mirror of
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor.git
synced 2024-11-10 21:23:58 +01:00
58de695f90
Allow config values in quotes to contain special characters, with full C escape syntax. With tests. Addresses bug 557. svn:r13021
1315 lines
53 KiB
Groff
1315 lines
53 KiB
Groff
.TH TOR 1 "January 2006" "TOR"
|
|
.SH NAME
|
|
tor \- The second-generation onion router
|
|
.SH SYNOPSIS
|
|
.B tor
|
|
[\fIOPTION value\fR]...
|
|
.SH DESCRIPTION
|
|
.I tor
|
|
is a connection-oriented anonymizing communication
|
|
service. Users choose a source-routed path through a set of nodes, and
|
|
negotiate a "virtual circuit" through the network, in which each node
|
|
knows its predecessor and successor, but no others. Traffic flowing down
|
|
the circuit is unwrapped by a symmetric key at each node, which reveals
|
|
the downstream node.
|
|
.PP
|
|
Basically \fItor\fR provides a distributed network of servers ("onion
|
|
routers"). Users bounce their TCP streams -- web traffic, ftp, ssh, etc --
|
|
around the routers, and recipients, observers, and even the routers
|
|
themselves have difficulty tracking the source of the stream.
|
|
.SH OPTIONS
|
|
\fB-h, -help\fP
|
|
Display a short help message and exit.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fB-f \fR\fIFILE\fP
|
|
FILE contains further "option value" pairs. (Default: @CONFDIR@/torrc)
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fB--hash-password\fP
|
|
Generates a hashed password for control port access.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fB--list-fingerprint\fP
|
|
Generate your keys and output your nickname and fingerprint.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fB--verify-config\fP
|
|
Verify the configuration file is valid.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fB--nt-service\fP
|
|
\fB--service [install|remove|start|stop]\fP
|
|
Manage the Tor Windows NT/2000/XP service. Current instructions can
|
|
be found at http://wiki.noreply.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#WinNTService
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fB--list-torrc-options\fP
|
|
List all valid options.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fB--version\fP
|
|
Display Tor version.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
Other options can be specified either on the command-line (\fI--option
|
|
value\fR), or in the configuration file (\fIoption value\fR or
|
|
\fIoption "value"\fR). Options are case-insensitive. C-style escaped
|
|
characters are allowed inside quoted values.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBBandwidthRate \fR\fIN\fR \fBbytes\fR|\fBKB\fR|\fBMB\fR|\fBGB\fR|\fBTB\fP
|
|
A token bucket limits the average incoming bandwidth usage on this node
|
|
to the specified number of bytes per second, and the average outgoing
|
|
bandwidth usage to that same value. (Default: 5 MB)
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBBandwidthBurst \fR\fIN\fR \fBbytes\fR|\fBKB\fR|\fBMB\fR|\fBGB\fR|\fBTB\fP
|
|
Limit the maximum token bucket size (also known as the burst) to the
|
|
given number of bytes in each direction. (Default: 10 MB)
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBMaxAdvertisedBandwidth \fR\fIN\fR \fBbytes\fR|\fBKB\fR|\fBMB\fR|\fBGB\fR|\fBTB\fP
|
|
If set, we will not advertise more than this amount of bandwidth for our
|
|
BandwidthRate. Server operators who want to reduce the number of clients
|
|
who ask to build circuits through them (since this is proportional to
|
|
advertised bandwidth rate) can thus reduce the CPU demands on their
|
|
server without impacting network performance.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBRelayBandwidthRate \fR\fIN\fR \fBbytes\fR|\fBKB\fR|\fBMB\fR|\fBGB\fR|\fBTB\fP
|
|
If defined, a separate token bucket limits the average incoming bandwidth
|
|
usage for _relayed traffic_ on this node to the specified number of
|
|
bytes per second, and the average outgoing bandwidth usage to that same
|
|
value. Relayed traffic is currently defined as answers to directory
|
|
requests, but that may change. (Default: 0)
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBRelayBandwidthBurst \fR\fIN\fR \fBbytes\fR|\fBKB\fR|\fBMB\fR|\fBGB\fR|\fBTB\fP
|
|
Limit the maximum token bucket size (also known as the burst) for
|
|
_relayed traffic_ to the
|
|
given number of bytes in each direction. (Default: 0)
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBConnLimit \fR\fINUM\fP
|
|
The minimum number of file descriptors that must be available to
|
|
the Tor process before it will start. Tor will ask the OS for as
|
|
many file descriptors as the OS will allow (you can find this
|
|
by "ulimit -H -n"). If this number is less than ConnLimit, then
|
|
Tor will refuse to start.
|
|
|
|
You probably don't need to adjust this. It has no effect on
|
|
Windows since that platform lacks getrlimit(). (Default: 1000)
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBConstrainedSockets \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
|
|
If set, Tor will tell the kernel to attempt to shrink the buffers for all
|
|
sockets to the size specified in \fBConstrainedSockSize\fP. This is useful
|
|
for virtual servers and other environments where system level TCP
|
|
buffers may be limited. If you're on a virtual server, and you
|
|
encounter the "Error creating network
|
|
socket: No buffer space available" message, you are likely experiencing
|
|
this problem.
|
|
|
|
The preferred solution is to have the admin increase the buffer pool for
|
|
the host itself via /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_mem or equivalent facility; this
|
|
configuration option is a second-resort.
|
|
|
|
The DirPort option should also not be used if TCP buffers are scarce. The
|
|
cached directory requests consume additional sockets which exacerbates the
|
|
problem.
|
|
|
|
You should \fBnot\fP enable this feature unless you encounter the "no buffer
|
|
space available" issue. Reducing the TCP buffers affects window size for
|
|
the TCP stream and will reduce throughput in proportion to round trip
|
|
time on long paths. (Default: 0.)
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBConstrainedSockSize \fR\fIN\fR \fBbytes\fR|\fBKB\fP
|
|
When \fBConstrainedSockets\fP is enabled the receive and transmit buffers for
|
|
all sockets will be set to this limit. Must be a value between 2048
|
|
and 262144, in 1024 byte increments. Default of 8192 is recommended.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBControlPort \fR\fIPort\fP
|
|
If set, Tor will accept connections on this port and allow those
|
|
connections to control the Tor process using the Tor Control Protocol
|
|
(described in control-spec.txt). Note: unless you also specify one of
|
|
\fBHashedControlPassword\fP or \fBCookieAuthentication\fP, setting
|
|
this option will cause Tor to allow any process on the local host to
|
|
control it. This option is required for many Tor controllers; most use
|
|
the value of 9051.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBControlListenAddress \fR\fIIP\fR[:\fIPORT\fR]\fP
|
|
Bind the controller listener to this address. If you specify a port,
|
|
bind to this port rather than the one specified in ControlPort. We
|
|
strongly recommend that you leave this alone unless you know what you're
|
|
doing, since giving attackers access to your control listener is really
|
|
dangerous. (Default: 127.0.0.1)
|
|
This directive can be specified multiple times to bind to multiple
|
|
addresses/ports.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBControlSocket \fR\fIPath\fP
|
|
Like ControlPort, but listens on a Unix domain socket, rather than a TCP
|
|
socket. (Unix and Unix-like systems only.)
