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2304 lines
73 KiB
C
2304 lines
73 KiB
C
/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
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* Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
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* Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
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* Copyright (c) 2007-2011, The Tor Project, Inc. */
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/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
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#define ROUTER_PRIVATE
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#include "or.h"
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#include "circuitbuild.h"
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#include "circuitlist.h"
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#include "circuituse.h"
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#include "config.h"
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#include "connection.h"
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#include "control.h"
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#include "directory.h"
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#include "dirserv.h"
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#include "dns.h"
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#include "geoip.h"
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#include "hibernate.h"
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#include "main.h"
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#include "networkstatus.h"
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#include "nodelist.h"
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#include "policies.h"
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#include "relay.h"
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#include "rephist.h"
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#include "router.h"
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#include "routerlist.h"
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#include "routerparse.h"
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/**
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* \file router.c
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* \brief OR functionality, including key maintenance, generating
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* and uploading server descriptors, retrying OR connections.
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**/
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extern long stats_n_seconds_working;
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/************************************************************/
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/*****
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* Key management: ORs only.
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*****/
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/** Private keys for this OR. There is also an SSL key managed by tortls.c.
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*/
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static tor_mutex_t *key_lock=NULL;
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static time_t onionkey_set_at=0; /**< When was onionkey last changed? */
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/** Current private onionskin decryption key: used to decode CREATE cells. */
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static crypto_pk_env_t *onionkey=NULL;
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/** Previous private onionskin decryption key: used to decode CREATE cells
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* generated by clients that have an older version of our descriptor. */
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static crypto_pk_env_t *lastonionkey=NULL;
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/** Private server "identity key": used to sign directory info and TLS
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* certificates. Never changes. */
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static crypto_pk_env_t *server_identitykey=NULL;
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/** Digest of server_identitykey. */
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static char server_identitykey_digest[DIGEST_LEN];
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/** Private client "identity key": used to sign bridges' and clients'
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* outbound TLS certificates. Regenerated on startup and on IP address
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* change. */
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static crypto_pk_env_t *client_identitykey=NULL;
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/** Signing key used for v3 directory material; only set for authorities. */
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static crypto_pk_env_t *authority_signing_key = NULL;
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/** Key certificate to authenticate v3 directory material; only set for
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* authorities. */
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static authority_cert_t *authority_key_certificate = NULL;
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/** For emergency V3 authority key migration: An extra signing key that we use
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* with our old (obsolete) identity key for a while. */
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static crypto_pk_env_t *legacy_signing_key = NULL;
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/** For emergency V3 authority key migration: An extra certificate to
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* authenticate legacy_signing_key with our obsolete identity key.*/
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static authority_cert_t *legacy_key_certificate = NULL;
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/* (Note that v3 authorities also have a separate "authority identity key",
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* but this key is never actually loaded by the Tor process. Instead, it's
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* used by tor-gencert to sign new signing keys and make new key
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* certificates. */
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/** Replace the current onion key with <b>k</b>. Does not affect
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* lastonionkey; to update lastonionkey correctly, call rotate_onion_key().
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*/
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static void
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set_onion_key(crypto_pk_env_t *k)
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{
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tor_mutex_acquire(key_lock);
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crypto_free_pk_env(onionkey);
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onionkey = k;
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onionkey_set_at = time(NULL);
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tor_mutex_release(key_lock);
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mark_my_descriptor_dirty();
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}
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/** Return the current onion key. Requires that the onion key has been
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* loaded or generated. */
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crypto_pk_env_t *
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get_onion_key(void)
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{
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tor_assert(onionkey);
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return onionkey;
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}
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/** Store a full copy of the current onion key into *<b>key</b>, and a full
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* copy of the most recent onion key into *<b>last</b>.
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*/
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void
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dup_onion_keys(crypto_pk_env_t **key, crypto_pk_env_t **last)
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{
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tor_assert(key);
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tor_assert(last);
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tor_mutex_acquire(key_lock);
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tor_assert(onionkey);
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*key = crypto_pk_copy_full(onionkey);
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if (lastonionkey)
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*last = crypto_pk_copy_full(lastonionkey);
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else
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*last = NULL;
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tor_mutex_release(key_lock);
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}
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/** Return the time when the onion key was last set. This is either the time
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* when the process launched, or the time of the most recent key rotation since
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* the process launched.
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*/
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time_t
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get_onion_key_set_at(void)
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{
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return onionkey_set_at;
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}
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/** Set the current server identity key to <b>k</b>.
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*/
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void
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set_server_identity_key(crypto_pk_env_t *k)
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{
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crypto_free_pk_env(server_identitykey);
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server_identitykey = k;
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crypto_pk_get_digest(server_identitykey, server_identitykey_digest);
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}
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/** Make sure that we have set up our identity keys to match or not match as
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* appropriate, and die with an assertion if we have not. */
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static void
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assert_identity_keys_ok(void)
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{
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tor_assert(client_identitykey);
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if (public_server_mode(get_options())) {
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/* assert that we have set the client and server keys to be equal */
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tor_assert(server_identitykey);
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tor_assert(0==crypto_pk_cmp_keys(client_identitykey, server_identitykey));
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} else {
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/* assert that we have set the client and server keys to be unequal */
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if (server_identitykey)
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tor_assert(0!=crypto_pk_cmp_keys(client_identitykey,
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server_identitykey));
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}
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}
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/** Returns the current server identity key; requires that the key has
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* been set, and that we are running as a Tor server.
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*/
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crypto_pk_env_t *
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get_server_identity_key(void)
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{
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tor_assert(server_identitykey);
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tor_assert(server_mode(get_options()));
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assert_identity_keys_ok();
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return server_identitykey;
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}
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/** Return true iff the server identity key has been set. */
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int
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server_identity_key_is_set(void)
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{
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return server_identitykey != NULL;
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}
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/** Set the current client identity key to <b>k</b>.
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*/
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void
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set_client_identity_key(crypto_pk_env_t *k)
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{
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crypto_free_pk_env(client_identitykey);
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client_identitykey = k;
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}
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/** Returns the current client identity key for use on outgoing TLS
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* connections; requires that the key has been set.
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*/
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crypto_pk_env_t *
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get_tlsclient_identity_key(void)
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{
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tor_assert(client_identitykey);
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assert_identity_keys_ok();
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return client_identitykey;
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}
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/** Return true iff the client identity key has been set. */
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int
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client_identity_key_is_set(void)
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{
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return client_identitykey != NULL;
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}
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/** Return the key certificate for this v3 (voting) authority, or NULL
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* if we have no such certificate. */
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authority_cert_t *
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get_my_v3_authority_cert(void)
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{
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return authority_key_certificate;
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}
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/** Return the v3 signing key for this v3 (voting) authority, or NULL
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* if we have no such key. */
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crypto_pk_env_t *
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get_my_v3_authority_signing_key(void)
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{
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return authority_signing_key;
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}
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/** If we're an authority, and we're using a legacy authority identity key for
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* emergency migration purposes, return the certificate associated with that
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* key. */
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authority_cert_t *
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get_my_v3_legacy_cert(void)
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{
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return legacy_key_certificate;
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}
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/** If we're an authority, and we're using a legacy authority identity key for
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* emergency migration purposes, return that key. */
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crypto_pk_env_t *
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get_my_v3_legacy_signing_key(void)
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{
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return legacy_signing_key;
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}
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/** Replace the previous onion key with the current onion key, and generate
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* a new previous onion key. Immediately after calling this function,
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* the OR should:
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* - schedule all previous cpuworkers to shut down _after_ processing
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* pending work. (This will cause fresh cpuworkers to be generated.)
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* - generate and upload a fresh routerinfo.
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*/
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void
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rotate_onion_key(void)
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{
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char *fname, *fname_prev;
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crypto_pk_env_t *prkey;
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or_state_t *state = get_or_state();
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time_t now;
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fname = get_datadir_fname2("keys", "secret_onion_key");
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fname_prev = get_datadir_fname2("keys", "secret_onion_key.old");
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if (!(prkey = crypto_new_pk_env())) {
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log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error constructing rotated onion key");
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goto error;
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}
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if (crypto_pk_generate_key(prkey)) {
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log_err(LD_BUG,"Error generating onion key");
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goto error;
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}
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if (file_status(fname) == FN_FILE) {
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if (replace_file(fname, fname_prev))
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goto error;
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}
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if (crypto_pk_write_private_key_to_filename(prkey, fname)) {
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log_err(LD_FS,"Couldn't write generated onion key to \"%s\".", fname);
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goto error;
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}
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log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Rotating onion key");
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tor_mutex_acquire(key_lock);
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crypto_free_pk_env(lastonionkey);
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lastonionkey = onionkey;
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onionkey = prkey;
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now = time(NULL);
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state->LastRotatedOnionKey = onionkey_set_at = now;
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tor_mutex_release(key_lock);
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mark_my_descriptor_dirty();
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or_state_mark_dirty(state, get_options()->AvoidDiskWrites ? now+3600 : 0);
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goto done;
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error:
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log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Couldn't rotate onion key.");
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if (prkey)
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crypto_free_pk_env(prkey);
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done:
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tor_free(fname);
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tor_free(fname_prev);
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}
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/** Try to read an RSA key from <b>fname</b>. If <b>fname</b> doesn't exist
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* and <b>generate</b> is true, create a new RSA key and save it in
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* <b>fname</b>. Return the read/created key, or NULL on error. Log all
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* errors at level <b>severity</b>.
