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1679 lines
59 KiB
C
1679 lines
59 KiB
C
/* Copyright (c) 2016-2020, The Tor Project, Inc. */
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/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
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#define SHARED_RANDOM_PRIVATE
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#define SHARED_RANDOM_STATE_PRIVATE
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#define CONFIG_PRIVATE
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#define DIRVOTE_PRIVATE
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#include "core/or/or.h"
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#include "test/test.h"
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#include "app/config/config.h"
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#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h"
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#include "feature/dirauth/dirvote.h"
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#include "feature/dirauth/shared_random.h"
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#include "feature/dirauth/shared_random_state.h"
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#include "test/log_test_helpers.h"
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#include "feature/nodelist/networkstatus.h"
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#include "feature/relay/router.h"
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#include "feature/relay/routerkeys.h"
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#include "feature/nodelist/authcert.h"
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#include "feature/nodelist/dirlist.h"
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#include "feature/dirparse/authcert_parse.h"
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#include "feature/hs_common/shared_random_client.h"
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#include "feature/dircommon/voting_schedule.h"
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#include "feature/dirclient/dir_server_st.h"
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#include "feature/nodelist/networkstatus_st.h"
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#include "app/config/or_state_st.h"
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#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
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#include <sys/stat.h>
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#endif
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#ifdef _WIN32
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/* For mkdir */
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#include <direct.h>
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#endif
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static authority_cert_t *mock_cert;
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static authority_cert_t *
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get_my_v3_authority_cert_m(void)
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{
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tor_assert(mock_cert);
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return mock_cert;
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}
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static dir_server_t ds;
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static dir_server_t *
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trusteddirserver_get_by_v3_auth_digest_m(const char *digest)
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{
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(void) digest;
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/* The shared random code only need to know if a valid pointer to a dir
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* server object has been found so this is safe because it won't use the
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* pointer at all never. */
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return &ds;
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}
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/* Setup a minimal dirauth environment by initializing the SR state and
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* making sure the options are set to be an authority directory.
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* You must only call this function once per process. */
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static void
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init_authority_state(void)
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{
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MOCK(get_my_v3_authority_cert, get_my_v3_authority_cert_m);
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or_options_t *options = get_options_mutable();
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mock_cert = authority_cert_parse_from_string(AUTHORITY_CERT_1,
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strlen(AUTHORITY_CERT_1),
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NULL);
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tt_assert(mock_cert);
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options->AuthoritativeDir = 1;
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tt_int_op(load_ed_keys(options, time(NULL)), OP_GE, 0);
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sr_state_init(0, 0);
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/* It's possible a commit has been generated in our state depending on
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* the phase we are currently in which uses "now" as the starting
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* timestamp. Delete it before we do any testing below. */
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sr_state_delete_commits();
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/* It's also possible that a current SRV has been generated, if we are at
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* state transition time. But let's just forget about that SRV. */
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sr_state_clean_srvs();
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done:
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UNMOCK(get_my_v3_authority_cert);
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}
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static void
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test_get_sr_protocol_phase(void *arg)
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{
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time_t the_time;
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sr_phase_t phase;
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int retval;
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(void) arg;
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/* Initialize SR state */
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init_authority_state();
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{
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retval = parse_rfc1123_time("Wed, 20 Apr 2015 23:59:00 UTC", &the_time);
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tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0);
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phase = get_sr_protocol_phase(the_time);
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tt_int_op(phase, OP_EQ, SR_PHASE_REVEAL);
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}
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{
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retval = parse_rfc1123_time("Wed, 20 Apr 2015 00:00:00 UTC", &the_time);
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tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0);
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phase = get_sr_protocol_phase(the_time);
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tt_int_op(phase, OP_EQ, SR_PHASE_COMMIT);
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}
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{
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retval = parse_rfc1123_time("Wed, 20 Apr 2015 00:00:01 UTC", &the_time);
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tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0);
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phase = get_sr_protocol_phase(the_time);
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tt_int_op(phase, OP_EQ, SR_PHASE_COMMIT);
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}
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{
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retval = parse_rfc1123_time("Wed, 20 Apr 2015 11:59:00 UTC", &the_time);
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tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0);
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phase = get_sr_protocol_phase(the_time);
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tt_int_op(phase, OP_EQ, SR_PHASE_COMMIT);
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}
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{
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retval = parse_rfc1123_time("Wed, 20 Apr 2015 12:00:00 UTC", &the_time);
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tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0);
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phase = get_sr_protocol_phase(the_time);
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tt_int_op(phase, OP_EQ, SR_PHASE_REVEAL);
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}
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{
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retval = parse_rfc1123_time("Wed, 20 Apr 2015 12:00:01 UTC", &the_time);
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tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0);
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phase = get_sr_protocol_phase(the_time);
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tt_int_op(phase, OP_EQ, SR_PHASE_REVEAL);
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}
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{
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retval = parse_rfc1123_time("Wed, 20 Apr 2015 13:00:00 UTC", &the_time);
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tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0);
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phase = get_sr_protocol_phase(the_time);
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tt_int_op(phase, OP_EQ, SR_PHASE_REVEAL);
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}
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done:
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;
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}
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static networkstatus_t mock_consensus;
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/* Mock function to immediately return our local 'mock_consensus'. */
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static networkstatus_t *
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mock_networkstatus_get_live_consensus(time_t now)
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{
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(void) now;
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return &mock_consensus;
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}
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static void
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test_get_state_valid_until_time(void *arg)
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{
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time_t current_time;
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time_t valid_until_time;
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char tbuf[ISO_TIME_LEN + 1];
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int retval;
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(void) arg;
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MOCK(networkstatus_get_live_consensus,
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mock_networkstatus_get_live_consensus);
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retval = parse_rfc1123_time("Mon, 20 Apr 2015 01:00:00 UTC",
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&mock_consensus.fresh_until);
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tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0);
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retval = parse_rfc1123_time("Mon, 20 Apr 2015 00:00:00 UTC",
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&mock_consensus.valid_after);
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tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0);
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{
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/* Get the valid until time if called at 00:00:01 */
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retval = parse_rfc1123_time("Mon, 20 Apr 2015 00:00:01 UTC",
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¤t_time);
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tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0);
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voting_schedule_recalculate_timing(get_options(), current_time);
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valid_until_time = get_state_valid_until_time(current_time);
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/* Compare it with the correct result */
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format_iso_time(tbuf, valid_until_time);
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tt_str_op("2015-04-21 00:00:00", OP_EQ, tbuf);
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}
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{
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retval = parse_rfc1123_time("Mon, 20 Apr 2015 19:22:00 UTC",
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¤t_time);
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tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0);
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voting_schedule_recalculate_timing(get_options(), current_time);
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valid_until_time = get_state_valid_until_time(current_time);
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format_iso_time(tbuf, valid_until_time);
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tt_str_op("2015-04-21 00:00:00", OP_EQ, tbuf);
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}
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{
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retval = parse_rfc1123_time("Mon, 20 Apr 2015 23:59:00 UTC",
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¤t_time);
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tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0);
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voting_schedule_recalculate_timing(get_options(), current_time);
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valid_until_time = get_state_valid_until_time(current_time);
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format_iso_time(tbuf, valid_until_time);
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tt_str_op("2015-04-21 00:00:00", OP_EQ, tbuf);
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}
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{
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retval = parse_rfc1123_time("Mon, 20 Apr 2015 00:00:00 UTC",
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¤t_time);
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tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0);
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voting_schedule_recalculate_timing(get_options(), current_time);
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valid_until_time = get_state_valid_until_time(current_time);
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format_iso_time(tbuf, valid_until_time);
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tt_str_op("2015-04-21 00:00:00", OP_EQ, tbuf);
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}
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done:
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UNMOCK(networkstatus_get_live_consensus);
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}
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/** Test the function that calculates the start time of the current SRV
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* protocol run. */
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static void
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test_get_start_time_of_current_run(void *arg)
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{
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int retval;
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char tbuf[ISO_TIME_LEN + 1];
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time_t current_time, run_start_time;
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(void) arg;
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MOCK(networkstatus_get_live_consensus,
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mock_networkstatus_get_live_consensus);
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retval = parse_rfc1123_time("Mon, 20 Apr 2015 01:00:00 UTC",
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&mock_consensus.fresh_until);
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tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0);
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retval = parse_rfc1123_time("Mon, 20 Apr 2015 00:00:00 UTC",
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&mock_consensus.valid_after);
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tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0);
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{
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/* Get start time if called at 00:00:01 */
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retval = parse_rfc1123_time("Mon, 20 Apr 2015 00:00:01 UTC",
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¤t_time);
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tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0);
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voting_schedule_recalculate_timing(get_options(), current_time);
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run_start_time = sr_state_get_start_time_of_current_protocol_run();
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/* Compare it with the correct result */
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format_iso_time(tbuf, run_start_time);
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tt_str_op("2015-04-20 00:00:00", OP_EQ, tbuf);
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}
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{
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retval = parse_rfc1123_time("Mon, 20 Apr 2015 23:59:59 UTC",
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¤t_time);
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tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0);
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voting_schedule_recalculate_timing(get_options(), current_time);
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run_start_time = sr_state_get_start_time_of_current_protocol_run();
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/* Compare it with the correct result */
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format_iso_time(tbuf, run_start_time);
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tt_str_op("2015-04-20 00:00:00", OP_EQ, tbuf);
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}
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{
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retval = parse_rfc1123_time("Mon, 20 Apr 2015 00:00:00 UTC",
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¤t_time);
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tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0);
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voting_schedule_recalculate_timing(get_options(), current_time);
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run_start_time = sr_state_get_start_time_of_current_protocol_run();
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/* Compare it with the correct result */
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format_iso_time(tbuf, run_start_time);
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tt_str_op("2015-04-20 00:00:00", OP_EQ, tbuf);
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}
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{
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/* We want the local time to be past midnight, but the current consensus to
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* have valid-after 23:00 (e.g. this can happen if we fetch a new consensus
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* at 00:08 before dircaches have a chance to get the midnight consensus).
