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83 KiB
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1686 lines
83 KiB
Plaintext
// Copyright (c) The Tor Project, Inc.
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// See LICENSE for licensing information
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// This is an asciidoc file used to generate the manpage/html reference.
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// Learn asciidoc on http://www.methods.co.nz/asciidoc/userguide.html
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TOR(1)
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======
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NAME
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----
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tor - The second-generation onion router
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SYNOPSIS
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--------
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**tor** [__OPTION__ __value__]...
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DESCRIPTION
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-----------
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__tor__ is a connection-oriented anonymizing communication
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service. Users choose a source-routed path through a set of nodes, and
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negotiate a "virtual circuit" through the network, in which each node
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knows its predecessor and successor, but no others. Traffic flowing down
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the circuit is unwrapped by a symmetric key at each node, which reveals
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the downstream node. +
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Basically __tor__ provides a distributed network of servers ("onion routers").
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Users bounce their TCP streams -- web traffic, ftp, ssh, etc -- around the
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routers, and recipients, observers, and even the routers themselves have
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difficulty tracking the source of the stream.
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OPTIONS
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-------
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**-h**, **-help**::
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Display a short help message and exit.
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**-f** __FILE__::
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FILE contains further "option value" pairs. (Default: @CONFDIR@/torrc)
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**--hash-password**::
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Generates a hashed password for control port access.
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**--list-fingerprint**::
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Generate your keys and output your nickname and fingerprint.
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**--verify-config**::
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Verify the configuration file is valid.
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**--nt-service**::
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**--service [install|remove|start|stop]** Manage the Tor Windows
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NT/2000/XP service. Current instructions can be found at
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https://wiki.torproject.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#WinNTService
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**--list-torrc-options**::
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List all valid options.
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**--version**::
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Display Tor version and exit.
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**--quiet**::
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Do not start Tor with a console log unless explicitly requested to do so.
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(By default, Tor starts out logging messages at level "notice" or higher to
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the console, until it has parsed its configuration.)
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Other options can be specified either on the command-line (--option
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value), or in the configuration file (option value or option "value").
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Options are case-insensitive. C-style escaped characters are allowed inside
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quoted values. Options on the command line take precedence over
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options found in the configuration file, except indicated otherwise. To
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split one configuration entry into multiple lines, use a single \ before
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the end of the line. Comments can be used in such multiline entries, but
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they must start at the beginning of a line.
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**BandwidthRate** __N__ **bytes**|**KB**|**MB**|**GB**::
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A token bucket limits the average incoming bandwidth usage on this node to
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the specified number of bytes per second, and the average outgoing
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bandwidth usage to that same value. If you want to run a relay in the
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public network, this needs to be _at the very least_ 20 KB (that is,
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20480 bytes). (Default: 5 MB)
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**BandwidthBurst** __N__ **bytes**|**KB**|**MB**|**GB**::
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Limit the maximum token bucket size (also known as the burst) to the given
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number of bytes in each direction. (Default: 10 MB)
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**MaxAdvertisedBandwidth** __N__ **bytes**|**KB**|**MB**|**GB**::
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If set, we will not advertise more than this amount of bandwidth for our
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BandwidthRate. Server operators who want to reduce the number of clients
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who ask to build circuits through them (since this is proportional to
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advertised bandwidth rate) can thus reduce the CPU demands on their server
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without impacting network performance.
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**RelayBandwidthRate** __N__ **bytes**|**KB**|**MB**|**GB**::
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If not 0, a separate token bucket limits the average incoming bandwidth
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usage for \_relayed traffic_ on this node to the specified number of bytes
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per second, and the average outgoing bandwidth usage to that same value.
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Relayed traffic currently is calculated to include answers to directory
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requests, but that may change in future versions. (Default: 0)
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**RelayBandwidthBurst** __N__ **bytes**|**KB**|**MB**|**GB**::
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If not 0, limit the maximum token bucket size (also known as the burst) for
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\_relayed traffic_ to the given number of bytes in each direction.
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(Default: 0)
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**PerConnBWRate** __N__ **bytes**|**KB**|**MB**|**GB**::
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If set, do separate rate limiting for each connection from a non-relay.
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You should never need to change this value, since a network-wide value is
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published in the consensus and your relay will use that value. (Default: 0)
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**PerConnBWBurst** __N__ **bytes**|**KB**|**MB**|**GB**::
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If set, do separate rate limiting for each connection from a non-relay.
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You should never need to change this value, since a network-wide value is
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published in the consensus and your relay will use that value. (Default: 0)
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**ConnLimit** __NUM__::
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The minimum number of file descriptors that must be available to the Tor
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process before it will start. Tor will ask the OS for as many file
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descriptors as the OS will allow (you can find this by "ulimit -H -n").
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If this number is less than ConnLimit, then Tor will refuse to start. +
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+
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You probably don't need to adjust this. It has no effect on Windows
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since that platform lacks getrlimit(). (Default: 1000)
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**ConstrainedSockets** **0**|**1**::
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If set, Tor will tell the kernel to attempt to shrink the buffers for all
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sockets to the size specified in **ConstrainedSockSize**. This is useful for
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virtual servers and other environments where system level TCP buffers may
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be limited. If you're on a virtual server, and you encounter the "Error
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creating network socket: No buffer space available" message, you are
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likely experiencing this problem. +
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+
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The preferred solution is to have the admin increase the buffer pool for
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the host itself via /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_mem or equivalent facility;
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this configuration option is a second-resort. +
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+
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The DirPort option should also not be used if TCP buffers are scarce. The
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cached directory requests consume additional sockets which exacerbates
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the problem. +
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+
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You should **not** enable this feature unless you encounter the "no buffer
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space available" issue. Reducing the TCP buffers affects window size for
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the TCP stream and will reduce throughput in proportion to round trip
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time on long paths. (Default: 0.)
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**ConstrainedSockSize** __N__ **bytes**|**KB**::
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When **ConstrainedSockets** is enabled the receive and transmit buffers for
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all sockets will be set to this limit. Must be a value between 2048 and
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262144, in 1024 byte increments. Default of 8192 is recommended.
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**ControlPort** __PORT__|**auto**::
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If set, Tor will accept connections on this port and allow those
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connections to control the Tor process using the Tor Control Protocol
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(described in control-spec.txt). Note: unless you also specify one or
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more of **HashedControlPassword** or **CookieAuthentication**,
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setting this option will cause Tor to allow any process on the local
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host to control it. (Setting both authentication methods means either
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method is sufficient to authenticate to Tor.) This
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option is required for many Tor controllers; most use the value of 9051.
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Set it to "auto" to have Tor pick a port for you. (Default: 0).
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**ControlListenAddress** __IP__[:__PORT__]::
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Bind the controller listener to this address. If you specify a port, bind
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to this port rather than the one specified in ControlPort. We strongly
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recommend that you leave this alone unless you know what you're doing,
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since giving attackers access to your control listener is really
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dangerous. (Default: 127.0.0.1) This directive can be specified multiple
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times to bind to multiple addresses/ports.
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**ControlSocket** __Path__::
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Like ControlPort, but listens on a Unix domain socket, rather than a TCP
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socket. (Unix and Unix-like systems only.)
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**ControlSocketsGroupWritable** **0**|**1**::
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If this option is set to 0, don't allow the filesystem group to read and
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write unix sockets (e.g. ControlSocket). If the option is set to 1, make
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the control socket readable and writable by the default GID. (Default: 0)
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**HashedControlPassword** __hashed_password__::
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Allow connections on the control port if they present
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the password whose one-way hash is __hashed_password__. You
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can compute the hash of a password by running "tor --hash-password
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__password__". You can provide several acceptable passwords by using more
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than one HashedControlPassword line.
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**CookieAuthentication** **0**|**1**::
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If this option is set to 1, allow connections on the control port
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when the connecting process knows the contents of a file named
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"control_auth_cookie", which Tor will create in its data directory. This
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authentication method should only be used on systems with good filesystem
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security. (Default: 0)
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**CookieAuthFile** __Path__::
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If set, this option overrides the default location and file name
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for Tor's cookie file. (See CookieAuthentication above.)
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**CookieAuthFileGroupReadable** **0**|**1**|__Groupname__::
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If this option is set to 0, don't allow the filesystem group to read the
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cookie file. If the option is set to 1, make the cookie file readable by
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the default GID. [Making the file readable by other groups is not yet
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implemented; let us know if you need this for some reason.] (Default: 0).
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**ControlPortWriteToFile** __Path__::
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If set, Tor writes the address and port of any control port it opens to
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this address. Usable by controllers to learn the actual control port
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when ControlPort is set to "auto".
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**ControlPortFileGroupReadable** **0**|**1**::
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If this option is set to 0, don't allow the filesystem group to read the
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control port file. If the option is set to 1, make the control port
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file readable by the default GID. (Default: 0).
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**DataDirectory** __DIR__::
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Store working data in DIR (Default: @LOCALSTATEDIR@/lib/tor)
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**DirServer** [__nickname__] [**flags**] __address__:__port__ __fingerprint__::
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Use a nonstandard authoritative directory server at the provided address
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and port, with the specified key fingerprint. This option can be repeated
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many times, for multiple authoritative directory servers. Flags are
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separated by spaces, and determine what kind of an authority this directory
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is. By default, every authority is authoritative for current ("v2")-style
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directories, unless the "no-v2" flag is given. If the "v1" flags is
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provided, Tor will use this server as an authority for old-style (v1)
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directories as well. (Only directory mirrors care about this.) Tor will
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use this server as an authority for hidden service information if the "hs"
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flag is set, or if the "v1" flag is set and the "no-hs" flag is **not** set.
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Tor will use this authority as a bridge authoritative directory if the
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"bridge" flag is set. If a flag "orport=**port**" is given, Tor will use the
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given port when opening encrypted tunnels to the dirserver. Lastly, if a
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flag "v3ident=**fp**" is given, the dirserver is a v3 directory authority
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whose v3 long-term signing key has the fingerprint **fp**. +
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+
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If no **dirserver** line is given, Tor will use the default directory
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servers. NOTE: this option is intended for setting up a private Tor
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network with its own directory authorities. If you use it, you will be
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distinguishable from other users, because you won't believe the same
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authorities they do.
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**AlternateDirAuthority** [__nickname__] [**flags**] __address__:__port__ __fingerprint__ +
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**AlternateHSAuthority** [__nickname__] [**flags**] __address__:__port__ __fingerprint__ +
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**AlternateBridgeAuthority** [__nickname__] [**flags**] __address__:__port__ __ fingerprint__::
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As DirServer, but replaces less of the default directory authorities. Using
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AlternateDirAuthority replaces the default Tor directory authorities, but
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leaves the hidden service authorities and bridge authorities in place.
