mirror of
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor.git
synced 2024-11-14 15:23:27 +01:00
91f83cfc2d
Make controllers accept LF as well as CRLF. Update spec to reflect this. Remove now-dead code. Make controller warning about v0 protocol more accurate. svn:r11299
1506 lines
59 KiB
Plaintext
1506 lines
59 KiB
Plaintext
$Id$
|
|
|
|
TC: A Tor control protocol (Version 1)
|
|
|
|
0. Scope
|
|
|
|
This document describes an implementation-specific protocol that is used
|
|
for other programs (such as frontend user-interfaces) to communicate with a
|
|
locally running Tor process. It is not part of the Tor onion routing
|
|
protocol.
|
|
|
|
This protocol replaces version 0 of TC, which is now deprecated. For
|
|
reference, TC is described in "control-spec-v0.txt". Implementors are
|
|
recommended to avoid using TC directly, but instead to use a library that
|
|
can easily be updated to use the newer protocol. (Version 0 is used by Tor
|
|
versions 0.1.0.x; the protocol in this document only works with Tor
|
|
versions in the 0.1.1.x series and later.)
|
|
|
|
1. Protocol outline
|
|
|
|
TC is a bidirectional message-based protocol. It assumes an underlying
|
|
stream for communication between a controlling process (the "client"
|
|
or "controller") and a Tor process (or "server"). The stream may be
|
|
implemented via TCP, TLS-over-TCP, a Unix-domain socket, or so on,
|
|
but it must provide reliable in-order delivery. For security, the
|
|
stream should not be accessible by untrusted parties.
|
|
|
|
In TC, the client and server send typed messages to each other over the
|
|
underlying stream. The client sends "commands" and the server sends
|
|
"replies".
|
|
|
|
By default, all messages from the server are in response to messages from
|
|
the client. Some client requests, however, will cause the server to send
|
|
messages to the client indefinitely far into the future. Such
|
|
"asynchronous" replies are marked as such.
|
|
|
|
Servers respond to messages in the order messages are received.
|
|
|
|
2. Message format
|
|
|
|
2.1. Description format
|
|
|
|
The message formats listed below use ABNF as described in RFC 2234.
|
|
The protocol itself is loosely based on SMTP (see RFC 2821).
|
|
|
|
We use the following nonterminals from RFC 2822: atom, qcontent
|
|
|
|
We define the following general-use nonterminals:
|
|
|
|
String = DQUOTE *qcontent DQUOTE
|
|
|
|
There are explicitly no limits on line length. All 8-bit characters are
|
|
permitted unless explicitly disallowed.
|
|
|
|
Wherever CRLF is specified to be accepted from the controller, Tor MAY also
|
|
accept LF. Tor, however, MUST NOT generate LF instead of CRLF.
|
|
Controllers SHOULD always send CRLF.
|
|
|
|
2.2. Commands from controller to Tor
|
|
|
|
Command = Keyword Arguments CRLF / "+" Keyword Arguments CRLF Data
|
|
Keyword = 1*ALPHA
|
|
Arguments = *(SP / VCHAR)
|
|
|
|
Specific commands and their arguments are described below in section 3.
|
|
|
|
2.3. Replies from Tor to the controller
|
|
|
|
Reply = SyncReply / AsyncReply
|
|
SyncReply = *(MidReplyLine / DataReplyLine) EndReplyLine
|
|
AsyncReply = *(MidReplyLine / DataReplyLine) EndReplyLine
|
|
|
|
MidReplyLine = StatusCode "-" ReplyLine
|
|
DataReplyLine = StatusCode "+" ReplyLine Data
|
|
EndReplyLine = StatusCode SP ReplyLine
|
|
ReplyLine = [ReplyText] CRLF
|
|
ReplyText = XXXX
|
|
StatusCode = 3DIGIT
|
|
|
|
Specific replies are mentioned below in section 3, and described more fully
|
|
in section 4.
|
|
|
|
[Compatibility note: versions of Tor before 0.2.0.3-alpha sometimes
|
|
generate AsyncReplies of the form "*(MidReplyLine / DataReplyLine)".
|
|
This is incorrect, but controllers that need to work with these
|
|
versions of Tor should be prepared to get multi-line AsyncReplies with
|
|
the final line (usually "650 OK") omitted.]
|
|
|
|
2.4. General-use tokens
|
|
|
|
; Identifiers for servers.
|
|
ServerID = Nickname / Fingerprint
|
|
|
|
Nickname = 1*19 NicknameChar
|
|
NicknameChar = "a"-"z" / "A"-"Z" / "0" - "9"
|
|
Fingerprint = "$" 40*HEXDIG
|
|
|
|
; A "=" indicates that the given nickname is canonical; a "~" indicates
|
|
; that the given nickname is not canonical.
|
|
LongName = Fingerprint [ ( "=" / "~" ) Nickname ]
|
|
|
|
; How a controller tells Tor about a particular OR. There are four
|
|
; possible formats:
|
|
; $Digest -- The router whose identity key hashes to the given digest.
|
|
; This is the preferred way to refer to an OR.
|
|
; $Digest~Name -- The router whose identity key hashes to the given
|
|
; digest, but only if the router has the given nickname.
|
|
; $Digest=Name -- The router whose identity key hashes to the given
|
|
; digest, but only if the router is Named and has the given
|
|
; nickname.
|
|
; Name -- The Named router with the given nickname, or, if no such
|
|
; router exists, any router whose nickname matches the one given.
|
|
; This is not a safe way to refer to routers, since Named status
|
|
; could under some circumstances change over time.
|
|
ServerSpec = LongName / Nickname
|
|
|
|
; Unique identifiers for streams or circuits. Currently, Tor only
|
|
; uses digits, but this may change
|
|
StreamID = 1*16 IDChar
|
|
CircuitID = 1*16 IDChar
|
|
IDChar = ALPHA / DIGIT
|
|
|
|
Address = ip4-address / ip6-address / hostname (XXXX Define these)
|
|
|
|
; A "Data" section is a sequence of octets concluded by the terminating
|
|
; sequence CRLF "." CRLF. The terminating sequence may not appear in the
|
|
; body of the data. Leading periods on lines in the data are escaped with
|
|
; an additional leading period as in RFC 2821 section 4.5.2.
|
|
Data = *DataLine "." CRLF
|
|
DataLine = CRLF / "." 1*LineItem CRLF / NonDotItem *LineItem CRLF
|
|
LineItem = NonCR / 1*CR NonCRLF
|
|
NonDotItem = NonDotCR / 1*CR NonCRLF
|
|
|
|
3. Commands
|
|
|
|
All commands and other keywords are case-insensitive.
|
|
|
|
3.1. SETCONF
|
|
|
|
Change the value of one or more configuration variables. The syntax is:
|
|
|
|
"SETCONF" 1*(SP keyword ["=" String]) CRLF
|
|
|
|
Tor behaves as though it had just read each of the key-value pairs
|
|
from its configuration file. Keywords with no corresponding values have
|
|
their configuration values reset to 0 or NULL (use RESETCONF if you want
|
|
to set it back to its default). SETCONF is all-or-nothing: if there
|
|
is an error in any of the configuration settings, Tor sets none of them.
|
|
|
|
Tor responds with a "250 configuration values set" reply on success.
|
|
If some of the listed keywords can't be found, Tor replies with a
|
|
"552 Unrecognized option" message. Otherwise, Tor responds with a
|
|
"513 syntax error in configuration values" reply on syntax error, or a
|
|
"553 impossible configuration setting" reply on a semantic error.
|
|
|
|
When a configuration option takes multiple values, or when multiple
|
|
configuration keys form a context-sensitive group (see GETCONF below), then
|
|
setting _any_ of the options in a SETCONF command is taken to reset all of
|
|
the others. For example, if two ORBindAddress values are configured, and a
|
|
SETCONF command arrives containing a single ORBindAddress value, the new
|
|
command's value replaces the two old values.
|
|
|
|
3.2. RESETCONF
|
|
|
|
Remove all settings for a given configuration option entirely, assign
|
|
its default value (if any), and then assign the String provided.
|
|
Typically the String is left empty, to simply set an option back to
|
|
its default. The syntax is:
|
|
|
|
"RESETCONF" 1*(SP keyword ["=" String]) CRLF
|
|
|
|
Otherwise it behaves like SETCONF above.
|
|
|
|
3.3. GETCONF
|
|
|
|
Request the value of a configuration variable. The syntax is:
|
|
|
|
"GETCONF" 1*(SP keyword) CRLF
|
|
|
|
If all of the listed keywords exist in the Tor configuration, Tor replies
|
|
with a series of reply lines of the form:
|
|
250 keyword=value
|
|
If any option is set to a 'default' value semantically different from an
|
|
empty string, Tor may reply with a reply line of the form:
|
|
250 keyword
|
|
|
|
If some of the listed keywords can't be found, Tor replies with a
|
|
"552 unknown configuration keyword" message.
