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https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor.git
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296 lines
11 KiB
C
296 lines
11 KiB
C
/* Copyright (c) 2012-2013, The Tor Project, Inc. */
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/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
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#include "orconfig.h"
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#include "crypto.h"
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#define ONION_NTOR_PRIVATE
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#include "onion_ntor.h"
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#include "torlog.h"
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#include "util.h"
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/** Free storage held in an ntor handshake state. */
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void
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ntor_handshake_state_free(ntor_handshake_state_t *state)
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{
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if (!state)
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return;
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memwipe(state, 0, sizeof(*state));
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tor_free(state);
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}
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/** Convenience function to represent HMAC_SHA256 as our instantiation of
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* ntor's "tweaked hash'. Hash the <b>inp_len</b> bytes at <b>inp</b> into
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* a DIGEST256_LEN-byte digest at <b>out</b>, with the hash changing
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* depending on the value of <b>tweak</b>. */
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static void
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h_tweak(uint8_t *out,
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const uint8_t *inp, size_t inp_len,
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const char *tweak)
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{
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size_t tweak_len = strlen(tweak);
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crypto_hmac_sha256((char*)out, tweak, tweak_len, (const char*)inp, inp_len);
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}
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/** Wrapper around a set of tweak-values for use with the ntor handshake. */
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typedef struct tweakset_t {
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const char *t_mac;
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const char *t_key;
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const char *t_verify;
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const char *m_expand;
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} tweakset_t;
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/** The tweaks to be used with our handshake. */
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const tweakset_t proto1_tweaks = {
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#define PROTOID "ntor-curve25519-sha256-1"
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#define PROTOID_LEN 24
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PROTOID ":mac",
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PROTOID ":key_extract",
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PROTOID ":verify",
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PROTOID ":key_expand"
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};
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/** Convenience macro: copy <b>len</b> bytes from <b>inp</b> to <b>ptr</b>,
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* and advance <b>ptr</b> by the number of bytes copied. */
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#define APPEND(ptr, inp, len) \
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STMT_BEGIN { \
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memcpy(ptr, (inp), (len)); \
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ptr += len; \
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} STMT_END
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/**
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* Compute the first client-side step of the ntor handshake for communicating
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* with a server whose DIGEST_LEN-byte server identity is <b>router_id</b>,
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* and whose onion key is <b>router_key</b>. Store the NTOR_ONIONSKIN_LEN-byte
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* message in <b>onion_skin_out</b>, and store the handshake state in
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* *<b>handshake_state_out</b>. Return 0 on success, -1 on failure.
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*/
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int
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onion_skin_ntor_create(const uint8_t *router_id,
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const curve25519_public_key_t *router_key,
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ntor_handshake_state_t **handshake_state_out,
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uint8_t *onion_skin_out)
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{
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ntor_handshake_state_t *state;
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uint8_t *op;
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state = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(ntor_handshake_state_t));
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memcpy(state->router_id, router_id, DIGEST_LEN);
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memcpy(&state->pubkey_B, router_key, sizeof(curve25519_public_key_t));
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if (curve25519_secret_key_generate(&state->seckey_x, 0) < 0) {
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tor_free(state);
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return -1;
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}
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curve25519_public_key_generate(&state->pubkey_X, &state->seckey_x);
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op = onion_skin_out;
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APPEND(op, router_id, DIGEST_LEN);
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APPEND(op, router_key->public_key, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
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APPEND(op, state->pubkey_X.public_key, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
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tor_assert(op == onion_skin_out + NTOR_ONIONSKIN_LEN);
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*handshake_state_out = state;
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return 0;
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}
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#define SERVER_STR "Server"
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#define SERVER_STR_LEN 6
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#define SECRET_INPUT_LEN (CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN * 3 + \
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CURVE25519_OUTPUT_LEN * 2 + \
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DIGEST_LEN + PROTOID_LEN)
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#define AUTH_INPUT_LEN (DIGEST256_LEN + DIGEST_LEN + \
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CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN*3 + \
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PROTOID_LEN + SERVER_STR_LEN)
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/**
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* Perform the server side of an ntor handshake. Given an
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* NTOR_ONIONSKIN_LEN-byte message in <b>onion_skin</b>, our own identity
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* fingerprint as <b>my_node_id</b>, and an associative array mapping public
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* onion keys to curve25519_keypair_t in <b>private_keys</b>, attempt to
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* perform the handshake. Use <b>junk_keys</b> if present if the handshake
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* indicates an unrecognized public key. Write an NTOR_REPLY_LEN-byte
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* message to send back to the client into <b>handshake_reply_out</b>, and
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* generate <b>key_out_len</b> bytes of key material in <b>key_out</b>. Return
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* 0 on success, -1 on failure.
