mirror of
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor.git
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5393 lines
219 KiB
C
5393 lines
219 KiB
C
/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
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* Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
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* Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
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* Copyright (c) 2007-2017, The Tor Project, Inc. */
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/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
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/**
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* \file or.h
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* \brief Master header file for Tor-specific functionality.
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**/
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#ifndef TOR_OR_H
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#define TOR_OR_H
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#include "orconfig.h"
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#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
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#include <unistd.h>
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#endif
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#ifdef HAVE_SIGNAL_H
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#include <signal.h>
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#endif
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#ifdef HAVE_NETDB_H
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#include <netdb.h>
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#endif
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#ifdef HAVE_SYS_PARAM_H
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#include <sys/param.h> /* FreeBSD needs this to know what version it is */
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#endif
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#include "torint.h"
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#ifdef HAVE_SYS_FCNTL_H
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#include <sys/fcntl.h>
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#endif
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#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H
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#include <fcntl.h>
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#endif
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#ifdef HAVE_SYS_IOCTL_H
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#include <sys/ioctl.h>
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#endif
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#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H
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#include <sys/un.h>
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#endif
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#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
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#include <sys/stat.h>
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#endif
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#ifdef HAVE_NETINET_IN_H
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#include <netinet/in.h>
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#endif
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#ifdef HAVE_ARPA_INET_H
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#include <arpa/inet.h>
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#endif
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#ifdef HAVE_ERRNO_H
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#include <errno.h>
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#endif
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#ifdef HAVE_ASSERT_H
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#include <assert.h>
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#endif
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#ifdef HAVE_TIME_H
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#include <time.h>
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#endif
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#ifdef _WIN32
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#include <winsock2.h>
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#include <io.h>
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#include <process.h>
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#include <direct.h>
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#include <windows.h>
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#endif
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#include "crypto.h"
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#include "crypto_format.h"
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#include "tortls.h"
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#include "torlog.h"
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#include "container.h"
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#include "compress.h"
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#include "address.h"
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#include "compat_libevent.h"
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#include "ht.h"
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#include "confline.h"
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#include "replaycache.h"
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#include "crypto_curve25519.h"
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#include "crypto_ed25519.h"
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#include "tor_queue.h"
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#include "util_format.h"
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#include "hs_circuitmap.h"
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/* These signals are defined to help handle_control_signal work.
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*/
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#ifndef SIGHUP
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#define SIGHUP 1
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#endif
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#ifndef SIGINT
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#define SIGINT 2
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#endif
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#ifndef SIGUSR1
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#define SIGUSR1 10
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#endif
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#ifndef SIGUSR2
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#define SIGUSR2 12
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#endif
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#ifndef SIGTERM
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#define SIGTERM 15
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#endif
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/* Controller signals start at a high number so we don't
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* conflict with system-defined signals. */
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#define SIGNEWNYM 129
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#define SIGCLEARDNSCACHE 130
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#define SIGHEARTBEAT 131
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#if (SIZEOF_CELL_T != 0)
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/* On Irix, stdlib.h defines a cell_t type, so we need to make sure
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* that our stuff always calls cell_t something different. */
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#define cell_t tor_cell_t
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#endif
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#ifdef ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE
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#define NON_ANONYMOUS_MODE_ENABLED 1
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#endif
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/** Helper macro: Given a pointer to to.base_, of type from*, return &to. */
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#define DOWNCAST(to, ptr) ((to*)SUBTYPE_P(ptr, to, base_))
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/** Length of longest allowable configured nickname. */
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#define MAX_NICKNAME_LEN 19
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/** Length of a router identity encoded as a hexadecimal digest, plus
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* possible dollar sign. */
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#define MAX_HEX_NICKNAME_LEN (HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1)
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/** Maximum length of verbose router identifier: dollar sign, hex ID digest,
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* equal sign or tilde, nickname. */
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#define MAX_VERBOSE_NICKNAME_LEN (1+HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1+MAX_NICKNAME_LEN)
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/** Maximum size, in bytes, for resized buffers. */
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#define MAX_BUF_SIZE ((1<<24)-1) /* 16MB-1 */
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/** Maximum size, in bytes, for any directory object that we've downloaded. */
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#define MAX_DIR_DL_SIZE MAX_BUF_SIZE
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/** For HTTP parsing: Maximum number of bytes we'll accept in the headers
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* of an HTTP request or response. */
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#define MAX_HEADERS_SIZE 50000
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/** Maximum size, in bytes, for any directory object that we're accepting
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* as an upload. */
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#define MAX_DIR_UL_SIZE MAX_BUF_SIZE
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/** Maximum size, in bytes, of a single router descriptor uploaded to us
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* as a directory authority. Caches and clients fetch whatever descriptors
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* the authorities tell them to fetch, and don't care about size. */
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#define MAX_DESCRIPTOR_UPLOAD_SIZE 20000
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/** Maximum size of a single extrainfo document, as above. */
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#define MAX_EXTRAINFO_UPLOAD_SIZE 50000
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/** Minimum lifetime for an onion key in days. */
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#define MIN_ONION_KEY_LIFETIME_DAYS (1)
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/** Maximum lifetime for an onion key in days. */
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#define MAX_ONION_KEY_LIFETIME_DAYS (90)
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/** Default lifetime for an onion key in days. */
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#define DEFAULT_ONION_KEY_LIFETIME_DAYS (28)
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/** Minimum grace period for acceptance of an onion key in days.
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* The maximum value is defined in proposal #274 as being the current network
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* consensus parameter for "onion-key-rotation-days". */
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#define MIN_ONION_KEY_GRACE_PERIOD_DAYS (1)
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/** Default grace period for acceptance of an onion key in days. */
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#define DEFAULT_ONION_KEY_GRACE_PERIOD_DAYS (7)
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/** How often we should check the network consensus if it is time to rotate or
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* expire onion keys. */
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#define ONION_KEY_CONSENSUS_CHECK_INTERVAL (60*60)
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/** How often do we rotate TLS contexts? */
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#define MAX_SSL_KEY_LIFETIME_INTERNAL (2*60*60)
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/** How old do we allow a router to get before removing it
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* from the router list? In seconds. */
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#define ROUTER_MAX_AGE (60*60*48)
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/** How old can a router get before we (as a server) will no longer
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* consider it live? In seconds. */
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#define ROUTER_MAX_AGE_TO_PUBLISH (60*60*24)
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/** How old do we let a saved descriptor get before force-removing it? */
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#define OLD_ROUTER_DESC_MAX_AGE (60*60*24*5)
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/** Possible rules for generating circuit IDs on an OR connection. */
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typedef enum {
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CIRC_ID_TYPE_LOWER=0, /**< Pick from 0..1<<15-1. */
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CIRC_ID_TYPE_HIGHER=1, /**< Pick from 1<<15..1<<16-1. */
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/** The other side of a connection is an OP: never create circuits to it,
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* and let it use any circuit ID it wants. */
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CIRC_ID_TYPE_NEITHER=2
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} circ_id_type_t;
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#define circ_id_type_bitfield_t ENUM_BF(circ_id_type_t)
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#define CONN_TYPE_MIN_ 3
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/** Type for sockets listening for OR connections. */
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#define CONN_TYPE_OR_LISTENER 3
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/** A bidirectional TLS connection transmitting a sequence of cells.
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* May be from an OR to an OR, or from an OP to an OR. */
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#define CONN_TYPE_OR 4
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/** A TCP connection from an onion router to a stream's destination. */
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#define CONN_TYPE_EXIT 5
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/** Type for sockets listening for SOCKS connections. */
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#define CONN_TYPE_AP_LISTENER 6
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/** A SOCKS proxy connection from the user application to the onion
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* proxy. */
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#define CONN_TYPE_AP 7
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/** Type for sockets listening for HTTP connections to the directory server. */
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#define CONN_TYPE_DIR_LISTENER 8
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/** Type for HTTP connections to the directory server. */
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#define CONN_TYPE_DIR 9
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/* Type 10 is unused. */
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/** Type for listening for connections from user interface process. */
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#define CONN_TYPE_CONTROL_LISTENER 11
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/** Type for connections from user interface process. */
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#define CONN_TYPE_CONTROL 12
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/** Type for sockets listening for transparent connections redirected by pf or
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* netfilter. */
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#define CONN_TYPE_AP_TRANS_LISTENER 13
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/** Type for sockets listening for transparent connections redirected by
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* natd. */
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#define CONN_TYPE_AP_NATD_LISTENER 14
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/** Type for sockets listening for DNS requests. */
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#define CONN_TYPE_AP_DNS_LISTENER 15
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/** Type for connections from the Extended ORPort. */
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#define CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR 16
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/** Type for sockets listening for Extended ORPort connections. */
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#define CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR_LISTENER 17
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#define CONN_TYPE_MAX_ 17
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/* !!!! If _CONN_TYPE_MAX is ever over 31, we must grow the type field in
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* connection_t. */
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/* Proxy client types */
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#define PROXY_NONE 0
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#define PROXY_CONNECT 1
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#define PROXY_SOCKS4 2
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#define PROXY_SOCKS5 3
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/* !!!! If there is ever a PROXY_* type over 3, we must grow the proxy_type
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* field in or_connection_t */
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/* Pluggable transport proxy type. Don't use this in or_connection_t,
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* instead use the actual underlying proxy type (see above). */
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#define PROXY_PLUGGABLE 4
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/* Proxy client handshake states */
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/* We use a proxy but we haven't even connected to it yet. */
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#define PROXY_INFANT 1
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/* We use an HTTP proxy and we've sent the CONNECT command. */
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#define PROXY_HTTPS_WANT_CONNECT_OK 2
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/* We use a SOCKS4 proxy and we've sent the CONNECT command. */
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#define PROXY_SOCKS4_WANT_CONNECT_OK 3
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/* We use a SOCKS5 proxy and we try to negotiate without
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any authentication . */
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#define PROXY_SOCKS5_WANT_AUTH_METHOD_NONE 4
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/* We use a SOCKS5 proxy and we try to negotiate with
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Username/Password authentication . */
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#define PROXY_SOCKS5_WANT_AUTH_METHOD_RFC1929 5
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/* We use a SOCKS5 proxy and we just sent our credentials. */
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#define PROXY_SOCKS5_WANT_AUTH_RFC1929_OK 6
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/* We use a SOCKS5 proxy and we just sent our CONNECT command. */
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#define PROXY_SOCKS5_WANT_CONNECT_OK 7
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/* We use a proxy and we CONNECTed successfully!. */
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#define PROXY_CONNECTED 8
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/** True iff <b>x</b> is an edge connection. */
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#define CONN_IS_EDGE(x) \
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((x)->type == CONN_TYPE_EXIT || (x)->type == CONN_TYPE_AP)
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/** State for any listener connection. */
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#define LISTENER_STATE_READY 0
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#define OR_CONN_STATE_MIN_ 1
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/** State for a connection to an OR: waiting for connect() to finish. */
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#define OR_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING 1
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/** State for a connection to an OR: waiting for proxy handshake to complete */
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#define OR_CONN_STATE_PROXY_HANDSHAKING 2
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/** State for an OR connection client: SSL is handshaking, not done
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* yet. */
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#define OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_HANDSHAKING 3
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/** State for a connection to an OR: We're doing a second SSL handshake for
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* renegotiation purposes. (V2 handshake only.) */
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#define OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATING 4
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/** State for a connection at an OR: We're waiting for the client to
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* renegotiate (to indicate a v2 handshake) or send a versions cell (to
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* indicate a v3 handshake) */
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#define OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_SERVER_RENEGOTIATING 5
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/** State for an OR connection: We're done with our SSL handshake, we've done
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* renegotiation, but we haven't yet negotiated link protocol versions and
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* sent a netinfo cell. */
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#define OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V2 6
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/** State for an OR connection: We're done with our SSL handshake, but we
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* haven't yet negotiated link protocol versions, done a V3 handshake, and
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* sent a netinfo cell. */
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#define OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3 7
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/** State for an OR connection: Ready to send/receive cells. */
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#define OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN 8
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#define OR_CONN_STATE_MAX_ 8
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/** States of the Extended ORPort protocol. Be careful before changing
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* the numbers: they matter. */
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#define EXT_OR_CONN_STATE_MIN_ 1
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/** Extended ORPort authentication is waiting for the authentication
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* type selected by the client. */
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#define EXT_OR_CONN_STATE_AUTH_WAIT_AUTH_TYPE 1
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/** Extended ORPort authentication is waiting for the client nonce. */
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#define EXT_OR_CONN_STATE_AUTH_WAIT_CLIENT_NONCE 2
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/** Extended ORPort authentication is waiting for the client hash. */
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#define EXT_OR_CONN_STATE_AUTH_WAIT_CLIENT_HASH 3
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#define EXT_OR_CONN_STATE_AUTH_MAX 3
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/** Authentication finished and the Extended ORPort is now accepting
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* traffic. */
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#define EXT_OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN 4
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/** Extended ORPort is flushing its last messages and preparing to
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* start accepting OR connections. */
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#define EXT_OR_CONN_STATE_FLUSHING 5
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#define EXT_OR_CONN_STATE_MAX_ 5
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#define EXIT_CONN_STATE_MIN_ 1
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/** State for an exit connection: waiting for response from DNS farm. */
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#define EXIT_CONN_STATE_RESOLVING 1
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/** State for an exit connection: waiting for connect() to finish. */
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#define EXIT_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING 2
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/** State for an exit connection: open and ready to transmit data. */
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#define EXIT_CONN_STATE_OPEN 3
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/** State for an exit connection: waiting to be removed. */
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#define EXIT_CONN_STATE_RESOLVEFAILED 4
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#define EXIT_CONN_STATE_MAX_ 4
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/* The AP state values must be disjoint from the EXIT state values. */
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#define AP_CONN_STATE_MIN_ 5
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/** State for a SOCKS connection: waiting for SOCKS request. */
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#define AP_CONN_STATE_SOCKS_WAIT 5
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/** State for a SOCKS connection: got a y.onion URL; waiting to receive
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* rendezvous descriptor. */
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#define AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT 6
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/** The controller will attach this connection to a circuit; it isn't our
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* job to do so. */
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#define AP_CONN_STATE_CONTROLLER_WAIT 7
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/** State for a SOCKS connection: waiting for a completed circuit. */
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#define AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT 8
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/** State for a SOCKS connection: sent BEGIN, waiting for CONNECTED. */
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#define AP_CONN_STATE_CONNECT_WAIT 9
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/** State for a SOCKS connection: sent RESOLVE, waiting for RESOLVED. */
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#define AP_CONN_STATE_RESOLVE_WAIT 10
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/** State for a SOCKS connection: ready to send and receive. */
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#define AP_CONN_STATE_OPEN 11
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/** State for a transparent natd connection: waiting for original
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* destination. */
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#define AP_CONN_STATE_NATD_WAIT 12
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#define AP_CONN_STATE_MAX_ 12
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/** True iff the AP_CONN_STATE_* value <b>s</b> means that the corresponding
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* edge connection is not attached to any circuit. */
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#define AP_CONN_STATE_IS_UNATTACHED(s) \
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((s) <= AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT || (s) == AP_CONN_STATE_NATD_WAIT)
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#define DIR_CONN_STATE_MIN_ 1
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/** State for connection to directory server: waiting for connect(). */
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#define DIR_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING 1
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/** State for connection to directory server: sending HTTP request. */
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#define DIR_CONN_STATE_CLIENT_SENDING 2
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/** State for connection to directory server: reading HTTP response. */
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#define DIR_CONN_STATE_CLIENT_READING 3
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/** State for connection to directory server: happy and finished. */
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#define DIR_CONN_STATE_CLIENT_FINISHED 4
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/** State for connection at directory server: waiting for HTTP request. */
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#define DIR_CONN_STATE_SERVER_COMMAND_WAIT 5
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/** State for connection at directory server: sending HTTP response. */
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#define DIR_CONN_STATE_SERVER_WRITING 6
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#define DIR_CONN_STATE_MAX_ 6
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/** True iff the purpose of <b>conn</b> means that it's a server-side
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* directory connection. */
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#define DIR_CONN_IS_SERVER(conn) ((conn)->purpose == DIR_PURPOSE_SERVER)
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#define CONTROL_CONN_STATE_MIN_ 1
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/** State for a control connection: Authenticated and accepting v1 commands. */
|
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#define CONTROL_CONN_STATE_OPEN 1
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/** State for a control connection: Waiting for authentication; speaking
|
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* protocol v1. */
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#define CONTROL_CONN_STATE_NEEDAUTH 2
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#define CONTROL_CONN_STATE_MAX_ 2
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#define DIR_PURPOSE_MIN_ 4
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/** A connection to a directory server: set after a v2 rendezvous
|
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* descriptor is downloaded. */
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#define DIR_PURPOSE_HAS_FETCHED_RENDDESC_V2 4
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/** A connection to a directory server: download one or more server
|
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* descriptors. */
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#define DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_SERVERDESC 6
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/** A connection to a directory server: download one or more extra-info
|
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* documents. */
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#define DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_EXTRAINFO 7
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/** A connection to a directory server: upload a server descriptor. */
|
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#define DIR_PURPOSE_UPLOAD_DIR 8
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/** A connection to a directory server: upload a v3 networkstatus vote. */
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#define DIR_PURPOSE_UPLOAD_VOTE 10
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/** A connection to a directory server: upload a v3 consensus signature */
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#define DIR_PURPOSE_UPLOAD_SIGNATURES 11
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/** A connection to a directory server: download one or more v3 networkstatus
|
||
* votes. */
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#define DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_STATUS_VOTE 12
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/** A connection to a directory server: download a v3 detached signatures
|
||
* object for a consensus. */
|
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#define DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_DETACHED_SIGNATURES 13
|
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/** A connection to a directory server: download a v3 networkstatus
|
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* consensus. */
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#define DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_CONSENSUS 14
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/** A connection to a directory server: download one or more directory
|
||
* authority certificates. */
|
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#define DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_CERTIFICATE 15
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||
|
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/** Purpose for connection at a directory server. */
|
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#define DIR_PURPOSE_SERVER 16
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/** A connection to a hidden service directory server: upload a v2 rendezvous
|
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* descriptor. */
|
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#define DIR_PURPOSE_UPLOAD_RENDDESC_V2 17
|
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/** A connection to a hidden service directory server: download a v2 rendezvous
|
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* descriptor. */
|
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#define DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_RENDDESC_V2 18
|
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/** A connection to a directory server: download a microdescriptor. */
|
||
#define DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_MICRODESC 19
|
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#define DIR_PURPOSE_MAX_ 19
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|
||
/** True iff <b>p</b> is a purpose corresponding to uploading
|
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* data to a directory server. */
|
||
#define DIR_PURPOSE_IS_UPLOAD(p) \
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((p)==DIR_PURPOSE_UPLOAD_DIR || \
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(p)==DIR_PURPOSE_UPLOAD_VOTE || \
|
||
(p)==DIR_PURPOSE_UPLOAD_SIGNATURES || \
|
||
(p)==DIR_PURPOSE_UPLOAD_RENDDESC_V2)
|
||
|
||
#define EXIT_PURPOSE_MIN_ 1
|
||
/** This exit stream wants to do an ordinary connect. */
|
||
#define EXIT_PURPOSE_CONNECT 1
|
||
/** This exit stream wants to do a resolve (either normal or reverse). */
|
||
#define EXIT_PURPOSE_RESOLVE 2
|
||
#define EXIT_PURPOSE_MAX_ 2
|
||
|
||
/* !!!! If any connection purpose is ever over 31, we must grow the type
|
||
* field in connection_t. */
|
||
|
||
/** Circuit state: I'm the origin, still haven't done all my handshakes. */
|
||
#define CIRCUIT_STATE_BUILDING 0
|
||
/** Circuit state: Waiting to process the onionskin. */
|
||
#define CIRCUIT_STATE_ONIONSKIN_PENDING 1
|
||
/** Circuit state: I'd like to deliver a create, but my n_chan is still
|
||
* connecting. */
|
||
#define CIRCUIT_STATE_CHAN_WAIT 2
|
||
/** Circuit state: the circuit is open but we don't want to actually use it
|
||
* until we find out if a better guard will be available.
|
||
*/
|
||
#define CIRCUIT_STATE_GUARD_WAIT 3
|
||
/** Circuit state: onionskin(s) processed, ready to send/receive cells. */
|
||
#define CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN 4
|
||
|
||
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_MIN_ 1
|
||
|
||
/* these circuits were initiated elsewhere */
|
||
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_OR_MIN_ 1
|
||
/** OR-side circuit purpose: normal circuit, at OR. */
|
||
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_OR 1
|
||
/** OR-side circuit purpose: At OR, from the service, waiting for intro from
|
||
* clients. */
|
||
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_INTRO_POINT 2
|
||
/** OR-side circuit purpose: At OR, from the client, waiting for the service.
|
||
*/
|
||
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_REND_POINT_WAITING 3
|
||
/** OR-side circuit purpose: At OR, both circuits have this purpose. */
|
||
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_REND_ESTABLISHED 4
|
||
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_OR_MAX_ 4
|
||
|
||
/* these circuits originate at this node */
|
||
|
||
/* here's how circ client-side purposes work:
|
||
* normal circuits are C_GENERAL.
|
||
* circuits that are c_introducing are either on their way to
|
||
* becoming open, or they are open and waiting for a
|
||
* suitable rendcirc before they send the intro.
|
||
* circuits that are c_introduce_ack_wait have sent the intro,
|
||
* but haven't gotten a response yet.
|
||
* circuits that are c_establish_rend are either on their way
|
||
* to becoming open, or they are open and have sent the
|
||
* establish_rendezvous cell but haven't received an ack.
|
||
* circuits that are c_rend_ready are open and have received a
|
||
* rend ack, but haven't heard from the service yet. if they have a
|
||
* buildstate->pending_final_cpath then they're expecting a
|
||
* cell from the service, else they're not.
|
||
* circuits that are c_rend_ready_intro_acked are open, and
|
||
* some intro circ has sent its intro and received an ack.
|
||
* circuits that are c_rend_joined are open, have heard from
|
||
* the service, and are talking to it.
|
||
*/
|
||
/** Client-side circuit purpose: Normal circuit, with cpath. */
|
||
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL 5
|
||
/** Client-side circuit purpose: at the client, connecting to intro point. */
|
||
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING 6
|
||
/** Client-side circuit purpose: at the client, sent INTRODUCE1 to intro point,
|
||
* waiting for ACK/NAK. */
|
||
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT 7
|
||
/** Client-side circuit purpose: at the client, introduced and acked, closing.
|
||
*/
|
||
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACKED 8
|
||
/** Client-side circuit purpose: at the client, waiting for ack. */
|
||
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND 9
|
||
/** Client-side circuit purpose: at the client, waiting for the service. */
|
||
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY 10
|
||
/** Client-side circuit purpose: at the client, waiting for the service,
|
||
* INTRODUCE has been acknowledged. */
|
||
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED 11
|
||
/** Client-side circuit purpose: at the client, rendezvous established. */
|
||
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED 12
|
||
/** This circuit is used for build time measurement only */
|
||
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT 13
|
||
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MAX_ 13
|
||
/** Hidden-service-side circuit purpose: at the service, waiting for
|
||
* introductions. */
|
||
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO 14
|
||
/** Hidden-service-side circuit purpose: at the service, successfully
|
||
* established intro. */
|
||
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO 15
|
||
/** Hidden-service-side circuit purpose: at the service, connecting to rend
|
||
* point. */
|
||
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND 16
|
||
/** Hidden-service-side circuit purpose: at the service, rendezvous
|
||
* established. */
|
||
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_REND_JOINED 17
|
||
/** A testing circuit; not meant to be used for actual traffic. */
|
||
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING 18
|
||
/** A controller made this circuit and Tor should not use it. */
|
||
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_CONTROLLER 19
|
||
/** This circuit is used for path bias probing only */
|
||
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_PATH_BIAS_TESTING 20
|
||
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_MAX_ 20
|
||
/** A catch-all for unrecognized purposes. Currently we don't expect
|
||
* to make or see any circuits with this purpose. */
|
||
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_UNKNOWN 255
|
||
|
||
/** True iff the circuit purpose <b>p</b> is for a circuit that
|
||
* originated at this node. */
|
||
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_IS_ORIGIN(p) ((p)>CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_OR_MAX_)
|
||
/** True iff the circuit purpose <b>p</b> is for a circuit that originated
|
||
* here to serve as a client. (Hidden services don't count here.) */
|
||
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_IS_CLIENT(p) \
|
||
((p)> CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_OR_MAX_ && \
|
||
(p)<=CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MAX_)
|
||
/** True iff the circuit_t <b>c</b> is actually an origin_circuit_t. */
|
||
#define CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(c) (CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_IS_ORIGIN((c)->purpose))
|
||
/** True iff the circuit purpose <b>p</b> is for an established rendezvous
|
||
* circuit. */
|
||
#define CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_IS_ESTABLISHED_REND(p) \
|
||
((p) == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED || \
|
||
(p) == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_REND_JOINED)
|
||
/** True iff the circuit_t c is actually an or_circuit_t */
|
||
#define CIRCUIT_IS_ORCIRC(c) (((circuit_t *)(c))->magic == OR_CIRCUIT_MAGIC)
|
||
|
||
/** How many circuits do we want simultaneously in-progress to handle
|
||
* a given stream? */
|
||
#define MIN_CIRCUITS_HANDLING_STREAM 2
|
||
|
||
/* These RELAY_COMMAND constants define values for relay cell commands, and
|
||
* must match those defined in tor-spec.txt. */
|
||
#define RELAY_COMMAND_BEGIN 1
|
||
#define RELAY_COMMAND_DATA 2
|
||
#define RELAY_COMMAND_END 3
|
||
#define RELAY_COMMAND_CONNECTED 4
|
||
#define RELAY_COMMAND_SENDME 5
|
||
#define RELAY_COMMAND_EXTEND 6
|
||
#define RELAY_COMMAND_EXTENDED 7
|
||
#define RELAY_COMMAND_TRUNCATE 8
|
||
#define RELAY_COMMAND_TRUNCATED 9
|
||
#define RELAY_COMMAND_DROP 10
|
||
#define RELAY_COMMAND_RESOLVE 11
|
||
#define RELAY_COMMAND_RESOLVED 12
|
||
#define RELAY_COMMAND_BEGIN_DIR 13
|
||
#define RELAY_COMMAND_EXTEND2 14
|
||
#define RELAY_COMMAND_EXTENDED2 15
|
||
|
||
#define RELAY_COMMAND_ESTABLISH_INTRO 32
|
||
#define RELAY_COMMAND_ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS 33
|
||
#define RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE1 34
|
||
#define RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE2 35
|
||
#define RELAY_COMMAND_RENDEZVOUS1 36
|
||
#define RELAY_COMMAND_RENDEZVOUS2 37
|
||
#define RELAY_COMMAND_INTRO_ESTABLISHED 38
|
||
#define RELAY_COMMAND_RENDEZVOUS_ESTABLISHED 39
|
||
#define RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE_ACK 40
|
||
|
||
/* Reasons why an OR connection is closed. */
|
||
#define END_OR_CONN_REASON_DONE 1
|
||
#define END_OR_CONN_REASON_REFUSED 2 /* connection refused */
|
||
#define END_OR_CONN_REASON_OR_IDENTITY 3
|
||
#define END_OR_CONN_REASON_CONNRESET 4 /* connection reset by peer */
|
||
#define END_OR_CONN_REASON_TIMEOUT 5
|
||
#define END_OR_CONN_REASON_NO_ROUTE 6 /* no route to host/net */
|
||
#define END_OR_CONN_REASON_IO_ERROR 7 /* read/write error */
|
||
#define END_OR_CONN_REASON_RESOURCE_LIMIT 8 /* sockets, buffers, etc */
|
||
#define END_OR_CONN_REASON_PT_MISSING 9 /* PT failed or not available */
|
||
#define END_OR_CONN_REASON_MISC 10
|
||
|
||
/* Reasons why we (or a remote OR) might close a stream. See tor-spec.txt for
|
||
* documentation of these. The values must match. */
|
||
#define END_STREAM_REASON_MISC 1
|
||
#define END_STREAM_REASON_RESOLVEFAILED 2
|
||
#define END_STREAM_REASON_CONNECTREFUSED 3
|
||
#define END_STREAM_REASON_EXITPOLICY 4
|
||
#define END_STREAM_REASON_DESTROY 5
|
||
#define END_STREAM_REASON_DONE 6
|
||
#define END_STREAM_REASON_TIMEOUT 7
|
||
#define END_STREAM_REASON_NOROUTE 8
|
||
#define END_STREAM_REASON_HIBERNATING 9
|
||
#define END_STREAM_REASON_INTERNAL 10
|
||
#define END_STREAM_REASON_RESOURCELIMIT 11
|
||
#define END_STREAM_REASON_CONNRESET 12
|
||
#define END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL 13
|
||
#define END_STREAM_REASON_NOTDIRECTORY 14
|
||
#define END_STREAM_REASON_ENTRYPOLICY 15
|
||
|
||
/* These high-numbered end reasons are not part of the official spec,
|
||
* and are not intended to be put in relay end cells. They are here
|
||
* to be more informative when sending back socks replies to the
|
||
* application. */
|
||
/* XXXX 256 is no longer used; feel free to reuse it. */
|
||
/** We were unable to attach the connection to any circuit at all. */
|
||
/* XXXX the ways we use this one don't make a lot of sense. */
|
||
#define END_STREAM_REASON_CANT_ATTACH 257
|
||
/** We can't connect to any directories at all, so we killed our streams
|
||
* before they can time out. */
|
||
#define END_STREAM_REASON_NET_UNREACHABLE 258
|
||
/** This is a SOCKS connection, and the client used (or misused) the SOCKS
|
||
* protocol in a way we couldn't handle. */
|
||
#define END_STREAM_REASON_SOCKSPROTOCOL 259
|
||
/** This is a transparent proxy connection, but we can't extract the original
|
||
* target address:port. */
|
||
#define END_STREAM_REASON_CANT_FETCH_ORIG_DEST 260
|
||
/** This is a connection on the NATD port, and the destination IP:Port was
|
||
* either ill-formed or out-of-range. */
|
||
#define END_STREAM_REASON_INVALID_NATD_DEST 261
|
||
/** The target address is in a private network (like 127.0.0.1 or 10.0.0.1);
|
||
* you don't want to do that over a randomly chosen exit */
|
||
#define END_STREAM_REASON_PRIVATE_ADDR 262
|
||
|
||
/** Bitwise-and this value with endreason to mask out all flags. */
|
||
#define END_STREAM_REASON_MASK 511
|
||
|
||
/** Bitwise-or this with the argument to control_event_stream_status
|
||
* to indicate that the reason came from an END cell. */
|
||
#define END_STREAM_REASON_FLAG_REMOTE 512
|
||
/** Bitwise-or this with the argument to control_event_stream_status
|
||
* to indicate that we already sent a CLOSED stream event. */
|
||
#define END_STREAM_REASON_FLAG_ALREADY_SENT_CLOSED 1024
|
||
/** Bitwise-or this with endreason to indicate that we already sent
|
||
* a socks reply, and no further reply needs to be sent from
|
||
* connection_mark_unattached_ap(). */
|
||
#define END_STREAM_REASON_FLAG_ALREADY_SOCKS_REPLIED 2048
|
||
|
||
/** Reason for remapping an AP connection's address: we have a cached
|
||
* answer. */
|
||
#define REMAP_STREAM_SOURCE_CACHE 1
|
||
/** Reason for remapping an AP connection's address: the exit node told us an
|
||
* answer. */
|
||
#define REMAP_STREAM_SOURCE_EXIT 2
|
||
|
||
/* 'type' values to use in RESOLVED cells. Specified in tor-spec.txt. */
|
||
#define RESOLVED_TYPE_HOSTNAME 0
|
||
#define RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV4 4
|
||
#define RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV6 6
|
||
#define RESOLVED_TYPE_ERROR_TRANSIENT 0xF0
|
||
#define RESOLVED_TYPE_ERROR 0xF1
|
||
|
||
/* Negative reasons are internal: we never send them in a DESTROY or TRUNCATE
|
||
* call; they only go to the controller for tracking */
|
||
|
||
/* Closing introduction point that were opened in parallel. */
|
||
#define END_CIRC_REASON_IP_NOW_REDUNDANT -4
|
||
|
||
/** Our post-timeout circuit time measurement period expired.
