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29 lines
1.4 KiB
Plaintext
29 lines
1.4 KiB
Plaintext
o Security fixes:
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- Don't send TLS certificate chains on outgoing OR connections
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from clients and bridges. Previously, each client or bridge
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would use a single cert chain for all outgoing OR connections
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for up to 24 hours, which allowed any relay connected to by a
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client or bridge to determine which entry guards it is using.
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This is a potential user-tracing bug for *all* users; everyone
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who uses Tor's client or hidden service functionality should
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upgrade. Fixes CVE-2011-2768. Bugfix on FIXME; found by
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frosty_un.
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- Don't use any OR connection on which we have received a
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CREATE_FAST cell to satisfy an EXTEND request. Previously, we
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would not consider whether a connection appears to be from a
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client or bridge when deciding whether to use that connection to
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satisfy an EXTEND request. Mitigates CVE-2011-2768, by
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preventing an attacker from determining whether an unpatched
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client is connected to a patched relay. Bugfix on FIXME; found
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by frosty_un.
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- Don't assign the Guard flag to relays running a version of Tor
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which would use an OR connection on which it has received a
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CREATE_FAST cell to satisfy an EXTEND request. Mitigates
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CVE-2011-2768, by ensuring that clients will not connect
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directly to any relay which an attacker could probe for an
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unpatched client's connections.
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