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Similarly, Using AlternateHSAuthority replaces the default hidden service
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authorities, but not the directory or bridge authorities.
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**DisableAllSwap** **0**|**1**::
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If set to 1, Tor will attempt to lock all current and future memory pages,
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so that memory cannot be paged out. Windows, OS X and Solaris are currently
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not supported. We believe that this feature works on modern Gnu/Linux
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distributions, and that it should work on *BSD systems (untested). This
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option requires that you start your Tor as root, and you should use the
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**User** option to properly reduce Tor's privileges. (Default: 0)
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**FetchDirInfoEarly** **0**|**1**::
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If set to 1, Tor will always fetch directory information like other
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directory caches, even if you don't meet the normal criteria for fetching
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early. Normal users should leave it off. (Default: 0)
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**FetchDirInfoExtraEarly** **0**|**1**::
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If set to 1, Tor will fetch directory information before other directory
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caches. It will attempt to download directory information closer to the
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start of the consensus period. Normal users should leave it off.
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(Default: 0)
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**FetchHidServDescriptors** **0**|**1**::
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If set to 0, Tor will never fetch any hidden service descriptors from the
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rendezvous directories. This option is only useful if you're using a Tor
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controller that handles hidden service fetches for you. (Default: 1)
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**FetchServerDescriptors** **0**|**1**::
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If set to 0, Tor will never fetch any network status summaries or server
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descriptors from the directory servers. This option is only useful if
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you're using a Tor controller that handles directory fetches for you.
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(Default: 1)
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**FetchUselessDescriptors** **0**|**1**::
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If set to 1, Tor will fetch every non-obsolete descriptor from the
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authorities that it hears about. Otherwise, it will avoid fetching useless
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descriptors, for example for routers that are not running. This option is
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useful if you're using the contributed "exitlist" script to enumerate Tor
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nodes that exit to certain addresses. (Default: 0)
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**HTTPProxy** __host__[:__port__]::
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Tor will make all its directory requests through this host:port (or host:80
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if port is not specified), rather than connecting directly to any directory
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servers.
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**HTTPProxyAuthenticator** __username:password__::
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If defined, Tor will use this username:password for Basic HTTP proxy
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authentication, as in RFC 2617. This is currently the only form of HTTP
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proxy authentication that Tor supports; feel free to submit a patch if you
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want it to support others.
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**HTTPSProxy** __host__[:__port__]::
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Tor will make all its OR (SSL) connections through this host:port (or
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host:443 if port is not specified), via HTTP CONNECT rather than connecting
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directly to servers. You may want to set **FascistFirewall** to restrict
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the set of ports you might try to connect to, if your HTTPS proxy only
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allows connecting to certain ports.
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**HTTPSProxyAuthenticator** __username:password__::
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If defined, Tor will use this username:password for Basic HTTPS proxy
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authentication, as in RFC 2617. This is currently the only form of HTTPS
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proxy authentication that Tor supports; feel free to submit a patch if you
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want it to support others.
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**Socks4Proxy** __host__[:__port__]::
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Tor will make all OR connections through the SOCKS 4 proxy at host:port
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(or host:1080 if port is not specified).
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**Socks5Proxy** __host__[:__port__]::
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Tor will make all OR connections through the SOCKS 5 proxy at host:port
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(or host:1080 if port is not specified).
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**Socks5ProxyUsername** __username__ +
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**Socks5ProxyPassword** __password__::
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If defined, authenticate to the SOCKS 5 server using username and password
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in accordance to RFC 1929. Both username and password must be between 1 and
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255 characters.
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**KeepalivePeriod** __NUM__::
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To keep firewalls from expiring connections, send a padding keepalive cell
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every NUM seconds on open connections that are in use. If the connection
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has no open circuits, it will instead be closed after NUM seconds of
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idleness. (Default: 5 minutes)
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**Log** __minSeverity__[-__maxSeverity__] **stderr**|**stdout**|**syslog**::
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Send all messages between __minSeverity__ and __maxSeverity__ to the standard
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output stream, the standard error stream, or to the system log. (The
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"syslog" value is only supported on Unix.) Recognized severity levels are
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debug, info, notice, warn, and err. We advise using "notice" in most cases,
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since anything more verbose may provide sensitive information to an
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attacker who obtains the logs. If only one severity level is given, all
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messages of that level or higher will be sent to the listed destination.
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**Log** __minSeverity__[-__maxSeverity__] **file** __FILENAME__::
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As above, but send log messages to the listed filename. The
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"Log" option may appear more than once in a configuration file.
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Messages are sent to all the logs that match their severity
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level.
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**Log** **[**__domain__,...**]**__minSeverity__[-__maxSeverity__] ... **file** __FILENAME__ +
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**Log** **[**__domain__,...**]**__minSeverity__[-__maxSeverity__] ... **stderr**|**stdout**|**syslog**::
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As above, but select messages by range of log severity __and__ by a
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set of "logging domains". Each logging domain corresponds to an area of
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functionality inside Tor. You can specify any number of severity ranges
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for a single log statement, each of them prefixed by a comma-separated
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list of logging domains. You can prefix a domain with $$~$$ to indicate
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negation, and use * to indicate "all domains". If you specify a severity
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range without a list of domains, it matches all domains. +
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+
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This is an advanced feature which is most useful for debugging one or two
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of Tor's subsystems at a time. +
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+
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The currently recognized domains are: general, crypto, net, config, fs,
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protocol, mm, http, app, control, circ, rend, bug, dir, dirserv, or, edge,
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acct, hist, and handshake. Domain names are case-insensitive. +
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+
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For example, "`Log [handshake]debug [~net,~mm]info notice stdout`" sends
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to stdout: all handshake messages of any severity, all info-and-higher
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messages from domains other than networking and memory management, and all
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messages of severity notice or higher.
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**LogMessageDomains** **0**|**1**::
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If 1, Tor includes message domains with each log message. Every log
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message currently has at least one domain; most currently have exactly
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one. This doesn't affect controller log messages. (Default: 0)
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**OutboundBindAddress** __IP__::
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Make all outbound connections originate from the IP address specified. This
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is only useful when you have multiple network interfaces, and you want all
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of Tor's outgoing connections to use a single one. This setting will be
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ignored for connections to the loopback addresses (127.0.0.0/8 and ::1).
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**PidFile** __FILE__::
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On startup, write our PID to FILE. On clean shutdown, remove
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FILE.
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**ProtocolWarnings** **0**|**1**::
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If 1, Tor will log with severity \'warn' various cases of other parties not
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following the Tor specification. Otherwise, they are logged with severity
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\'info'. (Default: 0)
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**RunAsDaemon** **0**|**1**::
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If 1, Tor forks and daemonizes to the background. This option has no effect
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on Windows; instead you should use the --service command-line option.
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(Default: 0)
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**LogTimeGranularity** __NUM__::
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Set the resolution of timestamps in Tor's logs to NUM milliseconds.
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NUM must be positive and either a divisor or a multiple of 1 second.
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Note that this option only controls the granularity written by Tor to
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a file or console log. Tor does not (for example) "batch up" log
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messages to affect times logged by a controller, times attached to
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syslog messages, or the mtime fields on log files. (Default: 1 second)
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**SafeLogging** **0**|**1**|**relay**::
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Tor can scrub potentially sensitive strings from log messages (e.g.
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addresses) by replacing them with the string [scrubbed]. This way logs can
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still be useful, but they don't leave behind personally identifying
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information about what sites a user might have visited. +
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+
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If this option is set to 0, Tor will not perform any scrubbing, if it is
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set to 1, all potentially sensitive strings are replaced. If it is set to
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relay, all log messages generated when acting as a relay are sanitized, but
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all messages generated when acting as a client are not. (Default: 1)
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**User** __UID__::
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On startup, setuid to this user and setgid to their primary group.
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**HardwareAccel** **0**|**1**::
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If non-zero, try to use built-in (static) crypto hardware acceleration when
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available. (Default: 0)
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**AccelName** __NAME__::
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When using OpenSSL hardware crypto acceleration attempt to load the dynamic
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engine of this name. This must be used for any dynamic hardware engine.
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Names can be verified with the openssl engine command.
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|
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**AccelDir** __DIR__::
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Specify this option if using dynamic hardware acceleration and the engine
|
|
implementation library resides somewhere other than the OpenSSL default.
|
|
|
|
**AvoidDiskWrites** **0**|**1**::
|
|
If non-zero, try to write to disk less frequently than we would otherwise.
|
|
This is useful when running on flash memory or other media that support
|
|
only a limited number of writes. (Default: 0)
|
|
|
|
**TunnelDirConns** **0**|**1**::
|
|
If non-zero, when a directory server we contact supports it, we will build
|
|
a one-hop circuit and make an encrypted connection via its ORPort.
|
|
(Default: 1)
|
|
|
|
**PreferTunneledDirConns** **0**|**1**::
|
|
If non-zero, we will avoid directory servers that don't support tunneled
|
|
directory connections, when possible. (Default: 1)
|
|
|
|
**CircuitPriorityHalflife** __NUM1__::
|
|
If this value is set, we override the default algorithm for choosing which
|
|
circuit's cell to deliver or relay next. When the value is 0, we
|
|
round-robin between the active circuits on a connection, delivering one
|
|
cell from each in turn. When the value is positive, we prefer delivering
|
|
cells from whichever connection has the lowest weighted cell count, where
|
|
cells are weighted exponentially according to the supplied
|
|
CircuitPriorityHalflife value (in seconds). If this option is not set at
|
|
all, we use the behavior recommended in the current consensus
|
|
networkstatus. This is an advanced option; you generally shouldn't have
|
|
to mess with it. (Default: not set.)
|
|
|
|
**DisableIOCP** **0**|**1**::
|
|
If Tor was built to use the Libevent's "bufferevents" networking code
|
|
and you're running on Windows, setting this option to 1 will tell Libevent
|
|
not to use the Windows IOCP networking API. (Default: 1)
|
|
|
|
**CountPrivateBandwidth** **0**|**1**::
|
|
If this option is set, then Tor's rate-limiting applies not only to
|
|
remote connections, but also to connections to private addresses like
|
|
127.0.0.1 or 10.0.0.1. This is mostly useful for debugging
|
|
rate-limiting. (Default: 0)
|
|
|
|
CLIENT OPTIONS
|
|
--------------
|
|
|
|
The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if
|
|
**SocksPort**, **TransPort**, **DNSPort**, or **NATDPort** is non-zero):
|
|
|
|
**AllowInvalidNodes** **entry**|**exit**|**middle**|**introduction**|**rendezvous**|**...**::
|
|
If some Tor servers are obviously not working right, the directory
|
|
authorities can manually mark them as invalid, meaning that it's not
|
|
recommended you use them for entry or exit positions in your circuits. You
|
|
can opt to use them in some circuit positions, though. The default is
|
|
"middle,rendezvous", and other choices are not advised.
