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284 lines
11 KiB
Plaintext
284 lines
11 KiB
Plaintext
Filename: 101-dir-voting.txt
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Title: Voting on the Tor Directory System
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Author: Nick Mathewson
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Created: Nov 2006
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Status: Closed
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Implemented-In: 0.2.0.x
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Overview
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This document describes a consensus voting scheme for Tor directories;
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instead of publishing different network statuses, directories would vote on
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and publish a single "consensus" network status document.
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This is an open proposal.
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Proposal:
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0. Scope and preliminaries
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This document describes a consensus voting scheme for Tor directories.
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Once it's accepted, it should be merged with dir-spec.txt. Some
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preliminaries for authority and caching support should be done during
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the 0.1.2.x series; the main deployment should come during the 0.2.0.x
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series.
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0.1. Goals and motivation: voting.
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The current directory system relies on clients downloading separate
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network status statements from the caches signed by each directory.
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Clients download a new statement every 30 minutes or so, choosing to
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replace the oldest statement they currently have.
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This creates a partitioning problem: different clients have different
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"most recent" networkstatus sources, and different versions of each
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(since authorities change their statements often).
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It also creates a scaling problem: most of the downloaded networkstatus
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are probably quite similar, and the redundancy grows as we add more
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authorities.
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So if we have clients only download a single multiply signed consensus
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network status statement, we can:
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- Save bandwidth.
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- Reduce client partitioning
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- Reduce client-side and cache-side storage
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- Simplify client-side voting code (by moving voting away from the
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client)
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We should try to do this without:
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- Assuming that client-side or cache-side clocks are more correct
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than we assume now.
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- Assuming that authority clocks are perfectly correct.
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- Degrading badly if a few authorities die or are offline for a bit.
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We do not have to perform well if:
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- No clique of more than half the authorities can agree about who
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the authorities are.
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1. The idea.
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Instead of publishing a network status whenever something changes,
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each authority instead publishes a fresh network status only once per
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"period" (say, 60 minutes). Authorities either upload this network
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status (or "vote") to every other authority, or download every other
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authority's "vote" (see 3.1 below for discussion on push vs pull).
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After an authority has (or has become convinced that it won't be able to
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get) every other authority's vote, it deterministically computes a
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consensus networkstatus, and signs it. Authorities download (or are
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uploaded; see 3.1) one another's signatures, and form a multiply signed
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consensus. This multiply-signed consensus is what caches cache and what
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clients download.
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If an authority is down, authorities vote based on what they *can*
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download/get uploaded.
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If an authority is "a little" down and only some authorities can reach
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it, authorities try to get its info from other authorities.
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If an authority computes the vote wrong, its signature isn't included on
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the consensus.
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Clients use a consensus if it is "trusted": signed by more than half the
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authorities they recognize. If clients can't find any such consensus,
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they use the most recent trusted consensus they have. If they don't
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have any trusted consensus, they warn the user and refuse to operate
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(and if DirServers is not the default, beg the user to adapt the list
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of authorities).
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2. Details.
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2.0. Versioning
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All documents generated here have version "3" given in their
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network-status-version entries.
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2.1. Vote specifications
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Votes in v3 are similar to v2 network status documents. We add these
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fields to the preamble:
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"vote-status" -- the word "vote".
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"valid-until" -- the time when this authority expects to publish its
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next vote.
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"known-flags" -- a space-separated list of flags that will sometimes
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be included on "s" lines later in the vote.
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"dir-source" -- as before, except the "hostname" part MUST be the
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authority's nickname, which MUST be unique among authorities, and
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MUST match the nickname in the "directory-signature" entry.
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Authorities SHOULD cache their most recently generated votes so they
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can persist them across restarts. Authorities SHOULD NOT generate
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another document until valid-until has passed.
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Router entries in the vote MUST be sorted in ascending order by router
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identity digest. The flags in "s" lines MUST appear in alphabetical
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order.
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Votes SHOULD be synchronized to half-hour publication intervals (one
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hour? XXX say more; be more precise.)
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XXXX some way to request older networkstatus docs?
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2.2. Consensus directory specifications
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Consensuses are like v3 votes, except for the following fields:
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"vote-status" -- the word "consensus".
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"published" is the latest of all the published times on the votes.
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"valid-until" is the earliest of all the valid-until times on the
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votes.
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"dir-source" and "fingerprint" and "dir-signing-key" and "contact"
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are included for each authority that contributed to the vote.
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"vote-digest" for each authority that contributed to the vote,
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calculated as for the digest in the signature on the vote. [XXX
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re-English this sentence]
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"client-versions" and "server-versions" are sorted in ascending
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order based on version-spec.txt.
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"dir-options" and "known-flags" are not included.