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*/
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crypto_pk_env_t *
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init_key_from_file(const char *fname, int generate, int severity)
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{
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crypto_pk_env_t *prkey = NULL;
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if (!(prkey = crypto_new_pk_env())) {
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log(severity, LD_GENERAL,"Error constructing key");
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goto error;
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}
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switch (file_status(fname)) {
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case FN_DIR:
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case FN_ERROR:
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log(severity, LD_FS,"Can't read key from \"%s\"", fname);
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goto error;
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case FN_NOENT:
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if (generate) {
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if (!have_lockfile()) {
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if (try_locking(get_options(), 0)<0) {
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/* Make sure that --list-fingerprint only creates new keys
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* if there is no possibility for a deadlock. */
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log(severity, LD_FS, "Another Tor process has locked \"%s\". Not "
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"writing any new keys.", fname);
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/*XXXX The 'other process' might make a key in a second or two;
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* maybe we should wait for it. */
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goto error;
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}
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}
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log_info(LD_GENERAL, "No key found in \"%s\"; generating fresh key.",
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fname);
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if (crypto_pk_generate_key(prkey)) {
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log(severity, LD_GENERAL,"Error generating onion key");
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goto error;
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}
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if (crypto_pk_check_key(prkey) <= 0) {
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log(severity, LD_GENERAL,"Generated key seems invalid");
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goto error;
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}
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log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Generated key seems valid");
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if (crypto_pk_write_private_key_to_filename(prkey, fname)) {
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log(severity, LD_FS,
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"Couldn't write generated key to \"%s\".", fname);
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goto error;
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}
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} else {
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log_info(LD_GENERAL, "No key found in \"%s\"", fname);
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}
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return prkey;
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case FN_FILE:
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if (crypto_pk_read_private_key_from_filename(prkey, fname)) {
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log(severity, LD_GENERAL,"Error loading private key.");
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goto error;
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}
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return prkey;
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default:
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tor_assert(0);
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}
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error:
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if (prkey)
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crypto_free_pk_env(prkey);
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return NULL;
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}
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/** Try to load the vote-signing private key and certificate for being a v3
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* directory authority, and make sure they match. If <b>legacy</b>, load a
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* legacy key/cert set for emergency key migration; otherwise load the regular
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* key/cert set. On success, store them into *<b>key_out</b> and
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* *<b>cert_out</b> respectively, and return 0. On failure, return -1. */
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static int
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load_authority_keyset(int legacy, crypto_pk_env_t **key_out,
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authority_cert_t **cert_out)
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{
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int r = -1;
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char *fname = NULL, *cert = NULL;
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const char *eos = NULL;
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crypto_pk_env_t *signing_key = NULL;
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authority_cert_t *parsed = NULL;
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fname = get_datadir_fname2("keys",
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legacy ? "legacy_signing_key" : "authority_signing_key");
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signing_key = init_key_from_file(fname, 0, LOG_INFO);
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if (!signing_key) {
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log_warn(LD_DIR, "No version 3 directory key found in %s", fname);
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goto done;
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}
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tor_free(fname);
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fname = get_datadir_fname2("keys",
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legacy ? "legacy_certificate" : "authority_certificate");
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cert = read_file_to_str(fname, 0, NULL);
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if (!cert) {
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log_warn(LD_DIR, "Signing key found, but no certificate found in %s",
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fname);
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goto done;
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}
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parsed = authority_cert_parse_from_string(cert, &eos);
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if (!parsed) {
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log_warn(LD_DIR, "Unable to parse certificate in %s", fname);
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goto done;
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}
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if (crypto_pk_cmp_keys(signing_key, parsed->signing_key) != 0) {
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log_warn(LD_DIR, "Stored signing key does not match signing key in "
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"certificate");
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goto done;
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}
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crypto_free_pk_env(*key_out);
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authority_cert_free(*cert_out);
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*key_out = signing_key;
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*cert_out = parsed;
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r = 0;
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signing_key = NULL;
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parsed = NULL;
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done:
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tor_free(fname);
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tor_free(cert);
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crypto_free_pk_env(signing_key);
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authority_cert_free(parsed);
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return r;
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}
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/** Load the v3 (voting) authority signing key and certificate, if they are
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* present. Return -1 if anything is missing, mismatched, or unloadable;
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* return 0 on success. */
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static int
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init_v3_authority_keys(void)
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{
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if (load_authority_keyset(0, &authority_signing_key,
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&authority_key_certificate)<0)
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return -1;
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if (get_options()->V3AuthUseLegacyKey &&
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load_authority_keyset(1, &legacy_signing_key,
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&legacy_key_certificate)<0)
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return -1;
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return 0;
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}
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|
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/** If we're a v3 authority, check whether we have a certificate that's
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* likely to expire soon. Warn if we do, but not too often. */
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void
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v3_authority_check_key_expiry(void)
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{
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time_t now, expires;
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static time_t last_warned = 0;
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int badness, time_left, warn_interval;
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if (!authdir_mode_v3(get_options()) || !authority_key_certificate)
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return;
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now = time(NULL);
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expires = authority_key_certificate->expires;
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time_left = (int)( expires - now );
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if (time_left <= 0) {
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badness = LOG_ERR;
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warn_interval = 60*60;
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} else if (time_left <= 24*60*60) {
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badness = LOG_WARN;
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warn_interval = 60*60;
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} else if (time_left <= 24*60*60*7) {
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badness = LOG_WARN;
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warn_interval = 24*60*60;
|
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} else if (time_left <= 24*60*60*30) {
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badness = LOG_WARN;
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warn_interval = 24*60*60*5;
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} else {
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return;
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}
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if (last_warned + warn_interval > now)
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return;
|
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|
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if (time_left <= 0) {
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log(badness, LD_DIR, "Your v3 authority certificate has expired."
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" Generate a new one NOW.");
|
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} else if (time_left <= 24*60*60) {
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log(badness, LD_DIR, "Your v3 authority certificate expires in %d hours;"
|
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" Generate a new one NOW.", time_left/(60*60));
|
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} else {
|
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log(badness, LD_DIR, "Your v3 authority certificate expires in %d days;"
|
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" Generate a new one soon.", time_left/(24*60*60));
|
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}
|
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last_warned = now;
|
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}
|
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|
|
/** Initialize all OR private keys, and the TLS context, as necessary.
|
|
* On OPs, this only initializes the tls context. Return 0 on success,
|
|
* or -1 if Tor should die.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
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init_keys(void)
|
|
{
|
|
char *keydir;
|
|
char fingerprint[FINGERPRINT_LEN+1];
|
|
/*nickname<space>fp\n\0 */
|
|
char fingerprint_line[MAX_NICKNAME_LEN+FINGERPRINT_LEN+3];
|
|
const char *mydesc;
|
|
crypto_pk_env_t *prkey;
|
|
char digest[20];
|
|
char v3_digest[20];
|
|
char *cp;
|
|
or_options_t *options = get_options();
|
|
dirinfo_type_t type;
|
|
time_t now = time(NULL);
|
|
trusted_dir_server_t *ds;
|
|
int v3_digest_set = 0;
|
|
authority_cert_t *cert = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if (!key_lock)
|
|
key_lock = tor_mutex_new();
|
|
|
|
/* There are a couple of paths that put us here before */
|
|
if (crypto_global_init(get_options()->HardwareAccel,
|
|
get_options()->AccelName,
|
|
get_options()->AccelDir)) {
|
|
log_err(LD_BUG, "Unable to initialize OpenSSL. Exiting.");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* OP's don't need persistent keys; just make up an identity and
|
|
* initialize the TLS context. */
|
|
if (!server_mode(options)) {
|
|
if (!(prkey = crypto_new_pk_env()))
|
|
return -1;
|
|
if (crypto_pk_generate_key(prkey)) {
|
|
crypto_free_pk_env(prkey);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
set_client_identity_key(prkey);
|
|
/* Create a TLS context. */
|
|
if (tor_tls_context_init(0,
|
|
get_tlsclient_identity_key(),
|
|
NULL,
|
|
MAX_SSL_KEY_LIFETIME) < 0) {
|
|
log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error creating TLS context for Tor client.");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Make sure DataDirectory exists, and is private. */
|
|
if (check_private_dir(options->DataDirectory, CPD_CREATE)) {
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Check the key directory. */
|
|
keydir = get_datadir_fname("keys");
|
|
if (check_private_dir(keydir, CPD_CREATE)) {
|
|
tor_free(keydir);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
tor_free(keydir);
|
|
|
|
/* 1a. Read v3 directory authority key/cert information. */
|
|
memset(v3_digest, 0, sizeof(v3_digest));
|
|
if (authdir_mode_v3(options)) {
|
|
if (init_v3_authority_keys()<0) {
|
|
log_err(LD_GENERAL, "We're configured as a V3 authority, but we "
|
|
"were unable to load our v3 authority keys and certificate! "
|
|
"Use tor-gencert to generate them. Dying.");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
cert = get_my_v3_authority_cert();
|
|
if (cert) {
|
|
crypto_pk_get_digest(get_my_v3_authority_cert()->identity_key,
|
|
v3_digest);
|
|
v3_digest_set = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* 1b. Read identity key. Make it if none is found. */
|
|
keydir = get_datadir_fname2("keys", "secret_id_key");
|
|
log_info(LD_GENERAL,"Reading/making identity key \"%s\"...",keydir);
|
|
prkey = init_key_from_file(keydir, 1, LOG_ERR);
|
|
tor_free(keydir);
|
|
if (!prkey) return -1;
|
|
set_server_identity_key(prkey);
|
|
|
|
/* 1c. If we are configured as a bridge, generate a client key;
|
|
* otherwise, set the server identity key as our client identity
|
|
* key. */
|
|
if (public_server_mode(options)) {
|
|
set_client_identity_key(crypto_pk_dup_key(prkey)); /* set above */
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (!(prkey = crypto_new_pk_env()))
|
|
return -1;
|
|
if (crypto_pk_generate_key(prkey)) {
|
|
crypto_free_pk_env(prkey);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
set_client_identity_key(prkey);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* 2. Read onion key. Make it if none is found. */
|
|
keydir = get_datadir_fname2("keys", "secret_onion_key");
|
|
log_info(LD_GENERAL,"Reading/making onion key \"%s\"...",keydir);
|
|
prkey = init_key_from_file(keydir, 1, LOG_ERR);
|
|
tor_free(keydir);
|
|
if (!prkey) return -1;
|
|
set_onion_key(prkey);
|
|
if (options->command == CMD_RUN_TOR) {
|
|
/* only mess with the state file if we're actually running Tor */
|
|
or_state_t *state = get_or_state();
|
|
if (state->LastRotatedOnionKey > 100 && state->LastRotatedOnionKey < now) {
|
|
/* We allow for some parsing slop, but we don't want to risk accepting
|
|
* values in the distant future. If we did, we might never rotate the
|
|
* onion key. */
|
|
onionkey_set_at = state->LastRotatedOnionKey;
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* We have no LastRotatedOnionKey set; either we just created the key
|
|
* or it's a holdover from 0.1.2.4-alpha-dev or earlier. In either case,
|
|
* start the clock ticking now so that we will eventually rotate it even
|
|
* if we don't stay up for a full MIN_ONION_KEY_LIFETIME. */
|
|
state->LastRotatedOnionKey = onionkey_set_at = now;
|
|
or_state_mark_dirty(state, options->AvoidDiskWrites ?