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBHashedControlPassword \fR\fIhashed_password\fP
|
|
Don't allow any connections on the control port except when the other process
|
|
knows the password whose one-way hash is \fIhashed_password\fP. You can
|
|
compute the hash of a password by running "tor --hash-password
|
|
\fIpassword\fP". You can provide several acceptable passwords by using
|
|
more than HashedControlPassword line.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBCookieAuthentication \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fP
|
|
If this option is set to 1, don't allow any connections on the control port
|
|
except when the connecting process knows the contents of a file named
|
|
"control_auth_cookie", which Tor will create in its data directory. This
|
|
authentication method should only be used on systems with good filesystem
|
|
security. (Default: 0)
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBCookieAuthFile \fR\fIPath\fP
|
|
If set, this option overrides the default location and file name for Tor's
|
|
cookie file. (See CookieAuthentication above.)
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBCookieAuthFileGroupReadable \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR|\fIGroupName\fP
|
|
If this option is set to 0, don't allow the filesystem group to read
|
|
the cookie file. If the option is set to 1, make the cookie file
|
|
readable by the default GID. [Making the file readable by other
|
|
groups is not yet implemented; let us know if you need this for some
|
|
reason.] (Default: 0).
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBDataDirectory \fR\fIDIR\fP
|
|
Store working data in DIR (Default: @LOCALSTATEDIR@/lib/tor)
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBDirServer \fR[\fInickname\fR] [\fBflags\fR] \fIaddress\fR\fB:\fIport fingerprint\fP
|
|
Use a nonstandard authoritative directory server at the provided
|
|
address and port, with the specified key fingerprint. This option can
|
|
be repeated many times, for multiple authoritative directory
|
|
servers. Flags are separated by spaces, and determine what kind of an
|
|
authority this directory is. By default, every authority is authoritative
|
|
for current ("v2")-style directories, unless the "no-v2" flag is given. If the "v1" flags is provided, Tor will use this server as an
|
|
authority for old-style (v1) directories as well. (Only directory mirrors
|
|
care about this.) Tor will use this server as an authority for hidden
|
|
service information if the "hs" flag is set, or if the "v1" flag is set and
|
|
the "no-hs" flag is \fBnot\fP set. Tor will use this authority as a bridge
|
|
authoritative directory if the "bridge" flag is set. Lastly, if a flag
|
|
"orport=\fBport\fR" is given, Tor will use the given port when opening
|
|
encrypted tunnels to the dirserver.
|
|
[XXX020 also mention v3ident= flag here]
|
|
|
|
If no \fBdirserver\fP line is given, Tor will use the default
|
|
directory servers. NOTE: this option is intended
|
|
for setting up a private Tor network with its own directory authorities. If
|
|
you use it, you will be distinguishable from other users, because you won't
|
|
believe the same authorities they do.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBFetchDirInfoEarly \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
|
|
If set to 1, Tor will always fetch directory information like other
|
|
directory caches, even if you don't meet the normal criteria for
|
|
fetching early. Normal users should leave it off.
|
|
(Default: 0)
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBFetchHidServDescriptors \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
|
|
If set to 0, Tor will never fetch any hidden service descriptors from
|
|
the rendezvous directories. This option is only useful if you're using
|
|
a Tor controller that handles hidserv fetches for you.
|
|
(Default: 1)
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBFetchServerDescriptors \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
|
|
If set to 0, Tor will never fetch any network status summaries or server
|
|
descriptors from the directory servers. This option is only useful if
|
|
you're using a Tor controller that handles directory fetches for you.
|
|
(Default: 1)
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBFetchUselessDescriptors \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
|
|
If set to 1, Tor will fetch every non-obsolete descriptor from the
|
|
authorities that it hears about. Otherwise, it will avoid fetching
|
|
useless descriptors, for example for routers that are not running.
|
|
This option is useful if you're using the contributed "exitlist"
|
|
script to enumerate Tor nodes that exit to certain addresses.
|
|
(Default: 0)
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBGroup \fR\fIGID\fP
|
|
On startup, setgid to this group.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBHttpProxy\fR \fIhost\fR[:\fIport\fR]\fP
|
|
Tor will make all its directory requests through this host:port
|
|
(or host:80 if port is not specified),
|
|
rather than connecting directly to any directory servers.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBHttpProxyAuthenticator\fR \fIusername:password\fP
|
|
If defined, Tor will use this username:password for Basic Http proxy
|
|
authentication, as in RFC 2617. This is currently the only form of
|
|
Http proxy authentication that Tor supports; feel free to submit a
|
|
patch if you want it to support others.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBHttpsProxy\fR \fIhost\fR[:\fIport\fR]\fP
|
|
Tor will make all its OR (SSL) connections through this host:port
|
|
(or host:443 if port is not specified), via HTTP CONNECT rather than
|
|
connecting directly to servers. You may want to set \fBFascistFirewall\fR
|
|
to restrict the set of ports you might try to connect to, if your Https
|
|
proxy only allows connecting to certain ports.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBHttpsProxyAuthenticator\fR \fIusername:password\fP
|
|
If defined, Tor will use this username:password for Basic Https proxy
|
|
authentication, as in RFC 2617. This is currently the only form of
|
|
Https proxy authentication that Tor supports; feel free to submit a
|
|
patch if you want it to support others.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBKeepalivePeriod \fR\fINUM\fP
|
|
To keep firewalls from expiring connections, send a padding keepalive
|
|
cell every NUM seconds on open connections that are in use. If the
|
|
connection has no open circuits, it will instead be closed after NUM
|
|
seconds of idleness. (Default: 5 minutes)
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBLog \fR\fIminSeverity\fR[-\fImaxSeverity\fR] \fBstderr\fR|\fBstdout\fR|\fBsyslog\fR\fP
|
|
Send all messages between \fIminSeverity\fR and \fImaxSeverity\fR to
|
|
the standard output stream, the standard error stream, or to the system
|
|
log. (The "syslog" value is only supported on Unix.) Recognized
|
|
severity levels are debug, info, notice, warn, and err. We advise using
|
|
"notice" in most cases, since anything more verbose may provide sensitive
|
|
information to an attacker who obtains the logs. If only one
|
|
severity level is given, all messages of that level or higher will be
|
|
sent to the listed destination.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBLog \fR\fIminSeverity\fR[-\fImaxSeverity\fR] \fBfile\fR \fIFILENAME\fP
|
|
As above, but send log messages to the listed filename. The "Log"
|
|
option may appear more than once in a configuration file. Messages
|
|
are sent to all the logs that match their severity level.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBOutboundBindAddress \fR\fIIP\fP
|
|
Make all outbound connections originate from the IP address specified. This
|
|
is only useful when you have multiple network interfaces, and you want all
|
|
of Tor's outgoing connections to use a single one.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBPidFile \fR\fIFILE\fP
|
|
On startup, write our PID to FILE. On clean shutdown, remove FILE.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBProtocolWarnings \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
|
|
If 1, Tor will log with severity 'warn' various cases of other parties
|
|
not following the Tor specification. Otherwise, they are logged with
|
|
severity 'info'. (Default: 0)
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBRunAsDaemon \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
|
|
If 1, Tor forks and daemonizes to the background. This option has
|
|
no effect on Windows; instead you should use the --service command-line
|
|
option. (Default: 0)
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBSafeLogging \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fP
|
|
If 1, Tor replaces potentially sensitive strings in the logs
|
|
(e.g. addresses) with the string [scrubbed]. This way logs can still be
|
|
useful, but they don't leave behind personally identifying information
|
|
about what sites a user might have visited. (Default: 1)
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBUser \fR\fIUID\fP
|
|
On startup, setuid to this user.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBHardwareAccel \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fP
|
|
If non-zero, try to use crypto hardware acceleration when
|
|
available. This is untested and probably buggy. (Default: 0)
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBAvoidDiskWrites \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fP
|
|
If non-zero, try to write to disk less frequently than we would otherwise.