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*
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* Basically, we want to cause a desynch between ns->valid_after (23:00)
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* and the voting_schedule.interval_starts (01:00), to make sure that
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* sr_state_get_start_time_of_current_protocol_run() handles it gracefully:
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* It should actually follow the local consensus time and not the voting
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* schedule (which is designed for authority voting purposes). */
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retval = parse_rfc1123_time("Mon, 20 Apr 2015 00:00:00 UTC",
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&mock_consensus.fresh_until);
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tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0);
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retval = parse_rfc1123_time("Mon, 19 Apr 2015 23:00:00 UTC",
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&mock_consensus.valid_after);
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tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0);
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retval = parse_rfc1123_time("Mon, 20 Apr 2015 00:08:00 UTC",
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¤t_time);
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tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0);
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update_approx_time(current_time);
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voting_schedule_recalculate_timing(get_options(), current_time);
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run_start_time = sr_state_get_start_time_of_current_protocol_run();
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/* Compare it with the correct result */
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format_iso_time(tbuf, run_start_time);
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tt_str_op("2015-04-19 00:00:00", OP_EQ, tbuf);
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/* Check that voting_schedule.interval_starts is at 01:00 (see above) */
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time_t interval_starts = voting_schedule_get_next_valid_after_time();
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format_iso_time(tbuf, interval_starts);
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tt_str_op("2015-04-20 01:00:00", OP_EQ, tbuf);
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}
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/* Next test is testing it without a consensus to use the testing voting
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* interval . */
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UNMOCK(networkstatus_get_live_consensus);
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/* Now let's alter the voting schedule and check the correctness of the
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* function. Voting interval of 10 seconds, means that an SRV protocol run
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* takes 10 seconds * 24 rounds = 4 mins */
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{
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or_options_t *options = get_options_mutable();
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options->V3AuthVotingInterval = 10;
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options->TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval = 10;
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retval = parse_rfc1123_time("Mon, 20 Apr 2015 00:15:32 UTC",
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¤t_time);
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tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0);
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voting_schedule_recalculate_timing(get_options(), current_time);
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run_start_time = sr_state_get_start_time_of_current_protocol_run();
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/* Compare it with the correct result */
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format_iso_time(tbuf, run_start_time);
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tt_str_op("2015-04-20 00:12:00", OP_EQ, tbuf);
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}
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done:
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;
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}
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/** Do some rudimentary consistency checks between the functions that
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* understand the shared random protocol schedule */
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static void
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test_get_start_time_functions(void *arg)
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{
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(void) arg;
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int retval;
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MOCK(networkstatus_get_live_consensus,
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mock_networkstatus_get_live_consensus);
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retval = parse_rfc1123_time("Mon, 20 Apr 2015 01:00:00 UTC",
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&mock_consensus.fresh_until);
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tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0);
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retval = parse_rfc1123_time("Mon, 20 Apr 2015 00:00:00 UTC",
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&mock_consensus.valid_after);
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tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0);
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time_t now = mock_consensus.valid_after;
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voting_schedule_recalculate_timing(get_options(), now);
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time_t start_time_of_protocol_run =
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sr_state_get_start_time_of_current_protocol_run();
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tt_assert(start_time_of_protocol_run);
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/* Check that the round start time of the beginning of the run, is itself */
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tt_int_op(get_start_time_of_current_round(), OP_EQ,
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start_time_of_protocol_run);
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done:
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UNMOCK(networkstatus_get_live_consensus);
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}
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static void
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test_get_sr_protocol_duration(void *arg)
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{
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(void) arg;
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/* Check that by default an SR phase is 12 hours */
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tt_int_op(sr_state_get_phase_duration(), OP_EQ, 12*60*60);
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tt_int_op(sr_state_get_protocol_run_duration(), OP_EQ, 24*60*60);
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/* Now alter the voting interval and check that the SR phase is 2 mins long
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* if voting happens every 10 seconds (10*12 seconds = 2 mins) */
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or_options_t *options = get_options_mutable();
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options->V3AuthVotingInterval = 10;
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tt_int_op(sr_state_get_phase_duration(), OP_EQ, 2*60);
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tt_int_op(sr_state_get_protocol_run_duration(), OP_EQ, 4*60);
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done: ;
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}
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/* In this test we are going to generate a sr_commit_t object and validate
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* it. We first generate our values, and then we parse them as if they were
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* received from the network. After we parse both the commit and the reveal,
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* we verify that they indeed match. */
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static void
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test_sr_commit(void *arg)
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{
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authority_cert_t *auth_cert = NULL;
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time_t now = time(NULL);
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sr_commit_t *our_commit = NULL;
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smartlist_t *args = smartlist_new();
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sr_commit_t *parsed_commit = NULL;
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(void) arg;
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{ /* Setup a minimal dirauth environment for this test */