|
|
|
|
If an option appears multiple times in the configuration, all of its
|
|
key-value pairs are returned in order.
|
|
|
|
Some options are context-sensitive, and depend on other options with
|
|
different keywords. These cannot be fetched directly. Currently there
|
|
is only one such option: clients should use the "HiddenServiceOptions"
|
|
virtual keyword to get all HiddenServiceDir, HiddenServicePort,
|
|
HiddenServiceNodes, and HiddenServiceExcludeNodes option settings.
|
|
|
|
3.4. SETEVENTS
|
|
|
|
Request the server to inform the client about interesting events. The
|
|
syntax is:
|
|
|
|
"SETEVENTS" [SP "EXTENDED"] *(SP EventCode) CRLF
|
|
|
|
EventCode = "CIRC" / "STREAM" / "ORCONN" / "BW" / "DEBUG" /
|
|
"INFO" / "NOTICE" / "WARN" / "ERR" / "NEWDESC" / "ADDRMAP" /
|
|
"AUTHDIR_NEWDESCS" / "DESCCHANGED" / "STATUS_GENERAL" /
|
|
"STATUS_CLIENT" / "STATUS_SERVER" / "GUARD" / "NS" / "STREAM_BW"
|
|
|
|
Any events *not* listed in the SETEVENTS line are turned off; thus, sending
|
|
SETEVENTS with an empty body turns off all event reporting.
|
|
|
|
The server responds with a "250 OK" reply on success, and a "552
|
|
Unrecognized event" reply if one of the event codes isn't recognized. (On
|
|
error, the list of active event codes isn't changed.)
|
|
|
|
If the flag string "EXTENDED" is provided, Tor may provide extra
|
|
information with events for this connection; see 4.1 for more information.
|
|
NOTE: All events on a given connection will be provided in extended format,
|
|
or none.
|
|
NOTE: "EXTENDED" is only supported in Tor 0.1.1.9-alpha or later.
|
|
|
|
Each event is described in more detail in Section 4.1.
|
|
|
|
3.5. AUTHENTICATE
|
|
|
|
Sent from the client to the server. The syntax is:
|
|
"AUTHENTICATE" [ SP 1*HEXDIG / QuotedString ] CRLF
|
|
|
|
The server responds with "250 OK" on success or "515 Bad authentication" if
|
|
the authentication cookie is incorrect. Tor closes the connection on an
|
|
authentication failure.
|
|
|
|
The format of the 'cookie' is implementation-dependent; see 5.1 below for
|
|
information on how the standard Tor implementation handles it.
|
|
|
|
Before the client has authenticated, no command other than PROTOCOLINFO,
|
|
AUTHENTICATE, or QUIT is valid. If the controller sends any other command,
|
|
or sends a malformed command, or sends an unsuccessful AUTHENTICATE
|
|
command, or sends PROTOCOLINFO more than once, Tor sends an error reply and
|
|
closes the connection.
|
|
|
|
(Versions of Tor before 0.1.2.16 and 0.2.0.4-alpha did not close the
|
|
connection after an authentication failure.)
|
|
|
|
3.6. SAVECONF
|
|
|
|
Sent from the client to the server. The syntax is:
|
|
"SAVECONF" CRLF
|
|
|
|
Instructs the server to write out its config options into its torrc. Server
|
|
returns "250 OK" if successful, or "551 Unable to write configuration
|
|
to disk" if it can't write the file or some other error occurs.
|
|
|
|
3.7. SIGNAL
|
|
|
|
Sent from the client to the server. The syntax is:
|
|
|
|
"SIGNAL" SP Signal CRLF
|
|
|
|
Signal = "RELOAD" / "SHUTDOWN" / "DUMP" / "DEBUG" / "HALT" /
|
|
"HUP" / "INT" / "USR1" / "USR2" / "TERM" / "NEWNYM" /
|
|
"CLEARDNSCACHE"
|
|
|
|
The meaning of the signals are:
|
|
|
|
RELOAD -- Reload: reload config items, refetch directory. (like HUP)
|
|
SHUTDOWN -- Controlled shutdown: if server is an OP, exit immediately.
|
|
If it's an OR, close listeners and exit after 30 seconds.
|
|
(like INT)
|
|
DUMP -- Dump stats: log information about open connections and
|
|
circuits. (like USR1)
|
|
DEBUG -- Debug: switch all open logs to loglevel debug. (like USR2)
|
|
HALT -- Immediate shutdown: clean up and exit now. (like TERM)
|
|
CLEARDNSCACHE -- Forget the client-side cached IPs for all hostnames.
|
|
NEWNYM -- Switch to clean circuits, so new application requests
|
|
don't share any circuits with old ones. Also clears
|
|
the client-side DNS cache. (Tor MAY rate-limit its
|
|
response to this signal.)
|
|
|
|
The server responds with "250 OK" if the signal is recognized (or simply
|
|
closes the socket if it was asked to close immediately), or "552
|
|
Unrecognized signal" if the signal is unrecognized.
|
|
|
|
3.8. MAPADDRESS
|
|
|
|
Sent from the client to the server. The syntax is:
|
|
|
|
"MAPADDRESS" 1*(Address "=" Address SP) CRLF
|
|
|
|
The first address in each pair is an "original" address; the second is a
|
|
"replacement" address. The client sends this message to the server in
|
|
order to tell it that future SOCKS requests for connections to the original
|
|
address should be replaced with connections to the specified replacement
|
|
address. If the addresses are well-formed, and the server is able to
|
|
fulfill the request, the server replies with a 250 message:
|
|
250-OldAddress1=NewAddress1
|
|
250 OldAddress2=NewAddress2
|
|
|
|
containing the source and destination addresses. If request is
|
|
malformed, the server replies with "512 syntax error in command
|
|
argument". If the server can't fulfill the request, it replies with
|
|
"451 resource exhausted".
|
|
|
|
The client may decline to provide a body for the original address, and
|
|
instead send a special null address ("0.0.0.0" for IPv4, "::0" for IPv6, or
|
|
"." for hostname), signifying that the server should choose the original
|
|
address itself, and return that address in the reply. The server
|
|
should ensure that it returns an element of address space that is unlikely
|
|
to be in actual use. If there is already an address mapped to the
|
|
destination address, the server may reuse that mapping.
|
|
|
|
If the original address is already mapped to a different address, the old
|
|
mapping is removed. If the original address and the destination address
|
|
are the same, the server removes any mapping in place for the original
|
|
address.
|
|
|
|
Example:
|
|
C: MAPADDRESS 0.0.0.0=tor.eff.org 1.2.3.4=tor.freehaven.net
|
|
S: 250-127.192.10.10=tor.eff.org
|
|
S: 250 1.2.3.4=tor.freehaven.net
|
|
|
|
{Note: This feature is designed to be used to help Tor-ify applications
|
|
that need to use SOCKS4 or hostname-less SOCKS5. There are three
|
|
approaches to doing this:
|
|
1. Somehow make them use SOCKS4a or SOCKS5-with-hostnames instead.
|
|
2. Use tor-resolve (or another interface to Tor's resolve-over-SOCKS
|
|
feature) to resolve the hostname remotely. This doesn't work
|
|
with special addresses like x.onion or x.y.exit.
|
|
3. Use MAPADDRESS to map an IP address to the desired hostname, and then
|
|
arrange to fool the application into thinking that the hostname
|
|
has resolved to that IP.
|
|
This functionality is designed to help implement the 3rd approach.}
|
|
|
|
Mappings set by the controller last until the Tor process exits:
|
|
they never expire. If the controller wants the mapping to last only
|
|
a certain time, then it must explicitly un-map the address when that
|
|
time has elapsed.
|
|
|
|
3.9. GETINFO
|
|
|
|
Sent from the client to the server. The syntax is as for GETCONF:
|
|
"GETINFO" 1*(SP keyword) CRLF
|
|
one or more NL-terminated strings. The server replies with an INFOVALUE
|
|
message, or a 551 or 552 error.
|
|
|
|
Unlike GETCONF, this message is used for data that are not stored in the Tor
|
|
configuration file, and that may be longer than a single line. On success,
|
|
one ReplyLine is sent for each requested value, followed by a final 250 OK
|
|
ReplyLine. If a value fits on a single line, the format is:
|
|
250-keyword=value
|
|
If a value must be split over multiple lines, the format is:
|
|
250+keyword=
|
|
value
|
|
.
|
|
Recognized keys and their values include:
|
|
|
|
"version" -- The version of the server's software, including the name
|
|
of the software. (example: "Tor 0.0.9.4")
|
|
|
|
"config-file" -- The location of Tor's configuration file ("torrc").