|
|
This is useful when running on flash memory or other media that support only
|
|
a limited number of writes. (Default: 0)
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBTunnelDirConns \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fP
|
|
If non-zero, when a directory server we contact supports it, we will
|
|
build a one-hop circuit and make an encrypted connection via its
|
|
ORPort. (Default: 0)
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBPreferTunneledDirConns \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fP
|
|
If non-zero, we will avoid directory servers that don't support tunneled
|
|
directory connections, when possible. (Default: 0)
|
|
|
|
.SH CLIENT OPTIONS
|
|
.PP
|
|
The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if \fBSocksPort\fP is non-zero):
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBAllowInvalidNodes\fR \fBentry\fR|\fBexit\fR|\fBmiddle\fR|\fBintroduction\fR|\fBrendezvous\fR|...\fP
|
|
If some Tor servers are obviously not working right, the directory
|
|
authorities can manually mark them as invalid, meaning that it's not
|
|
recommended you use them for entry or exit positions in your circuits. You
|
|
can opt to use them in some circuit positions, though. The default is
|
|
"middle,rendezvous", and other choices are not advised.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBBridge \fR\fIIP:ORPort\fR [fingerprint]\fP
|
|
When set along with UseBridges, instructs Tor to use the relay at
|
|
"IP:ORPort" as a "bridge" relaying into the Tor network. If "fingerprint"
|
|
is provided (using the same format as for DirServer), we will verify that
|
|
the relay running at that location has the right fingerprint. We also use
|
|
fingerprint to look up the bridge descriptor at the bridge authority, if
|
|
it's provided and if UpdateBridgesFromAuthority is set too.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBCircuitBuildTimeout \fR\fINUM\fP
|
|
Try for at most NUM seconds when building circuits. If the circuit
|
|
isn't open in that time, give up on it.
|
|
(Default: 1 minute.)
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBCircuitIdleTimeout \fR\fINUM\fP
|
|
If we have kept a clean (never used) circuit around for NUM seconds,
|
|
then close it. This way when the Tor client is entirely idle, it can
|
|
expire all of its circuits, and then expire its TLS connections. Also,
|
|
if we end up making a circuit that is not useful for exiting any of
|
|
the requests we're receiving, it won't forever take up a slot in the
|
|
circuit list.
|
|
(Default: 1 hour.)
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBClientOnly \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
|
|
If set to 1, Tor will under no circumstances run as a server. The default
|
|
is to run as a client unless ORPort is configured. (Usually,
|
|
you don't need to set this; Tor is pretty smart at figuring out whether
|
|
you are reliable and high-bandwidth enough to be a useful server.)
|
|
(Default: 0)
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBExcludeNodes \fR\fInode\fR,\fInode\fR,\fI...\fP
|
|
A list of identity fingerprints or nicknames of nodes to never use when
|
|
building a circuit.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBEntryNodes \fR\fInode\fR,\fInode\fR,\fI...\fP
|
|
A list of identity fingerprints or nicknames of preferred nodes to use for the
|
|
first hop in the circuit.
|
|
These are treated only as preferences unless StrictEntryNodes (see
|
|
below) is also set.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBExitNodes \fR\fInode\fR,\fInode\fR,\fI...\fP
|
|
A list of identity fingerprints or nicknames of preferred nodes to use for the
|
|
last hop in the circuit.
|
|
These are treated only as preferences unless StrictExitNodes (see
|
|
below) is also set.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBStrictEntryNodes \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
|
|
If 1, Tor will never use any nodes besides those listed in "EntryNodes" for
|
|
the first hop of a circuit.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBStrictExitNodes \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
|
|
If 1, Tor will never use any nodes besides those listed in "ExitNodes" for
|
|
the last hop of a circuit.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBFascistFirewall \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
|
|
If 1, Tor will only create outgoing connections to ORs running on ports that
|
|
your firewall allows (defaults to 80 and 443; see \fBFirewallPorts\fR). This will
|
|
allow you to run Tor as a client behind a firewall with restrictive policies,
|
|
but will not allow you to run as a server behind such a firewall.
|
|
If you prefer more fine-grained control, use ReachableAddresses instead.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBFirewallPorts \fR\fIPORTS\fP
|
|
A list of ports that your firewall allows you to connect to. Only
|
|
used when \fBFascistFirewall\fR is set. This option is deprecated; use
|
|
ReachableAddresses instead. (Default: 80, 443)
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBReachableAddresses \fR\fIADDR\fP[\fB/\fP\fIMASK\fP][:\fIPORT\fP]...\fP
|
|
A comma-separated list of IP addresses and ports that your firewall allows you
|
|
to connect to. The format is as
|
|
for the addresses in ExitPolicy, except that "accept" is understood
|
|
unless "reject" is explicitly provided. For example, 'ReachableAddresses
|
|
99.0.0.0/8, reject 18.0.0.0/8:80, accept *:80' means that your
|
|
firewall allows connections to everything inside net 99, rejects port
|
|
80 connections to net 18, and accepts connections to port 80 otherwise.
|
|
(Default: 'accept *:*'.)
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBReachableDirAddresses \fR\fIADDR\fP[\fB/\fP\fIMASK\fP][:\fIPORT\fP]...\fP
|
|
Like \fBReachableAddresses\fP, a list of addresses and ports. Tor will obey
|
|
these restrictions when fetching directory information, using standard HTTP
|
|
GET requests. If not set explicitly then the value of \fBReachableAddresses\fP
|
|
is used. If \fBHttpProxy\fR is set then these connections will go through that
|
|
proxy.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBReachableORAddresses \fR\fIADDR\fP[\fB/\fP\fIMASK\fP][:\fIPORT\fP]...\fP
|
|
Like \fBReachableAddresses\fP, a list of addresses and ports. Tor will obey
|
|
these restrictions when connecting to Onion Routers, using TLS/SSL. If not set
|
|
explicitly then the value of \fBReachableAddresses\fP is used. If
|
|
\fBHttpsProxy\fR is set then these connections will go through that proxy.
|
|
|
|
The separation between \fBReachableORAddresses\fP and
|
|
\fBReachableDirAddresses\fP is only interesting when you are connecting through
|
|
proxies (see \fBHttpProxy\fR and \fBHttpsProxy\fR). Most proxies limit TLS
|
|
connections (which Tor uses to connect to Onion Routers) to port 443, and some
|
|
limit HTTP GET requests (which Tor uses for fetching directory information) to
|
|
port 80.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBLongLivedPorts \fR\fIPORTS\fP
|
|
A list of ports for services that tend to have long-running connections
|
|
(e.g. chat and interactive shells). Circuits for streams that use these
|
|
ports will contain only high-uptime nodes, to reduce the chance that a
|
|
node will go down before the stream is finished.
|
|
(Default: 21, 22, 706, 1863, 5050, 5190, 5222, 5223, 6667, 6697, 8300)
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBMapAddress\fR \fIaddress\fR \fInewaddress\fR
|
|
When a request for address arrives to Tor, it will rewrite it to
|
|
newaddress before processing it. For example, if you always want
|
|
connections to www.indymedia.org to exit via \fItorserver\fR (where
|
|
\fItorserver\fR is the nickname of the server),
|
|
use "MapAddress www.indymedia.org www.indymedia.org.torserver.exit".
