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Actually, we missed a rule about what routers to prefer: first prefer authority to non-authority, *then* running, *then* bandwidth. svn:r10969
897 lines
41 KiB
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897 lines
41 KiB
Plaintext
$Id$
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Tor directory protocol, version 2
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0. Scope and preliminaries
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This directory protocol is used by Tor version 0.1.1.x and 0.1.2.x. See
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dir-spec-v1.txt for information on earlier versions, and dir-spec.txt
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for information on later versions.
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0.1. Goals and motivation
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There were several problems with the way Tor handles directory information
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in version 0.1.0.x and earlier. Here are the problems we try to fix with
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this new design, already implemented in 0.1.1.x:
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1. Directories were very large and use up a lot of bandwidth: clients
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downloaded descriptors for all router several times an hour.
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2. Every directory authority was a trust bottleneck: if a single
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directory authority lied, it could make clients believe for a time an
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arbitrarily distorted view of the Tor network.
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3. Our current "verified server" system is kind of nonsensical.
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4. Getting more directory authorities would add more points of failure
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and worsen possible partitioning attacks.
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There are two problems that remain unaddressed by this design.
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5. Requiring every client to know about every router won't scale.
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6. Requiring every directory cache to know every router won't scale.
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We attempt to fix 1-4 here, and to build a solution that will work when we
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figure out an answer for 5. We haven't thought at all about what to do
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about 6.
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1. Outline
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There is a small set (say, around 10) of semi-trusted directory
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authorities. A default list of authorities is shipped with the Tor
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software. Users can change this list, but are encouraged not to do so, in
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order to avoid partitioning attacks.
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Routers periodically upload signed "descriptors" to the directory
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authorities describing their keys, capabilities, and other information.
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Routers may act as directory mirrors (also called "caches"), to reduce
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load on the directory authorities. They announce this in their
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descriptors.
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Each directory authority periodically generates and signs a compact
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"network status" document that lists that authority's view of the current
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descriptors and status for known routers, but which does not include the
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descriptors themselves.
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Directory mirrors download, cache, and re-serve network-status documents
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to clients.
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Clients, directory mirrors, and directory authorities all use
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network-status documents to find out when their list of routers is
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out-of-date. If it is, they download any missing router descriptors.
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Clients download missing descriptors from mirrors; mirrors and authorities
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download from authorities. Descriptors are downloaded by the hash of the
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descriptor, not by the server's identity key: this prevents servers from
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attacking clients by giving them descriptors nobody else uses.
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All directory information is uploaded and downloaded with HTTP.
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Coordination among directory authorities is done client-side: clients
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compute a vote-like algorithm among the network-status documents they
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have, and base their decisions on the result.
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1.1. What's different from 0.1.0.x?
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Clients used to download a signed concatenated set of router descriptors
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(called a "directory") from directory mirrors, regardless of which
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descriptors had changed.
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Between downloading directories, clients would download "network-status"
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documents that would list which servers were supposed to running.
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Clients would always believe the most recently published network-status
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document they were served.
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Routers used to upload fresh descriptors all the time, whether their keys
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and other information had changed or not.
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1.2. Document meta-format
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Router descriptors, directories, and running-routers documents all obey the
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following lightweight extensible information format.
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The highest level object is a Document, which consists of one or more
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Items. Every Item begins with a KeywordLine, followed by one or more
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Objects. A KeywordLine begins with a Keyword, optionally followed by
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whitespace and more non-newline characters, and ends with a newline. A
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Keyword is a sequence of one or more characters in the set [A-Za-z0-9-].
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An Object is a block of encoded data in pseudo-Open-PGP-style
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armor. (cf. RFC 2440)
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More formally:
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Document ::= (Item | NL)+
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Item ::= KeywordLine Object*
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KeywordLine ::= Keyword NL | Keyword WS ArgumentsChar+ NL
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Keyword = KeywordChar+
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KeywordChar ::= 'A' ... 'Z' | 'a' ... 'z' | '0' ... '9' | '-'
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ArgumentChar ::= any printing ASCII character except NL.
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WS = (SP | TAB)+
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Object ::= BeginLine Base-64-encoded-data EndLine
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BeginLine ::= "-----BEGIN " Keyword "-----" NL
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EndLine ::= "-----END " Keyword "-----" NL
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The BeginLine and EndLine of an Object must use the same keyword.
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When interpreting a Document, software MUST ignore any KeywordLine that
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starts with a keyword it doesn't recognize; future implementations MUST NOT
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require current clients to understand any KeywordLine not currently
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described.
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The "opt" keyword was used until Tor 0.1.2.5-alpha for non-critical future
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extensions. All implementations MUST ignore any item of the form "opt
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keyword ....." when they would not recognize "keyword ....."; and MUST
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treat "opt keyword ....." as synonymous with "keyword ......" when keyword
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is recognized.