|
|
time(NULL)+3600 : 0);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
keydir = get_datadir_fname2("keys", "secret_onion_key.old");
|
|
if (!lastonionkey && file_status(keydir) == FN_FILE) {
|
|
prkey = init_key_from_file(keydir, 1, LOG_ERR);
|
|
if (prkey)
|
|
lastonionkey = prkey;
|
|
}
|
|
tor_free(keydir);
|
|
|
|
/* 3. Initialize link key and TLS context. */
|
|
if (tor_tls_context_init(public_server_mode(options),
|
|
get_tlsclient_identity_key(),
|
|
get_server_identity_key(),
|
|
MAX_SSL_KEY_LIFETIME) < 0) {
|
|
log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error initializing TLS context");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
/* 4. Build our router descriptor. */
|
|
/* Must be called after keys are initialized. */
|
|
mydesc = router_get_my_descriptor();
|
|
if (authdir_mode_handles_descs(options, ROUTER_PURPOSE_GENERAL)) {
|
|
const char *m = NULL;
|
|
routerinfo_t *ri;
|
|
/* We need to add our own fingerprint so it gets recognized. */
|
|
if (dirserv_add_own_fingerprint(options->Nickname,
|
|
get_server_identity_key())) {
|
|
log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error adding own fingerprint to approved set");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
if (mydesc) {
|
|
ri = router_parse_entry_from_string(mydesc, NULL, 1, 0, NULL);
|
|
if (!ri) {
|
|
log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Generated a routerinfo we couldn't parse.");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
if (!WRA_WAS_ADDED(dirserv_add_descriptor(ri, &m, "self"))) {
|
|
log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Unable to add own descriptor to directory: %s",
|
|
m?m:"<unknown error>");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* 5. Dump fingerprint to 'fingerprint' */
|
|
keydir = get_datadir_fname("fingerprint");
|
|
log_info(LD_GENERAL,"Dumping fingerprint to \"%s\"...",keydir);
|
|
if (crypto_pk_get_fingerprint(get_server_identity_key(),
|
|
fingerprint, 0) < 0) {
|
|
log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error computing fingerprint");
|
|
tor_free(keydir);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
tor_assert(strlen(options->Nickname) <= MAX_NICKNAME_LEN);
|
|
if (tor_snprintf(fingerprint_line, sizeof(fingerprint_line),
|
|
"%s %s\n",options->Nickname, fingerprint) < 0) {
|
|
log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error writing fingerprint line");
|
|
tor_free(keydir);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Check whether we need to write the fingerprint file. */
|
|
cp = NULL;
|
|
if (file_status(keydir) == FN_FILE)
|
|
cp = read_file_to_str(keydir, 0, NULL);
|
|
if (!cp || strcmp(cp, fingerprint_line)) {
|
|
if (write_str_to_file(keydir, fingerprint_line, 0)) {
|
|
log_err(LD_FS, "Error writing fingerprint line to file");
|
|
tor_free(keydir);
|
|
tor_free(cp);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
tor_free(cp);
|
|
tor_free(keydir);
|
|
|
|
log(LOG_NOTICE, LD_GENERAL,
|
|
"Your Tor server's identity key fingerprint is '%s %s'",
|
|
options->Nickname, fingerprint);
|
|
if (!authdir_mode(options))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
/* 6. [authdirserver only] load approved-routers file */
|
|
if (dirserv_load_fingerprint_file() < 0) {
|
|
log_err(LD_GENERAL,"Error loading fingerprints");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
/* 6b. [authdirserver only] add own key to approved directories. */
|
|
crypto_pk_get_digest(get_server_identity_key(), digest);
|
|
type = ((options->V1AuthoritativeDir ? V1_DIRINFO : NO_DIRINFO) |
|
|
(options->V2AuthoritativeDir ? V2_DIRINFO : NO_DIRINFO) |
|
|
(options->V3AuthoritativeDir ?
|
|
(V3_DIRINFO|MICRODESC_DIRINFO|EXTRAINFO_DIRINFO) : NO_DIRINFO) |
|
|
(options->BridgeAuthoritativeDir ? BRIDGE_DIRINFO : NO_DIRINFO) |
|
|
(options->HSAuthoritativeDir ? HIDSERV_DIRINFO : NO_DIRINFO));
|
|
|
|
ds = router_get_trusteddirserver_by_digest(digest);
|
|
if (!ds) {
|
|
ds = add_trusted_dir_server(options->Nickname, NULL,
|
|
(uint16_t)options->DirPort,
|
|
(uint16_t)options->ORPort,
|
|
digest,
|
|
v3_digest,
|
|
type);
|
|
if (!ds) {
|
|
log_err(LD_GENERAL,"We want to be a directory authority, but we "
|
|
"couldn't add ourselves to the authority list. Failing.");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if (ds->type != type) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_DIR, "Configured authority type does not match authority "
|
|
"type in DirServer list. Adjusting. (%d v %d)",
|
|
type, ds->type);
|
|
ds->type = type;
|
|
}
|
|
if (v3_digest_set && (ds->type & V3_DIRINFO) &&
|
|
tor_memneq(v3_digest, ds->v3_identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN)) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_DIR, "V3 identity key does not match identity declared in "
|
|
"DirServer line. Adjusting.");
|
|
memcpy(ds->v3_identity_digest, v3_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (cert) { /* add my own cert to the list of known certs */
|
|
log_info(LD_DIR, "adding my own v3 cert");
|
|
if (trusted_dirs_load_certs_from_string(
|
|
cert->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body, 0, 0)<0) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_DIR, "Unable to parse my own v3 cert! Failing.");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0; /* success */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Keep track of whether we should upload our server descriptor,
|
|
* and what type of server we are.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/** Whether we can reach our ORPort from the outside. */
|
|
static int can_reach_or_port = 0;
|
|
/** Whether we can reach our DirPort from the outside. */
|
|
static int can_reach_dir_port = 0;
|
|
|
|
/** Forget what we have learned about our reachability status. */
|
|
void
|
|
router_reset_reachability(void)
|
|
{
|
|
can_reach_or_port = can_reach_dir_port = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Return 1 if ORPort is known reachable; else return 0. */
|
|
int
|
|
check_whether_orport_reachable(void)
|
|
{
|
|
or_options_t *options = get_options();
|
|
return options->AssumeReachable ||
|
|
can_reach_or_port;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Return 1 if we don't have a dirport configured, or if it's reachable. */
|
|
int
|
|
check_whether_dirport_reachable(void)
|
|
{
|
|
or_options_t *options = get_options();
|
|
return !options->DirPort ||
|
|
options->AssumeReachable ||
|
|
we_are_hibernating() ||
|
|
can_reach_dir_port;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Look at a variety of factors, and return 0 if we don't want to
|
|
* advertise the fact that we have a DirPort open. Else return the
|
|
* DirPort we want to advertise.
|
|
*
|
|
* Log a helpful message if we change our mind about whether to publish
|
|
* a DirPort.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
decide_to_advertise_dirport(or_options_t *options, uint16_t dir_port)
|
|
{
|
|
static int advertising=1; /* start out assuming we will advertise */
|
|
int new_choice=1;
|
|
const char *reason = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* Section one: reasons to publish or not publish that aren't
|
|
* worth mentioning to the user, either because they're obvious
|
|
* or because they're normal behavior. */
|
|
|
|
if (!dir_port) /* short circuit the rest of the function */
|
|
return 0;
|
|
if (authdir_mode(options)) /* always publish */
|
|
return dir_port;
|
|
if (we_are_hibernating())
|
|
return 0;
|
|
if (!check_whether_dirport_reachable())
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Section two: reasons to publish or not publish that the user
|
|
* might find surprising. These are generally config options that
|
|
* make us choose not to publish. */
|
|
|
|
if (accounting_is_enabled(options)) {
|
|
/* if we might potentially hibernate */
|
|
new_choice = 0;
|
|
reason = "AccountingMax enabled";
|
|
#define MIN_BW_TO_ADVERTISE_DIRPORT 51200
|
|
} else if (options->BandwidthRate < MIN_BW_TO_ADVERTISE_DIRPORT ||
|
|
(options->RelayBandwidthRate > 0 &&
|
|
options->RelayBandwidthRate < MIN_BW_TO_ADVERTISE_DIRPORT)) {
|
|
/* if we're advertising a small amount */
|
|
new_choice = 0;
|
|
reason = "BandwidthRate under 50KB";
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (advertising != new_choice) {
|
|
if (new_choice == 1) {
|
|
log(LOG_NOTICE, LD_DIR, "Advertising DirPort as %d", dir_port);
|
|
} else {
|
|
tor_assert(reason);
|
|
log(LOG_NOTICE, LD_DIR, "Not advertising DirPort (Reason: %s)", reason);
|
|
}
|
|
advertising = new_choice;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return advertising ? dir_port : 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Some time has passed, or we just got new directory information.
|
|
* See if we currently believe our ORPort or DirPort to be
|
|
* unreachable. If so, launch a new test for it.
|
|
*
|
|
* For ORPort, we simply try making a circuit that ends at ourselves.
|
|
* Success is noticed in onionskin_answer().
|
|
*
|
|
* For DirPort, we make a connection via Tor to our DirPort and ask
|
|
* for our own server descriptor.
|
|
* Success is noticed in connection_dir_client_reached_eof().
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
consider_testing_reachability(int test_or, int test_dir)
|
|
{
|
|
const routerinfo_t *me = router_get_my_routerinfo();
|
|
int orport_reachable = check_whether_orport_reachable();
|
|
tor_addr_t addr;
|
|
or_options_t *options = get_options();
|
|
if (!me)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
if (routerset_contains_router(options->ExcludeNodes, me, -1) &&
|
|
options->StrictNodes) {
|
|
/* If we've excluded ourself, and StrictNodes is set, we can't test
|
|
* ourself. */
|
|
if (test_or || test_dir) {
|
|
#define SELF_EXCLUDED_WARN_INTERVAL 3600
|
|
static ratelim_t warning_limit=RATELIM_INIT(SELF_EXCLUDED_WARN_INTERVAL);
|
|
char *msg;
|
|
if ((msg = rate_limit_log(&warning_limit, approx_time()))) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_CIRC, "Can't peform self-tests for this relay: we have "
|
|
"listed ourself in ExcludeNodes, and StrictNodes is set. "
|
|
"We cannot learn whether we are usable, and will not "
|
|
"be able to advertise ourself.%s", msg);
|
|
tor_free(msg);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (test_or && (!orport_reachable || !circuit_enough_testing_circs())) {
|
|
extend_info_t *ei;
|
|
log_info(LD_CIRC, "Testing %s of my ORPort: %s:%d.",
|
|
!orport_reachable ? "reachability" : "bandwidth",
|
|
me->address, me->or_port);
|
|
ei = extend_info_from_router(me);
|
|
circuit_launch_by_extend_info(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING, ei,
|
|
CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_CAPACITY|CIRCLAUNCH_IS_INTERNAL);
|
|
extend_info_free(ei);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&addr, me->addr);
|
|
if (test_dir && !check_whether_dirport_reachable() &&
|
|
!connection_get_by_type_addr_port_purpose(
|
|
CONN_TYPE_DIR, &addr, me->dir_port,
|
|
DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_SERVERDESC)) {
|
|
/* ask myself, via tor, for my server descriptor. */
|
|
directory_initiate_command(me->address, &addr,
|
|
me->or_port, me->dir_port,
|
|
0, /* does not matter */
|
|
0, me->cache_info.identity_digest,
|
|
DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_SERVERDESC,
|
|
ROUTER_PURPOSE_GENERAL,
|
|
1, "authority.z", NULL, 0, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Annotate that we found our ORPort reachable. */
|
|
void
|
|
router_orport_found_reachable(void)
|
|
{
|
|
const routerinfo_t *me = router_get_my_routerinfo();
|
|
if (!can_reach_or_port && me) {
|
|
log_notice(LD_OR,"Self-testing indicates your ORPort is reachable from "
|
|
"the outside. Excellent.%s",
|
|
get_options()->_PublishServerDescriptor != NO_DIRINFO ?