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or_options_t *options = get_options_mutable();
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auth_cert = authority_cert_parse_from_string(AUTHORITY_CERT_1,
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strlen(AUTHORITY_CERT_1),
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NULL);
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tt_assert(auth_cert);
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options->AuthoritativeDir = 1;
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tt_int_op(load_ed_keys(options, time(NULL)), OP_GE, 0);
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}
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/* Generate our commit object and validate it has the appropriate field
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* that we can then use to build a representation that we'll find in a
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* vote coming from the network. */
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{
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sr_commit_t test_commit;
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our_commit = sr_generate_our_commit(now, auth_cert);
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tt_assert(our_commit);
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/* Default and only supported algorithm for now. */
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tt_assert(our_commit->alg == DIGEST_SHA3_256);
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/* We should have a reveal value. */
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tt_assert(commit_has_reveal_value(our_commit));
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/* We should have a random value. */
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tt_assert(!fast_mem_is_zero((char *) our_commit->random_number,
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sizeof(our_commit->random_number)));
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/* Commit and reveal timestamp should be the same. */
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tt_u64_op(our_commit->commit_ts, OP_EQ, our_commit->reveal_ts);
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/* We should have a hashed reveal. */
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tt_assert(!fast_mem_is_zero(our_commit->hashed_reveal,
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sizeof(our_commit->hashed_reveal)));
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/* Do we have a valid encoded commit and reveal. Note the following only
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* tests if the generated values are correct. Their could be a bug in
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* the decode function but we test them separately. */
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tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, reveal_decode(our_commit->encoded_reveal,
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&test_commit));
|
|
tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, commit_decode(our_commit->encoded_commit,
|
|
&test_commit));
|
|
tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, verify_commit_and_reveal(our_commit));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Let's make sure our verify commit and reveal function works. We'll
|
|
* make it fail a bit with known failure case. */
|
|
{
|
|
/* Copy our commit so we don't alter it for the rest of testing. */
|
|
sr_commit_t test_commit;
|
|
memcpy(&test_commit, our_commit, sizeof(test_commit));
|
|
|
|
/* Timestamp MUST match. */
|
|
test_commit.commit_ts = test_commit.reveal_ts - 42;
|
|
setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN);
|
|
tt_int_op(-1, OP_EQ, verify_commit_and_reveal(&test_commit));
|
|
expect_log_msg_containing("doesn't match reveal timestamp");
|
|
teardown_capture_of_logs();
|
|
memcpy(&test_commit, our_commit, sizeof(test_commit));
|
|
tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, verify_commit_and_reveal(&test_commit));
|
|
|
|
/* Hashed reveal must match the H(encoded_reveal). */
|
|
memset(test_commit.hashed_reveal, 'X',
|
|
sizeof(test_commit.hashed_reveal));
|
|
setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN);
|
|
tt_int_op(-1, OP_EQ, verify_commit_and_reveal(&test_commit));
|
|
expect_single_log_msg_containing("doesn't match the commit value");
|
|
teardown_capture_of_logs();
|
|
memcpy(&test_commit, our_commit, sizeof(test_commit));
|
|
tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, verify_commit_and_reveal(&test_commit));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* We'll build a list of values from our commit that our parsing function
|
|
* takes from a vote line and see if we can parse it correctly. */
|
|
{
|
|
smartlist_add_strdup(args, "1");
|
|
smartlist_add_strdup(args,
|
|
crypto_digest_algorithm_get_name(our_commit->alg));
|
|
smartlist_add_strdup(args, sr_commit_get_rsa_fpr(our_commit));
|
|
smartlist_add_strdup(args, our_commit->encoded_commit);
|
|
smartlist_add_strdup(args, our_commit->encoded_reveal);
|
|
parsed_commit = sr_parse_commit(args);
|
|
tt_assert(parsed_commit);
|
|
/* That parsed commit should be _EXACTLY_ like our original commit (we
|
|
* have to explicitly set the valid flag though). */
|
|
parsed_commit->valid = 1;
|
|
tt_mem_op(parsed_commit, OP_EQ, our_commit, sizeof(*parsed_commit));
|
|
/* Cleanup */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
teardown_capture_of_logs();
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(args, char *, cp, tor_free(cp));
|
|
smartlist_free(args);
|
|
sr_commit_free(our_commit);
|
|
sr_commit_free(parsed_commit);
|
|
authority_cert_free(auth_cert);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Test the encoding and decoding function for commit and reveal values. */
|
|
static void
|
|
test_encoding(void *arg)
|
|
{
|
|
(void) arg;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
/* Random number is 32 bytes. */
|
|
char raw_rand[32];
|
|
time_t ts = 1454333590;
|
|
char hashed_rand[DIGEST256_LEN], hashed_reveal[DIGEST256_LEN];
|
|
sr_commit_t parsed_commit;
|
|
|
|
/* Those values were generated by sr_commit_calc_ref.py where the random
|
|
* value is 32 'A' and timestamp is the one in ts. */
|
|
static const char *encoded_reveal =
|
|
"AAAAAFavXpZJxbwTupvaJCTeIUCQmOPxAMblc7ChL5H2nZKuGchdaA==";
|
|
static const char *encoded_commit =
|
|
"AAAAAFavXpbkBMzMQG7aNoaGLFNpm2Wkk1ozXhuWWqL//GynltxVAg==";
|
|
|
|
/* Set up our raw random bytes array. */
|
|
memset(raw_rand, 'A', sizeof(raw_rand));
|
|
/* Hash random number because we don't expose bytes of the RNG. */
|
|
ret = crypto_digest256(hashed_rand, raw_rand,
|
|
sizeof(raw_rand), SR_DIGEST_ALG);
|
|
tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, ret);
|
|
/* Hash reveal value. */
|
|
tt_int_op(SR_REVEAL_BASE64_LEN, OP_EQ, strlen(encoded_reveal));
|
|
ret = crypto_digest256(hashed_reveal, encoded_reveal,
|
|
strlen(encoded_reveal), SR_DIGEST_ALG);
|
|
tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, ret);
|
|
tt_int_op(SR_COMMIT_BASE64_LEN, OP_EQ, strlen(encoded_commit));
|
|
|
|
/* Test our commit/reveal decode functions. */
|
|
{
|
|
/* Test the reveal encoded value. */
|
|
tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, reveal_decode(encoded_reveal, &parsed_commit));
|
|
tt_u64_op(ts, OP_EQ, parsed_commit.reveal_ts);
|
|
tt_mem_op(hashed_rand, OP_EQ, parsed_commit.random_number,
|
|
sizeof(hashed_rand));
|
|
|
|
/* Test the commit encoded value. */
|
|
memset(&parsed_commit, 0, sizeof(parsed_commit));
|
|
tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, commit_decode(encoded_commit, &parsed_commit));
|
|
tt_u64_op(ts, OP_EQ, parsed_commit.commit_ts);
|
|
tt_mem_op(encoded_commit, OP_EQ, parsed_commit.encoded_commit,
|
|
sizeof(parsed_commit.encoded_commit));
|
|
tt_mem_op(hashed_reveal, OP_EQ, parsed_commit.hashed_reveal,
|
|
sizeof(hashed_reveal));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Test our commit/reveal encode functions. */
|
|
{
|
|
/* Test the reveal encode. */
|
|
char encoded[SR_REVEAL_BASE64_LEN + 1];
|
|
parsed_commit.reveal_ts = ts;
|
|
memcpy(parsed_commit.random_number, hashed_rand,
|
|
sizeof(parsed_commit.random_number));
|
|
ret = reveal_encode(&parsed_commit, encoded, sizeof(encoded));
|
|
tt_int_op(SR_REVEAL_BASE64_LEN, OP_EQ, ret);
|
|
tt_mem_op(encoded_reveal, OP_EQ, encoded, strlen(encoded_reveal));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
/* Test the commit encode. */
|
|
char encoded[SR_COMMIT_BASE64_LEN + 1];
|
|
parsed_commit.commit_ts = ts;
|
|
memcpy(parsed_commit.hashed_reveal, hashed_reveal,
|
|
sizeof(parsed_commit.hashed_reveal));
|
|
ret = commit_encode(&parsed_commit, encoded, sizeof(encoded));
|
|
tt_int_op(SR_COMMIT_BASE64_LEN, OP_EQ, ret);
|
|
tt_mem_op(encoded_commit, OP_EQ, encoded, strlen(encoded_commit));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Setup some SRVs in our SR state.
|
|
* If <b>also_current</b> is set, then set both current and previous SRVs.
|
|
* Otherwise, just set the previous SRV. (And clear the current SRV.)
|
|
*
|
|
* You must call sr_state_free_all() to free the state at the end of each test
|
|
* function (on pass or fail). */
|
|
static void
|
|
test_sr_setup_srv(int also_current)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Clear both SRVs before starting.
|
|
* In 0.3.5 and earlier, sr_state_set_previous_srv() and
|
|
* sr_state_set_current_srv() do not free() the old srvs. */
|
|
sr_state_clean_srvs();
|
|
|
|
sr_srv_t *srv = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(sr_srv_t));
