not know about. */
static const cipher_info_t CLIENT_CIPHER_INFO_LIST[] = {
#define CIPHER(id, name) { id, name },
#define XCIPHER(id, name) { id, #name },
#include "./ciphers.inc"
#undef CIPHER
#undef XCIPHER
};
/** The length of CLIENT_CIPHER_INFO_LIST and CLIENT_CIPHER_DUMMIES. */
static const int N_CLIENT_CIPHERS =
sizeof(CLIENT_CIPHER_INFO_LIST)/sizeof(CLIENT_CIPHER_INFO_LIST[0]);
#endif
#ifndef V2_HANDSHAKE_CLIENT
#undef CLIENT_CIPHER_LIST
#define CLIENT_CIPHER_LIST (TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA ":" \
SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA)
#endif
/** Free all storage held in <b>cert</b> */
void
tor_cert_free(tor_cert_t *cert)
{
if (! cert)
return;
if (cert->cert)
X509_free(cert->cert);
tor_free(cert->encoded);
memset(cert, 0x03, sizeof(cert));
tor_free(cert);
}
/**
* Allocate a new tor_cert_t to hold the certificate "x509_cert".
*
* Steals a reference to x509_cert.
*/
static tor_cert_t *
tor_cert_new(X509 *x509_cert)
{
tor_cert_t *cert;
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
RSA *rsa;
int length, length2;
unsigned char *cp;
if (!x509_cert)
return NULL;
length = i2d_X509(x509_cert, NULL);
cert = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_cert_t));
if (length <= 0) {
tor_free(cert);
log_err(LD_CRYPTO, "Couldn't get length of encoded x509 certificate");
X509_free(x509_cert);
return NULL;
}
cert->encoded_len = (size_t) length;
cp = cert->encoded = tor_malloc(length);
length2 = i2d_X509(x509_cert, &cp);
tor_assert(length2 == length);
cert->cert = x509_cert;
crypto_digest_all(&cert->cert_digests,
(char*)cert->encoded, cert->encoded_len);
if ((pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x509_cert)) &&
(rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey))) {
crypto_pk_env_t *pk = _crypto_new_pk_env_rsa(rsa);
crypto_pk_get_all_digests(pk, &cert->pkey_digests);
cert->pkey_digests_set = 1;
crypto_free_pk_env(pk);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
}
return cert;
}
/** Read a DER-encoded X509 cert, of length exactly <b>certificate_len</b>,
* from a <b>certificate</b>. Return a newly allocated tor_cert_t on success
* and NULL on failure. */
tor_cert_t *
tor_cert_decode(const uint8_t *certificate, size_t certificate_len)
{
X509 *x509;
const unsigned char *cp = (const unsigned char *)certificate;
tor_cert_t *newcert;
tor_assert(certificate);
if (certificate_len > INT_MAX)
return NULL;
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00908000l
/* This ifdef suppresses a type warning. Take out this case once everybody
* is using OpenSSL 0.9.8 or later. */
x509 = d2i_X509(NULL, (unsigned char**)&cp, (int)certificate_len);
#else
x509 = d2i_X509(NULL, &cp, (int)certificate_len);
#endif
if (!x509)
return NULL; /* Couldn't decode */
if (cp - certificate != (int)certificate_len) {
X509_free(x509);
return NULL; /* Didn't use all the bytes */
}
newcert = tor_cert_new(x509);
if (!newcert) {
return NULL;
}
if (newcert->encoded_len != certificate_len ||
fast_memneq(newcert->encoded, certificate, certificate_len)) {
/* Cert wasn't in DER */
tor_cert_free(newcert);
return NULL;
}
return newcert;
}
/** Set *<b>encoded_out</b> and *<b>size_out/b> to <b>cert</b>'s encoded DER
* representation and length, respectively. */
void
tor_cert_get_der(const tor_cert_t *cert,
const uint8_t **encoded_out, size_t *size_out)
{
tor_assert(cert);
tor_assert(encoded_out);
tor_assert(size_out);
*encoded_out = cert->encoded;
*size_out = cert->encoded_len;
}
/** Return a set of digests for the public key in <b>cert</b>, or NULL if this
* cert's public key is not one we know how to take the digest of. */
const digests_t *
tor_cert_get_id_digests(const tor_cert_t *cert)
{
if (cert->pkey_digests_set)
return &cert->pkey_digests;
else
return NULL;
}
/** Return a set of digests for the public key in <b>cert</b>. */
const digests_t *
tor_cert_get_cert_digests(const tor_cert_t *cert)
{
return &cert->cert_digests;
}
/** Remove a reference to <b>ctx</b>, and free it if it has no more
* references. */
static void
tor_tls_context_decref(tor_tls_context_t *ctx)
{
tor_assert(ctx);
if (--ctx->refcnt == 0) {
SSL_CTX_free(ctx->ctx);
tor_cert_free(ctx->my_link_cert);
tor_cert_free(ctx->my_id_cert);
tor_cert_free(ctx->my_auth_cert);
crypto_free_pk_env(ctx->link_key);
crypto_free_pk_env(ctx->auth_key);
tor_free(ctx);
}
}
/** Set *<b>link_cert_out</b> and *<b>id_cert_out</b> to the link certificate
* and ID certificate that we're currently using for our V3 in-protocol
* handshake's certificate chain. If <b>server</b> is true, provide the certs
* that we use in server mode; otherwise, provide the certs that we use in
* client mode. */
int
tor_tls_get_my_certs(int server,
const tor_cert_t **link_cert_out,
const tor_cert_t **id_cert_out)
{
tor_tls_context_t *ctx = server ? server_tls_context : client_tls_context;
if (! ctx)
return -1;
if (link_cert_out)
*link_cert_out = server ? ctx->my_link_cert : ctx->my_auth_cert;
if (id_cert_out)
*id_cert_out = ctx->my_id_cert;
return 0;
}
/**
* Return the authentication key that we use to authenticate ourselves as a
* client in the V3 in-protocol handshake.
*/
crypto_pk_env_t *
tor_tls_get_my_client_auth_key(void)
{
if (! client_tls_context)
return NULL;
return client_tls_context->auth_key;
}
/**
* Return the public key that a cetificate certifies. Return NULL if the
* cert's key is not RSA.
*/
crypto_pk_env_t *
tor_tls_cert_get_key(tor_cert_t *cert)
{
crypto_pk_env_t *result = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get_pubkey(cert->cert);
RSA *rsa;
if (!pkey)
return NULL;
rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey);
if (!rsa) {
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
return NULL;
}
result = _crypto_new_pk_env_rsa(rsa);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
return result;
}
/** Return true iff <b>a</b> and <b>b</b> represent the same public key. */
static int
pkey_eq(EVP_PKEY *a, EVP_PKEY *b)
{
/* We'd like to do this, but openssl 0.9.7 doesn't have it:
return EVP_PKEY_cmp(a,b) == 1;
*/
unsigned char *a_enc=NULL, *b_enc=NULL, *a_ptr, *b_ptr;
int a_len1, b_len1, a_len2, b_len2, result;
a_len1 = i2d_PublicKey(a, NULL);
b_len1 = i2d_PublicKey(b, NULL);
if (a_len1 != b_len1)
return 0;
a_ptr = a_enc = tor_malloc(a_len1);
b_ptr = b_enc = tor_malloc(b_len1);
a_len2 = i2d_PublicKey(a, &a_ptr);
b_len2 = i2d_PublicKey(b, &b_ptr);
tor_assert(a_len2 == a_len1);
tor_assert(b_len2 == b_len1);
result = tor_memeq(a_enc, b_enc, a_len1);
tor_free(a_enc);
tor_free(b_enc);
return result;
}
/** Return true iff the other side of <b>tls</b> has authenticated to us, and
* the key certified in <b>cert</b> is the same as the key they used to do it.
