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71 lines
2.8 KiB
Plaintext
71 lines
2.8 KiB
Plaintext
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Obvious things I'd like to do that won't break anything:
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* Abstract out crypto calls, with the eventual goal of moving
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from openssl to something with a more flexible license.
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* Test suite. We need one.
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* Since my OR can handle multiple circuits through a given OP,
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I think it's clear that the OP should pass new create cells through the
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same channel. Thus we can take advantage of the padding we're already
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getting. Does that mean the choose_onion functions should be changed
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to always pick a favorite OR first, so the OP can minimize the number
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of outgoing connections it must sustain?
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* Figure out what .h files we're actually using, and how portable
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those are.
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* Exit policies. Since we don't really know what protocol is being spoken,
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it really comes down to an IP range and port range that we
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allow/disallow. The 'application' connection can evaluate it and make
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a decision.
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* We currently block on gethostbyname at the exit. This is poor. We need
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to set it up so we have a separate process that we talk to. There are
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some free software versions we can use, but they'll still be tricky.
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* I'd like a cleaner interface for the configuration files, keys, etc.
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Perhaps the next step is a central repository where we download router
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lists? We can aim to make use of the directory servers that Mixminion
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deploys.
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* ORs should rotate their link keys periodically. Later.
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* The parts of the code that say 'FIXME'
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* Clean up the number of places that get to look at prkey. Later.
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* Circuits should expire sometime, say, when circuit->expire triggers?
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Later.
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Non-obvious things I'd like to do:
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(Many of these topics are inter-related. It's clear that we need more
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analysis before we can guess which approaches are good.)
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* Currently when a connection goes down, it generates a destroy cell
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(either in both directions or just the appropriate one). When a
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destroy cell arrives to an OR (and it gets read after all previous
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cells have arrived), it delivers a destroy cell for the "other side"
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of the circuit: if the other side is an OP or App, it closes the entire
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connection as well.
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But by "a connection going down", I mean "I read eof from it". Yet
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reading an eof simply means that it promises not to send any more
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data. It may still be perfectly fine receiving data (read "man 2
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shutdown"). In fact, some webservers work that way -- the client sends
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his entire request, and when the webserver reads an eof it begins
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its response. We currently don't support that sort of protocol; we
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may want to switch to some sort of a two-way-destroy-ripple technique
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(where a destroy makes its way all the way to the end of the circuit
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before being echoed back, and data stops flowing only when a destroy
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has been received from both sides of the circuit); this extends the
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one-hop-ack approach that Matej used.
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* Reply onions. Hrm.
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