|
|
|
|
["exit-policy/prepend" -- The default exit policy lines that Tor will
|
|
*prepend* to the ExitPolicy config option.
|
|
-- Never implemented. Useful?]
|
|
|
|
"exit-policy/default" -- The default exit policy lines that Tor will
|
|
*append* to the ExitPolicy config option.
|
|
|
|
"desc/id/<OR identity>" or "desc/name/<OR nickname>" -- the latest
|
|
server descriptor for a given OR, NUL-terminated.
|
|
|
|
"extra-info/digest/<digest>" -- the extrainfo document whose digest (in
|
|
hex) is <digest>. Only available if we're downloading extra-info
|
|
documents.
|
|
|
|
"ns/id/<OR identity>" or "ns/name/<OR nickname>" -- the latest network
|
|
status info for a given OR. Network status info is as given in
|
|
dir-spec.txt, and reflects the current beliefs of this Tor about the
|
|
router in question. Like directory clients, controllers MUST
|
|
tolerate unrecognized flags and lines. The published date and
|
|
descriptor digest are those believed to be best by this Tor,
|
|
not necessarily those for a descriptor that Tor currently has.
|
|
[First implemented in 0.1.2.3-alpha.]
|
|
|
|
"ns/all" -- Network status info (v2 directory style) for all ORs we
|
|
have an opinion about, joined by newlines. [First implemented
|
|
in 0.1.2.3-alpha.]
|
|
|
|
"desc/all-recent" -- the latest server descriptor for every router that
|
|
Tor knows about.
|
|
|
|
"network-status" -- a space-separated list (v1 directory style)
|
|
of all known OR identities. This is in the same format as the
|
|
router-status line in v1 directories; see dir-spec-v1.txt section
|
|
3 for details. (If VERBOSE_NAMES is enabled, the output will
|
|
not conform to dir-spec-v1.txt; instead, the result will be a
|
|
space-separated list of LongName, each preceded by a "!" if it is
|
|
believed to be not running.)
|
|
|
|
"address-mappings/all"
|
|
"address-mappings/config"
|
|
"address-mappings/cache"
|
|
"address-mappings/control" -- a \r\n-separated list of address
|
|
mappings, each in the form of "from-address to-address expiry".
|
|
The 'config' key returns those address mappings set in the
|
|
configuration; the 'cache' key returns the mappings in the
|
|
client-side DNS cache; the 'control' key returns the mappings set
|
|
via the control interface; the 'all' target returns the mappings
|
|
set through any mechanism.
|
|
Expiry is formatted as with ADDRMAP events, except that "expiry" is
|
|
always a time in GMT or the string "NEVER"; see section 4.1.7.
|
|
First introduced in 0.2.0.3-alpha.
|
|
|
|
"addr-mappings/*" -- as for address-mappings/*, but without the
|
|
expiry portion of the value. Use of this value is deprecated
|
|
since 0.2.0.3-alpha; use address-mappings instead.
|
|
|
|
"address" -- the best guess at our external IP address. If we
|
|
have no guess, return a 551 error. (Added in 0.1.2.2-alpha)
|
|
|
|
"fingerprint" -- the contents of the fingerprint file that Tor
|
|
writes as a server, or a 551 if we're not a server currently.
|
|
(Added in 0.1.2.3-alpha)
|
|
|
|
"circuit-status"
|
|
A series of lines as for a circuit status event. Each line is of
|
|
the form:
|
|
CircuitID SP CircStatus [SP Path] CRLF
|
|
|
|
"stream-status"
|
|
A series of lines as for a stream status event. Each is of the form:
|
|
StreamID SP StreamStatus SP CircID SP Target CRLF
|
|
|
|
"orconn-status"
|
|
A series of lines as for an OR connection status event. Each is of the
|
|
form:
|
|
ServerID SP ORStatus CRLF
|
|
|
|
"entry-guards"
|
|
A series of lines listing the currently chosen entry guards, if any.
|
|
Each is of the form:
|
|
ServerID2 SP Status [SP ISOTime] CRLF
|
|
|
|
Status-with-time = ("unlisted") SP ISOTime
|
|
Status = ("up" / "never-connected" / "down" /
|
|
"unusable" / "unlisted" )
|
|
|
|
ServerID2 = Nickname / 40*HEXDIG
|
|
|
|
[From 0.1.1.4-alpha to 0.1.1.10-alpha, this was called "helper-nodes".
|
|
Tor still supports calling it that for now, but support will be
|
|
removed in 0.1.3.x.]
|
|
|
|
[Older versions of Tor (before 0.1.2.x-final) generated 'down' instead
|
|
of unlisted/unusable. Current Tors never generate 'down'.]
|
|
|
|
[XXXX ServerID2 differs from ServerID in not prefixing fingerprints
|
|
with a $. This is an implementation error. It would be nice to add
|
|
the $ back in if we can do so without breaking compatibility.]
|
|
|
|
"accounting/enabled"
|
|
"accounting/hibernating"
|
|
"accounting/bytes"
|
|
"accounting/bytes-left"
|
|
"accounting/interval-start"
|
|
"accounting/interval-wake"
|
|
"accounting/interval-end"
|
|
Information about accounting status. If accounting is enabled,
|
|
"enabled" is 1; otherwise it is 0. The "hibernating" field is "hard"
|
|
if we are accepting no data; "soft" if we're accepting no new
|
|
connections, and "awake" if we're not hibernating at all. The "bytes"
|
|
and "bytes-left" fields contain (read-bytes SP write-bytes), for the
|
|
start and the rest of the interval respectively. The 'interval-start'
|
|
and 'interval-end' fields are the borders of the current interval; the
|
|
'interval-wake' field is the time within the current interval (if any)
|
|
where we plan[ned] to start being active.
|
|
|
|
"config/names"
|
|
A series of lines listing the available configuration options. Each is
|
|
of the form:
|
|
OptionName SP OptionType [ SP Documentation ] CRLF
|
|
OptionName = Keyword
|
|
OptionType = "Integer" / "TimeInterval" / "DataSize" / "Float" /
|
|
"Boolean" / "Time" / "CommaList" / "Dependant" / "Virtual" /
|
|
"String" / "LineList"
|
|
Documentation = Text
|
|
|
|
"info/names"
|
|
A series of lines listing the available GETINFO options. Each is of
|
|
one of these forms:
|
|
OptionName SP Documentation CRLF
|
|
OptionPrefix SP Documentation CRLF
|
|
OptionPrefix = OptionName "/*"
|
|
|
|
"events/names"
|
|
A space-separated list of all the events supported by this version of
|
|
Tor's SETEVENTS.
|
|
|
|
"features/names"
|
|
A space-separated list of all the events supported by this version of
|
|
Tor's USEFEATURE.
|
|
|
|
"next-circuit/IP:port"
|
|
XXX todo.
|
|
|
|
"dir/status/authority"
|
|
"dir/status/fp/<F>"
|
|
"dir/status/fp/<F1>+<F2>+<F3>"
|
|
"dir/status/all"
|
|
"dir/server/fp/<F>"
|
|
"dir/server/fp/<F1>+<F2>+<F3>"
|
|
"dir/server/d/<D>"
|
|
"dir/server/d/<D1>+<D2>+<D3>"
|
|
"dir/server/authority"
|
|
"dir/server/all"
|
|
A series of lines listing directory contents, provided according to the
|
|
specification for the URLs listed in Section 4.4 of dir-spec.txt. Note
|
|
that Tor MUST NOT provide private information, such as descriptors for
|
|
routers not marked as general-purpose. When asked for 'authority'
|
|
information for which this Tor is not authoritative, Tor replies with
|
|
an empty string.
|
|
|
|
"status/circuit-established"
|
|
"status/enough-dir-info"
|
|
"status/..."
|
|
These provide the current internal Tor values for various Tor
|
|
states. See Section 4.1.10 for explanations. (Only a few of the
|
|
status events are available as getinfo's currently. Let us know if
|
|
you want more exposed.)
|
|
"status/version/recommended" -- List of currently recommended versions
|
|
"status/version/current" -- Status of the current version. One of:
|
|
new, old, unrecommended, recommended, new in series, obsolete.
|
|
"status/version/num-versioning" -- Number of versioning authorities
|
|
"status/version/num-concurring" -- Number of versioning authorities
|
|
agreeing on the status of the current version
|
|
|
|
Examples:
|
|
C: GETINFO version desc/name/moria1
|
|
S: 250+desc/name/moria=
|
|
S: [Descriptor for moria]
|
|
S: .