*/
int
tor_tls_cert_matches_key(const tor_tls_t *tls, const tor_cert_t *cert)
{
X509 *peercert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(tls->ssl);
EVP_PKEY *link_key = NULL, *cert_key = NULL;
int result;
if (!peercert)
return 0;
link_key = X509_get_pubkey(peercert);
cert_key = X509_get_pubkey(cert->cert);
result = link_key && cert_key && pkey_eq(cert_key, link_key);
X509_free(peercert);
if (link_key)
EVP_PKEY_free(link_key);
if (cert_key)
EVP_PKEY_free(cert_key);
return result;
}
/** Check whether <b>cert</b> is well-formed, currently live, and correctly
* signed by the public key in <b>signing_cert</b>. If <b>check_rsa_1024</b>,
* make sure that it has an RSA key with 1024 bits; otherwise, just check that
* the key is long enough. Return 1 if the cert is good, and 0 if it's bad or
* we couldn't check it. */
int
tor_tls_cert_is_valid(const tor_cert_t *cert,
const tor_cert_t *signing_cert,
int check_rsa_1024)
{
EVP_PKEY *cert_key;
EVP_PKEY *signing_key = X509_get_pubkey(signing_cert->cert);
int r, key_ok = 0;
if (!signing_key)
return 0;
r = X509_verify(cert->cert, signing_key);
EVP_PKEY_free(signing_key);
if (r <= 0)
return 0;
/* okay, the signature checked out right. Now let's check the check the
* lifetime. */
/*XXXX tolerance might be iffy here */
if (check_cert_lifetime_internal(cert->cert, 60*60) < 0)
return 0;
cert_key = X509_get_pubkey(cert->cert);
if (check_rsa_1024 && cert_key) {
RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(cert_key);
if (rsa && BN_num_bits(rsa->n) == 1024)
key_ok = 1;
if (rsa)
RSA_free(rsa);
} else if (cert_key) {
int min_bits = 1024;
#ifdef EVP_PKEY_EC
if (EVP_PKEY_type(cert_key->type) == EVP_PKEY_EC)
min_bits = 128;
#endif
if (EVP_PKEY_bits(cert_key) >= min_bits)
key_ok = 1;
}
EVP_PKEY_free(cert_key);
if (!key_ok)
return 0;
/* XXXX compare DNs or anything? */
return 1;
}
/** Increase the reference count of <b>ctx</b>. */
static void
tor_tls_context_incref(tor_tls_context_t *ctx)
{
++ctx->refcnt;
}
/** Create new global client and server TLS contexts.
*
* If <b>server_identity</b> is NULL, this will not generate a server
* TLS context. If <b>is_public_server</b> is non-zero, this will use
* the same TLS context for incoming and outgoing connections, and
* ignore <b>client_identity</b>. */
int
tor_tls_context_init(int is_public_server,
crypto_pk_env_t *client_identity,
crypto_pk_env_t *server_identity,
unsigned int key_lifetime)
{
int rv1 = 0;
int rv2 = 0;
if (is_public_server) {
tor_tls_context_t *new_ctx;
tor_tls_context_t *old_ctx;
tor_assert(server_identity != NULL);
rv1 = tor_tls_context_init_one(&server_tls_context,
server_identity,
key_lifetime);
if (rv1 >= 0) {
new_ctx = server_tls_context;
tor_tls_context_incref(new_ctx);
old_ctx = client_tls_context;
client_tls_context = new_ctx;
if (old_ctx != NULL) {
tor_tls_context_decref(old_ctx);
}
}
} else {
if (server_identity != NULL) {
rv1 = tor_tls_context_init_one(&server_tls_context,
server_identity,
key_lifetime);
} else {
tor_tls_context_t *old_ctx = server_tls_context;
server_tls_context = NULL;
if (old_ctx != NULL) {
tor_tls_context_decref(old_ctx);
}
}
rv2 = tor_tls_context_init_one(&client_tls_context,
client_identity,
key_lifetime);
}
return MIN(rv1, rv2);
}
/** Create a new global TLS context.
*
* You can call this function multiple times. Each time you call it,
* it generates new certificates; all new connections will use
* the new SSL context.
*/
static int
tor_tls_context_init_one(tor_tls_context_t **ppcontext,
crypto_pk_env_t *identity,
unsigned int key_lifetime)
{
tor_tls_context_t *new_ctx = tor_tls_context_new(identity,
key_lifetime);
tor_tls_context_t *old_ctx = *ppcontext;
if (new_ctx != NULL) {
*ppcontext = new_ctx;
/* Free the old context if one existed. */
if (old_ctx != NULL) {
/* This is safe even if there are open connections: we reference-
* count tor_tls_context_t objects. */
tor_tls_context_decref(old_ctx);
}
}
return ((new_ctx != NULL) ? 0 : -1);
}
/** Create a new TLS context for use with Tor TLS handshakes.
* <b>identity</b> should be set to the identity key used to sign the
* certificate.
*/
static tor_tls_context_t *
tor_tls_context_new(crypto_pk_env_t *identity, unsigned int key_lifetime)
{
crypto_pk_env_t *rsa = NULL, *rsa_auth = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
tor_tls_context_t *result = NULL;
X509 *cert = NULL, *idcert = NULL, *authcert = NULL;
char *nickname = NULL, *nn2 = NULL;
tor_tls_init();
nickname = crypto_random_hostname(8, 20, "www.", ".net");
#ifdef DISABLE_V3_LINKPROTO_SERVERSIDE
nn2 = crypto_random_hostname(8, 20, "www.", ".net");
#else
nn2 = crypto_random_hostname(8, 20, "www.", ".com");
#endif
/* Generate short-term RSA key for use with TLS. */
if (!(rsa = crypto_new_pk_env()))
goto error;
if (crypto_pk_generate_key(rsa)<0)
goto error;
/* Generate short-term RSA key for use in the in-protocol ("v3")
* authentication handshake. */
if (!(rsa_auth = crypto_new_pk_env()))
goto error;
if (crypto_pk_generate_key(rsa_auth)<0)
goto error;
/* Create a link certificate signed by identity key. */
cert = tor_tls_create_certificate(rsa, identity, nickname, nn2,
key_lifetime);
/* Create self-signed certificate for identity key. */
idcert = tor_tls_create_certificate(identity, identity, nn2, nn2,
IDENTITY_CERT_LIFETIME);
/* Create an authentication certificate signed by identity key. */
authcert = tor_tls_create_certificate(rsa_auth, identity, nickname, nn2,
key_lifetime);
if (!cert || !idcert || !authcert) {
log(LOG_WARN, LD_CRYPTO, "Error creating certificate");
goto error;
}
result = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_context_t));
result->refcnt = 1;
result->my_link_cert = tor_cert_new(X509_dup(cert));
result->my_id_cert = tor_cert_new(X509_dup(idcert));
result->my_auth_cert = tor_cert_new(X509_dup(authcert));
if (!result->my_link_cert || !result->my_id_cert || !result->my_auth_cert)
goto error;
result->link_key = crypto_pk_dup_key(rsa);
result->auth_key = crypto_pk_dup_key(rsa_auth);
#ifdef EVERYONE_HAS_AES
/* Tell OpenSSL to only use TLS1 */
if (!(result->ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLSv1_method())))
goto error;
#else
/* Tell OpenSSL to use SSL3 or TLS1 but not SSL2. */
if (!(result->ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_method())))
goto error;
SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2);
#endif
SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE);
#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION
SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx,
SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION);
#endif
/* Yes, we know what we are doing here. No, we do not treat a renegotiation
* as authenticating any earlier-received data.