|
|
srv->num_reveals = 42;
|
|
memcpy(srv->value,
|
|
"ZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ",
|
|
sizeof(srv->value));
|
|
|
|
sr_state_set_previous_srv(srv);
|
|
|
|
if (also_current) {
|
|
srv = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(sr_srv_t));
|
|
srv->num_reveals = 128;
|
|
memcpy(srv->value,
|
|
"NNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNNN",
|
|
sizeof(srv->value));
|
|
|
|
sr_state_set_current_srv(srv);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Test anything that has to do with SR protocol and vote. */
|
|
static void
|
|
test_vote(void *arg)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
time_t now = time(NULL);
|
|
sr_commit_t *our_commit = NULL;
|
|
|
|
(void) arg;
|
|
|
|
MOCK(trusteddirserver_get_by_v3_auth_digest,
|
|
trusteddirserver_get_by_v3_auth_digest_m);
|
|
|
|
{ /* Setup a minimal dirauth environment for this test */
|
|
init_authority_state();
|
|
/* Set ourself in reveal phase so we can parse the reveal value in the
|
|
* vote as well. */
|
|
set_sr_phase(SR_PHASE_REVEAL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Generate our commit object and validate it has the appropriate field
|
|
* that we can then use to build a representation that we'll find in a
|
|
* vote coming from the network. */
|
|
{
|
|
sr_commit_t *saved_commit;
|
|
our_commit = sr_generate_our_commit(now, mock_cert);
|
|
tt_assert(our_commit);
|
|
sr_state_add_commit(our_commit);
|
|
/* Make sure it's there. */
|
|
saved_commit = sr_state_get_commit(our_commit->rsa_identity);
|
|
tt_assert(saved_commit);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Also setup the SRVs */
|
|
test_sr_setup_srv(1);
|
|
|
|
{ /* Now test the vote generation */
|
|
smartlist_t *chunks = smartlist_new();
|
|
smartlist_t *tokens = smartlist_new();
|
|
/* Get our vote line and validate it. */
|
|
char *lines = sr_get_string_for_vote();
|
|
tt_assert(lines);
|
|
/* Split the lines. We expect 2 here. */
|
|
ret = smartlist_split_string(chunks, lines, "\n", SPLIT_IGNORE_BLANK, 0);
|
|
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 4);
|
|
tt_str_op(smartlist_get(chunks, 0), OP_EQ, "shared-rand-participate");
|
|
/* Get our commitment line and will validate it against our commit. The
|
|
* format is as follow:
|
|
* "shared-rand-commitment" SP version SP algname SP identity
|
|
* SP COMMIT [SP REVEAL] NL
|
|
*/
|
|
char *commit_line = smartlist_get(chunks, 1);
|
|
tt_assert(commit_line);
|
|
ret = smartlist_split_string(tokens, commit_line, " ", 0, 0);
|
|
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 6);
|
|
tt_str_op(smartlist_get(tokens, 0), OP_EQ, "shared-rand-commit");
|
|
tt_str_op(smartlist_get(tokens, 1), OP_EQ, "1");
|
|
tt_str_op(smartlist_get(tokens, 2), OP_EQ,
|
|
crypto_digest_algorithm_get_name(DIGEST_SHA3_256));
|
|
char digest[DIGEST_LEN];
|
|
base16_decode(digest, sizeof(digest), smartlist_get(tokens, 3),
|
|
HEX_DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
tt_mem_op(digest, OP_EQ, our_commit->rsa_identity, sizeof(digest));
|
|
tt_str_op(smartlist_get(tokens, 4), OP_EQ, our_commit->encoded_commit);
|
|
tt_str_op(smartlist_get(tokens, 5), OP_EQ, our_commit->encoded_reveal)
|
|
;
|
|
/* Finally, does this vote line creates a valid commit object? */
|
|
smartlist_t *args = smartlist_new();
|
|
smartlist_add(args, smartlist_get(tokens, 1));
|
|
smartlist_add(args, smartlist_get(tokens, 2));
|
|
smartlist_add(args, smartlist_get(tokens, 3));
|
|
smartlist_add(args, smartlist_get(tokens, 4));
|
|
smartlist_add(args, smartlist_get(tokens, 5));
|
|
sr_commit_t *parsed_commit = sr_parse_commit(args);
|
|
tt_assert(parsed_commit);
|
|
/* Set valid flag explicitly here to compare since it's not set by
|
|
* simply parsing the commit. */
|
|
parsed_commit->valid = 1;
|
|
tt_mem_op(parsed_commit, OP_EQ, our_commit, sizeof(*our_commit));
|
|
|
|
/* minor cleanup */
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(tokens, char *, s, tor_free(s));
|
|
smartlist_clear(tokens);
|
|
|
|
/* Now test the previous SRV */
|
|
char *prev_srv_line = smartlist_get(chunks, 2);
|
|
tt_assert(prev_srv_line);
|
|
ret = smartlist_split_string(tokens, prev_srv_line, " ", 0, 0);
|
|
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 3);
|
|
tt_str_op(smartlist_get(tokens, 0), OP_EQ, "shared-rand-previous-value");
|
|
tt_str_op(smartlist_get(tokens, 1), OP_EQ, "42");
|
|
tt_str_op(smartlist_get(tokens, 2), OP_EQ,
|
|
"WlpaWlpaWlpaWlpaWlpaWlpaWlpaWlpaWlpaWlpaWlo=");
|
|
|
|
/* minor cleanup */
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(tokens, char *, s, tor_free(s));
|
|
smartlist_clear(tokens);
|
|
|
|
/* Now test the current SRV */
|
|
char *current_srv_line = smartlist_get(chunks, 3);
|
|
tt_assert(current_srv_line);
|
|
ret = smartlist_split_string(tokens, current_srv_line, " ", 0, 0);
|
|
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 3);
|
|
tt_str_op(smartlist_get(tokens, 0), OP_EQ, "shared-rand-current-value");
|
|
tt_str_op(smartlist_get(tokens, 1), OP_EQ, "128");
|
|
tt_str_op(smartlist_get(tokens, 2), OP_EQ,
|
|
"Tk5OTk5OTk5OTk5OTk5OTk5OTk5OTk5OTk5OTk5OTk4=");
|
|
|
|
/* Clean up */
|
|
sr_commit_free(parsed_commit);
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(chunks, char *, s, tor_free(s));
|
|
smartlist_free(chunks);
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(tokens, char *, s, tor_free(s));
|
|
smartlist_free(tokens);
|
|
smartlist_clear(args);
|
|
smartlist_free(args);
|
|
tor_free(lines);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
UNMOCK(trusteddirserver_get_by_v3_auth_digest);
|
|
sr_state_free_all();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static const char *sr_state_str = "Version 1\n"
|
|
"TorVersion 0.2.9.0-alpha-dev\n"
|
|
"ValidAfter 2037-04-19 07:16:00\n"
|
|
"ValidUntil 2037-04-20 07:16:00\n"
|
|
"Commit 1 sha3-256 FA3CEC2C99DC68D3166B9B6E4FA21A4026C2AB1C "
|
|
"7M8GdubCAAdh7WUG0DiwRyxTYRKji7HATa7LLJEZ/UAAAAAAVmfUSg== "
|
|
"AAAAAFZn1EojfIheIw42bjK3VqkpYyjsQFSbv/dxNna3Q8hUEPKpOw==\n"
|
|
"Commit 1 sha3-256 41E89EDFBFBA44983E21F18F2230A4ECB5BFB543 "
|
|
"17aUsYuMeRjd2N1r8yNyg7aHqRa6gf4z7QPoxxAZbp0AAAAAVmfUSg==\n"
|
|
"Commit 1 sha3-256 36637026573A04110CF3E6B1D201FB9A98B88734 "
|
|
"DDDYtripvdOU+XPEUm5xpU64d9IURSds1xSwQsgeB8oAAAAAVmfUSg==\n"
|
|
"SharedRandPreviousValue 4 qqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqqo=\n"
|
|
"SharedRandCurrentValue 3 8dWeW12KEzTGEiLGgO1UVJ7Z91CekoRcxt6Q9KhnOFI=\n";
|
|
|
|
/** Create an SR disk state, parse it and validate that the parsing went
|
|
* well. Yes! */
|
|
static void
|
|
test_state_load_from_disk(void *arg)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret;
|
|
char *dir = tor_strdup(get_fname("test_sr_state"));
|
|
char *sr_state_path = tor_strdup(get_fname("test_sr_state/sr_state"));
|
|
sr_state_t *the_sr_state = NULL;
|
|
|
|
(void) arg;
|
|
|
|
MOCK(trusteddirserver_get_by_v3_auth_digest,
|
|
trusteddirserver_get_by_v3_auth_digest_m);
|
|
|
|
/* First try with a nonexistent path. */
|
|
ret = disk_state_load_from_disk_impl("NONEXISTENTNONEXISTENT");
|
|
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -ENOENT);
|
|
|
|
/* Now create a mock state directory and state file */
|
|
#ifdef _WIN32
|
|
ret = mkdir(dir);
|
|
#else
|
|
ret = mkdir(dir, 0700);
|
|
#endif
|
|
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
|
|
ret = write_str_to_file(sr_state_path, sr_state_str, 0);
|
|
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
|
|
|
|
/* Try to load the directory itself. Should fail. */
|
|
ret = disk_state_load_from_disk_impl(dir);
|
|
tt_int_op(ret, OP_LT, 0);
|
|
|
|
/* State should be non-existent at this point. */
|
|
the_sr_state = get_sr_state();
|
|
tt_ptr_op(the_sr_state, OP_EQ, NULL);
|
|
|
|
/* Now try to load the correct file! */
|
|
ret = disk_state_load_from_disk_impl(sr_state_path);
|
|
tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0);
|
|
|
|
/* Check the content of the state */
|
|
/* XXX check more deeply!!! */
|
|
the_sr_state = get_sr_state();
|
|
tt_assert(the_sr_state);
|
|
tt_assert(the_sr_state->version == 1);
|
|
tt_assert(digestmap_size(the_sr_state->commits) == 3);
|
|
tt_assert(the_sr_state->current_srv);
|
|
tt_assert(the_sr_state->current_srv->num_reveals == 3);
|
|
tt_assert(the_sr_state->previous_srv);
|
|
|
|
/* XXX Now also try loading corrupted state files and make sure parsing
|
|
fails */
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
tor_free(dir);
|
|
tor_free(sr_state_path);
|
|
UNMOCK(trusteddirserver_get_by_v3_auth_digest);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Generate three specially crafted commits (based on the test
|
|
* vector at sr_srv_calc_ref.py). Helper of test_sr_compute_srv(). */
|
|
static void
|
|
test_sr_setup_commits(void)
|
|
{
|
|
time_t now = time(NULL);
|
|
sr_commit_t *commit_a, *commit_b, *commit_c, *commit_d;
|
|
sr_commit_t *place_holder = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*place_holder));
|
|
authority_cert_t *auth_cert = NULL;
|
|
|
|
{ /* Setup a minimal dirauth environment for this test */
|
|
or_options_t *options = get_options_mutable();
|
|
|
|
auth_cert = authority_cert_parse_from_string(AUTHORITY_CERT_1,
|
|
strlen(AUTHORITY_CERT_1),
|
|
NULL);
|
|
tt_assert(auth_cert);
|
|
|
|
options->AuthoritativeDir = 1;
|
|
tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, load_ed_keys(options, now));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Generate three dummy commits according to sr_srv_calc_ref.py . Then
|
|
register them to the SR state. Also register a fourth commit 'd' with no
|
|
reveal info, to make sure that it will get ignored during SRV
|
|
calculation. */
|
|
|
|
{ /* Commit from auth 'a' */