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*/
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int
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onion_skin_ntor_server_handshake(const uint8_t *onion_skin,
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const di_digest256_map_t *private_keys,
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const curve25519_keypair_t *junk_keys,
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const uint8_t *my_node_id,
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uint8_t *handshake_reply_out,
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uint8_t *key_out,
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size_t key_out_len)
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{
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const tweakset_t *T = &proto1_tweaks;
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/* Sensitive stack-allocated material. Kept in an anonymous struct to make
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* it easy to wipe. */
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struct {
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uint8_t secret_input[SECRET_INPUT_LEN];
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uint8_t auth_input[AUTH_INPUT_LEN];
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curve25519_public_key_t pubkey_X;
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curve25519_secret_key_t seckey_y;
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curve25519_public_key_t pubkey_Y;
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uint8_t verify[DIGEST256_LEN];
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} s;
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uint8_t *si = s.secret_input, *ai = s.auth_input;
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const curve25519_keypair_t *keypair_bB;
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int bad;
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/* Decode the onion skin */
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/* XXXX Does this possible early-return business threaten our security? */
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if (tor_memneq(onion_skin, my_node_id, DIGEST_LEN))
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return -1;
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/* Note that on key-not-found, we go through with this operation anyway,
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* using "junk_keys". This will result in failed authentication, but won't
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* leak whether we recognized the key. */
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keypair_bB = dimap_search(private_keys, onion_skin + DIGEST_LEN,
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(void*)junk_keys);
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if (!keypair_bB)
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return -1;
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memcpy(s.pubkey_X.public_key, onion_skin+DIGEST_LEN+DIGEST256_LEN,
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CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
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/* Make y, Y */
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curve25519_secret_key_generate(&s.seckey_y, 0);
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curve25519_public_key_generate(&s.pubkey_Y, &s.seckey_y);
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/* NOTE: If we ever use a group other than curve25519, or a different
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* representation for its points, we may need to perform different or
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* additional checks on X here and on Y in the client handshake, or lose our
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* security properties. What checks we need would depend on the properties
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* of the group and its representation.
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*
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* In short: if you use anything other than curve25519, this aspect of the
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* code will need to be reconsidered carefully. */
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/* build secret_input */
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curve25519_handshake(si, &s.seckey_y, &s.pubkey_X);
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bad = safe_mem_is_zero(si, CURVE25519_OUTPUT_LEN);
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si += CURVE25519_OUTPUT_LEN;
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curve25519_handshake(si, &keypair_bB->seckey, &s.pubkey_X);
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bad |= safe_mem_is_zero(si, CURVE25519_OUTPUT_LEN);
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si += CURVE25519_OUTPUT_LEN;
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APPEND(si, my_node_id, DIGEST_LEN);
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APPEND(si, keypair_bB->pubkey.public_key, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
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APPEND(si, s.pubkey_X.public_key, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
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APPEND(si, s.pubkey_Y.public_key, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
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APPEND(si, PROTOID, PROTOID_LEN);
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tor_assert(si == s.secret_input + sizeof(s.secret_input));
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/* Compute hashes of secret_input */
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h_tweak(s.verify, s.secret_input, sizeof(s.secret_input), T->t_verify);
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/* Compute auth_input */
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APPEND(ai, s.verify, DIGEST256_LEN);
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APPEND(ai, my_node_id, DIGEST_LEN);
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APPEND(ai, keypair_bB->pubkey.public_key, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
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APPEND(ai, s.pubkey_Y.public_key, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
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APPEND(ai, s.pubkey_X.public_key, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
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APPEND(ai, PROTOID, PROTOID_LEN);
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APPEND(ai, SERVER_STR, SERVER_STR_LEN);
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tor_assert(ai == s.auth_input + sizeof(s.auth_input));
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/* Build the reply */
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memcpy(handshake_reply_out, s.pubkey_Y.public_key, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
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h_tweak(handshake_reply_out+CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN,
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s.auth_input, sizeof(s.auth_input),
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T->t_mac);
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/* Generate the key material */
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crypto_expand_key_material_rfc5869_sha256(
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s.secret_input, sizeof(s.secret_input),
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(const uint8_t*)T->t_key, strlen(T->t_key),
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(const uint8_t*)T->m_expand, strlen(T->m_expand),
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key_out, key_out_len);
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/* Wipe all of our local state */
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memwipe(&s, 0, sizeof(s));
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return bad ? -1 : 0;
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}
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/**
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* Perform the final client side of the ntor handshake, using the state in
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* <b>handshake_state</b> and the server's NTOR_REPLY_LEN-byte reply in
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* <b>handshake_reply</b>. Generate <b>key_out_len</b> bytes of key material
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* in <b>key_out</b>. Return 0 on success, -1 on failure.