*/
if (use_unsafe_renegotiation_op) {
SSL_CTX_set_options(result->ctx,
SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION);
}
/* Don't actually allow compression; it uses ram and time, but the data
* we transmit is all encrypted anyway. */
if (result->ctx->comp_methods)
result->ctx->comp_methods = NULL;
#ifdef SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
SSL_CTX_set_mode(result->ctx, SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS);
#endif
if (cert && !SSL_CTX_use_certificate(result->ctx,cert))
goto error;
X509_free(cert); /* We just added a reference to cert. */
cert=NULL;
if (idcert) {
X509_STORE *s = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(result->ctx);
tor_assert(s);
X509_STORE_add_cert(s, idcert);
X509_free(idcert); /* The context now owns the reference to idcert */
idcert = NULL;
}
SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(result->ctx, SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF);
tor_assert(rsa);
if (!(pkey = _crypto_pk_env_get_evp_pkey(rsa,1)))
goto error;
if (!SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(result->ctx, pkey))
goto error;
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
pkey = NULL;
if (!SSL_CTX_check_private_key(result->ctx))
goto error;
{
crypto_dh_env_t *dh = crypto_dh_new(DH_TYPE_TLS);
tor_assert(dh);
SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(result->ctx, _crypto_dh_env_get_dh(dh));
crypto_dh_free(dh);
}
SSL_CTX_set_verify(result->ctx, SSL_VERIFY_PEER,
always_accept_verify_cb);
/* let us realloc bufs that we're writing from */
SSL_CTX_set_mode(result->ctx, SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER);
if (rsa)
crypto_free_pk_env(rsa);
if (rsa_auth)
crypto_free_pk_env(rsa_auth);
X509_free(authcert);
tor_free(nickname);
tor_free(nn2);
return result;
error:
tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "creating TLS context");
tor_free(nickname);
tor_free(nn2);
if (pkey)
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
if (rsa)
crypto_free_pk_env(rsa);
if (rsa_auth)
crypto_free_pk_env(rsa_auth);
if (result)
tor_tls_context_decref(result);
if (cert)
X509_free(cert);
if (idcert)
X509_free(idcert);
if (authcert)
X509_free(authcert);
return NULL;
}
/** Return true if the <b>tls</b> object has completed more
* renegotiations than needed for the Tor protocol. */
static INLINE int
tor_tls_got_excess_renegotiations(tor_tls_t *tls)
{
/** The Tor v2 server handshake needs a single renegotiation after
the initial SSL handshake. This means that if we ever see more
than 2 handshakes, we raise the flag. */
return (tls->server_handshake_count > 2) ? 1 : 0;
}
#ifdef V2_HANDSHAKE_SERVER
/** Return true iff the cipher list suggested by the client for <b>ssl</b> is
* a list that indicates that the client knows how to do the v2 TLS connection
* handshake. */
static int
tor_tls_client_is_using_v2_ciphers(const SSL *ssl, const char *address)
{
int i;
SSL_SESSION *session;
/* If we reached this point, we just got a client hello. See if there is
* a cipher list. */
if (!(session = SSL_get_session((SSL *)ssl))) {
log_info(LD_NET, "No session on TLS?");
return 0;
}
if (!session->ciphers) {
log_info(LD_NET, "No ciphers on session");
return 0;
}
/* Now we need to see if there are any ciphers whose presence means we're
* dealing with an updated Tor. */
for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(session->ciphers); ++i) {
SSL_CIPHER *cipher = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(session->ciphers, i);
const char *ciphername = SSL_CIPHER_get_name(cipher);
if (strcmp(ciphername, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA) &&
strcmp(ciphername, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA) &&
strcmp(ciphername, SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA) &&
strcmp(ciphername, "(NONE)")) {
log_debug(LD_NET, "Got a non-version-1 cipher called '%s'", ciphername);
// return 1;
goto dump_list;
}
}
return 0;
dump_list:
{
smartlist_t *elts = smartlist_create();
char *s;
for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(session->ciphers); ++i) {
SSL_CIPHER *cipher = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(session->ciphers, i);
const char *ciphername = SSL_CIPHER_get_name(cipher);
smartlist_add(elts, (char*)ciphername);
}
s = smartlist_join_strings(elts, ":", 0, NULL);
log_debug(LD_NET, "Got a non-version-1 cipher list from %s. It is: '%s'",
address, s);
tor_free(s);
smartlist_free(elts);
}
return 1;
}
/** We got an SSL ClientHello message. This might mean that the
* client wants to initiate a renegotiation and appropriate actions
* must be taken. */
static void
tor_tls_got_client_hello(tor_tls_t *tls)
{
if (tls->server_handshake_count < 3)
++tls->server_handshake_count;
if (tls->server_handshake_count == 2) {
if (!tls->negotiated_callback) {
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Got a renegotiation request but we don't"
" have a renegotiation callback set!");
}
tls->got_renegotiate = 1;
}
/* Now check the cipher list. */
if (tor_tls_client_is_using_v2_ciphers(tls->ssl, ADDR(tls))) {
/*XXXX_TLS keep this from happening more than once! */
/* Yes, we're casting away the const from ssl. This is very naughty of us.
* Let's hope openssl doesn't notice! */
/* Set SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN to keep from sending back any extra certs. */
SSL_set_mode((SSL*) tls->ssl, SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN);
/* Don't send a hello request. */
SSL_set_verify((SSL*) tls->ssl, SSL_VERIFY_NONE, NULL);
if (tls) {
tls->wasV2Handshake = 1;
#ifdef USE_BUFFEREVENTS
if (use_unsafe_renegotiation_flag)
tls->ssl->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION;
#endif
} else {
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't look up the tls for an SSL*. How odd!");
}
}
}
#endif
/** This is a callback function for SSL_set_info_callback() and it
* will be called in every SSL state change.
* It logs the SSL state change, and executes any actions that must be
* taken. */
static void
tor_tls_state_changed_callback(const SSL *ssl, int type, int val)
{
log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE, "SSL %p is now in state %s [type=%d,val=%d].",
ssl, ssl_state_to_string(ssl->state), type, val);
#ifdef V2_HANDSHAKE_SERVER
if (type == SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP &&
ssl->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) {
/* Call tor_tls_got_client_hello() for every SSL ClientHello we
receive. */
tor_tls_t *tls = tor_tls_get_by_ssl(ssl);
if (!tls) {
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't look up the tls for an SSL*. How odd!");
return;
}
tor_tls_got_client_hello(tls);
}
#endif
}
/** Replace *<b>ciphers</b> with a new list of SSL ciphersuites: specifically,
* a list designed to mimic a common web browser. Some of the ciphers in the
* list won't actually be implemented by OpenSSL: that's okay so long as the
* server doesn't select them, and the server won't select anything besides
* what's in SERVER_CIPHER_LIST.