|
||
* We must give up now */
|
||
#define END_CIRC_REASON_MEASUREMENT_EXPIRED -3
|
||
|
||
/** We couldn't build a path for this circuit. */
|
||
#define END_CIRC_REASON_NOPATH -2
|
||
/** Catch-all "other" reason for closing origin circuits. */
|
||
#define END_CIRC_AT_ORIGIN -1
|
||
|
||
/* Reasons why we (or a remote OR) might close a circuit. See tor-spec.txt for
|
||
* documentation of these. */
|
||
#define END_CIRC_REASON_MIN_ 0
|
||
#define END_CIRC_REASON_NONE 0
|
||
#define END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL 1
|
||
#define END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL 2
|
||
#define END_CIRC_REASON_REQUESTED 3
|
||
#define END_CIRC_REASON_HIBERNATING 4
|
||
#define END_CIRC_REASON_RESOURCELIMIT 5
|
||
#define END_CIRC_REASON_CONNECTFAILED 6
|
||
#define END_CIRC_REASON_OR_IDENTITY 7
|
||
#define END_CIRC_REASON_CHANNEL_CLOSED 8
|
||
#define END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED 9
|
||
#define END_CIRC_REASON_TIMEOUT 10
|
||
#define END_CIRC_REASON_DESTROYED 11
|
||
#define END_CIRC_REASON_NOSUCHSERVICE 12
|
||
#define END_CIRC_REASON_MAX_ 12
|
||
|
||
/** Bitwise-OR this with the argument to circuit_mark_for_close() or
|
||
* control_event_circuit_status() to indicate that the reason was
|
||
* passed through from a destroy or truncate cell. */
|
||
#define END_CIRC_REASON_FLAG_REMOTE 512
|
||
|
||
/** Length of 'y' portion of 'y.onion' URL. */
|
||
#define REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32 16
|
||
|
||
/** Length of 'y.onion' including '.onion' URL. */
|
||
#define REND_SERVICE_ADDRESS_LEN (16+1+5)
|
||
|
||
/** Length of a binary-encoded rendezvous service ID. */
|
||
#define REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN 10
|
||
|
||
/** Time period for which a v2 descriptor will be valid. */
|
||
#define REND_TIME_PERIOD_V2_DESC_VALIDITY (24*60*60)
|
||
|
||
/** Time period within which two sets of v2 descriptors will be uploaded in
|
||
* parallel. */
|
||
#define REND_TIME_PERIOD_OVERLAPPING_V2_DESCS (60*60)
|
||
|
||
/** Number of non-consecutive replicas (i.e. distributed somewhere
|
||
* in the ring) for a descriptor. */
|
||
#define REND_NUMBER_OF_NON_CONSECUTIVE_REPLICAS 2
|
||
|
||
/** Number of consecutive replicas for a descriptor. */
|
||
#define REND_NUMBER_OF_CONSECUTIVE_REPLICAS 3
|
||
|
||
/** Length of v2 descriptor ID (32 base32 chars = 160 bits). */
|
||
#define REND_DESC_ID_V2_LEN_BASE32 32
|
||
|
||
/** Length of the base32-encoded secret ID part of versioned hidden service
|
||
* descriptors. */
|
||
#define REND_SECRET_ID_PART_LEN_BASE32 32
|
||
|
||
/** Length of the base32-encoded hash of an introduction point's
|
||
* identity key. */
|
||
#define REND_INTRO_POINT_ID_LEN_BASE32 32
|
||
|
||
/** Length of the descriptor cookie that is used for client authorization
|
||
* to hidden services. */
|
||
#define REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN 16
|
||
|
||
/** Length of the base64-encoded descriptor cookie that is used for
|
||
* exchanging client authorization between hidden service and client. */
|
||
#define REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN_BASE64 22
|
||
|
||
/** Length of client identifier in encrypted introduction points for hidden
|
||
* service authorization type 'basic'. */
|
||
#define REND_BASIC_AUTH_CLIENT_ID_LEN 4
|
||
|
||
/** Multiple of the number of clients to which the real number of clients
|
||
* is padded with fake clients for hidden service authorization type
|
||
* 'basic'. */
|
||
#define REND_BASIC_AUTH_CLIENT_MULTIPLE 16
|
||
|
||
/** Length of client entry consisting of client identifier and encrypted
|
||
* session key for hidden service authorization type 'basic'. */
|
||
#define REND_BASIC_AUTH_CLIENT_ENTRY_LEN (REND_BASIC_AUTH_CLIENT_ID_LEN \
|
||
+ CIPHER_KEY_LEN)
|
||
|
||
/** Maximum size of v2 hidden service descriptors. */
|
||
#define REND_DESC_MAX_SIZE (20 * 1024)
|
||
|
||
/** Legal characters for use in authorized client names for a hidden
|
||
* service. */
|
||
#define REND_LEGAL_CLIENTNAME_CHARACTERS \
|
||
"abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789+-_"
|
||
|
||
/** Maximum length of authorized client names for a hidden service. */
|
||
#define REND_CLIENTNAME_MAX_LEN 16
|
||
|
||
/** Length of the rendezvous cookie that is used to connect circuits at the
|
||
* rendezvous point. */
|
||
#define REND_COOKIE_LEN DIGEST_LEN
|
||
|
||
/** Client authorization type that a hidden service performs. */
|
||
typedef enum rend_auth_type_t {
|
||
REND_NO_AUTH = 0,
|
||
REND_BASIC_AUTH = 1,
|
||
REND_STEALTH_AUTH = 2,
|
||
} rend_auth_type_t;
|
||
|
||
/** Client-side configuration of authorization for a hidden service. */
|
||
typedef struct rend_service_authorization_t {
|
||
uint8_t descriptor_cookie[REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN];
|
||
char onion_address[REND_SERVICE_ADDRESS_LEN+1];
|
||
rend_auth_type_t auth_type;
|
||
} rend_service_authorization_t;
|
||
|
||
/** Client- and server-side data that is used for hidden service connection
|
||
* establishment. Not all fields contain data depending on where this struct
|
||
* is used. */
|
||
typedef struct rend_data_t {
|
||
/* Hidden service protocol version of this base object. */
|
||
uint32_t version;
|
||
|
||
/** List of HSDir fingerprints on which this request has been sent to. This
|
||
* contains binary identity digest of the directory of size DIGEST_LEN. */
|
||
smartlist_t *hsdirs_fp;
|
||
|
||
/** Rendezvous cookie used by both, client and service. */
|
||
char rend_cookie[REND_COOKIE_LEN];
|
||
|
||
/** Number of streams associated with this rendezvous circuit. */
|
||
int nr_streams;
|
||
} rend_data_t;
|
||
|
||
typedef struct rend_data_v2_t {
|
||
/* Rendezvous base data. */
|
||
rend_data_t base_;
|
||
|
||
/** Onion address (without the .onion part) that a client requests. */
|
||
char onion_address[REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1];
|
||
|
||
/** Descriptor ID for each replicas computed from the onion address. If
|
||
* the onion address is empty, this array MUST be empty. We keep them so
|
||
* we know when to purge our entry in the last hsdir request table. */
|
||
char descriptor_id[REND_NUMBER_OF_NON_CONSECUTIVE_REPLICAS][DIGEST_LEN];
|
||
|
||
/** (Optional) descriptor cookie that is used by a client. */
|
||
char descriptor_cookie[REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN];
|
||
|
||
/** Authorization type for accessing a service used by a client. */
|
||
rend_auth_type_t auth_type;
|
||
|
||
/** Descriptor ID for a client request. The control port command HSFETCH
|
||
* uses this. It's set if the descriptor query should only use this
|
||
* descriptor ID. */
|
||
char desc_id_fetch[DIGEST_LEN];
|
||
|
||
/** Hash of the hidden service's PK used by a service. */
|
||
char rend_pk_digest[DIGEST_LEN];
|
||
} rend_data_v2_t;
|
||
|
||
/* From a base rend_data_t object <b>d</d>, return the v2 object. */
|
||
static inline
|
||
rend_data_v2_t *TO_REND_DATA_V2(const rend_data_t *d)
|
||
{
|
||
tor_assert(d);
|
||
tor_assert(d->version == 2);
|
||
return DOWNCAST(rend_data_v2_t, d);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/** Time interval for tracking replays of DH public keys received in
|
||
* INTRODUCE2 cells. Used only to avoid launching multiple
|
||
* simultaneous attempts to connect to the same rendezvous point. */
|
||
#define REND_REPLAY_TIME_INTERVAL (5 * 60)
|
||
|
||
/** Used to indicate which way a cell is going on a circuit. */
|
||
typedef enum {
|
||
CELL_DIRECTION_IN=1, /**< The cell is moving towards the origin. */
|
||
CELL_DIRECTION_OUT=2, /**< The cell is moving away from the origin. */
|
||
} cell_direction_t;
|
||
|
||
/** Initial value for both sides of a circuit transmission window when the
|
||
* circuit is initialized. Measured in cells. */
|
||
#define CIRCWINDOW_START 1000
|
||
#define CIRCWINDOW_START_MIN 100
|
||
#define CIRCWINDOW_START_MAX 1000
|
||
/** Amount to increment a circuit window when we get a circuit SENDME. */
|
||
#define CIRCWINDOW_INCREMENT 100
|
||
/** Initial value on both sides of a stream transmission window when the
|
||
* stream is initialized. Measured in cells. */
|
||
#define STREAMWINDOW_START 500
|
||
/** Amount to increment a stream window when we get a stream SENDME. */
|
||
#define STREAMWINDOW_INCREMENT 50
|
||
|
||
/** Maximum number of queued cells on a circuit for which we are the
|
||
* midpoint before we give up and kill it. This must be >= circwindow
|
||
* to avoid killing innocent circuits, and >= circwindow*2 to give
|
||
* leaky-pipe a chance of working someday. The ORCIRC_MAX_MIDDLE_KILL_THRESH
|
||
* ratio controls the margin of error between emitting a warning and
|
||
* killing the circuit.
|
||
*/
|
||
#define ORCIRC_MAX_MIDDLE_CELLS (CIRCWINDOW_START_MAX*2)
|
||
/** Ratio of hard (circuit kill) to soft (warning) thresholds for the
|
||
* ORCIRC_MAX_MIDDLE_CELLS tests.
|
||
*/
|
||
#define ORCIRC_MAX_MIDDLE_KILL_THRESH (1.1f)
|
||
|
||
/* Cell commands. These values are defined in tor-spec.txt. */
|
||
#define CELL_PADDING 0
|
||
#define CELL_CREATE 1
|
||
#define CELL_CREATED 2
|
||
#define CELL_RELAY 3
|
||
#define CELL_DESTROY 4
|
||
#define CELL_CREATE_FAST 5
|
||
#define CELL_CREATED_FAST 6
|
||
#define CELL_VERSIONS 7
|
||
#define CELL_NETINFO 8
|
||
#define CELL_RELAY_EARLY 9
|
||
#define CELL_CREATE2 10
|
||
#define CELL_CREATED2 11
|
||
#define CELL_PADDING_NEGOTIATE 12
|
||
|
||
#define CELL_VPADDING 128
|
||
#define CELL_CERTS 129
|
||
#define CELL_AUTH_CHALLENGE 130
|
||
#define CELL_AUTHENTICATE 131
|
||
#define CELL_AUTHORIZE 132
|
||
#define CELL_COMMAND_MAX_ 132
|
||
|
||
/** How long to test reachability before complaining to the user. */
|
||
#define TIMEOUT_UNTIL_UNREACHABILITY_COMPLAINT (20*60)
|
||
|
||
/** Legal characters in a nickname. */
|
||
#define LEGAL_NICKNAME_CHARACTERS \
|
||
"abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789"
|
||
|
||
/** Name to use in client TLS certificates if no nickname is given. Once
|
||
* Tor 0.1.2.x is obsolete, we can remove this. */
|
||
#define DEFAULT_CLIENT_NICKNAME "client"
|
||
|
||
/** Name chosen by routers that don't configure nicknames */
|
||
#define UNNAMED_ROUTER_NICKNAME "Unnamed"
|
||
|
||
/** Number of bytes in a SOCKS4 header. */
|
||
#define SOCKS4_NETWORK_LEN 8
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* Relay payload:
|
||
* Relay command [1 byte]
|
||
* Recognized [2 bytes]
|
||
* Stream ID [2 bytes]
|
||
* Partial SHA-1 [4 bytes]
|
||
* Length [2 bytes]
|
||
* Relay payload [498 bytes]
|
||
*/
|
||
|
||
/** Number of bytes in a cell, minus cell header. */
|
||
#define CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE 509
|
||
/** Number of bytes in a cell transmitted over the network, in the longest
|
||
* form */
|
||
#define CELL_MAX_NETWORK_SIZE 514
|
||
|
||
/** Maximum length of a header on a variable-length cell. */
|
||
#define VAR_CELL_MAX_HEADER_SIZE 7
|
||
|
||
static int get_cell_network_size(int wide_circ_ids);
|
||
static inline int get_cell_network_size(int wide_circ_ids)
|
||
{
|
||
return wide_circ_ids ? CELL_MAX_NETWORK_SIZE : CELL_MAX_NETWORK_SIZE - 2;
|
||
}
|
||
static int get_var_cell_header_size(int wide_circ_ids);
|
||
static inline int get_var_cell_header_size(int wide_circ_ids)
|
||
{
|
||
return wide_circ_ids ? VAR_CELL_MAX_HEADER_SIZE :
|
||
VAR_CELL_MAX_HEADER_SIZE - 2;
|
||
}
|
||
static int get_circ_id_size(int wide_circ_ids);
|
||
static inline int get_circ_id_size(int wide_circ_ids)
|
||
{
|
||
return wide_circ_ids ? 4 : 2;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/** Number of bytes in a relay cell's header (not including general cell
|
||
* header). */
|
||
#define RELAY_HEADER_SIZE (1+2+2+4+2)
|
||
/** Largest number of bytes that can fit in a relay cell payload. */
|
||
#define RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE (CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE-RELAY_HEADER_SIZE)
|
||
|
||
/** Identifies a circuit on an or_connection */
|
||
typedef uint32_t circid_t;
|
||
/** Identifies a stream on a circuit */
|
||
typedef uint16_t streamid_t;
|
||
|
||
/* channel_t typedef; struct channel_s is in channel.h */
|
||
|
||
typedef struct channel_s channel_t;
|
||
|
||
/* channel_listener_t typedef; struct channel_listener_s is in channel.h */
|
||
|
||
typedef struct channel_listener_s channel_listener_t;
|
||
|
||
/* channel states for channel_t */
|
||
|
||
typedef enum {
|
||
/*
|
||
* Closed state - channel is inactive
|
||
*
|
||
* Permitted transitions from:
|
||
* - CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSING
|
||
* Permitted transitions to:
|
||
* - CHANNEL_STATE_OPENING
|
||
*/
|
||
CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSED = 0,
|
||
/*
|
||
* Opening state - channel is trying to connect
|
||
*
|
||
* Permitted transitions from:
|
||
* - CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSED
|
||
* Permitted transitions to:
|
||
* - CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSING
|
||
* - CHANNEL_STATE_ERROR
|
||
* - CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN
|
||
*/
|
||
CHANNEL_STATE_OPENING,
|
||
/*
|
||
* Open state - channel is active and ready for use
|
||
*
|
||
* Permitted transitions from:
|
||
* - CHANNEL_STATE_MAINT
|
||
* - CHANNEL_STATE_OPENING
|
||
* Permitted transitions to:
|
||
* - CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSING
|
||
* - CHANNEL_STATE_ERROR
|
||
* - CHANNEL_STATE_MAINT
|
||
*/
|
||
CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN,
|
||
/*
|
||
* Maintenance state - channel is temporarily offline for subclass specific
|
||
* maintenance activities such as TLS renegotiation.
|
||
*
|
||
* Permitted transitions from:
|
||
* - CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN
|
||
* Permitted transitions to:
|
||
* - CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSING
|
||
* - CHANNEL_STATE_ERROR
|
||
* - CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN
|
||
*/
|
||
CHANNEL_STATE_MAINT,
|
||
/*
|
||
* Closing state - channel is shutting down
|
||
*
|
||
* Permitted transitions from:
|
||
* - CHANNEL_STATE_MAINT
|
||
* - CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN
|
||
* Permitted transitions to:
|
||
* - CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSED,
|
||
* - CHANNEL_STATE_ERROR
|
||
*/
|
||
CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSING,
|
||
/*
|
||
* Error state - channel has experienced a permanent error
|
||
*
|
||
* Permitted transitions from:
|
||
* - CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSING
|
||
* - CHANNEL_STATE_MAINT
|
||
* - CHANNEL_STATE_OPENING
|
||
* - CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN
|
||
* Permitted transitions to:
|
||
* - None
|
||
*/
|
||
CHANNEL_STATE_ERROR,
|
||
/*
|
||
* Placeholder for maximum state value
|
||
*/
|
||
CHANNEL_STATE_LAST
|
||
} channel_state_t;
|
||
|
||
/* channel listener states for channel_listener_t */
|
||
|
||
typedef enum {
|
||
/*
|
||
* Closed state - channel listener is inactive
|
||
*
|
||
* Permitted transitions from:
|
||
* - CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_CLOSING
|
||
* Permitted transitions to:
|
||
* - CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_LISTENING
|
||
*/
|
||
CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_CLOSED = 0,
|
||
/*
|
||
* Listening state - channel listener is listening for incoming
|
||
* connections
|
||
*
|
||
* Permitted transitions from:
|
||
* - CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_CLOSED
|
||
* Permitted transitions to:
|
||
* - CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_CLOSING
|
||
* - CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_ERROR
|
||
*/
|
||
CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_LISTENING,
|
||
/*
|
||
* Closing state - channel listener is shutting down
|
||
*
|
||
* Permitted transitions from:
|
||
* - CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_LISTENING
|
||
* Permitted transitions to:
|
||
* - CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_CLOSED,
|
||
* - CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_ERROR
|
||
*/
|
||
CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_CLOSING,
|
||
/*
|
||
* Error state - channel listener has experienced a permanent error
|
||
*
|
||
* Permitted transitions from:
|
||
* - CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSING
|
||
* - CHANNEL_STATE_LISTENING
|
||
* Permitted transitions to:
|
||
* - None
|
||
*/
|
||
CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_ERROR,
|
||
/*
|
||
* Placeholder for maximum state value
|
||
*/
|
||
CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_LAST
|
||
} channel_listener_state_t;
|
||
|
||
/* TLS channel stuff */
|
||
|
||
typedef struct channel_tls_s channel_tls_t;
|
||
|
||
/* circuitmux_t typedef; struct circuitmux_s is in circuitmux.h */
|
||
|
||
typedef struct circuitmux_s circuitmux_t;
|
||
|
||
/** Parsed onion routing cell. All communication between nodes
|
||
* is via cells. */
|
||
typedef struct cell_t {
|
||
circid_t circ_id; /**< Circuit which received the cell. */
|
||
uint8_t command; /**< Type of the cell: one of CELL_PADDING, CELL_CREATE,
|
||
* CELL_DESTROY, etc */
|
||
uint8_t payload[CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE]; /**< Cell body. */
|
||
} cell_t;
|
||
|
||
/** Parsed variable-length onion routing cell. */
|
||
typedef struct var_cell_t {
|
||
/** Type of the cell: CELL_VERSIONS, etc. */
|
||
uint8_t command;
|
||
/** Circuit thich received the cell */
|
||
circid_t circ_id;
|
||
/** Number of bytes actually stored in <b>payload</b> */
|
||
uint16_t payload_len;
|
||
/** Payload of this cell */
|
||
uint8_t payload[FLEXIBLE_ARRAY_MEMBER];
|
||
} var_cell_t;
|
||
|
||
/** A parsed Extended ORPort message. */
|
||
typedef struct ext_or_cmd_t {
|
||
uint16_t cmd; /** Command type */
|
||
uint16_t len; /** Body length */
|
||
char body[FLEXIBLE_ARRAY_MEMBER]; /** Message body */
|
||
} ext_or_cmd_t;
|
||
|
||
/** A cell as packed for writing to the network. */
|
||
typedef struct packed_cell_t {
|
||
/** Next cell queued on this circuit. */
|
||
TOR_SIMPLEQ_ENTRY(packed_cell_t) next;
|
||
char body[CELL_MAX_NETWORK_SIZE]; /**< Cell as packed for network. */
|
||
uint32_t inserted_time; /**< Time (in milliseconds since epoch, with high
|
||
* bits truncated) when this cell was inserted. */
|
||
} packed_cell_t;
|
||
|
||
/** A queue of cells on a circuit, waiting to be added to the
|
||
* or_connection_t's outbuf. */
|
||
typedef struct cell_queue_t {
|
||
/** Linked list of packed_cell_t*/
|
||
TOR_SIMPLEQ_HEAD(cell_simpleq, packed_cell_t) head;
|
||
int n; /**< The number of cells in the queue. */
|
||
} cell_queue_t;
|
||
|
||
/** Beginning of a RELAY cell payload. */
|
||
typedef struct {
|
||
uint8_t command; /**< The end-to-end relay command. */
|
||
uint16_t recognized; /**< Used to tell whether cell is for us. */
|
||
streamid_t stream_id; /**< Which stream is this cell associated with? */
|
||
char integrity[4]; /**< Used to tell whether cell is corrupted. */
|
||
uint16_t length; /**< How long is the payload body? */
|
||
} relay_header_t;
|
||
|
||
typedef struct buf_t buf_t;
|
||
typedef struct socks_request_t socks_request_t;
|
||
|
||
#define buf_t buf_t
|
||
|
||
typedef struct entry_port_cfg_t {
|
||
/* Client port types (socks, dns, trans, natd) only: */
|
||
uint8_t isolation_flags; /**< Zero or more isolation flags */
|
||
int session_group; /**< A session group, or -1 if this port is not in a
|
||
* session group. */
|
||
|
||
/* Socks only: */
|
||
/** When both no-auth and user/pass are advertised by a SOCKS client, select
|
||
* no-auth. */
|
||
unsigned int socks_prefer_no_auth : 1;
|
||
/** When ISO_SOCKSAUTH is in use, Keep-Alive circuits indefinitely. */
|
||
unsigned int socks_iso_keep_alive : 1;
|
||
|
||
/* Client port types only: */
|
||
unsigned int ipv4_traffic : 1;
|
||
unsigned int ipv6_traffic : 1;
|
||
unsigned int prefer_ipv6 : 1;
|
||
unsigned int dns_request : 1;
|
||
unsigned int onion_traffic : 1;
|
||
|
||
/** For a socks listener: should we cache IPv4/IPv6 DNS information that
|
||
* exit nodes tell us?
|
||
*
|
||
* @{ */
|
||
unsigned int cache_ipv4_answers : 1;
|
||
unsigned int cache_ipv6_answers : 1;
|
||
/** @} */
|
||
/** For a socks listeners: if we find an answer in our client-side DNS cache,
|
||
* should we use it?
|
||
*
|
||
* @{ */
|
||
unsigned int use_cached_ipv4_answers : 1;
|
||
unsigned int use_cached_ipv6_answers : 1;
|
||
/** @} */
|
||
/** For socks listeners: When we can automap an address to IPv4 or IPv6,
|
||
* do we prefer IPv6? */
|
||
unsigned int prefer_ipv6_virtaddr : 1;
|
||
|
||
} entry_port_cfg_t;
|
||
|
||
typedef struct server_port_cfg_t {
|
||
/* Server port types (or, dir) only: */
|
||
unsigned int no_advertise : 1;
|
||
unsigned int no_listen : 1;
|
||
unsigned int all_addrs : 1;
|
||
unsigned int bind_ipv4_only : 1;
|
||
unsigned int bind_ipv6_only : 1;
|
||
} server_port_cfg_t;
|
||
|
||
/* Values for connection_t.magic: used to make sure that downcasts (casts from
|
||
* connection_t to foo_connection_t) are safe. */
|
||
#define BASE_CONNECTION_MAGIC 0x7C3C304Eu
|
||
#define OR_CONNECTION_MAGIC 0x7D31FF03u
|
||
#define EDGE_CONNECTION_MAGIC 0xF0374013u
|
||
#define ENTRY_CONNECTION_MAGIC 0xbb4a5703
|
||
#define DIR_CONNECTION_MAGIC 0x9988ffeeu
|
||
#define CONTROL_CONNECTION_MAGIC 0x8abc765du
|
||
#define LISTENER_CONNECTION_MAGIC 0x1a1ac741u
|
||
|
||
/** Description of a connection to another host or process, and associated
|
||
* data.
|
||
*
|
||
* A connection is named based on what it's connected to -- an "OR
|
||
* connection" has a Tor node on the other end, an "exit
|
||
* connection" has a website or other server on the other end, and an
|
||
* "AP connection" has an application proxy (and thus a user) on the
|
||
* other end.
|
||
*
|
||
* Every connection has a type and a state. Connections never change
|
||
* their type, but can go through many state changes in their lifetime.
|
||
*
|
||
* Every connection has two associated input and output buffers.
|
||
* Listeners don't use them. For non-listener connections, incoming
|
||
* data is appended to conn->inbuf, and outgoing data is taken from
|
||
* conn->outbuf. Connections differ primarily in the functions called
|
||
* to fill and drain these buffers.
|
||
*/
|
||
typedef struct connection_t {
|
||
uint32_t magic; /**< For memory debugging: must equal one of
|
||
* *_CONNECTION_MAGIC. */
|
||
|
||
uint8_t state; /**< Current state of this connection. */
|
||
unsigned int type:5; /**< What kind of connection is this? */
|
||
unsigned int purpose:5; /**< Only used for DIR and EXIT types currently. */
|
||
|
||
/* The next fields are all one-bit booleans. Some are only applicable to
|
||
* connection subtypes, but we hold them here anyway, to save space.
|
||
*/
|
||
unsigned int read_blocked_on_bw:1; /**< Boolean: should we start reading
|
||
* again once the bandwidth throttler allows it? */
|
||
unsigned int write_blocked_on_bw:1; /**< Boolean: should we start writing
|
||
* again once the bandwidth throttler allows
|
||
* writes? */
|
||
unsigned int hold_open_until_flushed:1; /**< Despite this connection's being
|
||
* marked for close, do we flush it
|
||
* before closing it? */
|
||
unsigned int inbuf_reached_eof:1; /**< Boolean: did read() return 0 on this
|
||
* conn? */
|
||
/** Set to 1 when we're inside connection_flushed_some to keep us from
|
||
* calling connection_handle_write() recursively. */
|
||
unsigned int in_flushed_some:1;
|
||
/** True if connection_handle_write is currently running on this connection.
|
||
*/
|
||
unsigned int in_connection_handle_write:1;
|
||
|
||
/* For linked connections:
|
||
*/
|
||
unsigned int linked:1; /**< True if there is, or has been, a linked_conn. */
|
||
/** True iff we'd like to be notified about read events from the
|
||
* linked conn. */
|
||
unsigned int reading_from_linked_conn:1;
|
||
/** True iff we're willing to write to the linked conn. */
|
||
unsigned int writing_to_linked_conn:1;
|
||
/** True iff we're currently able to read on the linked conn, and our
|
||
* read_event should be made active with libevent. */
|
||
unsigned int active_on_link:1;
|
||
/** True iff we've called connection_close_immediate() on this linked
|
||
* connection. */
|
||
unsigned int linked_conn_is_closed:1;
|
||
|
||
/** CONNECT/SOCKS proxy client handshake state (for outgoing connections). */
|
||
unsigned int proxy_state:4;
|
||
|
||
/** Our socket; set to TOR_INVALID_SOCKET if this connection is closed,
|
||
* or has no socket. */
|
||
tor_socket_t s;
|
||
int conn_array_index; /**< Index into the global connection array. */
|
||
|
||
struct event *read_event; /**< Libevent event structure. */
|
||
struct event *write_event; /**< Libevent event structure. */
|
||
buf_t *inbuf; /**< Buffer holding data read over this connection. */
|
||
buf_t *outbuf; /**< Buffer holding data to write over this connection. */
|
||
size_t outbuf_flushlen; /**< How much data should we try to flush from the
|
||
* outbuf? */
|
||
time_t timestamp_lastread; /**< When was the last time libevent said we could
|
||
* read? */
|
||
time_t timestamp_lastwritten; /**< When was the last time libevent said we
|
||
* could write? */
|
||
|
||
time_t timestamp_created; /**< When was this connection_t created? */
|
||
|
||
int socket_family; /**< Address family of this connection's socket. Usually
|
||
* AF_INET, but it can also be AF_UNIX, or AF_INET6 */
|
||
tor_addr_t addr; /**< IP that socket "s" is directly connected to;
|
||
* may be the IP address for a proxy or pluggable transport,
|
||
* see "address" for the address of the final destination.
|
||
*/
|
||
uint16_t port; /**< If non-zero, port that socket "s" is directly connected
|
||
* to; may be the port for a proxy or pluggable transport,
|
||
* see "address" for the port at the final destination. */
|
||
uint16_t marked_for_close; /**< Should we close this conn on the next
|
||
* iteration of the main loop? (If true, holds
|
||
* the line number where this connection was
|
||
* marked.) */
|
||
const char *marked_for_close_file; /**< For debugging: in which file were
|
||
* we marked for close? */
|
||
char *address; /**< FQDN (or IP) and port of the final destination for this
|
||
* connection; this is always the remote address, it is
|
||
* passed to a proxy or pluggable transport if one in use.
|
||
* See "addr" and "port" for the address that socket "s" is
|
||
* directly connected to.
|
||
* strdup into this, because free_connection() frees it. */
|
||
/** Another connection that's connected to this one in lieu of a socket. */
|
||
struct connection_t *linked_conn;
|
||
|
||
/** Unique identifier for this connection on this Tor instance. */
|
||
uint64_t global_identifier;
|
||
|
||
/** Bytes read since last call to control_event_conn_bandwidth_used().
|
||
* Only used if we're configured to emit CONN_BW events. */
|
||
uint32_t n_read_conn_bw;
|
||
|
||
/** Bytes written since last call to control_event_conn_bandwidth_used().
|
||
* Only used if we're configured to emit CONN_BW events. */
|
||
uint32_t n_written_conn_bw;
|
||
} connection_t;
|
||
|
||
/** Subtype of connection_t; used for a listener socket. */
|
||
typedef struct listener_connection_t {
|
||
connection_t base_;
|
||
|
||
/** If the connection is a CONN_TYPE_AP_DNS_LISTENER, this field points
|
||
* to the evdns_server_port it uses to listen to and answer connections. */
|
||
struct evdns_server_port *dns_server_port;
|
||
|
||
entry_port_cfg_t entry_cfg;
|
||
|
||
} listener_connection_t;
|
||
|
||
/** Minimum length of the random part of an AUTH_CHALLENGE cell. */
|
||
#define OR_AUTH_CHALLENGE_LEN 32
|
||
|
||
/**
|
||
* @name Certificate types for CERTS cells.
|
||
*
|
||
* These values are defined by the protocol, and affect how an X509
|
||
* certificate in a CERTS cell is interpreted and used.
|
||
*
|
||
* @{ */
|
||
/** A certificate that authenticates a TLS link key. The subject key
|
||
* must match the key used in the TLS handshake; it must be signed by
|
||
* the identity key. */
|
||
#define OR_CERT_TYPE_TLS_LINK 1
|
||
/** A self-signed identity certificate. The subject key must be a
|
||
* 1024-bit RSA key. */
|
||
#define OR_CERT_TYPE_ID_1024 2
|
||
/** A certificate that authenticates a key used in an AUTHENTICATE cell
|
||
* in the v3 handshake. The subject key must be a 1024-bit RSA key; it
|
||
* must be signed by the identity key */
|
||
#define OR_CERT_TYPE_AUTH_1024 3
|
||
/* DOCDOC */
|
||
#define OR_CERT_TYPE_RSA_ED_CROSSCERT 7
|
||
/**@}*/
|
||
|
||
/** The first supported type of AUTHENTICATE cell. It contains
|
||
* a bunch of structures signed with an RSA1024 key. The signed
|
||
* structures include a HMAC using negotiated TLS secrets, and a digest
|
||
* of all cells sent or received before the AUTHENTICATE cell (including
|
||
* the random server-generated AUTH_CHALLENGE cell).
|
||
*/
|
||
#define AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET 1
|
||
/** As AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET, but instead of using the
|
||
* negotiated TLS secrets, uses exported keying material from the TLS
|
||
* session as described in RFC 5705.
|
||
*
|
||
* Not used by today's tors, since everything that supports this
|
||
* also supports ED25519_SHA3_5705, which is better.