|
|
|
|
**ExcludeSingleHopRelays** **0**|**1**::
|
|
This option controls whether circuits built by Tor will include relays with
|
|
the AllowSingleHopExits flag set to true. If ExcludeSingleHopRelays is set
|
|
to 0, these relays will be included. Note that these relays might be at
|
|
higher risk of being seized or observed, so they are not normally
|
|
included. Also note that relatively few clients turn off this option,
|
|
so using these relays might make your client stand out.
|
|
(Default: 1)
|
|
|
|
**Bridge** __IP__:__ORPort__ [fingerprint]::
|
|
When set along with UseBridges, instructs Tor to use the relay at
|
|
"IP:ORPort" as a "bridge" relaying into the Tor network. If "fingerprint"
|
|
is provided (using the same format as for DirServer), we will verify that
|
|
the relay running at that location has the right fingerprint. We also use
|
|
fingerprint to look up the bridge descriptor at the bridge authority, if
|
|
it's provided and if UpdateBridgesFromAuthority is set too.
|
|
|
|
**LearnCircuitBuildTimeout** **0**|**1**::
|
|
If 0, CircuitBuildTimeout adaptive learning is disabled. (Default: 1)
|
|
|
|
**CircuitBuildTimeout** __NUM__::
|
|
|
|
Try for at most NUM seconds when building circuits. If the circuit isn't
|
|
open in that time, give up on it. If LearnCircuitBuildTimeout is 1, this
|
|
value serves as the initial value to use before a timeout is learned. If
|
|
LearnCircuitBuildTimeout is 0, this value is the only value used.
|
|
(Default: 60 seconds.)
|
|
|
|
**CircuitIdleTimeout** __NUM__::
|
|
If we have kept a clean (never used) circuit around for NUM seconds, then
|
|
close it. This way when the Tor client is entirely idle, it can expire all
|
|
of its circuits, and then expire its TLS connections. Also, if we end up
|
|
making a circuit that is not useful for exiting any of the requests we're
|
|
receiving, it won't forever take up a slot in the circuit list. (Default: 1
|
|
hour.)
|
|
|
|
**CircuitStreamTimeout** __NUM__::
|
|
If non-zero, this option overrides our internal timeout schedule for how
|
|
many seconds until we detach a stream from a circuit and try a new circuit.
|
|
If your network is particularly slow, you might want to set this to a
|
|
number like 60. (Default: 0)
|
|
|
|
**ClientOnly** **0**|**1**::
|
|
If set to 1, Tor will under no circumstances run as a server or serve
|
|
directory requests. The default is to run as a client unless ORPort is
|
|
configured. (Usually, you don't need to set this; Tor is pretty smart at
|
|
figuring out whether you are reliable and high-bandwidth enough to be a
|
|
useful server.) (Default: 0)
|
|
|
|
**ExcludeNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__::
|
|
A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and address
|
|
patterns of nodes to avoid when building a circuit.
|
|
(Example:
|
|
ExcludeNodes SlowServer, $ EFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF, \{cc}, 255.254.0.0/8) +
|
|
+
|
|
By default, this option is treated as a preference that Tor is allowed
|
|
to override in order to keep working.
|
|
For example, if you try to connect to a hidden service,
|
|
but you have excluded all of the hidden service's introduction points,
|
|
Tor will connect to one of them anyway. If you do not want this
|
|
behavior, set the StrictNodes option (documented below). +
|
|
+
|
|
Note also that if you are a relay, this (and the other node selection
|
|
options below) only affects your own circuits that Tor builds for you.
|
|
Clients can still build circuits through you to any node. Controllers
|
|
can tell Tor to build circuits through any node.
|
|
|
|
|
|
**ExcludeExitNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__::
|
|
A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and address
|
|
patterns of nodes to never use when picking an exit node---that is, a
|
|
node that delivers traffic for you outside the Tor network. Note that any
|
|
node listed in ExcludeNodes is automatically considered to be part of this
|
|
list too. See also the caveats on the "ExitNodes" option below.
|
|
|
|
**ExitNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__::
|
|
A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and address
|
|
patterns of nodes to use as exit node---that is, a
|
|
node that delivers traffic for you outside the Tor network. +
|
|
+
|
|
Note that if you list too few nodes here, or if you exclude too many exit
|
|
nodes with ExcludeExitNodes, you can degrade functionality. For example,
|
|
if none of the exits you list allows traffic on port 80 or 443, you won't
|
|
be able to browse the web. +
|
|
+
|
|
Note also that not every circuit is used to deliver traffic outside of
|
|
the Tor network. It is normal to see non-exit circuits (such as those
|
|
used to connect to hidden services, those that do directory fetches,
|
|
those used for relay reachability self-tests, and so on) that end
|
|
at a non-exit node. To
|
|
keep a node from being used entirely, see ExcludeNodes and StrictNodes. +
|
|
+
|
|
The ExcludeNodes option overrides this option: any node listed in both
|
|
ExitNodes and ExcludeNodes is treated as excluded. +
|
|
+
|
|
The .exit address notation, if enabled via AllowDotExit, overrides
|
|
this option.
|
|
|
|
**EntryNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__::
|
|
A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, and country codes of nodes
|
|
to use for the first hop in your normal circuits.
|
|
Normal circuits include all
|
|
circuits except for direct connections to directory servers. The Bridge
|
|
option overrides this option; if you have configured bridges and
|
|
UseBridges is 1, the Bridges are used as your entry nodes. +
|
|
+
|
|
The ExcludeNodes option overrides this option: any node listed in both
|
|
EntryNodes and ExcludeNodes is treated as excluded.
|
|
|
|
**StrictNodes** **0**|**1**::
|
|
If StrictNodes is set to 1, Tor will treat the ExcludeNodes option as a
|
|
requirement to follow for all the circuits you generate, even if doing so
|
|
will break functionality for you. If StrictNodes is set to 0, Tor will
|
|
still try to avoid nodes in the ExcludeNodes list, but it will err on the
|
|
side of avoiding unexpected errors. Specifically, StrictNodes 0 tells
|
|
Tor that it is okay to use an excluded node when it is *necessary* to
|
|
perform relay reachability self-tests, connect to
|
|
a hidden service, provide a hidden service to a client, fulfill a .exit
|
|
request, upload directory information, or download directory information.
|
|
(Default: 0)
|
|
|
|
**FascistFirewall** **0**|**1**::
|
|
If 1, Tor will only create outgoing connections to ORs running on ports
|
|
that your firewall allows (defaults to 80 and 443; see **FirewallPorts**).
|
|
This will allow you to run Tor as a client behind a firewall with
|
|
restrictive policies, but will not allow you to run as a server behind such
|
|
a firewall. If you prefer more fine-grained control, use
|
|
ReachableAddresses instead.
|
|
|
|
**FirewallPorts** __PORTS__::
|
|
A list of ports that your firewall allows you to connect to. Only used when
|
|
**FascistFirewall** is set. This option is deprecated; use ReachableAddresses
|
|
instead. (Default: 80, 443)
|
|
|
|
**HidServAuth** __onion-address__ __auth-cookie__ [__service-name__]::
|
|
Client authorization for a hidden service. Valid onion addresses contain 16
|
|
characters in a-z2-7 plus ".onion", and valid auth cookies contain 22
|
|
characters in A-Za-z0-9+/. The service name is only used for internal
|
|
purposes, e.g., for Tor controllers. This option may be used multiple times
|
|
for different hidden services. If a hidden service uses authorization and
|
|
this option is not set, the hidden service is not accessible. Hidden
|
|
services can be configured to require authorization using the
|
|
**HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient** option.
|
|
|
|
**ReachableAddresses** __ADDR__[/__MASK__][:__PORT__]...::
|
|
A comma-separated list of IP addresses and ports that your firewall allows
|
|
you to connect to. The format is as for the addresses in ExitPolicy, except
|
|
that "accept" is understood unless "reject" is explicitly provided. For
|
|
example, \'ReachableAddresses 99.0.0.0/8, reject 18.0.0.0/8:80, accept
|
|
\*:80' means that your firewall allows connections to everything inside net
|
|
99, rejects port 80 connections to net 18, and accepts connections to port
|
|
80 otherwise. (Default: \'accept \*:*'.)
|
|
|
|
**ReachableDirAddresses** __ADDR__[/__MASK__][:__PORT__]...::
|
|
Like **ReachableAddresses**, a list of addresses and ports. Tor will obey
|
|
these restrictions when fetching directory information, using standard HTTP
|
|
GET requests. If not set explicitly then the value of
|
|
**ReachableAddresses** is used. If **HTTPProxy** is set then these
|
|
connections will go through that proxy.
|
|
|
|
**ReachableORAddresses** __ADDR__[/__MASK__][:__PORT__]...::
|
|
Like **ReachableAddresses**, a list of addresses and ports. Tor will obey
|
|
these restrictions when connecting to Onion Routers, using TLS/SSL. If not
|
|
set explicitly then the value of **ReachableAddresses** is used. If
|
|
**HTTPSProxy** is set then these connections will go through that proxy. +
|
|
+
|
|
The separation between **ReachableORAddresses** and
|
|
**ReachableDirAddresses** is only interesting when you are connecting
|
|
through proxies (see **HTTPProxy** and **HTTPSProxy**). Most proxies limit
|
|
TLS connections (which Tor uses to connect to Onion Routers) to port 443,
|
|
and some limit HTTP GET requests (which Tor uses for fetching directory
|
|
information) to port 80.
|
|
|
|
**LongLivedPorts** __PORTS__::
|
|
A list of ports for services that tend to have long-running connections
|
|
(e.g. chat and interactive shells). Circuits for streams that use these
|
|
ports will contain only high-uptime nodes, to reduce the chance that a node
|
|
will go down before the stream is finished. (Default: 21, 22, 706, 1863,
|
|
5050, 5190, 5222, 5223, 6523, 6667, 6697, 8300)
|
|
|
|
**MapAddress** __address__ __newaddress__::
|
|
When a request for address arrives to Tor, it will rewrite it to newaddress
|
|
before processing it. For example, if you always want connections to
|
|
www.indymedia.org to exit via __torserver__ (where __torserver__ is the
|
|
nickname of the server), use "MapAddress www.indymedia.org
|
|
www.indymedia.org.torserver.exit".