|
|
" Publishing server descriptor." : "");
|
|
can_reach_or_port = 1;
|
|
mark_my_descriptor_dirty();
|
|
control_event_server_status(LOG_NOTICE,
|
|
"REACHABILITY_SUCCEEDED ORADDRESS=%s:%d",
|
|
me->address, me->or_port);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Annotate that we found our DirPort reachable. */
|
|
void
|
|
router_dirport_found_reachable(void)
|
|
{
|
|
const routerinfo_t *me = router_get_my_routerinfo();
|
|
if (!can_reach_dir_port && me) {
|
|
log_notice(LD_DIRSERV,"Self-testing indicates your DirPort is reachable "
|
|
"from the outside. Excellent.");
|
|
can_reach_dir_port = 1;
|
|
if (decide_to_advertise_dirport(get_options(), me->dir_port))
|
|
mark_my_descriptor_dirty();
|
|
control_event_server_status(LOG_NOTICE,
|
|
"REACHABILITY_SUCCEEDED DIRADDRESS=%s:%d",
|
|
me->address, me->dir_port);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** We have enough testing circuits open. Send a bunch of "drop"
|
|
* cells down each of them, to exercise our bandwidth. */
|
|
void
|
|
router_perform_bandwidth_test(int num_circs, time_t now)
|
|
{
|
|
int num_cells = (int)(get_options()->BandwidthRate * 10 / CELL_NETWORK_SIZE);
|
|
int max_cells = num_cells < CIRCWINDOW_START ?
|
|
num_cells : CIRCWINDOW_START;
|
|
int cells_per_circuit = max_cells / num_circs;
|
|
origin_circuit_t *circ = NULL;
|
|
|
|
log_notice(LD_OR,"Performing bandwidth self-test...done.");
|
|
while ((circ = circuit_get_next_by_pk_and_purpose(circ, NULL,
|
|
CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING))) {
|
|
/* dump cells_per_circuit drop cells onto this circ */
|
|
int i = cells_per_circuit;
|
|
if (circ->_base.state != CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN)
|
|
continue;
|
|
circ->_base.timestamp_dirty = now;
|
|
while (i-- > 0) {
|
|
if (relay_send_command_from_edge(0, TO_CIRCUIT(circ),
|
|
RELAY_COMMAND_DROP,
|
|
NULL, 0, circ->cpath->prev)<0) {
|
|
return; /* stop if error */
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Return true iff we believe ourselves to be an authoritative
|
|
* directory server.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
authdir_mode(or_options_t *options)
|
|
{
|
|
return options->AuthoritativeDir != 0;
|
|
}
|
|
/** Return true iff we believe ourselves to be a v1 authoritative
|
|
* directory server.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
authdir_mode_v1(or_options_t *options)
|
|
{
|
|
return authdir_mode(options) && options->V1AuthoritativeDir != 0;
|
|
}
|
|
/** Return true iff we believe ourselves to be a v2 authoritative
|
|
* directory server.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
authdir_mode_v2(or_options_t *options)
|
|
{
|
|
return authdir_mode(options) && options->V2AuthoritativeDir != 0;
|
|
}
|
|
/** Return true iff we believe ourselves to be a v3 authoritative
|
|
* directory server.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
authdir_mode_v3(or_options_t *options)
|
|
{
|
|
return authdir_mode(options) && options->V3AuthoritativeDir != 0;
|
|
}
|
|
/** Return true iff we are a v1, v2, or v3 directory authority. */
|
|
int
|
|
authdir_mode_any_main(or_options_t *options)
|
|
{
|
|
return options->V1AuthoritativeDir ||
|
|
options->V2AuthoritativeDir ||
|
|
options->V3AuthoritativeDir;
|
|
}
|
|
/** Return true if we believe ourselves to be any kind of
|
|
* authoritative directory beyond just a hidserv authority. */
|
|
int
|
|
authdir_mode_any_nonhidserv(or_options_t *options)
|
|
{
|
|
return options->BridgeAuthoritativeDir ||
|
|
authdir_mode_any_main(options);
|
|
}
|
|
/** Return true iff we are an authoritative directory server that is
|
|
* authoritative about receiving and serving descriptors of type
|
|
* <b>purpose</b> its dirport. Use -1 for "any purpose". */
|
|
int
|
|
authdir_mode_handles_descs(or_options_t *options, int purpose)
|
|
{
|
|
if (purpose < 0)
|
|
return authdir_mode_any_nonhidserv(options);
|
|
else if (purpose == ROUTER_PURPOSE_GENERAL)
|
|
return authdir_mode_any_main(options);
|
|
else if (purpose == ROUTER_PURPOSE_BRIDGE)
|
|
return (options->BridgeAuthoritativeDir);
|
|
else
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
/** Return true iff we are an authoritative directory server that
|
|
* publishes its own network statuses.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
authdir_mode_publishes_statuses(or_options_t *options)
|
|
{
|
|
if (authdir_mode_bridge(options))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return authdir_mode_any_nonhidserv(options);
|
|
}
|
|
/** Return true iff we are an authoritative directory server that
|
|
* tests reachability of the descriptors it learns about.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
authdir_mode_tests_reachability(or_options_t *options)
|
|
{
|
|
return authdir_mode_handles_descs(options, -1);
|
|
}
|
|
/** Return true iff we believe ourselves to be a bridge authoritative
|
|
* directory server.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
authdir_mode_bridge(or_options_t *options)
|
|
{
|
|
return authdir_mode(options) && options->BridgeAuthoritativeDir != 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Return true iff we are trying to be a server.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
server_mode(or_options_t *options)
|
|
{
|
|
if (options->ClientOnly) return 0;
|
|
return (options->ORPort != 0 || options->ORListenAddress);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Return true iff we are trying to be a non-bridge server.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
public_server_mode(or_options_t *options)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!server_mode(options)) return 0;
|
|
return (!options->BridgeRelay);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Return true iff the combination of options in <b>options</b> and parameters
|
|
* in the consensus mean that we don't want to allow exits from circuits
|
|
* we got from addresses not known to be servers. */
|
|
int
|
|
should_refuse_unknown_exits(or_options_t *options)
|
|
{
|
|
if (options->RefuseUnknownExits != -1) {
|
|
return options->RefuseUnknownExits;
|
|
} else {
|
|
return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "refuseunknownexits", 1, 0, 1);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Remember if we've advertised ourselves to the dirservers. */
|
|
static int server_is_advertised=0;
|
|
|
|
/** Return true iff we have published our descriptor lately.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
advertised_server_mode(void)
|
|
{
|
|
return server_is_advertised;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Called with a boolean: set whether we have recently published our
|
|
* descriptor.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void
|
|
set_server_advertised(int s)
|
|
{
|
|
server_is_advertised = s;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Return true iff we are trying to be a socks proxy. */
|
|
int
|
|
proxy_mode(or_options_t *options)
|
|
{
|
|
return (options->SocksPort != 0 ||
|
|
options->TransPort != 0 ||
|
|
options->NATDPort != 0 ||
|
|
options->DNSPort != 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Decide if we're a publishable server. We are a publishable server if:
|
|
* - We don't have the ClientOnly option set
|
|
* and
|
|
* - We have the PublishServerDescriptor option set to non-empty
|
|
* and
|
|
* - We have ORPort set
|
|
* and
|
|
* - We believe we are reachable from the outside; or
|
|
* - We are an authoritative directory server.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
decide_if_publishable_server(void)
|
|
{
|
|
or_options_t *options = get_options();
|
|
|
|
if (options->ClientOnly)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
if (options->_PublishServerDescriptor == NO_DIRINFO)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
if (!server_mode(options))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
if (authdir_mode(options))
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
|
return check_whether_orport_reachable();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Initiate server descriptor upload as reasonable (if server is publishable,
|
|
* etc). <b>force</b> is as for router_upload_dir_desc_to_dirservers.
|
|
*
|
|
* We need to rebuild the descriptor if it's dirty even if we're not
|
|
* uploading, because our reachability testing *uses* our descriptor to
|
|
* determine what IP address and ports to test.
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
consider_publishable_server(int force)
|
|
{
|
|
int rebuilt;
|
|
|
|
if (!server_mode(get_options()))
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
rebuilt = router_rebuild_descriptor(0);
|
|
if (decide_if_publishable_server()) {
|
|
set_server_advertised(1);
|
|
if (rebuilt == 0)
|
|
router_upload_dir_desc_to_dirservers(force);
|
|
} else {
|
|
set_server_advertised(0);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* OR descriptor generation.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/** My routerinfo. */
|
|
static routerinfo_t *desc_routerinfo = NULL;
|
|
/** My extrainfo */
|
|
static extrainfo_t *desc_extrainfo = NULL;
|
|
/** Since when has our descriptor been "clean"? 0 if we need to regenerate it
|
|
* now. */
|
|
static time_t desc_clean_since = 0;
|
|
/** Boolean: do we need to regenerate the above? */
|
|
static int desc_needs_upload = 0;
|
|
|
|
/** OR only: If <b>force</b> is true, or we haven't uploaded this
|
|
* descriptor successfully yet, try to upload our signed descriptor to
|
|
* all the directory servers we know about.