|
||
**/
|
||
#define AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_RFC5705 2
|
||
/** As AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_RFC5705, but uses an Ed25519 identity key to
|
||
* authenticate. */
|
||
#define AUTHTYPE_ED25519_SHA256_RFC5705 3
|
||
/*
|
||
* NOTE: authchallenge_type_is_better() relies on these AUTHTYPE codes
|
||
* being sorted in order of preference. If we someday add one with
|
||
* a higher numerical value that we don't like as much, we should revise
|
||
* authchallenge_type_is_better().
|
||
*/
|
||
|
||
/** The length of the part of the AUTHENTICATE cell body that the client and
|
||
* server can generate independently (when using RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET). It
|
||
* contains everything except the client's timestamp, the client's randomly
|
||
* generated nonce, and the signature. */
|
||
#define V3_AUTH_FIXED_PART_LEN (8+(32*6))
|
||
/** The length of the part of the AUTHENTICATE cell body that the client
|
||
* signs. */
|
||
#define V3_AUTH_BODY_LEN (V3_AUTH_FIXED_PART_LEN + 8 + 16)
|
||
|
||
/** Structure to hold all the certificates we've received on an OR connection
|
||
*/
|
||
typedef struct or_handshake_certs_t {
|
||
/** True iff we originated this connection. */
|
||
int started_here;
|
||
/** The cert for the 'auth' RSA key that's supposed to sign the AUTHENTICATE
|
||
* cell. Signed with the RSA identity key. */
|
||
tor_x509_cert_t *auth_cert;
|
||
/** The cert for the 'link' RSA key that was used to negotiate the TLS
|
||
* connection. Signed with the RSA identity key. */
|
||
tor_x509_cert_t *link_cert;
|
||
/** A self-signed identity certificate: the RSA identity key signed
|
||
* with itself. */
|
||
tor_x509_cert_t *id_cert;
|
||
/** The Ed25519 signing key, signed with the Ed25519 identity key. */
|
||
struct tor_cert_st *ed_id_sign;
|
||
/** A digest of the X509 link certificate for the TLS connection, signed
|
||
* with the Ed25519 siging key. */
|
||
struct tor_cert_st *ed_sign_link;
|
||
/** The Ed25519 authentication key (that's supposed to sign an AUTHENTICATE
|
||
* cell) , signed with the Ed25519 siging key. */
|
||
struct tor_cert_st *ed_sign_auth;
|
||
/** The Ed25519 identity key, crosssigned with the RSA identity key. */
|
||
uint8_t *ed_rsa_crosscert;
|
||
/** The length of <b>ed_rsa_crosscert</b> in bytes */
|
||
size_t ed_rsa_crosscert_len;
|
||
} or_handshake_certs_t;
|
||
|
||
/** Stores flags and information related to the portion of a v2/v3 Tor OR
|
||
* connection handshake that happens after the TLS handshake is finished.
|
||
*/
|
||
typedef struct or_handshake_state_t {
|
||
/** When was the VERSIONS cell sent on this connection? Used to get
|
||
* an estimate of the skew in the returning NETINFO reply. */
|
||
time_t sent_versions_at;
|
||
/** True iff we originated this connection */
|
||
unsigned int started_here : 1;
|
||
/** True iff we have received and processed a VERSIONS cell. */
|
||
unsigned int received_versions : 1;
|
||
/** True iff we have received and processed an AUTH_CHALLENGE cell */
|
||
unsigned int received_auth_challenge : 1;
|
||
/** True iff we have received and processed a CERTS cell. */
|
||
unsigned int received_certs_cell : 1;
|
||
/** True iff we have received and processed an AUTHENTICATE cell */
|
||
unsigned int received_authenticate : 1;
|
||
|
||
/* True iff we've received valid authentication to some identity. */
|
||
unsigned int authenticated : 1;
|
||
unsigned int authenticated_rsa : 1;
|
||
unsigned int authenticated_ed25519 : 1;
|
||
|
||
/* True iff we have sent a netinfo cell */
|
||
unsigned int sent_netinfo : 1;
|
||
|
||
/** The signing->ed25519 link certificate corresponding to the x509
|
||
* certificate we used on the TLS connection (if this is a server-side
|
||
* connection). We make a copy of this here to prevent a race condition
|
||
* caused by TLS context rotation. */
|
||
struct tor_cert_st *own_link_cert;
|
||
|
||
/** True iff we should feed outgoing cells into digest_sent and
|
||
* digest_received respectively.
|
||
*
|
||
* From the server's side of the v3 handshake, we want to capture everything
|
||
* from the VERSIONS cell through and including the AUTH_CHALLENGE cell.
|
||
* From the client's, we want to capture everything from the VERSIONS cell
|
||
* through but *not* including the AUTHENTICATE cell.
|
||
*
|
||
* @{ */
|
||
unsigned int digest_sent_data : 1;
|
||
unsigned int digest_received_data : 1;
|
||
/**@}*/
|
||
|
||
/** Identity RSA digest that we have received and authenticated for our peer
|
||
* on this connection. */
|
||
uint8_t authenticated_rsa_peer_id[DIGEST_LEN];
|
||
/** Identity Ed25519 public key that we have received and authenticated for
|
||
* our peer on this connection. */
|
||
ed25519_public_key_t authenticated_ed25519_peer_id;
|
||
|
||
/** Digests of the cells that we have sent or received as part of a V3
|
||
* handshake. Used for making and checking AUTHENTICATE cells.
|
||
*
|
||
* @{
|
||
*/
|
||
crypto_digest_t *digest_sent;
|
||
crypto_digest_t *digest_received;
|
||
/** @} */
|
||
|
||
/** Certificates that a connection initiator sent us in a CERTS cell; we're
|
||
* holding on to them until we get an AUTHENTICATE cell.
|
||
*/
|
||
or_handshake_certs_t *certs;
|
||
} or_handshake_state_t;
|
||
|
||
/** Length of Extended ORPort connection identifier. */
|
||
#define EXT_OR_CONN_ID_LEN DIGEST_LEN /* 20 */
|
||
/*
|
||
* OR_CONN_HIGHWATER and OR_CONN_LOWWATER moved from connection_or.c so
|
||
* channeltls.c can see them too.
|
||
*/
|
||
|
||
/** When adding cells to an OR connection's outbuf, keep adding until the
|
||
* outbuf is at least this long, or we run out of cells. */
|
||
#define OR_CONN_HIGHWATER (32*1024)
|
||
|
||
/** Add cells to an OR connection's outbuf whenever the outbuf's data length
|
||
* drops below this size. */
|
||
#define OR_CONN_LOWWATER (16*1024)
|
||
|
||
/** Subtype of connection_t for an "OR connection" -- that is, one that speaks
|
||
* cells over TLS. */
|
||
typedef struct or_connection_t {
|
||
connection_t base_;
|
||
|
||
/** Hash of the public RSA key for the other side's identity key, or zeroes
|
||
* if the other side hasn't shown us a valid identity key. */
|
||
char identity_digest[DIGEST_LEN];
|
||
|
||
/** Extended ORPort connection identifier. */
|
||
char *ext_or_conn_id;
|
||
/** This is the ClientHash value we expect to receive from the
|
||
* client during the Extended ORPort authentication protocol. We
|
||
* compute it upon receiving the ClientNoce from the client, and we
|
||
* compare it with the acual ClientHash value sent by the
|
||
* client. */
|
||
char *ext_or_auth_correct_client_hash;
|
||
/** String carrying the name of the pluggable transport
|
||
* (e.g. "obfs2") that is obfuscating this connection. If no
|
||
* pluggable transports are used, it's NULL. */
|
||
char *ext_or_transport;
|
||
|
||
char *nickname; /**< Nickname of OR on other side (if any). */
|
||
|
||
tor_tls_t *tls; /**< TLS connection state. */
|
||
int tls_error; /**< Last tor_tls error code. */
|
||
/** When we last used this conn for any client traffic. If not
|
||
* recent, we can rate limit it further. */
|
||
|
||
/* Channel using this connection */
|
||
channel_tls_t *chan;
|
||
|
||
tor_addr_t real_addr; /**< The actual address that this connection came from
|
||
* or went to. The <b>addr</b> field is prone to
|
||
* getting overridden by the address from the router
|
||
* descriptor matching <b>identity_digest</b>. */
|
||
|
||
/** Should this connection be used for extending circuits to the server
|
||
* matching the <b>identity_digest</b> field? Set to true if we're pretty
|
||
* sure we aren't getting MITMed, either because we're connected to an
|
||
* address listed in a server descriptor, or because an authenticated
|
||
* NETINFO cell listed the address we're connected to as recognized. */
|
||
unsigned int is_canonical:1;
|
||
|
||
/** True iff this is an outgoing connection. */
|
||
unsigned int is_outgoing:1;
|
||
unsigned int proxy_type:2; /**< One of PROXY_NONE...PROXY_SOCKS5 */
|
||
unsigned int wide_circ_ids:1;
|
||
/** True iff this connection has had its bootstrap failure logged with
|
||
* control_event_bootstrap_problem. */
|
||
unsigned int have_noted_bootstrap_problem:1;
|
||
|
||
uint16_t link_proto; /**< What protocol version are we using? 0 for
|
||
* "none negotiated yet." */
|
||
uint16_t idle_timeout; /**< How long can this connection sit with no
|
||
* circuits on it before we close it? Based on
|
||
* IDLE_CIRCUIT_TIMEOUT_{NON,}CANONICAL and
|
||
* on is_canonical, randomized. */
|
||
or_handshake_state_t *handshake_state; /**< If we are setting this connection
|
||
* up, state information to do so. */
|
||
|
||
time_t timestamp_lastempty; /**< When was the outbuf last completely empty?*/
|
||
|
||
/* bandwidth* and *_bucket only used by ORs in OPEN state: */
|
||
int bandwidthrate; /**< Bytes/s added to the bucket. (OPEN ORs only.) */
|
||
int bandwidthburst; /**< Max bucket size for this conn. (OPEN ORs only.) */
|
||
int read_bucket; /**< When this hits 0, stop receiving. Every second we
|
||
* add 'bandwidthrate' to this, capping it at
|
||
* bandwidthburst. (OPEN ORs only) */
|
||
int write_bucket; /**< When this hits 0, stop writing. Like read_bucket. */
|
||
|
||
/** Last emptied read token bucket in msec since midnight; only used if
|
||
* TB_EMPTY events are enabled. */
|
||
uint32_t read_emptied_time;
|
||
/** Last emptied write token bucket in msec since midnight; only used if
|
||
* TB_EMPTY events are enabled. */
|
||
uint32_t write_emptied_time;
|
||
|
||
/*
|
||
* Count the number of bytes flushed out on this orconn, and the number of
|
||
* bytes TLS actually sent - used for overhead estimation for scheduling.
|
||
*/
|
||
uint64_t bytes_xmitted, bytes_xmitted_by_tls;
|
||
} or_connection_t;
|
||
|
||
/** Subtype of connection_t for an "edge connection" -- that is, an entry (ap)
|
||
* connection, or an exit. */
|
||
typedef struct edge_connection_t {
|
||
connection_t base_;
|
||
|
||
struct edge_connection_t *next_stream; /**< Points to the next stream at this
|
||
* edge, if any */
|
||
int package_window; /**< How many more relay cells can I send into the
|
||
* circuit? */
|
||
int deliver_window; /**< How many more relay cells can end at me? */
|
||
|
||
struct circuit_t *on_circuit; /**< The circuit (if any) that this edge
|
||
* connection is using. */
|
||
|
||
/** A pointer to which node in the circ this conn exits at. Set for AP
|
||
* connections and for hidden service exit connections. */
|
||
struct crypt_path_t *cpath_layer;
|
||
/** What rendezvous service are we querying for (if an AP) or providing (if
|
||
* an exit)? */
|
||
rend_data_t *rend_data;
|
||
|
||
uint32_t address_ttl; /**< TTL for address-to-addr mapping on exit
|
||
* connection. Exit connections only. */
|
||
uint32_t begincell_flags; /** Flags sent or received in the BEGIN cell
|
||
* for this connection */
|
||
|
||
streamid_t stream_id; /**< The stream ID used for this edge connection on its
|
||
* circuit */
|
||
|
||
/** The reason why this connection is closing; passed to the controller. */
|
||
uint16_t end_reason;
|
||
|
||
/** Bytes read since last call to control_event_stream_bandwidth_used() */
|
||
uint32_t n_read;
|
||
|
||
/** Bytes written since last call to control_event_stream_bandwidth_used() */
|
||
uint32_t n_written;
|
||
|
||
/** True iff this connection is for a DNS request only. */
|
||
unsigned int is_dns_request:1;
|
||
/** True iff this connection is for a PTR DNS request. (exit only) */
|
||
unsigned int is_reverse_dns_lookup:1;
|
||
|
||
unsigned int edge_has_sent_end:1; /**< For debugging; only used on edge
|
||
* connections. Set once we've set the stream end,
|
||
* and check in connection_about_to_close_connection().
|
||
*/
|
||
/** True iff we've blocked reading until the circuit has fewer queued
|
||
* cells. */
|
||
unsigned int edge_blocked_on_circ:1;
|
||
|
||
/** Unique ID for directory requests; this used to be in connection_t, but
|
||
* that's going away and being used on channels instead. We still tag
|
||
* edge connections with dirreq_id from circuits, so it's copied here. */
|
||
uint64_t dirreq_id;
|
||
} edge_connection_t;
|
||
|
||
/** Subtype of edge_connection_t for an "entry connection" -- that is, a SOCKS
|
||
* connection, a DNS request, a TransPort connection or a NATD connection */
|
||
typedef struct entry_connection_t {
|
||
edge_connection_t edge_;
|
||
|
||
/** Nickname of planned exit node -- used with .exit support. */
|
||
/* XXX prop220: we need to make chosen_exit_name able to encode Ed IDs too.
|
||
* That's logically part of the UI parts for prop220 though. */
|
||
char *chosen_exit_name;
|
||
|
||
socks_request_t *socks_request; /**< SOCKS structure describing request (AP
|
||
* only.) */
|
||
|
||
/* === Isolation related, AP only. === */
|
||
entry_port_cfg_t entry_cfg;
|
||
/** AP only: The newnym epoch in which we created this connection. */
|
||
unsigned nym_epoch;
|
||
|
||
/** AP only: The original requested address before we rewrote it. */
|
||
char *original_dest_address;
|
||
/* Other fields to isolate on already exist. The ClientAddr is addr. The
|
||
ClientProtocol is a combination of type and socks_request->
|
||
socks_version. SocksAuth is socks_request->username/password.
|
||
DestAddr is in socks_request->address. */
|
||
|
||
/** Number of times we've reassigned this application connection to
|
||
* a new circuit. We keep track because the timeout is longer if we've
|
||
* already retried several times. */
|
||
uint8_t num_socks_retries;
|
||
|
||
/** For AP connections only: buffer for data that we have sent
|
||
* optimistically, which we might need to re-send if we have to
|
||
* retry this connection. */
|
||
buf_t *pending_optimistic_data;
|
||
/* For AP connections only: buffer for data that we previously sent
|
||
* optimistically which we are currently re-sending as we retry this
|
||
* connection. */
|
||
buf_t *sending_optimistic_data;
|
||
|
||
/** If this is a DNSPort connection, this field holds the pending DNS
|
||
* request that we're going to try to answer. */
|
||
struct evdns_server_request *dns_server_request;
|
||
|
||
#define DEBUGGING_17659
|
||
|
||
#ifdef DEBUGGING_17659
|
||
uint16_t marked_pending_circ_line;
|
||
const char *marked_pending_circ_file;
|
||
#endif
|
||
|
||
#define NUM_CIRCUITS_LAUNCHED_THRESHOLD 10
|
||
/** Number of times we've launched a circuit to handle this stream. If
|
||
* it gets too high, that could indicate an inconsistency between our
|
||
* "launch a circuit to handle this stream" logic and our "attach our
|
||
* stream to one of the available circuits" logic. */
|
||
unsigned int num_circuits_launched:4;
|
||
|
||
/** True iff this stream must attach to a one-hop circuit (e.g. for
|
||
* begin_dir). */
|
||
unsigned int want_onehop:1;
|
||
/** True iff this stream should use a BEGIN_DIR relay command to establish
|
||
* itself rather than BEGIN (either via onehop or via a whole circuit). */
|
||
unsigned int use_begindir:1;
|
||
|
||
/** For AP connections only. If 1, and we fail to reach the chosen exit,
|
||
* stop requiring it. */
|
||
unsigned int chosen_exit_optional:1;
|
||
/** For AP connections only. If non-zero, this exit node was picked as
|
||
* a result of the TrackHostExit, and the value decrements every time
|
||
* we fail to complete a circuit to our chosen exit -- if it reaches
|
||
* zero, abandon the associated mapaddress. */
|
||
unsigned int chosen_exit_retries:3;
|
||
|
||
/** True iff this is an AP connection that came from a transparent or
|
||
* NATd connection */
|
||
unsigned int is_transparent_ap:1;
|
||
|
||
/** For AP connections only: Set if this connection's target exit node
|
||
* allows optimistic data (that is, data sent on this stream before
|
||
* the exit has sent a CONNECTED cell) and we have chosen to use it.
|
||
*/
|
||
unsigned int may_use_optimistic_data : 1;
|
||
|
||
/** Are we a socks SocksSocket listener? */
|
||
unsigned int is_socks_socket:1;
|
||
} entry_connection_t;
|
||
|
||
/** Subtype of connection_t for an "directory connection" -- that is, an HTTP
|
||
* connection to retrieve or serve directory material. */
|
||
typedef struct dir_connection_t {
|
||
connection_t base_;
|
||
|
||
/** Which 'resource' did we ask the directory for? This is typically the part
|
||
* of the URL string that defines, relative to the directory conn purpose,
|
||
* what thing we want. For example, in router descriptor downloads by
|
||
* descriptor digest, it contains "d/", then one or more +-separated
|
||
* fingerprints.
|
||
**/
|
||
char *requested_resource;
|
||
unsigned int dirconn_direct:1; /**< Is this dirconn direct, or via Tor? */
|
||
|
||
/** If we're fetching descriptors, what router purpose shall we assign
|
||
* to them? */
|
||
uint8_t router_purpose;
|
||
|
||
/** List of spooled_resource_t for objects that we're spooling. We use
|
||
* it from back to front. */
|
||
smartlist_t *spool;
|
||
/** The compression object doing on-the-fly compression for spooled data. */
|
||
tor_compress_state_t *compress_state;
|
||
|
||
/** What rendezvous service are we querying for? */
|
||
rend_data_t *rend_data;
|
||
|
||
/** If this is a one-hop connection, tracks the state of the directory guard
|
||
* for this connection (if any). */
|
||
struct circuit_guard_state_t *guard_state;
|
||
|
||
char identity_digest[DIGEST_LEN]; /**< Hash of the public RSA key for
|
||
* the directory server's signing key. */
|
||
|
||
/** Unique ID for directory requests; this used to be in connection_t, but
|
||
* that's going away and being used on channels instead. The dirserver still
|
||
* needs this for the incoming side, so it's moved here. */
|
||
uint64_t dirreq_id;
|
||
|
||
#ifdef MEASUREMENTS_21206
|
||
/** Number of RELAY_DATA cells received. */
|
||
uint32_t data_cells_received;
|
||
|
||
/** Number of RELAY_DATA cells sent. */
|
||
uint32_t data_cells_sent;
|
||
#endif
|
||
} dir_connection_t;
|
||
|
||
/** Subtype of connection_t for an connection to a controller. */
|
||
typedef struct control_connection_t {
|
||
connection_t base_;
|
||
|
||
uint64_t event_mask; /**< Bitfield: which events does this controller
|
||
* care about?
|
||
* EVENT_MAX_ is >31, so we need a 64 bit mask */
|
||
|
||
/** True if we have sent a protocolinfo reply on this connection. */
|
||
unsigned int have_sent_protocolinfo:1;
|
||
/** True if we have received a takeownership command on this
|
||
* connection. */
|
||
unsigned int is_owning_control_connection:1;
|
||
|
||
/** List of ephemeral onion services belonging to this connection. */
|
||
smartlist_t *ephemeral_onion_services;
|
||
|
||
/** If we have sent an AUTHCHALLENGE reply on this connection and
|
||
* have not received a successful AUTHENTICATE command, points to
|
||
* the value which the client must send to authenticate itself;
|
||
* otherwise, NULL. */
|
||
char *safecookie_client_hash;
|
||
|
||
/** Amount of space allocated in incoming_cmd. */
|
||
uint32_t incoming_cmd_len;
|
||
/** Number of bytes currently stored in incoming_cmd. */
|
||
uint32_t incoming_cmd_cur_len;
|
||
/** A control command that we're reading from the inbuf, but which has not
|
||
* yet arrived completely. */
|
||
char *incoming_cmd;
|
||
} control_connection_t;
|
||
|
||
/** Cast a connection_t subtype pointer to a connection_t **/
|
||
#define TO_CONN(c) (&(((c)->base_)))
|
||
|
||
/** Cast a entry_connection_t subtype pointer to a edge_connection_t **/
|
||
#define ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(c) (&(((c))->edge_))
|
||
/** Cast a entry_connection_t subtype pointer to a connection_t **/
|
||
#define ENTRY_TO_CONN(c) (TO_CONN(ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(c)))
|
||
|
||
/** Convert a connection_t* to an or_connection_t*; assert if the cast is
|
||
* invalid. */
|
||
static or_connection_t *TO_OR_CONN(connection_t *);
|
||
/** Convert a connection_t* to a dir_connection_t*; assert if the cast is
|
||
* invalid. */
|
||
static dir_connection_t *TO_DIR_CONN(connection_t *);
|
||
/** Convert a connection_t* to an edge_connection_t*; assert if the cast is
|
||
* invalid. */
|
||
static edge_connection_t *TO_EDGE_CONN(connection_t *);
|
||
/** Convert a connection_t* to an entry_connection_t*; assert if the cast is
|
||
* invalid. */
|
||
static entry_connection_t *TO_ENTRY_CONN(connection_t *);
|
||
/** Convert a edge_connection_t* to an entry_connection_t*; assert if the cast
|
||
* is invalid. */
|
||
static entry_connection_t *EDGE_TO_ENTRY_CONN(edge_connection_t *);
|
||
/** Convert a connection_t* to an control_connection_t*; assert if the cast is
|
||
* invalid. */
|
||
static control_connection_t *TO_CONTROL_CONN(connection_t *);
|
||
/** Convert a connection_t* to an listener_connection_t*; assert if the cast is
|
||
* invalid. */
|
||
static listener_connection_t *TO_LISTENER_CONN(connection_t *);
|
||
|
||
static inline or_connection_t *TO_OR_CONN(connection_t *c)
|
||
{
|
||
tor_assert(c->magic == OR_CONNECTION_MAGIC);
|
||
return DOWNCAST(or_connection_t, c);
|
||
}
|
||
static inline dir_connection_t *TO_DIR_CONN(connection_t *c)
|
||
{
|
||
tor_assert(c->magic == DIR_CONNECTION_MAGIC);
|
||
return DOWNCAST(dir_connection_t, c);
|
||
}
|
||
static inline edge_connection_t *TO_EDGE_CONN(connection_t *c)
|
||
{
|
||
tor_assert(c->magic == EDGE_CONNECTION_MAGIC ||
|
||
c->magic == ENTRY_CONNECTION_MAGIC);
|
||
return DOWNCAST(edge_connection_t, c);
|
||
}
|
||
static inline entry_connection_t *TO_ENTRY_CONN(connection_t *c)
|
||
{
|
||
tor_assert(c->magic == ENTRY_CONNECTION_MAGIC);
|
||
return (entry_connection_t*) SUBTYPE_P(c, entry_connection_t, edge_.base_);
|
||
}
|
||
static inline entry_connection_t *EDGE_TO_ENTRY_CONN(edge_connection_t *c)
|
||
{
|
||
tor_assert(c->base_.magic == ENTRY_CONNECTION_MAGIC);
|
||
return (entry_connection_t*) SUBTYPE_P(c, entry_connection_t, edge_);
|
||
}
|
||
static inline control_connection_t *TO_CONTROL_CONN(connection_t *c)
|
||
{
|
||
tor_assert(c->magic == CONTROL_CONNECTION_MAGIC);
|
||
return DOWNCAST(control_connection_t, c);
|
||
}
|
||
static inline listener_connection_t *TO_LISTENER_CONN(connection_t *c)
|
||
{
|
||
tor_assert(c->magic == LISTENER_CONNECTION_MAGIC);
|
||
return DOWNCAST(listener_connection_t, c);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/** What action type does an address policy indicate: accept or reject? */
|
||
typedef enum {
|
||
ADDR_POLICY_ACCEPT=1,
|
||
ADDR_POLICY_REJECT=2,
|
||
} addr_policy_action_t;
|
||
#define addr_policy_action_bitfield_t ENUM_BF(addr_policy_action_t)
|
||
|
||
/** A reference-counted address policy rule. */
|
||
typedef struct addr_policy_t {
|
||
int refcnt; /**< Reference count */
|
||
/** What to do when the policy matches.*/
|
||
addr_policy_action_bitfield_t policy_type:2;
|
||
unsigned int is_private:1; /**< True iff this is the pseudo-address,
|
||
* "private". */
|
||
unsigned int is_canonical:1; /**< True iff this policy is the canonical
|
||
* copy (stored in a hash table to avoid
|
||
* duplication of common policies) */
|
||
maskbits_t maskbits; /**< Accept/reject all addresses <b>a</b> such that the
|
||
* first <b>maskbits</b> bits of <b>a</b> match
|
||
* <b>addr</b>. */
|
||
/** Base address to accept or reject.
|
||
*
|
||
* Note that wildcards are treated
|
||
* differntly depending on address family. An AF_UNSPEC address means
|
||
* "All addresses, IPv4 or IPv6." An AF_INET address with maskbits==0 means
|
||
* "All IPv4 addresses" and an AF_INET6 address with maskbits == 0 means
|
||
* "All IPv6 addresses".
|
||
**/
|
||
tor_addr_t addr;
|
||
uint16_t prt_min; /**< Lowest port number to accept/reject. */
|
||
uint16_t prt_max; /**< Highest port number to accept/reject. */
|
||
} addr_policy_t;
|
||
|
||
/** A cached_dir_t represents a cacheable directory object, along with its
|
||
* compressed form. */
|
||
typedef struct cached_dir_t {
|
||
char *dir; /**< Contents of this object, NUL-terminated. */
|
||
char *dir_compressed; /**< Compressed contents of this object. */
|
||
size_t dir_len; /**< Length of <b>dir</b> (not counting its NUL). */
|
||
size_t dir_compressed_len; /**< Length of <b>dir_compressed</b>. */
|
||
time_t published; /**< When was this object published. */
|
||
common_digests_t digests; /**< Digests of this object (networkstatus only) */
|
||
/** Sha3 digest (also ns only) */
|
||
uint8_t digest_sha3_as_signed[DIGEST256_LEN];
|
||
int refcnt; /**< Reference count for this cached_dir_t. */
|
||
} cached_dir_t;
|
||
|
||
/** Enum used to remember where a signed_descriptor_t is stored and how to
|
||
* manage the memory for signed_descriptor_body. */
|
||
typedef enum {
|
||
/** The descriptor isn't stored on disk at all: the copy in memory is
|
||
* canonical; the saved_offset field is meaningless. */
|
||
SAVED_NOWHERE=0,
|
||
/** The descriptor is stored in the cached_routers file: the
|
||
* signed_descriptor_body is meaningless; the signed_descriptor_len and
|
||
* saved_offset are used to index into the mmaped cache file. */
|
||
SAVED_IN_CACHE,
|
||
/** The descriptor is stored in the cached_routers.new file: the
|
||
* signed_descriptor_body and saved_offset fields are both set. */
|
||
/* FFFF (We could also mmap the file and grow the mmap as needed, or
|
||
* lazy-load the descriptor text by using seek and read. We don't, for
|
||
* now.)
|
||
*/
|
||
SAVED_IN_JOURNAL
|
||
} saved_location_t;
|
||
#define saved_location_bitfield_t ENUM_BF(saved_location_t)
|
||
|
||
/** Enumeration: what directory object is being downloaded?
|
||
* This determines which schedule is selected to perform the download. */
|
||
typedef enum {
|
||
DL_SCHED_GENERIC = 0,
|
||
DL_SCHED_CONSENSUS = 1,
|
||
DL_SCHED_BRIDGE = 2,
|
||
} download_schedule_t;
|
||
#define download_schedule_bitfield_t ENUM_BF(download_schedule_t)
|
||
|
||
/** Enumeration: is the download schedule for downloading from an authority,
|
||
* or from any available directory mirror?
|
||
* During bootstrap, "any" means a fallback (or an authority, if there
|
||
* are no fallbacks).
|
||
* When we have a valid consensus, "any" means any directory server. */
|
||
typedef enum {
|
||
DL_WANT_ANY_DIRSERVER = 0,
|
||
DL_WANT_AUTHORITY = 1,
|
||
} download_want_authority_t;
|
||
#define download_want_authority_bitfield_t \
|
||
ENUM_BF(download_want_authority_t)
|
||
|
||
/** Enumeration: do we want to increment the schedule position each time a
|
||
* connection is attempted (these attempts can be concurrent), or do we want
|
||
* to increment the schedule position after a connection fails? */
|
||
typedef enum {
|
||
DL_SCHED_INCREMENT_FAILURE = 0,
|
||
DL_SCHED_INCREMENT_ATTEMPT = 1,
|
||
} download_schedule_increment_t;
|
||
#define download_schedule_increment_bitfield_t \
|
||
ENUM_BF(download_schedule_increment_t)
|
||
|
||
/** Enumeration: do we want to use the random exponential backoff
|
||
* mechanism? */
|
||
typedef enum {
|
||
DL_SCHED_DETERMINISTIC = 0,
|
||
DL_SCHED_RANDOM_EXPONENTIAL = 1,
|
||
} download_schedule_backoff_t;
|
||
#define download_schedule_backoff_bitfield_t \
|
||
ENUM_BF(download_schedule_backoff_t)
|
||
|
||
/** Information about our plans for retrying downloads for a downloadable
|
||
* directory object.
|
||
* Each type of downloadable directory object has a corresponding retry
|
||
* <b>schedule</b>, which can be different depending on whether the object is
|
||
* being downloaded from an authority or a mirror (<b>want_authority</b>).
|
||
* <b>next_attempt_at</b> contains the next time we will attempt to download
|
||
* the object.
|
||
* For schedules that <b>increment_on</b> failure, <b>n_download_failures</b>
|
||
* is used to determine the position in the schedule. (Each schedule is a
|
||
* smartlist of integer delays, parsed from a CSV option.) Every time a
|
||
* connection attempt fails, <b>n_download_failures</b> is incremented,
|
||
* the new delay value is looked up from the schedule, and
|
||
* <b>next_attempt_at</b> is set delay seconds from the time the previous
|
||
* connection failed. Therefore, at most one failure-based connection can be
|
||
* in progress for each download_status_t.
|
||
* For schedules that <b>increment_on</b> attempt, <b>n_download_attempts</b>
|
||
* is used to determine the position in the schedule. Every time a
|
||
* connection attempt is made, <b>n_download_attempts</b> is incremented,
|
||
* the new delay value is looked up from the schedule, and
|
||
* <b>next_attempt_at</b> is set delay seconds from the time the previous
|
||
* connection was attempted. Therefore, multiple concurrent attempted-based
|
||
* connections can be in progress for each download_status_t.
|
||
* After an object is successfully downloaded, any other concurrent connections
|
||
* are terminated. A new schedule which starts at position 0 is used for
|
||
* subsequent downloads of the same object.
|
||
*/
|
||
typedef struct download_status_t {
|
||
time_t next_attempt_at; /**< When should we try downloading this object
|
||
* again? */
|
||
uint8_t n_download_failures; /**< Number of failed downloads of the most
|
||
* recent object, since the last success. */
|
||
uint8_t n_download_attempts; /**< Number of (potentially concurrent) attempts
|
||
* to download the most recent object, since
|
||
* the last success. */
|
||
download_schedule_bitfield_t schedule : 8; /**< What kind of object is being
|
||
* downloaded? This determines the
|
||
* schedule used for the download.
