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49dd5ef3a3
Apparently some compilers like to eliminate memset() operations on data that's about to go out-of-scope. I've gone with the safest possible replacement, which might be a bit slow. I don't think this is critical path in any way that will affect performance, but if it is, we can work on that in 0.2.4. Fixes bug 7352.
13 lines
687 B
Plaintext
13 lines
687 B
Plaintext
o Major bugfixes:
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- Tor tries to wipe potentially sensitive data after using it, so
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that if some subsequent security failure exposes Tor's memory,
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the damage will be limited. But we had a bug where the compiler
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was eliminating these wipe operations when it decided that the
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memory was no longer visible to a (correctly running) program,
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hence defeating our attempt at defense in depth. We fix that
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by using OpenSSL's OPENSSL_cleanse() operation, which a compiler
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is unlikely to optimize away. Future versions of Tor may use
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a less ridiculously heavy approach for this. Fixes bug 7352.
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Reported in an article by Andrey Karpov.
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