|
|
commit_a = sr_generate_our_commit(now, auth_cert);
|
|
tt_assert(commit_a);
|
|
|
|
/* Do some surgery on the commit */
|
|
memset(commit_a->rsa_identity, 'A', sizeof(commit_a->rsa_identity));
|
|
base16_encode(commit_a->rsa_identity_hex,
|
|
sizeof(commit_a->rsa_identity_hex), commit_a->rsa_identity,
|
|
sizeof(commit_a->rsa_identity));
|
|
strlcpy(commit_a->encoded_reveal,
|
|
"AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA",
|
|
sizeof(commit_a->encoded_reveal));
|
|
memcpy(commit_a->hashed_reveal,
|
|
"AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA",
|
|
sizeof(commit_a->hashed_reveal));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
{ /* Commit from auth 'b' */
|
|
commit_b = sr_generate_our_commit(now, auth_cert);
|
|
tt_assert(commit_b);
|
|
|
|
/* Do some surgery on the commit */
|
|
memset(commit_b->rsa_identity, 'B', sizeof(commit_b->rsa_identity));
|
|
base16_encode(commit_b->rsa_identity_hex,
|
|
sizeof(commit_b->rsa_identity_hex), commit_b->rsa_identity,
|
|
sizeof(commit_b->rsa_identity));
|
|
strlcpy(commit_b->encoded_reveal,
|
|
"BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB",
|
|
sizeof(commit_b->encoded_reveal));
|
|
memcpy(commit_b->hashed_reveal,
|
|
"BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB",
|
|
sizeof(commit_b->hashed_reveal));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
{ /* Commit from auth 'c' */
|
|
commit_c = sr_generate_our_commit(now, auth_cert);
|
|
tt_assert(commit_c);
|
|
|
|
/* Do some surgery on the commit */
|
|
memset(commit_c->rsa_identity, 'C', sizeof(commit_c->rsa_identity));
|
|
base16_encode(commit_c->rsa_identity_hex,
|
|
sizeof(commit_c->rsa_identity_hex), commit_c->rsa_identity,
|
|
sizeof(commit_c->rsa_identity));
|
|
strlcpy(commit_c->encoded_reveal,
|
|
"CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC",
|
|
sizeof(commit_c->encoded_reveal));
|
|
memcpy(commit_c->hashed_reveal,
|
|
"CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC",
|
|
sizeof(commit_c->hashed_reveal));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
{ /* Commit from auth 'd' */
|
|
commit_d = sr_generate_our_commit(now, auth_cert);
|
|
tt_assert(commit_d);
|
|
|
|
/* Do some surgery on the commit */
|
|
memset(commit_d->rsa_identity, 'D', sizeof(commit_d->rsa_identity));
|
|
base16_encode(commit_d->rsa_identity_hex,
|
|
sizeof(commit_d->rsa_identity_hex), commit_d->rsa_identity,
|
|
sizeof(commit_d->rsa_identity));
|
|
strlcpy(commit_d->encoded_reveal,
|
|
"DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD",
|
|
sizeof(commit_d->encoded_reveal));
|
|
memcpy(commit_d->hashed_reveal,
|
|
"DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD",
|
|
sizeof(commit_d->hashed_reveal));
|
|
/* Clean up its reveal info */
|
|
memcpy(place_holder, commit_d, sizeof(*place_holder));
|
|
memset(commit_d->encoded_reveal, 0, sizeof(commit_d->encoded_reveal));
|
|
tt_assert(!commit_has_reveal_value(commit_d));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Register commits to state (during commit phase) */
|
|
set_sr_phase(SR_PHASE_COMMIT);
|
|
save_commit_to_state(commit_a);
|
|
save_commit_to_state(commit_b);
|
|
save_commit_to_state(commit_c);
|
|
save_commit_to_state(commit_d);
|
|
tt_int_op(digestmap_size(get_sr_state()->commits), OP_EQ, 4);
|
|
|
|
/* Now during REVEAL phase save commit D by restoring its reveal. */
|
|
set_sr_phase(SR_PHASE_REVEAL);
|
|
save_commit_to_state(place_holder);
|
|
place_holder = NULL;
|
|
tt_str_op(commit_d->encoded_reveal, OP_EQ,
|
|
"DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD");
|
|
/* Go back to an empty encoded reveal value. */
|
|
memset(commit_d->encoded_reveal, 0, sizeof(commit_d->encoded_reveal));
|
|
memset(commit_d->random_number, 0, sizeof(commit_d->random_number));
|
|
tt_assert(!commit_has_reveal_value(commit_d));
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
tor_free(place_holder);
|
|
authority_cert_free(auth_cert);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Verify that the SRV generation procedure is proper by testing it against
|
|
* the test vector from ./sr_srv_calc_ref.py. */
|
|
static void
|
|
test_sr_compute_srv(void *arg)
|
|
{
|
|
(void) arg;
|
|
const sr_srv_t *current_srv = NULL;
|
|
|
|
#define SRV_TEST_VECTOR \
|
|
"2A9B1D6237DAB312A40F575DA85C147663E7ED3F80E9555395F15B515C74253D"
|
|
|
|
MOCK(trusteddirserver_get_by_v3_auth_digest,
|
|
trusteddirserver_get_by_v3_auth_digest_m);
|
|
|
|
init_authority_state();
|
|
|
|
/* Setup the commits for this unittest */
|
|
test_sr_setup_commits();
|
|
test_sr_setup_srv(0);
|
|
|
|
/* Now switch to reveal phase */
|
|
set_sr_phase(SR_PHASE_REVEAL);
|
|
|
|
/* Compute the SRV */
|
|
sr_compute_srv();
|
|
|
|
/* Check the result against the test vector */
|
|
current_srv = sr_state_get_current_srv();
|
|
tt_assert(current_srv);
|
|
tt_u64_op(current_srv->num_reveals, OP_EQ, 3);
|
|
tt_str_op(hex_str((char*)current_srv->value, 32),
|
|
OP_EQ,
|
|
SRV_TEST_VECTOR);
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
UNMOCK(trusteddirserver_get_by_v3_auth_digest);
|
|
sr_state_free_all();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Return a minimal vote document with a current SRV value set to
|
|
* <b>srv</b>. */
|
|
static networkstatus_t *
|
|
get_test_vote_with_curr_srv(const char *srv)
|
|
{
|
|
networkstatus_t *vote = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(networkstatus_t));
|
|
|
|
vote->type = NS_TYPE_VOTE;
|
|
vote->sr_info.participate = 1;
|
|
vote->sr_info.current_srv = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(sr_srv_t));
|
|
vote->sr_info.current_srv->num_reveals = 42;
|
|
memcpy(vote->sr_info.current_srv->value,
|
|
srv,
|
|
sizeof(vote->sr_info.current_srv->value));
|
|
|
|
return vote;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Test the function that picks the right SRV given a bunch of votes. Make sure
|
|
* that the function returns an SRV iff the majority/agreement requirements are
|
|
* met. */
|
|
static void
|
|
test_sr_get_majority_srv_from_votes(void *arg)
|
|
{
|
|
sr_srv_t *chosen_srv;
|
|
smartlist_t *votes = smartlist_new();
|
|
|
|
#define SRV_1 "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"
|
|
#define SRV_2 "BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB"
|
|
|
|
(void) arg;
|
|
|
|
init_authority_state();
|
|
/* Make sure our SRV is fresh so we can consider the super majority with
|
|
* the consensus params of number of agreements needed. */
|
|
sr_state_set_fresh_srv();
|
|
|
|
/* The test relies on the dirauth list being initialized. */
|
|
clear_dir_servers();
|
|
add_default_trusted_dir_authorities(V3_DIRINFO);
|
|
|
|
{ /* Prepare voting environment with just a single vote. */
|
|
networkstatus_t *vote = get_test_vote_with_curr_srv(SRV_1);
|
|
smartlist_add(votes, vote);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Since it's only one vote with an SRV, it should not achieve majority and
|
|
hence no SRV will be returned. */
|
|
chosen_srv = get_majority_srv_from_votes(votes, 1);
|
|
tt_ptr_op(chosen_srv, OP_EQ, NULL);
|
|
|
|
{ /* Now put in 8 more votes. Let SRV_1 have majority. */
|
|
int i;
|
|
/* Now 7 votes believe in SRV_1 */
|
|
for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
|
|
networkstatus_t *vote = get_test_vote_with_curr_srv(SRV_1);
|
|
smartlist_add(votes, vote);
|
|
}
|
|
/* and 2 votes believe in SRV_2 */
|
|
for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
|
|
networkstatus_t *vote = get_test_vote_with_curr_srv(SRV_2);
|
|
smartlist_add(votes, vote);
|
|
}
|
|
for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
|
|
networkstatus_t *vote = get_test_vote_with_curr_srv(SRV_1);
|
|
smartlist_add(votes, vote);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
tt_int_op(smartlist_len(votes), OP_EQ, 9);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Now we achieve majority for SRV_1, but not the AuthDirNumSRVAgreements
|
|
requirement. So still not picking an SRV. */
|
|
set_num_srv_agreements(8);
|
|
chosen_srv = get_majority_srv_from_votes(votes, 1);
|
|
tt_ptr_op(chosen_srv, OP_EQ, NULL);
|
|
|
|
/* We will now lower the AuthDirNumSRVAgreements requirement by tweaking the
|
|
* consensus parameter and we will try again. This time it should work. */
|
|
set_num_srv_agreements(7);
|
|
chosen_srv = get_majority_srv_from_votes(votes, 1);
|
|
tt_assert(chosen_srv);
|
|
tt_u64_op(chosen_srv->num_reveals, OP_EQ, 42);
|
|
tt_mem_op(chosen_srv->value, OP_EQ, SRV_1, sizeof(chosen_srv->value));
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(votes, networkstatus_t *, vote,
|
|
networkstatus_vote_free(vote));
|
|
smartlist_free(votes);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Testing sr_srv_dup(). */
|
|
static void
|
|
test_sr_svr_dup(void *arg)
|
|
{
|
|
(void)arg;
|
|
|
|
sr_srv_t *srv = NULL, *dup_srv = NULL;
|
|
const char *srv_value =
|
|
"1BDB7C3E973936E4D13A49F37C859B3DC69C429334CF9412E3FEF6399C52D47A";
|
|
srv = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*srv));
|
|
srv->num_reveals = 42;
|
|
memcpy(srv->value, srv_value, sizeof(srv->value));
|
|
dup_srv = sr_srv_dup(srv);
|
|
tt_assert(dup_srv);
|
|
tt_u64_op(dup_srv->num_reveals, OP_EQ, srv->num_reveals);
|
|
tt_mem_op(dup_srv->value, OP_EQ, srv->value, sizeof(srv->value));
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
tor_free(srv);
|
|
tor_free(dup_srv);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Testing commitments_are_the_same(). Currently, the check is to test the
|
|
* value of the encoded commit so let's make sure that actually works. */
|
|
static void
|
|
test_commitments_are_the_same(void *arg)
|
|
{
|
|
(void)arg;
|
|
|
|
/* Payload of 57 bytes that is the length of sr_commit_t->encoded_commit.