|
|
S: 250-version=Tor 0.1.1.0-alpha-cvs
|
|
S: 250 OK
|
|
|
|
3.10. EXTENDCIRCUIT
|
|
|
|
Sent from the client to the server. The format is:
|
|
"EXTENDCIRCUIT" SP CircuitID SP
|
|
ServerSpec *("," ServerSpec)
|
|
[SP "purpose=" Purpose] CRLF
|
|
|
|
This request takes one of two forms: either the CircuitID is zero, in
|
|
which case it is a request for the server to build a new circuit according
|
|
to the specified path, or the CircuitID is nonzero, in which case it is a
|
|
request for the server to extend an existing circuit with that ID according
|
|
to the specified path.
|
|
|
|
If CircuitID is 0 and "purpose=" is specified, then the circuit's
|
|
purpose is set. Two choices are recognized: "general" and
|
|
"controller". If not specified, circuits are created as "general".
|
|
|
|
If the request is successful, the server sends a reply containing a
|
|
message body consisting of the CircuitID of the (maybe newly created)
|
|
circuit. The syntax is "250" SP "EXTENDED" SP CircuitID CRLF.
|
|
|
|
3.11. SETCIRCUITPURPOSE
|
|
|
|
Sent from the client to the server. The format is:
|
|
"SETCIRCUITPURPOSE" SP CircuitID SP Purpose CRLF
|
|
|
|
This changes the circuit's purpose. See EXTENDCIRCUIT above for details.
|
|
|
|
3.12. SETROUTERPURPOSE
|
|
|
|
Sent from the client to the server. The format is:
|
|
"SETROUTERPURPOSE" SP NicknameOrKey SP Purpose CRLF
|
|
|
|
This changes the descriptor's purpose. See +POSTDESCRIPTOR below
|
|
for details.
|
|
|
|
3.13. ATTACHSTREAM
|
|
|
|
Sent from the client to the server. The syntax is:
|
|
"ATTACHSTREAM" SP StreamID SP CircuitID [SP "HOP=" HopNum] CRLF
|
|
|
|
This message informs the server that the specified stream should be
|
|
associated with the specified circuit. Each stream may be associated with
|
|
at most one circuit, and multiple streams may share the same circuit.
|
|
Streams can only be attached to completed circuits (that is, circuits that
|
|
have sent a circuit status 'BUILT' event or are listed as built in a
|
|
GETINFO circuit-status request).
|
|
|
|
If the circuit ID is 0, responsibility for attaching the given stream is
|
|
returned to Tor.
|
|
|
|
If HOP=HopNum is specified, Tor will choose the HopNumth hop in the
|
|
circuit as the exit node, rather than the last node in the circuit.
|
|
Hops are 1-indexed; generally, it is not permitted to attach to hop 1.
|
|
|
|
Tor responds with "250 OK" if it can attach the stream, 552 if the circuit
|
|
or stream didn't exist, or 551 if the stream couldn't be attached for
|
|
another reason.
|
|
|
|
{Implementation note: Tor will close unattached streams by itself,
|
|
roughly two minutes after they are born. Let the developers know if
|
|
that turns out to be a problem.}
|
|
|
|
{Implementation note: By default, Tor automatically attaches streams to
|
|
circuits itself, unless the configuration variable
|
|
"__LeaveStreamsUnattached" is set to "1". Attempting to attach streams
|
|
via TC when "__LeaveStreamsUnattached" is false may cause a race between
|
|
Tor and the controller, as both attempt to attach streams to circuits.}
|
|
|
|
{Implementation note: You can try to attachstream to a stream that
|
|
has already sent a connect or resolve request but hasn't succeeded
|
|
yet, in which case Tor will detach the stream from its current circuit
|
|
before proceeding with the new attach request.}
|
|
|
|
3.14. POSTDESCRIPTOR
|
|
|
|
Sent from the client to the server. The syntax is:
|
|
"+POSTDESCRIPTOR" [SP "purpose=" Purpose] CRLF Descriptor CRLF "." CRLF
|
|
|
|
This message informs the server about a new descriptor. If Purpose is
|
|
specified, it must be either "general" or "controller", else we
|
|
return a 552 error.
|
|
|
|
The descriptor, when parsed, must contain a number of well-specified
|
|
fields, including fields for its nickname and identity.
|
|
|
|
If there is an error in parsing the descriptor, the server must send a "554
|
|
Invalid descriptor" reply. If the descriptor is well-formed but the server
|
|
chooses not to add it, it must reply with a 251 message whose body explains
|
|
why the server was not added. If the descriptor is added, Tor replies with
|
|
"250 OK".
|
|
|
|
3.15. REDIRECTSTREAM
|
|
|
|
Sent from the client to the server. The syntax is:
|
|
"REDIRECTSTREAM" SP StreamID SP Address [SP Port] CRLF
|
|
|
|
Tells the server to change the exit address on the specified stream. If
|
|
Port is specified, changes the destination port as well. No remapping
|
|
is performed on the new provided address.
|
|
|
|
To be sure that the modified address will be used, this event must be sent
|
|
after a new stream event is received, and before attaching this stream to
|
|
a circuit.
|
|
|
|
Tor replies with "250 OK" on success.
|
|
|
|
3.16. CLOSESTREAM
|
|
|
|
Sent from the client to the server. The syntax is:
|
|
|
|
"CLOSESTREAM" SP StreamID SP Reason *(SP Flag) CRLF
|
|
|
|
Tells the server to close the specified stream. The reason should be one
|
|
of the Tor RELAY_END reasons given in tor-spec.txt, as a decimal. Flags is
|
|
not used currently; Tor servers SHOULD ignore unrecognized flags. Tor may
|
|
hold the stream open for a while to flush any data that is pending.
|
|
|
|
Tor replies with "250 OK" on success, or a 512 if there aren't enough
|
|
arguments, or a 552 if it doesn't recognize the StreamID or reason.
|
|
|
|
3.17. CLOSECIRCUIT
|
|
|
|
The syntax is:
|
|
CLOSECIRCUIT SP CircuitID *(SP Flag) CRLF
|
|
Flag = "IfUnused"
|
|
|
|
Tells the server to close the specified circuit. If "IfUnused" is
|
|
provided, do not close the circuit unless it is unused.
|
|
|
|
Other flags may be defined in the future; Tor SHOULD ignore unrecognized
|
|
flags.
|
|
|
|
Tor replies with "250 OK" on success, or a 512 if there aren't enough
|
|
arguments, or a 552 if it doesn't recognize the CircuitID.
|
|
|
|
3.18. QUIT
|
|
|
|
Tells the server to hang up on this controller connection. This command
|
|
can be used before authenticating.
|
|
|
|
3.19. USEFEATURE
|
|
|
|
The syntax is:
|
|
|
|
"USEFEATURE" *(SP FeatureName) CRLF
|
|
FeatureName = 1*(ALPHA / DIGIT / "_" / "-")
|
|
|
|
Sometimes extensions to the controller protocol break compatibility with
|
|
older controllers. In this case, whenever possible, the extensions are
|
|
first included in Tor disabled by default, and only enabled on a given
|
|
controller connection when the "USEFEATURE" command is given. Once a
|
|
"USEFEATURE" command is given, it applies to all subsequent interactions on
|
|
the same connection; to disable an enabled feature, a new controller
|
|
connection must be opened.
|
|
|
|
This is a forward-compatibility mechanism; each feature will eventually
|
|
become a regular part of the control protocol in some future version of Tor.
|
|
Tor will ignore a request to use any feature that is already on by default.
|
|
Tor will give a "552" error if any requested feature is not recognized.
|
|
|
|
Feature names are case-insensitive.
|
|
|
|
EXTENDED_EVENTS
|
|
|
|
Same as passing 'EXTENDED' to SETEVENTS; this is the preferred way to
|
|
request the extended event syntax.
|
|
|
|
This will not be always-enabled until at least XXX (or, at least two
|
|
stable releases after XXX, the release where it was first used for
|
|
anything.)
|
|
|
|
VERBOSE_NAMES
|
|
|
|
Instead of ServerID as specified above, the controller should
|
|
identify ORs by LongName in events and GETINFO results. This format is
|
|
strictly more informative: rather than including Nickname for
|
|
known Named routers and Fingerprint for unknown or unNamed routers, the
|
|
LongName format includes a Fingerprint, an indication of Named status,
|
|
and a Nickname (if one is known).
|
|
|
|
This will not be always-enabled until at least 0.1.4.x (or at least two
|
|
stable releases after 0.1.2.2-alpha, the release where it was first
|
|
available.)