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Implementations before 0.1.2.5-alpha rejected any document with a
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KeywordLine that started with a keyword that they didn't recognize.
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Implementations MUST prefix items not recognized by older versions of Tor
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with an "opt" until those versions of Tor are obsolete.
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Other implementations that want to extend Tor's directory format MAY
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introduce their own items. The keywords for extension items SHOULD start
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with the characters "x-" or "X-", to guarantee that they will not conflict
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with keywords used by future versions of Tor.
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2. Router operation
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ORs SHOULD generate a new router descriptor whenever any of the
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following events have occurred:
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- A period of time (18 hrs by default) has passed since the last
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time a descriptor was generated.
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- A descriptor field other than bandwidth or uptime has changed.
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- Bandwidth has changed by more than +/- 50% from the last time a
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descriptor was generated, and at least a given interval of time
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(20 mins by default) has passed since then.
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- Its uptime has been reset (by restarting).
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After generating a descriptor, ORs upload it to every directory
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authority they know, by posting it to the URL
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http://<hostname:port>/tor/
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2.1. Router descriptor format
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Every router descriptor MUST start with a "router" Item; MUST end with a
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"router-signature" Item and an extra NL; and MUST contain exactly one
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instance of each of the following Items: "published" "onion-key"
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"signing-key" "bandwidth".
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A router descriptor MAY have zero or one of each of the following Items,
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but MUST NOT have more than one: "contact", "uptime", "fingerprint",
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"hibernating", "read-history", "write-history", "eventdns", "platform",
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"family".
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Additionally, a router descriptor MAY contain any number of "accept",
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"reject", and "opt" Items. Other than "router" and "router-signature",
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the items may appear in any order.
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The items' formats are as follows:
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"router" nickname address ORPort SocksPort DirPort
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Indicates the beginning of a router descriptor. "address" must be an
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IPv4 address in dotted-quad format. The last three numbers indicate
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the TCP ports at which this OR exposes functionality. ORPort is a port
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at which this OR accepts TLS connections for the main OR protocol;
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SocksPort is deprecated and should always be 0; and DirPort is the
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port at which this OR accepts directory-related HTTP connections. If
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any port is not supported, the value 0 is given instead of a port
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number.
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"bandwidth" bandwidth-avg bandwidth-burst bandwidth-observed
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Estimated bandwidth for this router, in bytes per second. The
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"average" bandwidth is the volume per second that the OR is willing to
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sustain over long periods; the "burst" bandwidth is the volume that
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the OR is willing to sustain in very short intervals. The "observed"
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value is an estimate of the capacity this server can handle. The
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server remembers the max bandwidth sustained output over any ten
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second period in the past day, and another sustained input. The
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"observed" value is the lesser of these two numbers.
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"platform" string
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A human-readable string describing the system on which this OR is
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running. This MAY include the operating system, and SHOULD include
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the name and version of the software implementing the Tor protocol.
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"published" YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM:SS
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The time, in GMT, when this descriptor was generated.
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"fingerprint"
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A fingerprint (a HASH_LEN-byte of asn1 encoded public key, encoded in
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hex, with a single space after every 4 characters) for this router's
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identity key. A descriptor is considered invalid (and MUST be
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rejected) if the fingerprint line does not match the public key.
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[We didn't start parsing this line until Tor 0.1.0.6-rc; it should
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be marked with "opt" until earlier versions of Tor are obsolete.]
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"hibernating" 0|1
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If the value is 1, then the Tor server was hibernating when the
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descriptor was published, and shouldn't be used to build circuits.
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[We didn't start parsing this line until Tor 0.1.0.6-rc; it should be
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marked with "opt" until earlier versions of Tor are obsolete.]
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"uptime"
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The number of seconds that this OR process has been running.
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"onion-key" NL a public key in PEM format
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This key is used to encrypt EXTEND cells for this OR. The key MUST be
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accepted for at least 1 week after any new key is published in a
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subsequent descriptor.
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"signing-key" NL a public key in PEM format
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The OR's long-term identity key.
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"accept" exitpattern
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"reject" exitpattern
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These lines describe the rules that an OR follows when
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deciding whether to allow a new stream to a given address. The
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'exitpattern' syntax is described below. The rules are considered in
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order; if no rule matches, the address will be accepted. For clarity,
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the last such entry SHOULD be accept *:* or reject *:*.
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"router-signature" NL Signature NL
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The "SIGNATURE" object contains a signature of the PKCS1-padded
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hash of the entire router descriptor, taken from the beginning of the
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"router" line, through the newline after the "router-signature" line.
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The router descriptor is invalid unless the signature is performed
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with the router's identity key.
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"contact" info NL
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Describes a way to contact the server's administrator, preferably
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including an email address and a PGP key fingerprint.