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBNewCircuitPeriod \fR\fINUM\fP
|
|
Every NUM seconds consider whether to build a new circuit. (Default: 30 seconds)
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBMaxCircuitDirtiness \fR\fINUM\fP
|
|
Feel free to reuse a circuit that was first used at most NUM seconds ago,
|
|
but never attach a new stream to a circuit that is too old.
|
|
(Default: 10 minutes)
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBNodeFamily \fR\fInode\fR,\fInode\fR,\fI...\fP
|
|
The Tor servers, defined by their identity fingerprints or nicknames,
|
|
constitute a "family" of similar or co-administered
|
|
servers, so never use any two of them in the same circuit. Defining a
|
|
NodeFamily is only needed when a server doesn't list the family itself
|
|
(with MyFamily). This option can be used multiple times.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBEnforceDistinctSubnets \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
|
|
If 1, Tor will not put two servers whose IP addresses are "too
|
|
close" on the same circuit. Currently, two addresses are
|
|
"too close" if they lie in the same /16 range. (Default: 1)
|
|
|
|
.\" \fBPathlenCoinWeight \fR\fI0.0-1.0\fP
|
|
.\" Paths are 3 hops plus a geometric distribution centered around this coinweight.
|
|
.\" Must be >=0.0 and <1.0. (Default: 0.3) NOT USED CURRENTLY
|
|
.\" .TP
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBRendNodes \fR\fInode\fR,\fInode\fR,\fI...\fP
|
|
A list of identity fingerprints or nicknames of preferred nodes to use for the
|
|
rendezvous point, if possible.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBRendExcludeNodes \fR\fInode\fR,\fInode\fR,\fI...\fP
|
|
A list of identity fingerprints or nicknames of nodes to never use when
|
|
choosing a rendezvous point.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBSocksPort \fR\fIPORT\fP
|
|
Advertise this port to listen for connections from Socks-speaking
|
|
applications. Set this to 0 if you don't want to allow application
|
|
connections. (Default: 9050)
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBSocksListenAddress \fR\fIIP\fR[:\fIPORT\fR]\fP
|
|
Bind to this address to listen for connections from Socks-speaking
|
|
applications. (Default: 127.0.0.1) You can also specify a port
|
|
(e.g. 192.168.0.1:9100).
|
|
This directive can be specified multiple times to bind to multiple
|
|
addresses/ports.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBSocksPolicy \fR\fIpolicy\fR,\fIpolicy\fR,\fI...\fP
|
|
Set an entrance policy for this server, to limit who can connect to the
|
|
SocksPort and DNSPort ports.
|
|
The policies have the same form as exit policies below.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBSocksTimeout \fR\fINUM\fP
|
|
Let a socks connection wait NUM seconds handshaking, and NUM seconds
|
|
unattached waiting for an appropriate circuit, before we fail it.
|
|
(Default: 2 minutes.)
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBTestVia \fR\fInode\fR,\fInode\fR,\fI...\fP
|
|
A list of identity fingerprints or nicknames of nodes to prefer for your middle
|
|
hop when building testing circuits. This option is mainly for debugging
|
|
reachability problems.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBTrackHostExits \fR\fIhost\fR,\fI.domain\fR,\fI...\fR\fP
|
|
For each value in the comma separated list, Tor will track recent connections
|
|
to hosts that match this value and attempt to
|
|
reuse the same exit node for each. If the value is prepended with a '.', it is
|
|
treated as matching an entire domain. If one of the values is just a '.', it
|
|
means match everything. This option is useful if you frequently connect to
|
|
sites that will expire all your authentication cookies (ie log you out) if
|
|
your IP address changes. Note that this option does have the disadvantage of
|
|
making it more clear that a given history is
|
|
associated with a single user. However, most people who would wish to observe
|
|
this will observe it through cookies or other protocol-specific means anyhow.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBTrackHostExitsExpire \fR\fINUM\fP
|
|
Since exit servers go up and down, it is desirable to expire the association
|
|
between host and exit server after NUM seconds. The default
|
|
is 1800 seconds (30 minutes).
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBUpdateBridgesFromAuthority \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
|
|
When set (along with UseBridges), Tor will try to fetch bridge descriptors
|
|
from the configured bridge authorities when feasible. It will fall back
|
|
to a direct request if the authority responds with a 404. (Default: 0)
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBUseBridges \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
|
|
When set, Tor will fetch descriptors for each bridge listed in the
|
|
"Bridge" config lines, and use these relays as both entry guards and
|
|
directory guards. (Default: 0)
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBUseEntryGuards \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
|
|
If this option is set to 1, we pick a few long-term entry servers, and
|
|
try to stick with them. This is desirable because
|
|
constantly changing servers increases the odds that an adversary who owns
|
|
some servers will observe a fraction of your paths.
|
|
(Defaults to 1.)
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBNumEntryGuards \fR\fINUM\fP
|
|
If UseEntryGuards is set to 1, we will try to pick a total of NUM routers
|
|
as long-term entries for our circuits.
|
|
(Defaults to 3.)
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBSafeSocks \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
|
|
When this option is enabled, Tor will reject application connections that
|
|
use unsafe variants of the socks protocol -- ones that only provide an
|
|
IP address, meaning the application is doing a DNS resolve first.
|
|
Specifically, these are socks4 and socks5 when not doing remote DNS.
|
|
(Defaults to 0.)
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBTestSocks \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
|
|
When this option is enabled, Tor will make a notice-level log entry for
|
|
each connection to the Socks port indicating whether the request used
|
|
a safe socks protocol or an unsafe one (see above entry on SafeSocks).
|
|
This helps to determine whether an application using Tor is possibly
|
|
leaking DNS requests.
|
|
(Default: 0)
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBVirtualAddrNetwork \fR\fIAddress\fB/\fIbits\fP
|
|
When a controller asks for a virtual (unused) address with the
|
|
MAPADDRESS command, Tor picks an unassigned address from this range.
|
|
(Default: 127.192.0.0/10)
|
|
|
|
When providing proxy server service to a network of computers using a tool like
|
|
dns-proxy-tor,
|
|
change this address to "10.192.0.0/10" or "172.16.0.0/12".
|
|
The default \fBVirtualAddrNetwork\fP address range on a
|
|
properly configured machine will route to the loopback interface.
|
|
For local use, no change to the
|
|
default \fBVirtualAddrNetwork\fP setting is needed.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBAllowNonRFC953Hostnames \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
|
|
When this option is disabled, Tor blocks hostnames containing illegal
|
|
characters (like @ and :) rather than sending them to an exit node to be
|
|
resolved. This helps trap accidental attempts to resolve URLs and so on.
|
|
(Default: 0)
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBFastFirstHopPK \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
|
|
When this option is enabled and we aren't running as a server, Tor
|
|
skips the public key step for the first hop of creating circuits. This is
|
|
safe since we have already used TLS to authenticate the server and to
|
|
establish forward-secure keys. Turning this option off makes circuit
|
|
building slower.
|
|
(Default: 1)
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBTransPort\fP \fR\fIPORT\fP
|
|
If non-zero, enables transparent proxy support on \fR\fIPORT\fP (by
|
|
convention, 9040).
|
|
.\" This is required to enable support for \fBdns-proxy-tor\fP.
|
|
.\" ControlPort must be set when using \fBTransPort\fP.
|
|
Requires OS support for transparent proxies, such as BSDs' pf or
|
|
Linux's IPTables.
|
|
If you're planning
|
|
to use Tor as a transparent proxy for a network, you'll want to examine
|
|
and change VirtualAddrNetwork from the default setting. You'll also want
|
|
to set the TransListenAddress option for the network you'd like to proxy.
|
|
(Default: 0).