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*/
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int
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onion_skin_ntor_client_handshake(
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const ntor_handshake_state_t *handshake_state,
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const uint8_t *handshake_reply,
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uint8_t *key_out,
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size_t key_out_len)
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{
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const tweakset_t *T = &proto1_tweaks;
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/* Sensitive stack-allocated material. Kept in an anonymous struct to make
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* it easy to wipe. */
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struct {
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curve25519_public_key_t pubkey_Y;
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uint8_t secret_input[SECRET_INPUT_LEN];
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uint8_t verify[DIGEST256_LEN];
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uint8_t auth_input[AUTH_INPUT_LEN];
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uint8_t auth[DIGEST256_LEN];
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} s;
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uint8_t *ai = s.auth_input, *si = s.secret_input;
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const uint8_t *auth_candidate;
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int bad;
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/* Decode input */
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memcpy(s.pubkey_Y.public_key, handshake_reply, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
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auth_candidate = handshake_reply + CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN;
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/* See note in server_handshake above about checking points. The
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* circumstances under which we'd need to check Y for membership are
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* different than those under which we'd be checking X. */
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/* Compute secret_input */
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curve25519_handshake(si, &handshake_state->seckey_x, &s.pubkey_Y);
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bad = safe_mem_is_zero(si, CURVE25519_OUTPUT_LEN);
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si += CURVE25519_OUTPUT_LEN;
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curve25519_handshake(si, &handshake_state->seckey_x,
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&handshake_state->pubkey_B);
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bad |= safe_mem_is_zero(si, CURVE25519_OUTPUT_LEN);
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si += CURVE25519_OUTPUT_LEN;
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APPEND(si, handshake_state->router_id, DIGEST_LEN);
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APPEND(si, handshake_state->pubkey_B.public_key, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
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APPEND(si, handshake_state->pubkey_X.public_key, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
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APPEND(si, s.pubkey_Y.public_key, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
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APPEND(si, PROTOID, PROTOID_LEN);
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tor_assert(si == s.secret_input + sizeof(s.secret_input));
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/* Compute verify from secret_input */
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h_tweak(s.verify, s.secret_input, sizeof(s.secret_input), T->t_verify);
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/* Compute auth_input */
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APPEND(ai, s.verify, DIGEST256_LEN);
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APPEND(ai, handshake_state->router_id, DIGEST_LEN);
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APPEND(ai, handshake_state->pubkey_B.public_key, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
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APPEND(ai, s.pubkey_Y.public_key, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
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APPEND(ai, handshake_state->pubkey_X.public_key, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
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APPEND(ai, PROTOID, PROTOID_LEN);
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APPEND(ai, SERVER_STR, SERVER_STR_LEN);
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tor_assert(ai == s.auth_input + sizeof(s.auth_input));
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/* Compute auth */
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h_tweak(s.auth, s.auth_input, sizeof(s.auth_input), T->t_mac);
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bad |= tor_memneq(s.auth, auth_candidate, DIGEST256_LEN);
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crypto_expand_key_material_rfc5869_sha256(
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s.secret_input, sizeof(s.secret_input),
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(const uint8_t*)T->t_key, strlen(T->t_key),
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(const uint8_t*)T->m_expand, strlen(T->m_expand),
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key_out, key_out_len);
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memwipe(&s, 0, sizeof(s));
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return bad ? -1 : 0;
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}
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