*
* [If the server <b>does</b> select a bogus cipher, we won't crash or
* anything; we'll just fail later when we try to look up the cipher in
* ssl->cipher_list_by_id.]
*/
static void
rectify_client_ciphers(STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **ciphers)
{
#ifdef V2_HANDSHAKE_CLIENT
if (PREDICT_UNLIKELY(!CLIENT_CIPHER_STACK)) {
/* We need to set CLIENT_CIPHER_STACK to an array of the ciphers
* we want.*/
int i = 0, j = 0;
/* First, create a dummy SSL_CIPHER for every cipher. */
CLIENT_CIPHER_DUMMIES =
tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(SSL_CIPHER)*N_CLIENT_CIPHERS);
for (i=0; i < N_CLIENT_CIPHERS; ++i) {
CLIENT_CIPHER_DUMMIES[i].valid = 1;
CLIENT_CIPHER_DUMMIES[i].id = CLIENT_CIPHER_INFO_LIST[i].id | (3<<24);
CLIENT_CIPHER_DUMMIES[i].name = CLIENT_CIPHER_INFO_LIST[i].name;
}
CLIENT_CIPHER_STACK = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null();
tor_assert(CLIENT_CIPHER_STACK);
log_debug(LD_NET, "List was: %s", CLIENT_CIPHER_LIST);
for (j = 0; j < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(*ciphers); ++j) {
SSL_CIPHER *cipher = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(*ciphers, j);
log_debug(LD_NET, "Cipher %d: %lx %s", j, cipher->id, cipher->name);
}
/* Then copy as many ciphers as we can from the good list, inserting
* dummies as needed. */
j=0;
for (i = 0; i < N_CLIENT_CIPHERS; ) {
SSL_CIPHER *cipher = NULL;
if (j < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(*ciphers))
cipher = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(*ciphers, j);
if (cipher && ((cipher->id >> 24) & 0xff) != 3) {
log_debug(LD_NET, "Skipping v2 cipher %s", cipher->name);
++j;
} else if (cipher &&
(cipher->id & 0xffff) == CLIENT_CIPHER_INFO_LIST[i].id) {
log_debug(LD_NET, "Found cipher %s", cipher->name);
sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(CLIENT_CIPHER_STACK, cipher);
++j;
++i;
} else {
log_debug(LD_NET, "Inserting fake %s", CLIENT_CIPHER_DUMMIES[i].name);
sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(CLIENT_CIPHER_STACK, &CLIENT_CIPHER_DUMMIES[i]);
++i;
}
}
}
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(*ciphers);
*ciphers = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(CLIENT_CIPHER_STACK);
tor_assert(*ciphers);
#else
(void)ciphers;
#endif
}
/** Create a new TLS object from a file descriptor, and a flag to
* determine whether it is functioning as a server.
*/
tor_tls_t *
tor_tls_new(int sock, int isServer)
{
BIO *bio = NULL;
tor_tls_t *result = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(tor_tls_t));
tor_tls_context_t *context = isServer ? server_tls_context :
client_tls_context;
result->magic = TOR_TLS_MAGIC;
tor_assert(context); /* make sure somebody made it first */
if (!(result->ssl = SSL_new(context->ctx))) {
tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "creating SSL object");
tor_free(result);
return NULL;
}
#ifdef SSL_set_tlsext_host_name
/* Browsers use the TLS hostname extension, so we should too. */
if (!isServer) {
char *fake_hostname = crypto_random_hostname(4,25, "www.",".com");
SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(result->ssl, fake_hostname);
tor_free(fake_hostname);
}
#endif
if (!SSL_set_cipher_list(result->ssl,
isServer ? SERVER_CIPHER_LIST : CLIENT_CIPHER_LIST)) {
tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "setting ciphers");
#ifdef SSL_set_tlsext_host_name
SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(result->ssl, NULL);
#endif
SSL_free(result->ssl);
tor_free(result);
return NULL;
}
if (!isServer)
rectify_client_ciphers(&result->ssl->cipher_list);
result->socket = sock;
bio = BIO_new_socket(sock, BIO_NOCLOSE);
if (! bio) {
tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "opening BIO");
#ifdef SSL_set_tlsext_host_name
SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(result->ssl, NULL);
#endif
SSL_free(result->ssl);
tor_free(result);
return NULL;
}
{
int set_worked =
SSL_set_ex_data(result->ssl, tor_tls_object_ex_data_index, result);
if (!set_worked) {
log_warn(LD_BUG,
"Couldn't set the tls for an SSL*; connection will fail");
}
}
SSL_set_bio(result->ssl, bio, bio);
tor_tls_context_incref(context);
result->context = context;
result->state = TOR_TLS_ST_HANDSHAKE;
result->isServer = isServer;
result->wantwrite_n = 0;
result->last_write_count = BIO_number_written(bio);
result->last_read_count = BIO_number_read(bio);
if (result->last_write_count || result->last_read_count) {
log_warn(LD_NET, "Newly created BIO has read count %lu, write count %lu",
result->last_read_count, result->last_write_count);
}
SSL_set_info_callback(result->ssl, tor_tls_state_changed_callback);
/* Not expected to get called. */
tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "creating tor_tls_t object");
return result;
}
/** Make future log messages about <b>tls</b> display the address
* <b>address</b>.
*/
void
tor_tls_set_logged_address(tor_tls_t *tls, const char *address)
{
tor_assert(tls);
tor_free(tls->address);
tls->address = tor_strdup(address);
}
/** Set <b>cb</b> to be called with argument <b>arg</b> whenever <b>tls</b>
* next gets a client-side renegotiate in the middle of a read. Do not
* invoke this function until <em>after</em> initial handshaking is done!
*/
void
tor_tls_set_renegotiate_callback(tor_tls_t *tls,
void (*cb)(tor_tls_t *, void *arg),
void *arg)
{
tls->negotiated_callback = cb;
tls->callback_arg = arg;
tls->got_renegotiate = 0;
SSL_set_info_callback(tls->ssl, tor_tls_state_changed_callback);
}
/** If this version of openssl requires it, turn on renegotiation on
* <b>tls</b>.
*/
void
tor_tls_unblock_renegotiation(tor_tls_t *tls)
{
/* Yes, we know what we are doing here. No, we do not treat a renegotiation
* as authenticating any earlier-received data. */
if (use_unsafe_renegotiation_flag) {
tls->ssl->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION;
}
if (use_unsafe_renegotiation_op) {
SSL_set_options(tls->ssl,
SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION);
}
}
void
tor_tls_assert_renegotiation_unblocked(tor_tls_t *tls)
{
if (use_unsafe_renegotiation_flag) {
tor_assert(0 != (tls->ssl->s3->flags &
SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION));
}
if (use_unsafe_renegotiation_op) {
long options = SSL_get_options(tls->ssl);
tor_assert(0 != (options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION));
}
}
/** Return whether this tls initiated the connect (client) or
* received it (server). */
int
tor_tls_is_server(tor_tls_t *tls)
{
tor_assert(tls);
return tls->isServer;
}
/** Release resources associated with a TLS object. Does not close the
* underlying file descriptor.