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
router_upload_dir_desc_to_dirservers(int force)
|
|
{
|
|
const routerinfo_t *ri;
|
|
extrainfo_t *ei;
|
|
char *msg;
|
|
size_t desc_len, extra_len = 0, total_len;
|
|
dirinfo_type_t auth = get_options()->_PublishServerDescriptor;
|
|
|
|
ri = router_get_my_routerinfo();
|
|
if (!ri) {
|
|
log_info(LD_GENERAL, "No descriptor; skipping upload");
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
ei = router_get_my_extrainfo();
|
|
if (auth == NO_DIRINFO)
|
|
return;
|
|
if (!force && !desc_needs_upload)
|
|
return;
|
|
desc_needs_upload = 0;
|
|
|
|
desc_len = ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len;
|
|
extra_len = ei ? ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len : 0;
|
|
total_len = desc_len + extra_len + 1;
|
|
msg = tor_malloc(total_len);
|
|
memcpy(msg, ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body, desc_len);
|
|
if (ei) {
|
|
memcpy(msg+desc_len, ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body, extra_len);
|
|
}
|
|
msg[desc_len+extra_len] = 0;
|
|
|
|
directory_post_to_dirservers(DIR_PURPOSE_UPLOAD_DIR,
|
|
(auth & BRIDGE_DIRINFO) ?
|
|
ROUTER_PURPOSE_BRIDGE :
|
|
ROUTER_PURPOSE_GENERAL,
|
|
auth, msg, desc_len, extra_len);
|
|
tor_free(msg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** OR only: Check whether my exit policy says to allow connection to
|
|
* conn. Return 0 if we accept; non-0 if we reject.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
router_compare_to_my_exit_policy(edge_connection_t *conn)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!router_get_my_routerinfo()) /* make sure desc_routerinfo exists */
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
/* make sure it's resolved to something. this way we can't get a
|
|
'maybe' below. */
|
|
if (tor_addr_is_null(&conn->_base.addr))
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
/* XXXX IPv6 */
|
|
if (tor_addr_family(&conn->_base.addr) != AF_INET)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
return compare_tor_addr_to_addr_policy(&conn->_base.addr, conn->_base.port,
|
|
desc_routerinfo->exit_policy) != ADDR_POLICY_ACCEPTED;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Return true iff my exit policy is reject *:*. Return -1 if we don't
|
|
* have a descriptor */
|
|
int
|
|
router_my_exit_policy_is_reject_star(void)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!router_get_my_routerinfo()) /* make sure desc_routerinfo exists */
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
return desc_routerinfo->policy_is_reject_star;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Return true iff I'm a server and <b>digest</b> is equal to
|
|
* my server identity key digest. */
|
|
int
|
|
router_digest_is_me(const char *digest)
|
|
{
|
|
return (server_identitykey &&
|
|
tor_memeq(server_identitykey_digest, digest, DIGEST_LEN));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Return true iff I'm a server and <b>digest</b> is equal to
|
|
* my identity digest. */
|
|
int
|
|
router_extrainfo_digest_is_me(const char *digest)
|
|
{
|
|
extrainfo_t *ei = router_get_my_extrainfo();
|
|
if (!ei)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
return tor_memeq(digest,
|
|
ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_digest,
|
|
DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** A wrapper around router_digest_is_me(). */
|
|
int
|
|
router_is_me(const routerinfo_t *router)
|
|
{
|
|
return router_digest_is_me(router->cache_info.identity_digest);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Return true iff <b>fp</b> is a hex fingerprint of my identity digest. */
|
|
int
|
|
router_fingerprint_is_me(const char *fp)
|
|
{
|
|
char digest[DIGEST_LEN];
|
|
if (strlen(fp) == HEX_DIGEST_LEN &&
|
|
base16_decode(digest, sizeof(digest), fp, HEX_DIGEST_LEN) == 0)
|
|
return router_digest_is_me(digest);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Return a routerinfo for this OR, rebuilding a fresh one if
|
|
* necessary. Return NULL on error, or if called on an OP. */
|
|
const routerinfo_t *
|
|
router_get_my_routerinfo(void)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!server_mode(get_options()))
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
if (router_rebuild_descriptor(0))
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
return desc_routerinfo;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** OR only: Return a signed server descriptor for this OR, rebuilding a fresh
|
|
* one if necessary. Return NULL on error.
|
|
*/
|
|
const char *
|
|
router_get_my_descriptor(void)
|
|
{
|
|
const char *body;
|
|
if (!router_get_my_routerinfo())
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
/* Make sure this is nul-terminated. */
|
|
tor_assert(desc_routerinfo->cache_info.saved_location == SAVED_NOWHERE);
|
|
body = signed_descriptor_get_body(&desc_routerinfo->cache_info);
|
|
tor_assert(!body[desc_routerinfo->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len]);
|
|
log_debug(LD_GENERAL,"my desc is '%s'", body);
|
|
return body;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Return the extrainfo document for this OR, or NULL if we have none.
|
|
* Rebuilt it (and the server descriptor) if necessary. */
|
|
extrainfo_t *
|
|
router_get_my_extrainfo(void)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!server_mode(get_options()))
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
if (router_rebuild_descriptor(0))
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
return desc_extrainfo;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** A list of nicknames that we've warned about including in our family
|
|
* declaration verbatim rather than as digests. */
|
|
static smartlist_t *warned_nonexistent_family = NULL;
|
|
|
|
static int router_guess_address_from_dir_headers(uint32_t *guess);
|
|
|
|
/** Make a current best guess at our address, either because
|
|
* it's configured in torrc, or because we've learned it from
|
|
* dirserver headers. Place the answer in *<b>addr</b> and return
|
|
* 0 on success, else return -1 if we have no guess. */
|
|
int
|
|
router_pick_published_address(or_options_t *options, uint32_t *addr)
|
|
{
|
|
if (resolve_my_address(LOG_INFO, options, addr, NULL) < 0) {
|
|
log_info(LD_CONFIG, "Could not determine our address locally. "
|
|
"Checking if directory headers provide any hints.");
|
|
if (router_guess_address_from_dir_headers(addr) < 0) {
|
|
log_info(LD_CONFIG, "No hints from directory headers either. "
|
|
"Will try again later.");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
log_info(LD_CONFIG,"Success: chose address '%s'.", fmt_addr32(*addr));
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** If <b>force</b> is true, or our descriptor is out-of-date, rebuild a fresh
|
|
* routerinfo, signed server descriptor, and extra-info document for this OR.
|
|
* Return 0 on success, -1 on temporary error.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
router_rebuild_descriptor(int force)
|
|
{
|
|
routerinfo_t *ri;
|
|
extrainfo_t *ei;
|
|
uint32_t addr;
|
|
char platform[256];
|
|
int hibernating = we_are_hibernating();
|
|
or_options_t *options = get_options();
|
|
|
|
if (desc_clean_since && !force)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
if (router_pick_published_address(options, &addr) < 0) {
|
|
/* Stop trying to rebuild our descriptor every second. We'll
|
|
* learn that it's time to try again when ip_address_changed()
|
|
* marks it dirty. */
|
|
desc_clean_since = time(NULL);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ri = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(routerinfo_t));
|
|
ri->cache_info.routerlist_index = -1;
|
|
ri->address = tor_dup_ip(addr);
|
|
ri->nickname = tor_strdup(options->Nickname);
|
|
ri->addr = addr;
|
|
ri->or_port = options->ORPort;
|
|
ri->dir_port = options->DirPort;
|
|
ri->cache_info.published_on = time(NULL);
|
|
ri->onion_pkey = crypto_pk_dup_key(get_onion_key()); /* must invoke from
|
|
* main thread */
|
|
ri->identity_pkey = crypto_pk_dup_key(get_server_identity_key());
|
|
if (crypto_pk_get_digest(ri->identity_pkey,
|
|
ri->cache_info.identity_digest)<0) {
|
|
routerinfo_free(ri);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
get_platform_str(platform, sizeof(platform));
|
|
ri->platform = tor_strdup(platform);
|
|
|
|
/* compute ri->bandwidthrate as the min of various options */
|
|
ri->bandwidthrate = get_effective_bwrate(options);
|
|
|
|
/* and compute ri->bandwidthburst similarly */
|
|
ri->bandwidthburst = get_effective_bwburst(options);
|
|
|
|
ri->bandwidthcapacity = hibernating ? 0 : rep_hist_bandwidth_assess();
|
|
|
|
if (dns_seems_to_be_broken() || has_dns_init_failed()) {
|
|
/* DNS is screwed up; don't claim to be an exit. */
|
|
policies_exit_policy_append_reject_star(&ri->exit_policy);
|
|
} else {
|
|
policies_parse_exit_policy(options->ExitPolicy, &ri->exit_policy,
|
|
options->ExitPolicyRejectPrivate,
|
|
ri->address, !options->BridgeRelay);
|
|
}
|
|
ri->policy_is_reject_star =
|
|
policy_is_reject_star(ri->exit_policy);
|
|
|
|
#if 0
|
|
/* XXXX NM NM I belive this is safe to remove */
|
|
if (authdir_mode(options))
|
|
ri->is_valid = ri->is_named = 1; /* believe in yourself */
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if (options->MyFamily) {
|
|
smartlist_t *family;
|
|
if (!warned_nonexistent_family)
|
|
warned_nonexistent_family = smartlist_create();
|
|
family = smartlist_create();
|
|
ri->declared_family = smartlist_create();
|
|
smartlist_split_string(family, options->MyFamily, ",",
|
|
SPLIT_SKIP_SPACE|SPLIT_SKIP_SPACE|SPLIT_IGNORE_BLANK, 0);
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(family, char *, name) {
|
|
const node_t *member;
|
|
if (!strcasecmp(name, options->Nickname))
|
|
goto skip; /* Don't list ourself, that's redundant */
|
|
else
|
|
member = node_get_by_nickname(name, 1);
|
|
if (!member) {
|
|
int is_legal = is_legal_nickname_or_hexdigest(name);
|
|
if (!smartlist_string_isin(warned_nonexistent_family, name) &&
|
|
!is_legal_hexdigest(name)) {
|
|
if (is_legal)
|
|
log_warn(LD_CONFIG,
|
|
"I have no descriptor for the router named \"%s\" in my "
|
|
"declared family; I'll use the nickname as is, but "
|
|