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBTransListenAddress\fP \fR\fIIP\fR[:\fIPORT\fR]\fP
|
|
Bind to this address to listen for transparent proxy connections.
|
|
(Default: 127.0.0.1).
|
|
This is useful for exporting a transparent proxy server
|
|
to an entire network.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBNATDPort\fP \fR\fIPORT\fP
|
|
Allow old versions of ipfw (as included in old versions of FreeBSD,
|
|
etc.) to send connections through Tor using the NATD protocol.
|
|
This option is only for people who cannot
|
|
use TransPort.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBNATDListenAddress\fP \fR\fIIP\fR[:\fIPORT\fR]\fP
|
|
Bind to this address to listen for NATD connections.
|
|
(Default: 127.0.0.1).
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBAutomapHostsOnResolve\fP \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
|
|
When this option is enabled, and we get a request to resolve an
|
|
address that ends with one of the suffixes in
|
|
\fBAutomapHostsSuffixes\fP, we map an unused virtual address to that
|
|
address, and return the new virtual address. This is handy for making
|
|
.onion addresses work with applications that resolve an address and
|
|
then connect to it.
|
|
(Default: 0).
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBAutomapHostsSuffixes\fP \fR\fISUFFIX\fR,\fISUFFIX\fR,...\fP
|
|
A comma-separated list of suffixes to use with \fBAutomapHostsOnResolve\fP.
|
|
The "." suffix is equivalent to "all addresses."
|
|
(Default: .exit,.onion).
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBDNSPort\fP \fR\fIPORT\fP
|
|
If non-zero, Tor listens for UDP DNS requests on this port and resolves them
|
|
anonymously.
|
|
(Default: 0).
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBDNSListenAddress\fP \fR\fIIP\fR[:\fIPORT\fR]\fP
|
|
Bind to this address to listen for DNS connections.
|
|
(Default: 127.0.0.1).
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses\fP \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
|
|
If true, Tor does not believe any anonymously retrieved DNS answer that tells
|
|
it that an address resolves to an internal address (like 127.0.0.1 or
|
|
192.168.0.1). This option prevents certain browser-based attacks; don't turn
|
|
it off unless you know what you're doing. (Default: 1).
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBDownloadExtraInfo\fP \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
|
|
If true, Tor downloads and caches "extra-info" documents. These
|
|
documents contain information about servers other than the information
|
|
in their regular router descriptors. Tor does not use this information for
|
|
anything itself; to save bandwidth, leave this option turned off.
|
|
(Default: 0).
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBFallbackNetworkstatusFile\fP \fIFILENAME\fP
|
|
If Tor doesn't have a cached networkstatus file, it starts out using
|
|
this one instead. Even if this file is out of date, Tor can still use
|
|
it to learn about directory mirrors, so it doesn't need to put load on
|
|
the authorities. (Default: None).
|
|
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
.SH SERVER OPTIONS
|
|
.PP
|
|
The following options are useful only for servers (that is, if \fBORPort\fP is non-zero):
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBAddress \fR\fIaddress\fP
|
|
The IP address or fqdn of this server (e.g. moria.mit.edu). You can
|
|
leave this unset, and Tor will guess your IP address.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBAssumeReachable \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
|
|
This option is used when bootstrapping a new Tor network. If set to 1,
|
|
don't do self-reachability testing; just upload your server descriptor
|
|
immediately. If \fBAuthoritativeDirectory\fP is also set, this option
|
|
instructs the dirserver to bypass remote reachability testing too and
|
|
list all connected servers as running.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBBridgeRelay \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
|
|
Sets the relay to act as a "bridge" with respect to relaying connections
|
|
from bridge users to the Tor network. Mainly it influences how the relay
|
|
will cache and serve directory information. Usually used in combination
|
|
with PublishServerDescriptor.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBContactInfo \fR\fIemail_address\fP
|
|
Administrative contact information for server. This line might get
|
|
picked up by spam harvesters, so you may want to obscure the fact
|
|
that it's an email address.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBExitPolicy \fR\fIpolicy\fR,\fIpolicy\fR,\fI...\fP
|
|
Set an exit policy for this server. Each policy is of the form
|
|
"\fBaccept\fP|\fBreject\fP \fIADDR\fP[\fB/\fP\fIMASK\fP]\fB[:\fP\fIPORT\fP]".
|
|
If \fB/\fP\fIMASK\fP is omitted then this policy just applies to the host
|
|
given. Instead of giving a host or network you can also use "\fB*\fP" to
|
|
denote the universe (0.0.0.0/0). \fIPORT\fP can be a single port number,
|
|
an interval of ports "\fIFROM_PORT\fP\fB-\fP\fITO_PORT\fP", or "\fB*\fP".
|
|
If \fIPORT\fP is omitted, that means "\fB*\fP".
|
|
|
|
For example, "accept 18.7.22.69:*,reject 18.0.0.0/8:*,accept *:*" would
|
|
reject any traffic destined for MIT except for web.mit.edu, and
|
|
accept anything else.
|
|
|
|
To specify all internal and link-local networks (including 0.0.0.0/8,
|
|
169.254.0.0/16, 127.0.0.0/8, 192.168.0.0/16, 10.0.0.0/8, and
|
|
172.16.0.0/12), you can use the "private" alias instead of an address.
|
|
These addresses are rejected by default (at the beginning of your
|
|
exit policy), along with your public IP address, unless you set the
|
|
ExitPolicyRejectPrivate config option
|
|
to 0. For example, once you've done that, you could allow HTTP to
|
|
127.0.0.1 and block all other connections to internal networks with
|
|
"accept 127.0.0.1:80,reject private:*", though that may also allow
|
|
connections to your own computer that are addressed to its public
|
|
(external) IP address. See RFC 1918 and RFC 3330 for more
|
|
details about internal and reserved IP address space.
|
|
|
|
This directive can be specified multiple times so you don't have to put
|
|
it all on one line.
|
|
|
|
Policies are considered first to last, and the first match wins. If
|
|
you want to _replace_ the default exit policy, end your exit policy with
|
|
either a reject *:* or an accept *:*. Otherwise, you're _augmenting_
|
|
(prepending to) the default exit policy. The default exit policy is:
|
|
.PD 0
|
|
.RS 12
|
|
.IP "reject *:25"
|
|
.IP "reject *:119"
|
|
.IP "reject *:135-139"
|
|
.IP "reject *:445"
|
|
.IP "reject *:465"
|
|
.IP "reject *:563"
|
|
.IP "reject *:587"
|
|
.IP "reject *:1214"
|
|
.IP "reject *:4661-4666"
|
|
.IP "reject *:6346-6429"
|
|
.IP "reject *:6699"
|
|
.IP "reject *:6881-6999"
|
|
.IP "accept *:*"
|
|
.RE
|
|
.PD
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBExitPolicyRejectPrivate \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
|
|
Reject all private (local) networks, along with your own public IP
|
|
address, at the beginning of your exit
|
|
policy. See above entry on ExitPolicy. (Default: 1)
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBMaxOnionsPending \fR\fINUM\fP
|
|
If you have more than this number of onionskins queued for decrypt, reject new ones. (Default: 100)
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBMyFamily \fR\fInode\fR,\fInode\fR,\fI...\fP
|
|
Declare that this Tor server is controlled or administered by a group
|
|
or organization identical or similar to that of the other servers, defined by their identity fingerprints or nicknames.
|
|
When two servers both declare that they are in the same 'family', Tor clients
|
|
will not use them in the same circuit. (Each server only needs to list the
|
|
other servers in its family; it doesn't need to list itself, but it won't hurt.)