*/
void
tor_tls_free(tor_tls_t *tls)
{
if (!tls)
return;
tor_assert(tls->ssl);
#ifdef SSL_set_tlsext_host_name
SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(tls->ssl, NULL);
#endif
SSL_free(tls->ssl);
tls->ssl = NULL;
tls->negotiated_callback = NULL;
if (tls->context)
tor_tls_context_decref(tls->context);
tor_free(tls->address);
tls->magic = 0x99999999;
tor_free(tls);
}
/** Underlying function for TLS reading. Reads up to <b>len</b>
* characters from <b>tls</b> into <b>cp</b>. On success, returns the
* number of characters read. On failure, returns TOR_TLS_ERROR,
* TOR_TLS_CLOSE, TOR_TLS_WANTREAD, or TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE.
*/
int
tor_tls_read(tor_tls_t *tls, char *cp, size_t len)
{
int r, err;
tor_assert(tls);
tor_assert(tls->ssl);
tor_assert(tls->state == TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN);
tor_assert(len<INT_MAX);
r = SSL_read(tls->ssl, cp, (int)len);
if (r > 0) /* return the number of characters read */
return r;
/* If we got here, SSL_read() did not go as expected. */
err = tor_tls_get_error(tls, r, CATCH_ZERO, "reading", LOG_DEBUG, LD_NET);
if (tor_tls_got_excess_renegotiations(tls)) {
log_info(LD_NET, "Detected excess renegotiation from %s!", ADDR(tls));
return TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC;
}
#ifdef V2_HANDSHAKE_SERVER
if (tls->got_renegotiate) {
if (tls->server_handshake_count != 2) {
log_warn(LD_BUG, "We did not notice renegotiation in a timely fashion (%u)!",
tls->server_handshake_count);
}
/* Renegotiation happened! */
log_info(LD_NET, "Got a TLS renegotiation from %s", ADDR(tls));
if (tls->negotiated_callback)
tls->negotiated_callback(tls, tls->callback_arg);
tls->got_renegotiate = 0;
return r;
}
#endif
if (err == _TOR_TLS_ZERORETURN || err == TOR_TLS_CLOSE) {
log_debug(LD_NET,"read returned r=%d; TLS is closed",r);
tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_CLOSED;
return TOR_TLS_CLOSE;
} else {
tor_assert(err != TOR_TLS_DONE);
log_debug(LD_NET,"read returned r=%d, err=%d",r,err);
return err;
}
}
/** Underlying function for TLS writing. Write up to <b>n</b>
* characters from <b>cp</b> onto <b>tls</b>. On success, returns the
* number of characters written. On failure, returns TOR_TLS_ERROR,
* TOR_TLS_WANTREAD, or TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE.
*/
int
tor_tls_write(tor_tls_t *tls, const char *cp, size_t n)
{
int r, err;
tor_assert(tls);
tor_assert(tls->ssl);
tor_assert(tls->state == TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN);
tor_assert(n < INT_MAX);
if (n == 0)
return 0;
if (tls->wantwrite_n) {
/* if WANTWRITE last time, we must use the _same_ n as before */
tor_assert(n >= tls->wantwrite_n);
log_debug(LD_NET,"resuming pending-write, (%d to flush, reusing %d)",
(int)n, (int)tls->wantwrite_n);
n = tls->wantwrite_n;
tls->wantwrite_n = 0;
}
r = SSL_write(tls->ssl, cp, (int)n);
err = tor_tls_get_error(tls, r, 0, "writing", LOG_INFO, LD_NET);
if (tor_tls_got_excess_renegotiations(tls)) {
log_info(LD_NET, "Detected excess renegotiation from %s!", ADDR(tls));
return TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC;
}
if (err == TOR_TLS_DONE) {
return r;
}
if (err == TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE || err == TOR_TLS_WANTREAD) {
tls->wantwrite_n = n;
}
return err;
}
/** Perform initial handshake on <b>tls</b>. When finished, returns
* TOR_TLS_DONE. On failure, returns TOR_TLS_ERROR, TOR_TLS_WANTREAD,
* or TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE.
*/
int
tor_tls_handshake(tor_tls_t *tls)
{
int r;
int oldstate;
tor_assert(tls);
tor_assert(tls->ssl);
tor_assert(tls->state == TOR_TLS_ST_HANDSHAKE);
check_no_tls_errors();
oldstate = tls->ssl->state;
if (tls->isServer) {
log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE, "About to call SSL_accept on %p (%s)", tls,
ssl_state_to_string(tls->ssl->state));
r = SSL_accept(tls->ssl);
} else {
log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE, "About to call SSL_connect on %p (%s)", tls,
ssl_state_to_string(tls->ssl->state));
r = SSL_connect(tls->ssl);
}
if (oldstate != tls->ssl->state)
log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE, "After call, %p was in state %s",
tls, ssl_state_to_string(tls->ssl->state));
/* We need to call this here and not earlier, since OpenSSL has a penchant
* for clearing its flags when you say accept or connect. */
tor_tls_unblock_renegotiation(tls);
r = tor_tls_get_error(tls,r,0, "handshaking", LOG_INFO, LD_HANDSHAKE);
if (ERR_peek_error() != 0) {
tls_log_errors(tls, tls->isServer ? LOG_INFO : LOG_WARN, LD_HANDSHAKE,
"handshaking");
return TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC;
}
if (r == TOR_TLS_DONE) {
tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN;
return tor_tls_finish_handshake(tls);
}
return r;
}
/** Perform the final part of the intial TLS handshake on <b>tls</b>. This
* should be called for the first handshake only: it determines whether the v1
* or the v2 handshake was used, and adjusts things for the renegotiation
* handshake as appropriate.
*
* tor_tls_handshake() calls this on its own; you only need to call this if
* bufferevent is doing the handshake for you.