"this may confuse clients.", name);
|
|
else
|
|
log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "There is a router named \"%s\" in my "
|
|
"declared family, but that isn't a legal nickname. "
|
|
"Skipping it.", escaped(name));
|
|
smartlist_add(warned_nonexistent_family, tor_strdup(name));
|
|
}
|
|
if (is_legal) {
|
|
smartlist_add(ri->declared_family, name);
|
|
name = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
} else if (router_digest_is_me(member->identity)) {
|
|
/* Don't list ourself in our own family; that's redundant */
|
|
/* XXX shouldn't be possible */
|
|
} else {
|
|
char *fp = tor_malloc(HEX_DIGEST_LEN+2);
|
|
fp[0] = '$';
|
|
base16_encode(fp+1,HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1,
|
|
member->identity, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
smartlist_add(ri->declared_family, fp);
|
|
if (smartlist_string_isin(warned_nonexistent_family, name))
|
|
smartlist_string_remove(warned_nonexistent_family, name);
|
|
}
|
|
skip:
|
|
tor_free(name);
|
|
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(name);
|
|
|
|
/* remove duplicates from the list */
|
|
smartlist_sort_strings(ri->declared_family);
|
|
smartlist_uniq_strings(ri->declared_family);
|
|
|
|
smartlist_free(family);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Now generate the extrainfo. */
|
|
ei = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(extrainfo_t));
|
|
ei->cache_info.is_extrainfo = 1;
|
|
strlcpy(ei->nickname, get_options()->Nickname, sizeof(ei->nickname));
|
|
ei->cache_info.published_on = ri->cache_info.published_on;
|
|
memcpy(ei->cache_info.identity_digest, ri->cache_info.identity_digest,
|
|
DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
if (extrainfo_dump_to_string(&ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body,
|
|
ei, get_server_identity_key()) < 0) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't generate extra-info descriptor.");
|
|
extrainfo_free(ei);
|
|
ei = NULL;
|
|
} else {
|
|
ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len =
|
|
strlen(ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body);
|
|
router_get_extrainfo_hash(ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body,
|
|
ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_digest);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Now finish the router descriptor. */
|
|
if (ei) {
|
|
memcpy(ri->cache_info.extra_info_digest,
|
|
ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_digest,
|
|
DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* ri was allocated with tor_malloc_zero, so there is no need to
|
|
* zero ri->cache_info.extra_info_digest here. */
|
|
}
|
|
ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body = tor_malloc(8192);
|
|
if (router_dump_router_to_string(ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body, 8192,
|
|
ri, get_server_identity_key()) < 0) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't generate router descriptor.");
|
|
routerinfo_free(ri);
|
|
extrainfo_free(ei);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_len =
|
|
strlen(ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body);
|
|
|
|
ri->purpose =
|
|
options->BridgeRelay ? ROUTER_PURPOSE_BRIDGE : ROUTER_PURPOSE_GENERAL;
|
|
ri->cache_info.send_unencrypted = 1;
|
|
/* Let bridges serve their own descriptors unencrypted, so they can
|
|
* pass reachability testing. (If they want to be harder to notice,
|
|
* they can always leave the DirPort off). */
|
|
if (ei && !options->BridgeRelay)
|
|
ei->cache_info.send_unencrypted = 1;
|
|
|
|
router_get_router_hash(ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body,
|
|
strlen(ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_body),
|
|
ri->cache_info.signed_descriptor_digest);
|
|
|
|
if (ei) {
|
|
tor_assert(! routerinfo_incompatible_with_extrainfo(ri, ei, NULL, NULL));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
routerinfo_free(desc_routerinfo);
|
|
desc_routerinfo = ri;
|
|
extrainfo_free(desc_extrainfo);
|
|
desc_extrainfo = ei;
|
|
|
|
desc_clean_since = time(NULL);
|
|
desc_needs_upload = 1;
|
|
control_event_my_descriptor_changed();
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Mark descriptor out of date if it's older than <b>when</b> */
|
|
void
|
|
mark_my_descriptor_dirty_if_older_than(time_t when)
|
|
{
|
|
if (desc_clean_since < when)
|
|
mark_my_descriptor_dirty();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Call when the current descriptor is out of date. */
|
|
void
|
|
mark_my_descriptor_dirty(void)
|
|
{
|
|
desc_clean_since = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** How frequently will we republish our descriptor because of large (factor
|
|
* of 2) shifts in estimated bandwidth? */
|
|
#define MAX_BANDWIDTH_CHANGE_FREQ (20*60)
|
|
|
|
/** Check whether bandwidth has changed a lot since the last time we announced
|
|
* bandwidth. If so, mark our descriptor dirty. */
|
|
void
|
|
check_descriptor_bandwidth_changed(time_t now)
|
|
{
|
|
static time_t last_changed = 0;
|
|
uint64_t prev, cur;
|
|
if (!desc_routerinfo)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
prev = desc_routerinfo->bandwidthcapacity;
|
|
cur = we_are_hibernating() ? 0 : rep_hist_bandwidth_assess();
|
|
if ((prev != cur && (!prev || !cur)) ||
|
|
cur > prev*2 ||
|
|
cur < prev/2) {
|
|
if (last_changed+MAX_BANDWIDTH_CHANGE_FREQ < now) {
|
|
log_info(LD_GENERAL,
|
|
"Measured bandwidth has changed; rebuilding descriptor.");
|
|
mark_my_descriptor_dirty();
|
|
last_changed = now;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Note at log level severity that our best guess of address has changed from
|
|
* <b>prev</b> to <b>cur</b>. */
|
|
static void
|
|
log_addr_has_changed(int severity, uint32_t prev, uint32_t cur,
|
|
const char *source)
|
|
{
|
|
char addrbuf_prev[INET_NTOA_BUF_LEN];
|
|
char addrbuf_cur[INET_NTOA_BUF_LEN];
|
|
struct in_addr in_prev;
|
|
struct in_addr in_cur;
|
|
|
|
in_prev.s_addr = htonl(prev);
|
|
tor_inet_ntoa(&in_prev, addrbuf_prev, sizeof(addrbuf_prev));
|
|
|
|
in_cur.s_addr = htonl(cur);
|
|
tor_inet_ntoa(&in_cur, addrbuf_cur, sizeof(addrbuf_cur));
|
|
|
|
if (prev)
|
|
log_fn(severity, LD_GENERAL,
|
|
"Our IP Address has changed from %s to %s; "
|
|
"rebuilding descriptor (source: %s).",
|
|
addrbuf_prev, addrbuf_cur, source);
|
|
else
|
|
log_notice(LD_GENERAL,
|
|
"Guessed our IP address as %s (source: %s).",
|
|
addrbuf_cur, source);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Check whether our own address as defined by the Address configuration
|
|
* has changed. This is for routers that get their address from a service
|
|
* like dyndns. If our address has changed, mark our descriptor dirty. */
|
|
void
|
|
check_descriptor_ipaddress_changed(time_t now)
|
|
{
|
|
uint32_t prev, cur;
|
|
or_options_t *options = get_options();
|
|
(void) now;
|
|
|
|
if (!desc_routerinfo)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
prev = desc_routerinfo->addr;
|
|
if (resolve_my_address(LOG_INFO, options, &cur, NULL) < 0) {
|
|
log_info(LD_CONFIG,"options->Address didn't resolve into an IP.");
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (prev != cur) {
|
|
log_addr_has_changed(LOG_NOTICE, prev, cur, "resolve");
|
|
ip_address_changed(0);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** The most recently guessed value of our IP address, based on directory
|
|
* headers. */
|
|
static uint32_t last_guessed_ip = 0;
|
|
|
|
/** A directory server <b>d_conn</b> told us our IP address is
|
|
* <b>suggestion</b>.
|
|
* If this address is different from the one we think we are now, and
|
|
* if our computer doesn't actually know its IP address, then switch. */
|
|
void
|
|
router_new_address_suggestion(const char *suggestion,
|
|
const dir_connection_t *d_conn)
|
|
{
|
|
uint32_t addr, cur = 0;
|
|
struct in_addr in;
|
|
or_options_t *options = get_options();
|
|
|
|
/* first, learn what the IP address actually is */
|
|
if (!tor_inet_aton(suggestion, &in)) {
|
|
log_debug(LD_DIR, "Malformed X-Your-Address-Is header %s. Ignoring.",
|
|
escaped(suggestion));
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
addr = ntohl(in.s_addr);
|
|
|
|
log_debug(LD_DIR, "Got X-Your-Address-Is: %s.", suggestion);
|
|
|
|
if (!server_mode(options)) {
|
|
last_guessed_ip = addr; /* store it in case we need it later */
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (resolve_my_address(LOG_INFO, options, &cur, NULL) >= 0) {
|
|
/* We're all set -- we already know our address. Great. */
|
|
last_guessed_ip = cur; /* store it in case we need it later */
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
if (is_internal_IP(addr, 0)) {
|
|
/* Don't believe anybody who says our IP is, say, 127.0.0.1. */
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
if (tor_addr_eq_ipv4h(&d_conn->_base.addr, addr)) {
|
|
/* Don't believe anybody who says our IP is their IP. */
|
|
log_debug(LD_DIR, "A directory server told us our IP address is %s, "
|
|
"but he's just reporting his own IP address. Ignoring.",
|
|
suggestion);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Okay. We can't resolve our own address, and X-Your-Address-Is is giving
|
|
* us an answer different from what we had the last time we managed to
|
|
* resolve it. */
|
|
if (last_guessed_ip != addr) {
|
|
control_event_server_status(LOG_NOTICE,
|
|
"EXTERNAL_ADDRESS ADDRESS=%s METHOD=DIRSERV",
|
|
suggestion);
|
|
log_addr_has_changed(LOG_NOTICE, last_guessed_ip, addr,
|
|
d_conn->_base.address);
|
|
ip_address_changed(0);
|
|
last_guessed_ip = addr; /* router_rebuild_descriptor() will fetch it */
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** We failed to resolve our address locally, but we'd like to build
|
|
* a descriptor and publish / test reachability. If we have a guess
|
|
* about our address based on directory headers, answer it and return
|
|
* 0; else return -1. */
|
|
static int
|
|
router_guess_address_from_dir_headers(uint32_t *guess)
|
|
{
|
|
if (last_guessed_ip) {
|
|
*guess = last_guessed_ip;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Set <b>platform</b> (max length <b>len</b>) to a NUL-terminated short
|
|
* string describing the version of Tor and the operating system we're
|
|
* currently running on.