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"family" names NL
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'Names' is a space-separated list of server nicknames or
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hexdigests. If two ORs list one another in their "family" entries,
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then OPs should treat them as a single OR for the purpose of path
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selection.
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For example, if node A's descriptor contains "family B", and node B's
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descriptor contains "family A", then node A and node B should never
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be used on the same circuit.
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"read-history" YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM:SS (NSEC s) NUM,NUM,NUM,NUM,NUM... NL
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"write-history" YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM:SS (NSEC s) NUM,NUM,NUM,NUM,NUM... NL
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Declare how much bandwidth the OR has used recently. Usage is divided
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into intervals of NSEC seconds. The YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM:SS field
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defines the end of the most recent interval. The numbers are the
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number of bytes used in the most recent intervals, ordered from
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oldest to newest.
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[We didn't start parsing these lines until Tor 0.1.0.6-rc; they should
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be marked with "opt" until earlier versions of Tor are obsolete.]
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"eventdns" bool NL
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Declare whether this version of Tor is using the newer enhanced
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dns logic. Versions of Tor without eventdns SHOULD NOT be used for
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reverse hostname lookups.
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[All versions of Tor before 0.1.2.2-alpha should be assumed to have
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this option set to 0 if it is not present. All Tor versions at
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0.1.2.2-alpha or later should be assumed to have this option set to
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1 if it is not present. Until 0.1.2.1-alpha-dev, this option was
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not generated, even when eventdns was in use. Versions of Tor
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before 0.1.2.1-alpha-dev did not parse this option, so it should be
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marked "opt". With 0.2.0.1-alpha, the old 'dnsworker' logic has
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been removed, rendering this option of historical interest only.]
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2.2. Nonterminals in router descriptors
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nickname ::= between 1 and 19 alphanumeric characters, case-insensitive.
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hexdigest ::= a '$', followed by 20 hexadecimal characters.
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[Represents a server by the digest of its identity key.]
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exitpattern ::= addrspec ":" portspec
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portspec ::= "*" | port | port "-" port
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port ::= an integer between 1 and 65535, inclusive.
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[Some implementations incorrectly generate ports with value 0.
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Implementations SHOULD accept this, and SHOULD NOT generate it.]
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addrspec ::= "*" | ip4spec | ip6spec
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ipv4spec ::= ip4 | ip4 "/" num_ip4_bits | ip4 "/" ip4mask
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ip4 ::= an IPv4 address in dotted-quad format
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ip4mask ::= an IPv4 mask in dotted-quad format
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num_ip4_bits ::= an integer between 0 and 32
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ip6spec ::= ip6 | ip6 "/" num_ip6_bits
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ip6 ::= an IPv6 address, surrounded by square brackets.
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num_ip6_bits ::= an integer between 0 and 128
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bool ::= "0" | "1"
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Ports are required; if they are not included in the router
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line, they must appear in the "ports" lines.
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3. Network status format
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Directory authorities generate, sign, and compress network-status
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documents. Directory servers SHOULD generate a fresh network-status
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document when the contents of such a document would be different from the
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last one generated, and some time (at least one second, possibly longer)
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has passed since the last one was generated.
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The network status document contains a preamble, a set of router status
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entries, and a signature, in that order.
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We use the same meta-format as used for directories and router descriptors
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in "tor-spec.txt". Implementations MAY insert blank lines
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for clarity between sections; these blank lines are ignored.
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Implementations MUST NOT depend on blank lines in any particular location.
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As used here, "whitespace" is a sequence of 1 or more tab or space
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characters.
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The preamble contains:
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"network-status-version" -- A document format version. For this
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specification, the version is "2".
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"dir-source" -- The authority's hostname, current IP address, and
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directory port, all separated by whitespace.
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"fingerprint" -- A base16-encoded hash of the signing key's
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fingerprint, with no additional spaces added.
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"contact" -- An arbitrary string describing how to contact the
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directory server's administrator. Administrators should include at
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least an email address and a PGP fingerprint.
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"dir-signing-key" -- The directory server's public signing key.
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"client-versions" -- A comma-separated list of recommended client
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versions.
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"server-versions" -- A comma-separated list of recommended server
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versions.
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"published" -- The publication time for this network-status object.
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"dir-options" -- A set of flags, in any order, separated by whitespace:
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"Names" if this directory authority performs name bindings.
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"Versions" if this directory authority recommends software versions.
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"BadExits" if the directory authority flags nodes that it believes
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are performing incorrectly as exit nodes.
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"BadDirectories" if the directory authority flags nodes that it
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believes are performing incorrectly as directory caches.
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The dir-options entry is optional. The "-versions" entries are required if
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the "Versions" flag is present. The other entries are required and must
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appear exactly once. The "network-status-version" entry must appear first;
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the others may appear in any order. Implementations MUST ignore
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additional arguments to the items above, and MUST ignore unrecognized
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flags.