|
|
|
|
3.20. RESOLVE
|
|
|
|
The syntax is
|
|
"RESOLVE" *Option *Address CRLF
|
|
Option = "mode=reverse"
|
|
Address = a hostname or IPv4 address
|
|
|
|
This command launches a remote hostname lookup request for every specified
|
|
request (or reverse lookup if "mode=reverse" is specified). Note that the
|
|
request is done in the background: to see the answers, your controller will
|
|
need to listen for ADDRMAP events; see 4.1.7 below.
|
|
|
|
[Added in Tor 0.2.0.3-alpha]
|
|
|
|
3.21. PROTOCOLINFO
|
|
|
|
The syntax is:
|
|
"PROTOCOLINFO" *(SP PIVERSION) CRLF
|
|
|
|
The server reply format is:
|
|
"250-PROTOCOLINFO" SP PIVERSION CRLF *InfoLine "250 OK" CRLF
|
|
|
|
InfoLine = AuthLine / VersionLine / OtherLine
|
|
|
|
AuthLine = "250-AUTH" SP "METHODS=" AuthMethod *(",")AuthMethod
|
|
*(SP "COOKIEFILE=" AuthCookieFile) CRLF
|
|
VersionLine = "250-VERSION" SP "Tor=" TorVersion [SP Arguments] CRLF
|
|
|
|
AuthMethod =
|
|
"NULL" / ; No authentication is required
|
|
"HASHEDPASSWORD" / ; A controller must supply the original password
|
|
"COOKIE" / ; A controller must supply the contents of a cookie
|
|
|
|
AuthCookieFile = QuotedString
|
|
TorVersion = QuotedString
|
|
|
|
OtherLine = "250-" Keyword [SP Arguments] CRLF
|
|
|
|
PIVERSION: 1*DIGIT
|
|
|
|
Tor MAY give its InfoLines in any order; controllers MUST ignore InfoLines
|
|
with keywords they do not recognize. Controllers MUST ignore extraneous
|
|
data on any InfoLine.
|
|
|
|
PIVERSION is there in case we drastically change the syntax one day. For
|
|
now it should always be "1". Controllers MAY provide a list of the
|
|
protocolinfo versions they support; Tor MAY select a version that the
|
|
controller does not support.
|
|
|
|
AuthMethod is used to specify one or more control authentication
|
|
methods that Tor currently accepts.
|
|
|
|
AuthCookieFile specifies the absolute path and filename of the
|
|
authentication cookie that Tor is expecting and is provided iff
|
|
the METHODS field contains the method "COOKIE". Controllers MUST handle
|
|
escape sequences inside this string.
|
|
|
|
The VERSION line contains the Tor version.
|
|
|
|
[Unlike other commands besides AUTHENTICATE, PROTOCOLINFO may be used (but
|
|
only once!) before AUTHENTICATE.]
|
|
|
|
[PROTOCOLINFO was not supported before Tor 0.2.0.5-alpha.]
|
|
|
|
4. Replies
|
|
|
|
Reply codes follow the same 3-character format as used by SMTP, with the
|
|
first character defining a status, the second character defining a
|
|
subsystem, and the third designating fine-grained information.
|
|
|
|
The TC protocol currently uses the following first characters:
|
|
|
|
2yz Positive Completion Reply
|
|
The command was successful; a new request can be started.
|
|
|
|
4yz Temporary Negative Completion reply
|
|
The command was unsuccessful but might be reattempted later.
|
|
|
|
5yz Permanent Negative Completion Reply
|
|
The command was unsuccessful; the client should not try exactly
|
|
that sequence of commands again.
|
|
|
|
6yz Asynchronous Reply
|
|
Sent out-of-order in response to an earlier SETEVENTS command.
|
|
|
|
The following second characters are used:
|
|
|
|
x0z Syntax
|
|
Sent in response to ill-formed or nonsensical commands.
|
|
|
|
x1z Protocol
|
|
Refers to operations of the Tor Control protocol.
|
|
|
|
x5z Tor
|
|
Refers to actual operations of Tor system.
|
|
|
|
The following codes are defined:
|
|
|
|
250 OK
|
|
251 Operation was unnecessary
|
|
[Tor has declined to perform the operation, but no harm was done.]
|
|
|
|
451 Resource exhausted
|
|
|
|
500 Syntax error: protocol
|
|
|
|
510 Unrecognized command
|
|
511 Unimplemented command
|
|
512 Syntax error in command argument
|
|
513 Unrecognized command argument
|
|
514 Authentication required
|
|
515 Bad authentication
|
|
|
|
550 Unspecified Tor error
|
|
|
|
551 Internal error
|
|
[Something went wrong inside Tor, so that the client's
|
|
request couldn't be fulfilled.]
|
|
|
|
552 Unrecognized entity
|
|
[A configuration key, a stream ID, circuit ID, event,
|
|
mentioned in the command did not actually exist.]
|
|
|
|
553 Invalid configuration value
|
|
[The client tried to set a configuration option to an
|
|
incorrect, ill-formed, or impossible value.]
|
|
|
|
554 Invalid descriptor
|
|
|
|
555 Unmanaged entity
|
|
|
|
650 Asynchronous event notification
|
|
|
|
Unless specified to have specific contents, the human-readable messages
|
|
in error replies should not be relied upon to match those in this document.
|
|
|
|
4.1. Asynchronous events
|
|
|
|
These replies can be sent after a corresponding SETEVENTS command has been
|
|
received. They will not be interleaved with other Reply elements, but they
|
|
can appear between a command and its corresponding reply. For example,
|
|
this sequence is possible:
|
|
|
|
C: SETEVENTS CIRC
|
|
S: 250 OK
|
|
C: GETCONF SOCKSPORT ORPORT
|
|
S: 650 CIRC 1000 EXTENDED moria1,moria2
|
|
S: 250-SOCKSPORT=9050
|
|
S: 250 ORPORT=0
|
|
|
|
But this sequence is disallowed:
|
|
C: SETEVENTS CIRC
|
|
S: 250 OK
|
|
C: GETCONF SOCKSPORT ORPORT
|
|
S: 250-SOCKSPORT=9050
|
|
S: 650 CIRC 1000 EXTENDED moria1,moria2
|
|
S: 250 ORPORT=0
|
|
|
|
Clients MUST tolerate more arguments in an asynchonous reply than
|
|
expected, and MUST tolerate more lines in an asynchronous reply than
|
|
expected. For instance, a client that expects a CIRC message like:
|
|
650 CIRC 1000 EXTENDED moria1,moria2
|
|
must tolerate:
|
|
650-CIRC 1000 EXTENDED moria1,moria2 0xBEEF
|
|
650-EXTRAMAGIC=99
|
|
650 ANONYMITY=high
|
|
|
|
If clients ask for extended events, then each event line as specified below
|
|
will be followed by additional extensions. Additional lines will be of the
|
|
form
|
|
"650" ("-"/" ") KEYWORD ["=" ARGUMENTS] CRLF
|
|
Additional arguments will be of the form
|
|
SP KEYWORD ["=" ( QuotedString / * NonSpDquote ) ]
|
|
Such clients MUST tolerate lines with keywords they do not recognize.
|
|
|
|
4.1.1. Circuit status changed
|
|
|
|
The syntax is:
|
|
|
|
"650" SP "CIRC" SP CircuitID SP CircStatus [SP Path]
|
|
[SP "REASON=" Reason [SP "REMOTE_REASON=" Reason]] CRLF
|
|
|
|
CircStatus =
|
|
"LAUNCHED" / ; circuit ID assigned to new circuit
|
|
"BUILT" / ; all hops finished, can now accept streams
|
|
"EXTENDED" / ; one more hop has been completed
|
|
"FAILED" / ; circuit closed (was not built)
|
|
"CLOSED" ; circuit closed (was built)
|
|
|
|
Path = ServerID *("," ServerID)
|
|
|
|
Reason = "NONE" / "TORPROTOCOL" / "INTERNAL" / "REQUESTED" /
|
|
"HIBERNATING" / "RESOURCELIMIT" / "CONNECTFAILED" /
|
|
"OR_IDENTITY" / "OR_CONN_CLOSED" / "TIMEOUT" /
|
|
"FINISHED" / "DESTROYED" / "NOPATH" / "NOSUCHSERVICE"
|
|
|
|
The path is provided only when the circuit has been extended at least one
|
|
hop.
|
|
|
|
The "REASON" field is provided only for FAILED and CLOSED events, and only
|
|
if extended events are enabled (see 3.19). Clients MUST accept reasons
|
|
not listed above. Reasons are as given in tor-spec.txt, except for:
|
|
|
|
NOPATH (Not enough nodes to make circuit)
|
|
|
|
The "REMOTE_REASON" field is provided only when we receive a DESTROY or
|
|
TRUNCATE cell, and only if extended events are enabled. It contains the
|
|
actual reason given by the remote OR for closing the circuit. Clients MUST
|
|
accept reasons not listed above. Reasons are as listed in tor-spec.txt.