|
|
|
|
**NewCircuitPeriod** __NUM__::
|
|
Every NUM seconds consider whether to build a new circuit. (Default: 30
|
|
seconds)
|
|
|
|
**MaxCircuitDirtiness** __NUM__::
|
|
Feel free to reuse a circuit that was first used at most NUM seconds ago,
|
|
but never attach a new stream to a circuit that is too old. (Default: 10
|
|
minutes)
|
|
|
|
**NodeFamily** __node__,__node__,__...__::
|
|
The Tor servers, defined by their identity fingerprints or nicknames,
|
|
constitute a "family" of similar or co-administered servers, so never use
|
|
any two of them in the same circuit. Defining a NodeFamily is only needed
|
|
when a server doesn't list the family itself (with MyFamily). This option
|
|
can be used multiple times. In addition to nodes, you can also list
|
|
IP address and ranges and country codes in {curly braces}.
|
|
|
|
**EnforceDistinctSubnets** **0**|**1**::
|
|
If 1, Tor will not put two servers whose IP addresses are "too close" on
|
|
the same circuit. Currently, two addresses are "too close" if they lie in
|
|
the same /16 range. (Default: 1)
|
|
|
|
**SOCKSPort** \['address':]__port__|**auto** [_isolation flags_]::
|
|
Open this port to listen for connections from SOCKS-speaking
|
|
applications. Set this to 0 if you don't want to allow application
|
|
connections via SOCKS. Set it to "auto" to have Tor pick a port for
|
|
you. This directive can be specified multiple times to bind
|
|
to multiple addresses/ports. (Default: 9050) +
|
|
+
|
|
The _isolation flags_ arguments give Tor rules for which streams
|
|
received on this SOCKSPort are allowed to share circuits with one
|
|
another. Recognized isolation flags are:
|
|
**IsolateClientAddr**;;
|
|
Don't share a circuits with streams from a different
|
|
client address. (On by default and strongly recommended;
|
|
you can disable it with **NoIsolateClientAddr**.)
|
|
**IsolateSOCKSAuth**;;
|
|
Don't share a circuits with streams for which different
|
|
SOCKS authentication was provided. (On by default;
|
|
you can disable it with **NoIsolateSOCKSAuth**.)
|
|
**IsolateClientProtocol**;;
|
|
Don't share circuits with streams using a different protocol.
|
|
(SOCKS 4, SOCKS 5, TransPort connections, NATDPort connections,
|
|
and DNSPort requests are all considered to be different protocols.)
|
|
**IsolateDestPort**;;
|
|
Don't share a circuits with streams targetting a different
|
|
destination port.
|
|
**IsolateDestAddr**;;
|
|
Don't share a circuits with streams targetting a different
|
|
destination address.
|
|
**SessionGroup=**__INT__;;
|
|
If no other isolation rules would prevent it, allow streams
|
|
on this port to share circuits with streams from every other
|
|
port with the same session group. (By default, streams received
|
|
on different ports are always isolated from one another.)
|
|
|
|
**SOCKSListenAddress** __IP__[:__PORT__]::
|
|
Bind to this address to listen for connections from Socks-speaking
|
|
applications. (Default: 127.0.0.1) You can also specify a port (e.g.
|
|
192.168.0.1:9100). This directive can be specified multiple times to bind
|
|
to multiple addresses/ports. (DEPRECATED: As of 0.2.3.x-alpha, you can
|
|
now use multiple SOCKSPort entries, and provide addresses for SOCKSPort
|
|
entries, so SOCKSListenAddress no longer has a purpose. For backward
|
|
compatibility, SOCKSListenAddress is only allowed when SOCKSPort is just
|
|
a port number.)
|
|
|
|
**SocksPolicy** __policy__,__policy__,__...__::
|
|
Set an entrance policy for this server, to limit who can connect to the
|
|
SocksPort and DNSPort ports. The policies have the same form as exit
|
|
policies below.
|
|
|
|
**SocksTimeout** __NUM__::
|
|
Let a socks connection wait NUM seconds handshaking, and NUM seconds
|
|
unattached waiting for an appropriate circuit, before we fail it. (Default:
|
|
2 minutes.)
|
|
|
|
**TokenBucketRefillInterval** __NUM__::
|
|
Set the refill interval of Tor's token bucket to NUM milliseconds.
|
|
NUM must be positive and either a divisor or a multiple of 1 second.
|
|
Note that this option retains the configured bandwidth limits and refills
|
|
token buckets only in ratio to the interval. This option will be ignored
|
|
when Tor was built with Libevent's bufferevents enabled. (Default: 1 second)
|
|
|
|
|
|
**TrackHostExits** __host__,__.domain__,__...__::
|
|
For each value in the comma separated list, Tor will track recent
|
|
connections to hosts that match this value and attempt to reuse the same
|
|
exit node for each. If the value is prepended with a \'.\', it is treated as
|
|
matching an entire domain. If one of the values is just a \'.', it means
|
|
match everything. This option is useful if you frequently connect to sites
|
|
that will expire all your authentication cookies (i.e. log you out) if
|
|
your IP address changes. Note that this option does have the disadvantage
|
|
of making it more clear that a given history is associated with a single
|
|
user. However, most people who would wish to observe this will observe it
|
|
through cookies or other protocol-specific means anyhow.
|
|
|
|
**TrackHostExitsExpire** __NUM__::
|
|
Since exit servers go up and down, it is desirable to expire the
|
|
association between host and exit server after NUM seconds. The default is
|
|
1800 seconds (30 minutes).
|
|
|
|
**UpdateBridgesFromAuthority** **0**|**1**::
|
|
When set (along with UseBridges), Tor will try to fetch bridge descriptors
|
|
from the configured bridge authorities when feasible. It will fall back to
|
|
a direct request if the authority responds with a 404. (Default: 0)
|
|
|
|
**UseBridges** **0**|**1**::
|
|
When set, Tor will fetch descriptors for each bridge listed in the "Bridge"
|
|
config lines, and use these relays as both entry guards and directory
|
|
guards. (Default: 0)
|
|
|
|
**UseEntryGuards** **0**|**1**::
|
|
If this option is set to 1, we pick a few long-term entry servers, and try
|
|
to stick with them. This is desirable because constantly changing servers
|
|
increases the odds that an adversary who owns some servers will observe a
|
|
fraction of your paths. (Defaults to 1.)
|
|
|
|
**NumEntryGuards** __NUM__::
|
|
If UseEntryGuards is set to 1, we will try to pick a total of NUM routers
|
|
as long-term entries for our circuits. (Defaults to 3.)
|
|
|
|
**SafeSocks** **0**|**1**::
|
|
When this option is enabled, Tor will reject application connections that
|
|
use unsafe variants of the socks protocol -- ones that only provide an IP
|
|
address, meaning the application is doing a DNS resolve first.
|
|
Specifically, these are socks4 and socks5 when not doing remote DNS.
|
|
(Defaults to 0.)
|
|
|
|
**TestSocks** **0**|**1**::
|
|
When this option is enabled, Tor will make a notice-level log entry for
|
|
each connection to the Socks port indicating whether the request used a
|
|
safe socks protocol or an unsafe one (see above entry on SafeSocks). This
|
|
helps to determine whether an application using Tor is possibly leaking
|
|
DNS requests. (Default: 0)
|
|
|
|
**WarnUnsafeSocks** **0**|**1**::
|
|
When this option is enabled, Tor will warn whenever a request is
|
|
received that only contains an IP address instead of a hostname. Allowing
|
|
applications to do DNS resolves themselves is usually a bad idea and
|
|
can leak your location to attackers. (Default: 1)
|
|
|
|
**VirtualAddrNetwork** __Address__/__bits__::
|
|
When Tor needs to assign a virtual (unused) address because of a MAPADDRESS
|
|
command from the controller or the AutomapHostsOnResolve feature, Tor
|
|
picks an unassigned address from this range. (Default:
|
|
127.192.0.0/10) +
|
|
+
|
|
When providing proxy server service to a network of computers using a tool
|
|
like dns-proxy-tor, change this address to "10.192.0.0/10" or
|
|
"172.16.0.0/12". The default **VirtualAddrNetwork** address range on a
|
|
properly configured machine will route to the loopback interface. For
|
|
local use, no change to the default VirtualAddrNetwork setting is needed.
|
|
|
|
**AllowNonRFC953Hostnames** **0**|**1**::
|
|
When this option is disabled, Tor blocks hostnames containing illegal
|
|
characters (like @ and :) rather than sending them to an exit node to be
|
|
resolved. This helps trap accidental attempts to resolve URLs and so on.
|
|
(Default: 0)
|
|
|
|
**AllowDotExit** **0**|**1**::
|
|
If enabled, we convert "www.google.com.foo.exit" addresses on the
|
|
SocksPort/TransPort/NATDPort into "www.google.com" addresses that exit from
|
|
the node "foo". Disabled by default since attacking websites and exit
|
|
relays can use it to manipulate your path selection. (Default: 0)
|
|
|
|
**FastFirstHopPK** **0**|**1**::
|
|
When this option is disabled, Tor uses the public key step for the first
|
|
hop of creating circuits. Skipping it is generally safe since we have
|
|
already used TLS to authenticate the relay and to establish forward-secure
|
|
keys. Turning this option off makes circuit building slower. +
|
|
+
|
|
Note that Tor will always use the public key step for the first hop if it's
|
|
operating as a relay, and it will never use the public key step if it
|
|
doesn't yet know the onion key of the first hop. (Default: 1)
|
|
|
|
**TransPort** \['address':]__port__|**auto** [_isolation flags_]::
|
|
Open this port to listen for transparent proxy connections. Set this to
|
|
0 if you don't want to allow transparent proxy connections. Set the port
|
|
to "auto" to have Tor pick a port for you. This directive can be
|
|
specified multiple times to bind to multiple addresses/ports. See
|
|
SOCKSPort for an explanation of isolation flags. +
|
|
+
|
|
TransPort requires OS support for transparent proxies, such as BSDs' pf or
|
|
Linux's IPTables. If you're planning to use Tor as a transparent proxy for
|
|
a network, you'll want to examine and change VirtualAddrNetwork from the
|
|
default setting. You'll also want to set the TransListenAddress option for
|
|
the network you'd like to proxy. (Default: 0).