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For each router, the router entry contains: (This format is designed for
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conciseness.)
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"r" -- followed by the following elements, in order, separated by
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whitespace:
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- The OR's nickname,
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- A hash of its identity key, encoded in base64, with trailing =
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signs removed.
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- A hash of its most recent descriptor, encoded in base64, with
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trailing = signs removed. (The hash is calculated as for
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computing the signature of a descriptor.)
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- The publication time of its most recent descriptor, in the form
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YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM:SS, in GMT.
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- An IP address
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- An OR port
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- A directory port (or "0" for none")
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"s" -- A series of whitespace-separated status flags, in any order:
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"Authority" if the router is a directory authority.
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"BadExit" if the router is believed to be useless as an exit node
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(because its ISP censors it, because it is behind a restrictive
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proxy, or for some similar reason).
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"BadDirectory" if the router is believed to be useless as a
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directory cache (because its directory port isn't working,
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its bandwidth is always throttled, or for some similar
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reason).
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"Exit" if the router is useful for building general-purpose exit
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circuits.
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"Fast" if the router is suitable for high-bandwidth circuits.
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"Guard" if the router is suitable for use as an entry guard.
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"Named" if the router's identity-nickname mapping is canonical,
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and this authority binds names.
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"Stable" if the router is suitable for long-lived circuits.
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"Running" if the router is currently usable.
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"Valid" if the router has been 'validated'.
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"V2Dir" if the router implements this protocol.
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"v" -- The version of the Tor protocol that this server is running. If
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the value begins with "Tor" SP, the rest of the string is a Tor
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version number, and the protocol is "The Tor protocol as supported
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by the given version of Tor." Otherwise, if the value begins with
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some other string, Tor has upgraded to a more sophisticated
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protocol versioning system, and the protocol is "a version of the
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Tor protocol more recent than any we recognize."
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The "r" entry for each router must appear first and is required. The
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"s" entry is optional (see Section 3.1 below for how the flags are
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decided). Unrecognized flags on the "s" line and extra elements
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on the "r" line must be ignored. The "v" line is optional; it was not
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supported until 0.1.2.5-alpha, and it must be preceded with an "opt"
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until all earlier versions of Tor are obsolete.
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The signature section contains:
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"directory-signature" nickname-of-dirserver NL Signature
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Signature is a signature of this network-status document
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(the document up until the signature, including the line
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"directory-signature <nick>\n"), using the directory authority's
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signing key.
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We compress the network status list with zlib before transmitting it.
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3.1. Establishing server status
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(This section describes how directory authorities choose which status
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flags to apply to routers, as of Tor 0.1.1.18-rc. Later directory
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authorities MAY do things differently, so long as clients keep working
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well. Clients MUST NOT depend on the exact behaviors in this section.)
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In the below definitions, a router is considered "active" if it is
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running, valid, and not hibernating.
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"Valid" -- a router is 'Valid' if it is running a version of Tor not
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known to be broken, and the directory authority has not blacklisted
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it as suspicious.
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"Named" -- Directory authority administrators may decide to support name
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binding. If they do, then they must maintain a file of
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nickname-to-identity-key mappings, and try to keep this file consistent
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with other directory authorities. If they don't, they act as clients, and
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report bindings made by other directory authorities (name X is bound to
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identity Y if at least one binding directory lists it, and no directory
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binds X to some other Y'.) A router is called 'Named' if the router
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believes the given name should be bound to the given key.
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"Running" -- A router is 'Running' if the authority managed to connect to
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it successfully within the last 30 minutes.
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"Stable" -- A router is 'Stable' if it is active, and either its
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uptime is at least the median uptime for known active routers, or
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its uptime is at least 30 days. Routers are never called stable if
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they are running a version of Tor known to drop circuits stupidly.
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(0.1.1.10-alpha through 0.1.1.16-rc are stupid this way.)
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"Fast" -- A router is 'Fast' if it is active, and its bandwidth is
|
|
in the top 7/8ths for known active routers.
|
|
|
|
"Guard" -- A router is a possible 'Guard' if it is 'Stable' and its
|
|
bandwidth is above median for known active routers. If the total
|
|
bandwidth of active non-BadExit Exit servers is less than one third
|
|
of the total bandwidth of all active servers, no Exit is listed as
|
|
a Guard.
|
|
|
|
"Authority" -- A router is called an 'Authority' if the authority
|
|
generating the network-status document believes it is an authority.
|
|
|
|
"V2Dir" -- A router supports the v2 directory protocol if it has an open
|
|
directory port, and it is running a version of the directory protocol that
|
|
supports the functionality clients need. (Currently, this is
|
|
0.1.1.9-alpha or later.)