*/
int
tor_tls_finish_handshake(tor_tls_t *tls)
{
int r = TOR_TLS_DONE;
if (tls->isServer) {
SSL_set_info_callback(tls->ssl, NULL);
SSL_set_verify(tls->ssl, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, always_accept_verify_cb);
/* There doesn't seem to be a clear OpenSSL API to clear mode flags. */
tls->ssl->mode &= ~SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN;
#ifdef V2_HANDSHAKE_SERVER
if (tor_tls_client_is_using_v2_ciphers(tls->ssl, ADDR(tls))) {
/* This check is redundant, but back when we did it in the callback,
* we might have not been able to look up the tor_tls_t if the code
* was buggy. Fixing that. */
if (!tls->wasV2Handshake) {
log_warn(LD_BUG, "For some reason, wasV2Handshake didn't"
" get set. Fixing that.");
}
tls->wasV2Handshake = 1;
log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE, "Completed V2 TLS handshake with client; waiting"
" for renegotiation.");
} else {
tls->wasV2Handshake = 0;
}
#endif
} else {
#ifdef V2_HANDSHAKE_CLIENT
/* If we got no ID cert, we're a v2 handshake. */
X509 *cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(tls->ssl);
STACK_OF(X509) *chain = SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(tls->ssl);
int n_certs = sk_X509_num(chain);
if (n_certs > 1 || (n_certs == 1 && cert != sk_X509_value(chain, 0))) {
log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE, "Server sent back multiple certificates; it "
"looks like a v1 handshake on %p", tls);
tls->wasV2Handshake = 0;
} else {
log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE,
"Server sent back a single certificate; looks like "
"a v2 handshake on %p.", tls);
tls->wasV2Handshake = 1;
}
if (cert)
X509_free(cert);
#endif
if (SSL_set_cipher_list(tls->ssl, SERVER_CIPHER_LIST) == 0) {
tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_HANDSHAKE, "re-setting ciphers");
r = TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC;
}
}
return r;
}
#ifdef USE_BUFFEREVENTS
/** Put <b>tls</b>, which must be a client connection, into renegotiation
* mode. */
int
tor_tls_start_renegotiating(tor_tls_t *tls)
{
int r = SSL_renegotiate(tls->ssl);
if (r <= 0) {
return tor_tls_get_error(tls, r, 0, "renegotiating", LOG_WARN,
LD_HANDSHAKE);
}
return 0;
}
#endif
/** Client only: Renegotiate a TLS session. When finished, returns
* TOR_TLS_DONE. On failure, returns TOR_TLS_ERROR, TOR_TLS_WANTREAD, or
* TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE.
*/
int
tor_tls_renegotiate(tor_tls_t *tls)
{
int r;
tor_assert(tls);
/* We could do server-initiated renegotiation too, but that would be tricky.
* Instead of "SSL_renegotiate, then SSL_do_handshake until done" */
tor_assert(!tls->isServer);
if (tls->state != TOR_TLS_ST_RENEGOTIATE) {
int r = SSL_renegotiate(tls->ssl);
if (r <= 0) {
return tor_tls_get_error(tls, r, 0, "renegotiating", LOG_WARN,
LD_HANDSHAKE);
}
tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_RENEGOTIATE;
}
r = SSL_do_handshake(tls->ssl);
if (r == 1) {
tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_OPEN;
return TOR_TLS_DONE;
} else
return tor_tls_get_error(tls, r, 0, "renegotiating handshake", LOG_INFO,
LD_HANDSHAKE);
}
/** Shut down an open tls connection <b>tls</b>. When finished, returns
* TOR_TLS_DONE. On failure, returns TOR_TLS_ERROR, TOR_TLS_WANTREAD,
* or TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE.
*/
int
tor_tls_shutdown(tor_tls_t *tls)
{
int r, err;
char buf[128];
tor_assert(tls);
tor_assert(tls->ssl);
while (1) {
if (tls->state == TOR_TLS_ST_SENTCLOSE) {
/* If we've already called shutdown once to send a close message,
* we read until the other side has closed too.
*/
do {
r = SSL_read(tls->ssl, buf, 128);
} while (r>0);
err = tor_tls_get_error(tls, r, CATCH_ZERO, "reading to shut down",
LOG_INFO, LD_NET);
if (err == _TOR_TLS_ZERORETURN) {
tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_GOTCLOSE;
/* fall through... */
} else {
return err;
}
}
r = SSL_shutdown(tls->ssl);
if (r == 1) {
/* If shutdown returns 1, the connection is entirely closed. */
tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_CLOSED;
return TOR_TLS_DONE;
}
err = tor_tls_get_error(tls, r, CATCH_SYSCALL|CATCH_ZERO, "shutting down",
LOG_INFO, LD_NET);
if (err == _TOR_TLS_SYSCALL) {
/* The underlying TCP connection closed while we were shutting down. */
tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_CLOSED;
return TOR_TLS_DONE;
} else if (err == _TOR_TLS_ZERORETURN) {
/* The TLS connection says that it sent a shutdown record, but
* isn't done shutting down yet. Make sure that this hasn't
* happened before, then go back to the start of the function
* and try to read.
*/
if (tls->state == TOR_TLS_ST_GOTCLOSE ||
tls->state == TOR_TLS_ST_SENTCLOSE) {
log(LOG_WARN, LD_NET,
"TLS returned \"half-closed\" value while already half-closed");
return TOR_TLS_ERROR_MISC;
}
tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_SENTCLOSE;
/* fall through ... */
} else {
return err;
}
} /* end loop */
}
/** Return true iff this TLS connection is authenticated.
*/
int
tor_tls_peer_has_cert(tor_tls_t *tls)
{
X509 *cert;
cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(tls->ssl);
tls_log_errors(tls, LOG_WARN, LD_HANDSHAKE, "getting peer certificate");
if (!cert)
return 0;
X509_free(cert);
return 1;
}
/** Return the peer certificate, or NULL if there isn't one. */
tor_cert_t *
tor_tls_get_peer_cert(tor_tls_t *tls)
{
X509 *cert;
cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(tls->ssl);
tls_log_errors(tls, LOG_WARN, LD_HANDSHAKE, "getting peer certificate");
if (!cert)
return NULL;
return tor_cert_new(cert);
}
/** Warn that a certificate lifetime extends through a certain range. */
static void
log_cert_lifetime(const X509 *cert, const char *problem)
{
BIO *bio = NULL;
BUF_MEM *buf;
char *s1=NULL, *s2=NULL;
char mytime[33];
time_t now = time(NULL);
struct tm tm;
if (problem)
log_warn(LD_GENERAL,
"Certificate %s: is your system clock set incorrectly?",
problem);
if (!(bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()))) {
log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Couldn't allocate BIO!"); goto end;
}
if (!(ASN1_TIME_print(bio, X509_get_notBefore(cert)))) {
tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "printing certificate lifetime");
goto end;
}
BIO_get_mem_ptr(bio, &buf);
s1 = tor_strndup(buf->data, buf->length);
(void)BIO_reset(bio);
if (!(ASN1_TIME_print(bio, X509_get_notAfter(cert)))) {
tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "printing certificate lifetime");
goto end;
}
BIO_get_mem_ptr(bio, &buf);
s2 = tor_strndup(buf->data, buf->length);
strftime(mytime, 32, "%b %d %H:%M:%S %Y GMT", tor_gmtime_r(&now, &tm));
log_warn(LD_GENERAL,
"(certificate lifetime runs from %s through %s. Your time is %s.)",
s1,s2,mytime);
end:
/* Not expected to get invoked */
tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "getting certificate lifetime");
if (bio)
BIO_free(bio);
tor_free(s1);
tor_free(s2);
}
/** Helper function: try to extract a link certificate and an identity
* certificate from <b>tls</b>, and store them in *<b>cert_out</b> and
* *<b>id_cert_out</b> respectively. Log all messages at level
* <b>severity</b>.
*
* Note that a reference is added to cert_out, so it needs to be
* freed. id_cert_out doesn't. */
static void
try_to_extract_certs_from_tls(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls,
X509 **cert_out, X509 **id_cert_out)
{
X509 *cert = NULL, *id_cert = NULL;
STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL;
int num_in_chain, i;
*cert_out = *id_cert_out = NULL;
if (!(cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(tls->ssl)))
return;
*cert_out = cert;
if (!(chain = SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(tls->ssl)))
return;
num_in_chain = sk_X509_num(chain);
/* 1 means we're receiving (server-side), and it's just the id_cert.