|
||
*/
|
||
download_want_authority_bitfield_t want_authority : 1; /**< Is the download
|
||
* happening from an authority
|
||
* or a mirror? This determines
|
||
* the schedule used for the
|
||
* download. */
|
||
download_schedule_increment_bitfield_t increment_on : 1; /**< does this
|
||
* schedule increment on each attempt,
|
||
* or after each failure? */
|
||
download_schedule_backoff_bitfield_t backoff : 1; /**< do we use the
|
||
* deterministic schedule, or random
|
||
* exponential backoffs? */
|
||
uint8_t last_backoff_position; /**< number of attempts/failures, depending
|
||
* on increment_on, when we last recalculated
|
||
* the delay. Only updated if backoff
|
||
* == 1. */
|
||
int last_delay_used; /**< last delay used for random exponential backoff;
|
||
* only updated if backoff == 1 */
|
||
} download_status_t;
|
||
|
||
/** If n_download_failures is this high, the download can never happen. */
|
||
#define IMPOSSIBLE_TO_DOWNLOAD 255
|
||
|
||
/** The max size we expect router descriptor annotations we create to
|
||
* be. We'll accept larger ones if we see them on disk, but we won't
|
||
* create any that are larger than this. */
|
||
#define ROUTER_ANNOTATION_BUF_LEN 256
|
||
|
||
/** Information need to cache an onion router's descriptor. */
|
||
typedef struct signed_descriptor_t {
|
||
/** Pointer to the raw server descriptor, preceded by annotations. Not
|
||
* necessarily NUL-terminated. If saved_location is SAVED_IN_CACHE, this
|
||
* pointer is null. */
|
||
char *signed_descriptor_body;
|
||
/** Length of the annotations preceding the server descriptor. */
|
||
size_t annotations_len;
|
||
/** Length of the server descriptor. */
|
||
size_t signed_descriptor_len;
|
||
/** Digest of the server descriptor, computed as specified in
|
||
* dir-spec.txt. */
|
||
char signed_descriptor_digest[DIGEST_LEN];
|
||
/** Identity digest of the router. */
|
||
char identity_digest[DIGEST_LEN];
|
||
/** Declared publication time of the descriptor. */
|
||
time_t published_on;
|
||
/** For routerdescs only: digest of the corresponding extrainfo. */
|
||
char extra_info_digest[DIGEST_LEN];
|
||
/** For routerdescs only: A SHA256-digest of the extrainfo (if any) */
|
||
char extra_info_digest256[DIGEST256_LEN];
|
||
/** Certificate for ed25519 signing key. */
|
||
struct tor_cert_st *signing_key_cert;
|
||
/** For routerdescs only: Status of downloading the corresponding
|
||
* extrainfo. */
|
||
download_status_t ei_dl_status;
|
||
/** Where is the descriptor saved? */
|
||
saved_location_t saved_location;
|
||
/** If saved_location is SAVED_IN_CACHE or SAVED_IN_JOURNAL, the offset of
|
||
* this descriptor in the corresponding file. */
|
||
off_t saved_offset;
|
||
/** What position is this descriptor within routerlist->routers or
|
||
* routerlist->old_routers? -1 for none. */
|
||
int routerlist_index;
|
||
/** The valid-until time of the most recent consensus that listed this
|
||
* descriptor. 0 for "never listed in a consensus, so far as we know." */
|
||
time_t last_listed_as_valid_until;
|
||
/* If true, we do not ever try to save this object in the cache. */
|
||
unsigned int do_not_cache : 1;
|
||
/* If true, this item is meant to represent an extrainfo. */
|
||
unsigned int is_extrainfo : 1;
|
||
/* If true, we got an extrainfo for this item, and the digest was right,
|
||
* but it was incompatible. */
|
||
unsigned int extrainfo_is_bogus : 1;
|
||
/* If true, we are willing to transmit this item unencrypted. */
|
||
unsigned int send_unencrypted : 1;
|
||
} signed_descriptor_t;
|
||
|
||
/** A signed integer representing a country code. */
|
||
typedef int16_t country_t;
|
||
|
||
/** Information about another onion router in the network. */
|
||
typedef struct {
|
||
signed_descriptor_t cache_info;
|
||
char *nickname; /**< Human-readable OR name. */
|
||
|
||
uint32_t addr; /**< IPv4 address of OR, in host order. */
|
||
uint16_t or_port; /**< Port for TLS connections. */
|
||
uint16_t dir_port; /**< Port for HTTP directory connections. */
|
||
|
||
/** A router's IPv6 address, if it has one. */
|
||
/* XXXXX187 Actually these should probably be part of a list of addresses,
|
||
* not just a special case. Use abstractions to access these; don't do it
|
||
* directly. */
|
||
tor_addr_t ipv6_addr;
|
||
uint16_t ipv6_orport;
|
||
|
||
crypto_pk_t *onion_pkey; /**< Public RSA key for onions. */
|
||
crypto_pk_t *identity_pkey; /**< Public RSA key for signing. */
|
||
/** Public curve25519 key for onions */
|
||
curve25519_public_key_t *onion_curve25519_pkey;
|
||
/** What's the earliest expiration time on all the certs in this
|
||
* routerinfo? */
|
||
time_t cert_expiration_time;
|
||
|
||
char *platform; /**< What software/operating system is this OR using? */
|
||
|
||
char *protocol_list; /**< Encoded list of subprotocol versions supported
|
||
* by this OR */
|
||
|
||
/* link info */
|
||
uint32_t bandwidthrate; /**< How many bytes does this OR add to its token
|
||
* bucket per second? */
|
||
uint32_t bandwidthburst; /**< How large is this OR's token bucket? */
|
||
/** How many bytes/s is this router known to handle? */
|
||
uint32_t bandwidthcapacity;
|
||
smartlist_t *exit_policy; /**< What streams will this OR permit
|
||
* to exit on IPv4? NULL for 'reject *:*'. */
|
||
/** What streams will this OR permit to exit on IPv6?
|
||
* NULL for 'reject *:*' */
|
||
struct short_policy_t *ipv6_exit_policy;
|
||
long uptime; /**< How many seconds the router claims to have been up */
|
||
smartlist_t *declared_family; /**< Nicknames of router which this router
|
||
* claims are its family. */
|
||
char *contact_info; /**< Declared contact info for this router. */
|
||
unsigned int is_hibernating:1; /**< Whether the router claims to be
|
||
* hibernating */
|
||
unsigned int caches_extra_info:1; /**< Whether the router says it caches and
|
||
* serves extrainfo documents. */
|
||
unsigned int allow_single_hop_exits:1; /**< Whether the router says
|
||
* it allows single hop exits. */
|
||
|
||
unsigned int wants_to_be_hs_dir:1; /**< True iff this router claims to be
|
||
* a hidden service directory. */
|
||
unsigned int policy_is_reject_star:1; /**< True iff the exit policy for this
|
||
* router rejects everything. */
|
||
/** True if, after we have added this router, we should re-launch
|
||
* tests for it. */
|
||
unsigned int needs_retest_if_added:1;
|
||
|
||
/** True iff this router included "tunnelled-dir-server" in its descriptor,
|
||
* implying it accepts tunnelled directory requests, or it advertised
|
||
* dir_port > 0. */
|
||
unsigned int supports_tunnelled_dir_requests:1;
|
||
|
||
/** Used during voting to indicate that we should not include an entry for
|
||
* this routerinfo. Used only during voting. */
|
||
unsigned int omit_from_vote:1;
|
||
|
||
/** Tor can use this router for general positions in circuits; we got it
|
||
* from a directory server as usual, or we're an authority and a server
|
||
* uploaded it. */
|
||
#define ROUTER_PURPOSE_GENERAL 0
|
||
/** Tor should avoid using this router for circuit-building: we got it
|
||
* from a crontroller. If the controller wants to use it, it'll have to
|
||
* ask for it by identity. */
|
||
#define ROUTER_PURPOSE_CONTROLLER 1
|
||
/** Tor should use this router only for bridge positions in circuits: we got
|
||
* it via a directory request from the bridge itself, or a bridge
|
||
* authority. x*/
|
||
#define ROUTER_PURPOSE_BRIDGE 2
|
||
/** Tor should not use this router; it was marked in cached-descriptors with
|
||
* a purpose we didn't recognize. */
|
||
#define ROUTER_PURPOSE_UNKNOWN 255
|
||
|
||
/* In what way did we find out about this router? One of ROUTER_PURPOSE_*.
|
||
* Routers of different purposes are kept segregated and used for different
|
||
* things; see notes on ROUTER_PURPOSE_* macros above.
|
||
*/
|
||
uint8_t purpose;
|
||
} routerinfo_t;
|
||
|
||
/** Information needed to keep and cache a signed extra-info document. */
|
||
typedef struct extrainfo_t {
|
||
signed_descriptor_t cache_info;
|
||
/** SHA256 digest of this document */
|
||
uint8_t digest256[DIGEST256_LEN];
|
||
/** The router's nickname. */
|
||
char nickname[MAX_NICKNAME_LEN+1];
|
||
/** True iff we found the right key for this extra-info, verified the
|
||
* signature, and found it to be bad. */
|
||
unsigned int bad_sig : 1;
|
||
/** If present, we didn't have the right key to verify this extra-info,
|
||
* so this is a copy of the signature in the document. */
|
||
char *pending_sig;
|
||
/** Length of pending_sig. */
|
||
size_t pending_sig_len;
|
||
} extrainfo_t;
|
||
|
||
/** Contents of a single router entry in a network status object.
|
||
*/
|
||
typedef struct routerstatus_t {
|
||
time_t published_on; /**< When was this router published? */
|
||
char nickname[MAX_NICKNAME_LEN+1]; /**< The nickname this router says it
|
||
* has. */
|
||
char identity_digest[DIGEST_LEN]; /**< Digest of the router's identity
|
||
* key. */
|
||
/** Digest of the router's most recent descriptor or microdescriptor.
|
||
* If it's a descriptor, we only use the first DIGEST_LEN bytes. */
|
||
char descriptor_digest[DIGEST256_LEN];
|
||
uint32_t addr; /**< IPv4 address for this router, in host order. */
|
||
uint16_t or_port; /**< OR port for this router. */
|
||
uint16_t dir_port; /**< Directory port for this router. */
|
||
tor_addr_t ipv6_addr; /**< IPv6 address for this router. */
|
||
uint16_t ipv6_orport; /**<IPV6 OR port for this router. */
|
||
unsigned int is_authority:1; /**< True iff this router is an authority. */
|
||
unsigned int is_exit:1; /**< True iff this router is a good exit. */
|
||
unsigned int is_stable:1; /**< True iff this router stays up a long time. */
|
||
unsigned int is_fast:1; /**< True iff this router has good bandwidth. */
|
||
/** True iff this router is called 'running' in the consensus. We give it
|
||
* this funny name so that we don't accidentally use this bit as a view of
|
||
* whether we think the router is *currently* running. If that's what you
|
||
* want to know, look at is_running in node_t. */
|
||
unsigned int is_flagged_running:1;
|
||
unsigned int is_named:1; /**< True iff "nickname" belongs to this router. */
|
||
unsigned int is_unnamed:1; /**< True iff "nickname" belongs to another
|
||
* router. */
|
||
unsigned int is_valid:1; /**< True iff this router isn't invalid. */
|
||
unsigned int is_possible_guard:1; /**< True iff this router would be a good
|
||
* choice as an entry guard. */
|
||
unsigned int is_bad_exit:1; /**< True iff this node is a bad choice for
|
||
* an exit node. */
|
||
unsigned int is_hs_dir:1; /**< True iff this router is a v2-or-later hidden
|
||
* service directory. */
|
||
unsigned int is_v2_dir:1; /** True iff this router publishes an open DirPort
|
||
* or it claims to accept tunnelled dir requests.
|
||
*/
|
||
/** True iff we have a proto line for this router, or a versions line
|
||
* from which we could infer the protocols. */
|
||
unsigned int protocols_known:1;
|
||
|
||
/** True iff this router has a version or protocol list that allows it to
|
||
* accept EXTEND2 cells */
|
||
unsigned int supports_extend2_cells:1;
|
||
|
||
/** True iff this router has a protocol list that allows it to negotiate
|
||
* ed25519 identity keys on a link handshake. */
|
||
unsigned int supports_ed25519_link_handshake:1;
|
||
|
||
/** True iff this router has a protocol list that allows it to be an
|
||
* introduction point supporting ed25519 authentication key which is part of
|
||
* the v3 protocol detailed in proposal 224. This requires HSIntro=4. */
|
||
unsigned int supports_ed25519_hs_intro : 1;
|
||
|
||
/** True iff this router has a protocol list that allows it to be an hidden
|
||
* service directory supporting version 3 as seen in proposal 224. This
|
||
* requires HSDir=2. */
|
||
unsigned int supports_v3_hsdir : 1;
|
||
|
||
unsigned int has_bandwidth:1; /**< The vote/consensus had bw info */
|
||
unsigned int has_exitsummary:1; /**< The vote/consensus had exit summaries */
|
||
unsigned int bw_is_unmeasured:1; /**< This is a consensus entry, with
|
||
* the Unmeasured flag set. */
|
||
|
||
uint32_t bandwidth_kb; /**< Bandwidth (capacity) of the router as reported in
|
||
* the vote/consensus, in kilobytes/sec. */
|
||
|
||
/** The consensus has guardfraction information for this router. */
|
||
unsigned int has_guardfraction:1;
|
||
/** The guardfraction value of this router. */
|
||
uint32_t guardfraction_percentage;
|
||
|
||
char *exitsummary; /**< exit policy summary -
|
||
* XXX weasel: this probably should not stay a string. */
|
||
|
||
/* ---- The fields below aren't derived from the networkstatus; they
|
||
* hold local information only. */
|
||
|
||
time_t last_dir_503_at; /**< When did this router last tell us that it
|
||
* was too busy to serve directory info? */
|
||
download_status_t dl_status;
|
||
|
||
} routerstatus_t;
|
||
|
||
/** A single entry in a parsed policy summary, describing a range of ports. */
|
||
typedef struct short_policy_entry_t {
|
||
uint16_t min_port, max_port;
|
||
} short_policy_entry_t;
|
||
|
||
/** A short_poliy_t is the parsed version of a policy summary. */
|
||
typedef struct short_policy_t {
|
||
/** True if the members of 'entries' are port ranges to accept; false if
|
||
* they are port ranges to reject */
|
||
unsigned int is_accept : 1;
|
||
/** The actual number of values in 'entries'. */
|
||
unsigned int n_entries : 31;
|
||
/** An array of 0 or more short_policy_entry_t values, each describing a
|
||
* range of ports that this policy accepts or rejects (depending on the
|
||
* value of is_accept).
|
||
*/
|
||
short_policy_entry_t entries[FLEXIBLE_ARRAY_MEMBER];
|
||
} short_policy_t;
|
||
|
||
/** A microdescriptor is the smallest amount of information needed to build a
|
||
* circuit through a router. They are generated by the directory authorities,
|
||
* using information from the uploaded routerinfo documents. They are not
|
||
* self-signed, but are rather authenticated by having their hash in a signed
|
||
* networkstatus document. */
|
||
typedef struct microdesc_t {
|
||
/** Hashtable node, used to look up the microdesc by its digest. */
|
||
HT_ENTRY(microdesc_t) node;
|
||
|
||
/* Cache information */
|
||
|
||
/** When was this microdescriptor last listed in a consensus document?
|
||
* Once a microdesc has been unlisted long enough, we can drop it.
|
||
*/
|
||
time_t last_listed;
|
||
/** Where is this microdescriptor currently stored? */
|
||
saved_location_bitfield_t saved_location : 3;
|
||
/** If true, do not attempt to cache this microdescriptor on disk. */
|
||
unsigned int no_save : 1;
|
||
/** If true, this microdesc has an entry in the microdesc_map */
|
||
unsigned int held_in_map : 1;
|
||
/** Reference count: how many node_ts have a reference to this microdesc? */
|
||
unsigned int held_by_nodes;
|
||
|
||
/** If saved_location == SAVED_IN_CACHE, this field holds the offset of the
|
||
* microdescriptor in the cache. */
|
||
off_t off;
|
||
|
||
/* The string containing the microdesc. */
|
||
|
||
/** A pointer to the encoded body of the microdescriptor. If the
|
||
* saved_location is SAVED_IN_CACHE, then the body is a pointer into an
|
||
* mmap'd region. Otherwise, it is a malloc'd string. The string might not
|
||
* be NUL-terminated; take the length from <b>bodylen</b>. */
|
||
char *body;
|
||
/** The length of the microdescriptor in <b>body</b>. */
|
||
size_t bodylen;
|
||
/** A SHA256-digest of the microdescriptor. */
|
||
char digest[DIGEST256_LEN];
|
||
|
||
/* Fields in the microdescriptor. */
|
||
|
||
/** As routerinfo_t.onion_pkey */
|
||
crypto_pk_t *onion_pkey;
|
||
/** As routerinfo_t.onion_curve25519_pkey */
|
||
curve25519_public_key_t *onion_curve25519_pkey;
|
||
/** Ed25519 identity key, if included. */
|
||
ed25519_public_key_t *ed25519_identity_pkey;
|
||
/** As routerinfo_t.ipv6_addr */
|
||
tor_addr_t ipv6_addr;
|
||
/** As routerinfo_t.ipv6_orport */
|
||
uint16_t ipv6_orport;
|
||
/** As routerinfo_t.family */
|
||
smartlist_t *family;
|
||
/** IPv4 exit policy summary */
|
||
short_policy_t *exit_policy;
|
||
/** IPv6 exit policy summary */
|
||
short_policy_t *ipv6_exit_policy;
|
||
|
||
} microdesc_t;
|
||
|
||
/** A node_t represents a Tor router.
|
||
*
|
||
* Specifically, a node_t is a Tor router as we are using it: a router that
|
||
* we are considering for circuits, connections, and so on. A node_t is a
|
||
* thin wrapper around the routerstatus, routerinfo, and microdesc for a
|
||
* single router, and provides a consistent interface for all of them.
|
||
*
|
||
* Also, a node_t has mutable state. While a routerinfo, a routerstatus,
|
||
* and a microdesc have[*] only the information read from a router
|
||
* descriptor, a consensus entry, and a microdescriptor (respectively)...
|
||
* a node_t has flags based on *our own current opinion* of the node.
|
||
*
|
||
* [*] Actually, there is some leftover information in each that is mutable.
|
||
* We should try to excise that.
|
||
*/
|
||
typedef struct node_t {
|
||
/* Indexing information */
|
||
|
||
/** Used to look up the node_t by its identity digest. */
|
||
HT_ENTRY(node_t) ht_ent;
|
||
/** Position of the node within the list of nodes */
|
||
int nodelist_idx;
|
||
|
||
/** The identity digest of this node_t. No more than one node_t per
|
||
* identity may exist at a time. */
|
||
char identity[DIGEST_LEN];
|
||
|
||
microdesc_t *md;
|
||
routerinfo_t *ri;
|
||
routerstatus_t *rs;
|
||
|
||
/* local info: copied from routerstatus, then possibly frobbed based
|
||
* on experience. Authorities set this stuff directly. Note that
|
||
* these reflect knowledge of the primary (IPv4) OR port only. */
|
||
|
||
unsigned int is_running:1; /**< As far as we know, is this OR currently
|
||
* running? */
|
||
unsigned int is_valid:1; /**< Has a trusted dirserver validated this OR?
|
||
* (For Authdir: Have we validated this OR?) */
|
||
unsigned int is_fast:1; /** Do we think this is a fast OR? */
|
||
unsigned int is_stable:1; /** Do we think this is a stable OR? */
|
||
unsigned int is_possible_guard:1; /**< Do we think this is an OK guard? */
|
||
unsigned int is_exit:1; /**< Do we think this is an OK exit? */
|
||
unsigned int is_bad_exit:1; /**< Do we think this exit is censored, borked,
|
||
* or otherwise nasty? */
|
||
unsigned int is_hs_dir:1; /**< True iff this router is a hidden service
|
||
* directory according to the authorities. */
|
||
|
||
/* Local info: warning state. */
|
||
|
||
unsigned int name_lookup_warned:1; /**< Have we warned the user for referring
|
||
* to this (unnamed) router by nickname?
|
||
*/
|
||
|
||
/** Local info: we treat this node as if it rejects everything */
|
||
unsigned int rejects_all:1;
|
||
|
||
/* Local info: derived. */
|
||
|
||
/** True if the IPv6 OR port is preferred over the IPv4 OR port.
|
||
* XX/teor - can this become out of date if the torrc changes? */
|
||
unsigned int ipv6_preferred:1;
|
||
|
||
/** According to the geoip db what country is this router in? */
|
||
/* XXXprop186 what is this suppose to mean with multiple OR ports? */
|
||
country_t country;
|
||
|
||
/* The below items are used only by authdirservers for
|
||
* reachability testing. */
|
||
|
||
/** When was the last time we could reach this OR? */
|
||
time_t last_reachable; /* IPv4. */
|
||
time_t last_reachable6; /* IPv6. */
|
||
|
||
} node_t;
|
||
|
||
/** Linked list of microdesc hash lines for a single router in a directory
|
||
* vote.
|
||
*/
|
||
typedef struct vote_microdesc_hash_t {
|
||
/** Next element in the list, or NULL. */
|
||
struct vote_microdesc_hash_t *next;
|
||
/** The raw contents of the microdesc hash line, from the "m" through the
|
||
* newline. */
|
||
char *microdesc_hash_line;
|
||
} vote_microdesc_hash_t;
|
||
|
||
/** The claim about a single router, made in a vote. */
|
||
typedef struct vote_routerstatus_t {
|
||
routerstatus_t status; /**< Underlying 'status' object for this router.
|
||
* Flags are redundant. */
|
||
/** How many known-flags are allowed in a vote? This is the width of
|
||
* the flags field of vote_routerstatus_t */
|
||
#define MAX_KNOWN_FLAGS_IN_VOTE 64
|
||
uint64_t flags; /**< Bit-field for all recognized flags; index into
|
||
* networkstatus_t.known_flags. */
|
||
char *version; /**< The version that the authority says this router is
|
||
* running. */
|
||
char *protocols; /**< The protocols that this authority says this router
|
||
* provides. */
|
||
unsigned int has_measured_bw:1; /**< The vote had a measured bw */
|
||
/** True iff the vote included an entry for ed25519 ID, or included
|
||
* "id ed25519 none" to indicate that there was no ed25519 ID. */
|
||
unsigned int has_ed25519_listing:1;
|
||
/** True if the Ed25519 listing here is the consensus-opinion for the
|
||
* Ed25519 listing; false if there was no consensus on Ed25519 key status,
|
||
* or if this VRS doesn't reflect it. */
|
||
unsigned int ed25519_reflects_consensus:1;
|
||
uint32_t measured_bw_kb; /**< Measured bandwidth (capacity) of the router */
|
||
/** The hash or hashes that the authority claims this microdesc has. */
|
||
vote_microdesc_hash_t *microdesc;
|
||
/** Ed25519 identity for this router, or zero if it has none. */
|
||
uint8_t ed25519_id[ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN];
|
||
} vote_routerstatus_t;
|
||
|
||
/** A signature of some document by an authority. */
|
||
typedef struct document_signature_t {
|
||
/** Declared SHA-1 digest of this voter's identity key */
|
||
char identity_digest[DIGEST_LEN];
|
||
/** Declared SHA-1 digest of signing key used by this voter. */
|
||
char signing_key_digest[DIGEST_LEN];
|
||
/** Algorithm used to compute the digest of the document. */
|
||
digest_algorithm_t alg;
|
||
/** Signature of the signed thing. */
|
||
char *signature;
|
||
/** Length of <b>signature</b> */
|
||
int signature_len;
|
||
unsigned int bad_signature : 1; /**< Set to true if we've tried to verify
|
||
* the sig, and we know it's bad. */
|
||
unsigned int good_signature : 1; /**< Set to true if we've verified the sig
|
||
* as good. */
|
||
} document_signature_t;
|
||
|
||
/** Information about a single voter in a vote or a consensus. */
|
||
typedef struct networkstatus_voter_info_t {
|
||
/** Declared SHA-1 digest of this voter's identity key */
|
||
char identity_digest[DIGEST_LEN];
|
||
char *nickname; /**< Nickname of this voter */
|
||
/** Digest of this voter's "legacy" identity key, if any. In vote only; for
|
||
* consensuses, we treat legacy keys as additional signers. */
|
||
char legacy_id_digest[DIGEST_LEN];
|
||
char *address; /**< Address of this voter, in string format. */
|
||
uint32_t addr; /**< Address of this voter, in IPv4, in host order. */
|
||
uint16_t dir_port; /**< Directory port of this voter */
|
||
uint16_t or_port; /**< OR port of this voter */
|
||
char *contact; /**< Contact information for this voter. */
|
||
char vote_digest[DIGEST_LEN]; /**< Digest of this voter's vote, as signed. */
|
||
|
||
/* Nothing from here on is signed. */
|
||
/** The signature of the document and the signature's status. */
|
||
smartlist_t *sigs;
|
||
} networkstatus_voter_info_t;
|
||
|
||
typedef struct networkstatus_sr_info_t {
|
||
/* Indicate if the dirauth partitipates in the SR protocol with its vote.
|
||
* This is tied to the SR flag in the vote. */
|
||
unsigned int participate:1;
|
||
/* Both vote and consensus: Current and previous SRV. If list is empty,
|
||
* this means none were found in either the consensus or vote. */
|
||
struct sr_srv_t *previous_srv;
|
||
struct sr_srv_t *current_srv;
|
||
/* Vote only: List of commitments. */
|
||
smartlist_t *commits;
|
||
} networkstatus_sr_info_t;
|
||
|
||
/** Enumerates the possible seriousness values of a networkstatus document. */
|
||
typedef enum {
|
||
NS_TYPE_VOTE,
|
||
NS_TYPE_CONSENSUS,
|
||
NS_TYPE_OPINION,
|
||
} networkstatus_type_t;
|
||
|
||
/** Enumerates recognized flavors of a consensus networkstatus document. All
|
||
* flavors of a consensus are generated from the same set of votes, but they
|
||
* present different types information to different versions of Tor. */
|
||
typedef enum {
|
||
FLAV_NS = 0,
|
||
FLAV_MICRODESC = 1,
|
||
} consensus_flavor_t;
|
||
|
||
/** How many different consensus flavors are there? */
|
||
#define N_CONSENSUS_FLAVORS ((int)(FLAV_MICRODESC)+1)
|
||
|
||
/** A common structure to hold a v3 network status vote, or a v3 network
|
||
* status consensus. */
|
||
typedef struct networkstatus_t {
|
||
networkstatus_type_t type; /**< Vote, consensus, or opinion? */
|
||
consensus_flavor_t flavor; /**< If a consensus, what kind? */
|
||
unsigned int has_measured_bws : 1;/**< True iff this networkstatus contains
|
||
* measured= bandwidth values. */
|
||
|
||
time_t published; /**< Vote only: Time when vote was written. */
|
||
time_t valid_after; /**< Time after which this vote or consensus applies. */
|
||
time_t fresh_until; /**< Time before which this is the most recent vote or
|
||
* consensus. */
|
||
time_t valid_until; /**< Time after which this vote or consensus should not
|
||
* be used. */
|
||
|
||
/** Consensus only: what method was used to produce this consensus? */
|
||
int consensus_method;
|
||
/** Vote only: what methods is this voter willing to use? */
|
||
smartlist_t *supported_methods;
|
||
|
||
/** List of 'package' lines describing hashes of downloadable packages */
|
||
smartlist_t *package_lines;
|
||
|
||
/** How long does this vote/consensus claim that authorities take to
|
||
* distribute their votes to one another? */
|
||
int vote_seconds;
|
||
/** How long does this vote/consensus claim that authorities take to
|
||
* distribute their consensus signatures to one another? */
|
||
int dist_seconds;
|
||
|
||
/** Comma-separated list of recommended client software, or NULL if this
|
||
* voter has no opinion. */
|
||
char *client_versions;
|
||
char *server_versions;
|
||
|
||
/** Lists of subprotocol versions which are _recommended_ for relays and
|
||
* clients, or which are _require_ for relays and clients. Tor shouldn't
|
||
* make any more network connections if a required protocol is missing.
|
||
*/
|
||
char *recommended_relay_protocols;
|
||
char *recommended_client_protocols;
|
||
char *required_relay_protocols;
|
||
char *required_client_protocols;
|
||
|
||
/** List of flags that this vote/consensus applies to routers. If a flag is
|
||
* not listed here, the voter has no opinion on what its value should be. */
|
||
smartlist_t *known_flags;
|
||
|
||
/** List of key=value strings for the parameters in this vote or
|
||
* consensus, sorted by key. */
|
||
smartlist_t *net_params;
|
||
|
||
/** List of key=value strings for the bw weight parameters in the
|
||
* consensus. */
|
||
smartlist_t *weight_params;
|
||
|
||
/** List of networkstatus_voter_info_t. For a vote, only one element
|
||
* is included. For a consensus, one element is included for every voter
|
||
* whose vote contributed to the consensus. */
|
||
smartlist_t *voters;
|
||
|
||
struct authority_cert_t *cert; /**< Vote only: the voter's certificate. */
|
||
|
||
/** Digests of this document, as signed. */
|
||
common_digests_t digests;
|
||
/** A SHA3-256 digest of the document, not including signatures: used for
|
||
* consensus diffs */
|
||
uint8_t digest_sha3_as_signed[DIGEST256_LEN];
|
||
|
||
/** List of router statuses, sorted by identity digest. For a vote,
|
||
* the elements are vote_routerstatus_t; for a consensus, the elements
|
||
* are routerstatus_t. */
|
||
smartlist_t *routerstatus_list;
|
||
|
||
/** If present, a map from descriptor digest to elements of
|
||
* routerstatus_list. */
|
||
digestmap_t *desc_digest_map;
|
||
|
||
/** Contains the shared random protocol data from a vote or consensus. */
|
||
networkstatus_sr_info_t sr_info;
|
||
} networkstatus_t;
|
||
|
||
/** A set of signatures for a networkstatus consensus. Unless otherwise
|
||
* noted, all fields are as for networkstatus_t. */
|
||
typedef struct ns_detached_signatures_t {
|
||
time_t valid_after;
|
||
time_t fresh_until;
|
||
time_t valid_until;
|
||
strmap_t *digests; /**< Map from flavor name to digestset_t */
|
||
strmap_t *signatures; /**< Map from flavor name to list of
|
||
* document_signature_t */
|
||
} ns_detached_signatures_t;
|
||
|
||
/** Allowable types of desc_store_t. */
|
||
typedef enum store_type_t {
|
||
ROUTER_STORE = 0,
|
||
EXTRAINFO_STORE = 1
|
||
} store_type_t;
|
||
|
||
/** A 'store' is a set of descriptors saved on disk, with accompanying
|
||
* journal, mmaped as needed, rebuilt as needed. */
|
||
typedef struct desc_store_t {
|
||
/** Filename (within DataDir) for the store. We append .tmp to this
|
||
* filename for a temporary file when rebuilding the store, and .new to this
|
||
* filename for the journal. */
|
||
const char *fname_base;
|
||
/** Human-readable description of what this store contains. */
|
||
const char *description;
|
||
|
||
tor_mmap_t *mmap; /**< A mmap for the main file in the store. */
|
||
|
||
store_type_t type; /**< What's stored in this store? */
|
||
|
||
/** The size of the router log, in bytes. */
|
||
size_t journal_len;
|
||
/** The size of the router store, in bytes. */
|
||
size_t store_len;
|
||
/** Total bytes dropped since last rebuild: this is space currently
|
||
* used in the cache and the journal that could be freed by a rebuild. */
|
||
size_t bytes_dropped;
|
||
} desc_store_t;
|
||
|
||
/** Contents of a directory of onion routers. */
|
||
typedef struct {
|
||
/** Map from server identity digest to a member of routers. */
|
||
struct digest_ri_map_t *identity_map;
|
||
/** Map from server descriptor digest to a signed_descriptor_t from
|
||
* routers or old_routers. */
|
||
struct digest_sd_map_t *desc_digest_map;
|
||
/** Map from extra-info digest to an extrainfo_t. Only exists for
|
||
* routers in routers or old_routers. */
|
||
struct digest_ei_map_t *extra_info_map;
|
||
/** Map from extra-info digests to a signed_descriptor_t for a router
|
||
* descriptor having that extra-info digest. Only exists for
|
||
* routers in routers or old_routers. */
|
||
struct digest_sd_map_t *desc_by_eid_map;
|
||
/** List of routerinfo_t for all currently live routers we know. */
|
||
smartlist_t *routers;
|
||
/** List of signed_descriptor_t for older router descriptors we're
|
||
* caching. */
|
||
smartlist_t *old_routers;
|
||
/** Store holding server descriptors. If present, any router whose
|
||
* cache_info.saved_location == SAVED_IN_CACHE is stored in this file
|
||
* starting at cache_info.saved_offset */
|
||
desc_store_t desc_store;
|
||
/** Store holding extra-info documents. */
|
||
desc_store_t extrainfo_store;
|
||
} routerlist_t;
|
||
|
||
/** Information on router used when extending a circuit. We don't need a
|
||
* full routerinfo_t to extend: we only need addr:port:keyid to build an OR
|
||
* connection, and onion_key to create the onionskin. Note that for onehop
|
||
* general-purpose tunnels, the onion_key is NULL. */
|
||
typedef struct extend_info_t {
|
||
char nickname[MAX_HEX_NICKNAME_LEN+1]; /**< This router's nickname for
|
||
* display. */
|
||
/** Hash of this router's RSA identity key. */
|
||
char identity_digest[DIGEST_LEN];
|
||
/** Ed25519 identity for this router, if any. */
|
||
ed25519_public_key_t ed_identity;
|
||
uint16_t port; /**< OR port. */
|
||
tor_addr_t addr; /**< IP address. */
|
||
crypto_pk_t *onion_key; /**< Current onionskin key. */
|
||
curve25519_public_key_t curve25519_onion_key;
|
||
} extend_info_t;
|
||
|
||
/** Certificate for v3 directory protocol: binds long-term authority identity
|
||
* keys to medium-term authority signing keys. */
|
||
typedef struct authority_cert_t {
|
||
/** Information relating to caching this cert on disk and looking it up. */
|
||
signed_descriptor_t cache_info;
|
||
/** This authority's long-term authority identity key. */
|
||
crypto_pk_t *identity_key;
|
||
/** This authority's medium-term signing key. */
|
||
crypto_pk_t *signing_key;
|
||
/** The digest of <b>signing_key</b> */
|
||
char signing_key_digest[DIGEST_LEN];
|
||
/** The listed expiration time of this certificate. */
|
||
time_t expires;
|
||
/** This authority's IPv4 address, in host order. */
|
||
uint32_t addr;
|
||
/** This authority's directory port. */
|
||
uint16_t dir_port;
|
||
} authority_cert_t;
|
||
|
||
/** Bitfield enum type listing types of information that directory authorities
|
||
* can be authoritative about, and that directory caches may or may not cache.