|
|
|
|
Directory server administrators may label some servers or IPs as
|
|
blacklisted, and elect not to include them in their network-status lists.
|
|
|
|
Authorities SHOULD 'disable' any servers in excess of 3 on any single IP.
|
|
When there are more than 3 to choose from, authorities should first prefer
|
|
authorities to non-authorities, then prefer Running to non-Running, and
|
|
then prefer high-bandwidth to low-bandwidth. To 'disable' a server, the
|
|
authority *should* advertise it without the Running or Valid flag.
|
|
|
|
Thus, the network-status list includes all non-blacklisted,
|
|
non-expired, non-superseded descriptors.
|
|
|
|
4. Directory server operation
|
|
|
|
All directory authorities and directory mirrors ("directory servers")
|
|
implement this section, except as noted.
|
|
|
|
4.1. Accepting uploads (authorities only)
|
|
|
|
When a router posts a signed descriptor to a directory authority, the
|
|
authority first checks whether it is well-formed and correctly
|
|
self-signed. If it is, the authority next verifies that the nickname
|
|
question is already assigned to a router with a different public key.
|
|
Finally, the authority MAY check that the router is not blacklisted
|
|
because of its key, IP, or another reason.
|
|
|
|
If the descriptor passes these tests, and the authority does not already
|
|
have a descriptor for a router with this public key, it accepts the
|
|
descriptor and remembers it.
|
|
|
|
If the authority _does_ have a descriptor with the same public key, the
|
|
newly uploaded descriptor is remembered if its publication time is more
|
|
recent than the most recent old descriptor for that router, and either:
|
|
- There are non-cosmetic differences between the old descriptor and the
|
|
new one.
|
|
- Enough time has passed between the descriptors' publication times.
|
|
(Currently, 12 hours.)
|
|
|
|
Differences between router descriptors are "non-cosmetic" if they would be
|
|
sufficient to force an upload as described in section 2 above.
|
|
|
|
Note that the "cosmetic difference" test only applies to uploaded
|
|
descriptors, not to descriptors that the authority downloads from other
|
|
authorities.
|
|
|
|
4.2. Downloading network-status documents (authorities and caches)
|
|
|
|
All directory servers (authorities and mirrors) try to keep a fresh
|
|
set of network-status documents from every authority. To do so,
|
|
every 5 minutes, each authority asks every other authority for its
|
|
most recent network-status document. Every 15 minutes, each mirror
|
|
picks a random authority and asks it for the most recent network-status
|
|
documents for all the authorities the authority knows about (including
|
|
the chosen authority itself).
|
|
|
|
Directory servers and mirrors remember and serve the most recent
|
|
network-status document they have from each authority. Other
|
|
network-status documents don't need to be stored. If the most recent
|
|
network-status document is over 10 days old, it is discarded anyway.
|
|
Mirrors SHOULD store and serve network-status documents from authorities
|
|
they don't recognize, but SHOULD NOT use such documents for any other
|
|
purpose. Mirrors SHOULD discard network-status documents older than 48
|
|
hours.
|
|
|
|
4.3. Downloading and storing router descriptors (authorities and caches)
|
|
|
|
Periodically (currently, every 10 seconds), directory servers check
|
|
whether there are any specific descriptors (as identified by descriptor
|
|
hash in a network-status document) that they do not have and that they
|
|
are not currently trying to download.
|
|
|
|
If so, the directory server launches requests to the authorities for these
|
|
descriptors, such that each authority is only asked for descriptors listed
|
|
in its most recent network-status. When more than one authority lists the
|
|
descriptor, we choose which to ask at random.
|
|
|
|
If one of these downloads fails, we do not try to download that descriptor
|
|
from the authority that failed to serve it again unless we receive a newer
|
|
network-status from that authority that lists the same descriptor.
|
|
|
|
Directory servers must potentially cache multiple descriptors for each
|
|
router. Servers must not discard any descriptor listed by any current
|
|
network-status document from any authority. If there is enough space to
|
|
store additional descriptors, servers SHOULD try to hold those which
|
|
clients are likely to download the most. (Currently, this is judged
|
|
based on the interval for which each descriptor seemed newest.)
|
|
|
|
Authorities SHOULD NOT download descriptors for routers that they would
|
|
immediately reject for reasons listed in 3.1.
|
|
|
|
4.4. HTTP URLs
|
|
|
|
"Fingerprints" in these URLs are base-16-encoded SHA1 hashes.
