mirror of
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor.git
synced 2024-11-11 13:43:47 +01:00
954570486f
choose circuit ID types. This is important because our view of "the nickname of the router on the other side of this connection" is skewed, and depends on whether we think the other rotuer is verified--and there's no way to know whether another router thinks you are verified. For backward compatibility, we notice when the other router chooses the same circuit ID type as us (because it's running an old version), and switch our type to be polite. svn:r2797
490 lines
16 KiB
C
490 lines
16 KiB
C
/* Copyright 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
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* Copyright 2001-2004 Roger Dingledine.
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* Copyright 2004 Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. */
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/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
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/* $Id$ */
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/**
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* \file connection_or.c
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* \brief Functions to handle OR connections, TLS handshaking, and
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* cells on the network.
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**/
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#include "or.h"
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static int connection_tls_finish_handshake(connection_t *conn);
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static int connection_or_process_cells_from_inbuf(connection_t *conn);
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/**************************************************************/
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/** Pack the cell_t host-order structure <b>src</b> into network-order
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* in the buffer <b>dest</b>. See tor-spec.txt for details about the
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* wire format.
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*/
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static void cell_pack(char *dest, const cell_t *src) {
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*(uint16_t*)dest = htons(src->circ_id);
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*(uint8_t*)(dest+2) = src->command;
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memcpy(dest+3, src->payload, CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE);
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}
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/** Unpack the network-order buffer <b>src</b> into a host-order
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* cell_t structure <b>dest</b>.
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*/
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static void cell_unpack(cell_t *dest, const char *src) {
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dest->circ_id = ntohs(*(uint16_t*)(src));
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dest->command = *(uint8_t*)(src+2);
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memcpy(dest->payload, src+3, CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE);
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}
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/** Handle any new bytes that have come in on connection <b>conn</b>.
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* If conn is in 'open' state, hand it to
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* connection_or_process_cells_from_inbuf()
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* (else do nothing).
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*/
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int connection_or_process_inbuf(connection_t *conn) {
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tor_assert(conn);
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tor_assert(conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR);
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if(conn->inbuf_reached_eof) {
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log_fn(LOG_INFO,"OR connection reached EOF. Closing.");
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connection_mark_for_close(conn);
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return 0;
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}
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if(conn->state != OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN)
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return 0; /* don't do anything */
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return connection_or_process_cells_from_inbuf(conn);
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}
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/** Connection <b>conn</b> has finished writing and has no bytes left on
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* its outbuf.
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*
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* Otherwise it's in state "open": stop writing and return.
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*
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* If <b>conn</b> is broken, mark it for close and return -1, else
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* return 0.
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*/
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int connection_or_finished_flushing(connection_t *conn) {
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tor_assert(conn);
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tor_assert(conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR);
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assert_connection_ok(conn,0);
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if (conn->state != OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN) {
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log_fn(LOG_WARN,"BUG: called in unexpected state %d",conn->state);
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return -1;
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}
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connection_stop_writing(conn);
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return 0;
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}
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/** Connected handler for OR connections: begin the TLS handshake.
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*/
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int connection_or_finished_connecting(connection_t *conn)
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{
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tor_assert(conn);
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tor_assert(conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR);
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tor_assert(conn->state == OR_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING);
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log_fn(LOG_INFO,"OR connect() to router %s:%u finished.",
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conn->address,conn->port);
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if(connection_tls_start_handshake(conn, 0) < 0) {
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/* TLS handshaking error of some kind. */
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connection_mark_for_close(conn);
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return -1;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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/** Initialize <b>conn</b> to include all the relevant data from <b>router</b>.
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* This function is called either from connection_or_connect(), if
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* we initiated the connect, or from connection_tls_finish_handshake()
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* if the other side initiated it.