|
|
|
|
**TransListenAddress** __IP__[:__PORT__]::
|
|
Bind to this address to listen for transparent proxy connections. (Default:
|
|
127.0.0.1). This is useful for exporting a transparent proxy server to an
|
|
entire network. (DEPRECATED: As of 0.2.3.x-alpha, you can
|
|
now use multiple TransPort entries, and provide addresses for TransPort
|
|
entries, so TransListenAddress no longer has a purpose. For backward
|
|
compatibility, TransListenAddress is only allowed when TransPort is just
|
|
a port number.)
|
|
|
|
**NATDPort** \['address':]__port__|**auto** [_isolation flags_]::
|
|
Open this port to listen for connections from old versions of ipfw (as
|
|
included in old versions of FreeBSD, etc) using the NATD protocol.
|
|
Use 0 if you don't want to allow NATD connections. Set the port
|
|
to "auto" to have Tor pick a port for you. This directive can be
|
|
specified multiple times to bind to multiple addresses/ports. See
|
|
SOCKSPort for an explanation of isolation flags. +
|
|
+
|
|
This option is only for people who cannot use TransPort. (Default: 0)
|
|
|
|
**NATDListenAddress** __IP__[:__PORT__]::
|
|
Bind to this address to listen for NATD connections. (DEPRECATED: As of
|
|
0.2.3.x-alpha, you can now use multiple NATDPort entries, and provide
|
|
addresses for NATDPort entries, so NATDListenAddress no longer has a
|
|
purpose. For backward compatibility, NATDListenAddress is only allowed
|
|
when NATDPort is just a port number.)
|
|
|
|
**AutomapHostsOnResolve** **0**|**1**::
|
|
When this option is enabled, and we get a request to resolve an address
|
|
that ends with one of the suffixes in **AutomapHostsSuffixes**, we map an
|
|
unused virtual address to that address, and return the new virtual address.
|
|
This is handy for making ".onion" addresses work with applications that
|
|
resolve an address and then connect to it. (Default: 0).
|
|
|
|
**AutomapHostsSuffixes** __SUFFIX__,__SUFFIX__,__...__::
|
|
A comma-separated list of suffixes to use with **AutomapHostsOnResolve**.
|
|
The "." suffix is equivalent to "all addresses." (Default: .exit,.onion).
|
|
|
|
**DNSPort** \['address':]__port__|**auto** [_isolation flags_]::
|
|
If non-zero, open this port to listen for UDP DNS requests, and resolve
|
|
them anonymously. Set the port to "auto" to have Tor pick a port for
|
|
you. This directive can be specified multiple times to bind to multiple
|
|
addresses/ports. See SOCKSPort for an explanation of isolation
|
|
flags. (Default: 0).
|
|
|
|
**DNSListenAddress** __IP__[:__PORT__]::
|
|
Bind to this address to listen for DNS connections. (DEPRECATED: As of
|
|
0.2.3.x-alpha, you can now use multiple DNSPort entries, and provide
|
|
addresses for DNSPort entries, so DNSListenAddress no longer has a
|
|
purpose. For backward compatibility, DNSListenAddress is only allowed
|
|
when DNSPort is just a port number.)
|
|
|
|
**ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses** **0**|**1**::
|
|
If true, Tor does not believe any anonymously retrieved DNS answer that
|
|
tells it that an address resolves to an internal address (like 127.0.0.1 or
|
|
192.168.0.1). This option prevents certain browser-based attacks; don't
|
|
turn it off unless you know what you're doing. (Default: 1).
|
|
|
|
**ClientRejectInternalAddresses** **0**|**1**::
|
|
If true, Tor does not try to fulfill requests to connect to an internal
|
|
address (like 127.0.0.1 or 192.168.0.1) __unless a exit node is
|
|
specifically requested__ (for example, via a .exit hostname, or a
|
|
controller request). (Default: 1).
|
|
|
|
**DownloadExtraInfo** **0**|**1**::
|
|
If true, Tor downloads and caches "extra-info" documents. These documents
|
|
contain information about servers other than the information in their
|
|
regular router descriptors. Tor does not use this information for anything
|
|
itself; to save bandwidth, leave this option turned off. (Default: 0).
|
|
|
|
**FallbackNetworkstatusFile** __FILENAME__::
|
|
If Tor doesn't have a cached networkstatus file, it starts out using this
|
|
one instead. Even if this file is out of date, Tor can still use it to
|
|
learn about directory mirrors, so it doesn't need to put load on the
|
|
authorities. (Default: None).
|
|
|
|
**WarnPlaintextPorts** __port__,__port__,__...__::
|
|
Tells Tor to issue a warnings whenever the user tries to make an anonymous
|
|
connection to one of these ports. This option is designed to alert users
|
|
to services that risk sending passwords in the clear. (Default:
|
|
23,109,110,143).
|
|
|
|
**RejectPlaintextPorts** __port__,__port__,__...__::
|
|
Like WarnPlaintextPorts, but instead of warning about risky port uses, Tor
|
|
will instead refuse to make the connection. (Default: None).
|
|
|
|
**AllowSingleHopCircuits** **0**|**1**::
|
|
When this option is set, the attached Tor controller can use relays
|
|
that have the **AllowSingleHopExits** option turned on to build
|
|
one-hop Tor connections. (Default: 0)
|
|
|
|
**OptimisticData** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
|
|
When this option is set, and Tor is using an exit node that supports
|
|
the feature, it will try optimistically to send data to the exit node
|
|
without waiting for the exit node to report whether the connection
|
|
succeeded. This can save a round-trip time for protocols like HTTP
|
|
where the client talks first. If OptimisticData is set to **auto**,
|
|
Tor will look at the UseOptimisticData parameter in the networkstatus.
|
|
(Default: auto)
|
|
|
|
|
|
SERVER OPTIONS
|
|
--------------
|
|
|
|
The following options are useful only for servers (that is, if ORPort
|
|
is non-zero):
|
|
|
|
**Address** __address__::
|
|
The IP address or fully qualified domain name of this server (e.g.
|
|
moria.mit.edu). You can leave this unset, and Tor will guess your IP
|
|
address. This IP address is the one used to tell clients and other
|
|
servers where to find your Tor server; it doesn't affect the IP that your
|
|
Tor client binds to. To bind to a different address, use the
|
|
*ListenAddress and OutboundBindAddress options.
|
|
|
|
**AllowSingleHopExits** **0**|**1**::
|
|
This option controls whether clients can use this server as a single hop
|
|
proxy. If set to 1, clients can use this server as an exit even if it is
|
|
the only hop in the circuit. Note that most clients will refuse to use
|
|
servers that set this option, since most clients have
|
|
ExcludeSingleHopRelays set. (Default: 0)
|
|
|
|
**AssumeReachable** **0**|**1**::
|
|
This option is used when bootstrapping a new Tor network. If set to 1,
|
|
don't do self-reachability testing; just upload your server descriptor
|
|
immediately. If **AuthoritativeDirectory** is also set, this option
|
|
instructs the dirserver to bypass remote reachability testing too and list
|
|
all connected servers as running.
|
|
|
|
**BridgeRelay** **0**|**1**::
|
|
Sets the relay to act as a "bridge" with respect to relaying connections
|
|
from bridge users to the Tor network. It mainly causes Tor to publish a
|
|
server descriptor to the bridge database, rather than publishing a relay
|
|
descriptor to the public directory authorities.
|
|
|
|
**ContactInfo** __email_address__::
|
|
Administrative contact information for server. This line might get picked
|
|
up by spam harvesters, so you may want to obscure the fact that it's an
|
|
email address.
|
|
|
|
**ExitPolicy** __policy__,__policy__,__...__::
|
|
Set an exit policy for this server. Each policy is of the form
|
|
"**accept**|**reject** __ADDR__[/__MASK__][:__PORT__]". If /__MASK__ is
|
|
omitted then this policy just applies to the host given. Instead of giving
|
|
a host or network you can also use "\*" to denote the universe (0.0.0.0/0).
|
|
__PORT__ can be a single port number, an interval of ports
|
|
"__FROM_PORT__-__TO_PORT__", or "\*". If __PORT__ is omitted, that means
|
|
"\*". +
|
|
+
|
|
For example, "accept 18.7.22.69:\*,reject 18.0.0.0/8:\*,accept \*:\*" would
|
|
reject any traffic destined for MIT except for web.mit.edu, and accept
|
|
anything else. +
|
|
+
|
|
To specify all internal and link-local networks (including 0.0.0.0/8,
|
|
169.254.0.0/16, 127.0.0.0/8, 192.168.0.0/16, 10.0.0.0/8, and
|
|
172.16.0.0/12), you can use the "private" alias instead of an address.
|
|
These addresses are rejected by default (at the beginning of your exit
|
|
policy), along with your public IP address, unless you set the
|
|
ExitPolicyRejectPrivate config option to 0. For example, once you've done
|
|
that, you could allow HTTP to 127.0.0.1 and block all other connections to
|
|
internal networks with "accept 127.0.0.1:80,reject private:\*", though that
|
|
may also allow connections to your own computer that are addressed to its
|
|
public (external) IP address. See RFC 1918 and RFC 3330 for more details
|
|
about internal and reserved IP address space. +
|
|
+
|
|
This directive can be specified multiple times so you don't have to put it
|
|
all on one line. +
|
|
+
|
|
Policies are considered first to last, and the first match wins. If you
|
|
want to \_replace_ the default exit policy, end your exit policy with
|
|
either a reject \*:* or an accept \*:*. Otherwise, you're \_augmenting_
|
|
(prepending to) the default exit policy. The default exit policy is: +
|
|
|
|
reject *:25
|
|
reject *:119
|
|
reject *:135-139
|
|
reject *:445
|
|
reject *:563
|
|
reject *:1214
|
|
reject *:4661-4666
|
|
reject *:6346-6429
|
|
reject *:6699
|
|
reject *:6881-6999
|
|
accept *:*
|
|
|
|
**ExitPolicyRejectPrivate** **0**|**1**::
|
|
Reject all private (local) networks, along with your own public IP address,
|
|
at the beginning of your exit policy. See above entry on ExitPolicy.
|
|
(Default: 1)
|
|
|
|
**MaxOnionsPending** __NUM__::
|
|
If you have more than this number of onionskins queued for decrypt, reject
|
|
new ones. (Default: 100)
|
|
|
|
**MyFamily** __node__,__node__,__...__::
|
|
Declare that this Tor server is controlled or administered by a group or
|
|
organization identical or similar to that of the other servers, defined by
|
|
their identity fingerprints or nicknames. When two servers both declare
|
|
that they are in the same \'family', Tor clients will not use them in the
|
|
same circuit. (Each server only needs to list the other servers in its
|
|
family; it doesn't need to list itself, but it won't hurt.)