|
|
|
|
The authoritative network-status published by a host should be available at:
|
|
http://<hostname>/tor/status/authority.z
|
|
|
|
The network-status published by a host with fingerprint
|
|
<F> should be available at:
|
|
http://<hostname>/tor/status/fp/<F>.z
|
|
|
|
The network-status documents published by hosts with fingerprints
|
|
<F1>,<F2>,<F3> should be available at:
|
|
http://<hostname>/tor/status/fp/<F1>+<F2>+<F3>.z
|
|
|
|
The most recent network-status documents from all known authorities,
|
|
concatenated, should be available at:
|
|
http://<hostname>/tor/status/all.z
|
|
|
|
The most recent descriptor for a server whose identity key has a
|
|
fingerprint of <F> should be available at:
|
|
http://<hostname>/tor/server/fp/<F>.z
|
|
|
|
The most recent descriptors for servers with identity fingerprints
|
|
<F1>,<F2>,<F3> should be available at:
|
|
http://<hostname>/tor/server/fp/<F1>+<F2>+<F3>.z
|
|
|
|
(NOTE: Implementations SHOULD NOT download descriptors by identity key
|
|
fingerprint. This allows a corrupted server (in collusion with a cache) to
|
|
provide a unique descriptor to a client, and thereby partition that client
|
|
from the rest of the network.)
|
|
|
|
The server descriptor with (descriptor) digest <D> (in hex) should be
|
|
available at:
|
|
http://<hostname>/tor/server/d/<D>.z
|
|
|
|
The most recent descriptors with digests <D1>,<D2>,<D3> should be
|
|
available at:
|
|
http://<hostname>/tor/server/d/<D1>+<D2>+<D3>.z
|
|
|
|
The most recent descriptor for this server should be at:
|
|
http://<hostname>/tor/server/authority.z
|
|
[Nothing in the Tor protocol uses this resource yet, but it is useful
|
|
for debugging purposes. Also, the official Tor implementations
|
|
(starting at 0.1.1.x) use this resource to test whether a server's
|
|
own DirPort is reachable.]
|
|
|
|
A concatenated set of the most recent descriptors for all known servers
|
|
should be available at:
|
|
http://<hostname>/tor/server/all.z
|
|
|
|
For debugging, directories SHOULD expose non-compressed objects at URLs like
|
|
the above, but without the final ".z".
|
|
Clients MUST handle compressed concatenated information in two forms:
|
|
- A concatenated list of zlib-compressed objects.
|
|
- A zlib-compressed concatenated list of objects.
|
|
Directory servers MAY generate either format: the former requires less
|
|
CPU, but the latter requires less bandwidth.
|
|
|
|
Clients SHOULD use upper case letters (A-F) when base16-encoding
|
|
fingerprints. Servers MUST accept both upper and lower case fingerprints
|
|
in requests.
|
|
|
|
5. Client operation: downloading information
|
|
|
|
Every Tor that is not a directory server (that is, those that do
|
|
not have a DirPort set) implements this section.
|
|
|
|
5.1. Downloading network-status documents
|
|
|
|
Each client maintains an ordered list of directory authorities.
|
|
Insofar as possible, clients SHOULD all use the same ordered list.
|
|
|
|
For each network-status document a client has, it keeps track of its
|
|
publication time *and* the time when the client retrieved it. Clients
|
|
consider a network-status document "live" if it was published within the
|
|
last 24 hours.
|
|
|
|
Clients try to have a live network-status document hours from *every*
|
|
authority, and try to periodically get new network-status documents from
|
|
each authority in rotation as follows:
|
|
|
|
If a client is missing a live network-status document for any
|
|
authority, it tries to fetch it from a directory cache. On failure,
|
|
the client waits briefly, then tries that network-status document
|
|
again from another cache. The client does not build circuits until it
|
|
has live network-status documents from more than half the authorities
|
|
it trusts, and it has descriptors for more than 1/4 of the routers
|
|
that it believes are running.
|
|
|
|
If the most recently _retrieved_ network-status document is over 30
|
|
minutes old, the client attempts to download a network-status document.
|
|
When choosing which documents to download, clients treat their list of
|
|
directory authorities as a circular ring, and begin with the authority
|
|
appearing immediately after the authority for their most recently
|
|
retrieved network-status document. If this attempt fails (either it
|
|
fails to download at all, or the one it gets is not as good as the
|
|
one it has), the client retries at other caches several times, before
|
|
moving on to the next network-status document in sequence.
|
|
|
|
Clients discard all network-status documents over 24 hours old.
|
|
|
|
If enough mirrors (currently 4) claim not to have a given network status,
|
|
we stop trying to download that authority's network-status, until we
|
|
download a new network-status that makes us believe that the authority in
|
|
question is running. Clients should wait a little longer after each
|
|
failure.
|
|
|
|
Clients SHOULD try to batch as many network-status requests as possible
|
|
into each HTTP GET.
|
|
|
|
(Note: clients can and should pick caches based on the network-status
|
|
information they have: once they have first fetched network-status info
|
|
from an authority, they should not need to go to the authority directly
|
|
again.)