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*/
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static void
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connection_or_init_conn_from_router(connection_t *conn, routerinfo_t *router) {
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conn->addr = router->addr;
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conn->port = router->or_port;
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conn->receiver_bucket = conn->bandwidth = router->bandwidthburst;
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conn->identity_pkey = crypto_pk_dup_key(router->identity_pkey);
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crypto_pk_get_digest(conn->identity_pkey, conn->identity_digest);
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conn->nickname = tor_strdup(router->nickname);
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tor_free(conn->address);
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conn->address = tor_strdup(router->address);
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}
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static void
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connection_or_init_conn_from_address(connection_t *conn,
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uint32_t addr, uint16_t port,
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const char *id_digest)
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{
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struct in_addr in;
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const char *n;
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or_options_t *options = get_options();
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routerinfo_t *r = router_get_by_digest(id_digest);
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if (r) {
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connection_or_init_conn_from_router(conn,r);
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return;
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}
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conn->addr = addr;
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conn->port = port;
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/* This next part isn't really right, but it's good enough for now. */
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conn->receiver_bucket = conn->bandwidth = options->BandwidthBurstBytes;
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memcpy(conn->identity_digest, id_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
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/* If we're an authoritative directory server, we may know a
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* nickname for this router. */
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n = dirserv_get_nickname_by_digest(id_digest);
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if (n) {
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conn->nickname = tor_strdup(n);
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} else {
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conn->nickname = tor_malloc(HEX_DIGEST_LEN+2);
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conn->nickname[0] = '$';
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base16_encode(conn->nickname+1, HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1,
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conn->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
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}
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tor_free(conn->address);
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in.s_addr = htonl(addr);
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conn->address = tor_strdup(inet_ntoa(in));
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}
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void
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connection_or_update_nickname(connection_t *conn)
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{
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routerinfo_t *r;
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const char *n;
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tor_assert(conn);
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tor_assert(conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR);
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n = dirserv_get_nickname_by_digest(conn->identity_digest);
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if (n) {
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if (!conn->nickname || strcmp(conn->nickname, n)) {
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tor_free(conn->nickname);
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conn->nickname = tor_strdup(n);
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}
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return;
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}
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r = router_get_by_digest(conn->identity_digest);
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if (r && r->is_verified) {
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if (!conn->nickname || strcmp(conn->nickname, r->nickname)) {
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tor_free(conn->nickname);
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conn->nickname = tor_strdup(r->nickname);
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}
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return;
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}
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if (conn->nickname[0] != '$') {
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tor_free(conn->nickname);
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conn->nickname = tor_malloc(HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1);
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base16_encode(conn->nickname, HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1,
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conn->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
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}
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}
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/** Launch a new OR connection to <b>addr</b>:<b>port</b> and expect to
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* handshake with an OR with identity digest <b>id_digest</b>.
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*
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* If <b>id_digest</b> is me, do nothing. If we're already connected to it,
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* return that connection. If the connect() is in progress, set the
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* new conn's state to 'connecting' and return it. If connect() succeeds,
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* call * connection_tls_start_handshake() on it.
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*
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* This function is called from router_retry_connections(), for
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* ORs connecting to ORs, and circuit_establish_circuit(), for
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* OPs connecting to ORs.
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*
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* Return the launched conn, or NULL if it failed.
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*/
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connection_t *connection_or_connect(uint32_t addr, uint16_t port,
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const char *id_digest) {
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connection_t *conn;
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routerinfo_t *me;
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tor_assert(id_digest);
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if(server_mode(get_options()) && (me=router_get_my_routerinfo()) &&
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!memcmp(me->identity_digest, id_digest,DIGEST_LEN)) {
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log_fn(LOG_WARN,"Request to connect to myself! Failing.");
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return NULL;
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}
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/* this function should never be called if we're already connected to
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* id_digest, but check first to be sure */
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/*XXX008 this is getting called, at least by dirservers. */
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conn = connection_get_by_identity_digest(id_digest, CONN_TYPE_OR);
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if(conn) {
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tor_assert(conn->nickname);
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log_fn(LOG_WARN,"Asked me to connect to %s, but there's already a connection.", conn->nickname);
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return conn;
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}
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conn = connection_new(CONN_TYPE_OR);
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/* set up conn so it's got all the data we need to remember */
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connection_or_init_conn_from_address(conn, addr, port, id_digest);
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conn->state = OR_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING;
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control_event_or_conn_status(conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_LAUNCHED);
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switch(connection_connect(conn, conn->address, addr, port)) {
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case -1:
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router_mark_as_down(conn->identity_digest);
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control_event_or_conn_status(conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_FAILED);
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connection_free(conn);
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return NULL;
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case 0:
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connection_watch_events(conn, POLLIN | POLLOUT | POLLERR);
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/* writable indicates finish, readable indicates broken link,
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error indicates broken link on windows */
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return conn;
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/* case 1: fall through */
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}
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if(connection_tls_start_handshake(conn, 0) >= 0)
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return conn;
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/* failure */
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connection_mark_for_close(conn);
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return NULL;
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}
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/** Begin the tls handshake with <b>conn</b>. <b>receiving</b> is 0 if
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* we initiated the connection, else it's 1.
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*
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* Assign a new tls object to conn->tls, begin reading on <b>conn</b>, and pass
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* <b>conn</b> to connection_tls_continue_handshake().
