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108 lines
4.4 KiB
Plaintext
108 lines
4.4 KiB
Plaintext
Filename: 1xx-avoid-infinite-circuits.txt
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Title: Avoiding infinite length circuits
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Version:
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Last-Modified:
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Author: Roger Dingledine
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Created: 13-Mar-2007
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Status: Open
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Overview:
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Right now, an attacker can add load to the Tor network by extending a
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circuit an arbitrary number of times. Every cell that goes down the
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circuit then adds N times that amount of load in overall bandwidth
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use. This vulnerability arises because servers don't know their position
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on the path, so they can't tell how many nodes there are before them
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on the path.
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We propose a new set of relay cells that are distinguishable by
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intermediate hops as permitting extend cells. This approach will allow
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us to put an upper bound on circuit length relative to the number of
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colluding adversary nodes; but there are some downsides too.
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Motivation:
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The above attack can be used to generally increase load all across the
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network, or it can be used to target specific servers: by building a
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circuit back and forth between two victim servers, even a low-bandwidth
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attacker can soak up all the bandwidth offered by the fastest Tor
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servers.
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The general attacks could be used as a demonstration that Tor isn't
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perfect (leading to yet more media articles about "breaking" Tor), and
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the targetted attacks will come into play once we have a reputation
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system -- it will be trivial to DoS a server so it can't pass its
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reputation checks, in turn impacting security.
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Design:
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We should split RELAY cells into two types: RELAY and RELAY_EXTEND.
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Relay_extend cells can only be sent in the first K (say, 10) data
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cells sent across a circuit, and only relay_extend cells are allowed
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to contain extend requests. We still support obscuring the length of
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the circuit (if more research shows us what to do), because Alice can
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choose how many of the K to mark as relay_extend. Note that relay_extend
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cells *can* contain any sort of data cell; so in effect it's actually
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the relay type cells that are restricted. By default, she would just
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send the first K data cells over the stream as relay_extend cells,
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regardless of their actual type.
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Each intermediate server would pass on the same type of cell that it
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received (either relay or relay_extend), and the cell's destination
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will be able to learn whether it's allowed to contain an Extend request.
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If an intermediate server receives a relay_extend cell after it has
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already seen k data cells, or if it sees a relay cell that contains an
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extend request, then it tears down the circuit (protocol violation).
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Security implications:
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The upside is that this limits the bandwidth amplification factor to
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K: for an individual circuit to become arbitrary-length, the attacker
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would need an adversary-controlled node every K hops, and at that
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point the attack is no worse than if the attacker creates N/K separate
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K-hop circuits.
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On the other hand, we want to pick a large enough value of K that we
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don't mind the cap.
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If we ever want to take steps to hide the number of hops in the circuit
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or a node's position in the circuit, this design probably makes that
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more complex.
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Migration:
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Phase one: servers should recognize relay_extend cells and pass them
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on just like relay cells. Don't do any enforcement of the protocol
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yet. We could do this phase in the 0.2.0 timeline.
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Phase two: once support in phase one is pervasive, clients could start
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using relay_extend cells when all nodes currently in the circuit would
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recognize them. We could conceivably do this phase during 0.2.0 too.
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Phase three: once clients that don't use relay_extend cells are
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obsolete, servers should start enforcing the protocol.
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(Another migration plan would be to coordinate this with proposal
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105's new link versions. Would that be better/worse? Can somebody
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sketch out what it might look like?)
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Spec:
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[We can formalize this part once we think the design is a good one.]
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Additional complexity:
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Rather than limiting the relay_extend cells to being in the first K
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data cells seen, we could instead permit up to K relay_extend cells
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in the lifetime of the circuit. This would let us extend the circuit
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later on in its life if we decided it was worth doing, though we would
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reveal our intent to each node in the circuit when we do.
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Acknowledgements:
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This design has been kicking around since Christian Grothoff and I
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came up with it at PET 2004.
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