|
|
|
|
4.1.2. Stream status changed
|
|
|
|
The syntax is:
|
|
|
|
"650" SP "STREAM" SP StreamID SP StreamStatus SP CircID SP Target
|
|
[SP "REASON=" Reason [ SP "REMOTE_REASON=" Reason ]]
|
|
[SP "SOURCE=" Source] [ SP "SOURCE_ADDR=" Address ":" Port ]
|
|
CRLF
|
|
|
|
StreamStatus =
|
|
"NEW" / ; New request to connect
|
|
"NEWRESOLVE" / ; New request to resolve an address
|
|
"REMAP" / ; Address re-mapped to another
|
|
"SENTCONNECT" / ; Sent a connect cell along a circuit
|
|
"SENTRESOLVE" / ; Sent a resolve cell along a circuit
|
|
"SUCCEEDED" / ; Received a reply; stream established
|
|
"FAILED" / ; Stream failed and not retriable
|
|
"CLOSED" / ; Stream closed
|
|
"DETACHED" ; Detached from circuit; still retriable
|
|
|
|
Target = Address ":" Port
|
|
|
|
The circuit ID designates which circuit this stream is attached to. If
|
|
the stream is unattached, the circuit ID "0" is given.
|
|
|
|
Reason = "MISC" / "RESOLVEFAILED" / "CONNECTREFUSED" /
|
|
"EXITPOLICY" / "DESTROY" / "DONE" / "TIMEOUT" /
|
|
"HIBERNATING" / "INTERNAL"/ "RESOURCELIMIT" /
|
|
"CONNRESET" / "TORPROTOCOL" / "NOTDIRECTORY" / "END"
|
|
|
|
The "REASON" field is provided only for FAILED, CLOSED, and DETACHED
|
|
events, and only if extended events are enabled (see 3.19). Clients MUST
|
|
accept reasons not listed above. Reasons are as given in tor-spec.txt,
|
|
except for:
|
|
|
|
END (We received a RELAY_END cell from the other side of thise
|
|
stream.)
|
|
[XXXX document more.]
|
|
|
|
The "REMOTE_REASON" field is provided only when we receive a RELAY_END
|
|
cell, and only if extended events are enabled. It contains the actual
|
|
reason given by the remote OR for closing the stream. Clients MUST accept
|
|
reasons not listed above. Reasons are as listed in tor-spec.txt.
|
|
|
|
"REMAP" events include a Source if extended events are enabled:
|
|
Source = "CACHE" / "EXIT"
|
|
Clients MUST accept sources not listed above. "CACHE" is given if
|
|
the Tor client decided to remap the address because of a cached
|
|
answer, and "EXIT" is given if the remote node we queried gave us
|
|
the new address as a response.
|
|
|
|
The "SOURCE_ADDR" field is included with NEW and NEWRESOLVE events if
|
|
extended events are enabled. It indicates the address and port
|
|
that requested the connection, and can be (e.g.) used to look up the
|
|
requesting program.
|
|
|
|
4.1.3. OR Connection status changed
|
|
|
|
The syntax is:
|
|
"650" SP "ORCONN" SP (ServerID / Target) SP ORStatus [ SP "REASON="
|
|
Reason ] [ SP "NCIRCS=" NumCircuits ] CRLF
|
|
|
|
ORStatus = "NEW" / "LAUNCHED" / "CONNECTED" / "FAILED" / "CLOSED"
|
|
|
|
NEW is for incoming connections, and LAUNCHED is for outgoing
|
|
connections. CONNECTED means the TLS handshake has finished (in
|
|
either direction). FAILED means a connection is being closed that
|
|
hasn't finished its handshake, and CLOSED is for connections that
|
|
have handshaked.
|
|
|
|
A ServerID is specified unless it's a NEW connection, in which
|
|
case we don't know what server it is yet, so we use Address:Port.
|
|
|
|
If extended events are enabled (see 3.19), optional reason and
|
|
circuit counting information is provided for CLOSED and FAILED
|
|
events.
|
|
|
|
Reason = "MISC" / "DONE" / "CONNECTREFUSED" /
|
|
"IDENTITY" / "CONNECTRESET" / "TIMEOUT" / "NOROUTE" /
|
|
"IOERROR"
|
|
|
|
NumCircuits counts both established and pending circuits.
|
|
|
|
4.1.4. Bandwidth used in the last second
|
|
|
|
The syntax is:
|
|
"650" SP "BW" SP BytesRead SP BytesWritten *(SP Type "=" Num) CRLF
|
|
BytesRead = 1*DIGIT
|
|
BytesWritten = 1*DIGIT
|
|
Type = "DIR" / "OR" / "EXIT" / "APP" / ...
|
|
Num = 1*DIGIT
|
|
|
|
BytesRead and BytesWritten are the totals. In Tor 0.1.x.y-alpha
|
|
and later, we also include a breakdown of the connection types
|
|
that used bandwidth this second (not implemented yet).
|
|
|
|
4.1.5. Log messages
|
|
|
|
The syntax is:
|
|
"650" SP Severity SP ReplyText CRLF
|
|
or
|
|
"650+" Severity CRLF Data 650 SP "OK" CRLF
|
|
|
|
Severity = "DEBUG" / "INFO" / "NOTICE" / "WARN"/ "ERR"
|
|
|
|
4.1.6. New descriptors available
|
|
|
|
Syntax:
|
|
"650" SP "NEWDESC" 1*(SP ServerID) CRLF
|
|
|
|
4.1.7. New Address mapping
|
|
|
|
Syntax:
|
|
"650" SP "ADDRMAP" SP Address SP NewAddress SP Expiry
|
|
[SP Error] SP GMTExpiry CRLF
|
|
|
|
NewAddress = Address / "<error>"
|
|
Expiry = DQUOTE ISOTime DQUOTE / "NEVER"
|
|
|
|
Error = "error=" ErrorCode
|
|
ErrorCode = XXXX
|
|
GMTExpiry = "EXPIRES=" DQUOTE IsoTime DQUOTE
|
|
|
|
Error and GMTExpiry are only provided if extended events are enabled.
|
|
|
|
Expiry is expressed as the local time (rather than GMT). This is a bug,
|
|
left in for backward compatibility; new code should look at GMTExpiry
|
|
instead.
|
|
|
|
These events are generated when a new address mapping is entered in the
|
|
cache, or when the answer for a RESOLVE command is found.
|
|
|
|
4.1.8. Descriptors uploaded to us in our role as authoritative dirserver
|
|
|
|
Syntax:
|
|
"650" "+" "AUTHDIR_NEWDESCS" CRLF Action CRLF Message CRLF
|
|
Descriptor CRLF "." CRLF "650" SP "OK" CRLF
|
|
Action = "ACCEPTED" / "DROPPED" / "REJECTED"
|
|
Message = Text
|
|
|
|
4.1.9. Our descriptor changed
|
|
|
|
Syntax:
|
|
"650" SP "DESCCHANGED" CRLF
|
|
|
|
[First added in 0.1.2.2-alpha.]
|
|
|
|
4.1.10. Status events
|
|
|
|
Status events (STATUS_GENERAL, STATUS_CLIENT, and STATUS_SERVER) are sent
|
|
based on occurrences in the Tor process pertaining to the general state of
|
|
the program. Generally, they correspond to log messages of severity Notice
|
|
or higher. They differ from log messages in that their format is a
|
|
specified interface.
|
|
|
|
Syntax:
|
|
"650" SP StatusType SP StatusSeverity SP StatusAction
|
|
[SP StatusArguments] CRLF
|
|
|
|
StatusType = "STATUS_GENERAL" / "STATUS_CLIENT" / "STATUS_SERVER"
|
|
StatusSeverity = "NOTICE" / "WARN" / "ERR"
|
|
StatusAction = 1*ALPHA
|
|
StatusArguments = StatusArgument *(SP StatusArgument)
|
|
StatusArgument = StatusKeyword '=' StatusValue
|
|
StatusKeyword = 1*(ALNUM / "_")
|
|
StatusValue = 1*(ALNUM / '_') / QuotedString
|
|
|
|
Action is a string, and Arguments is a series of keyword=value
|
|
pairs on the same line. Values may be space-terminated strings,
|
|
or quoted strings.
|
|
|
|
These events are always produced with EXTENDED_EVENTS and
|
|
VERBOSE_NAMES; see the explanations in the USEFEATURE section
|
|
for details.
|
|
|
|
Controllers MUST tolerate unrecognized actions, MUST tolerate
|
|
unrecognized arguments, MUST tolerate missing arguments, and MUST
|
|
tolerate arguments that arrive in any order.