|
||
*
|
||
* Note that the granularity here is based on authority granularity and on
|
||
* cache capabilities. Thus, one particular bit may correspond in practice to
|
||
* a few types of directory info, so long as every authority that pronounces
|
||
* officially about one of the types prounounces officially about all of them,
|
||
* and so long as every cache that caches one of them caches all of them.
|
||
*/
|
||
typedef enum {
|
||
NO_DIRINFO = 0,
|
||
/** Serves/signs v3 directory information: votes, consensuses, certs */
|
||
V3_DIRINFO = 1 << 2,
|
||
/** Serves bridge descriptors. */
|
||
BRIDGE_DIRINFO = 1 << 4,
|
||
/** Serves extrainfo documents. */
|
||
EXTRAINFO_DIRINFO=1 << 5,
|
||
/** Serves microdescriptors. */
|
||
MICRODESC_DIRINFO=1 << 6,
|
||
} dirinfo_type_t;
|
||
|
||
#define ALL_DIRINFO ((dirinfo_type_t)((1<<7)-1))
|
||
|
||
#define CRYPT_PATH_MAGIC 0x70127012u
|
||
|
||
struct fast_handshake_state_t;
|
||
struct ntor_handshake_state_t;
|
||
#define ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_TAP 0x0000
|
||
#define ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_FAST 0x0001
|
||
#define ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_NTOR 0x0002
|
||
#define MAX_ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE 0x0002
|
||
typedef struct {
|
||
uint16_t tag;
|
||
union {
|
||
struct fast_handshake_state_t *fast;
|
||
crypto_dh_t *tap;
|
||
struct ntor_handshake_state_t *ntor;
|
||
} u;
|
||
} onion_handshake_state_t;
|
||
|
||
/** Holds accounting information for a single step in the layered encryption
|
||
* performed by a circuit. Used only at the client edge of a circuit. */
|
||
typedef struct crypt_path_t {
|
||
uint32_t magic;
|
||
|
||
/* crypto environments */
|
||
/** Encryption key and counter for cells heading towards the OR at this
|
||
* step. */
|
||
crypto_cipher_t *f_crypto;
|
||
/** Encryption key and counter for cells heading back from the OR at this
|
||
* step. */
|
||
crypto_cipher_t *b_crypto;
|
||
|
||
/** Digest state for cells heading towards the OR at this step. */
|
||
crypto_digest_t *f_digest; /* for integrity checking */
|
||
/** Digest state for cells heading away from the OR at this step. */
|
||
crypto_digest_t *b_digest;
|
||
|
||
/** Current state of the handshake as performed with the OR at this
|
||
* step. */
|
||
onion_handshake_state_t handshake_state;
|
||
/** Diffie-hellman handshake state for performing an introduction
|
||
* operations */
|
||
crypto_dh_t *rend_dh_handshake_state;
|
||
|
||
/** Negotiated key material shared with the OR at this step. */
|
||
char rend_circ_nonce[DIGEST_LEN];/* KH in tor-spec.txt */
|
||
|
||
/** Information to extend to the OR at this step. */
|
||
extend_info_t *extend_info;
|
||
|
||
/** Is the circuit built to this step? Must be one of:
|
||
* - CPATH_STATE_CLOSED (The circuit has not been extended to this step)
|
||
* - CPATH_STATE_AWAITING_KEYS (We have sent an EXTEND/CREATE to this step
|
||
* and not received an EXTENDED/CREATED)
|
||
* - CPATH_STATE_OPEN (The circuit has been extended to this step) */
|
||
uint8_t state;
|
||
#define CPATH_STATE_CLOSED 0
|
||
#define CPATH_STATE_AWAITING_KEYS 1
|
||
#define CPATH_STATE_OPEN 2
|
||
struct crypt_path_t *next; /**< Link to next crypt_path_t in the circuit.
|
||
* (The list is circular, so the last node
|
||
* links to the first.) */
|
||
struct crypt_path_t *prev; /**< Link to previous crypt_path_t in the
|
||
* circuit. */
|
||
|
||
int package_window; /**< How many cells are we allowed to originate ending
|
||
* at this step? */
|
||
int deliver_window; /**< How many cells are we willing to deliver originating
|
||
* at this step? */
|
||
} crypt_path_t;
|
||
|
||
/** A reference-counted pointer to a crypt_path_t, used only to share
|
||
* the final rendezvous cpath to be used on a service-side rendezvous
|
||
* circuit among multiple circuits built in parallel to the same
|
||
* destination rendezvous point. */
|
||
typedef struct {
|
||
/** The reference count. */
|
||
unsigned int refcount;
|
||
/** The pointer. Set to NULL when the crypt_path_t is put into use
|
||
* on an opened rendezvous circuit. */
|
||
crypt_path_t *cpath;
|
||
} crypt_path_reference_t;
|
||
|
||
#define CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN (20*2+16*2)
|
||
|
||
#define DH_KEY_LEN DH_BYTES
|
||
|
||
/** Information used to build a circuit. */
|
||
typedef struct {
|
||
/** Intended length of the final circuit. */
|
||
int desired_path_len;
|
||
/** How to extend to the planned exit node. */
|
||
extend_info_t *chosen_exit;
|
||
/** Whether every node in the circ must have adequate uptime. */
|
||
unsigned int need_uptime : 1;
|
||
/** Whether every node in the circ must have adequate capacity. */
|
||
unsigned int need_capacity : 1;
|
||
/** Whether the last hop was picked with exiting in mind. */
|
||
unsigned int is_internal : 1;
|
||
/** Did we pick this as a one-hop tunnel (not safe for other streams)?
|
||
* These are for encrypted dir conns that exit to this router, not
|
||
* for arbitrary exits from the circuit. */
|
||
unsigned int onehop_tunnel : 1;
|
||
/** The crypt_path_t to append after rendezvous: used for rendezvous. */
|
||
crypt_path_t *pending_final_cpath;
|
||
/** A ref-counted reference to the crypt_path_t to append after
|
||
* rendezvous; used on the service side. */
|
||
crypt_path_reference_t *service_pending_final_cpath_ref;
|
||
/** How many times has building a circuit for this task failed? */
|
||
int failure_count;
|
||
/** At what time should we give up on this task? */
|
||
time_t expiry_time;
|
||
} cpath_build_state_t;
|
||
|
||
/** "magic" value for an origin_circuit_t */
|
||
#define ORIGIN_CIRCUIT_MAGIC 0x35315243u
|
||
/** "magic" value for an or_circuit_t */
|
||
#define OR_CIRCUIT_MAGIC 0x98ABC04Fu
|
||
/** "magic" value for a circuit that would have been freed by circuit_free,
|
||
* but which we're keeping around until a cpuworker reply arrives. See
|
||
* circuit_free() for more documentation. */
|
||
#define DEAD_CIRCUIT_MAGIC 0xdeadc14c
|
||
|
||
struct create_cell_t;
|
||
|
||
/** Entry in the cell stats list of a circuit; used only if CELL_STATS
|
||
* events are enabled. */
|
||
typedef struct testing_cell_stats_entry_t {
|
||
uint8_t command; /**< cell command number. */
|
||
/** Waiting time in centiseconds if this event is for a removed cell,
|
||
* or 0 if this event is for adding a cell to the queue. 22 bits can
|
||
* store more than 11 hours, enough to assume that a circuit with this
|
||
* delay would long have been closed. */
|
||
unsigned int waiting_time:22;
|
||
unsigned int removed:1; /**< 0 for added to, 1 for removed from queue. */
|
||
unsigned int exitward:1; /**< 0 for app-ward, 1 for exit-ward. */
|
||
} testing_cell_stats_entry_t;
|
||
|
||
/**
|
||
* A circuit is a path over the onion routing
|
||
* network. Applications can connect to one end of the circuit, and can
|
||
* create exit connections at the other end of the circuit. AP and exit
|
||
* connections have only one circuit associated with them (and thus these
|
||
* connection types are closed when the circuit is closed), whereas
|
||
* OR connections multiplex many circuits at once, and stay standing even
|
||
* when there are no circuits running over them.
|
||
*
|
||
* A circuit_t structure can fill one of two roles. First, a or_circuit_t
|
||
* links two connections together: either an edge connection and an OR
|
||
* connection, or two OR connections. (When joined to an OR connection, a
|
||
* circuit_t affects only cells sent to a particular circID on that
|
||
* connection. When joined to an edge connection, a circuit_t affects all
|
||
* data.)
|
||
|
||
* Second, an origin_circuit_t holds the cipher keys and state for sending data
|
||
* along a given circuit. At the OP, it has a sequence of ciphers, each
|
||
* of which is shared with a single OR along the circuit. Separate
|
||
* ciphers are used for data going "forward" (away from the OP) and
|
||
* "backward" (towards the OP). At the OR, a circuit has only two stream
|
||
* ciphers: one for data going forward, and one for data going backward.
|
||
*/
|
||
typedef struct circuit_t {
|
||
uint32_t magic; /**< For memory and type debugging: must equal
|
||
* ORIGIN_CIRCUIT_MAGIC or OR_CIRCUIT_MAGIC. */
|
||
|
||
/** The channel that is next in this circuit. */
|
||
channel_t *n_chan;
|
||
|
||
/**
|
||
* The circuit_id used in the next (forward) hop of this circuit;
|
||
* this is unique to n_chan, but this ordered pair is globally
|
||
* unique:
|
||
*
|
||
* (n_chan->global_identifier, n_circ_id)
|
||
*/
|
||
circid_t n_circ_id;
|
||
|
||
/**
|
||
* Circuit mux associated with n_chan to which this circuit is attached;
|
||
* NULL if we have no n_chan.
|
||
*/
|
||
circuitmux_t *n_mux;
|
||
|
||
/** Queue of cells waiting to be transmitted on n_chan */
|
||
cell_queue_t n_chan_cells;
|
||
|
||
/**
|
||
* The hop to which we want to extend this circuit. Should be NULL if
|
||
* the circuit has attached to a channel.
|
||
*/
|
||
extend_info_t *n_hop;
|
||
|
||
/** True iff we are waiting for n_chan_cells to become less full before
|
||
* allowing p_streams to add any more cells. (Origin circuit only.) */
|
||
unsigned int streams_blocked_on_n_chan : 1;
|
||
/** True iff we are waiting for p_chan_cells to become less full before
|
||
* allowing n_streams to add any more cells. (OR circuit only.) */
|
||
unsigned int streams_blocked_on_p_chan : 1;
|
||
|
||
/** True iff we have queued a delete backwards on this circuit, but not put
|
||
* it on the output buffer. */
|
||
unsigned int p_delete_pending : 1;
|
||
/** True iff we have queued a delete forwards on this circuit, but not put
|
||
* it on the output buffer. */
|
||
unsigned int n_delete_pending : 1;
|
||
|
||
/** True iff this circuit has received a DESTROY cell in either direction */
|
||
unsigned int received_destroy : 1;
|
||
|
||
uint8_t state; /**< Current status of this circuit. */
|
||
uint8_t purpose; /**< Why are we creating this circuit? */
|
||
|
||
/** How many relay data cells can we package (read from edge streams)
|
||
* on this circuit before we receive a circuit-level sendme cell asking
|
||
* for more? */
|
||
int package_window;
|
||
/** How many relay data cells will we deliver (write to edge streams)
|
||
* on this circuit? When deliver_window gets low, we send some
|
||
* circuit-level sendme cells to indicate that we're willing to accept
|
||
* more. */
|
||
int deliver_window;
|
||
|
||
/** Temporary field used during circuits_handle_oom. */
|
||
uint32_t age_tmp;
|
||
|
||
/** For storage while n_chan is pending (state CIRCUIT_STATE_CHAN_WAIT). */
|
||
struct create_cell_t *n_chan_create_cell;
|
||
|
||
/** When did circuit construction actually begin (ie send the
|
||
* CREATE cell or begin cannibalization).
|
||
*
|
||
* Note: This timer will get reset if we decide to cannibalize
|
||
* a circuit. It may also get reset during certain phases of hidden
|
||
* service circuit use.
|
||
*
|
||
* We keep this timestamp with a higher resolution than most so that the
|
||
* circuit-build-time tracking code can get millisecond resolution.
|
||
*/
|
||
struct timeval timestamp_began;
|
||
|
||
/** This timestamp marks when the init_circuit_base constructor ran. */
|
||
struct timeval timestamp_created;
|
||
|
||
/** When the circuit was first used, or 0 if the circuit is clean.
|
||
*
|
||
* XXXX Note that some code will artifically adjust this value backward
|
||
* in time in order to indicate that a circuit shouldn't be used for new
|
||
* streams, but that it can stay alive as long as it has streams on it.
|
||
* That's a kludge we should fix.
|
||
*
|
||
* XXX The CBT code uses this field to record when HS-related
|
||
* circuits entered certain states. This usage probably won't
|
||
* interfere with this field's primary purpose, but we should
|
||
* document it more thoroughly to make sure of that.
|
||
*
|
||
* XXX The SocksPort option KeepaliveIsolateSOCKSAuth will artificially
|
||
* adjust this value forward each time a suitable stream is attached to an
|
||
* already constructed circuit, potentially keeping the circuit alive
|
||
* indefinitely.
|
||
*/
|
||
time_t timestamp_dirty;
|
||
|
||
uint16_t marked_for_close; /**< Should we close this circuit at the end of
|
||
* the main loop? (If true, holds the line number
|
||
* where this circuit was marked.) */
|
||
const char *marked_for_close_file; /**< For debugging: in which file was this
|
||
* circuit marked for close? */
|
||
/** For what reason (See END_CIRC_REASON...) is this circuit being closed?
|
||
* This field is set in circuit_mark_for_close and used later in
|
||
* circuit_about_to_free. */
|
||
int marked_for_close_reason;
|
||
/** As marked_for_close_reason, but reflects the underlying reason for
|
||
* closing this circuit.
|
||
*/
|
||
int marked_for_close_orig_reason;
|
||
|
||
/** Unique ID for measuring tunneled network status requests. */
|
||
uint64_t dirreq_id;
|
||
|
||
/** Index in smartlist of all circuits (global_circuitlist). */
|
||
int global_circuitlist_idx;
|
||
|
||
/** Next circuit in the doubly-linked ring of circuits waiting to add
|
||
* cells to n_conn. NULL if we have no cells pending, or if we're not
|
||
* linked to an OR connection. */
|
||
struct circuit_t *next_active_on_n_chan;
|
||
/** Previous circuit in the doubly-linked ring of circuits waiting to add
|
||
* cells to n_conn. NULL if we have no cells pending, or if we're not
|
||
* linked to an OR connection. */
|
||
struct circuit_t *prev_active_on_n_chan;
|
||
|
||
/** Various statistics about cells being added to or removed from this
|
||
* circuit's queues; used only if CELL_STATS events are enabled and
|
||
* cleared after being sent to control port. */
|
||
smartlist_t *testing_cell_stats;
|
||
|
||
/** If set, points to an HS token that this circuit might be carrying.
|
||
* Used by the HS circuitmap. */
|
||
hs_token_t *hs_token;
|
||
/** Hashtable node: used to look up the circuit by its HS token using the HS
|
||
circuitmap. */
|
||
HT_ENTRY(circuit_t) hs_circuitmap_node;
|
||
} circuit_t;
|
||
|
||
/** Largest number of relay_early cells that we can send on a given
|
||
* circuit. */
|
||
#define MAX_RELAY_EARLY_CELLS_PER_CIRCUIT 8
|
||
|
||
/**
|
||
* Describes the circuit building process in simplified terms based
|
||
* on the path bias accounting state for a circuit.
|
||
*
|
||
* NOTE: These state values are enumerated in the order for which we
|
||
* expect circuits to transition through them. If you add states,
|
||
* you need to preserve this overall ordering. The various pathbias
|
||
* state transition and accounting functions (pathbias_mark_* and
|
||
* pathbias_count_*) contain ordinal comparisons to enforce proper
|
||
* state transitions for corrections.
|
||
*
|
||
* This state machine and the associated logic was created to prevent
|
||
* miscounting due to unknown cases of circuit reuse. See also tickets
|
||
* #6475 and #7802.
|
||
*/
|
||
typedef enum {
|
||
/** This circuit is "new". It has not yet completed a first hop
|
||
* or been counted by the path bias code. */
|
||
PATH_STATE_NEW_CIRC = 0,
|
||
/** This circuit has completed one/two hops, and has been counted by
|
||
* the path bias logic. */
|
||
PATH_STATE_BUILD_ATTEMPTED = 1,
|
||
/** This circuit has been completely built */
|
||
PATH_STATE_BUILD_SUCCEEDED = 2,
|
||
/** Did we try to attach any SOCKS streams or hidserv introductions to
|
||
* this circuit?
|
||
*
|
||
* Note: If we ever implement end-to-end stream timing through test
|
||
* stream probes (#5707), we must *not* set this for those probes
|
||
* (or any other automatic streams) because the adversary could
|
||
* just tag at a later point.
|
||
*/
|
||
PATH_STATE_USE_ATTEMPTED = 3,
|
||
/** Did any SOCKS streams or hidserv introductions actually succeed on
|
||
* this circuit?
|
||
*
|
||
* If any streams detatch/fail from this circuit, the code transitions
|
||
* the circuit back to PATH_STATE_USE_ATTEMPTED to ensure we probe. See
|
||
* pathbias_mark_use_rollback() for that.
|
||
*/
|
||
PATH_STATE_USE_SUCCEEDED = 4,
|
||
|
||
/**
|
||
* This is a special state to indicate that we got a corrupted
|
||
* relay cell on a circuit and we don't intend to probe it.
|
||
*/
|
||
PATH_STATE_USE_FAILED = 5,
|
||
|
||
/**
|
||
* This is a special state to indicate that we already counted
|
||
* the circuit. Used to guard against potential state machine
|
||
* violations.
|
||
*/
|
||
PATH_STATE_ALREADY_COUNTED = 6,
|
||
} path_state_t;
|
||
#define path_state_bitfield_t ENUM_BF(path_state_t)
|
||
|
||
/** An origin_circuit_t holds data necessary to build and use a circuit.
|
||
*/
|
||
typedef struct origin_circuit_t {
|
||
circuit_t base_;
|
||
|
||
/** Linked list of AP streams (or EXIT streams if hidden service)
|
||
* associated with this circuit. */
|
||
edge_connection_t *p_streams;
|
||
|
||
/** Bytes read from any attached stream since last call to
|
||
* control_event_circ_bandwidth_used(). Only used if we're configured
|
||
* to emit CIRC_BW events. */
|
||
uint32_t n_read_circ_bw;
|
||
|
||
/** Bytes written to any attached stream since last call to
|
||
* control_event_circ_bandwidth_used(). Only used if we're configured
|
||
* to emit CIRC_BW events. */
|
||
uint32_t n_written_circ_bw;
|
||
|
||
/** Build state for this circuit. It includes the intended path
|
||
* length, the chosen exit router, rendezvous information, etc.
|
||
*/
|
||
cpath_build_state_t *build_state;
|
||
/** The doubly-linked list of crypt_path_t entries, one per hop,
|
||
* for this circuit. This includes ciphers for each hop,
|
||
* integrity-checking digests for each hop, and package/delivery
|
||
* windows for each hop.
|
||
*/
|
||
crypt_path_t *cpath;
|
||
|
||
/** Holds all rendezvous data on either client or service side. */
|
||
rend_data_t *rend_data;
|
||
|
||
/** Holds the data that the entry guard system uses to track the
|
||
* status of the guard this circuit is using, and thereby to determine
|
||
* whether this circuit can be used. */
|
||
struct circuit_guard_state_t *guard_state;
|
||
|
||
/** Index into global_origin_circuit_list for this circuit. -1 if not
|
||
* present. */
|
||
int global_origin_circuit_list_idx;
|
||
|
||
/** How many more relay_early cells can we send on this circuit, according
|
||
* to the specification? */
|
||
unsigned int remaining_relay_early_cells : 4;
|
||
|
||
/** Set if this circuit is insanely old and we already informed the user */
|
||
unsigned int is_ancient : 1;
|
||
|
||
/** Set if this circuit has already been opened. Used to detect
|
||
* cannibalized circuits. */
|
||
unsigned int has_opened : 1;
|
||
|
||
/**
|
||
* Path bias state machine. Used to ensure integrity of our
|
||
* circuit building and usage accounting. See path_state_t
|
||
* for more details.
|
||
*/
|
||
path_state_bitfield_t path_state : 3;
|
||
|
||
/* If this flag is set, we should not consider attaching any more
|
||
* connections to this circuit. */
|
||
unsigned int unusable_for_new_conns : 1;
|
||
|
||
/**
|
||
* Tristate variable to guard against pathbias miscounting
|
||
* due to circuit purpose transitions changing the decision
|
||
* of pathbias_should_count(). This variable is informational
|
||
* only. The current results of pathbias_should_count() are
|
||
* the official decision for pathbias accounting.
|
||
*/
|
||
uint8_t pathbias_shouldcount;
|
||
#define PATHBIAS_SHOULDCOUNT_UNDECIDED 0
|
||
#define PATHBIAS_SHOULDCOUNT_IGNORED 1
|
||
#define PATHBIAS_SHOULDCOUNT_COUNTED 2
|
||
|
||
/** For path probing. Store the temporary probe stream ID
|
||
* for response comparison */
|
||
streamid_t pathbias_probe_id;
|
||
|
||
/** For path probing. Store the temporary probe address nonce
|
||
* (in host byte order) for response comparison. */
|
||
uint32_t pathbias_probe_nonce;
|
||
|
||
/** Set iff this is a hidden-service circuit which has timed out
|
||
* according to our current circuit-build timeout, but which has
|
||
* been kept around because it might still succeed in connecting to
|
||
* its destination, and which is not a fully-connected rendezvous
|
||
* circuit.
|
||
*
|
||
* (We clear this flag for client-side rendezvous circuits when they
|
||
* are 'joined' to the other side's rendezvous circuit, so that
|
||
* connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit can put client streams on
|
||
* the circuit. We also clear this flag for service-side rendezvous
|
||
* circuits when they are 'joined' to a client's rend circ, but only
|
||
* for symmetry with the client case. Client-side introduction
|
||
* circuits are closed when we get a joined rend circ, and
|
||
* service-side introduction circuits never have this flag set.) */
|
||
unsigned int hs_circ_has_timed_out : 1;
|
||
|
||
/** Set iff this circuit has been given a relaxed timeout because
|
||
* no circuits have opened. Used to prevent spamming logs. */
|
||
unsigned int relaxed_timeout : 1;
|
||
|
||
/** Set iff this is a service-side rendezvous circuit for which a
|
||
* new connection attempt has been launched. We consider launching
|
||
* a new service-side rend circ to a client when the previous one
|
||
* fails; now that we don't necessarily close a service-side rend
|
||
* circ when we launch a new one to the same client, this flag keeps
|
||
* us from launching two retries for the same failed rend circ. */
|
||
unsigned int hs_service_side_rend_circ_has_been_relaunched : 1;
|
||
|
||
/** What commands were sent over this circuit that decremented the
|
||
* RELAY_EARLY counter? This is for debugging task 878. */
|
||
uint8_t relay_early_commands[MAX_RELAY_EARLY_CELLS_PER_CIRCUIT];
|
||
|
||
/** How many RELAY_EARLY cells have been sent over this circuit? This is
|
||
* for debugging task 878, too. */
|
||
int relay_early_cells_sent;
|
||
|
||
/** The next stream_id that will be tried when we're attempting to
|
||
* construct a new AP stream originating at this circuit. */
|
||
streamid_t next_stream_id;
|
||
|
||
/* The intro key replaces the hidden service's public key if purpose is
|
||
* S_ESTABLISH_INTRO or S_INTRO, provided that no unversioned rendezvous
|
||
* descriptor is used. */
|
||
crypto_pk_t *intro_key;
|
||
|
||
/** Quasi-global identifier for this circuit; used for control.c */
|
||
/* XXXX NM This can get re-used after 2**32 circuits. */
|
||
uint32_t global_identifier;
|
||
|
||
/** True if we have associated one stream to this circuit, thereby setting
|
||
* the isolation paramaters for this circuit. Note that this doesn't
|
||
* necessarily mean that we've <em>attached</em> any streams to the circuit:
|
||
* we may only have marked up this circuit during the launch process.
|
||
*/
|
||
unsigned int isolation_values_set : 1;
|
||
/** True iff any stream has <em>ever</em> been attached to this circuit.
|
||
*
|
||
* In a better world we could use timestamp_dirty for this, but
|
||
* timestamp_dirty is far too overloaded at the moment.
|
||
*/
|
||
unsigned int isolation_any_streams_attached : 1;
|
||
|
||
/** A bitfield of ISO_* flags for every isolation field such that this
|
||
* circuit has had streams with more than one value for that field
|
||
* attached to it. */
|
||
uint8_t isolation_flags_mixed;
|
||
|
||
/** @name Isolation parameters
|
||
*
|
||
* If any streams have been associated with this circ (isolation_values_set
|
||
* == 1), and all streams associated with the circuit have had the same
|
||
* value for some field ((isolation_flags_mixed & ISO_FOO) == 0), then these
|
||
* elements hold the value for that field.
|
||
*
|
||
* Note again that "associated" is not the same as "attached": we
|
||
* preliminarily associate streams with a circuit while the circuit is being
|
||
* launched, so that we can tell whether we need to launch more circuits.
|
||
*
|
||
* @{
|
||
*/
|
||
uint8_t client_proto_type;
|
||
uint8_t client_proto_socksver;
|
||
uint16_t dest_port;
|
||
tor_addr_t client_addr;
|
||
char *dest_address;
|
||
int session_group;
|
||
unsigned nym_epoch;
|
||
size_t socks_username_len;
|
||
uint8_t socks_password_len;
|
||
/* Note that the next two values are NOT NUL-terminated; see
|
||
socks_username_len and socks_password_len for their lengths. */
|
||
char *socks_username;
|
||
char *socks_password;
|
||
/** Global identifier for the first stream attached here; used by
|
||
* ISO_STREAM. */
|
||
uint64_t associated_isolated_stream_global_id;
|
||
/**@}*/
|
||
/** A list of addr_policy_t for this circuit in particular. Used by
|
||
* adjust_exit_policy_from_exitpolicy_failure.
|
||
*/
|
||
smartlist_t *prepend_policy;
|
||
|
||
/** How long do we wait before closing this circuit if it remains
|
||
* completely idle after it was built, in seconds? This value
|
||
* is randomized on a per-circuit basis from CircuitsAvailableTimoeut
|
||
* to 2*CircuitsAvailableTimoeut. */
|
||
int circuit_idle_timeout;
|
||
|
||
} origin_circuit_t;
|
||
|
||
struct onion_queue_t;
|
||
|
||
/** An or_circuit_t holds information needed to implement a circuit at an
|
||
* OR. */
|
||
typedef struct or_circuit_t {
|
||
circuit_t base_;
|
||
|
||
/** Next circuit in the doubly-linked ring of circuits waiting to add
|
||
* cells to p_chan. NULL if we have no cells pending, or if we're not
|
||
* linked to an OR connection. */
|
||
struct circuit_t *next_active_on_p_chan;
|
||
/** Previous circuit in the doubly-linked ring of circuits waiting to add
|
||
* cells to p_chan. NULL if we have no cells pending, or if we're not
|
||
* linked to an OR connection. */
|
||
struct circuit_t *prev_active_on_p_chan;
|
||
/** Pointer to an entry on the onion queue, if this circuit is waiting for a
|
||
* chance to give an onionskin to a cpuworker. Used only in onion.c */
|
||
struct onion_queue_t *onionqueue_entry;
|
||
/** Pointer to a workqueue entry, if this circuit has given an onionskin to
|
||
* a cpuworker and is waiting for a response. Used to decide whether it is
|
||
* safe to free a circuit or if it is still in use by a cpuworker. */
|
||
struct workqueue_entry_s *workqueue_entry;
|
||
|
||
/** The circuit_id used in the previous (backward) hop of this circuit. */
|
||
circid_t p_circ_id;
|
||
/** Queue of cells waiting to be transmitted on p_conn. */
|
||
cell_queue_t p_chan_cells;
|
||
/** The channel that is previous in this circuit. */
|
||
channel_t *p_chan;
|
||
/**
|
||
* Circuit mux associated with p_chan to which this circuit is attached;
|
||
* NULL if we have no p_chan.
|
||
*/
|
||
circuitmux_t *p_mux;
|
||
/** Linked list of Exit streams associated with this circuit. */
|
||
edge_connection_t *n_streams;
|
||
/** Linked list of Exit streams associated with this circuit that are
|
||
* still being resolved. */
|
||
edge_connection_t *resolving_streams;
|
||
/** The cipher used by intermediate hops for cells heading toward the
|
||
* OP. */
|
||
crypto_cipher_t *p_crypto;
|
||
/** The cipher used by intermediate hops for cells heading away from
|
||
* the OP. */
|
||
crypto_cipher_t *n_crypto;
|
||
|
||
/** The integrity-checking digest used by intermediate hops, for
|
||
* cells packaged here and heading towards the OP.
|
||
*/
|
||
crypto_digest_t *p_digest;
|
||
/** The integrity-checking digest used by intermediate hops, for
|
||
* cells packaged at the OP and arriving here.
|
||
*/
|
||
crypto_digest_t *n_digest;
|
||
|
||
/** Points to spliced circuit if purpose is REND_ESTABLISHED, and circuit
|
||
* is not marked for close. */
|
||
struct or_circuit_t *rend_splice;
|
||
|
||
/** Stores KH for the handshake. */
|
||
char rend_circ_nonce[DIGEST_LEN];/* KH in tor-spec.txt */
|
||
|
||
/** How many more relay_early cells can we send on this circuit, according
|
||
* to the specification? */
|
||
unsigned int remaining_relay_early_cells : 4;
|
||
|
||
/* We have already received an INTRODUCE1 cell on this circuit. */
|
||
unsigned int already_received_introduce1 : 1;
|
||
|
||
/** True iff this circuit was made with a CREATE_FAST cell. */
|
||
unsigned int is_first_hop : 1;
|
||
|
||
/** If set, this circuit carries HS traffic. Consider it in any HS
|
||
* statistics. */
|
||
unsigned int circuit_carries_hs_traffic_stats : 1;
|
||
|
||
/** Number of cells that were removed from circuit queue; reset every
|
||
* time when writing buffer stats to disk. */
|
||
uint32_t processed_cells;
|
||
|
||
/** Total time in milliseconds that cells spent in both app-ward and
|
||
* exit-ward queues of this circuit; reset every time when writing
|
||
* buffer stats to disk. */
|
||
uint64_t total_cell_waiting_time;
|
||
|
||
/** Maximum cell queue size for a middle relay; this is stored per circuit
|
||
* so append_cell_to_circuit_queue() can adjust it if it changes. If set
|
||
* to zero, it is initialized to the default value.