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
get_platform_str(char *platform, size_t len)
|
|
{
|
|
tor_snprintf(platform, len, "Tor %s on %s", get_version(), get_uname());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* XXX need to audit this thing and count fenceposts. maybe
|
|
* refactor so we don't have to keep asking if we're
|
|
* near the end of maxlen?
|
|
*/
|
|
#define DEBUG_ROUTER_DUMP_ROUTER_TO_STRING
|
|
|
|
/** OR only: Given a routerinfo for this router, and an identity key to sign
|
|
* with, encode the routerinfo as a signed server descriptor and write the
|
|
* result into <b>s</b>, using at most <b>maxlen</b> bytes. Return -1 on
|
|
* failure, and the number of bytes used on success.
|
|
*/
|
|
int
|
|
router_dump_router_to_string(char *s, size_t maxlen, routerinfo_t *router,
|
|
crypto_pk_env_t *ident_key)
|
|
{
|
|
char *onion_pkey; /* Onion key, PEM-encoded. */
|
|
char *identity_pkey; /* Identity key, PEM-encoded. */
|
|
char digest[DIGEST_LEN];
|
|
char published[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
|
|
char fingerprint[FINGERPRINT_LEN+1];
|
|
int has_extra_info_digest;
|
|
char extra_info_digest[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
|
|
size_t onion_pkeylen, identity_pkeylen;
|
|
size_t written;
|
|
int result=0;
|
|
addr_policy_t *tmpe;
|
|
char *family_line;
|
|
or_options_t *options = get_options();
|
|
|
|
/* Make sure the identity key matches the one in the routerinfo. */
|
|
if (crypto_pk_cmp_keys(ident_key, router->identity_pkey)) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG,"Tried to sign a router with a private key that didn't "
|
|
"match router's public key!");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* record our fingerprint, so we can include it in the descriptor */
|
|
if (crypto_pk_get_fingerprint(router->identity_pkey, fingerprint, 1)<0) {
|
|
log_err(LD_BUG,"Error computing fingerprint");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* PEM-encode the onion key */
|
|
if (crypto_pk_write_public_key_to_string(router->onion_pkey,
|
|
&onion_pkey,&onion_pkeylen)<0) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG,"write onion_pkey to string failed!");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* PEM-encode the identity key */
|
|
if (crypto_pk_write_public_key_to_string(router->identity_pkey,
|
|
&identity_pkey,&identity_pkeylen)<0) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG,"write identity_pkey to string failed!");
|
|
tor_free(onion_pkey);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Encode the publication time. */
|
|
format_iso_time(published, router->cache_info.published_on);
|
|
|
|
if (router->declared_family && smartlist_len(router->declared_family)) {
|
|
size_t n;
|
|
char *family = smartlist_join_strings(router->declared_family, " ", 0, &n);
|
|
n += strlen("family ") + 2; /* 1 for \n, 1 for \0. */
|
|
family_line = tor_malloc(n);
|
|
tor_snprintf(family_line, n, "family %s\n", family);
|
|
tor_free(family);
|
|
} else {
|
|
family_line = tor_strdup("");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
has_extra_info_digest =
|
|
! tor_digest_is_zero(router->cache_info.extra_info_digest);
|
|
|
|
if (has_extra_info_digest) {
|
|
base16_encode(extra_info_digest, sizeof(extra_info_digest),
|
|
router->cache_info.extra_info_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Generate the easy portion of the router descriptor. */
|
|
result = tor_snprintf(s, maxlen,
|
|
"router %s %s %d 0 %d\n"
|
|
"platform %s\n"
|
|
"opt protocols Link 1 2 Circuit 1\n"
|
|
"published %s\n"
|
|
"opt fingerprint %s\n"
|
|
"uptime %ld\n"
|
|
"bandwidth %d %d %d\n"
|
|
"%s%s%s%s"
|
|
"onion-key\n%s"
|
|
"signing-key\n%s"
|
|
"%s%s%s%s",
|
|
router->nickname,
|
|
router->address,
|
|
router->or_port,
|
|
decide_to_advertise_dirport(options, router->dir_port),
|
|
router->platform,
|
|
published,
|
|
fingerprint,
|
|
stats_n_seconds_working,
|
|
(int) router->bandwidthrate,
|
|
(int) router->bandwidthburst,
|
|
(int) router->bandwidthcapacity,
|
|
has_extra_info_digest ? "opt extra-info-digest " : "",
|
|
has_extra_info_digest ? extra_info_digest : "",
|
|
has_extra_info_digest ? "\n" : "",
|
|
options->DownloadExtraInfo ? "opt caches-extra-info\n" : "",
|
|
onion_pkey, identity_pkey,
|
|
family_line,
|
|
we_are_hibernating() ? "opt hibernating 1\n" : "",
|
|
options->HidServDirectoryV2 ? "opt hidden-service-dir\n" : "",
|
|
options->AllowSingleHopExits ? "opt allow-single-hop-exits\n" : "");
|
|
|
|
tor_free(family_line);
|
|
tor_free(onion_pkey);
|
|
tor_free(identity_pkey);
|
|
|
|
if (result < 0) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG,"descriptor snprintf #1 ran out of room!");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
/* From now on, we use 'written' to remember the current length of 's'. */
|
|
written = result;
|
|
|
|
if (options->ContactInfo && strlen(options->ContactInfo)) {
|
|
const char *ci = options->ContactInfo;
|
|
if (strchr(ci, '\n') || strchr(ci, '\r'))
|
|
ci = escaped(ci);
|
|
result = tor_snprintf(s+written,maxlen-written, "contact %s\n", ci);
|
|
if (result<0) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG,"descriptor snprintf #2 ran out of room!");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
written += result;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Write the exit policy to the end of 's'. */
|
|
if (!router->exit_policy || !smartlist_len(router->exit_policy)) {
|
|
strlcat(s+written, "reject *:*\n", maxlen-written);
|
|
written += strlen("reject *:*\n");
|
|
tmpe = NULL;
|
|
} else if (router->exit_policy) {
|
|
int i;
|
|
for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(router->exit_policy); ++i) {
|
|
tmpe = smartlist_get(router->exit_policy, i);
|
|
result = policy_write_item(s+written, maxlen-written, tmpe, 1);
|
|
if (result < 0) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG,"descriptor policy_write_item ran out of room!");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
tor_assert(result == (int)strlen(s+written));
|
|
written += result;
|
|
if (written+2 > maxlen) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG,"descriptor policy_write_item ran out of room (2)!");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
s[written++] = '\n';
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (written + DIROBJ_MAX_SIG_LEN > maxlen) {
|
|
/* Not enough room for signature. */
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG,"not enough room left in descriptor for signature!");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Sign the descriptor */
|
|
strlcpy(s+written, "router-signature\n", maxlen-written);
|
|
written += strlen(s+written);
|
|
s[written] = '\0';
|
|
if (router_get_router_hash(s, strlen(s), digest) < 0) {
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
note_crypto_pk_op(SIGN_RTR);
|
|
if (router_append_dirobj_signature(s+written,maxlen-written,
|
|
digest,DIGEST_LEN,ident_key)<0) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't sign router descriptor");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
written += strlen(s+written);
|
|
|
|
if (written+2 > maxlen) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG,"Not enough room to finish descriptor.");
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
/* include a last '\n' */
|
|
s[written] = '\n';
|
|
s[written+1] = 0;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef DEBUG_ROUTER_DUMP_ROUTER_TO_STRING
|
|
{
|
|
char *s_dup;
|
|
const char *cp;
|
|
routerinfo_t *ri_tmp;
|
|
cp = s_dup = tor_strdup(s);
|
|
ri_tmp = router_parse_entry_from_string(cp, NULL, 1, 0, NULL);
|
|
if (!ri_tmp) {
|
|
log_err(LD_BUG,
|
|
"We just generated a router descriptor we can't parse.");
|
|
log_err(LD_BUG, "Descriptor was: <<%s>>", s);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
tor_free(s_dup);
|
|
routerinfo_free(ri_tmp);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
return (int)written+1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Load the contents of <b>filename</b>, find the last line starting with
|
|
* <b>end_line</b>, ensure that its timestamp is not more than 25 hours in
|
|
* the past or more than 1 hour in the future with respect to <b>now</b>,
|
|
* and write the file contents starting with that line to *<b>out</b>.
