mirror of
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor.git
synced 2024-11-14 07:03:44 +01:00
273 lines
12 KiB
Plaintext
273 lines
12 KiB
Plaintext
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Legend:
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SPEC!! - Not specified
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SPEC - Spec not finalized
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NICK - nick claims
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ARMA - arma claims
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- Not done
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* Top priority
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. Partially done
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o Done
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D Deferred
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X Abandoned
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For scalability:
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- Slightly smarter bandwidth management: use link capacity
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intelligently.
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- Handle full buffers without totally borking
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For 0.0.8:
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NICK milestone 1:
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o make all ORs serve the directory too.
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o "AuthoritativeDir 1" for dirservers
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o non-authorative servers with dirport publish opt dircacheport
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o make clients read that and use it.
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o make clients able to read a normal dirport from non-trusted OR too
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o make ORs parse-and-keep-and-serve the directory they pull down
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o authoritativedirservers should pull down directories from
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other authdirservers, to merge descriptors.
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. allow dirservers to serve running-router list separately.
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o "get /running-routers" will fetch just this.
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o actually make the clients use this sometimes.
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o distinguish directory-is-dirty from runninglist-is-dirty
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- ORs keep this too, and serve it
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o Design: do we need running and non-running lists?
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o tor remembers descriptor-lists across reboots.
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. Packages define datadir as /var/lib/tor/. If no datadir is defined,
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then choose, make, and secure ~/.tor as datadir.
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o Adjust tor
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o Change torrc.sample
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D Change packages (not till 0.0.8 packages!)
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NICK - Look in ~/.tor/ if no */etc/torrc is found?
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NICK - Possible to get autoconf to easily install things into ~/.tor?
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o Contact info, pgp fingerprint, comments in router desc.
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o Add a ContactInfo line to torrc, which gets published in
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descriptor (as opt)
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o write tor version at the top of each log file
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milestone 2:
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. refer to things by key:
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o extend cells need ip:port:identitykeyhash.
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o Lookup routers and connections by key digest; accept hex
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key digest in place of nicknames.
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o Audit all uses of lookup-by-hostname and lookup-by-addr-port
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to search by digest when appropriate.
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NICK - make sure to use addr/port in cpuworker tasks, because
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OPs don't have keys.
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NICK - and fix the function comments in rephist
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o Rep-hist functions need to store info by keyid
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- also use this in intro points and rendezvous points, and
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hidserv descs. [XXXX This isn't enough.]
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- figure out what to do about ip:port:differentkey
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o ORs connect on demand. attach circuits to new connections, keep
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create cells around somewhere, send destroy if fail.
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o nickname defaults to first piece of hostname
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o running-routers list refers to nickname if verified, else
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hash-base64'ed.
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- Mark routers as verified or unverified based on whether
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running-routers list includes nickname or id hash.
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o put OR uptime in descriptor
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o name the secret-key directory something to discourage people
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from mailing their identity key to tor-ops
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milestone 3:
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- users can set their bandwidth, or we auto-detect it:
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- advertised bandwidth defaults to 10KB
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- advertised bandwidth is the min of max seen in each direction
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in the past N seconds.
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NICK - calculate this
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o not counting "local" connections
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- round detected bandwidth up to nearest 10KB
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- client software not upload descriptor until:
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- you've been running for an hour
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- it's sufficiently satisfied with its bandwidth
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- it decides it is reachable
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- start counting again if your IP ever changes.
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- never regenerate identity keys, for now.
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- you can set a bit for not-being-an-OR.
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NICK - Reputation info needs to give better weight to recent events than
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very old ones.
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- Have clients and dirservers preserve reputation info over
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reboots.
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- clients choose nodes proportional to advertised bandwidth
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- authdirserver includes descriptor and lists as running iff:
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- he can connect to you
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- he has successfully extended to you
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- he has sufficient mean-time-between-failures
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- add new "Middleman 1" config variable?
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o if torrc not found, exitpolicy reject *:*
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NICK - change if(options.ORPort) to what we really mean.
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NICK - same with socksport.
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ongoing:
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. rename/rearrange functions for what file they're in
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- generalize our transport: add transport.c in preparation for
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http, airhook, etc transport.
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For September:
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NICK . Windows port
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o works as client
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- deal with pollhup / reached_eof on all platforms
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. robust as a client
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. works as server
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- can be configured
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- robust as a server
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. Usable as NT service
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- docs for building in win
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- installer
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- Docs
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- FAQ
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o overview of tor. how does it work, what's it do, pros and
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cons of using it, why should I use it, etc.
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- a howto tutorial with examples
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o tutorial: how to set up your own tor network
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- (need to not hardcode dirservers file in config.c)
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. correct, update, polish spec
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- document the exposed function api?
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- document what we mean by socks.
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NICK . packages
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. rpm
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- find a long-term rpm maintainer
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- code
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- better warn/info messages
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o let tor do resolves.
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o extend socks4 to do resolves?