|
|
|
|
**Nickname** __name__::
|
|
Set the server's nickname to \'name'. Nicknames must be between 1 and 19
|
|
characters inclusive, and must contain only the characters [a-zA-Z0-9].
|
|
|
|
**NumCPUs** __num__::
|
|
How many processes to use at once for decrypting onionskins and other
|
|
parallelizable operations. If this is set to 0, Tor will try to detect
|
|
how many CPUs you have, defaulting to 1 if it can't tell. (Default: 0)
|
|
|
|
**ORPort** __PORT__|**auto**::
|
|
Advertise this port to listen for connections from Tor clients and
|
|
servers. This option is required to be a Tor server.
|
|
Set it to "auto" to have Tor pick a port for you. (Default: 0).
|
|
|
|
**ORListenAddress** __IP__[:__PORT__]::
|
|
Bind to this IP address to listen for connections from Tor clients and
|
|
servers. If you specify a port, bind to this port rather than the one
|
|
specified in ORPort. (Default: 0.0.0.0) This directive can be specified
|
|
multiple times to bind to multiple addresses/ports.
|
|
|
|
**PortForwarding** **0**|**1**::
|
|
Attempt to automatically forward the DirPort and ORPort on a NAT router
|
|
connecting this Tor server to the Internet. If set, Tor will try both
|
|
NAT-PMP (common on Apple routers) and UPnP (common on routers from other
|
|
manufacturers). (Default: 0)
|
|
|
|
**PortForwardingHelper** __filename__|__pathname__::
|
|
If PortForwarding is set, use this executable to configure the forwarding.
|
|
If set to a filename, the system path will be searched for the executable.
|
|
If set to a path, only the specified path will be executed.
|
|
(Default: tor-fw-helper)
|
|
|
|
**PublishServerDescriptor** **0**|**1**|**v1**|**v2**|**v3**|**bridge**,**...**::
|
|
This option specifies which descriptors Tor will publish when acting as
|
|
a relay. You can
|
|
choose multiple arguments, separated by commas.
|
|
+
|
|
If this option is set to 0, Tor will not publish its
|
|
descriptors to any directories. (This is useful if you're testing
|
|
out your server, or if you're using a Tor controller that handles directory
|
|
publishing for you.) Otherwise, Tor will publish its descriptors of all
|
|
type(s) specified. The default is "1",
|
|
which means "if running as a server, publish the
|
|
appropriate descriptors to the authorities".
|
|
|
|
**ShutdownWaitLength** __NUM__::
|
|
When we get a SIGINT and we're a server, we begin shutting down:
|
|
we close listeners and start refusing new circuits. After **NUM**
|
|
seconds, we exit. If we get a second SIGINT, we exit immedi-
|
|
ately. (Default: 30 seconds)
|
|
|
|
**HeartbeatPeriod** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**::
|
|
Log a heartbeat message every **HeartbeatPeriod** seconds. This is
|
|
a log level __info__ message, designed to let you know your Tor
|
|
server is still alive and doing useful things. Settings this
|
|
to 0 will disable the heartbeat. (Default: 6 hours)
|
|
|
|
**AccountingMax** __N__ **bytes**|**KB**|**MB**|**GB**|**TB**::
|
|
Never send more than the specified number of bytes in a given accounting
|
|
period, or receive more than that number in the period. For example, with
|
|
AccountingMax set to 1 GB, a server could send 900 MB and receive 800 MB
|
|
and continue running. It will only hibernate once one of the two reaches 1
|
|
GB. When the number of bytes gets low, Tor will stop accepting new
|
|
connections and circuits. When the number of bytes
|
|
is exhausted, Tor will hibernate until some
|
|
time in the next accounting period. To prevent all servers from waking at
|
|
the same time, Tor will also wait until a random point in each period
|
|
before waking up. If you have bandwidth cost issues, enabling hibernation
|
|
is preferable to setting a low bandwidth, since it provides users with a
|
|
collection of fast servers that are up some of the time, which is more
|
|
useful than a set of slow servers that are always "available".
|
|
|
|
**AccountingStart** **day**|**week**|**month** [__day__] __HH:MM__::
|
|
Specify how long accounting periods last. If **month** is given, each
|
|
accounting period runs from the time __HH:MM__ on the __dayth__ day of one
|
|
month to the same day and time of the next. (The day must be between 1 and
|
|
28.) If **week** is given, each accounting period runs from the time __HH:MM__
|
|
of the __dayth__ day of one week to the same day and time of the next week,
|
|
with Monday as day 1 and Sunday as day 7. If **day** is given, each
|
|
accounting period runs from the time __HH:MM__ each day to the same time on
|
|
the next day. All times are local, and given in 24-hour time. (Defaults to
|
|
"month 1 0:00".)
|
|
|
|
**RefuseUnknownExits** **0**|**1**|**auto**::
|
|
Prevent nodes that don't appear in the consensus from exiting using this
|
|
relay. If the option is 1, we always block exit attempts from such
|
|
nodes; if it's 0, we never do, and if the option is "auto", then we do
|
|
whatever the authorities suggest in the consensus. (Defaults to auto.)
|
|
|
|
**ServerDNSResolvConfFile** __filename__::
|
|
Overrides the default DNS configuration with the configuration in
|
|
__filename__. The file format is the same as the standard Unix
|
|
"**resolv.conf**" file (7). This option, like all other ServerDNS options,
|
|
only affects name lookups that your server does on behalf of clients.
|
|
(Defaults to use the system DNS configuration.)
|
|
|
|
**ServerDNSAllowBrokenConfig** **0**|**1**::
|
|
If this option is false, Tor exits immediately if there are problems
|
|
parsing the system DNS configuration or connecting to nameservers.
|
|
Otherwise, Tor continues to periodically retry the system nameservers until
|
|
it eventually succeeds. (Defaults to "1".)
|
|
|
|
**ServerDNSSearchDomains** **0**|**1**::
|
|
If set to 1, then we will search for addresses in the local search domain.
|
|
For example, if this system is configured to believe it is in
|
|
"example.com", and a client tries to connect to "www", the client will be
|
|
connected to "www.example.com". This option only affects name lookups that
|
|
your server does on behalf of clients. (Defaults to "0".)
|
|
|
|
**ServerDNSDetectHijacking** **0**|**1**::
|
|
When this option is set to 1, we will test periodically to determine
|
|
whether our local nameservers have been configured to hijack failing DNS
|
|
requests (usually to an advertising site). If they are, we will attempt to
|
|
correct this. This option only affects name lookups that your server does
|
|
on behalf of clients. (Defaults to "1".)
|
|
|
|
**ServerDNSTestAddresses** __address__,__address__,__...__::
|
|
When we're detecting DNS hijacking, make sure that these __valid__ addresses
|
|
aren't getting redirected. If they are, then our DNS is completely useless,
|
|
and we'll reset our exit policy to "reject *:*". This option only affects
|
|
name lookups that your server does on behalf of clients. (Defaults to
|
|
"www.google.com, www.mit.edu, www.yahoo.com, www.slashdot.org".)
|
|
|
|
**ServerDNSAllowNonRFC953Hostnames** **0**|**1**::
|
|
When this option is disabled, Tor does not try to resolve hostnames
|
|
containing illegal characters (like @ and :) rather than sending them to an
|
|
exit node to be resolved. This helps trap accidental attempts to resolve
|
|
URLs and so on. This option only affects name lookups that your server does
|
|
on behalf of clients. (Default: 0)
|
|
|
|
**BridgeRecordUsageByCountry** **0**|**1**::
|
|
When this option is enabled and BridgeRelay is also enabled, and we have
|
|
GeoIP data, Tor keeps a keep a per-country count of how many client
|
|
addresses have contacted it so that it can help the bridge authority guess
|
|
which countries have blocked access to it. (Default: 1)
|
|
|
|
**ServerDNSRandomizeCase** **0**|**1**::
|
|
When this option is set, Tor sets the case of each character randomly in
|
|
outgoing DNS requests, and makes sure that the case matches in DNS replies.
|
|
This so-called "0x20 hack" helps resist some types of DNS poisoning attack.
|
|
For more information, see "Increased DNS Forgery Resistance through
|
|
0x20-Bit Encoding". This option only affects name lookups that your server
|
|
does on behalf of clients. (Default: 1)
|
|
|
|
**GeoIPFile** __filename__::
|
|
A filename containing GeoIP data, for use with BridgeRecordUsageByCountry.
|
|
|
|
**CellStatistics** **0**|**1**::
|
|
When this option is enabled, Tor writes statistics on the mean time that
|
|
cells spend in circuit queues to disk every 24 hours. (Default: 0)
|
|
|
|
**DirReqStatistics** **0**|**1**::
|
|
When this option is enabled, Tor writes statistics on the number and
|
|
response time of network status requests to disk every 24 hours.
|
|
(Default: 0)
|
|
|
|
**EntryStatistics** **0**|**1**::
|
|
When this option is enabled, Tor writes statistics on the number of
|
|
directly connecting clients to disk every 24 hours. (Default: 0)
|
|
|
|
**ExitPortStatistics** **0**|**1**::
|
|
When this option is enabled, Tor writes statistics on the number of relayed
|
|
bytes and opened stream per exit port to disk every 24 hours. (Default: 0)
|
|
|
|
**ConnDirectionStatistics** **0**|**1**::
|
|
When this option is enabled, Tor writes statistics on the bidirectional use
|
|
of connections to disk every 24 hours. (Default: 0)
|
|
|
|
**ExtraInfoStatistics** **0**|**1**::
|
|
When this option is enabled, Tor includes previously gathered statistics in
|
|
its extra-info documents that it uploads to the directory authorities.
|
|
(Default: 0)
|
|
|
|
DIRECTORY SERVER OPTIONS
|
|
------------------------
|
|
|
|
The following options are useful only for directory servers (that is,
|
|
if DirPort is non-zero):
|
|
|
|
**AuthoritativeDirectory** **0**|**1**::
|
|
When this option is set to 1, Tor operates as an authoritative directory
|
|
server. Instead of caching the directory, it generates its own list of
|
|
good servers, signs it, and sends that to the clients. Unless the clients
|
|
already have you listed as a trusted directory, you probably do not want
|
|
to set this option. Please coordinate with the other admins at
|
|
tor-ops@torproject.org if you think you should be a directory.