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBNickname \fR\fIname\fP
|
|
Set the server's nickname to 'name'. Nicknames must be between 1
|
|
and 19 characters inclusive, and must contain only the characters
|
|
[a-zA-Z0-9].
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBNumCPUs \fR\fInum\fP
|
|
How many processes to use at once for decrypting onionskins. (Default: 1)
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBORPort \fR\fIPORT\fP
|
|
Advertise this port to listen for connections from Tor clients and servers.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBORListenAddress \fR\fIIP\fR[:\fIPORT\fR]\fP
|
|
Bind to this IP address to listen for connections from Tor clients and
|
|
servers. If you specify a port, bind to this port rather than the one
|
|
specified in ORPort. (Default: 0.0.0.0)
|
|
This directive can be specified multiple times to bind to multiple
|
|
addresses/ports.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBPublishServerDescriptor \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR|\fBv1\fR|\fBv2\fR|\fBv3\fR|\fBbridge\fR|\fBhidserv\fR, ...\fP
|
|
This option is only considered if you have an ORPort defined. You can
|
|
choose multiple arguments, separated by commas.
|
|
|
|
If set to 0, Tor will act as a server but it will not publish its
|
|
descriptor to the directory authorities. (This is useful if you're
|
|
testing out your server, or if you're using a Tor controller that handles
|
|
directory publishing for you.) Otherwise, Tor will publish its descriptor
|
|
to all directory authorities of the type(s) specified. The value "1" is
|
|
treated as a synonym for the default, which is currently "v2,v3".
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBRedirectExit \fR\fIpattern target\fP
|
|
THIS OPTION IS DEPRECATED. It will go away in a future version of Tor.
|
|
Whenever an outgoing connection tries to connect to one of a given set
|
|
of addresses, connect to \fItarget\fP (an \fIaddress:port\fP pair) instead.
|
|
The address
|
|
pattern is given in the same format as for an exit policy. The
|
|
address translation applies after exit policies are applied. Multiple
|
|
\fBRedirectExit\fP options can be used: once any one has matched
|
|
successfully, no subsequent rules are considered. You can specify that no
|
|
redirection is to be performed on a given set of addresses by using the
|
|
special target string "pass", which prevents subsequent rules from being
|
|
considered.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBShutdownWaitLength\fR \fINUM\fP
|
|
When we get a SIGINT and we're a server, we begin shutting down: we close
|
|
listeners and start refusing new circuits. After \fBNUM\fP seconds,
|
|
we exit. If we get a second SIGINT, we exit immediately. (Default:
|
|
30 seconds)
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBAccountingMax \fR\fIN\fR \fBbytes\fR|\fBKB\fR|\fBMB\fR|\fBGB\fR|\fBTB\fP
|
|
Never send more than the specified number of bytes in a given
|
|
accounting period, or receive more than that number in the period.
|
|
For example, with AccountingMax set to 1 GB, a server could send 900 MB
|
|
and receive 800 MB and continue running. It will only hibernate once one
|
|
of the two reaches 1 GB.
|
|
When the number of bytes is exhausted, Tor will hibernate until some
|
|
time in the next accounting period. To prevent all servers from
|
|
waking at the same time, Tor will also wait until a random point in
|
|
each period before waking up. If you have bandwidth cost issues,
|
|
enabling hibernation is preferable to setting a low bandwidth, since it
|
|
provides users with a collection of fast servers that are up some of
|
|
the time, which is more useful than a set of slow servers that are
|
|
always "available".
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBAccountingStart \fR\fBday\fR|\fBweek\fR|\fBmonth\fR [\fIday\fR] \fIHH:MM\fR\fP
|
|
Specify how long accounting periods last. If \fBmonth\fP is given,
|
|
each accounting period runs from the time \fIHH:MM\fR on the
|
|
\fIday\fRth day of one month to the same day and time of the next.
|
|
(The day must be between 1 and 28.) If \fBweek\fP is given, each
|
|
accounting period runs from the time \fIHH:MM\fR of the \fIday\fRth
|
|
day of one week to the same day and time of the next week, with Monday
|
|
as day 1 and Sunday as day 7. If \fBday\fR is given, each accounting
|
|
period runs from the time \fIHH:MM\fR each day to the same time on the
|
|
next day. All times are local, and given in 24-hour time. (Defaults to
|
|
"month 1 0:00".)
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBServerDNSResolvConfFile \fR\fIfilename\fP
|
|
Overrides the default DNS configuration with the configuration in
|
|
\fIfilename\fP. The file format is the same as the standard Unix
|
|
"\fBresolv.conf\fP" file (7). This option, like all other
|
|
ServerDNS options, only affects name lookups that your server does on
|
|
behalf of clients. Also, it only takes effect if Tor was built with
|
|
eventdns support. (Defaults to use the system DNS configuration.)
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBServerDNSSearchDomains \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
|
|
If set to \fB1\fP, then we will search for addresses in the local search
|
|
domain. For example, if this system is configured to believe it is in
|
|
"example.com", and a client tries to connect to "www", the client will be
|
|
connected to "www.example.com".
|
|
This option only affects name lookups that your server does on
|
|
behalf of clients, and only takes effect if Tor was built with
|
|
eventdns support.
|
|
(Defaults to "0".)
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBServerDNSDetectHijacking \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
|
|
When this option is set to 1, we will test periodically to determine whether
|
|
our local nameservers have been configured to hijack failing DNS requests
|
|
(usually to an advertising site). If they are, we will attempt to correct
|
|
this.
|
|
This option only affects name lookups that your server does on
|
|
behalf of clients, and only takes effect if Tor was built with
|
|
eventdns support.
|
|
(Defaults to "1".)
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBServerDNSTestAddresses \fR\fIaddress\fR,\fIaddress\fR,\fI...\fP
|
|
When we're detecting DNS hijacking, make sure that these \fIvalid\fP
|
|
addresses aren't getting redirected. If they are, then our DNS is
|
|
completely useless, and we'll reset our exit policy to "reject *:*".
|
|
This option only affects name lookups that your server does on
|
|
behalf of clients, and only takes effect if Tor was built with
|
|
eventdns support.
|
|
(Defaults to "www.google.com, www.mit.edu, www.yahoo.com,
|
|
www.slashdot.org".)