|
|
* 56 bytes of payload and a NUL terminated byte at the end ('\x00')
|
|
* which comes down to SR_COMMIT_BASE64_LEN + 1. */
|
|
const char *payload =
|
|
"\x5d\xb9\x60\xb6\xcc\x51\x68\x52\x31\xd9\x88\x88\x71\x71\xe0\x30"
|
|
"\x59\x55\x7f\xcd\x61\xc0\x4b\x05\xb8\xcd\xc1\x48\xe9\xcd\x16\x1f"
|
|
"\x70\x15\x0c\xfc\xd3\x1a\x75\xd0\x93\x6c\xc4\xe0\x5c\xbe\xe2\x18"
|
|
"\xc7\xaf\x72\xb6\x7c\x9b\x52\x00";
|
|
sr_commit_t commit1, commit2;
|
|
memcpy(commit1.encoded_commit, payload, sizeof(commit1.encoded_commit));
|
|
memcpy(commit2.encoded_commit, payload, sizeof(commit2.encoded_commit));
|
|
tt_int_op(commitments_are_the_same(&commit1, &commit2), OP_EQ, 1);
|
|
/* Let's corrupt one of them. */
|
|
memset(commit1.encoded_commit, 'A', sizeof(commit1.encoded_commit));
|
|
tt_int_op(commitments_are_the_same(&commit1, &commit2), OP_EQ, 0);
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Testing commit_is_authoritative(). */
|
|
static void
|
|
test_commit_is_authoritative(void *arg)
|
|
{
|
|
(void)arg;
|
|
|
|
crypto_pk_t *k = crypto_pk_new();
|
|
char digest[DIGEST_LEN];
|
|
sr_commit_t commit;
|
|
|
|
tt_assert(!crypto_pk_generate_key(k));
|
|
|
|
tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, crypto_pk_get_digest(k, digest));
|
|
memcpy(commit.rsa_identity, digest, sizeof(commit.rsa_identity));
|
|
tt_int_op(commit_is_authoritative(&commit, digest), OP_EQ, 1);
|
|
/* Change the pubkey. */
|
|
memset(commit.rsa_identity, 0, sizeof(commit.rsa_identity));
|
|
tt_int_op(commit_is_authoritative(&commit, digest), OP_EQ, 0);
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
crypto_pk_free(k);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
test_get_phase_str(void *arg)
|
|
{
|
|
(void)arg;
|
|
|
|
tt_str_op(get_phase_str(SR_PHASE_REVEAL), OP_EQ, "reveal");
|
|
tt_str_op(get_phase_str(SR_PHASE_COMMIT), OP_EQ, "commit");
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Test utils that depend on authority state */
|
|
static void
|
|
test_utils_auth(void *arg)
|
|
{
|
|
(void)arg;
|
|
init_authority_state();
|
|
|
|
/* Testing phase transition */
|
|
{
|
|
set_sr_phase(SR_PHASE_COMMIT);
|
|
tt_int_op(is_phase_transition(SR_PHASE_REVEAL), OP_EQ, 1);
|
|
tt_int_op(is_phase_transition(SR_PHASE_COMMIT), OP_EQ, 0);
|
|
set_sr_phase(SR_PHASE_REVEAL);
|
|
tt_int_op(is_phase_transition(SR_PHASE_REVEAL), OP_EQ, 0);
|
|
tt_int_op(is_phase_transition(SR_PHASE_COMMIT), OP_EQ, 1);
|
|
/* Junk. */
|
|
tt_int_op(is_phase_transition(42), OP_EQ, 1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Testing get, set, delete, clean SRVs */
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
/* Just set the previous SRV */
|
|
test_sr_setup_srv(0);
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_previous_srv(), OP_NE, NULL);
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_current_srv(), OP_EQ, NULL);
|
|
state_del_previous_srv();
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_previous_srv(), OP_EQ, NULL);
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_current_srv(), OP_EQ, NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
/* Delete the SRVs one at a time */
|
|
test_sr_setup_srv(1);
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_previous_srv(), OP_NE, NULL);
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_current_srv(), OP_NE, NULL);
|
|
state_del_current_srv();
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_previous_srv(), OP_NE, NULL);
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_current_srv(), OP_EQ, NULL);
|
|
state_del_previous_srv();
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_previous_srv(), OP_EQ, NULL);
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_current_srv(), OP_EQ, NULL);
|
|
|
|
/* And in the opposite order */
|
|
test_sr_setup_srv(1);
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_previous_srv(), OP_NE, NULL);
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_current_srv(), OP_NE, NULL);
|
|
state_del_previous_srv();
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_previous_srv(), OP_EQ, NULL);
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_current_srv(), OP_NE, NULL);
|
|
state_del_current_srv();
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_previous_srv(), OP_EQ, NULL);
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_current_srv(), OP_EQ, NULL);
|
|
|
|
/* And both at once */
|
|
test_sr_setup_srv(1);
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_previous_srv(), OP_NE, NULL);
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_current_srv(), OP_NE, NULL);
|
|
sr_state_clean_srvs();
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_previous_srv(), OP_EQ, NULL);
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_current_srv(), OP_EQ, NULL);
|
|
|
|
/* And do the gets and sets multiple times */
|
|
test_sr_setup_srv(1);
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_previous_srv(), OP_NE, NULL);
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_current_srv(), OP_NE, NULL);
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_previous_srv(), OP_NE, NULL);
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_current_srv(), OP_NE, NULL);
|
|
state_del_previous_srv();
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_previous_srv(), OP_EQ, NULL);
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_current_srv(), OP_NE, NULL);
|
|
state_del_previous_srv();
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_previous_srv(), OP_EQ, NULL);
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_current_srv(), OP_NE, NULL);
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_previous_srv(), OP_EQ, NULL);
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_current_srv(), OP_NE, NULL);
|
|
sr_state_clean_srvs();
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_previous_srv(), OP_EQ, NULL);
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_current_srv(), OP_EQ, NULL);
|
|
state_del_current_srv();
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_previous_srv(), OP_EQ, NULL);
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_current_srv(), OP_EQ, NULL);
|
|
sr_state_clean_srvs();
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_previous_srv(), OP_EQ, NULL);
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_current_srv(), OP_EQ, NULL);
|
|
state_del_current_srv();
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_previous_srv(), OP_EQ, NULL);
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_current_srv(), OP_EQ, NULL);
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_previous_srv(), OP_EQ, NULL);
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_current_srv(), OP_EQ, NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
/* Now set the SRVs to NULL instead */
|
|
test_sr_setup_srv(1);
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_previous_srv(), OP_NE, NULL);
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_current_srv(), OP_NE, NULL);
|
|
sr_state_set_current_srv(NULL);
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_previous_srv(), OP_NE, NULL);
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_current_srv(), OP_EQ, NULL);
|
|
sr_state_set_previous_srv(NULL);
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_previous_srv(), OP_EQ, NULL);
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_current_srv(), OP_EQ, NULL);
|
|
|
|
/* And in the opposite order */
|
|
test_sr_setup_srv(1);
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_previous_srv(), OP_NE, NULL);
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_current_srv(), OP_NE, NULL);
|
|
sr_state_set_previous_srv(NULL);
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_previous_srv(), OP_EQ, NULL);
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_current_srv(), OP_NE, NULL);
|
|
sr_state_set_current_srv(NULL);
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_previous_srv(), OP_EQ, NULL);
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_current_srv(), OP_EQ, NULL);
|
|
|
|
/* And both at once */
|
|
test_sr_setup_srv(1);
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_previous_srv(), OP_NE, NULL);
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_current_srv(), OP_NE, NULL);
|
|
sr_state_clean_srvs();
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_previous_srv(), OP_EQ, NULL);
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_current_srv(), OP_EQ, NULL);
|
|
|
|
/* And do the gets and sets multiple times */
|
|
test_sr_setup_srv(1);
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_previous_srv(), OP_NE, NULL);
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_current_srv(), OP_NE, NULL);
|
|
sr_state_set_previous_srv(NULL);
|
|
sr_state_set_previous_srv(NULL);
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_previous_srv(), OP_EQ, NULL);
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_current_srv(), OP_NE, NULL);
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_previous_srv(), OP_EQ, NULL);
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_current_srv(), OP_NE, NULL);
|
|
sr_state_set_current_srv(NULL);
|
|
sr_state_set_previous_srv(NULL);
|
|
sr_state_set_current_srv(NULL);
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_previous_srv(), OP_EQ, NULL);
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_current_srv(), OP_EQ, NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
/* Now copy the values across */
|
|
test_sr_setup_srv(1);
|
|
/* Check that the pointers are non-NULL, and different from each other */
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_previous_srv(), OP_NE, NULL);
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_current_srv(), OP_NE, NULL);
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_previous_srv(), OP_NE,
|
|
sr_state_get_current_srv());
|
|
/* Check that the content is different */
|
|
tt_mem_op(sr_state_get_previous_srv(), OP_NE,
|
|
sr_state_get_current_srv(), sizeof(sr_srv_t));
|
|
/* Set the current to the previous: the protocol goes the other way */
|
|
sr_state_set_current_srv(sr_srv_dup(sr_state_get_previous_srv()));
|
|
/* Check that the pointers are non-NULL, and different from each other */
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_previous_srv(), OP_NE, NULL);
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_current_srv(), OP_NE, NULL);
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_previous_srv(), OP_NE,
|
|
sr_state_get_current_srv());
|
|
/* Check that the content is the same */
|
|
tt_mem_op(sr_state_get_previous_srv(), OP_EQ,
|
|
sr_state_get_current_srv(), sizeof(sr_srv_t));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
/* Now copy a value onto itself */
|
|
test_sr_setup_srv(1);
|
|
/* Check that the pointers are non-NULL, and different from each other */
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_previous_srv(), OP_NE, NULL);
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_current_srv(), OP_NE, NULL);
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_previous_srv(), OP_NE,
|
|
sr_state_get_current_srv());
|
|
/* Take a copy of the old value */
|
|
sr_srv_t old_current_srv;
|
|
memcpy(&old_current_srv, sr_state_get_current_srv(), sizeof(sr_srv_t));
|
|
/* Check that the content is different */
|
|
tt_mem_op(sr_state_get_previous_srv(), OP_NE,
|
|
sr_state_get_current_srv(), sizeof(sr_srv_t));
|
|
/* Set the current to the current: the protocol never replaces an SRV with
|
|
* the same value */
|
|
sr_state_set_current_srv(sr_srv_dup(sr_state_get_current_srv()));
|
|
/* Check that the pointers are non-NULL, and different from each other */
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_previous_srv(), OP_NE, NULL);
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_current_srv(), OP_NE, NULL);
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_previous_srv(), OP_NE,
|
|
sr_state_get_current_srv());
|
|
/* Check that the content is different between current and previous */
|
|
tt_mem_op(sr_state_get_previous_srv(), OP_NE,
|
|
sr_state_get_current_srv(), sizeof(sr_srv_t));
|
|
/* Check that the content is the same as the old content */
|
|
tt_mem_op(&old_current_srv, OP_EQ,
|
|
sr_state_get_current_srv(), sizeof(sr_srv_t));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* I don't think we can say "expect a BUG()" in our tests. */
|
|
#if 0
|
|
{
|
|
/* Now copy a value onto itself without sr_srv_dup().