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[XXX really? why not list the ones that are used in the consensus?
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For example, right now BadExit is in use, but no servers would be
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labelled BadExit, and it's still worth knowing that it was considered
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by the authorities. -RD]
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The fields MUST occur in the following order:
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"network-status-version"
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"vote-status"
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"published"
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"valid-until"
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For each authority, sorted in ascending order of nickname, case-
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insensitively:
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"dir-source", "fingerprint", "contact", "dir-signing-key",
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"vote-digest".
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"client-versions"
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"server-versions"
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The signatures at the end of the document appear as multiple instances
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of directory-signature, sorted in ascending order by nickname,
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case-insensitively.
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A router entry should be included in the result if it is included by more
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than half of the authorities (total authorities, not just those whose votes
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we have). A router entry has a flag set if it is included by more than
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half of the authorities who care about that flag. [XXXX this creates an
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incentive for attackers to DOS authorities whose votes they don't like.
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Can we remember what flags people set the last time we saw them? -NM]
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[Which 'we' are we talking here? The end-users never learn which
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authority sets which flags. So you're thinking the authorities
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should record the last vote they saw from each authority and if it's
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within a week or so, count all the flags that it advertised as 'no'
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votes? Plausible. -RD]
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The signature hash covers from the "network-status-version" line through
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the characters "directory-signature" in the first "directory-signature"
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line.
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Consensus directories SHOULD be rejected if they are not signed by more
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than half of the known authorities.
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2.2.1. Detached signatures
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Assuming full connectivity, every authority should compute and sign the
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same consensus directory in each period. Therefore, it isn't necessary to
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download the consensus computed by each authority; instead, the authorities
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only push/fetch each others' signatures. A "detached signature" document
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contains a single "consensus-digest" entry and one or more
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directory-signature entries. [XXXX specify more.]
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2.3. URLs and timelines
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2.3.1. URLs and timeline used for agreement
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An authority SHOULD publish its vote immediately at the start of each voting
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period. It does this by making it available at
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http://<hostname>/tor/status-vote/current/authority.z
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and sending it in an HTTP POST request to each other authority at the URL
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http://<hostname>/tor/post/vote
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If, N minutes after the voting period has begun, an authority does not have
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a current statement from another authority, the first authority retrieves
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the other's statement.
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Once an authority has a vote from another authority, it makes it available
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at
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http://<hostname>/tor/status-vote/current/<fp>.z
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where <fp> is the fingerprint of the other authority's identity key.
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The consensus network status, along with as many signatures as the server
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currently knows, should be available at
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http://<hostname>/tor/status-vote/current/consensus.z
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All of the detached signatures it knows for consensus status should be
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available at:
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http://<hostname>/tor/status-vote/current/consensus-signatures.z
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Once an authority has computed and signed a consensus network status, it
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should send its detached signature to each other authority in an HTTP POST
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request to the URL:
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http://<hostname>/tor/post/consensus-signature
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[XXXX Store votes to disk.]
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2.3.2. Serving a consensus directory
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Once the authority is done getting signatures on the consensus directory,
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it should serve it from:
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http://<hostname>/tor/status/consensus.z
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Caches SHOULD download consensus directories from an authority and serve
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them from the same URL.
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2.3.3. Timeline and synchronization
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[XXXX]
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2.4. Distributing routerdescs between authorities
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Consensus will be more meaningful if authorities take steps to make sure
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that they all have the same set of descriptors _before_ the voting
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starts. This is safe, since all descriptors are self-certified and
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timestamped: it's always okay to replace a signed descriptor with a more
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recent one signed by the same identity.
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In the long run, we might want some kind of sophisticated process here.
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For now, since authorities already download one another's networkstatus
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documents and use them to determine what descriptors to download from one
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another, we can rely on this existing mechanism to keep authorities up to
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date.
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[We should do a thorough read-through of dir-spec again to make sure
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that the authorities converge on which descriptor to "prefer" for
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each router. Right now the decision happens at the client, which is
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no longer the right place for it. -RD]
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3. Questions and concerns
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3.1. Push or pull?
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The URLs above define a push mechanism for publishing votes and consensus
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signatures via HTTP POST requests, and a pull mechanism for downloading
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these documents via HTTP GET requests. As specified, every authority will
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post to every other. The "download if no copy has been received" mechanism
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exists only as a fallback.
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4. Migration
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* It would be cool if caches could get ready to download consensus
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status docs, verify enough signatures, and serve them now. That way
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once stuff works all we need to do is upgrade the authorities. Caches
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don't need to verify the correctness of the format so long as it's
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signed (or maybe multisigned?). We need to make sure that caches back
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off very quickly from downloading consensus docs until they're
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actually implemented.
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