|
||
*/
|
||
uint32_t max_middle_cells;
|
||
} or_circuit_t;
|
||
|
||
#if REND_COOKIE_LEN != DIGEST_LEN
|
||
#error "The REND_TOKEN_LEN macro assumes REND_COOKIE_LEN == DIGEST_LEN"
|
||
#endif
|
||
#define REND_TOKEN_LEN DIGEST_LEN
|
||
|
||
/** Convert a circuit subtype to a circuit_t. */
|
||
#define TO_CIRCUIT(x) (&((x)->base_))
|
||
|
||
/** Convert a circuit_t* to a pointer to the enclosing or_circuit_t. Assert
|
||
* if the cast is impossible. */
|
||
static or_circuit_t *TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circuit_t *);
|
||
static const or_circuit_t *CONST_TO_OR_CIRCUIT(const circuit_t *);
|
||
/** Convert a circuit_t* to a pointer to the enclosing origin_circuit_t.
|
||
* Assert if the cast is impossible. */
|
||
static origin_circuit_t *TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circuit_t *);
|
||
static const origin_circuit_t *CONST_TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(const circuit_t *);
|
||
|
||
/** Return 1 iff <b>node</b> has Exit flag and no BadExit flag.
|
||
* Otherwise, return 0.
|
||
*/
|
||
static inline int node_is_good_exit(const node_t *node)
|
||
{
|
||
return node->is_exit && ! node->is_bad_exit;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
static inline or_circuit_t *TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circuit_t *x)
|
||
{
|
||
tor_assert(x->magic == OR_CIRCUIT_MAGIC);
|
||
return DOWNCAST(or_circuit_t, x);
|
||
}
|
||
static inline const or_circuit_t *CONST_TO_OR_CIRCUIT(const circuit_t *x)
|
||
{
|
||
tor_assert(x->magic == OR_CIRCUIT_MAGIC);
|
||
return DOWNCAST(or_circuit_t, x);
|
||
}
|
||
static inline origin_circuit_t *TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circuit_t *x)
|
||
{
|
||
tor_assert(x->magic == ORIGIN_CIRCUIT_MAGIC);
|
||
return DOWNCAST(origin_circuit_t, x);
|
||
}
|
||
static inline const origin_circuit_t *CONST_TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(
|
||
const circuit_t *x)
|
||
{
|
||
tor_assert(x->magic == ORIGIN_CIRCUIT_MAGIC);
|
||
return DOWNCAST(origin_circuit_t, x);
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
/* limits for TCP send and recv buffer size used for constrained sockets */
|
||
#define MIN_CONSTRAINED_TCP_BUFFER 2048
|
||
#define MAX_CONSTRAINED_TCP_BUFFER 262144 /* 256k */
|
||
|
||
/** @name Isolation flags
|
||
|
||
Ways to isolate client streams
|
||
|
||
@{
|
||
*/
|
||
/** Isolate based on destination port */
|
||
#define ISO_DESTPORT (1u<<0)
|
||
/** Isolate based on destination address */
|
||
#define ISO_DESTADDR (1u<<1)
|
||
/** Isolate based on SOCKS authentication */
|
||
#define ISO_SOCKSAUTH (1u<<2)
|
||
/** Isolate based on client protocol choice */
|
||
#define ISO_CLIENTPROTO (1u<<3)
|
||
/** Isolate based on client address */
|
||
#define ISO_CLIENTADDR (1u<<4)
|
||
/** Isolate based on session group (always on). */
|
||
#define ISO_SESSIONGRP (1u<<5)
|
||
/** Isolate based on newnym epoch (always on). */
|
||
#define ISO_NYM_EPOCH (1u<<6)
|
||
/** Isolate all streams (Internal only). */
|
||
#define ISO_STREAM (1u<<7)
|
||
/**@}*/
|
||
|
||
/** Default isolation level for ports. */
|
||
#define ISO_DEFAULT (ISO_CLIENTADDR|ISO_SOCKSAUTH|ISO_SESSIONGRP|ISO_NYM_EPOCH)
|
||
|
||
/** Indicates that we haven't yet set a session group on a port_cfg_t. */
|
||
#define SESSION_GROUP_UNSET -1
|
||
/** Session group reserved for directory connections */
|
||
#define SESSION_GROUP_DIRCONN -2
|
||
/** Session group reserved for resolve requests launched by a controller */
|
||
#define SESSION_GROUP_CONTROL_RESOLVE -3
|
||
/** First automatically allocated session group number */
|
||
#define SESSION_GROUP_FIRST_AUTO -4
|
||
|
||
/** Configuration for a single port that we're listening on. */
|
||
typedef struct port_cfg_t {
|
||
tor_addr_t addr; /**< The actual IP to listen on, if !is_unix_addr. */
|
||
int port; /**< The configured port, or CFG_AUTO_PORT to tell Tor to pick its
|
||
* own port. */
|
||
uint8_t type; /**< One of CONN_TYPE_*_LISTENER */
|
||
unsigned is_unix_addr : 1; /**< True iff this is an AF_UNIX address. */
|
||
|
||
unsigned is_group_writable : 1;
|
||
unsigned is_world_writable : 1;
|
||
unsigned relax_dirmode_check : 1;
|
||
|
||
entry_port_cfg_t entry_cfg;
|
||
|
||
server_port_cfg_t server_cfg;
|
||
|
||
/* Unix sockets only: */
|
||
/** Path for an AF_UNIX address */
|
||
char unix_addr[FLEXIBLE_ARRAY_MEMBER];
|
||
} port_cfg_t;
|
||
|
||
typedef struct routerset_t routerset_t;
|
||
|
||
/** A magic value for the (Socks|OR|...)Port options below, telling Tor
|
||
* to pick its own port. */
|
||
#define CFG_AUTO_PORT 0xc4005e
|
||
|
||
/** Enumeration of outbound address configuration types:
|
||
* Exit-only, OR-only, or both */
|
||
typedef enum {OUTBOUND_ADDR_EXIT, OUTBOUND_ADDR_OR,
|
||
OUTBOUND_ADDR_EXIT_AND_OR,
|
||
OUTBOUND_ADDR_MAX} outbound_addr_t;
|
||
|
||
/** Configuration options for a Tor process. */
|
||
typedef struct {
|
||
uint32_t magic_;
|
||
|
||
/** What should the tor process actually do? */
|
||
enum {
|
||
CMD_RUN_TOR=0, CMD_LIST_FINGERPRINT, CMD_HASH_PASSWORD,
|
||
CMD_VERIFY_CONFIG, CMD_RUN_UNITTESTS, CMD_DUMP_CONFIG,
|
||
CMD_KEYGEN
|
||
} command;
|
||
char *command_arg; /**< Argument for command-line option. */
|
||
|
||
config_line_t *Logs; /**< New-style list of configuration lines
|
||
* for logs */
|
||
int LogTimeGranularity; /**< Log resolution in milliseconds. */
|
||
|
||
int LogMessageDomains; /**< Boolean: Should we log the domain(s) in which
|
||
* each log message occurs? */
|
||
int TruncateLogFile; /**< Boolean: Should we truncate the log file
|
||
before we start writing? */
|
||
char *SyslogIdentityTag; /**< Identity tag to add for syslog logging. */
|
||
|
||
char *DebugLogFile; /**< Where to send verbose log messages. */
|
||
char *DataDirectory; /**< OR only: where to store long-term data. */
|
||
int DataDirectoryGroupReadable; /**< Boolean: Is the DataDirectory g+r? */
|
||
char *Nickname; /**< OR only: nickname of this onion router. */
|
||
char *Address; /**< OR only: configured address for this onion router. */
|
||
char *PidFile; /**< Where to store PID of Tor process. */
|
||
|
||
routerset_t *ExitNodes; /**< Structure containing nicknames, digests,
|
||
* country codes and IP address patterns of ORs to
|
||
* consider as exits. */
|
||
routerset_t *EntryNodes;/**< Structure containing nicknames, digests,
|
||
* country codes and IP address patterns of ORs to
|
||
* consider as entry points. */
|
||
int StrictNodes; /**< Boolean: When none of our EntryNodes or ExitNodes
|
||
* are up, or we need to access a node in ExcludeNodes,
|
||
* do we just fail instead? */
|
||
routerset_t *ExcludeNodes;/**< Structure containing nicknames, digests,
|
||
* country codes and IP address patterns of ORs
|
||
* not to use in circuits. But see StrictNodes
|
||
* above. */
|
||
routerset_t *ExcludeExitNodes;/**< Structure containing nicknames, digests,
|
||
* country codes and IP address patterns of
|
||
* ORs not to consider as exits. */
|
||
|
||
/** Union of ExcludeNodes and ExcludeExitNodes */
|
||
routerset_t *ExcludeExitNodesUnion_;
|
||
|
||
int DisableAllSwap; /**< Boolean: Attempt to call mlockall() on our
|
||
* process for all current and future memory. */
|
||
|
||
config_line_t *ExitPolicy; /**< Lists of exit policy components. */
|
||
int ExitPolicyRejectPrivate; /**< Should we not exit to reserved private
|
||
* addresses, and our own published addresses?
|
||
*/
|
||
int ExitPolicyRejectLocalInterfaces; /**< Should we not exit to local
|
||
* interface addresses?
|
||
* Includes OutboundBindAddresses and
|
||
* configured ports. */
|
||
config_line_t *SocksPolicy; /**< Lists of socks policy components */
|
||
config_line_t *DirPolicy; /**< Lists of dir policy components */
|
||
/** Local address to bind outbound sockets */
|
||
config_line_t *OutboundBindAddress;
|
||
/** Local address to bind outbound relay sockets */
|
||
config_line_t *OutboundBindAddressOR;
|
||
/** Local address to bind outbound exit sockets */
|
||
config_line_t *OutboundBindAddressExit;
|
||
/** Addresses derived from the various OutboundBindAddress lines.
|
||
* [][0] is IPv4, [][1] is IPv6
|
||
*/
|
||
tor_addr_t OutboundBindAddresses[OUTBOUND_ADDR_MAX][2];
|
||
/** Directory server only: which versions of
|
||
* Tor should we tell users to run? */
|
||
config_line_t *RecommendedVersions;
|
||
config_line_t *RecommendedClientVersions;
|
||
config_line_t *RecommendedServerVersions;
|
||
config_line_t *RecommendedPackages;
|
||
/** Whether dirservers allow router descriptors with private IPs. */
|
||
int DirAllowPrivateAddresses;
|
||
/** Whether routers accept EXTEND cells to routers with private IPs. */
|
||
int ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses;
|
||
char *User; /**< Name of user to run Tor as. */
|
||
config_line_t *ORPort_lines; /**< Ports to listen on for OR connections. */
|
||
/** Ports to listen on for extended OR connections. */
|
||
config_line_t *ExtORPort_lines;
|
||
/** Ports to listen on for SOCKS connections. */
|
||
config_line_t *SocksPort_lines;
|
||
/** Ports to listen on for transparent pf/netfilter connections. */
|
||
config_line_t *TransPort_lines;
|
||
const char *TransProxyType; /**< What kind of transparent proxy
|
||
* implementation are we using? */
|
||
/** Parsed value of TransProxyType. */
|
||
enum {
|
||
TPT_DEFAULT,
|
||
TPT_PF_DIVERT,
|
||
TPT_IPFW,
|
||
TPT_TPROXY,
|
||
} TransProxyType_parsed;
|
||
config_line_t *NATDPort_lines; /**< Ports to listen on for transparent natd
|
||
* connections. */
|
||
config_line_t *ControlPort_lines; /**< Ports to listen on for control
|
||
* connections. */
|
||
config_line_t *ControlSocket; /**< List of Unix Domain Sockets to listen on
|
||
* for control connections. */
|
||
|
||
int ControlSocketsGroupWritable; /**< Boolean: Are control sockets g+rw? */
|
||
int SocksSocketsGroupWritable; /**< Boolean: Are SOCKS sockets g+rw? */
|
||
/** Ports to listen on for directory connections. */
|
||
config_line_t *DirPort_lines;
|
||
config_line_t *DNSPort_lines; /**< Ports to listen on for DNS requests. */
|
||
|
||
/* MaxMemInQueues value as input by the user. We clean this up to be
|
||
* MaxMemInQueues. */
|
||
uint64_t MaxMemInQueues_raw;
|
||
uint64_t MaxMemInQueues;/**< If we have more memory than this allocated
|
||
* for queues and buffers, run the OOM handler */
|
||
/** Above this value, consider ourselves low on RAM. */
|
||
uint64_t MaxMemInQueues_low_threshold;
|
||
|
||
/** @name port booleans
|
||
*
|
||
* Derived booleans: For server ports and ControlPort, true iff there is a
|
||
* non-listener port on an AF_INET or AF_INET6 address of the given type
|
||
* configured in one of the _lines options above.
|
||
* For client ports, also true if there is a unix socket configured.
|
||
* If you are checking for client ports, you may want to use:
|
||
* SocksPort_set || TransPort_set || NATDPort_set || DNSPort_set
|
||
* rather than SocksPort_set.
|
||
*
|
||
* @{
|
||
*/
|
||
unsigned int ORPort_set : 1;
|
||
unsigned int SocksPort_set : 1;
|
||
unsigned int TransPort_set : 1;
|
||
unsigned int NATDPort_set : 1;
|
||
unsigned int ControlPort_set : 1;
|
||
unsigned int DirPort_set : 1;
|
||
unsigned int DNSPort_set : 1;
|
||
unsigned int ExtORPort_set : 1;
|
||
/**@}*/
|
||
|
||
int AssumeReachable; /**< Whether to publish our descriptor regardless. */
|
||
int AuthoritativeDir; /**< Boolean: is this an authoritative directory? */
|
||
int V3AuthoritativeDir; /**< Boolean: is this an authoritative directory
|
||
* for version 3 directories? */
|
||
int VersioningAuthoritativeDir; /**< Boolean: is this an authoritative
|
||
* directory that's willing to recommend
|
||
* versions? */
|
||
int BridgeAuthoritativeDir; /**< Boolean: is this an authoritative directory
|
||
* that aggregates bridge descriptors? */
|
||
|
||
/** If set on a bridge authority, it will answer requests on its dirport
|
||
* for bridge statuses -- but only if the requests use this password. */
|
||
char *BridgePassword;
|
||
/** If BridgePassword is set, this is a SHA256 digest of the basic http
|
||
* authenticator for it. Used so we can do a time-independent comparison. */
|
||
char *BridgePassword_AuthDigest_;
|
||
|
||
int UseBridges; /**< Boolean: should we start all circuits with a bridge? */
|
||
config_line_t *Bridges; /**< List of bootstrap bridge addresses. */
|
||
|
||
config_line_t *ClientTransportPlugin; /**< List of client
|
||
transport plugins. */
|
||
|
||
config_line_t *ServerTransportPlugin; /**< List of client
|
||
transport plugins. */
|
||
|
||
/** List of TCP/IP addresses that transports should listen at. */
|
||
config_line_t *ServerTransportListenAddr;
|
||
|
||
/** List of options that must be passed to pluggable transports. */
|
||
config_line_t *ServerTransportOptions;
|
||
|
||
int BridgeRelay; /**< Boolean: are we acting as a bridge relay? We make
|
||
* this explicit so we can change how we behave in the
|
||
* future. */
|
||
|
||
/** Boolean: if we know the bridge's digest, should we get new
|
||
* descriptors from the bridge authorities or from the bridge itself? */
|
||
int UpdateBridgesFromAuthority;
|
||
|
||
int AvoidDiskWrites; /**< Boolean: should we never cache things to disk?
|
||
* Not used yet. */
|
||
int ClientOnly; /**< Boolean: should we never evolve into a server role? */
|
||
|
||
int ReducedConnectionPadding; /**< Boolean: Should we try to keep connections
|
||
open shorter and pad them less against
|
||
connection-level traffic analysis? */
|
||
/** Autobool: if auto, then connection padding will be negotiated by client
|
||
* and server. If 0, it will be fully disabled. If 1, the client will still
|
||
* pad to the server regardless of server support. */
|
||
int ConnectionPadding;
|
||
|
||
/** To what authority types do we publish our descriptor? Choices are
|
||
* "v1", "v2", "v3", "bridge", or "". */
|
||
smartlist_t *PublishServerDescriptor;
|
||
/** A bitfield of authority types, derived from PublishServerDescriptor. */
|
||
dirinfo_type_t PublishServerDescriptor_;
|
||
/** Boolean: do we publish hidden service descriptors to the HS auths? */
|
||
int PublishHidServDescriptors;
|
||
int FetchServerDescriptors; /**< Do we fetch server descriptors as normal? */
|
||
int FetchHidServDescriptors; /**< and hidden service descriptors? */
|
||
|
||
int MinUptimeHidServDirectoryV2; /**< As directory authority, accept hidden
|
||
* service directories after what time? */
|
||
|
||
int FetchUselessDescriptors; /**< Do we fetch non-running descriptors too? */
|
||
int AllDirActionsPrivate; /**< Should every directory action be sent
|
||
* through a Tor circuit? */
|
||
|
||
/** Run in 'tor2web mode'? (I.e. only make client connections to hidden
|
||
* services, and use a single hop for all hidden-service-related
|
||
* circuits.) */
|
||
int Tor2webMode;
|
||
|
||
/** A routerset that should be used when picking RPs for HS circuits. */
|
||
routerset_t *Tor2webRendezvousPoints;
|
||
|
||
/** Onion Services in HiddenServiceSingleHopMode make one-hop (direct)
|
||
* circuits between the onion service server, and the introduction and
|
||
* rendezvous points. (Onion service descriptors are still posted using
|
||
* 3-hop paths, to avoid onion service directories blocking the service.)
|
||
* This option makes every hidden service instance hosted by
|
||
* this tor instance a Single Onion Service.
|
||
* HiddenServiceSingleHopMode requires HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode to be
|
||
* set to 1.
|
||
* Use rend_service_allow_non_anonymous_connection() or
|
||
* rend_service_reveal_startup_time() instead of using this option directly.
|
||
*/
|
||
int HiddenServiceSingleHopMode;
|
||
/* Makes hidden service clients and servers non-anonymous on this tor
|
||
* instance. Allows the non-anonymous HiddenServiceSingleHopMode. Enables
|
||
* non-anonymous behaviour in the hidden service protocol.
|
||
* Use rend_service_non_anonymous_mode_enabled() instead of using this option
|
||
* directly.
|
||
*/
|
||
int HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode;
|
||
|
||
int ConnLimit; /**< Demanded minimum number of simultaneous connections. */
|
||
int ConnLimit_; /**< Maximum allowed number of simultaneous connections. */
|
||
int ConnLimit_high_thresh; /**< start trying to lower socket usage if we
|
||
* have this many. */
|
||
int ConnLimit_low_thresh; /**< try to get down to here after socket
|
||
* exhaustion. */
|
||
int RunAsDaemon; /**< If true, run in the background. (Unix only) */
|
||
int FascistFirewall; /**< Whether to prefer ORs reachable on open ports. */
|
||
smartlist_t *FirewallPorts; /**< Which ports our firewall allows
|
||
* (strings). */
|
||
config_line_t *ReachableAddresses; /**< IP:ports our firewall allows. */
|
||
config_line_t *ReachableORAddresses; /**< IP:ports for OR conns. */
|
||
config_line_t *ReachableDirAddresses; /**< IP:ports for Dir conns. */
|
||
|
||
int ConstrainedSockets; /**< Shrink xmit and recv socket buffers. */
|
||
uint64_t ConstrainedSockSize; /**< Size of constrained buffers. */
|
||
|
||
/** Whether we should drop exit streams from Tors that we don't know are
|
||
* relays. One of "0" (never refuse), "1" (always refuse), or "-1" (do
|
||
* what the consensus says, defaulting to 'refuse' if the consensus says
|
||
* nothing). */
|
||
int RefuseUnknownExits;
|
||
|
||
/** Application ports that require all nodes in circ to have sufficient
|
||
* uptime. */
|
||
smartlist_t *LongLivedPorts;
|
||
/** Application ports that are likely to be unencrypted and
|
||
* unauthenticated; we reject requests for them to prevent the
|
||
* user from screwing up and leaking plaintext secrets to an
|
||
* observer somewhere on the Internet. */
|
||
smartlist_t *RejectPlaintextPorts;
|
||
/** Related to RejectPlaintextPorts above, except this config option
|
||
* controls whether we warn (in the log and via a controller status
|
||
* event) every time a risky connection is attempted. */
|
||
smartlist_t *WarnPlaintextPorts;
|
||
/** Should we try to reuse the same exit node for a given host */
|
||
smartlist_t *TrackHostExits;
|
||
int TrackHostExitsExpire; /**< Number of seconds until we expire an
|
||
* addressmap */
|
||
config_line_t *AddressMap; /**< List of address map directives. */
|
||
int AutomapHostsOnResolve; /**< If true, when we get a resolve request for a
|
||
* hostname ending with one of the suffixes in
|
||
* <b>AutomapHostsSuffixes</b>, map it to a
|
||
* virtual address. */
|
||
/** List of suffixes for <b>AutomapHostsOnResolve</b>. The special value
|
||
* "." means "match everything." */
|
||
smartlist_t *AutomapHostsSuffixes;
|
||
int RendPostPeriod; /**< How often do we post each rendezvous service
|
||
* descriptor? Remember to publish them independently. */
|
||
int KeepalivePeriod; /**< How often do we send padding cells to keep
|
||
* connections alive? */
|
||
int SocksTimeout; /**< How long do we let a socks connection wait
|
||
* unattached before we fail it? */
|
||
int LearnCircuitBuildTimeout; /**< If non-zero, we attempt to learn a value
|
||
* for CircuitBuildTimeout based on timeout
|
||
* history. Use circuit_build_times_disabled()
|
||
* rather than checking this value directly. */
|
||
int CircuitBuildTimeout; /**< Cull non-open circuits that were born at
|
||
* least this many seconds ago. Used until
|
||
* adaptive algorithm learns a new value. */
|
||
int CircuitsAvailableTimeout; /**< Try to have an open circuit for at
|
||
least this long after last activity */
|
||
int CircuitStreamTimeout; /**< If non-zero, detach streams from circuits
|
||
* and try a new circuit if the stream has been
|
||
* waiting for this many seconds. If zero, use
|
||
* our default internal timeout schedule. */
|
||
int MaxOnionQueueDelay; /*< DOCDOC */
|
||
int NewCircuitPeriod; /**< How long do we use a circuit before building
|
||
* a new one? */
|
||
int MaxCircuitDirtiness; /**< Never use circs that were first used more than
|
||
this interval ago. */
|
||
uint64_t BandwidthRate; /**< How much bandwidth, on average, are we willing
|
||
* to use in a second? */
|
||
uint64_t BandwidthBurst; /**< How much bandwidth, at maximum, are we willing
|
||
* to use in a second? */
|
||
uint64_t MaxAdvertisedBandwidth; /**< How much bandwidth are we willing to
|
||
* tell other nodes we have? */
|
||
uint64_t RelayBandwidthRate; /**< How much bandwidth, on average, are we
|
||
* willing to use for all relayed conns? */
|
||
uint64_t RelayBandwidthBurst; /**< How much bandwidth, at maximum, will we
|
||
* use in a second for all relayed conns? */
|
||
uint64_t PerConnBWRate; /**< Long-term bw on a single TLS conn, if set. */
|
||
uint64_t PerConnBWBurst; /**< Allowed burst on a single TLS conn, if set. */
|
||
int NumCPUs; /**< How many CPUs should we try to use? */
|
||
config_line_t *RendConfigLines; /**< List of configuration lines
|
||
* for rendezvous services. */
|
||
config_line_t *HidServAuth; /**< List of configuration lines for client-side
|
||
* authorizations for hidden services */
|
||
char *ContactInfo; /**< Contact info to be published in the directory. */
|
||
|
||
int HeartbeatPeriod; /**< Log heartbeat messages after this many seconds
|
||
* have passed. */
|
||
|
||
char *HTTPProxy; /**< hostname[:port] to use as http proxy, if any. */
|
||
tor_addr_t HTTPProxyAddr; /**< Parsed IPv4 addr for http proxy, if any. */
|
||
uint16_t HTTPProxyPort; /**< Parsed port for http proxy, if any. */
|
||
char *HTTPProxyAuthenticator; /**< username:password string, if any. */
|
||
|
||
char *HTTPSProxy; /**< hostname[:port] to use as https proxy, if any. */
|
||
tor_addr_t HTTPSProxyAddr; /**< Parsed addr for https proxy, if any. */
|
||
uint16_t HTTPSProxyPort; /**< Parsed port for https proxy, if any. */
|
||
char *HTTPSProxyAuthenticator; /**< username:password string, if any. */
|
||
|
||
char *Socks4Proxy; /**< hostname:port to use as a SOCKS4 proxy, if any. */
|
||
tor_addr_t Socks4ProxyAddr; /**< Derived from Socks4Proxy. */
|
||
uint16_t Socks4ProxyPort; /**< Derived from Socks4Proxy. */
|
||
|
||
char *Socks5Proxy; /**< hostname:port to use as a SOCKS5 proxy, if any. */
|
||
tor_addr_t Socks5ProxyAddr; /**< Derived from Sock5Proxy. */
|
||
uint16_t Socks5ProxyPort; /**< Derived from Socks5Proxy. */
|
||
char *Socks5ProxyUsername; /**< Username for SOCKS5 authentication, if any */
|
||
char *Socks5ProxyPassword; /**< Password for SOCKS5 authentication, if any */
|
||
|
||
/** List of configuration lines for replacement directory authorities.
|
||
* If you just want to replace one class of authority at a time,
|
||
* use the "Alternate*Authority" options below instead. */
|
||
config_line_t *DirAuthorities;
|
||
|
||
/** List of fallback directory servers */
|
||
config_line_t *FallbackDir;
|
||
/** Whether to use the default hard-coded FallbackDirs */
|
||
int UseDefaultFallbackDirs;
|
||
|
||
/** Weight to apply to all directory authority rates if considering them
|
||
* along with fallbackdirs */
|
||
double DirAuthorityFallbackRate;
|
||
|
||
/** If set, use these main (currently v3) directory authorities and
|
||
* not the default ones. */
|
||
config_line_t *AlternateDirAuthority;
|
||
|
||
/** If set, use these bridge authorities and not the default one. */
|
||
config_line_t *AlternateBridgeAuthority;
|
||
|
||
config_line_t *MyFamily_lines; /**< Declared family for this OR. */
|
||
config_line_t *MyFamily; /**< Declared family for this OR, normalized */
|
||
config_line_t *NodeFamilies; /**< List of config lines for
|
||
* node families */
|
||
smartlist_t *NodeFamilySets; /**< List of parsed NodeFamilies values. */
|
||
config_line_t *AuthDirBadExit; /**< Address policy for descriptors to
|
||
* mark as bad exits. */
|
||
config_line_t *AuthDirReject; /**< Address policy for descriptors to
|
||
* reject. */
|
||
config_line_t *AuthDirInvalid; /**< Address policy for descriptors to
|
||
* never mark as valid. */
|
||
/** @name AuthDir...CC
|
||
*
|
||
* Lists of country codes to mark as BadExit, or Invalid, or to
|
||
* reject entirely.
|
||
*
|
||
* @{
|
||
*/
|
||
smartlist_t *AuthDirBadExitCCs;
|
||
smartlist_t *AuthDirInvalidCCs;
|
||
smartlist_t *AuthDirRejectCCs;
|
||
/**@}*/
|
||
|
||
int AuthDirListBadExits; /**< True iff we should list bad exits,
|
||
* and vote for all other exits as good. */
|
||
int AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr; /**< Do not permit more than this
|
||
* number of servers per IP address. */
|
||
int AuthDirHasIPv6Connectivity; /**< Boolean: are we on IPv6? */
|
||
int AuthDirPinKeys; /**< Boolean: Do we enforce key-pinning? */
|
||
|
||
/** If non-zero, always vote the Fast flag for any relay advertising
|
||
* this amount of capacity or more. */
|
||
uint64_t AuthDirFastGuarantee;
|
||
|
||
/** If non-zero, this advertised capacity or more is always sufficient
|
||
* to satisfy the bandwidth requirement for the Guard flag. */
|
||
uint64_t AuthDirGuardBWGuarantee;
|
||
|
||
char *AccountingStart; /**< How long is the accounting interval, and when
|
||
* does it start? */
|
||
uint64_t AccountingMax; /**< How many bytes do we allow per accounting
|
||
* interval before hibernation? 0 for "never
|
||
* hibernate." */
|
||
/** How do we determine when our AccountingMax has been reached?
|
||
* "max" for when in or out reaches AccountingMax
|
||
* "sum" for when in plus out reaches AccountingMax
|
||
* "in" for when in reaches AccountingMax
|
||
* "out" for when out reaches AccountingMax */
|
||
char *AccountingRule_option;
|
||
enum { ACCT_MAX, ACCT_SUM, ACCT_IN, ACCT_OUT } AccountingRule;
|
||
|
||
/** Base64-encoded hash of accepted passwords for the control system. */
|
||
config_line_t *HashedControlPassword;
|
||
/** As HashedControlPassword, but not saved. */
|
||
config_line_t *HashedControlSessionPassword;
|
||
|
||
int CookieAuthentication; /**< Boolean: do we enable cookie-based auth for
|
||
* the control system? */
|
||
char *CookieAuthFile; /**< Filesystem location of a ControlPort
|
||
* authentication cookie. */
|
||
char *ExtORPortCookieAuthFile; /**< Filesystem location of Extended
|
||
* ORPort authentication cookie. */
|
||
int CookieAuthFileGroupReadable; /**< Boolean: Is the CookieAuthFile g+r? */
|
||
int ExtORPortCookieAuthFileGroupReadable; /**< Boolean: Is the
|
||
* ExtORPortCookieAuthFile g+r? */
|
||
int LeaveStreamsUnattached; /**< Boolean: Does Tor attach new streams to
|
||
* circuits itself (0), or does it expect a controller
|
||
* to cope? (1) */
|
||
int DisablePredictedCircuits; /**< Boolean: does Tor preemptively
|
||
* make circuits in the background (0),
|
||
* or not (1)? */
|
||
|
||
/** Process specifier for a controller that ‘owns’ this Tor
|
||
* instance. Tor will terminate if its owning controller does. */
|
||
char *OwningControllerProcess;
|
||
|
||
int ShutdownWaitLength; /**< When we get a SIGINT and we're a server, how
|
||
* long do we wait before exiting? */
|
||
char *SafeLogging; /**< Contains "relay", "1", "0" (meaning no scrubbing). */
|
||
|
||
/* Derived from SafeLogging */
|
||
enum {
|
||
SAFELOG_SCRUB_ALL, SAFELOG_SCRUB_RELAY, SAFELOG_SCRUB_NONE
|
||
} SafeLogging_;
|
||
|
||
int Sandbox; /**< Boolean: should sandboxing be enabled? */
|
||
int SafeSocks; /**< Boolean: should we outright refuse application
|
||
* connections that use socks4 or socks5-with-local-dns? */
|
||
#define LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN (get_options()->ProtocolWarnings ? \
|
||
LOG_WARN : LOG_INFO)
|
||
int ProtocolWarnings; /**< Boolean: when other parties screw up the Tor
|
||
* protocol, is it a warn or an info in our logs? */
|
||
int TestSocks; /**< Boolean: when we get a socks connection, do we loudly
|
||
* log whether it was DNS-leaking or not? */
|
||
int HardwareAccel; /**< Boolean: Should we enable OpenSSL hardware
|
||
* acceleration where available? */
|
||
/** Token Bucket Refill resolution in milliseconds. */
|
||
int TokenBucketRefillInterval;
|
||
char *AccelName; /**< Optional hardware acceleration engine name. */
|
||
char *AccelDir; /**< Optional hardware acceleration engine search dir. */
|
||
|
||
/** Boolean: Do we try to enter from a smallish number
|
||
* of fixed nodes? */
|
||
int UseEntryGuards_option;
|
||
/** Internal variable to remember whether we're actually acting on
|
||
* UseEntryGuards_option -- when we're a non-anonymous Tor2web client or
|
||
* Single Onion Service, it is alwasy false, otherwise we use the value of
|
||
* UseEntryGuards_option. */
|
||
int UseEntryGuards;
|
||
|
||
int NumEntryGuards; /**< How many entry guards do we try to establish? */
|
||
|
||
/** If 1, we use any guardfraction information we see in the
|
||
* consensus. If 0, we don't. If -1, let the consensus parameter
|
||
* decide. */
|
||
int UseGuardFraction;
|
||
|
||
int NumDirectoryGuards; /**< How many dir guards do we try to establish?