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*
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* Return -1 if <b>conn</b> is broken, else return 0.
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*/
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int connection_tls_start_handshake(connection_t *conn, int receiving) {
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conn->state = OR_CONN_STATE_HANDSHAKING;
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conn->tls = tor_tls_new(conn->s, receiving, 0);
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if(!conn->tls) {
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log_fn(LOG_WARN,"tor_tls_new failed. Closing.");
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return -1;
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}
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connection_start_reading(conn);
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log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"starting the handshake");
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if(connection_tls_continue_handshake(conn) < 0) {
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return -1;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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/** Move forward with the tls handshake. If it finishes, hand
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* <b>conn</b> to connection_tls_finish_handshake().
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*
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* Return -1 if <b>conn</b> is broken, else return 0.
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*/
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int connection_tls_continue_handshake(connection_t *conn) {
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switch(tor_tls_handshake(conn->tls)) {
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case TOR_TLS_ERROR:
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case TOR_TLS_CLOSE:
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log_fn(LOG_INFO,"tls error. breaking.");
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return -1;
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case TOR_TLS_DONE:
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return connection_tls_finish_handshake(conn);
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case TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE:
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connection_start_writing(conn);
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log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"wanted write");
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return 0;
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case TOR_TLS_WANTREAD: /* handshaking conns are *always* reading */
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log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"wanted read");
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return 0;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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static char ZERO_DIGEST[] = { 0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0 };
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int connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(connection_t *conn)
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{
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tor_assert(sizeof(ZERO_DIGEST) == DIGEST_LEN);
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tor_assert(conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR);
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if (!memcmp(ZERO_DIGEST, conn->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN))
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return 0;
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else
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return 1;
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}
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/** The tls handshake is finished.
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*
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* Make sure we are happy with the person we just handshaked with:
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* If it's an OP (that is, it has no certificate), make sure I'm an OR.
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* If it's an OR (it has a certificate), make sure it has a recognized
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* nickname, and its cert is signed by the identity key of that nickname.
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* If I initiated the connection, make sure it's the right guy; and if
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* he initiated the connection, make sure he's not already connected.
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*
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* If he initiated the conn, also initialize conn from the information
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* in router.
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*
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* If either of us is an OP, set bandwidth to the default OP bandwidth.
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*
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* If all is successful and he's an OR, then call circuit_n_conn_done()
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* to handle events that have been pending on the tls handshake
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* completion, and set the directory to be dirty (only matters if I'm
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* an authdirserver).
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*/
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static int
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connection_tls_finish_handshake(connection_t *conn) {
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routerinfo_t *router;
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char nickname[MAX_NICKNAME_LEN+1];
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connection_t *c;
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crypto_pk_env_t *identity_rcvd=NULL;
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char digest_rcvd[DIGEST_LEN];
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or_options_t *options = get_options();
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conn->state = OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN;
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connection_watch_events(conn, POLLIN);
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log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"tls handshake done. verifying.");
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if (! tor_tls_peer_has_cert(conn->tls)) { /* It's an old OP. */
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if (server_mode(options)) { /* I'm an OR; good. */
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conn->receiver_bucket = conn->bandwidth = DEFAULT_BANDWIDTH_OP;
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return 0;
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} else { /* Neither side sent a certificate: ouch. */
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log_fn(LOG_WARN,"Neither peer sent a cert! Closing.");
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return -1;
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}
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}
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/* Okay; the other side is an OR or a post-0.0.8 OP (with a cert). */
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if (tor_tls_get_peer_cert_nickname(conn->tls, nickname, MAX_NICKNAME_LEN)) {
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log_fn(LOG_WARN,"Other side (%s:%d) has a cert without a valid nickname. Closing.",
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conn->address, conn->port);
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return -1;
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}
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log_fn(LOG_DEBUG, "Other side (%s:%d) claims to be '%s'", conn->address,
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conn->port, nickname);
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if(tor_tls_verify(conn->tls, &identity_rcvd) < 0) {
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log_fn(LOG_WARN,"Other side '%s' (%s:%d) has a cert but it's invalid. Closing.",
