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174 lines
6.7 KiB
HTML
174 lines
6.7 KiB
HTML
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.01 Transitional//EN">
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<html>
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<title>Tor Documentation</title>
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<meta name="Author" content="Roger Dingledine">
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<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8">
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<meta http-equiv="Content-Style-Type" content="text/css">
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<link rel="stylesheet" type="text/css" href="tor-doc.css">
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<h1><a href="http://tor.eff.org/">Tor</a> documentation</h1>
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<p>Tor provides a distributed network of servers ("onion routers"). Users
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bounce their communications (web requests, IM, IRC, SSH, etc.) around
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the routers. This makes it hard for recipients, observers, and even the
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onion routers themselves to track the source of the stream.</p>
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<a name="why"></a>
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<h2>Why should I use Tor?</h2>
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<p>Individuals need Tor for privacy:
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<ul>
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<li>Privacy in web browsing -- both from the remote website (so it can't
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track and sell your behavior), and similarly from your local ISP.
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<li>Safety in web browsing: if your local government doesn't approve
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of its citizens visiting certain websites, they may monitor the sites
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and put readers on a list of suspicious persons.
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<li>Circumvention of local censorship: connect to resources (news
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sites, instant messaging, etc.) that are restricted from your
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ISP/school/company/government.
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<li>Socially sensitive communication: chat rooms and web forums for
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rape and abuse survivors, or people with illnesses.
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</ul>
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<p>Journalists and NGOs need Tor for safety:
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<ul>
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<li>Allowing dissidents and whistleblowers to communicate more safely.
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<li>Censorship-resistant publication, such as making available your
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home-made movie anonymously via a Tor <a
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href="http://tor.eff.org/doc/tor-hidden-service.html">hidden
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service</a>; and reading, e.g. of news sites not permitted in some
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countries.
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<li>Allowing your workers to check back with your home website while
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they're in a foreign country, without notifying everybody nearby that
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they're working with your organization.
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</ul>
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<p>Companies need Tor for business security:
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<ul>
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<li>Competitive analysis: browse the competition's website safely.
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<li>Protecting collaborations of sensitive business units or partners.
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<li>Protecting procurement suppliers or patterns.
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<li>Putting the "P" back in "VPN": traditional VPNs reveal the exact
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amount and frequency of communication. Which locations have employees
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working late? Which locations have employees consulting job-hunting
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websites? Which research groups are communicating with your company's
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patent lawyers?
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</ul>
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<p>Governments need Tor for traffic-analysis-resistant communication:
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<ul>
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<li>Open source intelligence gathering (hiding individual analysts is
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not enough -- the organization itself may be sensitive).
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<li>Defense in depth on open <em>and classified</em> networks -- networks
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with a million users (even if they're all cleared) can't be made safe just
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by hardening them to external threat.
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<li>Dynamic and semi-trusted international coalitions: the network can
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be shared without revealing the existence or amount of communication
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between all parties.
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<li>Networks partially under known hostile control: to block
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communications, the enemy must take down the whole network.
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<li>Politically sensitive negotiations.
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<li>Road warriors.
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<li>Protecting procurement patterns.
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<li>Anonymous tips.
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</ul>
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<p>Law enforcement needs Tor for safety:
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<ul>
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<li>Allowing anonymous tips or crime reporting
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<li>Allowing agents to observe websites without notifying them that
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they're being observed (or, more broadly, without having it be an
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official visit from law enforcement).
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<li>Surveillance and honeypots (sting operations)
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</ul>
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<p>Does the idea of sharing the Tor network with
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all of these groups bother you? It shouldn't -- <a
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href="http://freehaven.net/doc/fc03/econymics.pdf">you need them for
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your security</a>.</p>
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<a name="installing"></a>
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<a name="client"></a>
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<h2>Installing and configuring Tor</h2>
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<p>See the <a href="tor-doc-win32.html">Windows</a>,
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<a href="tor-doc-osx.html">OS X</a>, and <a
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href="tor-doc-unix.html">Linux/BSD/Unix</a> documentation guides.
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<a name="client-or-server"></a>
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<a name="server"></a>
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<h2>Configuring a server</h2>
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<p>
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We've moved this section over to the new
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<a href="http://tor.eff.org/doc/tor-doc-server.html">Tor Server
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Configuration Guide</a>. Hope you like it.
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</p>
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<a name="hidden-service"></a>
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<h2>Configuring a hidden service</h2>
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<p>
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We've moved this section over to the new <a
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href="http://tor.eff.org/doc/tor-hidden-service.html">Tor Hidden Service
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Howto</a>. Hope you like it.
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</p>
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<a name="own-network"></a>
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<h2>Setting up your own network</h2>
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<p>
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If you want to experiment locally with your own network, or you're cut
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off from the Internet and want to be able to mess with Tor still, then
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you may want to set up your own separate Tor network.
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<p>
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To set up your own Tor network, you need to run your own directory
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servers, and you need to configure each client and server so it knows
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about your directory servers rather than the default ones.
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<ul>
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<li>1: Grab the latest release. Use at least 0.1.1.6-alpha.</li>
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<li>2: For each directory server you want,</li>
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<ul>
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<li>2a: Set it up as a server (see <a href="#server">"setting up a
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server"</a> above), with a least ORPort, DirPort, DataDirectory, and Nickname
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defined. Set "AuthoritativeDirectory 1", and set "RecommendedVersions"
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to a comma-separated list of acceptable
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versions of the code for clients and servers to be running.</li>
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<li>2b: Create a file called approved-routers in its DataDirectory.
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Leave it empty for now.</li>
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<li>2c: Run it: <tt>tor --list-fingerprint</tt> if your torrc is in
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the default place, or <tt>tor -f torrc --list-fingerprint</tt> to
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specify a torrc. This will generate your keys and output a fingerprint
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line.</li>
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</ul>
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<li>3: Now you need to teach clients and servers to use the new
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dirservers. For each fingerprint, add a line like<br>
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<tt>DirServer 18.244.0.114:80 719B E45D E224 B607 C537 07D0 E214 3E2D 423E 74CF</tt><br>
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to the torrc of each client and server who will be using your network.</li>
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<li>4: Each server (including the dir-servers) should set
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"AssumeReachable 1" in their torrc. This bypasses the reachability detection
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and lets the network bootstrap.
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<li>5: If you are running the network using local/private IP space, the
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dirservers need to set "DirAllowPrivateAddresses 1" in their torrc, and
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all the servers need to explicitly set their Address to their IP in the
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torrc.
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<li>6: Collect the 'fingerprint' lines from
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each server (including directory servers), and include them (one per
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line) in each approved-routers file. You can hup the tor process for
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each directory server to reload the approved-routers file (so you don't
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have to restart the process).</li>
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<li>7: Be sure to start at least 3 servers in addition to the
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dir-servers. If they're not succeeding at building circuits, hup them
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until they do.</li>
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</ul>
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</body>
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</html>
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