|
|
|
|
**DirPortFrontPage** __FILENAME__::
|
|
When this option is set, it takes an HTML file and publishes it as "/" on
|
|
the DirPort. Now relay operators can provide a disclaimer without needing
|
|
to set up a separate webserver. There's a sample disclaimer in
|
|
contrib/tor-exit-notice.html.
|
|
|
|
**V1AuthoritativeDirectory** **0**|**1**::
|
|
When this option is set in addition to **AuthoritativeDirectory**, Tor
|
|
generates version 1 directory and running-routers documents (for legacy
|
|
Tor clients up to 0.1.0.x).
|
|
|
|
**V2AuthoritativeDirectory** **0**|**1**::
|
|
When this option is set in addition to **AuthoritativeDirectory**, Tor
|
|
generates version 2 network statuses and serves descriptors, etc as
|
|
described in doc/spec/dir-spec-v2.txt (for Tor clients and servers running
|
|
0.1.1.x and 0.1.2.x).
|
|
|
|
**V3AuthoritativeDirectory** **0**|**1**::
|
|
When this option is set in addition to **AuthoritativeDirectory**, Tor
|
|
generates version 3 network statuses and serves descriptors, etc as
|
|
described in doc/spec/dir-spec.txt (for Tor clients and servers running at
|
|
least 0.2.0.x).
|
|
|
|
**VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory** **0**|**1**::
|
|
When this option is set to 1, Tor adds information on which versions of
|
|
Tor are still believed safe for use to the published directory. Each
|
|
version 1 authority is automatically a versioning authority; version 2
|
|
authorities provide this service optionally. See **RecommendedVersions**,
|
|
**RecommendedClientVersions**, and **RecommendedServerVersions**.
|
|
|
|
**NamingAuthoritativeDirectory** **0**|**1**::
|
|
When this option is set to 1, then the server advertises that it has
|
|
opinions about nickname-to-fingerprint bindings. It will include these
|
|
opinions in its published network-status pages, by listing servers with
|
|
the flag "Named" if a correct binding between that nickname and fingerprint
|
|
has been registered with the dirserver. Naming dirservers will refuse to
|
|
accept or publish descriptors that contradict a registered binding. See
|
|
**approved-routers** in the **FILES** section below.
|
|
|
|
**HSAuthoritativeDir** **0**|**1**::
|
|
When this option is set in addition to **AuthoritativeDirectory**, Tor also
|
|
accepts and serves v0 hidden service descriptors,
|
|
which are produced and used by Tor 0.2.1.x and older. (Default: 0)
|
|
|
|
**HidServDirectoryV2** **0**|**1**::
|
|
When this option is set, Tor accepts and serves v2 hidden service
|
|
descriptors. Setting DirPort is not required for this, because clients
|
|
connect via the ORPort by default. (Default: 1)
|
|
|
|
**BridgeAuthoritativeDir** **0**|**1**::
|
|
When this option is set in addition to **AuthoritativeDirectory**, Tor
|
|
accepts and serves router descriptors, but it caches and serves the main
|
|
networkstatus documents rather than generating its own. (Default: 0)
|
|
|
|
**MinUptimeHidServDirectoryV2** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**::
|
|
Minimum uptime of a v2 hidden service directory to be accepted as such by
|
|
authoritative directories. (Default: 25 hours)
|
|
|
|
**DirPort** __PORT__|**auto**::
|
|
If this option is nonzero, advertise the directory service on this port.
|
|
Set it to "auto" to have Tor pick a port for you. (Default: 0)
|
|
|
|
**DirListenAddress** __IP__[:__PORT__]::
|
|
Bind the directory service to this address. If you specify a port, bind to
|
|
this port rather than the one specified in DirPort. (Default: 0.0.0.0)
|
|
This directive can be specified multiple times to bind to multiple
|
|
addresses/ports.
|
|
|
|
**DirPolicy** __policy__,__policy__,__...__::
|
|
Set an entrance policy for this server, to limit who can connect to the
|
|
directory ports. The policies have the same form as exit policies above.
|
|
|
|
**FetchV2Networkstatus** **0**|**1**::
|
|
If set, we try to fetch the (obsolete, unused) version 2 network status
|
|
consensus documents from the directory authorities. No currently
|
|
supported Tor version uses them. (Default: 0.)
|
|
|
|
|
|
DIRECTORY AUTHORITY SERVER OPTIONS
|
|
----------------------------------
|
|
|
|
**RecommendedVersions** __STRING__::
|
|
STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions currently believed to be
|
|
safe. The list is included in each directory, and nodes which pull down the
|
|
directory learn whether they need to upgrade. This option can appear
|
|
multiple times: the values from multiple lines are spliced together. When
|
|
this is set then **VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory** should be set too.
|
|
|
|
**RecommendedClientVersions** __STRING__::
|
|
STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions currently believed to be
|
|
safe for clients to use. This information is included in version 2
|
|
directories. If this is not set then the value of **RecommendedVersions**
|
|
is used. When this is set then **VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory** should
|
|
be set too.
|
|
|
|
**RecommendedServerVersions** __STRING__::
|
|
STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions currently believed to be
|
|
safe for servers to use. This information is included in version 2
|
|
directories. If this is not set then the value of **RecommendedVersions**
|
|
is used. When this is set then **VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory** should
|
|
be set too.
|
|
|
|
**ConsensusParams** __STRING__::
|
|
STRING is a space-separated list of key=value pairs that Tor will include
|
|
in the "params" line of its networkstatus vote.
|
|
|
|
**DirAllowPrivateAddresses** **0**|**1**::
|
|
If set to 1, Tor will accept router descriptors with arbitrary "Address"
|
|
elements. Otherwise, if the address is not an IP address or is a private IP
|
|
address, it will reject the router descriptor. Defaults to 0.
|
|
|
|
**AuthDirBadDir** __AddressPattern...__::
|
|
Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that
|
|
will be listed as bad directories in any network status document this
|
|
authority publishes, if **AuthDirListBadDirs** is set.
|
|
|
|
**AuthDirBadExit** __AddressPattern...__::
|
|
Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that
|
|
will be listed as bad exits in any network status document this authority
|
|
publishes, if **AuthDirListBadExits** is set.
|
|
|
|
**AuthDirInvalid** __AddressPattern...__::
|
|
Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that
|
|
will never be listed as "valid" in any network status document that this
|
|
authority publishes.
|
|
|
|
**AuthDirReject** __AddressPattern__...::
|
|
Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that
|
|
will never be listed at all in any network status document that this
|
|
authority publishes, or accepted as an OR address in any descriptor
|
|
submitted for publication by this authority.
|
|
|
|
**AuthDirListBadDirs** **0**|**1**::
|
|
Authoritative directories only. If set to 1, this directory has some
|
|
opinion about which nodes are unsuitable as directory caches. (Do not set
|
|
this to 1 unless you plan to list non-functioning directories as bad;
|
|
otherwise, you are effectively voting in favor of every declared
|
|
directory.)
|
|
|
|
**AuthDirListBadExits** **0**|**1**::
|
|
Authoritative directories only. If set to 1, this directory has some
|
|
opinion about which nodes are unsuitable as exit nodes. (Do not set this to
|
|
1 unless you plan to list non-functioning exits as bad; otherwise, you are
|
|
effectively voting in favor of every declared exit as an exit.)
|
|
|
|
**AuthDirRejectUnlisted** **0**|**1**::
|
|
Authoritative directories only. If set to 1, the directory server rejects
|
|
all uploaded server descriptors that aren't explicitly listed in the
|
|
fingerprints file. This acts as a "panic button" if we get hit with a Sybil
|
|
attack. (Default: 0)
|
|
|
|
**AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr** __NUM__::
|
|
Authoritative directories only. The maximum number of servers that we will
|
|
list as acceptable on a single IP address. Set this to "0" for "no limit".
|
|
(Default: 2)
|
|
|
|
**AuthDirMaxServersPerAuthAddr** __NUM__::
|
|
Authoritative directories only. Like AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr, but applies
|
|
to addresses shared with directory authorities. (Default: 5)
|
|
|
|
**BridgePassword** __Password__::
|
|
If set, contains an HTTP authenticator that tells a bridge authority to
|
|
serve all requested bridge information. Used for debugging. (Default:
|
|
not set.)
|
|
|
|
**V3AuthVotingInterval** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**::
|
|
V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the server's preferred voting
|
|
interval. Note that voting will __actually__ happen at an interval chosen
|
|
by consensus from all the authorities' preferred intervals. This time
|
|
SHOULD divide evenly into a day. (Default: 1 hour)
|
|
|
|
**V3AuthVoteDelay** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**::
|
|
V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the server's preferred delay
|
|
between publishing its vote and assuming it has all the votes from all the
|
|
other authorities. Note that the actual time used is not the server's
|
|
preferred time, but the consensus of all preferences. (Default: 5 minutes.)
|
|
|
|
**V3AuthDistDelay** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**::
|
|
V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the server's preferred delay
|
|
between publishing its consensus and signature and assuming it has all the
|
|
signatures from all the other authorities. Note that the actual time used
|
|
is not the server's preferred time, but the consensus of all preferences.
|
|
(Default: 5 minutes.)
|
|
|
|
**V3AuthNIntervalsValid** __NUM__::
|
|
V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the number of VotingIntervals
|
|
for which each consensus should be valid for. Choosing high numbers
|
|
increases network partitioning risks; choosing low numbers increases
|
|
directory traffic. Note that the actual number of intervals used is not the
|
|
server's preferred number, but the consensus of all preferences. Must be at
|
|
least 2. (Default: 3.)
|
|
|
|
**V3BandwidthsFile** __FILENAME__::
|
|
V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the location of the
|
|
bandiwdth-authority generated file storing information on relays' measured
|
|
bandwidth capacities. (Default: unset.)
|
|
|
|
**V3AuthUseLegacyKey** **0**|**1**::
|
|
If set, the directory authority will sign consensuses not only with its
|
|
own signing key, but also with a "legacy" key and certificate with a
|
|
different identity. This feature is used to migrate directory authority
|
|
keys in the event of a compromise. (Default: 0.)
|
|
|
|
**RephistTrackTime** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**::
|
|
Tells an authority, or other node tracking node reliability and history,
|
|
that fine-grained information about nodes can be discarded when it hasn't
|
|
changed for a given amount of time. (Default: 24 hours)
|
|
|
|
**VoteOnHidServDirectoriesV2** **0**|**1**::
|
|
When this option is set in addition to **AuthoritativeDirectory**, Tor
|
|
votes on whether to accept relays as hidden service directories.