* 2 means we're connecting (client-side), and it's both the link
* cert and the id_cert.
*/
if (num_in_chain < 1) {
log_fn(severity,LD_PROTOCOL,
"Unexpected number of certificates in chain (%d)",
num_in_chain);
return;
}
for (i=0; i<num_in_chain; ++i) {
id_cert = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
if (X509_cmp(id_cert, cert) != 0)
break;
}
*id_cert_out = id_cert;
}
/** If the provided tls connection is authenticated and has a
* certificate chain that is currently valid and signed, then set
* *<b>identity_key</b> to the identity certificate's key and return
* 0. Else, return -1 and log complaints with log-level <b>severity</b>.
*/
int
tor_tls_verify(int severity, tor_tls_t *tls, crypto_pk_env_t **identity_key)
{
X509 *cert = NULL, *id_cert = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *id_pkey = NULL;
RSA *rsa;
int r = -1;
*identity_key = NULL;
try_to_extract_certs_from_tls(severity, tls, &cert, &id_cert);
if (!cert)
goto done;
if (!id_cert) {
log_fn(severity,LD_PROTOCOL,"No distinct identity certificate found");
goto done;
}
tls_log_errors(tls, severity, LD_HANDSHAKE, "before verifying certificate");
if (!(id_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(id_cert)) ||
X509_verify(cert, id_pkey) <= 0) {
log_fn(severity,LD_PROTOCOL,"X509_verify on cert and pkey returned <= 0");
tls_log_errors(tls, severity, LD_HANDSHAKE, "verifying certificate");
goto done;
}
rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(id_pkey);
if (!rsa)
goto done;
*identity_key = _crypto_new_pk_env_rsa(rsa);
r = 0;
done:
if (cert)
X509_free(cert);
if (id_pkey)
EVP_PKEY_free(id_pkey);
/* This should never get invoked, but let's make sure in case OpenSSL
* acts unexpectedly. */
tls_log_errors(tls, LOG_WARN, LD_HANDSHAKE, "finishing tor_tls_verify");
return r;
}
/** Check whether the certificate set on the connection <b>tls</b> is
* expired or not-yet-valid, give or take <b>tolerance</b>
* seconds. Return 0 for valid, -1 for failure.
*
* NOTE: you should call tor_tls_verify before tor_tls_check_lifetime.
*/
int
tor_tls_check_lifetime(tor_tls_t *tls, int tolerance)
{
X509 *cert;
int r = -1;
if (!(cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(tls->ssl)))
goto done;
if (check_cert_lifetime_internal(cert, tolerance) < 0)
goto done;
r = 0;
done:
if (cert)
X509_free(cert);
/* Not expected to get invoked */
tls_log_errors(tls, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, "checking certificate lifetime");
return r;
}
/** Helper: check whether <b>cert</b> is currently live, give or take
* <b>tolerance</b> seconds. If it is live, return 0. If it is not live,
* log a message and return -1. */
static int
check_cert_lifetime_internal(const X509 *cert, int tolerance)
{
time_t now, t;
now = time(NULL);
t = now + tolerance;
if (X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(cert), &t) > 0) {
log_cert_lifetime(cert, "not yet valid");
return -1;
}
t = now - tolerance;
if (X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notAfter(cert), &t) < 0) {
log_cert_lifetime(cert, "already expired");
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
/** Return the number of bytes available for reading from <b>tls</b>.
*/
int
tor_tls_get_pending_bytes(tor_tls_t *tls)
{
tor_assert(tls);
return SSL_pending(tls->ssl);
}
/** If <b>tls</b> requires that the next write be of a particular size,
* return that size. Otherwise, return 0. */
size_t
tor_tls_get_forced_write_size(tor_tls_t *tls)
{
return tls->wantwrite_n;
}
/** Sets n_read and n_written to the number of bytes read and written,
* respectively, on the raw socket used by <b>tls</b> since the last time this
* function was called on <b>tls</b>. */
void
tor_tls_get_n_raw_bytes(tor_tls_t *tls, size_t *n_read, size_t *n_written)
{
BIO *wbio, *tmpbio;
unsigned long r, w;
r = BIO_number_read(SSL_get_rbio(tls->ssl));
/* We want the number of bytes actually for real written. Unfortunately,
* sometimes OpenSSL replaces the wbio on tls->ssl with a buffering bio,
* which makes the answer turn out wrong. Let's cope with that. Note
* that this approach will fail if we ever replace tls->ssl's BIOs with
* buffering bios for reasons of our own. As an alternative, we could
* save the original BIO for tls->ssl in the tor_tls_t structure, but
* that would be tempting fate. */
wbio = SSL_get_wbio(tls->ssl);
if (wbio->method == BIO_f_buffer() && (tmpbio = BIO_next(wbio)) != NULL)
wbio = tmpbio;
w = BIO_number_written(wbio);
/* We are ok with letting these unsigned ints go "negative" here:
* If we wrapped around, this should still give us the right answer, unless
* we wrapped around by more than ULONG_MAX since the last time we called
* this function.
*/
*n_read = (size_t)(r - tls->last_read_count);
*n_written = (size_t)(w - tls->last_write_count);
if (*n_read > INT_MAX || *n_written > INT_MAX) {
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Preposterously large value in tor_tls_get_n_raw_bytes. "
"r=%lu, last_read=%lu, w=%lu, last_written=%lu",
r, tls->last_read_count, w, tls->last_write_count);
}
tls->last_read_count = r;
tls->last_write_count = w;
}
/** Implement check_no_tls_errors: If there are any pending OpenSSL
* errors, log an error message. */
void
_check_no_tls_errors(const char *fname, int line)
{
if (ERR_peek_error() == 0)
return;
log(LOG_WARN, LD_CRYPTO, "Unhandled OpenSSL errors found at %s:%d: ",
tor_fix_source_file(fname), line);
tls_log_errors(NULL, LOG_WARN, LD_NET, NULL);
}
/** Return true iff the initial TLS connection at <b>tls</b> did not use a v2
* TLS handshake. Output is undefined if the handshake isn't finished. */
int
tor_tls_used_v1_handshake(tor_tls_t *tls)
{
if (tls->isServer) {
#ifdef V2_HANDSHAKE_SERVER
return ! tls->wasV2Handshake;
#endif
} else {
#ifdef V2_HANDSHAKE_CLIENT
return ! tls->wasV2Handshake;
#endif
}
return 1;
}
/** Return true iff <b>name</b> is a DN of a kind that could only
* occur in a v3-handshake-indicating certificate */
static int
dn_indicates_v3_cert(X509_NAME *name)
{
#ifdef DISABLE_V3_LINKPROTO_CLIENTSIDE
(void)name;
return 0;
#else
X509_NAME_ENTRY *entry;
int n_entries;
ASN1_OBJECT *obj;
ASN1_STRING *str;
unsigned char *s;
int len, r;
n_entries = X509_NAME_entry_count(name);
if (n_entries != 1)
return 1; /* More than one entry in the DN. */
entry = X509_NAME_get_entry(name, 0);
obj = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(entry);
if (OBJ_obj2nid(obj) != OBJ_txt2nid("commonName"))
return 1; /* The entry isn't a commonName. */
str = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(entry);
len = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&s, str);
if (len < 0)
return 0;
r = fast_memneq(s + len - 4, ".net", 4);
OPENSSL_free(s);
return r;
#endif
}
/** Return true iff the peer certificate we're received on <b>tls</b>
* indicates that this connection should use the v3 (in-protocol)
* authentication handshake.