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o make script to ask tor for resolves
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- tsocks
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- gather patches, submit to maintainer
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- intercept gethostbyname and others, do resolve via tor
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- redesign and thorough code revamp, with particular eye toward:
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- support half-open tcp connections
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- conn key rotation
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- other transports -- http, airhook
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- modular introduction mechanism
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- allow non-clique topology
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Other details and small and hard things:
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- tor should be able to have a pool of outgoing IP addresses
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that it is able to rotate through. (maybe)
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- tie into squid
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- buffer size pool, to let a few buffers grow huge or many buffers
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grow a bit
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- hidserv offerers shouldn't need to define a SocksPort
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- when the client fails to pick an intro point for a hidserv,
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it should refetch the hidserv desc.
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. should maybe make clients exit(1) when bad things happen?
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e.g. clock skew.
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- should retry exitpolicy end streams even if the end cell didn't
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resolve the address for you
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- Add '[...truncated]' or similar to truncated log entries (like the directory
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in connection_dir_process_inbuf()).
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. Make logs handle it better when writing to them fails.
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o Dirserver shouldn't put you in running-routers list if you haven't
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uploaded a descriptor recently
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. Refactor: add own routerinfo to routerlist. Right now, only
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router_get_by_nickname knows about 'this router', as a hack to
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get circuit_launch_new to do the right thing.
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. Scrubbing proxies
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- Find an smtp proxy?
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. Get socks4a support into Mozilla
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- Extend by hostname, not by IP.
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- Need a relay teardown cell, separate from one-way ends.
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- Make it harder to circumvent bandwidth caps: look at number of bytes
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sent across sockets, not number sent inside TLS stream.
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- fix router_get_by_* functions so they can get ourselves too,
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and audit everything to make sure rend and intro points are
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just as likely to be us as not.
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***************************Future tasks:****************************
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Rendezvous and hidden services:
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make it fast:
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- preemptively build and start rendezvous circs.
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- preemptively build n-1 hops of intro circs?
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- cannibalize general circs?
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make it reliable:
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- standby/hotswap/redundant services.
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- store stuff to disk? dirservers forget service descriptors when
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they restart; nodes offering hidden services forget their chosen
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intro points when they restart.
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make it robust:
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- auth mechanisms to let midpoint and bob selectively choose
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connection requests.
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make it scalable:
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- right now the hidserv store/lookup system is run by the dirservers;
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this won't scale.
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Tor scalability:
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Relax clique assumptions.
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Redesign how directories are handled.
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- Separate running-routers lookup from descriptor list lookup.
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- Resolve directory agreement somehow.
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- Cache directory on all servers.
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Find and remove bottlenecks
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- Address linear searches on e.g. circuit and connection lists.
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Reputation/memory system, so dirservers can measure people,
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and so other people can verify their measurements.
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- Need to measure via relay, so it's not distinguishable.
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Bandwidth-aware path selection. So people with T3's are picked
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more often than people with DSL.
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Reliability-aware node selection. So people who are stable are
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preferred for long-term circuits such as intro and rend circs,
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and general circs for irc, aim, ssh, etc.
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Let dissidents get to Tor servers via Tor users. ("Backbone model")
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Anonymity improvements:
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Is abandoning the circuit the only option when an extend fails, or
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can we do something without impacting anonymity too much?
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Is exiting from the middle of the circuit always a bad idea?
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Helper nodes. Decide how to use them to improve safety.
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DNS resolution: need to make tor support resolve requests. Need to write
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a script and an interface (including an extension to the socks
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protocol) so we can ask it to do resolve requests. Need to patch
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tsocks to intercept gethostbyname, else we'll continue leaking it.
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Improve path selection algorithms based on routing-zones paper. Be sure
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to start and end circuits in different ASs. Ideally, consider AS of
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source and destination -- maybe even enter and exit via nearby AS.
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Intermediate model, with some delays and mixing.
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Add defensive dropping regime?
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Make it more correct:
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Handle half-open connections: right now we don't support all TCP
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streams, at least according to the protocol. But we handle all that
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we've seen in the wild.
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Support IPv6.
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Efficiency/speed/robustness:
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Congestion control. Is our current design sufficient once we have heavy
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use? Need to measure and tweak, or maybe overhaul.
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Allow small cells and large cells on the same network?
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Cell buffering and resending. This will allow us to handle broken
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circuits as long as the endpoints don't break, plus will allow
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connection (tls session key) rotation.
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Implement Morphmix, so we can compare its behavior, complexity, etc.
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Use cpuworker for more heavy lifting.
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- Signing (and verifying) hidserv descriptors
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- Signing (and verifying) intro/rend requests
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- Signing (and verifying) router descriptors
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- Signing (and verifying) directories
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- Doing TLS handshake (this is very hard to separate out, though)
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Buffer size pool: allocate a maximum size for all buffers, not
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a maximum size for each buffer. So we don't have to give up as
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quickly (and kill the thickpipe!) when there's congestion.
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Exit node caching: tie into squid or other caching web proxy.
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Other transport. HTTP, udp, rdp, airhook, etc. May have to do our own
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link crypto, unless we can bully openssl into it.
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P2P Tor:
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Do all the scalability stuff above, first.
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Incentives to relay. Not so hard.
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Incentives to allow exit. Possibly quite hard.
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Sybil defenses without having a human bottleneck.
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How to gather random sample of nodes.
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How to handle nodelist recommendations.
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Consider incremental switches: a p2p tor with only 50 users has
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different anonymity properties than one with 10k users, and should
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be treated differently.
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