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBServerDNSAllowNonRFC953Hostnames \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
|
|
When this option is disabled, Tor does not try to resolve hostnames
|
|
containing illegal characters (like @ and :) rather than sending them to an
|
|
exit node to be resolved. This helps trap accidental attempts to resolve
|
|
URLs and so on.
|
|
This option only affects name lookups that your server does on
|
|
behalf of clients, and only takes effect if Tor was built with
|
|
eventdns support.
|
|
(Default: 0)
|
|
|
|
.SH DIRECTORY SERVER OPTIONS
|
|
.PP
|
|
The following options are useful only for directory servers (that is, if \fBDirPort\fP is non-zero):
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBAuthoritativeDirectory \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
|
|
When this option is set to 1, Tor operates as an authoritative
|
|
directory server. Instead of caching the directory, it generates its
|
|
own list of good servers, signs it, and sends that to the clients.
|
|
Unless the clients already have you listed as a trusted directory, you
|
|
probably do not want to set this option. Please coordinate with the other
|
|
admins at tor-ops@freehaven.net if you think you should be a directory.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBV1AuthoritativeDirectory \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
|
|
When this option is set in addition to \fBAuthoritativeDirectory\fP, Tor
|
|
generates version 1 directory and running-routers documents (for legacy
|
|
Tor clients up to 0.1.0.x).
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBV2AuthoritativeDirectory \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
|
|
When this option is set in addition to \fBAuthoritativeDirectory\fP, Tor
|
|
generates version 2 network statuses and serves descriptors, etc as
|
|
described in doc/spec/dir-spec.txt.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBVersioningAuthoritativeDirectory \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
|
|
When this option is set to 1, Tor adds information on
|
|
which versions of Tor are still believed safe for use to
|
|
the published directory. Each version 1 authority is
|
|
automatically a versioning authority; version 2 authorities
|
|
provide this service optionally. See \fBRecommendedVersions\fP,
|
|
\fBRecommendedClientVersions\fP, and \fBRecommendedServerVersions\fP.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBNamingAuthoritativeDirectory \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
|
|
When this option is set to 1, then the server advertises that it has
|
|
opinions about nickname-to-fingerprint bindings. It will include these
|
|
opinions in its published network-status pages, by listing servers with
|
|
the flag "Named" if a correct binding between that nickname and
|
|
fingerprint has been registered with the dirserver. Naming dirservers
|
|
will refuse to accept or publish descriptors that contradict a
|
|
registered binding. See \fBapproved-routers\fP in the \fBFILES\fP
|
|
section below.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBHSAuthoritativeDir \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
|
|
When this option is set in addition to \fBAuthoritativeDirectory\fP, Tor also
|
|
accepts and serves hidden service descriptors. (Default: 0)
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBHSAuthorityRecordStats \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
|
|
When this option is set in addition to \fBHSAuthoritativeDir\fP, Tor
|
|
periodically (every 15 minutes) writes statistics about hidden service
|
|
usage to a file \fBhsusage\fP in its data directory. (Default: 0)
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBHidServDirectoryV2 \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
|
|
When this option is set, Tor accepts and serves v2 hidden service
|
|
descriptors. (Default: 0)
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBBridgeAuthoritativeDir \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
|
|
When this option is set in addition to \fBAuthoritativeDirectory\fP, Tor
|
|
accepts and serves router descriptors, but it caches and serves the main
|
|
networkstatus documents rather than generating its own. (Default: 0)
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBMinUptimeHidServDirectoryV2 \fR\fIN\fR \fBseconds\fR|\fBminutes\fR|\fBhours\fR|\fBdays\fR|\fBweeks\fP
|
|
Minimum uptime of a v2 hidden service directory to be accepted as such by
|
|
authoritative directories. (Default: 24 hours)
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBDirPort \fR\fIPORT\fP
|
|
Advertise the directory service on this port.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBDirListenAddress \fR\fIIP\fR[:\fIPORT\fR]\fP
|
|
Bind the directory service to this address. If you specify a port, bind
|
|
to this port rather than the one specified in DirPort. (Default: 0.0.0.0)
|
|
This directive can be specified multiple times to bind to multiple
|
|
addresses/ports.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBDirPolicy \fR\fIpolicy\fR,\fIpolicy\fR,\fI...\fP
|
|
Set an entrance policy for this server, to limit who can connect to the
|
|
directory ports.
|
|
The policies have the same form as exit policies above.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBRecommendedVersions \fR\fISTRING\fP
|
|
STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions currently believed
|
|
to be safe. The list is included in each directory, and nodes which
|
|
pull down the directory learn whether they need to upgrade. This
|
|
option can appear multiple times: the values from multiple lines are
|
|
spliced together.
|
|
When this is set then
|
|
\fBVersioningAuthoritativeDirectory\fP should be set too.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBRecommendedClientVersions \fR\fISTRING\fP
|
|
STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions currently believed
|
|
to be safe for clients to use. This information is included in version 2
|
|
directories. If this is not set then the value of \fBRecommendedVersions\fR
|
|
is used.
|
|
When this is set then
|
|
\fBVersioningAuthoritativeDirectory\fP should be set too.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBRecommendedServerVersions \fR\fISTRING\fP
|
|
STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions currently believed
|
|
to be safe for servers to use. This information is included in version 2
|
|
directories. If this is not set then the value of \fBRecommendedVersions\fR
|
|
is used.
|
|
When this is set then
|
|
\fBVersioningAuthoritativeDirectory\fP should be set too.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBDirAllowPrivateAddresses \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
|
|
If set to 1, Tor will accept router descriptors with arbitrary "Address"
|
|
elements. Otherwise, if the address is not an IP address or is a private
|
|
IP address, it will reject the router descriptor. Defaults to 0.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBAuthDirBadExit \fR\fIAddressPattern\fR...\fP
|
|
Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that
|
|
will be listed as bad exits in any network status document this authority
|
|
publishes, if \fBAuthDirListBadExits\fR is set.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBAuthDirInvalid \fR\fIAddressPattern\fR...\fP
|
|
Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that
|
|
will never be listed as "valid" in any network status document that this
|
|
authority publishes.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBAuthDirReject \fR\fIAddressPattern\fR...\fP
|
|
Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that
|
|
will never be listed at all in any network status document that this
|
|
authority publishes, or accepted as an OR address in any descriptor submitted
|
|
for publication by this authority.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBAuthDirListBadExits \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
|
|
Authoritative directories only. If set to 1, this directory has
|
|
some opinion about which nodes are unsuitable as exit nodes. (Do not
|
|
set this to 1 unless you plan to list nonfunctioning exits as bad;
|
|
otherwise, you are effectively voting in favor of every declared exit
|
|
as an exit.)
