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141 lines
5.7 KiB
Plaintext
141 lines
5.7 KiB
Plaintext
Filename: xxx-what-uses-sha1.txt
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Title: Where does Tor use SHA-1 today?
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Version: $Revision$
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Last-Modified: $Date$
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Author: Nick Mathewson
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Created: 30-Dec-2008
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Status: Meta
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Introduction:
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Tor uses SHA-1 as a message digest. SHA-1 is showing its age:
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theoretical attacks for finding collisions against it get better
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every year or two, and it will likely be broken in practice before
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too long.
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According to smart crypto people, the SHA-2 functions (SHA-256, etc)
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share too much of SHA-1's structure to be very good. Some people
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like other hash functions; most of these have not seen enough
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analysis to be widely regarded as an extra-good idea.
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By 2012, the NIST SHA-3 competition will be done, and with luck we'll
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have something good to switch too. But it's probably a bad idea to
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wait until 2012 to figure out _how_ to migrate to a new hash
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function, for two reasons:
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1) It's not inconceivable we'll want to migrate in a hurry
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some time before then.
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2) It's likely that migrating to a new hash function will
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require protocol changes, and it's easiest to make protocol
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changes backward compatible if we lay the groundwork in
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advance. It would suck to have to break compatibility with
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a big hard-to-test "flag day" protocol change.
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This document attempts to list everything Tor uses SHA-1 for today.
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This is the first step in getting all the design work done to switch
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to something else.
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This document SHOULD NOT be a clearinghouse of what to do about our
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use of SHA-1. That's better left for other individual proposals.
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Why now?
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The recent publication of "MD5 considered harmful today: Creating a
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rogue CA certificate" by Alexander Sotirov, Marc Stevens, Jacob
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Appelbaum, Arjen Lenstra, David Molnar, Dag Arne Osvik, and Benne de
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Weger has reminded me that:
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* You can't rely on theoretical attacks to stay theoretical.
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* It's quite unpleasant when theoretical attacks become practical
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and public on days you were planning to leave for vacation.
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* Broken hash functions (which SHA-1 is not quite yet AFAIU)
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should be dropped like hot potatoes. Failure to do so can make
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one look silly.
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What Tor uses hashes for today:
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1. Infrastructure.
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A. Our X.509 certificates are signed with SHA-1.
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B. TLS uses SHA-1 (and MD5) internally to generate keys.
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C. Some of the TLS ciphersuites we allow use SHA-1.
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D. When we sign our code with GPG, it might be using SHA-1.
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E. Our GPG keys might be authenticated with SHA-1.
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F. OpenSSL's random number generator uses SHA-1, I believe.
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2. The Tor protocol
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A. Everything we sign, we sign using SHA-1-based OAEP-MGF1.
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B. Our CREATE cell format uses SHA-1 for: OAEP padding.
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C. Our EXTEND cells use SHA-1 to hash the identity key of the
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target server.
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D. Our CREATED cells use SHA-1 to hash the derived key data.
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E. The data we use in CREATE_FAST cells to generate a key is the
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length of a SHA-1.
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F. The data we send back in a CREATED/CREATED_FAST cell is the length
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of a SHA-1.
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G. We use SHA-1 to derive our circuit keys from the negotiated g^xy value.
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H. We use SHA-1 to derive the digest field of each RELAY cell, but that's
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used more as a checksum than as a strong digest.
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3. Directory services
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A. All signatures are generated on the SHA-1 of their corresponding
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documents, using PKCS1 padding.
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B. Router descriptors identify their corresponding extra-info documents
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by their SHA-1 digest.
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C. Fingerprints in router descriptors are taken using SHA-1.
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D. Fingerprints in authority certs are taken using SHA-1.
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E. Fingerprints in dir-source lines of votes and consensuses are taken
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using SHA-1.
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F. Networkstatuses refer to routers identity keys and descriptors by their
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SHA-1 digests.
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G. Directory-signature lines identify which key is doing the signing by
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the SHA-1 digests of the authority's signing key and its identity key.
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H. The following items are downloaded by the SHA-1 of their contents:
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XXXX list them
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I. The following items are downloaded by the SHA-1 of an identity key:
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XXXX list them too.
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4. The rendezvous protocol
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A. Hidden servers use SHA-1 to establish introduction points on relays,
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and relays use SHA-1 to check incoming introduction point
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establishment requests.
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B. Hidden servers use SHA-1 in multiple places when generating hidden
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service descriptors.
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C. Hidden servers performing basic-type client authorization for their
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services use SHA-1 when encrypting introduction points contained in
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hidden service descriptors.
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D. Hidden service directories use SHA-1 to check whether a given hidden
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service descriptor may be published under a given descriptor
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identifier or not.
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E. Hidden servers use SHA-1 to derive .onion addresses of their
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services.
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F. Clients use SHA-1 to generate the current hidden service descriptor
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identifiers for a given .onion address.
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G. Hidden servers use SHA-1 to remember digests of the first parts of
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Diffie-Hellman handshakes contained in introduction requests in order
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to detect replays.
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H. Hidden servers use SHA-1 during the Diffie-Hellman key exchange with
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a connecting client.
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5. The bridge protocol
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XXXX write me
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6. The Tor user interface
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A. We log information about servers based on SHA-1 hashes of their
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identity keys.
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B. The controller identifies servers based on SHA-1 hashes of their
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identity keys.
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C. Nearly all of our configuration options that list servers allow SHA-1
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hashes of their identity keys.
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E. The deprecated .exit notation uses SHA-1 hashes of identity keys
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