|
|
* This should fail with a BUG() warning. */
|
|
test_sr_setup_srv(1);
|
|
sr_state_set_current_srv(sr_state_get_current_srv());
|
|
sr_state_set_previous_srv(sr_state_get_previous_srv());
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* 0 */
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
sr_state_free_all();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
test_state_transition(void *arg)
|
|
{
|
|
sr_state_t *state = NULL;
|
|
time_t now = time(NULL);
|
|
sr_srv_t *cur = NULL;
|
|
|
|
(void) arg;
|
|
|
|
{ /* Setup a minimal dirauth environment for this test */
|
|
init_authority_state();
|
|
state = get_sr_state();
|
|
tt_assert(state);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Test our state reset for a new protocol run. */
|
|
{
|
|
/* Add a commit to the state so we can test if the reset cleans the
|
|
* commits. Also, change all params that we expect to be updated. */
|
|
sr_commit_t *commit = sr_generate_our_commit(now, mock_cert);
|
|
tt_assert(commit);
|
|
sr_state_add_commit(commit);
|
|
tt_int_op(digestmap_size(state->commits), OP_EQ, 1);
|
|
/* Let's test our delete feature. */
|
|
sr_state_delete_commits();
|
|
tt_int_op(digestmap_size(state->commits), OP_EQ, 0);
|
|
/* Add it back so we can continue the rest of the test because after
|
|
* deletiong our commit will be freed so generate a new one. */
|
|
commit = sr_generate_our_commit(now, mock_cert);
|
|
tt_assert(commit);
|
|
sr_state_add_commit(commit);
|
|
tt_int_op(digestmap_size(state->commits), OP_EQ, 1);
|
|
state->n_reveal_rounds = 42;
|
|
state->n_commit_rounds = 43;
|
|
state->n_protocol_runs = 44;
|
|
reset_state_for_new_protocol_run(now);
|
|
tt_int_op(state->n_reveal_rounds, OP_EQ, 0);
|
|
tt_int_op(state->n_commit_rounds, OP_EQ, 0);
|
|
tt_u64_op(state->n_protocol_runs, OP_EQ, 45);
|
|
tt_int_op(digestmap_size(state->commits), OP_EQ, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Test SRV rotation in our state. */
|
|
{
|
|
test_sr_setup_srv(1);
|
|
tt_assert(sr_state_get_current_srv());
|
|
/* Take a copy of the data, because the state owns the pointer */
|
|
cur = sr_srv_dup(sr_state_get_current_srv());
|
|
tt_assert(cur);
|
|
/* After, the previous SRV should be the same as the old current SRV, and
|
|
* the current SRV should be set to NULL */
|
|
state_rotate_srv();
|
|
tt_mem_op(sr_state_get_previous_srv(), OP_EQ, cur, sizeof(sr_srv_t));
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_current_srv(), OP_EQ, NULL);
|
|
sr_state_clean_srvs();
|
|
tor_free(cur);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* New protocol run. */
|
|
{
|
|
/* Setup some new SRVs so we can confirm that a new protocol run
|
|
* actually makes them rotate and compute new ones. */
|
|
test_sr_setup_srv(1);
|
|
tt_assert(sr_state_get_current_srv());
|
|
/* Take a copy of the data, because the state owns the pointer */
|
|
cur = sr_srv_dup(sr_state_get_current_srv());
|
|
set_sr_phase(SR_PHASE_REVEAL);
|
|
MOCK(get_my_v3_authority_cert, get_my_v3_authority_cert_m);
|
|
new_protocol_run(now);
|
|
UNMOCK(get_my_v3_authority_cert);
|
|
/* Rotation happened. */
|
|
tt_mem_op(sr_state_get_previous_srv(), OP_EQ, cur, sizeof(sr_srv_t));
|
|
/* We are going into COMMIT phase so we had to rotate our SRVs. Usually
|
|
* our current SRV would be NULL but a new protocol run should make us
|
|
* compute a new SRV. */
|
|
tt_assert(sr_state_get_current_srv());
|
|
/* Also, make sure we did change the current. */
|
|
tt_mem_op(sr_state_get_current_srv(), OP_NE, cur, sizeof(sr_srv_t));
|
|
/* We should have our commitment alone. */
|
|
tt_int_op(digestmap_size(state->commits), OP_EQ, 1);
|
|
tt_int_op(state->n_reveal_rounds, OP_EQ, 0);
|
|
tt_int_op(state->n_commit_rounds, OP_EQ, 0);
|
|
/* 46 here since we were at 45 just before. */
|
|
tt_u64_op(state->n_protocol_runs, OP_EQ, 46);
|
|
tor_free(cur);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Cleanup of SRVs. */
|
|
{
|
|
sr_state_clean_srvs();
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_current_srv(), OP_EQ, NULL);
|
|
tt_ptr_op(sr_state_get_previous_srv(), OP_EQ, NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
tor_free(cur);
|
|
sr_state_free_all();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
test_keep_commit(void *arg)
|
|
{
|
|
char fp[FINGERPRINT_LEN + 1];
|
|
sr_commit_t *commit = NULL, *dup_commit = NULL;
|
|
sr_state_t *state;
|
|
time_t now = time(NULL);
|
|
crypto_pk_t *k = NULL;
|
|
|
|
(void) arg;
|
|
|
|
MOCK(trusteddirserver_get_by_v3_auth_digest,
|
|
trusteddirserver_get_by_v3_auth_digest_m);
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
k = pk_generate(1);
|
|
/* Setup a minimal dirauth environment for this test */
|
|
/* Have a key that is not the one from our commit. */
|
|
init_authority_state();
|
|
state = get_sr_state();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
crypto_rand((char*)fp, sizeof(fp));
|
|
|
|
/* Test this very important function that tells us if we should keep a
|
|
* commit or not in our state. Most of it depends on the phase and what's
|
|
* in the commit so we'll change the commit as we go. */
|
|
commit = sr_generate_our_commit(now, mock_cert);
|
|
tt_assert(commit);
|
|
/* Set us in COMMIT phase for starter. */
|
|
set_sr_phase(SR_PHASE_COMMIT);
|
|
/* We should never keep a commit from a non authoritative authority. */
|
|
tt_int_op(should_keep_commit(commit, fp, SR_PHASE_COMMIT), OP_EQ, 0);
|
|
/* This should NOT be kept because it has a reveal value in it. */
|
|
tt_assert(commit_has_reveal_value(commit));
|
|
tt_int_op(should_keep_commit(commit, commit->rsa_identity,
|
|
SR_PHASE_COMMIT), OP_EQ, 0);
|
|
/* Add it to the state which should return to not keep it. */
|
|
sr_state_add_commit(commit);
|
|
tt_int_op(should_keep_commit(commit, commit->rsa_identity,
|
|
SR_PHASE_COMMIT), OP_EQ, 0);
|
|
/* Remove it from state so we can continue our testing. */
|
|
digestmap_remove(state->commits, commit->rsa_identity);
|
|
/* Let's remove our reveal value which should make it OK to keep it. */
|
|
memset(commit->encoded_reveal, 0, sizeof(commit->encoded_reveal));
|
|
tt_int_op(should_keep_commit(commit, commit->rsa_identity,
|
|
SR_PHASE_COMMIT), OP_EQ, 1);
|
|
|
|
/* Let's reset our commit and go into REVEAL phase. */
|
|
sr_commit_free(commit);
|
|
commit = sr_generate_our_commit(now, mock_cert);
|
|
tt_assert(commit);
|
|
/* Dup the commit so we have one with and one without a reveal value. */
|
|
dup_commit = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*dup_commit));
|
|
memcpy(dup_commit, commit, sizeof(*dup_commit));