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nickname, conn->address, conn->port);
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return -1;
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}
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log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"The router's cert is valid.");
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crypto_pk_get_digest(identity_rcvd, digest_rcvd);
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crypto_free_pk_env(identity_rcvd);
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if (crypto_pk_cmp_keys(get_identity_key(), identity_rcvd)<0) {
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conn->circ_id_type = CIRC_ID_TYPE_LOWER;
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} else {
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conn->circ_id_type = CIRC_ID_TYPE_HIGHER;
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}
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router = router_get_by_nickname(nickname);
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if(router && /* we know this nickname */
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router->is_verified && /* make sure it's the right guy */
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memcmp(digest_rcvd, router->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN) != 0) {
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log_fn(LOG_WARN, "Identity key not as expected for %s", nickname);
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return -1;
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}
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if (connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(conn)) {
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/* I initiated this connection. */
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if (strcasecmp(conn->nickname, nickname)) {
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log_fn(options->DirPort ? LOG_WARN : LOG_INFO,
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"Other side (%s:%d) is '%s', but we tried to connect to '%s'",
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conn->address, conn->port, nickname, conn->nickname);
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control_event_or_conn_status(conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_FAILED);
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return -1;
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}
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} else {
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if((c=connection_get_by_identity_digest(digest_rcvd, CONN_TYPE_OR))) {
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log_fn(LOG_INFO,"Router %s is already connected on fd %d. Dropping fd %d.", nickname, c->s, conn->s);
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return -1;
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}
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connection_or_init_conn_from_address(conn,conn->addr,conn->port,digest_rcvd);
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}
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if (!server_mode(options)) { /* If I'm an OP... */
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conn->receiver_bucket = conn->bandwidth = DEFAULT_BANDWIDTH_OP;
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}
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directory_set_dirty();
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circuit_n_conn_done(conn, 1); /* send the pending creates, if any. */
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/* Note the success */
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rep_hist_note_connect_succeeded(conn->identity_digest, time(NULL));
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control_event_or_conn_status(conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_CONNECTED);
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return 0;
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}
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/** Pack <b>cell</b> into wire-format, and write it onto <b>conn</b>'s
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* outbuf.
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*
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* (Commented out) If it's an OR conn, and an entire TLS record is
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* ready, then try to flush the record now.
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*/
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void connection_or_write_cell_to_buf(const cell_t *cell, connection_t *conn) {
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char networkcell[CELL_NETWORK_SIZE];
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char *n = networkcell;
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tor_assert(cell);
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tor_assert(conn);
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tor_assert(connection_speaks_cells(conn));
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cell_pack(n, cell);
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connection_write_to_buf(n, CELL_NETWORK_SIZE, conn);
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#if 0 /* commented out -- can we get away with not doing this,
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* because we're already round-robining in handle_read?
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*/
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#define MIN_TLS_FLUSHLEN 15872
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/* openssl tls record size is 16383, this is close. The goal here is to
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* push data out as soon as we know there's enough for a tls record, so
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* during periods of high load we won't read the entire megabyte from
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* input before pushing any data out. */
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if(conn->outbuf_flushlen-CELL_NETWORK_SIZE < MIN_TLS_FLUSHLEN &&
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conn->outbuf_flushlen >= MIN_TLS_FLUSHLEN) {
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int extra = conn->outbuf_flushlen - MIN_TLS_FLUSHLEN;
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conn->outbuf_flushlen = MIN_TLS_FLUSHLEN;
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if(connection_handle_write(conn) < 0) {
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log_fn(LOG_WARN,"flushing failed.");
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return;
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}
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if(extra) {
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conn->outbuf_flushlen += extra;
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connection_start_writing(conn);
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}
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}
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#endif
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}
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/** Process cells from <b>conn</b>'s inbuf.
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*
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* Loop: while inbuf contains a cell, pull it off the inbuf, unpack it,
|
|
* and hand it to command_process_cell().
|
|
*
|
|
* Always return 0.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int connection_or_process_cells_from_inbuf(connection_t *conn) {
|
|
char buf[CELL_NETWORK_SIZE];
|
|
cell_t cell;
|
|
|
|
loop:
|
|
log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"%d: starting, inbuf_datalen %d (%d pending in tls object).",
|
|
conn->s,(int)buf_datalen(conn->inbuf),tor_tls_get_pending_bytes(conn->tls));
|
|
if(buf_datalen(conn->inbuf) < CELL_NETWORK_SIZE) /* entire response available? */
|
|
return 0; /* not yet */
|
|
|
|
connection_fetch_from_buf(buf, CELL_NETWORK_SIZE, conn);
|
|
|
|
/* retrieve cell info from buf (create the host-order struct from the
|
|
* network-order string) */
|
|
cell_unpack(&cell, buf);
|
|
|
|
command_process_cell(&cell, conn);
|
|
|
|
goto loop; /* process the remainder of the buffer */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
Local Variables:
|
|
mode:c
|
|
indent-tabs-mode:nil
|
|
c-basic-offset:2
|
|
End:
|
|
*/
|