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBAuthDirRejectUnlisted \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
|
|
Authoritative directories only. If set to 1, the directory server
|
|
rejects all uploaded server descriptors that aren't explicitly listed
|
|
in the fingerprints file. This acts as a "panic button" if we get
|
|
Sybiled. (Default: 0)
|
|
|
|
.SH HIDDEN SERVICE OPTIONS
|
|
.PP
|
|
The following options are used to configure a hidden service.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBHiddenServiceDir \fR\fIDIRECTORY\fP
|
|
Store data files for a hidden service in DIRECTORY. Every hidden
|
|
service must have a separate directory. You may use this option multiple
|
|
times to specify multiple services.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBHiddenServicePort \fR\fIVIRTPORT \fR[\fITARGET\fR]\fP
|
|
Configure a virtual port VIRTPORT for a hidden service. You may use this
|
|
option multiple times; each time applies to the service using the most recent
|
|
hiddenservicedir. By default, this option maps the virtual port to the
|
|
same port on 127.0.0.1. You may override the target port, address, or both
|
|
by specifying a target of addr, port, or addr:port. You may also have
|
|
multiple lines with the same VIRTPORT: when a user connects to that VIRTPORT,
|
|
one of the TARGETs from those lines will be chosen at random.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBHiddenServiceNodes \fR\fInode\fR,\fInode\fR,\fI...\fP
|
|
If possible, use the specified nodes, defined by their identity fingerprints or
|
|
nicknames, as introduction points for the hidden service. If this is left
|
|
unset, Tor will be smart and pick some reasonable ones; most people can leave
|
|
this unset.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBHiddenServiceExcludeNodes \fR\fInode\fR,\fInode\fR,\fI...\fP
|
|
Do not use the specified nodes, defined by their identity fingerprints or
|
|
nicknames, as introduction points for the hidden service. In normal use there
|
|
is no reason to set this.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBPublishHidServDescriptors \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
|
|
If set to 0, Tor will run any hidden services you configure, but it won't
|
|
advertise them to the rendezvous directory. This option is only useful
|
|
if you're using a Tor controller that handles hidserv publishing for you.
|
|
(Default: 1)
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBHiddenServiceVersion \fR\fIversion\fR,\fIversion\fR,\fI...\fP
|
|
A list of rendezvous service descriptor versions to publish for the hidden
|
|
service. Possible version numbers are 0 and 2. (Default: 0, 2)
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBRendPostPeriod \fR\fIN\fR \fBseconds\fR|\fBminutes\fR|\fBhours\fR|\fBdays\fR|\fBweeks\fP
|
|
Every time the specified period elapses, Tor uploads any rendezvous
|
|
service descriptors to the directory servers. This information is also
|
|
uploaded whenever it changes. (Default: 20 minutes)
|
|
|
|
.\" UNDOCUMENTED
|
|
.\" ignoreversion
|
|
|
|
.SH SIGNALS
|
|
Tor catches the following signals:
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBSIGTERM\fR
|
|
Tor will catch this, clean up and sync to disk if necessary, and exit.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBSIGINT\fR
|
|
Tor clients behave as with SIGTERM; but Tor servers will do a controlled
|
|
slow shutdown, closing listeners and waiting 30 seconds before exiting.
|
|
(The delay can be configured with the ShutdownWaitLength config option.)
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBSIGHUP\fR
|
|
The signal instructs Tor to reload its configuration (including closing
|
|
and reopening logs), fetch a new directory, and kill and restart its
|
|
helper processes if applicable.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBSIGUSR1\fR
|
|
Log statistics about current connections, past connections, and
|
|
throughput.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBSIGUSR2\fR
|
|
Switch all logs to loglevel debug. You can go back to the old loglevels
|
|
by sending a SIGHUP.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBSIGCHLD\fR
|
|
Tor receives this signal when one of its helper processes has exited,
|
|
so it can clean up.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBSIGPIPE\fR
|
|
Tor catches this signal and ignores it.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
\fBSIGXFSZ\fR
|
|
If this signal exists on your platform, Tor catches and ignores it.
|
|
|
|
.SH FILES
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
.B @CONFDIR@/torrc
|
|
The configuration file, which contains "option value" pairs.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
.B @LOCALSTATEDIR@/lib/tor/
|
|
The tor process stores keys and other data here.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
.B \fIDataDirectory\fP/cached-status/*
|
|
The most recently downloaded network status document for each authority. Each file holds one such document; the filenames are the hexadecimal identity key fingerprints of the directory authorities.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
.B \fIDataDirectory\fB/cached-descriptors\fR and \fBcached-descriptors.new\fR
|
|
These files hold downloaded router statuses. Some routers may appear more than once; if so, the most recently published descriptor is used. Lines beginning with @-signs are annotations that contain more information about a given router. The ".new" file is an append-only journal; when it gets too large, all entries are merged into a new cached-routers file.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
.B \fIDataDirectory\fB/cached-routers\fR and \fBcached-routers.new\fR
|
|
Obsolete versions of cached-descriptors and cached-descriptors.new. When Tor can't find the newer files, it looks here instead.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
.B \fIDataDirectory\fP/state
|
|
A set of persistent key-value mappings. These are documented in the file. These include:
|
|
.PD 0
|
|
.RS 5
|
|
.IP "- The current entry guards and their status."
|
|
.IP "- The current bandwidth accounting values (unused so far; see below)."
|
|
.IP "- When the file was last written"
|
|
.IP "- What version of Tor generated the state file"
|
|
.IP "- A short history of bandwidth usage, as produced in the router descriptors."
|
|
.RE
|
|
.PD
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
.B \fIDataDirectory\fP/bw_accounting
|
|
Used to track bandwidth accounting values (when the current period starts and ends; how much has been read and written so far this period). This file is obsolete, and the data is now stored in the 'state' file as well. Only used when bandwidth accounting is enabled.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
.B \fIDataDirectory\fP/hsusage
|
|
Used to track hidden service usage in terms of fetch and publish
|
|
requests to this hidden service authoritative directory. Only used when
|
|
recording of statistics is enabled.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
.B \fIDataDirectory\fP/control_auth_cookie
|
|
Used for cookie authentication with the controller. Location can be
|
|
overridden by the CookieAuthFile config option. Regenerated on startup.
|
|
See control-spec.txt for details. Only used when cookie authentication
|
|
is enabled.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
.B \fIDataDirectory\fP/keys/*
|
|
Only used by servers. Holds identity keys and onion keys.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
.B \fIDataDirectory\fP/fingerprint
|
|
Only used by servers. Holds the fingerprint of the server's identity key.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
.B \fIDataDirectory\fP/approved-routers
|
|
Only for naming authoritative directory servers (see \fBNamingAuthoritativeDirectory\fP). This file lists nickname to identity bindings. Each line lists a nickname and a fingerprint separated by whitespace. See your \fBfingerprint\fP file in the \fIDataDirectory\fP for an example line. If the nickname is \fB!reject\fP then descriptors from the given identity (fingerprint) are rejected by this server. If it is \fB!invalid\fP then descriptors are accepted but marked in the directory as not valid, that is, not recommended.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
.B \fIDataDirectory\fP/router-stability
|
|
Only used by authoritative directory servers. Tracks measurements for router mean-time-between-failures so that authorities have a good idea of how to set their Stable flags.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
.B \fIHiddenServiceDirectory\fP/hostname
|
|
The <base32-encoded-fingerprint>.onion domain name for this hidden service.
|
|
.LP
|
|
.TP
|
|
.B \fIHiddenServiceDirectory\fP/private_key
|
|
The private key for this hidden service.
|
|
.SH SEE ALSO
|
|
.BR privoxy (1),
|
|
.BR tsocks (1),
|
|
.BR torify (1)
|
|
|
|
.BR https://www.torproject.org/
|
|
|
|
.SH BUGS
|
|
Plenty, probably. Tor is still in development. Please report them.
|
|
.SH AUTHORS
|
|
Roger Dingledine <arma@mit.edu>, Nick Mathewson <nickm@alum.mit.edu>.
|