|
||
* If 0, use value from NumEntryGuards. */
|
||
int RephistTrackTime; /**< How many seconds do we keep rephist info? */
|
||
/** Should we always fetch our dir info on the mirror schedule (which
|
||
* means directly from the authorities) no matter our other config? */
|
||
int FetchDirInfoEarly;
|
||
|
||
/** Should we fetch our dir info at the start of the consensus period? */
|
||
int FetchDirInfoExtraEarly;
|
||
|
||
int DirCache; /**< Cache all directory documents and accept requests via
|
||
* tunnelled dir conns from clients. If 1, enabled (default);
|
||
* If 0, disabled. */
|
||
|
||
char *VirtualAddrNetworkIPv4; /**< Address and mask to hand out for virtual
|
||
* MAPADDRESS requests for IPv4 addresses */
|
||
char *VirtualAddrNetworkIPv6; /**< Address and mask to hand out for virtual
|
||
* MAPADDRESS requests for IPv6 addresses */
|
||
int ServerDNSSearchDomains; /**< Boolean: If set, we don't force exit
|
||
* addresses to be FQDNs, but rather search for them in
|
||
* the local domains. */
|
||
int ServerDNSDetectHijacking; /**< Boolean: If true, check for DNS failure
|
||
* hijacking. */
|
||
int ServerDNSRandomizeCase; /**< Boolean: Use the 0x20-hack to prevent
|
||
* DNS poisoning attacks. */
|
||
char *ServerDNSResolvConfFile; /**< If provided, we configure our internal
|
||
* resolver from the file here rather than from
|
||
* /etc/resolv.conf (Unix) or the registry (Windows). */
|
||
char *DirPortFrontPage; /**< This is a full path to a file with an html
|
||
disclaimer. This allows a server administrator to show
|
||
that they're running Tor and anyone visiting their server
|
||
will know this without any specialized knowledge. */
|
||
int DisableDebuggerAttachment; /**< Currently Linux only specific attempt to
|
||
disable ptrace; needs BSD testing. */
|
||
/** Boolean: if set, we start even if our resolv.conf file is missing
|
||
* or broken. */
|
||
int ServerDNSAllowBrokenConfig;
|
||
/** Boolean: if set, then even connections to private addresses will get
|
||
* rate-limited. */
|
||
int CountPrivateBandwidth;
|
||
smartlist_t *ServerDNSTestAddresses; /**< A list of addresses that definitely
|
||
* should be resolvable. Used for
|
||
* testing our DNS server. */
|
||
int EnforceDistinctSubnets; /**< If true, don't allow multiple routers in the
|
||
* same network zone in the same circuit. */
|
||
int PortForwarding; /**< If true, use NAT-PMP or UPnP to automatically
|
||
* forward the DirPort and ORPort on the NAT device */
|
||
char *PortForwardingHelper; /** < Filename or full path of the port
|
||
forwarding helper executable */
|
||
int AllowNonRFC953Hostnames; /**< If true, we allow connections to hostnames
|
||
* with weird characters. */
|
||
/** If true, we try resolving hostnames with weird characters. */
|
||
int ServerDNSAllowNonRFC953Hostnames;
|
||
|
||
/** If true, we try to download extra-info documents (and we serve them,
|
||
* if we are a cache). For authorities, this is always true. */
|
||
int DownloadExtraInfo;
|
||
|
||
/** If true, we convert "www.google.com.foo.exit" addresses on the
|
||
* socks/trans/natd ports into "www.google.com" addresses that
|
||
* exit from the node "foo". Disabled by default since attacking
|
||
* websites and exit relays can use it to manipulate your path
|
||
* selection. */
|
||
int AllowDotExit;
|
||
|
||
/** If true, we're configured to collect statistics on clients
|
||
* requesting network statuses from us as directory. */
|
||
int DirReqStatistics_option;
|
||
/** Internal variable to remember whether we're actually acting on
|
||
* DirReqStatistics_option -- yes if it's set and we're a server, else no. */
|
||
int DirReqStatistics;
|
||
|
||
/** If true, the user wants us to collect statistics on port usage. */
|
||
int ExitPortStatistics;
|
||
|
||
/** If true, the user wants us to collect connection statistics. */
|
||
int ConnDirectionStatistics;
|
||
|
||
/** If true, the user wants us to collect cell statistics. */
|
||
int CellStatistics;
|
||
|
||
/** If true, the user wants us to collect padding statistics. */
|
||
int PaddingStatistics;
|
||
|
||
/** If true, the user wants us to collect statistics as entry node. */
|
||
int EntryStatistics;
|
||
|
||
/** If true, the user wants us to collect statistics as hidden service
|
||
* directory, introduction point, or rendezvous point. */
|
||
int HiddenServiceStatistics_option;
|
||
/** Internal variable to remember whether we're actually acting on
|
||
* HiddenServiceStatistics_option -- yes if it's set and we're a server,
|
||
* else no. */
|
||
int HiddenServiceStatistics;
|
||
|
||
/** If true, include statistics file contents in extra-info documents. */
|
||
int ExtraInfoStatistics;
|
||
|
||
/** If true, do not believe anybody who tells us that a domain resolves
|
||
* to an internal address, or that an internal address has a PTR mapping.
|
||
* Helps avoid some cross-site attacks. */
|
||
int ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses;
|
||
|
||
/** If true, do not accept any requests to connect to internal addresses
|
||
* over randomly chosen exits. */
|
||
int ClientRejectInternalAddresses;
|
||
|
||
/** If true, clients may connect over IPv4. If false, they will avoid
|
||
* connecting over IPv4. We enforce this for OR and Dir connections. */
|
||
int ClientUseIPv4;
|
||
/** If true, clients may connect over IPv6. If false, they will avoid
|
||
* connecting over IPv4. We enforce this for OR and Dir connections.
|
||
* Use fascist_firewall_use_ipv6() instead of accessing this value
|
||
* directly. */
|
||
int ClientUseIPv6;
|
||
/** If true, prefer an IPv6 OR port over an IPv4 one for entry node
|
||
* connections. If auto, bridge clients prefer IPv6, and other clients
|
||
* prefer IPv4. Use node_ipv6_or_preferred() instead of accessing this value
|
||
* directly. */
|
||
int ClientPreferIPv6ORPort;
|
||
/** If true, prefer an IPv6 directory port over an IPv4 one for direct
|
||
* directory connections. If auto, bridge clients prefer IPv6, and other
|
||
* clients prefer IPv4. Use fascist_firewall_prefer_ipv6_dirport() instead of
|
||
* accessing this value directly. */
|
||
int ClientPreferIPv6DirPort;
|
||
|
||
/** The length of time that we think a consensus should be fresh. */
|
||
int V3AuthVotingInterval;
|
||
/** The length of time we think it will take to distribute votes. */
|
||
int V3AuthVoteDelay;
|
||
/** The length of time we think it will take to distribute signatures. */
|
||
int V3AuthDistDelay;
|
||
/** The number of intervals we think a consensus should be valid. */
|
||
int V3AuthNIntervalsValid;
|
||
|
||
/** Should advertise and sign consensuses with a legacy key, for key
|
||
* migration purposes? */
|
||
int V3AuthUseLegacyKey;
|
||
|
||
/** Location of bandwidth measurement file */
|
||
char *V3BandwidthsFile;
|
||
|
||
/** Location of guardfraction file */
|
||
char *GuardfractionFile;
|
||
|
||
/** Authority only: key=value pairs that we add to our networkstatus
|
||
* consensus vote on the 'params' line. */
|
||
char *ConsensusParams;
|
||
|
||
/** Authority only: minimum number of measured bandwidths we must see
|
||
* before we only believe measured bandwidths to assign flags. */
|
||
int MinMeasuredBWsForAuthToIgnoreAdvertised;
|
||
|
||
/** The length of time that we think an initial consensus should be fresh.
|
||
* Only altered on testing networks. */
|
||
int TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval;
|
||
|
||
/** The length of time we think it will take to distribute initial votes.
|
||
* Only altered on testing networks. */
|
||
int TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay;
|
||
|
||
/** The length of time we think it will take to distribute initial
|
||
* signatures. Only altered on testing networks.*/
|
||
int TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay;
|
||
|
||
/** Offset in seconds added to the starting time for consensus
|
||
voting. Only altered on testing networks. */
|
||
int TestingV3AuthVotingStartOffset;
|
||
|
||
/** If an authority has been around for less than this amount of time, it
|
||
* does not believe its reachability information is accurate. Only
|
||
* altered on testing networks. */
|
||
int TestingAuthDirTimeToLearnReachability;
|
||
|
||
/** Clients don't download any descriptor this recent, since it will
|
||
* probably not have propagated to enough caches. Only altered on testing
|
||
* networks. */
|
||
int TestingEstimatedDescriptorPropagationTime;
|
||
|
||
/** Schedule for when servers should download things in general. Only
|
||
* altered on testing networks. */
|
||
smartlist_t *TestingServerDownloadSchedule;
|
||
|
||
/** Schedule for when clients should download things in general. Only
|
||
* altered on testing networks. */
|
||
smartlist_t *TestingClientDownloadSchedule;
|
||
|
||
/** Schedule for when servers should download consensuses. Only altered
|
||
* on testing networks. */
|
||
smartlist_t *TestingServerConsensusDownloadSchedule;
|
||
|
||
/** Schedule for when clients should download consensuses. Only altered
|
||
* on testing networks. */
|
||
smartlist_t *TestingClientConsensusDownloadSchedule;
|
||
|
||
/** Schedule for when clients should download consensuses from authorities
|
||
* if they are bootstrapping (that is, they don't have a usable, reasonably
|
||
* live consensus). Only used by clients fetching from a list of fallback
|
||
* directory mirrors.
|
||
*
|
||
* This schedule is incremented by (potentially concurrent) connection
|
||
* attempts, unlike other schedules, which are incremented by connection
|
||
* failures. Only altered on testing networks. */
|
||
smartlist_t *ClientBootstrapConsensusAuthorityDownloadSchedule;
|
||
|
||
/** Schedule for when clients should download consensuses from fallback
|
||
* directory mirrors if they are bootstrapping (that is, they don't have a
|
||
* usable, reasonably live consensus). Only used by clients fetching from a
|
||
* list of fallback directory mirrors.
|
||
*
|
||
* This schedule is incremented by (potentially concurrent) connection
|
||
* attempts, unlike other schedules, which are incremented by connection
|
||
* failures. Only altered on testing networks. */
|
||
smartlist_t *ClientBootstrapConsensusFallbackDownloadSchedule;
|
||
|
||
/** Schedule for when clients should download consensuses from authorities
|
||
* if they are bootstrapping (that is, they don't have a usable, reasonably
|
||
* live consensus). Only used by clients which don't have or won't fetch
|
||
* from a list of fallback directory mirrors.
|
||
*
|
||
* This schedule is incremented by (potentially concurrent) connection
|
||
* attempts, unlike other schedules, which are incremented by connection
|
||
* failures. Only altered on testing networks. */
|
||
smartlist_t *ClientBootstrapConsensusAuthorityOnlyDownloadSchedule;
|
||
|
||
/** Schedule for when clients should download bridge descriptors. Only
|
||
* altered on testing networks. */
|
||
smartlist_t *TestingBridgeDownloadSchedule;
|
||
|
||
/** When directory clients have only a few descriptors to request, they
|
||
* batch them until they have more, or until this amount of time has
|
||
* passed. Only altered on testing networks. */
|
||
int TestingClientMaxIntervalWithoutRequest;
|
||
|
||
/** How long do we let a directory connection stall before expiring
|
||
* it? Only altered on testing networks. */
|
||
int TestingDirConnectionMaxStall;
|
||
|
||
/** How many times will we try to fetch a consensus before we give
|
||
* up? Only altered on testing networks. */
|
||
int TestingConsensusMaxDownloadTries;
|
||
|
||
/** How many times will a client try to fetch a consensus while
|
||
* bootstrapping using a list of fallback directories, before it gives up?
|
||
* Only altered on testing networks. */
|
||
int ClientBootstrapConsensusMaxDownloadTries;
|
||
|
||
/** How many times will a client try to fetch a consensus while
|
||
* bootstrapping using only a list of authorities, before it gives up?
|
||
* Only altered on testing networks. */
|
||
int ClientBootstrapConsensusAuthorityOnlyMaxDownloadTries;
|
||
|
||
/** How many simultaneous in-progress connections will we make when trying
|
||
* to fetch a consensus before we wait for one to complete, timeout, or
|
||
* error out? Only altered on testing networks. */
|
||
int ClientBootstrapConsensusMaxInProgressTries;
|
||
|
||
/** How many times will we try to download a router's descriptor before
|
||
* giving up? Only altered on testing networks. */
|
||
int TestingDescriptorMaxDownloadTries;
|
||
|
||
/** How many times will we try to download a microdescriptor before
|
||
* giving up? Only altered on testing networks. */
|
||
int TestingMicrodescMaxDownloadTries;
|
||
|
||
/** How many times will we try to fetch a certificate before giving
|
||
* up? Only altered on testing networks. */
|
||
int TestingCertMaxDownloadTries;
|
||
|
||
/** If true, we take part in a testing network. Change the defaults of a
|
||
* couple of other configuration options and allow to change the values
|
||
* of certain configuration options. */
|
||
int TestingTorNetwork;
|
||
|
||
/** Minimum value for the Exit flag threshold on testing networks. */
|
||
uint64_t TestingMinExitFlagThreshold;
|
||
|
||
/** Minimum value for the Fast flag threshold on testing networks. */
|
||
uint64_t TestingMinFastFlagThreshold;
|
||
|
||
/** Relays in a testing network which should be voted Exit
|
||
* regardless of exit policy. */
|
||
routerset_t *TestingDirAuthVoteExit;
|
||
int TestingDirAuthVoteExitIsStrict;
|
||
|
||
/** Relays in a testing network which should be voted Guard
|
||
* regardless of uptime and bandwidth. */
|
||
routerset_t *TestingDirAuthVoteGuard;
|
||
int TestingDirAuthVoteGuardIsStrict;
|
||
|
||
/** Relays in a testing network which should be voted HSDir
|
||
* regardless of uptime and DirPort. */
|
||
routerset_t *TestingDirAuthVoteHSDir;
|
||
int TestingDirAuthVoteHSDirIsStrict;
|
||
|
||
/** Enable CONN_BW events. Only altered on testing networks. */
|
||
int TestingEnableConnBwEvent;
|
||
|
||
/** Enable CELL_STATS events. Only altered on testing networks. */
|
||
int TestingEnableCellStatsEvent;
|
||
|
||
/** Enable TB_EMPTY events. Only altered on testing networks. */
|
||
int TestingEnableTbEmptyEvent;
|
||
|
||
/** If true, and we have GeoIP data, and we're a bridge, keep a per-country
|
||
* count of how many client addresses have contacted us so that we can help
|
||
* the bridge authority guess which countries have blocked access to us. */
|
||
int BridgeRecordUsageByCountry;
|
||
|
||
/** Optionally, IPv4 and IPv6 GeoIP data. */
|
||
char *GeoIPFile;
|
||
char *GeoIPv6File;
|
||
|
||
/** Autobool: if auto, then any attempt to Exclude{Exit,}Nodes a particular
|
||
* country code will exclude all nodes in ?? and A1. If true, all nodes in
|
||
* ?? and A1 are excluded. Has no effect if we don't know any GeoIP data. */
|
||
int GeoIPExcludeUnknown;
|
||
|
||
/** If true, SIGHUP should reload the torrc. Sometimes controllers want
|
||
* to make this false. */
|
||
int ReloadTorrcOnSIGHUP;
|
||
|
||
/* The main parameter for picking circuits within a connection.
|
||
*
|
||
* If this value is positive, when picking a cell to relay on a connection,
|
||
* we always relay from the circuit whose weighted cell count is lowest.
|
||
* Cells are weighted exponentially such that if one cell is sent
|
||
* 'CircuitPriorityHalflife' seconds before another, it counts for half as
|
||
* much.
|
||
*
|
||
* If this value is zero, we're disabling the cell-EWMA algorithm.
|
||
*
|
||
* If this value is negative, we're using the default approach
|
||
* according to either Tor or a parameter set in the consensus.
|
||
*/
|
||
double CircuitPriorityHalflife;
|
||
|
||
/** Set to true if the TestingTorNetwork configuration option is set.
|
||
* This is used so that options_validate() has a chance to realize that
|
||
* the defaults have changed. */
|
||
int UsingTestNetworkDefaults_;
|
||
|
||
/** If 1, we try to use microdescriptors to build circuits. If 0, we don't.
|
||
* If -1, Tor decides. */
|
||
int UseMicrodescriptors;
|
||
|
||
/** File where we should write the ControlPort. */
|
||
char *ControlPortWriteToFile;
|
||
/** Should that file be group-readable? */
|
||
int ControlPortFileGroupReadable;
|
||
|
||
#define MAX_MAX_CLIENT_CIRCUITS_PENDING 1024
|
||
/** Maximum number of non-open general-purpose origin circuits to allow at
|
||
* once. */
|
||
int MaxClientCircuitsPending;
|
||
|
||
/** If 1, we always send optimistic data when it's supported. If 0, we
|
||
* never use it. If -1, we do what the consensus says. */
|
||
int OptimisticData;
|
||
|
||
/** If 1, we accept and launch no external network connections, except on
|
||
* control ports. */
|
||
int DisableNetwork;
|
||
|
||
/**
|
||
* Parameters for path-bias detection.
|
||
* @{
|
||
* These options override the default behavior of Tor's (**currently
|
||
* experimental**) path bias detection algorithm. To try to find broken or
|
||
* misbehaving guard nodes, Tor looks for nodes where more than a certain
|
||
* fraction of circuits through that guard fail to get built.
|
||
*
|
||
* The PathBiasCircThreshold option controls how many circuits we need to
|
||
* build through a guard before we make these checks. The
|
||
* PathBiasNoticeRate, PathBiasWarnRate and PathBiasExtremeRate options
|
||
* control what fraction of circuits must succeed through a guard so we
|
||
* won't write log messages. If less than PathBiasExtremeRate circuits
|
||
* succeed *and* PathBiasDropGuards is set to 1, we disable use of that
|
||
* guard.
|
||
*
|
||
* When we have seen more than PathBiasScaleThreshold circuits through a
|
||
* guard, we scale our observations by 0.5 (governed by the consensus) so
|
||
* that new observations don't get swamped by old ones.
|
||
*
|
||
* By default, or if a negative value is provided for one of these options,
|
||
* Tor uses reasonable defaults from the networkstatus consensus document.
|
||
* If no defaults are available there, these options default to 150, .70,
|
||
* .50, .30, 0, and 300 respectively.
|
||
*/
|
||
int PathBiasCircThreshold;
|
||
double PathBiasNoticeRate;
|
||
double PathBiasWarnRate;
|
||
double PathBiasExtremeRate;
|
||
int PathBiasDropGuards;
|
||
int PathBiasScaleThreshold;
|
||
/** @} */
|
||
|
||
/**
|
||
* Parameters for path-bias use detection
|
||
* @{
|
||
* Similar to the above options, these options override the default behavior
|
||
* of Tor's (**currently experimental**) path use bias detection algorithm.
|
||
*
|
||
* Where as the path bias parameters govern thresholds for successfully
|
||
* building circuits, these four path use bias parameters govern thresholds
|
||
* only for circuit usage. Circuits which receive no stream usage are not
|
||
* counted by this detection algorithm. A used circuit is considered
|
||
* successful if it is capable of carrying streams or otherwise receiving
|
||
* well-formed responses to RELAY cells.
|
||
*
|
||
* By default, or if a negative value is provided for one of these options,
|
||
* Tor uses reasonable defaults from the networkstatus consensus document.
|
||
* If no defaults are available there, these options default to 20, .80,
|
||
* .60, and 100, respectively.
|
||
*/
|
||
int PathBiasUseThreshold;
|
||
double PathBiasNoticeUseRate;
|
||
double PathBiasExtremeUseRate;
|
||
int PathBiasScaleUseThreshold;
|
||
/** @} */
|
||
|
||
int IPv6Exit; /**< Do we support exiting to IPv6 addresses? */
|
||
|
||
/** Fraction: */
|
||
double PathsNeededToBuildCircuits;
|
||
|
||
/** What expiry time shall we place on our SSL certs? "0" means we
|
||
* should guess a suitable value. */
|
||
int SSLKeyLifetime;
|
||
|
||
/** How long (seconds) do we keep a guard before picking a new one? */
|
||
int GuardLifetime;
|
||
|
||
/** Low-water mark for global scheduler - start sending when estimated
|
||
* queued size falls below this threshold.
|
||
*/
|
||
uint64_t SchedulerLowWaterMark__;
|
||
/** High-water mark for global scheduler - stop sending when estimated
|
||
* queued size exceeds this threshold.
|
||
*/
|
||
uint64_t SchedulerHighWaterMark__;
|
||
/** Flush size for global scheduler - flush this many cells at a time
|
||
* when sending.
|
||
*/
|
||
int SchedulerMaxFlushCells__;
|
||
|
||
/** Is this an exit node? This is a tristate, where "1" means "yes, and use
|
||
* the default exit policy if none is given" and "0" means "no; exit policy
|
||
* is 'reject *'" and "auto" (-1) means "same as 1, but warn the user."
|
||
*
|
||
* XXXX Eventually, the default will be 0. */
|
||
int ExitRelay;
|
||
|
||
/** For how long (seconds) do we declare our signing keys to be valid? */
|
||
int SigningKeyLifetime;
|
||
/** For how long (seconds) do we declare our link keys to be valid? */
|
||
int TestingLinkCertLifetime;
|
||
/** For how long (seconds) do we declare our auth keys to be valid? */
|
||
int TestingAuthKeyLifetime;
|
||
|
||
/** How long before signing keys expire will we try to make a new one? */
|
||
int TestingSigningKeySlop;
|
||
/** How long before link keys expire will we try to make a new one? */
|
||
int TestingLinkKeySlop;
|
||
/** How long before auth keys expire will we try to make a new one? */
|
||
int TestingAuthKeySlop;
|
||
|
||
/** Force use of offline master key features: never generate a master
|
||
* ed25519 identity key except from tor --keygen */
|
||
int OfflineMasterKey;
|
||
|
||
enum {
|
||
FORCE_PASSPHRASE_AUTO=0,
|
||
FORCE_PASSPHRASE_ON,
|
||
FORCE_PASSPHRASE_OFF
|
||
} keygen_force_passphrase;
|
||
int use_keygen_passphrase_fd;
|
||
int keygen_passphrase_fd;
|
||
int change_key_passphrase;
|
||
char *master_key_fname;
|
||
|
||
/** Autobool: Do we try to retain capabilities if we can? */
|
||
int KeepBindCapabilities;
|
||
|
||
/** Maximum total size of unparseable descriptors to log during the
|
||
* lifetime of this Tor process.
|
||
*/
|
||
uint64_t MaxUnparseableDescSizeToLog;
|
||
|
||
/** Bool (default: 1): Switch for the shared random protocol. Only
|
||
* relevant to a directory authority. If off, the authority won't
|
||
* participate in the protocol. If on (default), a flag is added to the
|
||
* vote indicating participation. */
|
||
int AuthDirSharedRandomness;
|
||
|
||
/** If 1, we skip all OOS checks. */
|
||
int DisableOOSCheck;
|
||
|
||
/** Autobool: Should we include Ed25519 identities in extend2 cells?
|
||
* If -1, we should do whatever the consensus parameter says. */
|
||
int ExtendByEd25519ID;
|
||
|
||
/** Bool (default: 1): When testing routerinfos as a directory authority,
|
||
* do we enforce Ed25519 identity match? */
|
||
/* NOTE: remove this option someday. */
|
||
int AuthDirTestEd25519LinkKeys;
|
||
|
||
/** Bool (default: 0): Tells if a %include was used on torrc */
|
||
int IncludeUsed;
|
||
} or_options_t;
|
||
|
||
/** Persistent state for an onion router, as saved to disk. */
|
||
typedef struct {
|
||
uint32_t magic_;
|
||
/** The time at which we next plan to write the state to the disk. Equal to
|
||
* TIME_MAX if there are no savable changes, 0 if there are changes that
|
||
* should be saved right away. */
|
||
time_t next_write;
|
||
|
||
/** When was the state last written to disk? */
|
||
time_t LastWritten;
|
||
|
||
/** Fields for accounting bandwidth use. */
|
||
time_t AccountingIntervalStart;
|
||
uint64_t AccountingBytesReadInInterval;
|
||
uint64_t AccountingBytesWrittenInInterval;
|
||
int AccountingSecondsActive;
|
||
int AccountingSecondsToReachSoftLimit;
|
||
time_t AccountingSoftLimitHitAt;
|
||
uint64_t AccountingBytesAtSoftLimit;
|
||
uint64_t AccountingExpectedUsage;
|
||
|
||
/** A list of Entry Guard-related configuration lines. (pre-prop271) */
|
||
config_line_t *EntryGuards;
|
||
|
||
/** A list of guard-related configuration lines. (post-prop271) */
|
||
config_line_t *Guard;
|
||
|
||
config_line_t *TransportProxies;
|
||
|
||
/** These fields hold information on the history of bandwidth usage for
|
||
* servers. The "Ends" fields hold the time when we last updated the
|
||
* bandwidth usage. The "Interval" fields hold the granularity, in seconds,
|
||
* of the entries of Values. The "Values" lists hold decimal string
|
||
* representations of the number of bytes read or written in each
|
||
* interval. The "Maxima" list holds decimal strings describing the highest
|
||
* rate achieved during the interval.
|
||
*/
|
||
time_t BWHistoryReadEnds;
|
||
int BWHistoryReadInterval;
|
||
smartlist_t *BWHistoryReadValues;
|
||
smartlist_t *BWHistoryReadMaxima;
|
||
time_t BWHistoryWriteEnds;
|
||
int BWHistoryWriteInterval;
|
||
smartlist_t *BWHistoryWriteValues;
|
||
smartlist_t *BWHistoryWriteMaxima;
|
||
time_t BWHistoryDirReadEnds;
|
||
int BWHistoryDirReadInterval;
|
||
smartlist_t *BWHistoryDirReadValues;
|
||
smartlist_t *BWHistoryDirReadMaxima;
|
||
time_t BWHistoryDirWriteEnds;
|
||
int BWHistoryDirWriteInterval;
|
||
smartlist_t *BWHistoryDirWriteValues;
|
||
smartlist_t *BWHistoryDirWriteMaxima;
|
||
|
||
/** Build time histogram */
|
||
config_line_t * BuildtimeHistogram;
|
||
unsigned int TotalBuildTimes;
|
||
unsigned int CircuitBuildAbandonedCount;
|
||
|
||
/** What version of Tor wrote this state file? */
|
||
char *TorVersion;
|
||
|
||
/** Holds any unrecognized values we found in the state file, in the order
|
||
* in which we found them. */
|
||
config_line_t *ExtraLines;
|
||
|
||
/** When did we last rotate our onion key? "0" for 'no idea'. */
|
||
time_t LastRotatedOnionKey;
|
||
} or_state_t;
|
||
|
||
/** Change the next_write time of <b>state</b> to <b>when</b>, unless the
|
||
* state is already scheduled to be written to disk earlier than <b>when</b>.
|
||
*/
|
||
static inline void or_state_mark_dirty(or_state_t *state, time_t when)
|
||
{
|
||
if (state->next_write > when)
|
||
state->next_write = when;
|
||
}
|
||
|
||
#define MAX_SOCKS_REPLY_LEN 1024
|
||
#define MAX_SOCKS_ADDR_LEN 256
|
||
#define SOCKS_NO_AUTH 0x00
|
||
#define SOCKS_USER_PASS 0x02
|
||
|
||
/** Please open a TCP connection to this addr:port. */
|
||
#define SOCKS_COMMAND_CONNECT 0x01
|
||
/** Please turn this FQDN into an IP address, privately. */
|
||
#define SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE 0xF0
|
||
/** Please turn this IP address into an FQDN, privately. */
|
||
#define SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE_PTR 0xF1
|
||
|
||
/* || 0 is for -Wparentheses-equality (-Wall?) appeasement under clang */
|
||
#define SOCKS_COMMAND_IS_CONNECT(c) (((c)==SOCKS_COMMAND_CONNECT) || 0)
|
||
#define SOCKS_COMMAND_IS_RESOLVE(c) ((c)==SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE || \
|
||
(c)==SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE_PTR)
|
||
|
||
/** State of a SOCKS request from a user to an OP. Also used to encode other
|
||
* information for non-socks user request (such as those on TransPort and
|
||
* DNSPort) */
|
||
struct socks_request_t {
|
||
/** Which version of SOCKS did the client use? One of "0, 4, 5" -- where
|
||
* 0 means that no socks handshake ever took place, and this is just a
|
||
* stub connection (e.g. see connection_ap_make_link()). */
|
||
uint8_t socks_version;
|
||
/** If using socks5 authentication, which authentication type did we
|
||
* negotiate? currently we support 0 (no authentication) and 2
|
||
* (username/password). */
|
||
uint8_t auth_type;
|
||
/** What is this stream's goal? One of the SOCKS_COMMAND_* values */
|
||
uint8_t command;
|
||
/** Which kind of listener created this stream? */
|
||
uint8_t listener_type;
|
||
size_t replylen; /**< Length of <b>reply</b>. */
|
||
uint8_t reply[MAX_SOCKS_REPLY_LEN]; /**< Write an entry into this string if
|
||
* we want to specify our own socks reply,
|
||
* rather than using the default socks4 or
|
||
* socks5 socks reply. We use this for the
|
||
* two-stage socks5 handshake.
|
||
*/
|
||
char address[MAX_SOCKS_ADDR_LEN]; /**< What address did the client ask to
|
||
connect to/resolve? */
|
||
uint16_t port; /**< What port did the client ask to connect to? */
|
||
unsigned int has_finished : 1; /**< Has the SOCKS handshake finished? Used to
|
||
* make sure we send back a socks reply for
|
||
* every connection. */
|
||
unsigned int got_auth : 1; /**< Have we received any authentication data? */
|
||
/** If this is set, we will choose "no authentication" instead of
|
||
* "username/password" authentication if both are offered. Used as input to
|
||
* parse_socks. */
|
||
unsigned int socks_prefer_no_auth : 1;
|
||
|
||
/** Number of bytes in username; 0 if username is NULL */
|
||
size_t usernamelen;
|
||
/** Number of bytes in password; 0 if password is NULL */
|
||
uint8_t passwordlen;
|
||
/** The negotiated username value if any (for socks5), or the entire
|
||
* authentication string (for socks4). This value is NOT nul-terminated;
|
||
* see usernamelen for its length. */
|
||
char *username;
|
||
/** The negotiated password value if any (for socks5). This value is NOT
|
||
* nul-terminated; see passwordlen for its length. */
|
||
char *password;
|
||
};
|
||
|
||
/********************************* circuitbuild.c **********************/
|
||
|
||
/** How many hops does a general-purpose circuit have by default? */
|
||
#define DEFAULT_ROUTE_LEN 3
|
||
|
||
/* Circuit Build Timeout "public" structures. */
|
||
|
||
/** Precision multiplier for the Bw weights */
|
||
#define BW_WEIGHT_SCALE 10000
|
||
#define BW_MIN_WEIGHT_SCALE 1
|
||
#define BW_MAX_WEIGHT_SCALE INT32_MAX
|
||
|
||
/** Total size of the circuit timeout history to accumulate.
|
||
* 1000 is approx 2.5 days worth of continual-use circuits. */
|
||
#define CBT_NCIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE 1000
|
||
|
||
/** Width of the histogram bins in milliseconds */
|
||
#define CBT_BIN_WIDTH ((build_time_t)50)
|
||
|
||
/** Number of modes to use in the weighted-avg computation of Xm */
|
||
#define CBT_DEFAULT_NUM_XM_MODES 3
|
||
#define CBT_MIN_NUM_XM_MODES 1
|
||
#define CBT_MAX_NUM_XM_MODES 20
|
||
|
||
/** A build_time_t is milliseconds */
|
||
typedef uint32_t build_time_t;
|
||
|
||
/**
|
||
* CBT_BUILD_ABANDONED is our flag value to represent a force-closed
|
||
* circuit (Aka a 'right-censored' pareto value).
|
||
*/
|
||
#define CBT_BUILD_ABANDONED ((build_time_t)(INT32_MAX-1))
|
||
#define CBT_BUILD_TIME_MAX ((build_time_t)(INT32_MAX))
|
||
|
||
/** Save state every 10 circuits */
|
||
#define CBT_SAVE_STATE_EVERY 10
|
||
|
||
/* Circuit build times consensus parameters */
|
||
|
||
/**
|
||
* How long to wait before actually closing circuits that take too long to
|
||
* build in terms of CDF quantile.