*
* Only the connection initiator should use this, and only once the initial
* handshake is done; the responder detects a v1 handshake by cipher types,
* and a v3/v2 handshake by Versions cell vs renegotiation.
*/
int
tor_tls_received_v3_certificate(tor_tls_t *tls)
{
X509 *cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(tls->ssl);
EVP_PKEY *key;
X509_NAME *issuer_name, *subject_name;
if (!cert) {
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Called on a connection with no peer certificate");
return 0;
}
subject_name = X509_get_subject_name(cert);
issuer_name = X509_get_issuer_name(cert);
if (X509_name_cmp(subject_name, issuer_name) == 0)
return 1; /* purportedly self signed */
if (dn_indicates_v3_cert(subject_name) ||
dn_indicates_v3_cert(issuer_name))
return 1; /* DN is fancy */
key = X509_get_pubkey(cert);
if (EVP_PKEY_bits(key) != 1024 ||
EVP_PKEY_type(key->type) != EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
EVP_PKEY_free(key);
return 1; /* Key is fancy */
}
EVP_PKEY_free(key);
return 0;
}
/** Return the number of server handshakes that we've noticed doing on
* <b>tls</b>. */
int
tor_tls_get_num_server_handshakes(tor_tls_t *tls)
{
return tls->server_handshake_count;
}
/** Return true iff the server TLS connection <b>tls</b> got the renegotiation
* request it was waiting for. */
int
tor_tls_server_got_renegotiate(tor_tls_t *tls)
{
return tls->got_renegotiate;
}
/** Set the DIGEST256_LEN buffer at <b>secrets_out</b> to the value used in
* the v3 handshake to prove that the client knows the TLS secrets for the
* connection <b>tls</b>. Return 0 on success, -1 on failure.
*/
int
tor_tls_get_tlssecrets(tor_tls_t *tls, uint8_t *secrets_out)
{
#define TLSSECRET_MAGIC "Tor V3 handshake TLS cross-certification"
char buf[128];
size_t len;
tor_assert(tls);
tor_assert(tls->ssl);
tor_assert(tls->ssl->s3);
tor_assert(tls->ssl->session);
/*
The value is an HMAC, using the TLS master key as the HMAC key, of
client_random | server_random | TLSSECRET_MAGIC
*/
memcpy(buf + 0, tls->ssl->s3->client_random, 32);
memcpy(buf + 32, tls->ssl->s3->server_random, 32);
memcpy(buf + 64, TLSSECRET_MAGIC, strlen(TLSSECRET_MAGIC) + 1);
len = 64 + strlen(TLSSECRET_MAGIC) + 1;
crypto_hmac_sha256((char*)secrets_out,
(char*)tls->ssl->session->master_key,
tls->ssl->session->master_key_length,
buf, len);
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
return 0;
}
/** Examine the amount of memory used and available for buffers in <b>tls</b>.
* Set *<b>rbuf_capacity</b> to the amount of storage allocated for the read
* buffer and *<b>rbuf_bytes</b> to the amount actually used.
* Set *<b>wbuf_capacity</b> to the amount of storage allocated for the write
* buffer and *<b>wbuf_bytes</b> to the amount actually used. */
void
tor_tls_get_buffer_sizes(tor_tls_t *tls,
size_t *rbuf_capacity, size_t *rbuf_bytes,
size_t *wbuf_capacity, size_t *wbuf_bytes)
{
if (tls->ssl->s3->rbuf.buf)
*rbuf_capacity = tls->ssl->s3->rbuf.len;
else
*rbuf_capacity = 0;
if (tls->ssl->s3->wbuf.buf)
*wbuf_capacity = tls->ssl->s3->wbuf.len;
else
*wbuf_capacity = 0;
*rbuf_bytes = tls->ssl->s3->rbuf.left;
*wbuf_bytes = tls->ssl->s3->wbuf.left;
}
#ifdef USE_BUFFEREVENTS
/** Construct and return an TLS-encrypting bufferevent to send data over
* <b>socket</b>, which must match the socket of the underlying bufferevent
* <b>bufev_in</b>. The TLS object <b>tls</b> is used for encryption.
*
* This function will either create a filtering bufferevent that wraps around
* <b>bufev_in</b>, or it will free bufev_in and return a new bufferevent that
* uses the <b>tls</b> to talk to the network directly. Do not use
* <b>bufev_in</b> after calling this function.
*
* The connection will start out doing a server handshake if <b>receiving</b>
* is strue, and a client handshake otherwise.
*
* Returns NULL on failure.
*/
struct bufferevent *
tor_tls_init_bufferevent(tor_tls_t *tls, struct bufferevent *bufev_in,
evutil_socket_t socket, int receiving,
int filter)
{
struct bufferevent *out;
const enum bufferevent_ssl_state state = receiving ?
BUFFEREVENT_SSL_ACCEPTING : BUFFEREVENT_SSL_CONNECTING;
if (filter || tor_libevent_using_iocp_bufferevents()) {
/* Grab an extra reference to the SSL, since BEV_OPT_CLOSE_ON_FREE
means that the SSL will get freed too.
This increment makes our SSL usage not-threadsafe, BTW. We should
see if we're allowed to use CRYPTO_add from outside openssl. */
tls->ssl->references += 1;
out = bufferevent_openssl_filter_new(tor_libevent_get_base(),
bufev_in,
tls->ssl,
state,
BEV_OPT_DEFER_CALLBACKS|
BEV_OPT_CLOSE_ON_FREE);
/* Tell the underlying bufferevent when to accept more data from the SSL
filter (only when it's got less than 32K to write), and when to notify
the SSL filter that it could write more (when it drops under 24K). */
bufferevent_setwatermark(bufev_in, EV_WRITE, 24*1024, 32*1024);
} else {
if (bufev_in) {
evutil_socket_t s = bufferevent_getfd(bufev_in);
tor_assert(s == -1 || s == socket);
tor_assert(evbuffer_get_length(bufferevent_get_input(bufev_in)) == 0);
tor_assert(evbuffer_get_length(bufferevent_get_output(bufev_in)) == 0);
tor_assert(BIO_number_read(SSL_get_rbio(tls->ssl)) == 0);
tor_assert(BIO_number_written(SSL_get_rbio(tls->ssl)) == 0);
bufferevent_free(bufev_in);
}
/* Current versions (as of 2.0.x) of Libevent need to defer
* bufferevent_openssl callbacks, or else our callback functions will
* get called reentrantly, which is bad for us.
*/
out = bufferevent_openssl_socket_new(tor_libevent_get_base(),
socket,
tls->ssl,
state,
BEV_OPT_DEFER_CALLBACKS);
}
tls->state = TOR_TLS_ST_BUFFEREVENT;
/* Unblock _after_ creating the bufferevent, since accept/connect tend to
* clear flags. */
tor_tls_unblock_renegotiation(tls);
return out;
}
#endif
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