|
|
(Default: 1)
|
|
|
|
HIDDEN SERVICE OPTIONS
|
|
----------------------
|
|
|
|
The following options are used to configure a hidden service.
|
|
|
|
**HiddenServiceDir** __DIRECTORY__::
|
|
Store data files for a hidden service in DIRECTORY. Every hidden service
|
|
must have a separate directory. You may use this option multiple times to
|
|
specify multiple services. DIRECTORY must be an existing directory.
|
|
|
|
**HiddenServicePort** __VIRTPORT__ [__TARGET__]::
|
|
Configure a virtual port VIRTPORT for a hidden service. You may use this
|
|
option multiple times; each time applies to the service using the most
|
|
recent hiddenservicedir. By default, this option maps the virtual port to
|
|
the same port on 127.0.0.1. You may override the target port, address, or
|
|
both by specifying a target of addr, port, or addr:port. You may also have
|
|
multiple lines with the same VIRTPORT: when a user connects to that
|
|
VIRTPORT, one of the TARGETs from those lines will be chosen at random.
|
|
|
|
**PublishHidServDescriptors** **0**|**1**::
|
|
If set to 0, Tor will run any hidden services you configure, but it won't
|
|
advertise them to the rendezvous directory. This option is only useful if
|
|
you're using a Tor controller that handles hidserv publishing for you.
|
|
(Default: 1)
|
|
|
|
**HiddenServiceVersion** __version__,__version__,__...__::
|
|
A list of rendezvous service descriptor versions to publish for the hidden
|
|
service. Currently, only version 2 is supported. (Default: 2)
|
|
|
|
**HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient** __auth-type__ __client-name__,__client-name__,__...__::
|
|
If configured, the hidden service is accessible for authorized clients
|
|
only. The auth-type can either be \'basic' for a general-purpose
|
|
authorization protocol or \'stealth' for a less scalable protocol that also
|
|
hides service activity from unauthorized clients. Only clients that are
|
|
listed here are authorized to access the hidden service. Valid client names
|
|
are 1 to 19 characters long and only use characters in A-Za-z0-9+-_ (no
|
|
spaces). If this option is set, the hidden service is not accessible for
|
|
clients without authorization any more. Generated authorization data can be
|
|
found in the hostname file. Clients need to put this authorization data in
|
|
their configuration file using **HidServAuth**.
|
|
|
|
**RendPostPeriod** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**::
|
|
Every time the specified period elapses, Tor uploads any rendezvous
|
|
service descriptors to the directory servers. This information is also
|
|
uploaded whenever it changes. (Default: 1 hour)
|
|
|
|
TESTING NETWORK OPTIONS
|
|
-----------------------
|
|
|
|
The following options are used for running a testing Tor network.
|
|
|
|
**TestingTorNetwork** **0**|**1**::
|
|
If set to 1, Tor adjusts default values of the configuration options below,
|
|
so that it is easier to set up a testing Tor network. May only be set if
|
|
non-default set of DirServers is set. Cannot be unset while Tor is running.
|
|
(Default: 0) +
|
|
|
|
ServerDNSAllowBrokenConfig 1
|
|
DirAllowPrivateAddresses 1
|
|
EnforceDistinctSubnets 0
|
|
AssumeReachable 1
|
|
AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr 0
|
|
AuthDirMaxServersPerAuthAddr 0
|
|
ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses 0
|
|
ClientRejectInternalAddresses 0
|
|
CountPrivateBandwidth 1
|
|
ExitPolicyRejectPrivate 0
|
|
V3AuthVotingInterval 5 minutes
|
|
V3AuthVoteDelay 20 seconds
|
|
V3AuthDistDelay 20 seconds
|
|
MinUptimeHidServDirectoryV2 0 seconds
|
|
TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval 5 minutes
|
|
TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay 20 seconds
|
|
TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay 20 seconds
|
|
TestingAuthDirTimeToLearnReachability 0 minutes
|
|
TestingEstimatedDescriptorPropagationTime 0 minutes
|
|
|
|
**TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**::
|
|
Like V3AuthVotingInterval, but for initial voting interval before the first
|
|
consensus has been created. Changing this requires that
|
|
**TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 30 minutes)
|
|
|
|
**TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**::
|
|
Like TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay, but for initial voting interval before
|
|
the first consensus has been created. Changing this requires that
|
|
**TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 5 minutes)
|
|
|
|
**TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**::
|
|
Like TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay, but for initial voting interval before
|
|
the first consensus has been created. Changing this requires that
|
|
**TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 5 minutes)
|
|
|
|
**TestingAuthDirTimeToLearnReachability** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**::
|
|
After starting as an authority, do not make claims about whether routers
|
|
are Running until this much time has passed. Changing this requires
|
|
that **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 30 minutes)
|
|
|
|
**TestingEstimatedDescriptorPropagationTime** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**::
|
|
Clients try downloading router descriptors from directory caches after this
|
|
time. Changing this requires that **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default:
|
|
10 minutes)
|
|
|
|
SIGNALS
|
|
-------
|
|
|
|
Tor catches the following signals:
|
|
|
|
**SIGTERM**::
|
|
Tor will catch this, clean up and sync to disk if necessary, and exit.
|
|
|
|
**SIGINT**::
|
|
Tor clients behave as with SIGTERM; but Tor servers will do a controlled
|
|
slow shutdown, closing listeners and waiting 30 seconds before exiting.
|
|
(The delay can be configured with the ShutdownWaitLength config option.)
|
|
|
|
**SIGHUP**::
|
|
The signal instructs Tor to reload its configuration (including closing and
|
|
reopening logs), and kill and restart its helper processes if applicable.
|
|
|
|
**SIGUSR1**::
|
|
Log statistics about current connections, past connections, and throughput.
|
|
|
|
**SIGUSR2**::
|
|
Switch all logs to loglevel debug. You can go back to the old loglevels by
|
|
sending a SIGHUP.
|
|
|
|
**SIGCHLD**::
|
|
Tor receives this signal when one of its helper processes has exited, so it
|
|
can clean up.
|
|
|
|
**SIGPIPE**::
|
|
Tor catches this signal and ignores it.
|
|
|
|
**SIGXFSZ**::
|
|
If this signal exists on your platform, Tor catches and ignores it.
|
|
|
|
FILES
|
|
-----
|
|
|
|
**@CONFDIR@/torrc**::
|
|
The configuration file, which contains "option value" pairs.
|
|
|
|
**@LOCALSTATEDIR@/lib/tor/**::
|
|
The tor process stores keys and other data here.
|
|
|
|
__DataDirectory__**/cached-status/**::
|
|
The most recently downloaded network status document for each authority.
|
|
Each file holds one such document; the filenames are the hexadecimal
|
|
identity key fingerprints of the directory authorities.
|
|
|
|
__DataDirectory__**/cached-descriptors** and **cached-descriptors.new**::
|
|
These files hold downloaded router statuses. Some routers may appear more
|
|
than once; if so, the most recently published descriptor is used. Lines
|
|
beginning with @-signs are annotations that contain more information about
|
|
a given router. The ".new" file is an append-only journal; when it gets
|
|
too large, all entries are merged into a new cached-descriptors file.
|
|
|
|
__DataDirectory__**/cached-routers** and **cached-routers.new**::
|
|
Obsolete versions of cached-descriptors and cached-descriptors.new. When
|
|
Tor can't find the newer files, it looks here instead.
|
|
|
|
__DataDirectory__**/state**::
|
|
A set of persistent key-value mappings. These are documented in
|
|
the file. These include:
|
|
- The current entry guards and their status.
|
|
- The current bandwidth accounting values (unused so far; see
|
|
below).
|
|
- When the file was last written
|
|
- What version of Tor generated the state file
|
|
- A short history of bandwidth usage, as produced in the router
|
|
descriptors.
|
|
|
|
__DataDirectory__**/bw_accounting**::
|
|
Used to track bandwidth accounting values (when the current period starts
|
|
and ends; how much has been read and written so far this period). This file
|
|
is obsolete, and the data is now stored in the \'state' file as well. Only
|
|
used when bandwidth accounting is enabled.
|
|
|
|
__DataDirectory__**/control_auth_cookie**::
|
|
Used for cookie authentication with the controller. Location can be
|
|
overridden by the CookieAuthFile config option. Regenerated on startup. See
|
|
control-spec.txt for details. Only used when cookie authentication is
|
|
enabled.
|
|
|
|
__DataDirectory__**/keys/***::
|
|
Only used by servers. Holds identity keys and onion keys.
|
|
|
|
__DataDirectory__**/fingerprint**::
|
|
Only used by servers. Holds the fingerprint of the server's identity key.
|
|
|
|
__DataDirectory__**/approved-routers**::
|
|
Only for naming authoritative directory servers (see
|
|
**NamingAuthoritativeDirectory**). This file lists nickname to identity
|
|
bindings. Each line lists a nickname and a fingerprint separated by
|
|
whitespace. See your **fingerprint** file in the __DataDirectory__ for an
|
|
example line. If the nickname is **!reject** then descriptors from the
|
|
given identity (fingerprint) are rejected by this server. If it is
|
|
**!invalid** then descriptors are accepted but marked in the directory as
|
|
not valid, that is, not recommended.
|
|
|
|
__DataDirectory__**/router-stability**::
|
|
Only used by authoritative directory servers. Tracks measurements for
|
|
router mean-time-between-failures so that authorities have a good idea of
|
|
how to set their Stable flags.
|
|
|
|
__HiddenServiceDirectory__**/hostname**::
|
|
The <base32-encoded-fingerprint>.onion domain name for this hidden service.
|
|
If the hidden service is restricted to authorized clients only, this file
|
|
also contains authorization data for all clients.
|
|
|
|
__HiddenServiceDirectory__**/private_key**::
|
|
The private key for this hidden service.
|
|
|
|
__HiddenServiceDirectory__**/client_keys**::
|
|
Authorization data for a hidden service that is only accessible by
|
|
authorized clients.
|
|
|
|
SEE ALSO
|
|
--------
|
|
**privoxy**(1), **tsocks**(1), **torify**(1) +
|
|
|
|
**https://www.torproject.org/**
|
|
|
|
|
|
BUGS
|
|
----
|
|
|
|
Plenty, probably. Tor is still in development. Please report them.
|
|
|
|
AUTHORS
|
|
-------
|
|
Roger Dingledine [arma at mit.edu], Nick Mathewson [nickm at alum.mit.edu].
|
|
|