|
|
|
|
Each event description below is accompanied by a recommendation for
|
|
controllers. These recommendations are suggestions only; no controller
|
|
is required to implement them.
|
|
|
|
Actions for STATUS_GENERAL events can be as follows:
|
|
|
|
CLOCK_JUMPED
|
|
"TIME=NUM"
|
|
Tor spent enough time without CPU cycles that it has closed all
|
|
its circuits and will establish them anew. This typically
|
|
happens when a laptop goes to sleep and then wakes up again. It
|
|
also happens when the system is swapping so heavily that Tor is
|
|
starving. The "time" argument specifies the number of seconds Tor
|
|
thinks it was unconscious for (or alternatively, the number of
|
|
seconds it went back in time).
|
|
|
|
This status event is sent as NOTICE severity normally, but WARN
|
|
severity if Tor is acting as a server currently.
|
|
|
|
{Recommendation for controller: ignore it, since we don't really
|
|
know what the user should do anyway. Hm.}
|
|
|
|
DANGEROUS_VERSION
|
|
"CURRENT=version"
|
|
"REASON=NEW/OLD/UNRECOMMENDED"
|
|
"RECOMMENDED=\"version, version, ...\""
|
|
Tor has found that directory servers don't recommend its version of
|
|
the Tor software. RECOMMENDED is a comma-and-space-separated string
|
|
of Tor versions that are recommended. REASON is NEW if this version
|
|
of Tor is newer than any recommended version, OLD if this version of
|
|
Tor is older than any recommended version, and UNRECOMMENDED if
|
|
some recommended versions of Tor are newer and some are old than this
|
|
version.
|
|
|
|
{Controllers may want to suggest that the user upgrade OLD or
|
|
UNRECOMMENDED versions. NEW versions may be known-insecure, or may
|
|
simply be development versions.}
|
|
|
|
TOO_MANY_CONNECTIONS
|
|
"CURRENT=NUM"
|
|
Tor has reached its ulimit -n or whatever the native limit is on file
|
|
descriptors or sockets. CURRENT is the number of sockets Tor
|
|
currently has open. The user should really do something about
|
|
this. The "current" argument shows the number of connections currently
|
|
open.
|
|
|
|
{Controllers may recommend that the user increase the limit, or
|
|
increase it for them. Recommendations should be phrased in an
|
|
OS-appropriate way and automated when possible.}
|
|
|
|
BUG
|
|
"REASON=STRING"
|
|
Tor has encountered a situation that its developers never expected,
|
|
and the developers would like to learn that it happened. Perhaps
|
|
the controller can explain this to the user and encourage her to
|
|
file a bug report?
|
|
|
|
{Controllers should log bugs, but shouldn't annoy the user in case a
|
|
bug appears frequently.}
|
|
|
|
CLOCK_SKEWED
|
|
SKEW="+" / "-" SECONDS
|
|
SOURCE="DIRSERV:IP:Port" / "NETWORKSTATUS:IP:PORT"
|
|
If "SKEW" is present, it's an estimate of how far we are from the
|
|
time declared in the source. If the source is a DIRSERV, we got
|
|
the current time from a connection to a dirserver. If the source is
|
|
a NETWORKSTATUS, we decided we're skewed because we got a
|
|
networkstatus from far in the future.
|
|
|
|
{Controllers may want to warn the user if the skew is high, or if
|
|
multiple skew messages appear at severity WARN. Controllers
|
|
shouldn't blindly adjust the clock, since the more accurate source
|
|
of skew info (DIRSERV) is currently unauthenticated.}
|
|
|
|
BAD_LIBEVENT
|
|
"METHOD=" libevent method
|
|
"VERSION=" libevent version
|
|
"BADNESS=" "BROKEN" / "BUGGY" / "SLOW"
|
|
"RECOVERED=" "NO" / "YES"
|
|
Tor knows about bugs in using the configured event method in this
|
|
version of libevent. "BROKEN" libevents won't work at all;
|
|
"BUGGY" libevents might work okay; "SLOW" libevents will work
|
|
fine, but not quickly. If "RECOVERED" is YES, Tor managed to
|
|
switch to a more reliable (but probably slower!) libevent method.
|
|
|
|
{Controllers may want to warn the user if this event occurs, though
|
|
generally it's the fault of whoever built the Tor binary and there's
|
|
not much the user can do besides upgrade libevent or upgrade the
|
|
binary.}
|
|
|
|
DIR_ALL_UNREACHABLE
|
|
Tor believes that none of the known directory servers are
|
|
reachable -- this is most likely because the local network is
|
|
down or otherwise not working, and might help to explain for the
|
|
user why Tor appears to be broken.
|
|
|
|
{Controllers may want to warn the user if this event occurs; further
|
|
action is generally not possible.}
|
|
|
|
Actions for STATUS_CLIENT events can be as follows:
|
|
|
|
ENOUGH_DIR_INFO
|
|
Tor now knows enough network-status documents and enough server
|
|
descriptors that it's going to start trying to build circuits now.
|
|
|
|
{Controllers may want to use this event to decide when to indicate
|
|
progress to their users, but should not interrupt the user's browsing
|
|
to tell them so.}
|
|
|
|
NOT_ENOUGH_DIR_INFO
|
|
We discarded expired statuses and router descriptors to fall
|
|
below the desired threshold of directory information. We won't
|
|
try to build any circuits until ENOUGH_DIR_INFO occurs again.
|
|
|
|
{Controllers may want to use this event to decide when to indicate
|
|
progress to their users, but should not interrupt the user's browsing
|
|
to tell them so.}
|
|
|
|
CIRCUIT_ESTABLISHED
|
|
Tor is able to establish circuits for client use. This event will
|
|
only be sent if we just built a circuit that changed our mind --
|
|
that is, prior to this event we didn't know whether we could
|
|
establish circuits.
|
|
|
|
{Suggested use: controllers can notify their users that Tor is
|
|
ready for use as a client once they see this status event. [Perhaps
|
|
controllers should also have a timeout if too much time passes and
|
|
this event hasn't arrived, to give tips on how to troubleshoot.
|
|
On the other hand, hopefully Tor will send further status events
|
|
if it can identify the problem.]}
|
|
|
|
CIRCUIT_NOT_ESTABLISHED
|
|
"REASON=" "EXTERNAL_ADDRESS" / "DIR_ALL_UNREACHABLE" / "CLOCK_JUMPED"
|
|
We are no longer confident that we can build circuits. The "reason"
|
|
keyword provides an explanation: which other status event type caused
|
|
our lack of confidence.
|
|
|
|
{Controllers may want to use this event to decide when to indicate
|
|
progress to their users, but should not interrupt the user's browsing
|
|
to do so.}
|
|
[Note: only REASON=CLOCK_JUMPED is implemented currently.]
|
|
|
|
DANGEROUS_SOCKS
|
|
"PROTOCOL=SOCKS4/SOCKS5"
|
|
"ADDRESS=IP:port"
|
|
A connection was made to Tor's SOCKS port using one of the SOCKS
|
|
approaches that doesn't support hostnames -- only raw IP addresses.
|
|
If the client application got this address from gethostbyname(),
|
|
it may be leaking target addresses via DNS.
|
|
|
|
{Controllers should warn their users when this occurs, unless they
|
|
happen to know that the application using Tor is in fact doing so
|
|
correctly (e.g., because it is part of a distributed bundle).}
|
|
|
|
SOCKS_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL
|
|
"DATA=string"
|
|
A connection was made to Tor's SOCKS port that tried to use it
|
|
for something other than the SOCKS protocol. Perhaps the user is
|
|
using Tor as an HTTP proxy? The DATA is the first few characters
|
|
sent to Tor on the SOCKS port.
|
|
|
|
{Controllers may want to warn their users when this occurs: it
|
|
indicates a misconfigured application.}
|
|
|
|
SOCKS_BAD_HOSTNAME
|
|
"HOSTNAME=QuotedString"
|
|
Some application gave us a funny-looking hostname. Perhaps
|
|
it is broken? In any case it won't work with Tor and the user
|
|
should know.
|
|
|
|
{Controllers may want to warn their users when this occurs: it
|
|
usually indicates a misconfigured application.}
|
|
|
|
Actions for STATUS_SERVER can be as follows:
|
|
|
|
EXTERNAL_ADDRESS
|
|
"ADDRESS=IP"
|
|
"HOSTNAME=NAME"
|
|
"METHOD=CONFIGURED/DIRSERV/RESOLVED/INTERFACE/GETHOSTNAME"
|
|
Our best idea for our externally visible IP has changed to 'IP'.