|
|
memset(dup_commit->encoded_reveal, 0, sizeof(dup_commit->encoded_reveal));
|
|
set_sr_phase(SR_PHASE_REVEAL);
|
|
/* We should never keep a commit from a non authoritative authority. */
|
|
tt_int_op(should_keep_commit(commit, fp, SR_PHASE_REVEAL), OP_EQ, 0);
|
|
/* We shouldn't accept a commit that is not in our state. */
|
|
tt_int_op(should_keep_commit(commit, commit->rsa_identity,
|
|
SR_PHASE_REVEAL), OP_EQ, 0);
|
|
/* Important to add the commit _without_ the reveal here. */
|
|
sr_state_add_commit(dup_commit);
|
|
tt_int_op(digestmap_size(state->commits), OP_EQ, 1);
|
|
/* Our commit should be valid that is authoritative, contains a reveal, be
|
|
* in the state and commitment and reveal values match. */
|
|
tt_int_op(should_keep_commit(commit, commit->rsa_identity,
|
|
SR_PHASE_REVEAL), OP_EQ, 1);
|
|
/* The commit shouldn't be kept if it's not verified that is no matchin
|
|
* hashed reveal. */
|
|
{
|
|
/* Let's save the hash reveal so we can restore it. */
|
|
sr_commit_t place_holder;
|
|
memcpy(place_holder.hashed_reveal, commit->hashed_reveal,
|
|
sizeof(place_holder.hashed_reveal));
|
|
memset(commit->hashed_reveal, 0, sizeof(commit->hashed_reveal));
|
|
setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN);
|
|
tt_int_op(should_keep_commit(commit, commit->rsa_identity,
|
|
SR_PHASE_REVEAL), OP_EQ, 0);
|
|
expect_log_msg_containing("doesn't match the commit value.");
|
|
expect_log_msg_containing("has an invalid reveal value.");
|
|
assert_log_predicate(mock_saved_log_n_entries() == 2,
|
|
("expected 2 log entries"));
|
|
teardown_capture_of_logs();
|
|
memcpy(commit->hashed_reveal, place_holder.hashed_reveal,
|
|
sizeof(commit->hashed_reveal));
|
|
}
|
|
/* We shouldn't keep a commit that has no reveal. */
|
|
tt_int_op(should_keep_commit(dup_commit, dup_commit->rsa_identity,
|
|
SR_PHASE_REVEAL), OP_EQ, 0);
|
|
/* We must not keep a commit that is not the same from the commit phase. */
|
|
memset(commit->encoded_commit, 0, sizeof(commit->encoded_commit));
|
|
tt_int_op(should_keep_commit(commit, commit->rsa_identity,
|
|
SR_PHASE_REVEAL), OP_EQ, 0);
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
teardown_capture_of_logs();
|
|
sr_commit_free(commit);
|
|
sr_commit_free(dup_commit);
|
|
crypto_pk_free(k);
|
|
UNMOCK(trusteddirserver_get_by_v3_auth_digest);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void
|
|
test_state_update(void *arg)
|
|
{
|
|
time_t commit_phase_time = 1452076000;
|
|
time_t reveal_phase_time = 1452086800;
|
|
sr_state_t *state;
|
|
|
|
(void) arg;
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
init_authority_state();
|
|
state = get_sr_state();
|
|
set_sr_phase(SR_PHASE_COMMIT);
|
|
/* We'll cheat a bit here and reset the creation time of the state which
|
|
* will avoid us to compute a valid_after time that fits the commit
|
|
* phase. */
|
|
state->valid_after = 0;
|
|
state->n_reveal_rounds = 0;
|
|
state->n_commit_rounds = 0;
|
|
state->n_protocol_runs = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* We need to mock for the state update function call. */
|
|
MOCK(get_my_v3_authority_cert, get_my_v3_authority_cert_m);
|
|
|
|
/* We are in COMMIT phase here and we'll trigger a state update but no
|
|
* transition. */
|
|
sr_state_update(commit_phase_time);
|
|
tt_int_op(state->valid_after, OP_EQ, commit_phase_time);
|
|
tt_int_op(state->n_commit_rounds, OP_EQ, 1);
|
|
tt_int_op(state->phase, OP_EQ, SR_PHASE_COMMIT);
|
|
tt_int_op(digestmap_size(state->commits), OP_EQ, 1);
|
|
|
|
/* We are still in the COMMIT phase here but we'll trigger a state
|
|
* transition to the REVEAL phase. */
|
|
sr_state_update(reveal_phase_time);
|
|
tt_int_op(state->phase, OP_EQ, SR_PHASE_REVEAL);
|
|
tt_int_op(state->valid_after, OP_EQ, reveal_phase_time);
|
|
/* Only our commit should be in there. */
|
|
tt_int_op(digestmap_size(state->commits), OP_EQ, 1);
|
|
tt_int_op(state->n_reveal_rounds, OP_EQ, 1);
|
|
|
|
/* We can't update a state with a valid after _lower_ than the creation
|
|
* time so here it is. */
|
|
sr_state_update(commit_phase_time);
|
|
tt_int_op(state->valid_after, OP_EQ, reveal_phase_time);
|
|
|
|
/* Finally, let's go back in COMMIT phase so we can test the state update
|
|
* of a new protocol run. */
|
|
state->valid_after = 0;
|
|
sr_state_update(commit_phase_time);
|
|
tt_int_op(state->valid_after, OP_EQ, commit_phase_time);
|
|
tt_int_op(state->n_commit_rounds, OP_EQ, 1);
|
|
tt_int_op(state->n_reveal_rounds, OP_EQ, 0);
|
|
tt_u64_op(state->n_protocol_runs, OP_EQ, 1);
|
|
tt_int_op(state->phase, OP_EQ, SR_PHASE_COMMIT);
|
|
tt_int_op(digestmap_size(state->commits), OP_EQ, 1);
|
|
tt_assert(state->current_srv);
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
sr_state_free_all();
|
|
UNMOCK(get_my_v3_authority_cert);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
struct testcase_t sr_tests[] = {
|
|
{ "get_sr_protocol_phase", test_get_sr_protocol_phase, TT_FORK,
|
|
NULL, NULL },
|
|
{ "sr_commit", test_sr_commit, TT_FORK,
|
|
NULL, NULL },
|
|
{ "keep_commit", test_keep_commit, TT_FORK,
|
|
NULL, NULL },
|
|
{ "encoding", test_encoding, TT_FORK,
|
|
NULL, NULL },
|
|
{ "get_start_time_of_current_run", test_get_start_time_of_current_run,
|
|
TT_FORK, NULL, NULL },
|
|
{ "get_start_time_functions", test_get_start_time_functions,
|
|
TT_FORK, NULL, NULL },
|
|
{ "get_sr_protocol_duration", test_get_sr_protocol_duration, TT_FORK,
|
|
NULL, NULL },
|
|
{ "get_state_valid_until_time", test_get_state_valid_until_time, TT_FORK,
|
|
NULL, NULL },
|
|
{ "vote", test_vote, TT_FORK,
|
|
NULL, NULL },
|
|
{ "state_load_from_disk", test_state_load_from_disk, TT_FORK,
|
|
NULL, NULL },
|
|
{ "sr_compute_srv", test_sr_compute_srv, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL },
|
|
{ "sr_get_majority_srv_from_votes", test_sr_get_majority_srv_from_votes,
|
|
TT_FORK, NULL, NULL },
|
|
{ "sr_svr_dup", test_sr_svr_dup, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL },
|
|
{ "commitments_are_the_same", test_commitments_are_the_same, TT_FORK, NULL,
|
|
NULL },
|
|
{ "commit_is_authoritative", test_commit_is_authoritative, TT_FORK, NULL,
|
|
NULL },
|
|
{ "get_phase_str", test_get_phase_str, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL },
|
|
{ "utils_auth", test_utils_auth, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL },
|
|
{ "state_transition", test_state_transition, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL },
|
|
{ "state_update", test_state_update, TT_FORK,
|
|
NULL, NULL },
|
|
END_OF_TESTCASES
|
|
};
|