|
|
|
|
5.2. Downloading and storing router descriptors
|
|
|
|
Clients try to have the best descriptor for each router. A descriptor is
|
|
"best" if:
|
|
* It is the most recently published descriptor listed for that router
|
|
by at least two network-status documents.
|
|
OR,
|
|
* No descriptor for that router is listed by two or more
|
|
network-status documents, and it is the most recently published
|
|
descriptor listed by any network-status document.
|
|
|
|
Periodically (currently every 10 seconds) clients check whether there are
|
|
any "downloadable" descriptors. A descriptor is downloadable if:
|
|
- It is the "best" descriptor for some router.
|
|
- The descriptor was published at least 10 minutes in the past.
|
|
(This prevents clients from trying to fetch descriptors that the
|
|
mirrors have probably not yet retrieved and cached.)
|
|
- The client does not currently have it.
|
|
- The client is not currently trying to download it.
|
|
- The client would not discard it immediately upon receiving it.
|
|
- The client thinks it is running and valid (see 6.1 below).
|
|
|
|
If at least 16 known routers have downloadable descriptors, or if
|
|
enough time (currently 10 minutes) has passed since the last time the
|
|
client tried to download descriptors, it launches requests for all
|
|
downloadable descriptors, as described in 5.3 below.
|
|
|
|
When a descriptor download fails, the client notes it, and does not
|
|
consider the descriptor downloadable again until a certain amount of time
|
|
has passed. (Currently 0 seconds for the first failure, 60 seconds for the
|
|
second, 5 minutes for the third, 10 minutes for the fourth, and 1 day
|
|
thereafter.) Periodically (currently once an hour) clients reset the
|
|
failure count.
|
|
|
|
No descriptors are downloaded until the client has downloaded more than
|
|
half of the network-status documents.
|
|
|
|
Clients retain the most recent descriptor they have downloaded for each
|
|
router so long as it is not too old (currently, 48 hours), OR so long as
|
|
it is recommended by at least one networkstatus AND no "better"
|
|
descriptor has been downloaded. [Versions of Tor before 0.1.2.3-alpha
|
|
would discard descriptors simply for being published too far in the past.]
|
|
[The code seems to discard descriptors in all cases after they're 5
|
|
days old. True? -RD]
|
|
|
|
5.3. Managing downloads
|
|
|
|
When a client has no live network-status documents, it downloads
|
|
network-status documents from a randomly chosen authority. In all other
|
|
cases, the client downloads from mirrors randomly chosen from among those
|
|
believed to be V2 directory servers. (This information comes from the
|
|
network-status documents; see 6 below.)
|
|
|
|
When downloading multiple router descriptors, the client chooses multiple
|
|
mirrors so that:
|
|
- At least 3 different mirrors are used, except when this would result
|
|
in more than one request for under 4 descriptors.
|
|
- No more than 128 descriptors are requested from a single mirror.
|
|
- Otherwise, as few mirrors as possible are used.
|
|
After choosing mirrors, the client divides the descriptors among them
|
|
randomly.
|
|
|
|
After receiving any response client MUST discard any network-status
|
|
documents and descriptors that it did not request.
|
|
|
|
6. Using directory information
|
|
|
|
Everyone besides directory authorities uses the approaches in this section
|
|
to decide which servers to use and what their keys are likely to be.
|
|
(Directory authorities just believe their own opinions, as in 3.1 above.)
|
|
|
|
6.1. Choosing routers for circuits.
|
|
|
|
Tor implementations only pay attention to "live" network-status documents.
|
|
A network status is "live" if it is the most recently downloaded network
|
|
status document for a given directory server, and the server is a
|
|
directory server trusted by the client, and the network-status document is
|
|
no more than 1 day old.
|
|
|
|
For time-sensitive information, Tor implementations focus on "recent"
|
|
network-status documents. A network status is "recent" if it is live, and
|
|
if it was published in the last 60 minutes. If there are fewer
|
|
than 3 such documents, the most recently published 3 are "recent." If
|
|
there are fewer than 3 in all, all are "recent.")
|
|
|
|
Circuits SHOULD NOT be built until the client has enough directory
|
|
information: network-statuses (or failed attempts to download
|
|
network-statuses) for all authorities, network-statuses for at more than
|
|
half of the authorites, and descriptors for at least 1/4 of the servers
|
|
believed to be running.
|
|
|
|
A server is "listed" if it is included by more than half of the live
|
|
network status documents. Clients SHOULD NOT use unlisted servers.
|
|
|
|
Clients believe the flags "Valid", "Exit", "Fast", "Guard", "Stable", and
|
|
"V2Dir" about a given router when they are asserted by more than half of
|
|
the live network-status documents. Clients believe the flag "Running" if
|
|
it is listed by more than half of the recent network-status documents.