|
|
If 'HOSTNAME' is present, we got the new IP by resolving 'NAME'. If the
|
|
method is 'CONFIGURED', the IP was given verbatim as a configuration
|
|
option. If the method is 'RESOLVED', we resolved the Address
|
|
configuration option to get the IP. If the method is 'GETHOSTNAME',
|
|
we resolved our hostname to get the IP. If the method is 'INTERFACE',
|
|
we got the address of one of our network interfaces to get the IP. If
|
|
the method is 'DIRSERV', a directory server told us a guess for what
|
|
our IP might be.
|
|
|
|
{Controllers may want to record this info and display it to the user.}
|
|
|
|
CHECKING_REACHABILITY
|
|
"ORADDRESS=IP:port"
|
|
"DIRADDRESS=IP:port"
|
|
We're going to start testing the reachability of our external OR port
|
|
or directory port.
|
|
|
|
{This event could effect the controller's idea of server status, but
|
|
the controller should not interrupt the user to tell them so.}
|
|
|
|
REACHABILITY_SUCCEEDED
|
|
"ORADDRESS=IP:port"
|
|
"DIRADDRESS=IP:port"
|
|
We successfully verified the reachability of our external OR port or
|
|
directory port.
|
|
|
|
{This event could effect the controller's idea of server status, but
|
|
the controller should not interrupt the user to tell them so.}
|
|
|
|
GOOD_SERVER_DESCRIPTOR
|
|
We successfully uploaded our server descriptor to each of the
|
|
directory authorities, with no complaints.
|
|
|
|
{This event could effect the controller's idea of server status, but
|
|
the controller should not interrupt the user to tell them so.}
|
|
|
|
NAMESERVER_STATUS
|
|
"NS=addr"
|
|
"STATUS=" "UP" / "DOWN"
|
|
"ERR=" message
|
|
One of our nameservers has changed status.
|
|
// actually notice
|
|
|
|
{This event could effect the controller's idea of server status, but
|
|
the controller should not interrupt the user to tell them so.}
|
|
|
|
NAMESERVER_ALL_DOWN
|
|
All of our nameservers have gone down.
|
|
|
|
{This is a problem; if it happens often without the nameservers
|
|
coming up again, the user needs to configure more or better
|
|
nameservers.}
|
|
|
|
DNS_HIJACKED
|
|
Our DNS provider is providing an address when it should be saying
|
|
"NOTFOUND"; Tor will treat the address as a synonym for "NOTFOUND".
|
|
|
|
{This is an annoyance; controllers may want to tell admins that their
|
|
DNS provider is not to be trusted.}
|
|
|
|
DNS_USELESS
|
|
Our DNS provider is giving a hijacked address instead of well-known
|
|
websites; Tor will not try to be an exit node.
|
|
|
|
{Controllers could warn the admin if the server is running as an
|
|
exit server: the admin needs to configure a good DNS server.
|
|
Alternatively, this happens a lot in some restrictive environments
|
|
(hotels, universities, coffeeshops) when the user hasn't registered.}
|
|
|
|
BAD_SERVER_DESCRIPTOR
|
|
"DIRAUTH=addr:port"
|
|
"REASON=string"
|
|
A directory authority rejected our descriptor. Possible reasons
|
|
include malformed descriptors, incorrect keys, highly skewed clocks,
|
|
and so on.
|
|
|
|
{Controllers should warn the admin, and try to cope if they can.}
|
|
|
|
ACCEPTED_SERVER_DESCRIPTOR
|
|
"DIRAUTH=addr:port"
|
|
A single directory authority accepted our descriptor.
|
|
// actually notice
|
|
|
|
{This event could effect the controller's idea of server status, but
|
|
the controller should not interrupt the user to tell them so.}
|
|
|
|
REACHABILITY_FAILED
|
|
"ORADDRESS=IP:port"
|
|
"DIRADDRESS=IP:port"
|
|
We failed to connect to our external OR port or directory port
|
|
successfully.
|
|
|
|
{This event could effect the controller's idea of server status. The
|
|
controller should warn the admin and suggest reasonable steps to take.}
|
|
|
|
4.1.11. Our set of guard nodes has changed
|
|
|
|
Syntax:
|
|
"650" SP "GUARD" SP Type SP Name SP Status ... CRLF
|
|
Type = "ENTRY"
|
|
Name = The (possibly verbose) nickname of the guard affected.
|
|
Status = "NEW" | "UP" | "DOWN" | "BAD" | "GOOD" | "DROPPED"
|
|
|
|
[explain states. XXX]
|
|
|
|
4.1.12. Network status has changed
|
|
|
|
Syntax:
|
|
"650" "+" "NS" CRLF 1*NetworkStatus "." CRLF "650" SP "OK" CRLF
|
|
|
|
[First added in 0.1.2.3-alpha]
|
|
|
|
4.1.13. Bandwidth used on an application stream
|
|
|
|
The syntax is:
|
|
"650" SP "STREAM_BW" SP StreamID SP BytesRead SP BytesWritten CRLF
|
|
BytesRead = 1*DIGIT
|
|
BytesWritten = 1*DIGIT
|
|
|
|
BytesRead and BytesWritten are the number of bytes read and written since
|
|
the last STREAM_BW event on this stream. These events are generated about
|
|
once per second per stream; no events are generated for streams that have
|
|
not read or written.
|
|
|
|
These events apply only to streams entering Tor (such as on a SOCKSPort,
|
|
TransPort, or so on). They are not generated for exiting streams.
|
|
|
|
5. Implementation notes
|
|
|
|
5.1. Authentication
|
|
|
|
By default, the current Tor implementation trusts all local users.
|
|
|
|
If the 'CookieAuthentication' option is true, Tor writes a "magic cookie"
|
|
file named "control_auth_cookie" into its data directory. To authenticate,
|
|
the controller must send the contents of this file, encoded in hexadecimal.
|
|
|
|
If the 'HashedControlPassword' option is set, it must contain the salted
|
|
hash of a secret password. The salted hash is computed according to the
|
|
S2K algorithm in RFC 2440 (OpenPGP), and prefixed with the s2k specifier.
|
|
This is then encoded in hexadecimal, prefixed by the indicator sequence
|
|
"16:". Thus, for example, the password 'foo' could encode to:
|
|
16:660537E3E1CD49996044A3BF558097A981F539FEA2F9DA662B4626C1C2
|
|
++++++++++++++++**^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
|
|
salt hashed value
|
|
indicator
|
|
You can generate the salt of a password by calling
|
|
'tor --hash-password <password>'
|
|
or by using the example code in the Python and Java controller libraries.
|
|
To authenticate under this scheme, the controller sends Tor the original
|
|
secret that was used to generate the password.
|
|
|
|
5.2. Don't let the buffer get too big.
|
|
|
|
If you ask for lots of events, and 16MB of them queue up on the buffer,
|
|
the Tor process will close the socket.
|
|
|
|
5.3. Backward compatibility with v0 control protocol.
|
|
|
|
The 'version 0' control protocol was replaced in Tor 0.1.1.x. Support was
|
|
removed in Tor 0.2.0.x. Every non-obsolete version of Tor now supports the
|
|
version 1 control protocol.
|
|
|
|
For backward compatibility with the "version 0" control protocol,
|
|
Tor used to check whether the third octet of the first command is zero.
|
|
(If it was, Tor assumed that version 0 is in use.)
|
|
|
|
This compatibility was removed in Tor 0.1.2.16 and 0.2.0.4-alpha.
|
|
|
|
5.4. Options for use by controllers
|
|
|
|
Tor provides a few special configuration options for use by controllers.
|
|
These options can be set and examined by the SETCONF and GETCONF commands,
|
|
but are not saved to disk by SAVECONF.
|
|
|
|
Generally, these options make Tor unusable by disabling a portion of Tor's
|
|
normal operations. Unless a controller provides replacement functionality
|
|
to fill this gap, Tor will not correctly handle user requests.
|
|
|
|
__AllDirOptionsPrivate
|
|
|
|
If true, Tor will try to launch all directory operations through
|
|
anonymous connections. (Ordinarily, Tor only tries to anonymize
|
|
requests related to hidden services.) This option will slow down
|
|
directory access, and may stop Tor from working entirely if it does not
|
|
yet have enough directory information to build circuits.
|
|
|
|
(Boolean. Default: "0".)
|
|
|
|
__DisablePredictedCircuits
|
|
|
|
If true, Tor will not launch preemptive "general purpose" circuits for
|
|
streams to attach to. (It will still launch circuits for testing and
|
|
for hidden services.)
|
|
|
|
(Boolean. Default: "0".)
|
|
|
|
__LeaveStreamsUnattached
|
|
|
|
If true, Tor will not automatically attach new streams to circuits;
|
|
instead, the controller must attach them with ATTACHSTREAM. If the
|
|
controller does not attach the streams, their data will never be routed.
|
|
|
|
(Boolean. Default: "0".)
|
|
|