|
||
*/
|
||
#define CBT_DEFAULT_CLOSE_QUANTILE 95
|
||
#define CBT_MIN_CLOSE_QUANTILE CBT_MIN_QUANTILE_CUTOFF
|
||
#define CBT_MAX_CLOSE_QUANTILE CBT_MAX_QUANTILE_CUTOFF
|
||
|
||
/**
|
||
* How many circuits count as recent when considering if the
|
||
* connection has gone gimpy or changed.
|
||
*/
|
||
#define CBT_DEFAULT_RECENT_CIRCUITS 20
|
||
#define CBT_MIN_RECENT_CIRCUITS 3
|
||
#define CBT_MAX_RECENT_CIRCUITS 1000
|
||
|
||
/**
|
||
* Maximum count of timeouts that finish the first hop in the past
|
||
* RECENT_CIRCUITS before calculating a new timeout.
|
||
*
|
||
* This tells us whether to abandon timeout history and set
|
||
* the timeout back to whatever circuit_build_times_get_initial_timeout()
|
||
* gives us.
|
||
*/
|
||
#define CBT_DEFAULT_MAX_RECENT_TIMEOUT_COUNT (CBT_DEFAULT_RECENT_CIRCUITS*9/10)
|
||
#define CBT_MIN_MAX_RECENT_TIMEOUT_COUNT 3
|
||
#define CBT_MAX_MAX_RECENT_TIMEOUT_COUNT 10000
|
||
|
||
/** Minimum circuits before estimating a timeout */
|
||
#define CBT_DEFAULT_MIN_CIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE 100
|
||
#define CBT_MIN_MIN_CIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE 1
|
||
#define CBT_MAX_MIN_CIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE 10000
|
||
|
||
/** Cutoff percentile on the CDF for our timeout estimation. */
|
||
#define CBT_DEFAULT_QUANTILE_CUTOFF 80
|
||
#define CBT_MIN_QUANTILE_CUTOFF 10
|
||
#define CBT_MAX_QUANTILE_CUTOFF 99
|
||
double circuit_build_times_quantile_cutoff(void);
|
||
|
||
/** How often in seconds should we build a test circuit */
|
||
#define CBT_DEFAULT_TEST_FREQUENCY 10
|
||
#define CBT_MIN_TEST_FREQUENCY 1
|
||
#define CBT_MAX_TEST_FREQUENCY INT32_MAX
|
||
|
||
/** Lowest allowable value for CircuitBuildTimeout in milliseconds */
|
||
#define CBT_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MIN_VALUE (1500)
|
||
#define CBT_MIN_TIMEOUT_MIN_VALUE 500
|
||
#define CBT_MAX_TIMEOUT_MIN_VALUE INT32_MAX
|
||
|
||
/** Initial circuit build timeout in milliseconds */
|
||
#define CBT_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_INITIAL_VALUE (60*1000)
|
||
#define CBT_MIN_TIMEOUT_INITIAL_VALUE CBT_MIN_TIMEOUT_MIN_VALUE
|
||
#define CBT_MAX_TIMEOUT_INITIAL_VALUE INT32_MAX
|
||
int32_t circuit_build_times_initial_timeout(void);
|
||
|
||
#if CBT_DEFAULT_MAX_RECENT_TIMEOUT_COUNT < CBT_MIN_MAX_RECENT_TIMEOUT_COUNT
|
||
#error "RECENT_CIRCUITS is set too low."
|
||
#endif
|
||
|
||
/** Information about the state of our local network connection */
|
||
typedef struct {
|
||
/** The timestamp we last completed a TLS handshake or received a cell */
|
||
time_t network_last_live;
|
||
/** If the network is not live, how many timeouts has this caused? */
|
||
int nonlive_timeouts;
|
||
/** Circular array of circuits that have made it to the first hop. Slot is
|
||
* 1 if circuit timed out, 0 if circuit succeeded */
|
||
int8_t *timeouts_after_firsthop;
|
||
/** Number of elements allocated for the above array */
|
||
int num_recent_circs;
|
||
/** Index into circular array. */
|
||
int after_firsthop_idx;
|
||
} network_liveness_t;
|
||
|
||
typedef struct circuit_build_times_s circuit_build_times_t;
|
||
|
||
/********************************* config.c ***************************/
|
||
|
||
/** An error from options_trial_assign() or options_init_from_string(). */
|
||
typedef enum setopt_err_t {
|
||
SETOPT_OK = 0,
|
||
SETOPT_ERR_MISC = -1,
|
||
SETOPT_ERR_PARSE = -2,
|
||
SETOPT_ERR_TRANSITION = -3,
|
||
SETOPT_ERR_SETTING = -4,
|
||
} setopt_err_t;
|
||
|
||
/********************************* connection_edge.c *************************/
|
||
|
||
/** Enumerates possible origins of a client-side address mapping. */
|
||
typedef enum {
|
||
/** We're remapping this address because the controller told us to. */
|
||
ADDRMAPSRC_CONTROLLER,
|
||
/** We're remapping this address because of an AutomapHostsOnResolve
|
||
* configuration. */
|
||
ADDRMAPSRC_AUTOMAP,
|
||
/** We're remapping this address because our configuration (via torrc, the
|
||
* command line, or a SETCONF command) told us to. */
|
||
ADDRMAPSRC_TORRC,
|
||
/** We're remapping this address because we have TrackHostExit configured,
|
||
* and we want to remember to use the same exit next time. */
|
||
ADDRMAPSRC_TRACKEXIT,
|
||
/** We're remapping this address because we got a DNS resolution from a
|
||
* Tor server that told us what its value was. */
|
||
ADDRMAPSRC_DNS,
|
||
|
||
/** No remapping has occurred. This isn't a possible value for an
|
||
* addrmap_entry_t; it's used as a null value when we need to answer "Why
|
||
* did this remapping happen." */
|
||
ADDRMAPSRC_NONE
|
||
} addressmap_entry_source_t;
|
||
#define addressmap_entry_source_bitfield_t ENUM_BF(addressmap_entry_source_t)
|
||
|
||
/********************************* control.c ***************************/
|
||
|
||
/** Used to indicate the type of a circuit event passed to the controller.
|
||
* The various types are defined in control-spec.txt */
|
||
typedef enum circuit_status_event_t {
|
||
CIRC_EVENT_LAUNCHED = 0,
|
||
CIRC_EVENT_BUILT = 1,
|
||
CIRC_EVENT_EXTENDED = 2,
|
||
CIRC_EVENT_FAILED = 3,
|
||
CIRC_EVENT_CLOSED = 4,
|
||
} circuit_status_event_t;
|
||
|
||
/** Used to indicate the type of a CIRC_MINOR event passed to the controller.
|
||
* The various types are defined in control-spec.txt . */
|
||
typedef enum circuit_status_minor_event_t {
|
||
CIRC_MINOR_EVENT_PURPOSE_CHANGED,
|
||
CIRC_MINOR_EVENT_CANNIBALIZED,
|
||
} circuit_status_minor_event_t;
|
||
|
||
/** Used to indicate the type of a stream event passed to the controller.
|
||
* The various types are defined in control-spec.txt */
|
||
typedef enum stream_status_event_t {
|
||
STREAM_EVENT_SENT_CONNECT = 0,
|
||
STREAM_EVENT_SENT_RESOLVE = 1,
|
||
STREAM_EVENT_SUCCEEDED = 2,
|
||
STREAM_EVENT_FAILED = 3,
|
||
STREAM_EVENT_CLOSED = 4,
|
||
STREAM_EVENT_NEW = 5,
|
||
STREAM_EVENT_NEW_RESOLVE = 6,
|
||
STREAM_EVENT_FAILED_RETRIABLE = 7,
|
||
STREAM_EVENT_REMAP = 8
|
||
} stream_status_event_t;
|
||
|
||
/** Used to indicate the type of an OR connection event passed to the
|
||
* controller. The various types are defined in control-spec.txt */
|
||
typedef enum or_conn_status_event_t {
|
||
OR_CONN_EVENT_LAUNCHED = 0,
|
||
OR_CONN_EVENT_CONNECTED = 1,
|
||
OR_CONN_EVENT_FAILED = 2,
|
||
OR_CONN_EVENT_CLOSED = 3,
|
||
OR_CONN_EVENT_NEW = 4,
|
||
} or_conn_status_event_t;
|
||
|
||
/** Used to indicate the type of a buildtime event */
|
||
typedef enum buildtimeout_set_event_t {
|
||
BUILDTIMEOUT_SET_EVENT_COMPUTED = 0,
|
||
BUILDTIMEOUT_SET_EVENT_RESET = 1,
|
||
BUILDTIMEOUT_SET_EVENT_SUSPENDED = 2,
|
||
BUILDTIMEOUT_SET_EVENT_DISCARD = 3,
|
||
BUILDTIMEOUT_SET_EVENT_RESUME = 4
|
||
} buildtimeout_set_event_t;
|
||
|
||
/** Execute the statement <b>stmt</b>, which may log events concerning the
|
||
* connection <b>conn</b>. To prevent infinite loops, disable log messages
|
||
* being sent to controllers if <b>conn</b> is a control connection.
|
||
*
|
||
* Stmt must not contain any return or goto statements.
|
||
*/
|
||
#define CONN_LOG_PROTECT(conn, stmt) \
|
||
STMT_BEGIN \
|
||
int _log_conn_is_control; \
|
||
tor_assert(conn); \
|
||
_log_conn_is_control = (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_CONTROL); \
|
||
if (_log_conn_is_control) \
|
||
disable_control_logging(); \
|
||
STMT_BEGIN stmt; STMT_END; \
|
||
if (_log_conn_is_control) \
|
||
enable_control_logging(); \
|
||
STMT_END
|
||
|
||
/** Enum describing various stages of bootstrapping, for use with controller
|
||
* bootstrap status events. The values range from 0 to 100. */
|
||
typedef enum {
|
||
BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_UNDEF=-1,
|
||
BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_STARTING=0,
|
||
BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_CONN_DIR=5,
|
||
BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_HANDSHAKE=-2,
|
||
BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_HANDSHAKE_DIR=10,
|
||
BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_ONEHOP_CREATE=15,
|
||
BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_REQUESTING_STATUS=20,
|
||
BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_LOADING_STATUS=25,
|
||
BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_LOADING_KEYS=40,
|
||
BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_REQUESTING_DESCRIPTORS=45,
|
||
BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_LOADING_DESCRIPTORS=50,
|
||
BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_CONN_OR=80,
|
||
BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_HANDSHAKE_OR=85,
|
||
BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_CIRCUIT_CREATE=90,
|
||
BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_DONE=100
|
||
} bootstrap_status_t;
|
||
|
||
/********************************* directory.c ***************************/
|
||
|
||
/** A pair of digests created by dir_split_resource_info_fingerprint_pairs() */
|
||
typedef struct {
|
||
char first[DIGEST_LEN];
|
||
char second[DIGEST_LEN];
|
||
} fp_pair_t;
|
||
|
||
/********************************* dirserv.c ***************************/
|
||
|
||
/** An enum to describe what format we're generating a routerstatus line in.
|
||
*/
|
||
typedef enum {
|
||
/** For use in a v2 opinion */
|
||
NS_V2,
|
||
/** For use in a consensus networkstatus document (ns flavor) */
|
||
NS_V3_CONSENSUS,
|
||
/** For use in a vote networkstatus document */
|
||
NS_V3_VOTE,
|
||
/** For passing to the controlport in response to a GETINFO request */
|
||
NS_CONTROL_PORT,
|
||
/** For use in a consensus networkstatus document (microdesc flavor) */
|
||
NS_V3_CONSENSUS_MICRODESC
|
||
} routerstatus_format_type_t;
|
||
|
||
#ifdef DIRSERV_PRIVATE
|
||
typedef struct measured_bw_line_t {
|
||
char node_id[DIGEST_LEN];
|
||
char node_hex[MAX_HEX_NICKNAME_LEN+1];
|
||
long int bw_kb;
|
||
} measured_bw_line_t;
|
||
|
||
#endif
|
||
|
||
/********************************* dirvote.c ************************/
|
||
|
||
/** Describes the schedule by which votes should be generated. */
|
||
typedef struct vote_timing_t {
|
||
/** Length in seconds between one consensus becoming valid and the next
|
||
* becoming valid. */
|
||
int vote_interval;
|
||
/** For how many intervals is a consensus valid? */
|
||
int n_intervals_valid;
|
||
/** Time in seconds allowed to propagate votes */
|
||
int vote_delay;
|
||
/** Time in seconds allowed to propagate signatures */
|
||
int dist_delay;
|
||
} vote_timing_t;
|
||
|
||
/********************************* geoip.c **************************/
|
||
|
||
/** Indicates an action that we might be noting geoip statistics on.
|
||
* Note that if we're noticing CONNECT, we're a bridge, and if we're noticing
|
||
* the others, we're not.
|
||
*/
|
||
typedef enum {
|
||
/** We've noticed a connection as a bridge relay or entry guard. */
|
||
GEOIP_CLIENT_CONNECT = 0,
|
||
/** We've served a networkstatus consensus as a directory server. */
|
||
GEOIP_CLIENT_NETWORKSTATUS = 1,
|
||
} geoip_client_action_t;
|
||
/** Indicates either a positive reply or a reason for rejectng a network
|
||
* status request that will be included in geoip statistics. */
|
||
typedef enum {
|
||
/** Request is answered successfully. */
|
||
GEOIP_SUCCESS = 0,
|
||
/** V3 network status is not signed by a sufficient number of requested
|
||
* authorities. */
|
||
GEOIP_REJECT_NOT_ENOUGH_SIGS = 1,
|
||
/** Requested network status object is unavailable. */
|
||
GEOIP_REJECT_UNAVAILABLE = 2,
|
||
/** Requested network status not found. */
|
||
GEOIP_REJECT_NOT_FOUND = 3,
|
||
/** Network status has not been modified since If-Modified-Since time. */
|
||
GEOIP_REJECT_NOT_MODIFIED = 4,
|
||
/** Directory is busy. */
|
||
GEOIP_REJECT_BUSY = 5,
|
||
} geoip_ns_response_t;
|
||
#define GEOIP_NS_RESPONSE_NUM 6
|
||
|
||
/** Directory requests that we are measuring can be either direct or
|
||
* tunneled. */
|
||
typedef enum {
|
||
DIRREQ_DIRECT = 0,
|
||
DIRREQ_TUNNELED = 1,
|
||
} dirreq_type_t;
|
||
|
||
/** Possible states for either direct or tunneled directory requests that
|
||
* are relevant for determining network status download times. */
|
||
typedef enum {
|
||
/** Found that the client requests a network status; applies to both
|
||
* direct and tunneled requests; initial state of a request that we are
|
||
* measuring. */
|
||
DIRREQ_IS_FOR_NETWORK_STATUS = 0,
|
||
/** Finished writing a network status to the directory connection;
|
||
* applies to both direct and tunneled requests; completes a direct
|
||
* request. */
|
||
DIRREQ_FLUSHING_DIR_CONN_FINISHED = 1,
|
||
/** END cell sent to circuit that initiated a tunneled request. */
|
||
DIRREQ_END_CELL_SENT = 2,
|
||
/** Flushed last cell from queue of the circuit that initiated a
|
||
* tunneled request to the outbuf of the OR connection. */
|
||
DIRREQ_CIRC_QUEUE_FLUSHED = 3,
|
||
/** Flushed last byte from buffer of the channel belonging to the
|
||
* circuit that initiated a tunneled request; completes a tunneled
|
||
* request. */
|
||
DIRREQ_CHANNEL_BUFFER_FLUSHED = 4
|
||
} dirreq_state_t;
|
||
|
||
#define WRITE_STATS_INTERVAL (24*60*60)
|
||
|
||
/********************************* microdesc.c *************************/
|
||
|
||
typedef struct microdesc_cache_t microdesc_cache_t;
|
||
|
||
/********************************* networkstatus.c *********************/
|
||
|
||
/** Possible statuses of a version of Tor, given opinions from the directory
|
||
* servers. */
|
||
typedef enum version_status_t {
|
||
VS_RECOMMENDED=0, /**< This version is listed as recommended. */
|
||
VS_OLD=1, /**< This version is older than any recommended version. */
|
||
VS_NEW=2, /**< This version is newer than any recommended version. */
|
||
VS_NEW_IN_SERIES=3, /**< This version is newer than any recommended version
|
||
* in its series, but later recommended versions exist.
|
||
*/
|
||
VS_UNRECOMMENDED=4, /**< This version is not recommended (general case). */
|
||
VS_EMPTY=5, /**< The version list was empty; no agreed-on versions. */
|
||
VS_UNKNOWN, /**< We have no idea. */
|
||
} version_status_t;
|
||
|
||
/********************************* policies.c ************************/
|
||
|
||
/** Outcome of applying an address policy to an address. */
|
||
typedef enum {
|
||
/** The address was accepted */
|
||
ADDR_POLICY_ACCEPTED=0,
|
||
/** The address was rejected */
|
||
ADDR_POLICY_REJECTED=-1,
|
||
/** Part of the address was unknown, but as far as we can tell, it was
|
||
* accepted. */
|
||
ADDR_POLICY_PROBABLY_ACCEPTED=1,
|
||
/** Part of the address was unknown, but as far as we can tell, it was
|
||
* rejected. */
|
||
ADDR_POLICY_PROBABLY_REJECTED=2,
|
||
} addr_policy_result_t;
|
||
|
||
/********************************* rephist.c ***************************/
|
||
|
||
/** Possible public/private key operations in Tor: used to keep track of where
|
||
* we're spending our time. */
|
||
typedef enum {
|
||
SIGN_DIR, SIGN_RTR,
|
||
VERIFY_DIR, VERIFY_RTR,
|
||
ENC_ONIONSKIN, DEC_ONIONSKIN,
|
||
TLS_HANDSHAKE_C, TLS_HANDSHAKE_S,
|
||
REND_CLIENT, REND_MID, REND_SERVER,
|
||
} pk_op_t;
|
||
|
||
/********************************* rendcommon.c ***************************/
|
||
|
||
/** Hidden-service side configuration of client authorization. */
|
||
typedef struct rend_authorized_client_t {
|
||
char *client_name;
|
||
uint8_t descriptor_cookie[REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN];
|
||
crypto_pk_t *client_key;
|
||
} rend_authorized_client_t;
|
||
|
||
/** ASCII-encoded v2 hidden service descriptor. */
|
||
typedef struct rend_encoded_v2_service_descriptor_t {
|
||
char desc_id[DIGEST_LEN]; /**< Descriptor ID. */
|
||
char *desc_str; /**< Descriptor string. */
|
||
} rend_encoded_v2_service_descriptor_t;
|
||
|
||
/** The maximum number of non-circuit-build-timeout failures a hidden
|
||
* service client will tolerate while trying to build a circuit to an
|
||
* introduction point. See also rend_intro_point_t.unreachable_count. */
|
||
#define MAX_INTRO_POINT_REACHABILITY_FAILURES 5
|
||
|
||
/** The minimum and maximum number of distinct INTRODUCE2 cells which a
|
||
* hidden service's introduction point will receive before it begins to
|
||
* expire. */
|
||
#define INTRO_POINT_MIN_LIFETIME_INTRODUCTIONS 16384
|
||
/* Double the minimum value so the interval is [min, min * 2]. */
|
||
#define INTRO_POINT_MAX_LIFETIME_INTRODUCTIONS \
|
||
(INTRO_POINT_MIN_LIFETIME_INTRODUCTIONS * 2)
|
||
|
||
/** The minimum number of seconds that an introduction point will last
|
||
* before expiring due to old age. (If it receives
|
||
* INTRO_POINT_LIFETIME_INTRODUCTIONS INTRODUCE2 cells, it may expire
|
||
* sooner.)
|
||
*
|
||
* XXX Should this be configurable? */
|
||
#define INTRO_POINT_LIFETIME_MIN_SECONDS (18*60*60)
|
||
/** The maximum number of seconds that an introduction point will last
|
||
* before expiring due to old age.
|
||
*
|
||
* XXX Should this be configurable? */
|
||
#define INTRO_POINT_LIFETIME_MAX_SECONDS (24*60*60)
|
||
|
||
/** The maximum number of circuit creation retry we do to an intro point
|
||
* before giving up. We try to reuse intro point that fails during their
|
||
* lifetime so this is a hard limit on the amount of time we do that. */
|
||
#define MAX_INTRO_POINT_CIRCUIT_RETRIES 3
|
||
|
||
/** Introduction point information. Used both in rend_service_t (on
|
||
* the service side) and in rend_service_descriptor_t (on both the
|
||
* client and service side). */
|
||
typedef struct rend_intro_point_t {
|
||
extend_info_t *extend_info; /**< Extend info for connecting to this
|
||
* introduction point via a multi-hop path. */
|
||
crypto_pk_t *intro_key; /**< Introduction key that replaces the service
|
||
* key, if this descriptor is V2. */
|
||
|
||
/** (Client side only) Flag indicating that a timeout has occurred
|
||
* after sending an INTRODUCE cell to this intro point. After a
|
||
* timeout, an intro point should not be tried again during the same
|
||
* hidden service connection attempt, but it may be tried again
|
||
* during a future connection attempt. */
|
||
unsigned int timed_out : 1;
|
||
|
||
/** (Client side only) The number of times we have failed to build a
|
||
* circuit to this intro point for some reason other than our
|
||
* circuit-build timeout. See also MAX_INTRO_POINT_REACHABILITY_FAILURES. */
|
||
unsigned int unreachable_count : 3;
|
||
|
||
/** (Service side only) Flag indicating that this intro point was
|
||
* included in the last HS descriptor we generated. */
|
||
unsigned int listed_in_last_desc : 1;
|
||
|
||
/** (Service side only) A replay cache recording the RSA-encrypted parts
|
||
* of INTRODUCE2 cells this intro point's circuit has received. This is
|
||
* used to prevent replay attacks. */
|
||
replaycache_t *accepted_intro_rsa_parts;
|
||
|
||
/** (Service side only) Count of INTRODUCE2 cells accepted from this
|
||
* intro point.
|
||
*/
|
||
int accepted_introduce2_count;
|
||
|
||
/** (Service side only) Number of maximum INTRODUCE2 cells that this IP
|
||
* will accept. This is a random value between
|
||
* INTRO_POINT_MIN_LIFETIME_INTRODUCTIONS and
|
||
* INTRO_POINT_MAX_LIFETIME_INTRODUCTIONS. */
|
||
int max_introductions;
|
||
|
||
/** (Service side only) The time at which this intro point was first
|
||
* published, or -1 if this intro point has not yet been
|
||
* published. */
|
||
time_t time_published;
|
||
|
||
/** (Service side only) The time at which this intro point should
|
||
* (start to) expire, or -1 if we haven't decided when this intro
|
||
* point should expire. */
|
||
time_t time_to_expire;
|
||
|
||
/** (Service side only) The amount of circuit creation we've made to this
|
||
* intro point. This is incremented every time we do a circuit relaunch on
|
||
* this object which is triggered when the circuit dies but the node is
|
||
* still in the consensus. After MAX_INTRO_POINT_CIRCUIT_RETRIES, we give
|
||
* up on it. */
|
||
unsigned int circuit_retries;
|
||
|
||
/** (Service side only) Set if this intro point has an established circuit
|
||
* and unset if it doesn't. */
|
||
unsigned int circuit_established:1;
|
||
} rend_intro_point_t;
|
||
|
||
#define REND_PROTOCOL_VERSION_BITMASK_WIDTH 16
|
||
|
||
/** Information used to connect to a hidden service. Used on both the
|
||
* service side and the client side. */
|
||
typedef struct rend_service_descriptor_t {
|
||
crypto_pk_t *pk; /**< This service's public key. */
|
||
int version; /**< Version of the descriptor format: 0 or 2. */
|
||
time_t timestamp; /**< Time when the descriptor was generated. */
|
||
/** Bitmask: which introduce/rendezvous protocols are supported?
|
||
* (We allow bits '0', '1', '2' and '3' to be set.) */
|
||
unsigned protocols : REND_PROTOCOL_VERSION_BITMASK_WIDTH;
|
||
/** List of the service's introduction points. Elements are removed if
|
||
* introduction attempts fail. */
|
||
smartlist_t *intro_nodes;
|
||
/** Has descriptor been uploaded to all hidden service directories? */
|
||
int all_uploads_performed;
|
||
/** List of hidden service directories to which an upload request for
|
||
* this descriptor could be sent. Smartlist exists only when at least one
|
||
* of the previous upload requests failed (otherwise it's not important
|
||
* to know which uploads succeeded and which not). */
|
||
smartlist_t *successful_uploads;
|
||
} rend_service_descriptor_t;
|
||
|
||
/********************************* routerlist.c ***************************/
|
||
|
||
/** Represents information about a single trusted or fallback directory
|
||
* server. */
|
||
typedef struct dir_server_t {
|
||
char *description;
|
||
char *nickname;
|
||
char *address; /**< Hostname. */
|
||
/* XX/teor - why do we duplicate the address and port fields here and in
|
||
* fake_status? Surely we could just use fake_status (#17867). */
|
||
tor_addr_t ipv6_addr; /**< IPv6 address if present; AF_UNSPEC if not */
|
||
uint32_t addr; /**< IPv4 address. */
|
||
uint16_t dir_port; /**< Directory port. */
|
||
uint16_t or_port; /**< OR port: Used for tunneling connections. */
|
||
uint16_t ipv6_orport; /**< OR port corresponding to ipv6_addr. */
|
||
double weight; /** Weight used when selecting this node at random */
|
||
char digest[DIGEST_LEN]; /**< Digest of identity key. */
|
||
char v3_identity_digest[DIGEST_LEN]; /**< Digest of v3 (authority only,
|
||
* high-security) identity key. */
|
||
|
||
unsigned int is_running:1; /**< True iff we think this server is running. */
|
||
unsigned int is_authority:1; /**< True iff this is a directory authority
|
||
* of some kind. */
|
||
|
||
/** True iff this server has accepted the most recent server descriptor
|
||
* we tried to upload to it. */
|
||
unsigned int has_accepted_serverdesc:1;
|
||
|
||
/** What kind of authority is this? (Bitfield.) */
|
||
dirinfo_type_t type;
|
||
|
||
time_t addr_current_at; /**< When was the document that we derived the
|
||
* address information from published? */
|
||
|
||
routerstatus_t fake_status; /**< Used when we need to pass this trusted
|
||
* dir_server_t to
|
||
* directory_request_set_routerstatus.
|
||
* as a routerstatus_t. Not updated by the
|
||
* router-status management code!
|
||
**/
|
||
} dir_server_t;
|
||
|
||
#define RELAY_REQUIRED_MIN_BANDWIDTH (75*1024)
|
||
#define BRIDGE_REQUIRED_MIN_BANDWIDTH (50*1024)
|
||
|
||
#define ROUTER_MAX_DECLARED_BANDWIDTH INT32_MAX
|
||
|
||
/* Flags for pick_directory_server() and pick_trusteddirserver(). */
|
||
/** Flag to indicate that we should not automatically be willing to use
|
||
* ourself to answer a directory request.
|
||
* Passed to router_pick_directory_server (et al).*/
|
||
#define PDS_ALLOW_SELF (1<<0)
|
||
/** Flag to indicate that if no servers seem to be up, we should mark all
|
||
* directory servers as up and try again.
|
||
* Passed to router_pick_directory_server (et al).*/
|
||
#define PDS_RETRY_IF_NO_SERVERS (1<<1)
|
||
/** Flag to indicate that we should not exclude directory servers that
|
||
* our ReachableAddress settings would exclude. This usually means that
|
||
* we're going to connect to the server over Tor, and so we don't need to
|
||
* worry about our firewall telling us we can't.
|
||
* Passed to router_pick_directory_server (et al).*/
|
||
#define PDS_IGNORE_FASCISTFIREWALL (1<<2)
|
||
/** Flag to indicate that we should not use any directory authority to which
|
||
* we have an existing directory connection for downloading server descriptors
|
||
* or extrainfo documents.
|
||
*
|
||
* Passed to router_pick_directory_server (et al)
|
||
*/
|
||
#define PDS_NO_EXISTING_SERVERDESC_FETCH (1<<3)
|
||
/** Flag to indicate that we should not use any directory authority to which
|
||
* we have an existing directory connection for downloading microdescs.
|
||
*
|
||
* Passed to router_pick_directory_server (et al)
|
||
*/
|
||
#define PDS_NO_EXISTING_MICRODESC_FETCH (1<<4)
|
||
|
||
/** Possible ways to weight routers when choosing one randomly. See
|
||
* routerlist_sl_choose_by_bandwidth() for more information.*/
|
||
typedef enum bandwidth_weight_rule_t {
|
||
NO_WEIGHTING, WEIGHT_FOR_EXIT, WEIGHT_FOR_MID, WEIGHT_FOR_GUARD,
|
||
WEIGHT_FOR_DIR
|
||
} bandwidth_weight_rule_t;
|
||
|
||
/** Flags to be passed to control router_choose_random_node() to indicate what
|
||
* kind of nodes to pick according to what algorithm. */
|
||
typedef enum {
|
||
CRN_NEED_UPTIME = 1<<0,
|
||
CRN_NEED_CAPACITY = 1<<1,
|
||
CRN_NEED_GUARD = 1<<2,
|
||
/* XXXX not used, apparently. */
|
||
CRN_WEIGHT_AS_EXIT = 1<<5,
|
||
CRN_NEED_DESC = 1<<6,
|
||
/* On clients, only provide nodes that satisfy ClientPreferIPv6OR */
|
||
CRN_PREF_ADDR = 1<<7,
|
||
/* On clients, only provide nodes that we can connect to directly, based on
|
||
* our firewall rules */
|
||
CRN_DIRECT_CONN = 1<<8
|
||
} router_crn_flags_t;
|
||
|
||
/** Return value for router_add_to_routerlist() and dirserv_add_descriptor() */
|
||
typedef enum was_router_added_t {
|
||
/* Router was added successfully. */
|
||
ROUTER_ADDED_SUCCESSFULLY = 1,
|
||
/* Extrainfo document was rejected because no corresponding router
|
||
* descriptor was found OR router descriptor was rejected because
|
||
* it was incompatible with its extrainfo document. */
|
||
ROUTER_BAD_EI = -1,
|
||
/* Router descriptor was rejected because it is already known. */
|
||
ROUTER_IS_ALREADY_KNOWN = -2,
|
||
/* General purpose router was rejected, because it was not listed
|
||
* in consensus. */
|
||
ROUTER_NOT_IN_CONSENSUS = -3,
|
||
/* Router was neither in directory consensus nor in any of
|
||
* networkstatus documents. Caching it to access later.
|
||
* (Applies to fetched descriptors only.) */
|
||
ROUTER_NOT_IN_CONSENSUS_OR_NETWORKSTATUS = -4,
|
||
/* Router was rejected by directory authority. */
|
||
ROUTER_AUTHDIR_REJECTS = -5,
|
||
/* Bridge descriptor was rejected because such bridge was not one
|
||
* of the bridges we have listed in our configuration. */
|
||
ROUTER_WAS_NOT_WANTED = -6,
|
||
/* Router descriptor was rejected because it was older than
|
||
* OLD_ROUTER_DESC_MAX_AGE. */
|
||
ROUTER_WAS_TOO_OLD = -7, /* note contrast with 'NOT_NEW' */
|
||
/* DOCDOC */
|
||
ROUTER_CERTS_EXPIRED = -8
|
||
} was_router_added_t;
|
||
|
||
/********************************* routerparse.c ************************/
|
||
|
||
#define MAX_STATUS_TAG_LEN 32
|
||
/** Structure to hold parsed Tor versions. This is a little messier
|
||
* than we would like it to be, because we changed version schemes with 0.1.0.
|
||
*
|
||
* See version-spec.txt for the whole business.
|
||
*/
|
||
typedef struct tor_version_t {
|
||
int major;
|
||
int minor;
|
||
int micro;
|
||
/** Release status. For version in the post-0.1 format, this is always
|
||
* VER_RELEASE. */
|
||
enum { VER_PRE=0, VER_RC=1, VER_RELEASE=2, } status;
|
||
int patchlevel;
|
||
char status_tag[MAX_STATUS_TAG_LEN];
|
||
int svn_revision;
|
||
|
||
int git_tag_len;
|
||
char git_tag[DIGEST_LEN];
|
||
} tor_version_t;
|
||
|
||
#endif
|
||
|