|
|
|
|
These flags are used as follows:
|
|
|
|
- Clients SHOULD NOT use non-'Valid' or non-'Running' routers unless
|
|
requested to do so.
|
|
|
|
- Clients SHOULD NOT use non-'Fast' routers for any purpose other than
|
|
very-low-bandwidth circuits (such as introduction circuits).
|
|
|
|
- Clients SHOULD NOT use non-'Stable' routers for circuits that are
|
|
likely to need to be open for a very long time (such as those used for
|
|
IRC or SSH connections).
|
|
|
|
- Clients SHOULD NOT choose non-'Guard' nodes when picking entry guard
|
|
nodes.
|
|
|
|
- Clients SHOULD NOT download directory information from non-'V2Dir'
|
|
caches.
|
|
|
|
6.2. Managing naming
|
|
|
|
In order to provide human-memorable names for individual server
|
|
identities, some directory servers bind names to IDs. Clients handle
|
|
names in two ways:
|
|
|
|
When a client encounters a name it has not mapped before:
|
|
|
|
If all the live "Naming" network-status documents the client has
|
|
claim that the name binds to some identity ID, and the client has at
|
|
least three live network-status documents, the client maps the name to
|
|
ID.
|
|
|
|
When a user tries to refer to a router with a name that does not have a
|
|
mapping under the above rules, the implementation SHOULD warn the user.
|
|
After giving the warning, the implementation MAY use a router that at
|
|
least one Naming authority maps the name to, so long as no other naming
|
|
authority maps that name to a different router. If no Naming authority
|
|
maps the name to a router, the implementation MAY use any router that
|
|
advertises the name.
|
|
|
|
Not every router needs a nickname. When a router doesn't configure a
|
|
nickname, it publishes with the default nickname "Unnamed". Authorities
|
|
SHOULD NOT ever mark a router with this nickname as Named; client software
|
|
SHOULD NOT ever use a router in response to a user request for a router
|
|
called "Unnamed".
|
|
|
|
6.3. Software versions
|
|
|
|
An implementation of Tor SHOULD warn when it has fetched (or has
|
|
attempted to fetch and failed four consecutive times) a network-status
|
|
for each authority, and it is running a software version
|
|
not listed on more than half of the live "Versioning" network-status
|
|
documents.
|
|
|
|
6.4. Warning about a router's status.
|
|
|
|
If a router tries to publish its descriptor to a Naming authority
|
|
that has its nickname mapped to another key, the router SHOULD
|
|
warn the operator that it is either using the wrong key or is using
|
|
an already claimed nickname.
|
|
|
|
If a router has fetched (or attempted to fetch and failed four
|
|
consecutive times) a network-status for every authority, and at
|
|
least one of the authorities is "Naming", and no live "Naming"
|
|
authorities publish a binding for the router's nickname, the
|
|
router MAY remind the operator that the chosen nickname is not
|
|
bound to this key at the authorities, and suggest contacting the
|
|
authority operators.
|
|
|
|
...
|
|
|
|
6.5. Router protocol versions
|
|
|
|
A client should believe that a router supports a given feature if that
|
|
feature is supported by the router or protocol versions in more than half
|
|
of the live networkstatus's "v" entries for that router. In other words,
|
|
if the "v" entries for some router are:
|
|
v Tor 0.0.8pre1 (from authority 1)
|
|
v Tor 0.1.2.11 (from authority 2)
|
|
v FutureProtocolDescription 99 (from authority 3)
|
|
then the client should believe that the router supports any feature
|
|
supported by 0.1.2.11.
|
|
|
|
This is currently equivalent to believing the median declared version for
|
|
a router in all live networkstatuses.
|
|
|
|
7. Standards compliance
|
|
|
|
All clients and servers MUST support HTTP 1.0.
|
|
|
|
7.1. HTTP headers
|
|
|
|
Servers MAY set the Content-Length: header. Servers SHOULD set
|
|
Content-Encoding to "deflate" or "identity".
|
|
|
|
Servers MAY include an X-Your-Address-Is: header, whose value is the
|
|
apparent IP address of the client connecting to them (as a dotted quad).
|
|
For directory connections tunneled over a BEGIN_DIR stream, servers SHOULD
|
|
report the IP from which the circuit carrying the BEGIN_DIR stream reached
|
|
them. [Servers before version 0.1.2.5-alpha reported 127.0.0.1 for all
|
|
BEGIN_DIR-tunneled connections.]
|
|
|
|
Servers SHOULD disable caching of multiple network statuses or multiple
|
|
router descriptors. Servers MAY enable caching of single descriptors,
|
|
single network statuses, the list of all router descriptors, a v1
|
|
directory, or a v1 running routers document. XXX mention times.
|
|
|
|
7.2. HTTP status codes
|
|
|
|
XXX We should write down what return codes dirservers send in what situations.
|
|
|