|
|
* Return 1 for success, 0 if the file does not exist, or -1 if the file
|
|
* does not contain a line matching these criteria or other failure. */
|
|
static int
|
|
load_stats_file(const char *filename, const char *end_line, time_t now,
|
|
char **out)
|
|
{
|
|
int r = -1;
|
|
char *fname = get_datadir_fname(filename);
|
|
char *contents, *start = NULL, *tmp, timestr[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
|
|
time_t written;
|
|
switch (file_status(fname)) {
|
|
case FN_FILE:
|
|
/* X022 Find an alternative to reading the whole file to memory. */
|
|
if ((contents = read_file_to_str(fname, 0, NULL))) {
|
|
tmp = strstr(contents, end_line);
|
|
/* Find last block starting with end_line */
|
|
while (tmp) {
|
|
start = tmp;
|
|
tmp = strstr(tmp + 1, end_line);
|
|
}
|
|
if (!start)
|
|
goto notfound;
|
|
if (strlen(start) < strlen(end_line) + 1 + sizeof(timestr))
|
|
goto notfound;
|
|
strlcpy(timestr, start + 1 + strlen(end_line), sizeof(timestr));
|
|
if (parse_iso_time(timestr, &written) < 0)
|
|
goto notfound;
|
|
if (written < now - (25*60*60) || written > now + (1*60*60))
|
|
goto notfound;
|
|
*out = tor_strdup(start);
|
|
r = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
notfound:
|
|
tor_free(contents);
|
|
break;
|
|
case FN_NOENT:
|
|
r = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
case FN_ERROR:
|
|
case FN_DIR:
|
|
default:
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
tor_free(fname);
|
|
return r;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Write the contents of <b>extrainfo</b> and aggregated statistics to
|
|
* *<b>s_out</b>, signing them with <b>ident_key</b>. Return 0 on
|
|
* success, negative on failure. */
|
|
int
|
|
extrainfo_dump_to_string(char **s_out, extrainfo_t *extrainfo,
|
|
crypto_pk_env_t *ident_key)
|
|
{
|
|
or_options_t *options = get_options();
|
|
char identity[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
|
|
char published[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
|
|
char digest[DIGEST_LEN];
|
|
char *bandwidth_usage;
|
|
int result;
|
|
static int write_stats_to_extrainfo = 1;
|
|
char sig[DIROBJ_MAX_SIG_LEN+1];
|
|
char *s, *pre, *contents, *cp, *s_dup = NULL;
|
|
time_t now = time(NULL);
|
|
smartlist_t *chunks = smartlist_create();
|
|
extrainfo_t *ei_tmp = NULL;
|
|
|
|
base16_encode(identity, sizeof(identity),
|
|
extrainfo->cache_info.identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
format_iso_time(published, extrainfo->cache_info.published_on);
|
|
bandwidth_usage = rep_hist_get_bandwidth_lines();
|
|
|
|
tor_asprintf(&pre, "extra-info %s %s\npublished %s\n%s",
|
|
extrainfo->nickname, identity,
|
|
published, bandwidth_usage);
|
|
tor_free(bandwidth_usage);
|
|
smartlist_add(chunks, pre);
|
|
|
|
if (geoip_is_loaded()) {
|
|
char *chunk=NULL;
|
|
tor_asprintf(&chunk, "geoip-db-digest %s\n", geoip_db_digest());
|
|
smartlist_add(chunks, chunk);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (options->ExtraInfoStatistics && write_stats_to_extrainfo) {
|
|
log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Adding stats to extra-info descriptor.");
|
|
if (options->DirReqStatistics &&
|
|
load_stats_file("stats"PATH_SEPARATOR"dirreq-stats",
|
|
"dirreq-stats-end", now, &contents) > 0) {
|
|
smartlist_add(chunks, contents);
|
|
}
|
|
if (options->EntryStatistics &&
|
|
load_stats_file("stats"PATH_SEPARATOR"entry-stats",
|
|
"entry-stats-end", now, &contents) > 0) {
|
|
smartlist_add(chunks, contents);
|
|
}
|
|
if (options->CellStatistics &&
|
|
load_stats_file("stats"PATH_SEPARATOR"buffer-stats",
|
|
"cell-stats-end", now, &contents) > 0) {
|
|
smartlist_add(chunks, contents);
|
|
}
|
|
if (options->ExitPortStatistics &&
|
|
load_stats_file("stats"PATH_SEPARATOR"exit-stats",
|
|
"exit-stats-end", now, &contents) > 0) {
|
|
smartlist_add(chunks, contents);
|
|
}
|
|
if (options->ConnDirectionStatistics &&
|
|
load_stats_file("stats"PATH_SEPARATOR"conn-stats",
|
|
"conn-bi-direct", now, &contents) > 0) {
|
|
smartlist_add(chunks, contents);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (should_record_bridge_info(options) && write_stats_to_extrainfo) {
|
|
const char *bridge_stats = geoip_get_bridge_stats_extrainfo(now);
|
|
if (bridge_stats) {
|
|
smartlist_add(chunks, tor_strdup(bridge_stats));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
smartlist_add(chunks, tor_strdup("router-signature\n"));
|
|
s = smartlist_join_strings(chunks, "", 0, NULL);
|
|
|
|
while (strlen(s) > MAX_EXTRAINFO_UPLOAD_SIZE - DIROBJ_MAX_SIG_LEN) {
|
|
/* So long as there are at least two chunks (one for the initial
|
|
* extra-info line and one for the router-signature), we can keep removing
|
|
* things. */
|
|
if (smartlist_len(chunks) > 2) {
|
|
/* We remove the next-to-last element (remember, len-1 is the last
|
|
element), since we need to keep the router-signature element. */
|
|
int idx = smartlist_len(chunks) - 2;
|
|
char *e = smartlist_get(chunks, idx);
|
|
smartlist_del_keeporder(chunks, idx);
|
|
log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "We just generated an extra-info descriptor "
|
|
"with statistics that exceeds the 50 KB "
|
|
"upload limit. Removing last added "
|
|
"statistics.");
|
|
tor_free(e);
|
|
tor_free(s);
|
|
s = smartlist_join_strings(chunks, "", 0, NULL);
|
|
} else {
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG, "We just generated an extra-info descriptors that "
|
|
"exceeds the 50 KB upload limit.");
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memset(sig, 0, sizeof(sig));
|
|
if (router_get_extrainfo_hash(s, digest) < 0 ||
|
|
router_append_dirobj_signature(sig, sizeof(sig), digest, DIGEST_LEN,
|
|
ident_key) < 0) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Could not append signature to extra-info "
|
|
"descriptor.");
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
smartlist_add(chunks, tor_strdup(sig));
|
|
tor_free(s);
|
|
s = smartlist_join_strings(chunks, "", 0, NULL);
|
|
|
|
cp = s_dup = tor_strdup(s);
|
|
ei_tmp = extrainfo_parse_entry_from_string(cp, NULL, 1, NULL);
|
|
if (!ei_tmp) {
|
|
if (write_stats_to_extrainfo) {
|
|
log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "We just generated an extra-info descriptor "
|
|
"with statistics that we can't parse. Not "
|
|
"adding statistics to this or any future "
|
|
"extra-info descriptors.");
|
|
write_stats_to_extrainfo = 0;
|
|
result = extrainfo_dump_to_string(s_out, extrainfo, ident_key);
|
|
goto done;
|
|
} else {
|
|
log_warn(LD_BUG, "We just generated an extrainfo descriptor we "
|
|
"can't parse.");
|
|
goto err;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*s_out = s;
|
|
s = NULL; /* prevent free */
|
|
result = 0;
|
|
goto done;
|
|
|
|
err:
|
|
result = -1;
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
tor_free(s);
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(chunks, char *, cp, tor_free(cp));
|
|
smartlist_free(chunks);
|
|
tor_free(s_dup);
|
|
extrainfo_free(ei_tmp);
|
|
|
|
return result;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Return true iff <b>s</b> is a legally valid server nickname. */
|
|
int
|
|
is_legal_nickname(const char *s)
|
|
{
|
|
size_t len;
|
|
tor_assert(s);
|
|
len = strlen(s);
|
|
return len > 0 && len <= MAX_NICKNAME_LEN &&
|
|
strspn(s,LEGAL_NICKNAME_CHARACTERS) == len;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Return true iff <b>s</b> is a legally valid server nickname or
|
|
* hex-encoded identity-key digest. */
|
|
int
|
|
is_legal_nickname_or_hexdigest(const char *s)
|
|
{
|
|
if (*s!='$')
|
|
return is_legal_nickname(s);
|
|
else
|
|
return is_legal_hexdigest(s);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Return true iff <b>s</b> is a legally valid hex-encoded identity-key
|
|
* digest. */
|
|
int
|
|
is_legal_hexdigest(const char *s)
|
|
{
|
|
size_t len;
|
|
tor_assert(s);
|
|
if (s[0] == '$') s++;
|
|
len = strlen(s);
|
|
if (len > HEX_DIGEST_LEN) {
|
|
if (s[HEX_DIGEST_LEN] == '=' ||
|
|
s[HEX_DIGEST_LEN] == '~') {
|
|
if (!is_legal_nickname(s+HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
} else {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return (len >= HEX_DIGEST_LEN &&
|
|
strspn(s,HEX_CHARACTERS)==HEX_DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Set <b>buf</b> (which must have MAX_VERBOSE_NICKNAME_LEN+1 bytes) to the
|
|
* verbose representation of the identity of <b>router</b>. The format is:
|
|
* A dollar sign.
|
|
* The upper-case hexadecimal encoding of the SHA1 hash of router's identity.
|
|
* A "=" if the router is named; a "~" if it is not.
|
|
* The router's nickname.
|
|
**/
|
|
void
|
|
router_get_verbose_nickname(char *buf, const routerinfo_t *router)
|
|
{
|
|
const char *good_digest = networkstatus_get_router_digest_by_nickname(
|
|
router->nickname);
|
|
int is_named = good_digest && tor_memeq(good_digest,
|
|
router->cache_info.identity_digest,
|
|
DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
buf[0] = '$';
|
|
base16_encode(buf+1, HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1, router->cache_info.identity_digest,
|
|
DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
buf[1+HEX_DIGEST_LEN] = is_named ? '=' : '~';
|
|
strlcpy(buf+1+HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1, router->nickname, MAX_NICKNAME_LEN+1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Set <b>buf</b> (which must have MAX_VERBOSE_NICKNAME_LEN+1 bytes) to the
|
|
* verbose representation of the identity of <b>router</b>. The format is:
|
|
* A dollar sign.
|
|
* The upper-case hexadecimal encoding of the SHA1 hash of router's identity.
|
|
* A "=" if the router is named; a "~" if it is not.
|
|
* The router's nickname.
|
|
**/
|
|
void
|
|
routerstatus_get_verbose_nickname(char *buf, const routerstatus_t *router)
|
|
{
|
|
buf[0] = '$';
|
|
base16_encode(buf+1, HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1, router->identity_digest,
|
|
DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
buf[1+HEX_DIGEST_LEN] = router->is_named ? '=' : '~';
|
|
strlcpy(buf+1+HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1, router->nickname, MAX_NICKNAME_LEN+1);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Forget that we have issued any router-related warnings, so that we'll
|
|
* warn again if we see the same errors. */
|
|
void
|
|
router_reset_warnings(void)
|
|
{
|
|
if (warned_nonexistent_family) {
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(warned_nonexistent_family, char *, cp, tor_free(cp));
|
|
smartlist_clear(warned_nonexistent_family);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Given a router purpose, convert it to a string. Don't call this on
|
|
* ROUTER_PURPOSE_UNKNOWN: The whole point of that value is that we don't
|
|
* know its string representation. */
|
|
const char *
|
|
router_purpose_to_string(uint8_t p)
|
|
{
|
|
switch (p)
|
|
{
|
|
case ROUTER_PURPOSE_GENERAL: return "general";
|
|
case ROUTER_PURPOSE_BRIDGE: return "bridge";
|
|
case ROUTER_PURPOSE_CONTROLLER: return "controller";
|
|
default:
|
|
tor_assert(0);
|
|
}
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Given a string, convert it to a router purpose. */
|
|
uint8_t
|
|
router_purpose_from_string(const char *s)
|
|
{
|
|
if (!strcmp(s, "general"))
|
|
return ROUTER_PURPOSE_GENERAL;
|
|
else if (!strcmp(s, "bridge"))
|
|
return ROUTER_PURPOSE_BRIDGE;
|
|
else if (!strcmp(s, "controller"))
|
|
return ROUTER_PURPOSE_CONTROLLER;
|
|
else
|
|
return ROUTER_PURPOSE_UNKNOWN;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Release all static resources held in router.c */
|
|
void
|
|
router_free_all(void)
|
|
{
|
|
crypto_free_pk_env(onionkey);
|
|
crypto_free_pk_env(lastonionkey);
|
|
crypto_free_pk_env(server_identitykey);
|
|
crypto_free_pk_env(client_identitykey);
|
|
tor_mutex_free(key_lock);
|
|
routerinfo_free(desc_routerinfo);
|
|
extrainfo_free(desc_extrainfo);
|
|
crypto_free_pk_env(authority_signing_key);
|
|
authority_cert_free(authority_key_certificate);
|
|
crypto_free_pk_env(legacy_signing_key);
|
|
authority_cert_free(legacy_key_certificate);
|
|
|
|
if (warned_nonexistent_family) {
|
|
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(warned_nonexistent_family, char *, cp, tor_free(cp));
|
|
smartlist_free(warned_nonexistent_family);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|